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Different Games for Different Motives: Comment on Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015)



Recently, Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel strongly questioned the comparability and equivalence of different mixed-motive situations as modeled in economic games. Particularly, the authors found that different games correlated only weakly on average and loaded on two separate factors. In turn, personality traits failed to consistently account for behavioral tendencies across games. Contrary to the conclusions of Haesevoets et al., these findings are actually perfectly in line with the game-theoretic understanding of the different economic games. If one considers the variety of specific motives underlying decisions in different games, Haesevoets et al.’s findings actually support the validity of different games rather than questioning it. This, in turn, emphasizes the necessity for the plethora of different games that have been developed over decades in economics and psychology.
Different Games for Different Motives: Comment on Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015)
Isabel Thielmann1,2, Robert Böhm3, and Benjamin E. Hilbig1
1Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Landau, Germany
2Center for Doctoral Studies in Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Mannheim,
Mannheim, Germany
3School of Business and Economics, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany
This article has been published in European Journal of Personality. This accepted manuscript
version might not exactly replicate the official version published in the journal.
The published version of this article is available at
Please cite as:
Thielmann, I., Böhm, R., & Hilbig, B. E. (2015). Different games for different motives: Comment
on Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015). European Journal of Personality, 29(4), 506-508.
Recently, Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel strongly questioned the comparability and
equivalence of different mixed-motive situations as modeled in economic games. Particularly,
the authors found that different games correlated only weakly on average and loaded on two
separate factors. In turn, personality traits failed to consistently account for behavioral tendencies
across games. Contrary to the conclusions of Haesevoets et al., these findings are actually
perfectly in line with the game-theoretic understanding of the different economic games. If one
considers the variety of specific motives underlying decisions in different games, Haesevoets et
al.’s findings actually support the validity of different games rather than questioning it. This, in
turn, emphasizes the necessity for the plethora of different games that have been developed over
decades in economics and psychology.
Mixed-motive situations modeled in so-called economic games provide a
straightforward, transparent, and efficient approach to study pro-social behavior in various social
interactions. However, the exact relations between behavioral tendencies in different games are
insufficiently understood (cf. Yamagishi et al., 2013). In a well-designed experiment,
Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015) addressed this issue, examining associations between
several popular games: the Dictator Game (DG), the Ultimatum Bargaining Game (UG), the
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG), the Assurance Game (AG), the Public Goods Game (PGG),
the Common-Pool Resource Dilemma Game (CDG), and the Trust Game (TG). Contrary to the
hypothesis that all mixed-motive situations should involve an equivalent conflict between self-
interest and concern for others (self-others-conflict, in what follows), the authors merely
observed a small-to-medium-sized average correlation across all games which, in turn, loaded on
two separate factors rather than one common factor. Correspondingly, dispositional variables
(e.g., Social Value Orientation; SVO) hypothesized to constitute the common core of pro-
sociality across games merely accounted for small portions of variance in behavior. The
authors hence concluded that evidence calls into question the general idea that all mixed-motive
games bring the conflict between selfish interests and concern for others to the foreground”
(manuscript p. 9).
Unlike this rather pessimistic reasoning regarding the validity of economic games, we
argue that Haesevoets et al.’s results nicely converge with game-theoretic assumptions and the
differentiated consideration of social preferences in behavioral economics (Binmore, 2010). In
particular, the specific self-others-conflict characterizing each game is shaped by several motives
decisive for pro-social behavior (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; Van Lange, De Cremer, Van Dijk,
& Van Vugt, 2007), and corresponding to interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978)
these motives actually differ across games (cf. Table 1). For clarification, consider the decisions
to donate blood (mainly an altruistic act, as captured by the DG), to exchange one’s second keys
with one’s neighbor (mainly an act of mutual trust, as captured by the AG), and to take the bike
instead of the car for the sake of environmental protection (mainly an act of social welfare
maximization, as captured by the CDG). Although these situations obviously share certain
motives driving pro-social behavior, they also show considerable motivational differences
suggesting only weak behavioral links a priori (cf. Table 1).
In general, the nature, number, and salience (e.g., Betsch, Böhm, & Korn, 2013; Dhont,
Van Hiel, & De Cremer, 2012) of motives should affect which motivational components of
players’ utility functions (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) are decisive in a certain situation.
In other words, the additive combination of utility-relevant motives basically determines the
exact self-others-conflict.
Thus, the motives involved can be understood as the forces acting on
the player, either pushing the player to the selfish or to the pro-social choice. A weak average
correlation across various games may hence simply indicate that players adapt and optimize their
behavior depending on game-specific differences in these forces and the resulting conflict. Thus,
it actually supports the validity of the games: Although they share certain aspects (i.e., fairness,
altruism; cf. Table 1) which, one may argue is sufficiently supported by a relatively moderate
overall correlation they are primarily designed to measure different motives; by implication,
there cannot be a large overall correlation. Instead, certain games should correlate rather
strongly, as indeed they do in Haesevoets et al.’s data. In what follows, we elaborate on three
prominent motives on which the games investigated by Haesevoets et al. differ (i.e., social
Note that this also implies that apparent structural game characteristics (sequential vs. simultaneous play or dyad
vs. group) are negligible in themselves unless they alter the presence and/or salience of motives.
welfare concerns, greed, and fear; for definitions see Table 1) and show that the authors’ findings
actually nicely mirror these motivational differences.
Social welfare concerns
Social welfare refers to the aggregated sum of players’ payoffs, i.e., the collective interest
(e.g., Charness & Rabin, 2002; Wilke, 1991). Depending on whether social welfare changes for a
selfish versus pro-social choice, two game types can be distinguished. Specifically, if social
welfare is equivalent across choices (e.g., in the DG and UBG), the game becomes a constant-
sum game (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and social welfare concerns are irrelevant in
players’ utility functions (i.e., leading to indifference between strategies according to this utility
component). By contrast, if social welfare increases for a pro-social choice (e.g., in the PGG and
TG), the game becomes a social dilemma (e.g., Dawes, 1980; Kollock, 1998) and social welfare
concerns constitute a decisive component in players’ utility functions.
Considering this distinction between constant-sum games and social dilemmas,
Haesevoets et al.’s finding of two separate game factors is both reasonable and consistent with
game theory. In fact, in their study, constant-sum games and social dilemmas loaded on different
factors. Thus, the findings provide compelling empirical evidence that the games are not
equivalent and that social welfare concerns indeed matter for economic decision-making (see
also Engelmann & Strobel, 2004).
Greed and fear
Beyond social welfare concerns, economic games differ regarding the involvement and
effects of greed, i.e., the motive to maximize one’s own absolute payoff, and fear, i.e., the
expectation that the opponent player(s) will act selfishly or punish one’s own selfish behavior
(e.g., Bruins, Liebrand, & Wilke, 1989; Simpson, 2006; cf. Table 1). For example, in the DG
greed drives selfish behavior, whereas in the AG and TG greed drives pro-social behavior. This,
in turn, nicely fits Haesevoets et al.’s finding that the smallest associations with the DG emerged
for the AG (r = .15) and the TG (r = .13), respectively. The same applies to the overall weak
associations for the UBG: In all games but the UBG, fear drives selfish (and not pro-social)
Most strikingly, the interplay of greed and fear may even affect the game-theoretic
equilibrium solution of a game, i.e., the combination of players’ strategies for which no player
has an incentive to change her strategy (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). For example, in the AG, a
player can only achieve the best individual outcome if both players cooperate (which constitutes
one of two Nash-equilibria in pure strategies). By contrast, in the PDG, the best individual
outcome is associated with unilateral defection (the unique Nash-equilibrium). Thus, it is
reasonable that, for example, the correlation between PDG and AG was only weak in Haesevoets
et al.’s study (r = .10) although these two games appear similar in structure at a first glance.
Altogether, Haesevoets et al.’s findings hence support the differential involvement and effects of
greed and fear in economic decisions as implied by game theory.
Summary and conclusion
In sum, Haesevoets et al.’s conclusions are too pessimistic in light of game-theoretic
models of social preferences in behavioral economics. Without doubt, different economic games
have been developed to unveil specific aspects of pro-social behavior which, in turn, is perfectly
compatible with Haesevoets et al.’s findings. Consequently, it is actually necessary that no single
trait variable will explain stable behavioral tendencies across games. For example, SVO should
only drive pro-social behavior through fairness, altruism, and social welfare, but not through fear
or greed. In consequence, the relation between SVO and pro-social behavior should be
particularly diminished in those games in which fear and/or greed drive pro-social behavior (i.e.,
UBG, AG, and TG; cf. Table 1) which is exactly what Haesevoets et al. observe. To account
for behaviors in various games, one will need to consider a composition of personality traits
capturing different pro-social tendencies (e.g., the HEXACO model of personality; Zhao &
Smillie, in press). In any case, researchers should place care on the fine-grained differences
between economic games. Indeed, since these differences are still insufficiently understood,
further research is needed to determine which motives are particularly decisive for pro-social
behavior in certain situations, both in the absence and presence of other relevant motives.
Haesevoets et al.’s findings provide a valuable starting point for this endeavor.
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Table 1
Summary of Economic Games Used by Haesevoets et al. with Motives Underlying Pro-Social versus Selfish Choices.
Motives underlying
pro-social choice
selfish choice
Dictator Game
sum game
fairness, altruism
Bargaining Game
sum gamea
fairness, altruism,
Prisoner’s Dilemma
fairness, altruism,
trust, social welfare
greed, fear,
Assurance Game
fairness, altruism,
greed, trust, social
Public Goods
fairness, altruism,
trust, social welfare
greed, fear,
Resource Dilemma
fairness, altruism,
trust, social welfare
greed, fear,
Trust Game
fairness, altruism,
greed, trust, social
Note. Fairness: min(own other/s); altruism: max(other/s); trust: expectation that other/s play/s min(other/s), min(other/s own), or
max(own); social welfare: max(own + other/s); greed: max(own); fear: expectation that other/s play/s max(other/s), max(other/s
own), or min(own); competitiveness: max(own other/s).
aThe UBG is a special case of a constant-sum game given that the payoff for both players can be 0 (if the recipient rejects the offer).
However, for the proposer, the different strategies lead to a constant sum of payoffs.
bThe TG is a social dilemma from the perspective of the trustor, and a constant-sum game from the perspective of the trustee.
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Objective: Vaccination yields a direct effect by reducing infection, but also has the indirect effect of herd immunity: If many individuals are vaccinated, the immune population will protect unvaccinated individuals (social benefit). However, due to a vaccination's costs and risks, individual incentives to free-ride on others' protection also increase with the number of individuals who are already vaccinated (individual benefit). The objective was to assess the consequences of communicating the social and/or individual benefits of herd immunity on vaccination intentions. We assume that if social benefits are salient, vaccination intentions increase (prosocial behavior), whereas salience of individual benefits might decrease vaccination intentions (free-riding). Methods: In an online-experiment (N = 342) the definition of herd immunity was provided with one sentence summarizing the gist of the message, either making the individual or social benefit salient or both. A control group received no information about herd immunity. As a moderator, we tested the costs of vaccination (effort in obtaining the vaccine). The dependent measure was intention to vaccinate. Results: When a message emphasized individual benefit, vaccination intentions decreased (free-riding). Communication of social benefit reduced free-riding and increased vaccination intentions when costs to vaccinate were low. Conclusions: Communicating the social benefit of vaccination may prevent free-riding and should thus be explicitly communicated if individual decisions are meant to consider public health benefits. Especially when vaccination is not the individually (but instead collectively) optimal solution, vaccinations should be easily accessible in order to reach high coverage.
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This article presents a refined explanation of why minimal group identities affect cooperation in social dilemmas. The refined approach builds on key tenets of social identity theory to argue that identity affects cooperation by leadings actors to maximize ingroup outcomes and minimize ingroup inequalities. A key implication of the argument is that social identity is predicted to reduce actors' responses to the ‘greed component’ in social dilemmas (the incentive to ‘free-ride’ on others' cooperation), but that it will not affect actors' responses to the ‘fear component’ (the motivation to avoid being ‘suckered’). These predictions stand in contrast to those of two existing explanations of social identity and cooperation. The three arguments are tested against the results of two new experiments. Overall, the results support the refined approach.
Economic games are well-established experimental paradigms for modeling social decision making. A large body of literature has pointed to the heterogeneity of behavior within many of these games, which might be partly explained by broad interpersonal trait dispositions. Using the Big Five and HEXACO (Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience) personality frameworks, we review the role of personality in two main classes of economic games: social dilemmas and bargaining games. This reveals an emerging role for Big Five agreeableness in promoting cooperative, egalitarian, and altruistic behaviors across several games, consistent with its core characteristic of maintaining harmonious interpersonal relations. The role for extraversion is less clear, which may reflect the divergent effects of its underlying agentic and affiliative motivational components. In addition, HEXACO honesty-humility and agreeableness may capture distinct aspects of prosocial behavior outside the bounds of the Five-Factor Model. Important considerations and directions for future studies are discussed within the emerging personality-economics interface. © 2014 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.
Whereas rational choice theory predicts that harvesting in resource management situations is completely determined by greed, being the dominant choice, the GEF hypothesis predicts that although individuals are greedy (G), their greed is constrained by two other motives: the desire to use the resource efficiently (E) and the desire to realize fairness (F), referring to equal outcomes for all participants. The GEF hypothesis was corroborated by results from several computer-controlled experiments. It can account for (a) the pattern of individual responses to choices made by other group members, the impact of (b) environmental uncertainty and (c) social uncertainty, and (d) the conditions under which freedom of access is abandoned in favor of leadership.
Abstract We present simple one-shot distribution experiments comparing the relative importance of e¢ciency, maximin preferences and inequal- ity aversion, as well as the performance of the two competing fair- ness theories by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Several of our experiments induce opposing predictions made by both theories. We …nd a clear in‡uence of e¢ciency and max- imin preferences and overall a better performance of the model by Fehr and Schmidt, which, is, however also very poor in face of Pareto- dominance. We thank Gary Bolton, Martin Dufwenberg, Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, Wieland Müller, Hans Normann, Axel Ockenfels, Frank Riedel, Klaus Schmidt, an anonymous referee, and the editor as well as participants of the ESA 2000 annual meeting in New York, the First World Congress of the Game Theory Society in Bilbao and the 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society in Seattle for helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through Sonderforschungsbereich 373 and by the DGZ-DekaBank is gratefully acknowledged.
Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that material self-interest exclusively motivates all people. Experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence in recent years, however, that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis, suggesting that concerns for altruism, fairness, and reciprocity strongly motivate many people. Moreover, several theoretical papers demonstrate that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories then induced a first wave of experimental research which offered exciting insights into both the nature of preferences and the relative performance of competing fairness theories. The purpose of this chapter is to review these developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research. We also discuss recent neuroeconomic evidence that is consistent with the view that many people have a taste for mutual cooperation and the punishment of norm violators. We further illustrate the powerful impact of fairness concerns on cooperation, competition, incentives, and contract design.
"This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences. This sixtieth anniversary edition includes not only the original text but also an introduction by Harold Kuhn, an afterword by Ariel Rubinstein, and reviews and articles on the book that appeared at the time of its original publication in the New York Times, tthe American Economic Review, and a variety of other publications. Together, these writings provide readers a matchless opportunity to more fully appreciate a work whose influence will yet resound for generations to come.