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Philosophy of the Buddha
... To date, an impressive array of outcome constructs has been studied in meditation research (Shapiro 2008); however, little research has systematically tested whether meditation actually relates to the specific outcome constructs it was originally designed to produce. Within traditional Buddhist and Hindu teachings, meditation is principally considered a strategy for overcoming psychological distress (i.e., suffering; Gowans 2003). However, Buddhist teachings also place great emphasis on the cultivation of positive traits like empathy, compassion (Shankman 2008), and equanimity (emotional stability and resilience; Marcus 2003; Nyanaponika 1983) as well as positive emotions like happiness and wellbeing (Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso and Cutler 1998). ...
Despite evidence attesting to positive psychological effects of meditation, little is known about how variance in the level of engagement with meditation actually relates to positive outcomes. This study draws on multiple traditional and contemporary theoretical frameworks to (1) uncover fundamental aspects of variability in meditation practice, (2) test the role of several primary and secondary processes believed to be responsible for positive effects, and (3) explore a range of positive and negative outcomes believed to be closely aligned with the original intended outcomes of meditation practices. Using two large (each N > 500) heterogeneous samples of meditation practitioners, this study calibrated and then cross-validated a theoretical model testing the plausibility of several causal pathways linking variation in experience with meditation to positive and negative psychological outcomes. Results showed that individual differences in meditation involve both behavioral aspects accounting for the degree of engagement, and psychological aspects incorporating the intensity or depth of this engagement. Variation in these aspects accounts for large proportions of variance in psychological health and functioning outcomes. Several factors representing attention refinement (mindfulness), changes in self-perception and outlook (transcendence), worldview (insight), and psychological development serve as plausible change mechanisms serving to transmit the effects of meditation on psychological health and functioning.
Therefore, we ought to pay as much attention to the sayings and opinions, undemonstrated though they are, of wise and experienced older people as we do to demonstrated truths. For experience has given such people an eye (nous) with which they can see correctly. -Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1143b9-13 (Ostwald trans.) The phrase "experiments in truth" is adapted from Gandhi's philosophy where he saw it as a way to test ideas for both his personal life and his political programs. In this paper I will use Gandhi's rubric to investigate the concept of practical reason as it functions in Aristotle, Confucius, and the Buddha. The first section is a discussion about Aristotle's intellectual virtues and the distinctions among nous, sophia, and phronēsis. Using Aristotle's own language, I conclude that sophia gives us universal truths while phronēsis produces distinctively personal truths. The second section demonstrates how the Confucian concept of yi performs roughly the same function as phronēsis in Aristotle. Yi allows people to make a personal appropriation of societal norms (li) to become true human beings (ren*). The third section analyses the Buddha's motto "those who know causation know the Dharma," and concludes that he agrees with Aristotle and Confucius on the operation of practical reason. The fourth section discusses the Buddha's eight-fold path; and the concluding section offers three examples of experiments in truth--one each from the Buddha, Confucius, and Gandhi. Before proceeding we should mention some basic differences between the Buddha and Confucius and their ancient Greek counterpart Aristotle. Both of them would have requested at least three changes in Greek virtue ethics. First, neither the Buddha nor Confucius would have accepted Aristotle's claim that the intellect (nous) defines what it is to be human. Second, the two Asians held pride as a vice, so the humble soul is to be preferred over Aristotle's "great soul" (megalopsychia). Third, neither the Buddha nor Confucius would have accepted Aristotle's elitism. (Universal brotherhood is far more dominant in Confucian texts than the occasional allusion to class distinctions.) For Aristotle only a certain class of people (viz., free-born Greek males) could establish the virtues and attain the good life. (Greek
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