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Understanding resource nationalism: economic dynamics and political institutions
Abstract
Resource nationalism is on the rise around the globe. During the recent global resource boom, many governments have adopted nationalistic policies to maximise the political and economic benefits from their mining and energy sectors. Existing theories of resource nationalism rely upon economistic bargaining models, which fail to interrogate how political processes shape governments’ resource policy strategies. This article extends and develops these bargaining models by theorising the role of political institutions - specifically those found in rentier, developing and liberal market economies - in determining patterns of resource nationalism. A survey of 12 major resource-producing countries reveals that contemporary resource nationalism takes a range of distinct forms, which are connected to differences in political institutions that structure the objectives and policies of governments. It is therefore argued that while economic dynamics function as an enabling factor, political institutions are an equally important conditioning factor shaping the distinctive forms of resource nationalism observed today.
... While it is accepted that FDI tends to decline in regions where nationalism is prevalent, there is limited evidence suggesting that the impact of nationalism on FDI may be conditional (Wilson, 2015;Ko and Shin, 2021). Factors such as the configuration of political-economic institutions (Wilson, 2015) and the system of government, whether autocratic or democratic (Ko and Shin, 2021), play a role in moderating the effect of nationalism. ...
... While it is accepted that FDI tends to decline in regions where nationalism is prevalent, there is limited evidence suggesting that the impact of nationalism on FDI may be conditional (Wilson, 2015;Ko and Shin, 2021). Factors such as the configuration of political-economic institutions (Wilson, 2015) and the system of government, whether autocratic or democratic (Ko and Shin, 2021), play a role in moderating the effect of nationalism. These studies highlight instances where nationalism may have a temporary positive or insignificant impact on FDI. ...
... Although nationalism is commonly understood to have a limiting effect on FDI, its impact on FDI activities is conditional (Wilson, 2015;Ko and Shin, 2021). Thus, before examining a new form of nationalism that may promote FDI, it is essential to delineate the context or conditions under which such a form of nationalism might emerge. ...
Over the past two decades, there has been a marked increase in both theoretical
and empirical research focused on understanding foreign direct investment (FDI). This growing interest within the academic community can be largely attributed to the substantial rise in global FDI flows. Consequently, the determinants of FDI have been a primary focus of scholarly inquiry. On the other hand, there has been a global surge in nationalistic rhetoric and actions, as evidenced by events such as Brexit, policies and public attitudes towards immigration, and the Russian-Ukrainian war. While nationalism appears to influence various fields, particularly international business, its specific impacts on international business activities remain underexplored. This study, therefore, examines the relationship between nationalism and FDI.While research on the topic remains limited, recent studies indicate that
nationalism can negatively influence FDI flows. This adverse effect is often analyzed
within the conceptual frameworks of nationalism and FDI. The inherent nature of FDI,
typically involving the acquisition of strategic assets in host countries, clashes with
nationalism’s focus on strengthening and preserving national power and prestige on
the global stage. In this context, FDI is frequently viewed as a potential threat to
national sovereignty, leading to the perception of nationalism as a risk factor that deters
FDI inflows into nationalist-leaning countries.
Contrary to the literature, this study aims to explore the possibility of a new form
of nationalism that consistently supports FDI flows. Using the unique case of
Azerbaijan and Türkiye, this study introduces the concept of “nationalism as
vi
brotherhood” as a new form of nationalism. The Azerbaijan-Türkiye relationship
provides a unique context for examining this type of nationalism, as these two nations
embody the slogan “One Nation, Two States,” reflecting their commitment to acting
in unity despite being separate countries.
In this context, the research first investigates the unique features of nationalism
as brotherhood by analyzing the perspectives of various stakeholders through thematic
analysis and content analysis. Upon identifying the defining features of nationalism as
brotherhood, the study addresses how these distinctive characteristics influence firms’
FDI decisions by proposing three mechanisms grounded in Institutional Theory, Social
Network Theory, and Transaction Cost Theory, utilizing document analysis. Finally,
the research assesses the positive impact of nationalism as brotherhood on FDI flows
at the macroeconomic level through quantile regression analysis.
Utilizing a sequential mixed-method and a case study design, this study has
yielded the following findings: (i) nationalism as brotherhood is defined by eight
themes: strong relationships, mutual support, mutual interests, nationalist feelings,
future, market, firm perspective, and market perspective; (ii) nationalism as
brotherhood supports FDIs between brother nations by fostering legitimacy, building
trust, and reducing transaction costs; and (iii) the impact of nationalism as brotherhood
on FDI flows at the macroeconomic level is statistically significant and positive.
While this research offers several original contributions to the literature, three
stand out as particularly significant. First, it presents a unique and entirely different
perspective on the relationship between nationalism and FDI by introducing a form
of nationalism that consistently supports FDI flows. Second, it demonstrates that
nationalistic discourses do not merely remain rhetorical but can also have tangible
economic and practical outcomes. Third, the research provides a unique context and
introduces a novel concept for further exploration within the frameworks of
Institutional Theory, Social Network Theory, and Transaction Cost Theory.
... In theory, limited availability and growing demand creates strong conditions for exerting greater control over the resource sector (Wilson, 2015;Hickey et al., 2020;Caramento et al., 2023). However, the ability of producer states to negotiate favourable terms of extraction and development is often constrained by the profit maximizing actions of multinationals, whose financial resources, time horizons, and third-party enforcement mechanisms (e.g., investor protection agreements) make it difficult for states to negotiate favourable terms for domestic groups and sectors (Wilson, 2015;Bebbington et al., 2018;Caramento et al., 2023). ...
... In theory, limited availability and growing demand creates strong conditions for exerting greater control over the resource sector (Wilson, 2015;Hickey et al., 2020;Caramento et al., 2023). However, the ability of producer states to negotiate favourable terms of extraction and development is often constrained by the profit maximizing actions of multinationals, whose financial resources, time horizons, and third-party enforcement mechanisms (e.g., investor protection agreements) make it difficult for states to negotiate favourable terms for domestic groups and sectors (Wilson, 2015;Bebbington et al., 2018;Caramento et al., 2023). Within the contemporary context, global supply chains for lithium-ion batteries and EVs have been dominated by a small number of multinational corporations whose operations involve extensive industrial processing in mainland China (Bridge and Faigen, 2022). ...
... Resource nationalism can be usefully defined as a political strategy that seeks to reorient economic production in favour of domestic actors and interests (Wilson, 2015;Childs, 2016;Haslam and Heidrich, 2016;Pryke, 2017;Koch and Perreault, 2019;Hickey et al., 2020;Caramento et al., 2023). At its core, it involves leveraging state power to prioritize national and subnational interests through economic policy measures such as taxation, royalties, and duties to maximize public revenue. ...
International efforts to tackle climate change have ignited a global surge in demand for the "critical metals" that are used in the production of lithium-ion batteries and electric vehicles (EVs). Among them, lithium represents a critical strategic component that is concentrated in only a limited number of extractive zones. In theory, limited availability and strong demand creates favourable conditions for producer states. In practice, many states have struggled to nationalize the production of battery-grade lithium, reflecting the dominant role that multinational corporations play in the sector. This paper explores the strategies that producer states in Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia have used to navigate this rapidly changing dynamic, making the case that the recent surge in demand for battery metals has created new opportunities for challenging the oligopoly of multinational capital but the ability of governments to reorient production linkages for enhancing incomes, technical capacity, and economic opportunity in the production of lithium derivatives remains structurally and historically constrained by the institutional legacies of nationalization and social mobilization that vary across the three states. Drawing upon the "political settlements" literature, we contend that national and subnational efforts to exert greater control over the lithium sector can be attributed to the institutional legacy of political contestation and the role of social actors in crafting new power configurations that challenge dominant state-business coalitions.
... The ideological enclave is about the place of the mine in the local, national, and global imagination. It encompasses associated issues such as the selective presence/absence of the state (Szablowski 2007; Skrzypek 2021); neoliberalism (Ganti 2014) and the rise of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) discourse (Dashwood 2012;Dolan and Rajak 2016); the enrollment of the mining sector in the politics of Indigenous recognition or resource nationalism (Wilson 2015), including conflict and controversy unfolding in various arenas (Long 2001); and spaces of engagement (Cox 1998) about the right scale of control, appropriation, and benefit-sharing (Huber and Emel 2009). The ideological dimension of the mining enclave also encompasses the construction of the "extractive subject" (Frederiksen and Himley 2020) and debates about local/national, corporate, and Indigenous forms of sovereignty and citizenship (echoing Anthias' notion of hydrocarbon citizenship; Anthias 2019; Le Meur and Levacher 2022 for the New Caledonia case; Filer 2006 for PNG). ...
... The nickel strategy was partly formalized in legal instruments, namely, the mining plan (Schéma de mise en valeur des ressources minières) set out in the 1999 Organic Law, art. 39, andissued in 2009, andthe 2009 Mining Code. 5 In actual fact, the main operational outcome of this specific form of resource nationalism (Emel et al. 2011;Wilson 2015; for the New Caledonia case, Bouard et al. 2016;Demmer 2018;Burton and Levacher 2021) was the Koniambo Project, a joint venture between SMSP and Falconbridge (absorbed by the Anglo-Swiss firm Xstrata in 2006 and Glencore in 2013) for extracting and processing the Koniambo nickel deposit in the North Province (Grochain 2013). ...
... The late 1990s and 2000s saw another movement of convergence fueled by the CSR turn in the mining sector and the global mining boom that resulted, at the national level, in the drafting of new regulations and policy frameworks for PNG, 2004-2009for New Caledonia, and 2009 for West Papua). These, in turn, can be regarded as various degrees and forms of resource nationalism (Wilson 2015;see Demmer 2018 for New Caledonia, Winanti and Diprose 2020 for Indonesia). In other words, the densification of regulatory ties with the national and global levels reshaped the institutional enclave and, indirectly, its material layer through environmental impact assessments, technologies, and rules that were designed to better contain material overflows. ...
... Tis chapter also strives to contribute to a burgeoning discussion on resource nationalism in the Global South, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Most analyses of resource nationalism ofer a spatial comparison between diferent geographical cases, classifying and juxtaposing diferent ideal types with one another (Bremmer and Johnston 2009;Andreasson 2015;Wilson 2015), but this paper seeks to ofer a temporal comparison of two periods from a single geographical case. Tis will serve to demonstrate the constraints and limitations that economic liberalization has placed on current eforts to regulate and govern mineral extraction. ...
... Hence, this model maintains that resource nationalism is dependent on the maturity of the extractive industries. Te problem with the previous two explanations is that they are overly economistic, focusing on primary commodity prices and extractive industry maturity, neglecting political contexts (Wilson 2015), and narrowly conceiving resource nationalism as a bargaining process between states and frms, ignoring other constituencies and social forces. ...
... However, a typology developed from the perspective of investors misses key aspects of policy processes and impinges our understanding of the complexity of political and economic dynamics underlying the resource nationalist moment. A more useful typology is ofered by Jefrey Wilson (2015), who diferentiates between three forms of resource nationalism: rentier models, whereby resource rents "allow regimes to fashion loyal societal coalitions, fnance repressive apparatuses and engage in neopatrimonialism"; developmental approaches, which entail the use of interventionist strategies to harness resource extraction for industrial transformation; and market-based initiatives, which involve low-intervention strategies, like taxation to capture resource rents. Wilson's typology usefully focuses on developmental outcomes, placing greater importance on political institutions and thereby moving beyond economistic models rooted in bargaining processes around commodity prices and sunk assets. ...
... Another approach discusses the internal factors that shape resource nationalism, focusing on the ideas, the institutions and the social contentions that give rise to nationalist policies (Wilson 2015;Bremmer and Johnston 2009). In this case, the weight is placed on the goals of the policies and the narratives that accompany their application. ...
... In this case, the weight is placed on the goals of the policies and the narratives that accompany their application. Following Wilson (2015), resource nationalism can take different forms, as rentier, developmental or market-based. Unlike the cycles approach, liberalization or market-based regulation is seen as a potential variant of resource nationalism. ...
... Unlike the cycles approach, liberalization or market-based regulation is seen as a potential variant of resource nationalism. This approach includes moments of liberalization as potentially part of nationalist policies if national identity or security priorities are used to leverage and justify such measures (Wilson 2015). For some, while institutions and ideology do not determine resource nationalist policies as much as structural factors do, they shape the extent to which state control can expand (Monaldi 2020). ...
... First, the measures built on previous waves of nationalist policies adopted by Tanzania in the past, notably during President Julius Nyerere's socialist development strategy (1960s-1980s) and recently under President Jakaya Kikwete's administration (2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015). Second, President Magufuli's resource nationalist measures are part of the broader trend towards a tougher resource nationalist governance strategy that is observed throughout the world (Bucheli and Aguilera 2010;Wilson 2015;Kaup and Gellert 2017). ...
... The main thrust of resource nationalism is to revitalise and refocus the resource extraction-development debate on making resource extraction benefit local and national communities in countries that host large extractivist projects. Consequently, a range of measures including local content requirements, increased taxation, and direct state and public participation in resource extraction are deployed to make resource extraction deliver to local and national development (Wilson 2011(Wilson , 2015Ovadia 2016aOvadia , 2016bAndrews and Nwapi 2018). But does resource nationalism necessarily achieve what resource liberalism has all along failed to live up to? ...
... Resource nationalism has become a dominant narrative in popular and academic analyses of extractive resource governance across the world (Wilson 2015). Although very commonly applied to resource policy measures that have an imagined anti-liberal flavour, resource nationalism is a concept that defies universal clarity (Kaup and Gellert 2017;Koch and Perreault 2018). ...
Resource nationalism has dominated resource governance politics across Africa. Resource-rich states have sought to both relegitimise extraction and secure more economic benefits. However, there is a paucity of studies on the consequences of resource nationalism for community participation in resource-governance and decision-making processes. Drawing on three cases of community resistance and negotiation in three different eras, this paper compares two waves of resource nationalism, i.e. the second and third waves, to show whether and how resource nationalism promotes community participation. While presenting itself as pro-participatory governance, resource nationalism reproduces structural constraints on meaningful community engagement in extractive resource governance.
... In critical research literature, the first debate is framed as a concern over the rise of extractivism or new extraction, which are notions that have been especially used in relation to the social, economic and environmental impacts from the extraction of resources in Latin America (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014;Dougherty 2016). The other debate is over resource nationalism (Haslam & Heidrich 2016;Kaup & Gellert 2017;Wilson 2015;Koch & Perreault 2019), where the key focus is on the emphasis that national governments put on securing financial returns from the natural resources extracted within the territories they govern. The positions of new extraction and resource nationalism are related, as both aim at explaining the reasons for and consequences of the increase in the exploitation of resources. ...
... Haslam and Heidrich (2016) include three categories of actions under resource nationalism: the maximization of public revenue; the assertion of strategic state control, that is, ability to set a political or strategic direction to the development of the extraction of resources; and enhancement of developmental spillovers from extractive activity. Wilson (2015) argued that while economic dynamics function as an enabling factor for resource nationalism to emerge, political institutions are an equally important conditioning factor shaping resource nationalism. Therefore, resource nationalism can be defined as a strategy where governments use economic policies to improve returns from the resource industries. ...
... The reason for national governments for promoting resource nationalism is that they do not see that liberal economic policies would lead to natural resources within the territory of a nation-state to be developed in ways that will offer maximum benefits for the host state, which is why national governments prefer to define the terms for resource exploitation in ways that advance national goals. Three different versions of resource nationalism have been identified: rentier, developmental and market-based (Wilson 2015). There are also specific strategies that are deployed as means towards executing resource nationalism, including policies that aim at local or state ownership of resource industries; policies constraining the operations of resource firms through industrial policy requirements and trade regimes; and policies that are designed to capture economic rents for public purposes through taxation. ...
The chapter explores the reproduction of resource peripheries through a study on the raw materials policy of the European Union (EU). Established in the late 2000s, the raw materials policy has been mainly focused on non-renewable non-energy minerals. The policy has included the explicit goals of increasing the extraction of minerals in the EU territory and to secure the supply of raw materials from sources outside the EU. Paying attention to the spatial divisions these policy goals are creating, the chapter critically examines the EU’s raw materials policy as a multi-scalar undertaking, in which the main players are the European Commission, governmental organisations of the EU member states, industry interest groups, and the various administrative bodies of the European regions at a scale below the nation-state. There are political and economic actors in the regions who support the intensification of resource extraction as a part of their attempts to deal with the social and economic conditions in the regions. As a result, this agency produces and reproduces the regional identities as resource-based. The chapter specifically explores the ways in which such resource regionalism plays a role in the reproduction of resource peripheries.
... (2) Host country politics. We refer to the research of Wilson (2015) and Li and Adachi (2017) and select the rule of law (ROL), government efficiency (GE), Political Tendency of the Ruling Party (Right or Left), democratization (Polity) in the world governance indicators (Kohl and Farthing, 2012). Meanwhile, Right-wing (Ideology_left) for parties defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing. ...
... Although the extraction and processing of mineral resources have, to a certain extent, promoted the economic development and social progress of resource countries, they have also brought about many social development problems and ecological and environmental problems (Aramendia et al. 2023;Gershenson et al. 2023). In the face of potential value-added benefits in metal manufacturing, there is a strong tendency for resource-rich countries to take control of the more profitable parts of the metal chain (Wilson, 2015). The rise of emerging economies and the new technological revolution have contributed significantly to the prosperity of the global mineral market. ...
Resource nationalism has a complex economic, political, and cultural history and reality. The evolution of the supply and demand structure of the global mineral metal market influences it. It is closely linked to the “economic-political” system within resource-rich countries. We analyze the ‘economic-political’ logic of resource nationalist behavior using the two-tier game theory. We examine 261 cases of resource nationalism since 1990 and test the theoretical hypotheses using quantitative techniques. The results show that rising mineral prices are the main trigger for contemporary resource nationalism. However, ideology, institutional quality, social climate, and economic dependence within resource countries play a non-negligible role. Resource wealth dependence in host countries makes it difficult for policymakers to escape national resource interventions. We argue that (1) The global economic trading system imbalance is the root of resource nationalism. (2) Resource nationalism is an endeavor by resource-rich countries to seek entitlements from mineral resource endowments. (3) Resource nationalism is not a zero-sum competition in the national economic trading system. In the face of the potential risks posed by resource nationalism to the global supply of minerals, the relevant interest groups should have sufficient strategic reserves to cope with the possible game of interests.
... Several varia4ons of resource na4onalism policies are limita4ons or fully banned the export of raw ore, local content requirements to include more local contractors or domes4c procurement, compulsory CSR contribu4ons, and forced divestment of foreign assets to the state-owned enterprises (Dargin 2010;Wilson 2015;Marston 2016;D'Costa 2009). These policy pacerns are important to see the mo4ve behind the na4onaliza4on of foreign assets to see what policies are being deployed to achieve specific na4onalist and poli4cal economic agendas. ...
... Wilson contends that developmental resource na4onalism is characterized by governments driven by internal poli4cal mandates to catalyze economic transforma4on. This includes industrializa4on, technological progression, and delivering a wide spectrum of social services (Wilson 2015). Employing resource na4onalism as a strategy for development signifies that governments enact interven4onist policies to harness resource produc4on towards achieving various poli4cal, economic, and developmental objec4ves (ibid 412). ...
Indonesia has implemented resource nationalism policies in its oil, gas, and mining sectors, acquiring natural resource assets from foreign companies and promoting State-Owned Enterprises to manage these assets. However, the application of these policies varies: Chevron lost its asset entirely, Freeport McMoran surrendered majority ownership but retained operational rights, and British Petroleum maintained full ownership. This paper explores the political conditions that allow for these policy variations, positing that they arise from Indonesia’s resource nationalism being intertwined with the country's development strategy. This alignment has enabled technocratic intervention, crafting nationalist policies that also support economic growth. Consequently, technocrats have developed policies that uphold the political agenda of nationalism while ensuring the continued productivity of natural resource assets. This demonstrates the limits of resource nationalism agendas in developing countries and allows for strategic technocratic intervention within the implementation of economic nationalism policies
... Definitions generally agree upon (i) the increased sovereign control over the extractive process (via the involvement of state-owned companies, the tightening of fiscal regimes and/or the revision of contractual terms for exploration activities) for the purpose of retaining a bigger piece of the cake at the expense of foreign firms and (ii) the cyclical nature of the phenomenon, whose ebbs and flows appear to be connected with the boom-and-bust cycle of extractive economies for which governments will have greater incentives to govern the domestic resource base (and, conversely, to dampen foreign investments) at times of high commodity prices (Andreasson, 2015;Stevens, 2008;Vivoda, 2009;Wilson, 2011Wilson, , 2015. However, such mainstream perspective is problematic and partial for a number of reasons. ...
... In mainstream interpretations of resource nationalism, the relationship with identity formation fades into the background. As a partial corrective to macroeconomic approaches relying on bargaining theories, Wilson (2015) introduces political institutions as a key conditioning factor. He contends that 'rentier, developmental, and liberal market institutions pose different political imperatives for states, and thus lend themselves to distinct policy strategies for the capture of resource rents' (Wilson, 2015, p. 404). ...
Under Putin's tenure, the geopolitical representation of Russia as an 'energy superpower' has become a powerful mainstay for the restoration of a global status and a revanchist foreign policy. This article seeks to assess the extent to which such a nationalist narrative is prevalent among Russian academics in the oil and gas sector. Using a survey administered to research and teaching staff in selected industrial universities in 2021, we found partial confirmation of the relevance of centre-periphery relations and that nationalist attitudes are aligned with a state-centric approach. However, this perspective does not necessarily entail opposition to industry privatisation or foreign partnerships. These findings highlight the inadequacy of a simplistic privatisation/nationalisation dichotomy in capturing the hybrid nature of resource governance in petro-states. Additionally, our study suggests that resource nationalism plays a role in shaping experts' support for the government's energy policy. These findings contribute to the literature on resource nationalism and suggest potential avenues for future research exploring the role of higher education institutions in shaping resource governance.
... Not operating under the exclusive premise of profit maximization, state-owned enterprises may pursue non-commercial goals. Serving as national developmental actors and having politicians as principals, state enterprises often seek to maximize political legitimacy (La Porta/López-de-Silanes 1999; Wilson 2015). The employment of workers living within mining areas is one vehicle to promote support among voters. ...
... Connected to the social view of state-owned enterprises as national development actors, a political perspective suggests that politicians running state-controlled companies will use these for political gains (La Wilson 2015). In this vein, research on local content policies in Africa cautions against their usefulness to further local economic development. ...
... 3 O nacionalismo de recursos se refere a políticas nacionais coordenadas para exercício econômico ou político sobre os recursos naturais(Childs, 2016). Três diferentes grupos de políticas podem ser associados a esse conceito: (1) políticas voltadas para capturar parte da renda para objetivos públicos; (2) políticas visando o controle das empresas extrativas; e (3) políticas que restringem as operações das empresas extrativas(Wilson, 2015). ...
A elaboração deste relatório tem como objetivos principais contribuir para o aprofundamento do debate crítico sobre os minerais para eletrificação, bem como discutir as políticas voltadas para estimular a sua extração. O texto se propõe a avaliar as políticas federais voltadas para os chamados minerais “estratégicos”. Com relação a estas políticas, identifica-se que existe um movimento não apenas de legitimar a extração destes minerais, como ainda de criar uma condição de excepcionalidade, que garantiria um tratamento diferenciado com relação aos trâmites usuais de licenciamento ambiental. Ainda, para colaborar para um melhor entendimento da realidade da extração dos minerais “críticos” foram feitas análises de cinco materiais distintos (cobre, lítio, nióbio, níquel e terras raras). A proposta de tal avaliação é debater até que ponto há diferenças e semelhanças nas cadeias extrativas desses minerais.
Junto com o relatório foi disponibilizada uma apresentação que pode ser usada livremente para reuniões e debates sobre o tema. Além disso, um pequeno vídeo com a apresentação dos principais resultados está disponível em https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pAErtvSCUOs
... Ngành công nghiệp khai thác của một quốc gia nói riêng luôn được xem xét và đặt trong bối cảnh toàn cầu như một phần không thể tách rời bởi các hoạt động mang tính cạnh tranh quốc tế và đôi khi phải tuân thủ các tiêu chuẩn bắt buộc hoặc tự nguyện. Do sự cần thiết của ngoại thương và đầu tư để phát triển các ngành công nghiệp khai thác tài nguyên, các quốc gia phải cho phép mức độ mở cửa với thị trường quốc tế và cung cấp các điều kiện hấp dẫn cho các nhà đầu tư tư nhân (Wilson, 2015). ...
Nghề khai thác khoáng sản tại Việt Nam có lịch sử lâu đời. Từ thời đại đồ đồng, người Việt đã tiến hành khai thác đồng, kẽm, thiếc và vàng; trong khi đó, các khoáng sản phi kim như cao lanh được khai thác muộn hơn, từ thế kỷ thứ nhất trước Công nguyên (Nguyen Ngoc Khoi, 2014). Nghề khai mỏ dần được hình thành và phát triển, đóng góp lớn vào ngân sách nhà nước các triều đại phong kiến. Tuy nhiên, việc khai thác thời kỳ này vẫn được thực hiện bằng phương pháp thủ công. Phải đến thời nhà Nguyễn, ngành công nghiệp khai thác khoáng sản (khai khoáng) mới được hình thành, và tiếp tục được tăng cường sau khi người Pháp cai trị Việt Nam. Sau khi giành độc lập năm 1945, chính quyền Việt Nam tiếp tục phát triển ngành công nghiệp này với sự giúp đỡ của Liên Xô và Trung Quốc (Nguyen Ngoc Khoi, 2014). Nhiều mỏ khoáng sản bị tàn phá và đóng cửa trong chiến tranh cũng được hoạt động trở lại như mỏ than Phấn Mễ, Minh Khai, Đầm Đùn, Khe Bố được tổ chức lại năm 1949 – bốn mỏ than này được coi là những đơn vị công nghiệp nhà nước đầu tiên của chính thể Việt Nam Dân chủ Cộng hòa (Bộ Công thương, 2023). Đến giữa những năm 1990, hầu hết các mỏ và nhà máy chế biến khoáng sản đều do Chính phủ Việt Nam sở hữu (trừ một số mỏ khai thác vàng do tư nhân thực hiện). Tuy nhiên, đến năm 1996, khi Luật khoáng sản đầu tiên được giới thiệu đã cho phép tất cả các thành phần kinh tế đều được phép tham gia hoạt động khai thác khoáng sản. Một số công ty liên doanh giữa Việt Nam và nước ngoài hoạt động trong các lĩnh vực thăm dò, tìm kiếm, khai thác và sản xuất khoáng sản dần được hình thành như liên doanh giữa Liên đoàn Địa chất Nga với Công ty Kim loại màu Thái Nguyên trong sản xuất vàng, hay liên doanh giữa Ấn Độ và Pháp trong phát triển mỏ vàng tại Pắc Lạng (USGS, 1994).
... Este concepto se refiere a «los gobiernos que toman medidas para afirmar el control soberano sobre los recursos naturales de su nación, en competencia con las corporaciones multinacionales cuyo capital y tecnología se necesitan para extraer esos minerales» (Rutland, 2022, p. 123). La cualificación del nacionalismo de los recursos como desarrollista, formulada inicialmente por Wilson (2015) y fundamentada en los últimos análisis que desmontan la hipótesis de la maldición de los recursos 6 , describe en la actualidad la pretensión del Estado emprendedor y ambiental (los nuevos atributos del Estado desarrollista) de maximizar y centralizar las rentas de los recursos naturales del extractivismo verde, para ganar espacio fiscal y de políticas a favor de un cambio estructural incluyente y sostenible, dentro de una transición energética que debería ser más justa y equilibrada a nivel internacional (Dietz, 2023;Andreucci et al., 2023;Thrasher, 2023;CEPAL, 2023a). ...
El objetivo del artículo es discutir los viejos y nuevos dilemas del extractivismo para la transición al desarrollo (dentro de la transición energética y hacia la electromovilidad) de aquellos países ricos en recursos naturales, y/o dependientes de productos básicos que siguen bloqueados en la trampa de ingreso medio. Para ello, se revisan las principales teorías heterodoxas del desarrollo desde una perspectiva de economía política neodesarrollista. La conclusión es que las dificultades para realizar esa «transición dentro de la transición», aunque no resultan insalvables, serán mucho mayores en un futuro próximo de lo que fueron en el pasado.
... The role of the military in securing tanzanite production at Meralani, which is the clearest current example of military involvement in mining, can be understood through appreciation of the resource nationalist policy context in Tanzania. The literature discusses the strategies employed in RN approaches, including 'regulations affecting ownership of resource industries'; policies that regulate 'the operations of resource firms'; and 'policies designed to capture economic rents for public purposes' (Wilson, 2015). Other literature examines how resource nationalist approaches may be placed within broad 'categories' depending on the strategies employed, the narratives and political gestures associated with them, the political orientation of government, and the histories of resource extraction in any particular country. ...
The role of the military in the mining sector in sub-Saharan Africa has been primarily examined through the lens of securitization of the artisanal and small-scale mining sector. In many cases, the military have been part of state-led efforts to prevent informal mining. We apply a theoretical framework based on three elements (securitization of the mining sector, the nature of civil–military relations, and the nature of military involvement in the mining sector) to the case of Tanzania, and argue that the securitization concept has some salience in the Tanzania case, but that military involvement in mining can also be viewed as part of broader strategies of the state to promote industrialization, through state-owned enterprises, including military-owned companies. Recent military involvement in mining coincided with a government turn towards resource nationalism, and we conclude that military involvement is linked to discourses and practices of resource nationalism in Tanzania.
... One reason is that corporations within the extractive sector have enormous up-front capital costs and are therefore quite concerned with risk. MNCs face risk from national governments, which may withdraw concessions in case of noncompliance or may change regulatory frameworks, including nationalization of the resources (Lange and Kinyondo 2016;Sørreime and Tronvoll 2020;Wilson 2015; and chapter 6 in this volume). MNCs also face risk from local communities in the form of social unrest (Dashwood 2012;Davis and Franks 2014: 32;Shapiro, Hobdari, and Oh 2018), and many are open about the fact that CSR is, fi rst of all, a question of risk management and ge ing a social license to operate (Kirsch 2016;Wanvik 2016: 524). ...
... Resource nationalism has been a dominant framework in understanding energy politics mostly in Latin America, where oil is a major economic and energy resource at the heart of the region's politics and international relations. In general usage, resource nationalism broadly refers to strategies and measures that resource-rich states adopt to exert control over resources and extract more economic benefits from resource extraction for their national socio-economic development (Wilson 2015). These measures can include local content requirements, state ownership, increased taxation in the event of a raise on global commodity prices, and outright resource nationalisation. ...
As the world approaches the 2030 year marker for the implementation of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as defined by the United Nations, the global urgency for sustainable and energy sources grows. Lower-income countries, however, confront a choice between cleaner energy and ensuring cheap and reliable energy. This raises the question of how some countries can find a balance between meeting their global climate change commitments and meeting urgent energy generation needs. This article uses resource nationalism as a lens to examine Tanzania’s energy transition dynamics. It seeks to understand why renewable sources such as wind and solar have been promoted in government policy but have not attracted much developmental support and investment. The authors argue that resource nationalism provides context within which to understand why the state has been quick to promote energy projects (notably geothermal, coal, natural gas and hydroelectric) where it has direct investment interests, as opposed to large wind and solar projects where private – often foreign – investors are dominant.
... It is one of the resource governance approaches adopted in almost all resource-rich countries of the world in varying degrees (Andreasson, 2015;Angosto-Ferrández & Fernando, 2021;Childs, 2016;Laux & Molot, 1978;Wilson, 2011). Even though there is no commonly agreed definition of resource nationalism, it is generally used to refer to measures taken by resource-rich governments to increase their bargaining power relative to multinational extractive companies as a way of increasing the socio-economic contribution of resource extraction (Vivoda, 2009;Wilson, 2015). Many studies have tended to associate the recurrence of resource nationalism with circles of resource booms suggesting that resource-rich governments resort to nationalist policies when commodity prices go up (Bremmer & Johnston, 2009;Vivoda, 2009). ...
Many resource-rich countries in Africa have at one time or the other resorted to resource nationalism in a bid to increase economic benefits and bolster state and public participation. But has this translated into improved resource governance? With a focus on Tanzania’s State Mining Corporation (STAMICO), this paper critically examines whether the adoption of resource nationalism results in actual practice and improved resource governance. The paper shows that the pattern has been the same throughout: adoption of resource nationalist measures has not automatically translated into actual practice in terms of improved resource governance capacity. State enterprises have been established but the state has not injected capital into them to enable them spearhead resource nationalism into what the state wants to achieve. Consequently, resource nationalism appears to be politically motivated as a strategy to address opposition without having to invest into birthing what resource nationalism aspires to achieve
... One reason is that corporations within the extractive sector have enormous up-front capital costs and are therefore quite concerned with risk. MNCs face risk from national governments, which may withdraw concessions in case of noncompliance or may change regulatory frameworks, including nationalization of the resources (Lange and Kinyondo 2016;Sørreime and Tronvoll 2020;Wilson 2015; and chapter 6 in this volume). MNCs also face risk from local communities in the form of social unrest Davis and Franks 2014: 32;Shapiro, Hobdari, and Oh 2018), and many are open about the fact that CSR is, fi rst of all, a question of risk management and ge ing a social license to operate (Kirsch 2016;Wanvik 2016: 524). ...
Do transnational corporations act more responsibly when they are owned by the state and informed by the Nordic societal model? This is explored through multisited ethnographic studies of Norwegian energy and extraction corporations' operations abroad. The book also situates the corporate ethics in the Norwegian 'home context' of the corporations. Case studies are from operations in Brazil, Tanzania, Turkey, China, Northern Kurdistan and the far north of Norway, and include the corporations Norsk Hydro, DNO, Statkraft, and Equinor.
... There is a field of research dealing with so-called 'resource nationalism', where states or agents from a certain state seek ownership or control over natural resources, which is one way in which property rights and nationalism are connected. 26 Furthermore, property, especially in the form of land, has conceptual connections to state-building, and in particular to nation state-building. Andrew Reeve notes that: ...
This article reviews research on the relationship between property rights and nationalism. A property rights perspective to the study of nationalism is relevant to understanding the origins and development of nationalism and nation states. Yet, key theorists of nationalism have mostly ignored the relationship between property rights and nationalism, or looked at it only indirectly. There are a variety of ways in which ownership or possession more generally can be related to nationalism, for instance through colonialism, racism, and dispossession (Bannerji et al. 2001; Bhandar 2016; Bhandar & Toscano 2015). This review, however, in order to build a consistent perspective on the historical emergence of nation states and nationalism, will have its main focus on property rights, property regimes and state-building. The literature on state-building and democratization bears important insights about this relationship which can be applied to the study of nationalism. This review will therefore draw on such literature, in addition to works on nationalism where the topic of property has been mentioned, to show how an integrated property rights perspective to the study of nationalism may yield important insights to our understanding of nations and nationalism. The article is structured as follows. First, it offers a brief discussion of what property rights are and why they are key to understanding the long-term historical development of nations and nationalism. After this, it outlines the links between property regimes and the formation of nation states, followed by a discussion of the conceptual links between nationalism and private property. The final section offers some brief reflections on Marxism, property and nationalism.
... There is not one but several competing 'globalisations' at play (Gills, 2004). Resource nationalism in Tanzania, like elsewhere (Wilson, 2015), is not intended to nationalise the extractive industries completely, nor to end neoliberal extractivism, but rather to renegotiate the global terms of extractivism (Poncian, 2019). This exemplifies that power relations are not stable or unidirectional in global land use systems (Faier & Rofel, 2014) and that multiple actors engage in practices of global ordering (Coleman & Tucker, 2011). ...
In land system science (LSS), the globalisation of land use is often understood via trade flows. Fewer studies have explored the power asymmetries and local resistance that shape global connections. Consequently, calls for a deeper engagement with power and agency have been made within LSS. To accommodate this, we engage the ethnographic literature on encounters, emphasising the concepts of resistance and friction. These capture the ways actors position themselves in global systems, resist, and create global connections. To illustrate its relevance for land systems, we use qualitative data from the mining sector of Tanzania, highlighting the emergence of resource nationalism as an alternative form of globalisation (alter-globalisation). We argue that a focus on resistance, friction and alter-globalisation can move LSS towards a deeper engagement with power and agency in global flows, revealing the competing actors, values and visions embedded in land systems.
... Beside domestic politics, it is obvious for the increasing commodity globally during the last decade of 2003-2013, resource nationalism was on the rise around the globe (Wilson, 2015). National resource endowments posed policy choices for resource governments. ...
In the new century, a growing power rivalry and contest between China and USA has significantly impacted the Asia-Pacific region. In turn, Indonesia has tried to avoid being caught in the middle between these two great powers. Among unanswered questions are how to respond to influences affecting politics and security and how to interact concerning economic cooperation and market integration. This article will explore how Indonesia tried to protect its own national interests amid this great-power competition by making strategic and timely policy choices from 2016 to 2022. We offer a new argument and interpretation for how a middle-sized power like Indonesia can flexibly and efficiently operate a hedging strategy toward US and China to promote its own security and development. Neoclassic realism will be applied to interpret a strategic triangle. As such, we explore Indonesia’s state leadership, domestic politics, political culture, and economic entity within the context of US-China power rivalry, closely in related to facing China’s Belt-and-Road initiative (BRI) as well as US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy with Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
... Unlike resource nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, today's version of resource nationalism focuses less on nationalization and more on national participation. Tis has been observed by many scholars who focus on resource nationalism (Andreasson 2015;Wilson 2015;Childs 2016;Lange and Kinyondo 2016;Nwapi and Andrews 2017). Yet, Bassett and Fradella demonstrate that although a vision has been articulated by the state of empowering domestic entrepreneurs and small businesses so that the mineral sector can support local development, Zambia's copper-centric policy regime is structured to beneft foreign investors -whether they invest directly in copper mining or in backwardly linked industries. ...
... There is not one but several competing 'globalisations' at play (Gills, 2004). Resource nationalism in Tanzania, like elsewhere (Wilson, 2015), is not intended to nationalise the extractive industries completely, nor to end neoliberal extractivism, but rather to renegotiate the global terms of extractivism (Poncian, 2019). This exemplifies that power relations are not stable or unidirectional in global land use systems (Faier & Rofel, 2014) and that multiple actors engage in practices of global ordering (Coleman & Tucker, 2011). ...
In land system science (LSS), the globalisation of land use is often understood via trade flows. Fewer studies have explored the power asymmetries and local resistance that shape global connections. Consequently, calls for a deeper engagement with power and agency have been made within LSS. To accommodate this, we engage the ethnographic literature on encounters, emphasising the concepts of resistance and friction. These capture the ways actors position themselves in global systems, resist, and create global connections. To illustrate its relevance for land systems, we use qualitative data from the mining sector of Tanzania, highlighting the emergence of resource nationalism as an alternative form of globalisation (alter-globalisation). We argue that a focus on resistance, friction and alter-globalisation can move LSS towards a deeper engagement with power and agency in global flows, revealing the competing actors, values and visions embedded in land systems.
... It found its source in the financial model of the Koniambo project and other SMSP mining projects in which SMSP and North Province hold 51% of the shares. 15 The political process bore the hallmark of resource nationalism (Bouard et al. 2016;Burton and Levacher 2021;Le Meur 2017a;Wilson 2015). It displays the three core elements of nationalist policy regimes identified by Wilson (2015:401): the public ownership of mining industries (public equity), the encouragement of certain corporate behaviours to the benefit of local consumers (for instance good environmental practices) and the partial capture of mining revenues for public purposes. ...
Mining, especially nickel mining, has a long history in New Caledonia and cannot be separated from the trajectory of this territory as a settler colony. However, the construction of mining as a political stake and resource in the New Caledonian public arenas has come surprisingly late, only emerging explicitly in the 1990s as pro‐independence parties pushed the issue to the fore in their negotiations with the French state and anti‐independence parties. Nickel mining and processing became part of the claim for sovereignty in the form of a ‘resource nationalism’ discourse. This paper discusses the multi‐layered nature of sovereignty through the theoretical propositions of Richard Joyce on ‘competing sovereignties’ (2013) to illustrate both the complexities of a decolonization situation that has lasted for 20 years and the challenges posed to sovereignty by mining.
... On the other hand, the number of imported products will undoubtedly increase the dependence on other countries. Thus, protecting domestic products is such a nationalist act in Asia and Africa [1] [2]. Moreover, nearly 90 % of countries with abundant natural resources have local content policies and requirements [3][4] [5]. ...
Multipurpose autonomous robot technology has been developed to assist transportation sectors or the current emergency as the Covid-19 pandemic. A practical issue in the robotic industry concerns the domestic content in commodities, services, and a combination of goods and services commonly determined as domestic component level (DCL). To be considered a standardized national product, a product's DCL must surpass a certain level of local content composition. This research aims to investigate the DCL of a developed multipurpose autonomous robot in Indonesia called ROM20. The research was initiated by interviewing specialists in DCL calculation and robotics research to perform DCL analysis on ROM20. The next step was breaking down the ROM20 components into a second layer component, in which the amount of domestic component and overseas components can be derived. Finally, the ROM20 DCL value was calculated by dividing the cost of domestic components by the total cost of domestic and overseas components. As a digital product, the ROM20 DCL calculation result showed that the manufacturing aspect is 70 %, and the development aspect is 30 %. The overall ROM20 DCL value has been calculated as 52.23 %, which surpasses the national standard threshold at 40 % DCL value. Therefore, ROM20 can be considered a high-value standardized national product, impacting the competitiveness of local products and the fast-growing medical device industry in Indonesia.
... Nasionalisme Indonesia yang berkembang dan bertumbuh mengikuti perkembangan pergerakan kebangsaan Indonesia adalah sebuah jawaban politik, sosial, dan ekonomi secara spesifik yang timbul diakibatkan oleh situasi kolonial (Utomo, 1995). Nasionalisme Indonesia bergerak dari nasionalisme kultural, berkembang ke sosio-ekonomi, dan memuncak menjadi nasionalisme politik revolusioner multidimensional yang tampak menjadi suatu proses pendewasaan dan pematangan konsep nasionalisme (Kartodirdjo, 1990;Wilson, 2015) Terwujudnya kemerdekaan Indonesia dan usaha secara berkelanjutan dalam mempertahankannya merupakan suatu bentuk perjuangan yang berakar dari ideologi nasionalisme. Nilai-nilai perjuangan dan nasionalisme harus senantiasa dijaga sekaligus diwariskan kepada anak cucu sebagai generasi penerus bangsa, supaya keutuhan dan persatuan Negara Indonesia tetap terjaga untuk menghadapi tantangan zaman. ...
Nasionalisme merupakan keadaan pikiran, di mana kesetiaan individu muncul sebagai akibat dari eksistensi negara-bangsa. Keterikatan yang mendalam dengan tanah asal seseorang, dengan tradisi lokal otoritas teritorial yang mapan telah ada dalam kekuatan yang berbeda-beda di sepanjang proses sejarahnya. Bangsa Indonesia sebagai bangsa yang telah menghadapi berbagai tantangan zaman dalam berbagai fase sejarah terbentuk sebagai bangsa yang kuat. Kekuatan bangsa Indonesia dalam perspektif sejarah menguat saat nasionalisme mulai menggeser sifat-sifat primordial dan mengutamakan kepentingan yang bersifat nasional. Pentingnya penguatan nasionalisme hari ini adalah untuk tetap menjaga identitas luhur bangsa Indonesia di tengah arus globalisasi. Pembelajaran IPS merupakan salah satu kunci untuk memberikan dasar penanaman identitas generasi penerus bangsa dalam menghadapi segala tantangan dan ancaman arus globalisasi.
... Ces exemples ne sont pas exempts de controverses. Mais ils montrent que l'État peut jouer un rôle qui n'est pas limité à celui de « facilitateur » de l'investissement international, mais qui peut même s'étendre à l'implication directe dans l'exploitation dans des formes diverses de « nationalisme des ressources » (Wilson, 2015), comme le montre le « projet pays » calédonien ou la proposition initiale, et avortée, du renouveau minier français, consistant à créer la Compagnie nationale des mines. Ces initiatives montrent qu'il est possible et peut-être, en démocratie, nécessaire de réfléchir aux dispositifs permettant de faire de la politique temporelle des ressources minières un sujet de discussion collective. ...
Comme dans de nombreux domaines technologiques et industriels, l’exploration et l’exploita- tion minières s’appuient sur des instruments censés prévoir et organiser les développements futurs et leurs conséquences. Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons à trois formes de mobilisation du futur dans le cadre de ces activités et de leurs contestations: 1) l’investis- sement, caractérisé par le calcul des profits futurs et la place centrale accordée aux risques susceptibles de les remettre en cause ; 2) l’anticipation, qui associe l’activité extractive à des considérations plus larges susceptibles de faire émerger des questionnements nouveaux et une autre définition des risques ; 3) la planification, qui consiste à organiser l’activité minière en fonction d’objectifs à atteindre, tels que le développement territorial, par exemple. En se fondant sur plusieurs terrains (France métropolitaine, Nouvelle-Calédonie, Guyane), cet article propose de montrer qu’une analyse des formes de mobilisation du futur permet de repenser le problème bien connu des relations entre les entreprises minières, l’environne- ment et les populations concernées.
Цель – выполнить группировку субъектов Российской Федерации (РФ) с позиций значения удельного веса налоговых поступлений от налогоплательщиков, осуществляющих добычу полезных ископаемых, в общей сумме поступлений в консолидированный бюджет региона. Материалы и методы. Источником данных послужили Налоговые паспорта субъектов РФ и РФ в целом. Анализируемый период – 2014-2022; охватывает весь предоставляемый Федеральной налоговой службой России общедоступный массив данных по 85 субъектам РФ (83 в 2014 году). Данный период в хронологическом отношении соответствует началу новых геоэкономически условий, характеризующихся вводом против отечественной экономики рестрикций со стороны отдельных государств. Для дифференциации субъектов РФ по степени сырьевой зависимости применён сопоставительный метод для показателя в Налоговом паспорте «Удельный вес в общей сумме поступлений, %» для категории «Добыча полезных ископаемых». Результаты и обсуждение. Итоги за 9-летний период позволили выделить несколько групп ресурсодобывающих субъектов РФ, а также отметить взаимоувязанные с геоэкономическими условиями трансформации в отдельных регионах. Всего выделено 5 групп: 1) субъекты Российской Федерации сырьевой зависимости; 2) субъекты Российской Федерации сырьевой специализации; 3) субъекты Российской Федерации с сопутствующей сырьевой специализацией; 4) субъекты Российской Федерации с неустойчивой сырьевой специализацией; 5) иные регионы. Выводы. Полученные результаты дифференциации позволяют настраивать региональное управление в ресурсодобывающих субъектах РФ в зависимости от геоэкономических условий. На основе выявленных трендов для конкретного субъекта РФ эффективно принятие управленческих решений, приводящих к балансу налоговых поступлений.
The work is dedicated to the study of the energy factor in Turkish-Russian relations, particularly relevant in the context of the reconfiguration of international energy security and the restructuring of the European energy landscape against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis of 2022. The main goal of the work is to reveal the role and significance of the energy factor in the development of Turkish-Russian relations. Within the framework of the study, periods of bilateral relations are identified with a focus on their energy component, which allows for the analysis and revealing of trends, processes, and causal relationships in a specific temporal context. Methods of critical discourse analysis and comparative analysis are applied to identify perceptions of threats, challenges, and opportunities, as well as the evolution of the priorities of the two countries in the context of changing internal and external factors. This becomes possible through the comparison of strategic planning documents from Russia and Turkey. The study also draws on a wide range of contemporary sources and literature, including reports, scientific articles, and monographs by Russian, Turkish, and other foreign researchers. This approach enables the author to highlight key challenges and prospects for energy cooperation between the two countries and to develop scenarios for future trajectories in the energy sector. The research examines the dynamics of Turkish-Russian energy cooperation since the early 2000s, combining conventional theoretical paradigms and approaches with new models that take into account intangible factors. This allows for the analysis of the complex manifestations of conflict and cooperation among various actors in the political and energy spheres, with a particular focus on the Black Sea-Caspian region and Southeast Europe, where both countries, along with other key actors, strive to project their influence. Following the Ukrainian crisis of 2022, the dynamics of bilateral relations have persisted, but are now at a crossroads and may develop along different trajectories under the influence of global, regional, and domestic political processes. It is anticipated that both material and intangible factors that have shaped the trajectory of these relations over the past two decades, in the context of complex regional and global dynamics, will continue to support the momentum of mature bilateral ties despite emerging challenges. In this light, it is expected that in the short and medium term, relations between Russia and Turkey may be maintained and even deepened through modest steps on individual issues, including in the energy sector. Such research approaches shed light on the importance of not only economic and geopolitical aspects but also on issues of prestige, role, and identity that Russia and Turkey assign to themselves on the international stage, making this analysis both relevant and practically significant in the context of current international relations. // Выпускная квалификационная работа посвящена исследованию энергетического фактора в турецко-российских отношениях, особенно актуального в контексте реконфигурации международной энергетической безопасности и перестройки европейского энергетического ландшафта на фоне украинского кризиса 2022 года. Основной целью работы является раскрытие роли и значения энергетического фактора в развитии турецко-российских отношений. В рамках исследования выделяются периоды двусторонних отношений с акцентом на их энергетический компонент, что позволяет проанализировать и выявить тенденции, процессы и причинно-следственные связи в конкретном временном контексте. Применяются методы критического дискурс-анализа и сравнительного анализа для выявления восприятия угроз, вызовов и возможностей, а также эволюции приоритетов двух стран в условиях меняющихся внутренних и внешних факторов. Это становится возможным благодаря сопоставлению документов стратегического планирования России и Турции. В исследовании также привлечен широкий спектр современных и актуальных источников и литературы, включая отчеты, научные статьи и монографии российских, турецких и зарубежных исследователей. Такой подход позволяет автору выделить ключевые вызовы и перспективы энергетического сотрудничества двух стран и разработать сценарии будущей траектории в сфере энергетики. Исследование рассматривает динамику развития турецко-российского энергетического сотрудничества с начала 2000-х годов, сочетая общепринятые теоретические парадигмы и подходы с новыми моделями, учитывающими нематериальные факторы. Это позволяет анализировать комплекс проявлений конфликта и сотрудничества между различными акторами в политической и энергетической сферах, с особым акцентом на Черноморско-Каспийский регион и Юго-Восточную Европу, где обе страны наряду с другими ключевыми акторами стремятся проецировать своё влияние. После украинского кризиса 2022 года динамика двусторонних отношений сохраняется, но находится на перепутье и может развиваться по различным траекториям под влиянием глобальных, региональных и внутриполитических процессов. Предполагается, что материальные и нематериальные факторы, сформировавшие траекторию этих отношений на протяжении двух десятилетий в условиях сложной региональной и глобальной динамики, продолжат поддерживать импульс зрелых двусторонних связей, несмотря на возникающие проблемы. В этом ключе ожидается, что в краткосрочной и среднесрочной перспективе отношения между Россией и Турцией могут сохраняться и даже углубляться через скромные шаги по отдельным вопросам, включая сферу энергетики. Такие исследовательские подходы проливают свет на важность не только экономических и геополитических аспектов, но и на вопросы престижа, роли и идентичности, которые Россия и Турция отводят себе на международной арене, что делает этот анализ актуальным и практически значимым в контексте текущих международных отношений.
With its in-depth investigation of the opportunities and obstacles facing the region, this book offers data-driven assessments and policy recommendations to guide the process of energy transition in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the current state of carbon reduction initiatives in the GCC and the sustainable development practices that are driving progress. Chapters are divided into four sections: circular economy and pathway frameworks; infrastructure; policy and data transparency; and behavioural and human factors. The book includes case studies to offer unique insights into the policy frameworks, technological innovations, and behavioural changes needed to transition to cleaner, knowledge-based economies. It unpacks the interplay between the ambitions of the GCC countries regarding climate change and sustainable development and the challenges they face in trying to achieve these. It is an indispensable resource for researchers and policymakers in environmental policy, climate change, and the Gulf states.
This chapter explores how domestic political factors related to oil and gas resource nationalism and its path-dependency effect influence energy transition capabilities. Methodologically, the chapter adopts a qualitative case study approach in paired oil-rich countries, Kuwait, (UAE), Mexico, and Brazil.
It explores how the origins of each country’s resource nationalism have influenced their abilities to adapt to a post-hydrocarbon economy. Countries that have adopted social-based policies such as Kuwait and Mexico, transition to renewable energy more slowly in comparison with countries that have adopted market-based policies like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Brazil. Understanding these factors expands the literature on energy-rich countries beyond the concepts of the resource curse and rentier states, allowing academics to propose theories that are better suited to the heterogeneous nature of energy-rich countries.
In recent years, countries where extraction of so-called green minerals occur have increasingly asserted themselves. Negatively dubbed as resources nationalism, these political decisions are more akin to a willingness to increase in-country value added for regions often suffering from centuries of colonial extractivism. In the battery sector, these strategies led to cobalt, lithium, and nickel producers aiming to develop local manufacturing of battery components. This article provides a prospective analysis of these dynamics and takes the example of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the recent announcement to establish the country as a supplier of cathodes materials and potentially even manufactured batteries. However, the road to becoming a midstream supplier is long and the current state of infrastructures presents significant barriers to a shift in the country's industrial base. Throughout this article, informed by ethnographic work, I address these challenges in the context of the low-carbon transition. The sustained post-colonial state of Congo's extractive complex and its location at the core of geopolitical competitions constitute a significant obstacle to the establishment of this new industry, while the metal-rich country tried to find its way and raison d'être in the volt rush currently underway.
This research explains the progress of Indonesia’s nickel down streaming despite in climate of resource nationalism. The concepts of global supply chain and hybrid resource nationalism are applied using descriptive qualitative methods with literature-based research as data collection. The research found that convergence between global business and the Indonesian government’s interest creates a favourable condition for the progress of nickel downstream. Global businesses are trying to diversify from the domination of the Chinese electric vehicle supply chain and Indonesia has become the ideal alternative. On the other hand, the Indonesian government needs foreign investment to sustain its resource nationalism project. As a result, resource nationalism that emerges in the nickel sector is moderate and not against foreign participation while foreign companies and governments are looking for new locations to lower the dependence on China. The combination of the two situations forms the main argument of this research as to how Indonesia’s nickel down streaming has been sustained
We examine how nationalism influences governance choice in cross- border collaborations. While nationalism has historically been within the purview of political scientists, we demonstrate its relevance to management scholars by theorizing how nationalist attitudes and behaviors among decision-makers might shape strategic decisions about collaborations with foreign partners. Drawing on insights from the social psychology literature, we theorize how two attitudes commonly associated with nationalism, i.e., lower levels of trust and an unwillingness to work with foreigners, may increase decision-makers’ concerns about opportunistic behavior and invasiveness in cross-border collaborations. Integrating these insights into two key theories of governance choice, i.e., transaction cost economics (TCE) and resource dependence theory (RDT), we derive two competing effects of nationalism: TCE suggests that a heightened concern about opportunistic behavior will make equity alliances more preferable, whereas RDT predicts that a greater sensitivity to invasiveness would prioritize non- equity alliances. Examining 11,469 cross-border collaborations over a 25-year period, we find, in line with the RDT-based prediction, that firms from countries with stronger nationalist sentiments prefer non-equity alliances. We also find that cross-country dissimilarities and prior conflict between the firms’ home countries strengthen this negative association. Our findings advance research on cross-border collaborations by demonstrating why and when nationalism may influence governance mode choice. We also contribute to efforts to establish nationalism, specifically in the form of nationalist sentiments, as an important theoretical concept within the management literature.
This chapter surveys the literature on the political economy of oil and gas governance by focusing on the exploration, production, and sharing of revenues in the hydrocarbon sector. Emphasis is placed on the extent to which oil and gas governance is shaped by geopolitics and inter-party politics. We argue that the interests and ideas of key actors like multinational companies and political elites and the power dynamics among these actors are central to understanding the nature and performance of institutions governing the oil and gas sectors of emerging and developing countries, including how hydrocarbon revenues are shared.
Problem setting. Energy is the main resource, and therefore acts as an object of strategic interest and policy. There are many uncertainties in modern energy governance, as it is influenced by many political positions that have different approaches to how best to achieve the desired future and avoid undesirable developments in the energy market. The energy transition should be recognised as one of the main pressures that increasingly complicate and restructure energy supply pathways. The shifts it generates are not only purely technical, but also social, conceptual and political. Obviously, energy supply is in some way linked to national identity, the position a state takes in international relations, and technological development. However, as energy markets and resource supply chains are becoming increasingly global, national approaches to energy security (security of supply) are responding to international developments, in particular the Russian aggression against Ukraine, to varying degrees. Аnalysis of resent researches and publications. In the scientific literature, energy security, as well as energy sovereignty, are defined differently, since there is no clear consensus among researchers on these phenomena, but there are some dominant approaches. Over the past decade, domestic authors have devoted a lot of attention to the study of the conflict of ensuring energy security of Ukraine in the context of the need to make geopolitical choices. However, the problem of ensuring energy security in martial law and the post-war period is only being raised in scientific research, which determines its relevance. The target of the research is to determine the priority directions of energy policy to improve energy security based on the analysis of the problems of functioning of national energy security systems, as well as current threats to vital national interests in this area. Article’s main body. The issue of energy security is one of the cornerstones of the energy policy of modern states. The Russian-Ukrainian conflicts that began in 2006, in the phases of their greatest aggravation (2014 and 2022), significantly affect gas supplies, which have a very negative impact on the functioning of the EU and impede the implementation of the course of the global energy transition to a low-carbon economy. The concept of energy security has been studied by various authors and, although there is no consensus on its content, it is important for both individual states and regions, in particular Europe. An expanded concept of energy security based on three aspects should be considered optimal: sovereignty, reliability and sustainability. Conclusions and prospects for the development. An indicator of the effectiveness and balance of the national energy strategy is the moderate dependence of the state on imports of foreign energy resources. From the point of view of economic security, there is a need to build a balanced diversified structure of energy imports to avoid dependence (dictate) on individual exporting countries. The imbalance of foreign economic strategy in the energy sector is one of the reasons for the acute energy crisis in most European countries. The energy-related causes of the crisis are the inability of most states to significantly reduce energy consumption and increase the innovative component of technological renewal of the fuel and economic complex. Prevention of such crises requires a transition from the traditional paradigm of ensuring economic growth through the import of cheap energy to the strategy of energy saving and increasing the use of renewable energy sources, which is in line with the principles of sustainable development.
This chapter surveys the literature on the political-economy of oil and gas governance by focusing on the exploration, production and revenue sharing in the hydrocarbon sector. Emphasis is placed on the extent to which oil and gas governance is shaped by geopolitics and interparty-party politics. We argue that the interests and ideas relative to the power of key stakeholders, such as political actors, multinational companies, the citizens and the state are relevant to the understanding of the form and shape of the emergence and performance of the institutions governing the oil and gas sectors of emerging and developing countries.
The academic literature on international norms and Local Content (LC) policies offers key insights into the optimal conditions for the domestic implementation of international norms. Although some IR scholars suggest that there is automatic compliance with a mature norm and others point to value conflicts to explain an inability to reach normative compliance on the ground, both explanations fail to consider the impact of transnational networks on norm implementation. While the role of Transnational Advocacy Networks in norm diffusion on the international stage is widely accepted, transnational networks are assumed to retreat after the adoption of a norm by a national government. In contrast, we show how transnational networks contribute to successful norm implementation by sharing their know-how and skills and introduce the novel concept of Transnational Experience and Expertise Networks (TEENs). LC policies are defined in the context of the existing scholarly literature and are shown to be relevant to many different sectors, including higher education. LC policies, through their influence on TEENs and depending on how they are formulated, can hinder or facilitate norm implementation.KeywordsInternational normsConstructivismPolicy networksValue conflictTransnational Expertise and Experience NetworksLocalizationCommunities of practiceLocal Content policyTransnational ExpertiseExperience Networks
Les firmes minières se présentent comme des agents de développement au Sud. Elles le sont dans la mesure où leurs activités extractives sont productrices de richesses qui sont pour une petite partie redistribuées autour des sites et dans les pays où elles opèrent via différents mécanismes (rentes, salaires, entrepreneuriat, fiscalité). Les dommages environnementaux qu'elles causent les ont également amenées à entrer dans des logiques variées de compensation. Ce tournant s'est opéré dans le cadre de la montée du discours de responsabilité sociale et environnementale, prenant la forme de dispositifs localisés mais de portée globale, relevant de la catégorie des "modèles voyageurs" identifiés dans le monde du développement. Il s'agit en particulier des accords sur les avantages et les répercussions de l'activité minière (impact and benefit agreements) signés entre firmes et communautés, dont la place croissante dans la gouvernance minière souligne en creux les absences et présences de l'État. Les transformations contemporaines de l'arène minière constituent un cas d'étude qui nous permettra d'appréhender ce mouvement de manière générale, puis sur l'exemple néo-calédonien, élargissant ainsi la focale traditionnelle de l'APAD (projets de développement et politiques publiques) à des acteurs privés revendiquant une place dans la production du développement.
This article analyses the European Union's competences in the energy sector. It focuses on Article 194(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which affords EU Member States the right to determine the conditions for exploiting their energy resources, the choice between different energy sources and the general structure of their energy supply. This article traces the constitutional development of EU competences in the energy sector to demonstrate the relevance of Article 194(2) TFEU in the current constitutional, international and sector-specific contexts of EU energy law. It analyses the recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which shows that the scope of Article 194(2) TFEU is considerably narrower in practice than its wording implies. The article concludes by evaluating the implications of this narrow interpretation on the future development of EU energy law and, in a broader context, on the reach of EU energy and climate policy.
In this cogent, well-researched article, Michael Bradshaw explores the changes that have occurred in the Russian Oil and Gas industry since Vladimir Putin became President of the Federation in 2000, paying particular attention to the Kremlin's evolving relationships with prominent international oil companies. Dr. Bradshaw first outlines the growing importance to the world of Russian oil and gas production. Then he examines political and economic rationales behind the shift from the privatization model established under Yeltsin to the present model of state control. Dr. Bradshaw brings into focus the specific case of Sakhalin, where Moscow has dealt heavyhandedly with IOC's - most notably Shell - and now finds itself in a difficult situation: on the one hand, Russia hopes to limit further foreign investment, yet on the other hand, it does not possess the domestic capability to develop Sakhalin independently of the IOC's. Indeed, Dr. Bradshaw sees future Russian oil and gas development as hinging on IOC involvement but wonders whether the companies will 'forgive and forget' or be 'once bitten and twice shy'. In terms of global energy security, the author predicts Russian oil production declining over the near to medium-term but holds out some optimism for increased Russian gas capacity.
In the debate about post-neoliberal governance in Latin America, a key aspect is how the election of Left governments opened up new discussions about the role of the state in the economy. While Brazil and Chile are difficult to classify as “post neoliberal” states, their particular engagement with the global economy offers new insights about the aspirations and difficulties of a new kind of democratic politics based on a renegotiation between states and markets. The article contributes by exploring how natural resources have been managed in post-dictatorial Brazil and Chile. While legacies of neoliberalism clearly go in the way of greater state control over resources, it is also the case that highly institutionalized models of resource management have been contested for their profound emphasis on growth over equity. Instead, labor unions in mining and petroleum sectors have sought to embed social justice in extractive strategies of growth by rebuilding a stronger role for the state, forging a new “social contract” between the state and labor movement, and opening discussions on resource ownership and economic development. Yet these are changes in the margins precisely because of the embeddedness of neoliberalism in state–society relations. This analysis of repoliticization in Brazil and Chile traces attempts at changing the notions of resource ownership and economic development within the broader context of political demobilization of labor, privatization of resources, and depoliticization of mining management through technification and exclusionary practices.
Some scholars suggest that the Middle East's oil wealth helps explain its failure to democratize. This article examines three aspects of this “oil impedes democracy” claim. First, is it true? Does oil have a consistendy antidemocratic effect on states, once other factors are accounted for? Second, can this claim be generalized? Is it true only in the Middle East or elsewhere as well? Is it true for other types of mineral wealth and other types of commodity wealth or only for oil? Finally, if oil does have antidemocratic properties, what is the causal mechanism?
The author uses pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 to show that oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule; that this effect is not limited to the Middle East; and that other types of mineral exports have a similar antidemocratic effect, while other types of commodity exports do not.
The author also tests three explanations for this pattern: a “rentier effect,” which suggests that resource-rich governments use low tax rates and patronage to dampen democratic pressures; a “repression effect,” which holds that resource wealth enables governments to strengthen their internal security forces and hence repress popular movements; and a “modernization effect,” which implies that growth that is based on the export of oil and minerals will fail to bring about die social and cultural changes that tend to produce democratic government. He finds at least limited support for all three effects.
Dominant theoretical approaches in political economy today, whether they posit convergence to neoliberal capitalism, binary divergence of capitalisms, or tripartite differentiation of financial governance, downplay the importance of state action. Their methodological approaches, rational choice and historical institutionalism, tend to reinforce their substantive theories either by disaggregating the state into its historical institutional components or by focusing on the strategic actions of its rational actors. This article argues that by not taking state action seriously, they are unable to explain the differences in degree and kind of countries' neoliberal reforms. For this, it is necessary to bring the state back in and to put the political back into political economy not just in terms of political economic institutions but also in terms of policies, polity, and politics. To explore the political in all its variety, however, the article demonstrates that at least one more methodological approach, discursive institutionalism, is also needed. This approach, by taking the role of ideas and discourse seriously, brings political actors as sentient beings back in. This in turn also enables the author to explain the dynamics of neoliberal reform in political economy.
This article rejects the widely held view that economic nationalism is an anachronistic economic doctrine in the age of globalisation. Rather than being the opposite of economic liberalism, as the conventional view maintains, economic nationalism is better understood as a generic phenomenon that can accommodate almost any doctrinal content, including economic liberalism. Economic nationalism is not so much about the economy as it is about the nation, as illustrated by literature on economic nations and national economic cultures. Such a broader conception of economic nationalism is then placed in the context of a larger ‘nationalising mechanism’ that sheds new light on a variety of phenomena discussed in the globalisation debate, such as economic performance, state disintegration, or cultural conflict, and success or failure in post-communist systemic change.
Introduction The best-known model of relations between multinational enterprises and host country governments is the obsolescing bargain model (OBM), first developed by Raymond Vernon in Sovereignty at Bay (1971). obsolescing barguin model (OBM) explains the changing nature of bargaining relations between a MNE and host country (HC) government as a function of goals, resources, and constraints on both parties (Vernon, 1971, 1977; Kobrin, 1987; Brewer, 1992; Grosse and Behrman, 1992; Grosse, 1996). In OBM, the initial bargain favors the MNE, but relative bargaining power shifts to the host country government over time as MNE assets are transformed into hostages. Once bargaining power shifts from the MNE to the host country, the government imposes more conditions on the MNE, ranging from higher taxes to complete expropriation of MNE assets. Thus, the original bargain obsolesces, giving OBM its name. Originally applied as an explanation for widespread expropriation and nationalization in the 1970s of MNE natural-resource subsidiaries located in developing countries (Vernon, 1977), OBM was later tested in other situations such as manufacturing MNEs and developed HCs, with much weaker results (Kobrin, 1987). The now widely held view among IB scholars is that OBM has outlived its usefulness. The many case studies testing the model suggest that MNEs were able to retain relative bargaining power and prevent opportunistic behavior by HC governments so the bargains, in practice, seldom obsolesced.
With increasing international economic interdependence, the scholarly treatment as well as the practice of economic nationalism has become passe. Contrary to this conclusion, I argue that economic nationalism is not inconsistent with globalization. States are not only active participants in globalization but they continue to strategically express nationalism in new global settings by supporting national firms and citizens overseas. By redefining economic nationalism, states pursue a form of global "presence" that transcends economic might. This paper analyzes economic nationalism as a dynamic concept. Empirically it takes up three Indian industries (steel, auto, software) since 1950 to understand how nationalism was practiced and how under globalization it has changed. The paper establishes India's pursuit of economic nationalism under globalization through its expatriate, highly-skilled professionals abroad engaged with the high technology sectors. Though the coherence of nationalism may be weak now, it may be still expressed in looser, albeit effective forms of national "presence" abroad, as exemplified by the Indian state.
Contemporary approaches to varieties to capitalism are often criticized for neglecting issues of institutional change. This
paper develops an approach to institutional change more extended than the one provided in Hall and Soskice (in Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) but congruent with its varieties-of-capitalism perspective. It begins by outlining
an approach to institutional stability, which suggests that the persistence of institutions depends not only on their aggregate
welfare effects but also on the distributive benefits that they provide to the underlying social or political coalitions;
and not only on the Pareto-optimal quality of such equilibria but also on continuous processes of mobilization through which
the actors test the limits of the existing institutions. It then develops an analysis of institutional change that emphasizes
the ways in which defection, reinterpretation and reform emerge out of such contestation and assesses the accuracy of this
account against recent developments in the political economies of Europe. The paper concludes by outlining the implications
of this perspective for contemporary analyses of liberalization in the political economy.
This article analyses the conditions under which the Surinamese State Oil Company (Staatsolie) has been consolidated, not only as an oil producer, but also as a development agent. Staatsolie's chances of success seemed rather slim at its creation in the early 1980s, mainly because of the non-developmental, patrimonial character of Surinamese politics and the nature of Suriname's state, which has traditionally been oriented toward patronage and clientelism. The analysis documents the origins of Staatsolie and focuses on its commitment to the acquisition and further development of technological and managerial expertise. At present, Staatsolie ranks among the most successful companies in Suriname and its contributions to the economy of this small middle-income country are considerable. The success of Staatsolie's attempt to become a development agent is attributed, in particular, to the company's double strategy. The internal part of this strategy, derived from the management vision and ideological commitment of the company's leadership, was aimed at developing technological and management skills. The external part of the strategy was aimed at steering away from political influences on the company and playing out, politically, the formal-legal position of the firm in the petroleum sector. After 25 years of Staatsolie, it is argued that the same factors that were responsible for the company's success may turn out to be the main challenges for the years ahead.
For over one hundred years, the British economy has been in decline relative to other industrialized countries. This book explores the origins of Britain's economic problems and develops a striking new argument about the sources of decline. It goes on to analyze the evolution of economic policy in postwar Britain from the development of Keynesianism to the rise of monetarism under Margaret Thatcher. France, by contrast, experienced an economic miracle in the postwar period. Hall argues that the French state transformed itself and then its society through an extensive system of state intervention. In the recent period, however, the French system has encountered many difficulties, and the book locates their sources in the complex interaction between state and society in France culminating in the socialist experiment of Francois Mitterrand. Through his insightful, comparative examination of policy-making in Britain and France, Hall develops a new approach to state-society relations that emphasizes the crucial role of institutional structures.
This introductory chapter ties together themes running through all the chapters in this volume. It discusses critiques of the Varieties of Capitalism or VoC approach in four areas in which it has proven most vulnerable to criticism, and proposes a framework to address these. First, the chapter analyses the role of political and distributive struggles in generating change and adjustment. Second, it reconsiders the nature and function of complementarities in shaping and constraining institutional change. Third, the chapter extends the VoC approach to a broader range of political economies than traditionally receives attention, from southern Europe to Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. Fourth, it restores the role of the state in VoC analysis, not just where that role is most overt, but as an important factor in the construction everywhere of what Hall calls 'institutional ecologies'. The chapter then uses these insights to understand the shifts in the contemporary political economy of Europe.
In the 1970s and 1980s the countries of Latin America dealt with their similar debt problems in very different ways--ranging from militantly market-oriented approaches to massive state intervention in their economies--while their political systems headed toward either democracy or authoritarianism. Applying the tools of modern political economy to a developing-country context, Jeffry Frieden analyzes the different patterns of national economic and political behavior that arose in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela. This book will be useful to those interested in comparative politics, international studies, development studies, and political economy more generally. "Jeffry Frieden weaves together a powerful theoretical framework with comparative case studies of the region's five largest debtor states. The result is the most insightful analysis to date of how the interplay between politics and economics in post-war Latin America set the stage for the dramatic events of the 1980s."--Carol Wise, Center for Politics and Policy, Claremont Graduate School
This article outlines the core features of a particular, resource-led development model, the oil-rich guardian state. Its key distinguishing feature from other resource-rich economies consists in its strong economic welfare objective function, which in line with its exceptional oil wealth renders its population amongst the wealthiest nations in the world. However, the guardian state also illustrates some of the negative externalities associated with resource wealth, namely the policy dilemma of directing seemingly abundant financial resources into the economy. The state faces a high propensity for waste, and for the systemic dilution of market incentives, thereby rendering sustained and self-generating economic growth more difficult than in less resource-rich economies.
In neighbouring countries like Russia and Kazakhstan, resource nationalism that may look similar to outside observers has a different character and is driven by different circumstances in each state. To assess the underlying nature of state-centric models of resource-led development in the two post-Soviet states, we contrast recent state interventions into their respective resource sectors. In Russia, heightened state involvement in the resource sectors, including oil and gas pipeline networks, is characterised mainly by political goals, whereas Kazakhstan's resource nationalism is primarily motivated by economic goals. More specifically, Russia leverages its energy sector to achieve geopolitical objectives and domestic political stability. By contrast, Kazakhstan seeks widely dispersed economic development.
The Developmental State (DS) has been central to East Asia's rapid economic development over the last three decades. This analysis reviews the origins of the concept of the DS, the broader theoretical battles that provide the context in which the concept has been used, and the conditions that facilitated the emergence of the DS itself. The way in which the changing events in East Asia have influenced analyses of the DS will also be addressed with special attention paid to the onset of globalization, the end of the Cold War, and the impact of the Asian financial crisis. Finally, an assessment is undertaken of analyses of the DS that have appeared in the pages of The Pacific Review over the last twenty years.
This article presents an analysis of two post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which can be identified as post-Soviet rentier states. Both countries are characterised economically by enormous national resources of gas and oil and low economic diversification as well as politically by strong autocratic presidentialism with neopatrimonial structures. These two factors, combined with further post-Soviet legacies such as a low level of political interest in the respective societies and a basically hierarchical orientation of the population, lead to a specific post-Soviet variety of rentierism. From a political science perspective, this article reveals the impact of resource policies on these comparably new political systems and concludes with a summary of core features of these post-Soviet rentier states.
1. The issue: Do the instruments of good governance and the rule of law have any significance when faced with the force of the energy and resource industries cycles? As we experience a so far sustained upwards trend in the price of petroleum and minerals, 1 governments of producing countries worldwide are engaged in a fundamental revision of the terms under which international investors originally carried out their investment. 2 Changes are most extensive in the cases where contracts with host states (or their state enterprises) were negotiated in times of relatively low oil, gas and mineral prices (in particular between 1985 and 1999); in the cases where a fundamental re-orientation of a host state’s policy towards foreign and private investment has taken place (eg in countries where governments now pursue a policy of anti-Western (in particular antiUSA) resource nationalism); and in the cases where new governments have reversed visibly and significantly the policies of privatization of state-owned operated upstream oil and gas and mining assets carried out in the 1990s. The renegotiation demands are more acute where the original contracts did not provide for a balanced internal adaptation system providing, now, a politically acceptable outcome for the host state. Even an internal adjustment system which responds to changes in profitability and mineral rent (eg with rate-of-return-based financial regimes) may not be able to fully accommodate host state revision demands if its structure reflects unequal bargaining power at the time of negotiation. Contracts concluded with quite inexperienced governments, for example newly independent petroleum states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union have come under pressure, in particular if the explosion in oil prices has not led to a
It is now more than fifty years since the United Nations (UN) system and the Bretton Woods institutions were created. The world has changed since then, and so have its governance needs in terms of institutions and rules. It is time to think about the contours of institutions and governance that would meet the needs of the world economy, and also polity, at least for the first quarter of the 21st century. This book examines the subject in depth by situating it in the wider context of globalisation which has shaped development in the world economy, affected the living conditions of people, and constrained the role of nation states. It explores the international context and the national setting and analyses some issues of emerging significance in the contemporary world, such as global macroeconomic management, transnational corporations, international capital flows, and cross-border movements of people. It also provides a critical evaluation of the existing institutions, in retrospect, with a focus on the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation. It examines how existing rules need to be modified or existing institutions need to be restructured to meet the present and future needs of global governance. Finally, the book explores some important elements of governance which are critical for any vision of the future, suggests some changes in existing institutions, and points to emerging governance needs where new institutions may have to be created.
Since 2005, a burgeoning wave of Chinese investments has set off a new ‘minerals boom’ in the Australian iron ore and coal mining sectors. While normally a welcome development, the state-owned and strategic nature of the investors has raised concerns in Australia about how these should be regulated. As a result, in February 2008 the Australian government declared an intention to more closely screen foreign direct investment (FDI) from state-owned sources, which both supporters and detractors alike have claimed is evidence of ‘resource nationalism’ in Australia's approach towards its trade and investment relationships with China. This article challenges this understanding through an examination of the characteristics of Chinese mining FDI, the dilemmas these present to the Australian government, and the relatively restrained nature of its response. Through this, Australia's FDI policy is explained as a defensive move against the potential for strategic behaviour by Chinese investors resulting from their state ownership, rather than any national program to subject minerals trade and investment to political control. On this basis, the article argues that Australian government policy instead evidences a ‘resource liberalism’ approach, which intends to ensure that the governance of Australia's minerals trade and investment with China remain market-based processes.
Recent hydrocarbon nationalizations in Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador have renewed debates about the dangers of radicals, populists, or leftists. But, while some of these presidents have acted aggressively towards multinational owners, as a group their policies have not differed greatly from non-leftists facing similar circumstances. To test our hypothesis, we provide a detailed three-variable coding of every Mexican and South American president (for all countries with oil resources), as well as a coding of their policies towards the hydrocarbons industry. The historical review shows that political leaders from all sides of the ideological spectrum have advocated, pursued, or sustained nationalizations, and thus there is no clear relation between these political labels and nationalization policies. An examination of two alternative hypotheses – timing and starting point – finds that while nationalizations and privatizations do come in bunches, the hydrocarbon policy and economic circumstances that presidents inherit are more likely to determine the policy that they pursue.
With sharply falling prices for oil and other commodities over the second half of 2008, the geostrategic and industrial implications of resource nationalism are rapidly changing. In geostrategic terms, several regimes that have pursued resource nationalistic policies, sometimes described as use of the ‘energy weapon’, will have to revisit these policies. With the global economy slowing and commodity demand falling, a sustained period of weaker prices will shift the advantage back to international companies and away from host governments, as international companies can now afford to be more selective about the fiscal terms and regulatory conditions they are willing to accept from host governments. Evidence of this is already clear for producers of base metals and natural gas, and higher-cost oil producers are also beginning to feel the effects. The rapid shift of leverage from producer states to international companies will likely have destabilising effects in several key countries and regions.
This paper looks at resource nationalism and political instability as potential causes of disruption to global oil supplies. It points to depletion preferences and strategies as one form of resource nationalism. In most cases, resource nationalism appears to be motivated by rent maximization. Hence, we see the adoption of more restrictive policies when prices rise. Conversely, when oil prices are low, increasing export volumes becomes more important. Restrictions on exports are common, especially for natural gas, which is sometimes reserved for national consumption. Export taxes are a tool used by some countries to extract revenue from oil producers. Domestic prices of gas and petroleum products are frequently much lower than international prices, also in some sense reducing availability for export. Political instability has a much more elusive impact on oil and gas exports, and historical experience points to contradictory potential outcomes. This paper concludes that political instability and resource nationalism are rarely associated with acute supply crises or shortfalls. Their effect is rather gradual and normally compensated by action in other parts of the system.
The paper presents a comparative analysis of the resource-rich transition economies of Mongolia and the southern republics of the former Soviet Union. For Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the ability to earn revenue from cotton exports allowed them to avoid reform. Oil in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan was associated with large-scale corruption, but with soaring revenues in the 2000s their institutions evolved and to some extent improved. Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia illustrate the challenges facing small economies with large potential mineral resources, with the former suffering from competition for rents among the elite and the latter from lost opportunities. Overall the countries illustrate that a resource curse is not inevitable among transition economies, but a series of hurdles need to be surmounted to benefit from resource abundance. Neither the similar initial institutions nor those created in the 1990s are immutable.
This article examines contrasting claims made by scholars of oil and politics that oil wealth either tends (1) to undermine regime durability or (2) to enhance it. Using cross-sectional time-series data from 107 developing states between 1960 and 1999, I test the effects of oil wealth on regime failure, political protests, and civil war. I find that oil wealth is robustly associated with increased regime durability, even when controlling for repression, and with lower likelihoods of civil war and antistate protest. I also find that neither the boom nor bust periods exerted any significant effect on regime durability in the states most dependent on exports, even while those states saw more protests during the bust. In short, oil wealth has generally increased the durability of regimes, and repression does not account for this effect. Future research focused on the origins of robust coalitions in oil-rich states is most likely to provide fruitful explanations to this puzzle.
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