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Counterfeit electronics have been reported in a wide range of products, including computers, telecommunications equipment, automobiles, avionics and military systems. Counterfeit electronic products include everything from very inexpensive capacitors and resistors to costly microprocessors to servers. This paper describes the counterfeit electronic products problem, and discusses the implication of counterfeit electronics on the electronic supply chain. We then present counterfeit detection and prevention techniques for electronics.
Open Journal of Social Sciences
2013. Vol.1, No.7, 12-16
Published Online December 2013 in SciRes (
Open Access
The Counterfeit Electronics Problem
Michael Pecht
Center for Advanced Life Cycle Engineering (CALCE), University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
Received August 2013
Counterfeit electronics have been reported in a wide range of products, including computers, telecommu-
nications equipment, automobiles, avionics and military systems. Counterfeit electronic products include
everything from very inexpensive capacitors and resistors to costly microprocessors to servers. This paper
describes the counterfeit electronic products problem, and discusses the implication of counterfeit elec-
tronics on the electronic supply chain. We then present counterfeit detection and prevention techniques
for electronics.
Keywords: Counterfeiting; Supply Chain; Authentication
Counterfeiting is an infringement of the legal rights of an
owner of intellectual property (Tiku, Das, & Pecht, 2004). Coun-
terfeit goods mean any goods, including packaging, bearing with-
out authorization a trademark which is identical to the trade-
mark validly registered in respect of such goods, or which can-
not be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trade-
mark, and which thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the
trademark in question under the law of the country (of importa-
tion) (World Trade Organization, 2006).
Counterfeiting exists, because it is a way to make money by
by-passing the research, development, marketing and sometimes
the quality and reliability aspects of the original product. Some-
times these look-alike products are sold on the open-market
under a slightly different brand name; other times the products
are sold as the original. The first type of product usually in-
volves the issue of intellectual property and copyright infringe-
ment and can be associated with a specific manufacturer. The
latter product is usually slipped into the stream of commerce
surreptitiously, often through unknowing or corrupt distribution
channels and it is hard to trace it back to the original source.
This paper deals with the second type of counterfeiting.
Counterfeit electronics have been found in computers and
telecommunication products, as well as automobiles, avionics
and even military electronics. Whenever a product can be made
cheaper than the original, counterfeiting can occur. Counter-
feiting has been found to be further encouraged if there is a lack
of supply of the original product. In fact, products and systems
that are in service for long periods of time or have long-term
warranty requirements are particularly susceptible to counterfeit
products. The reason is primarily associated with the obsoles-
cence (lack of availability) of the products used in these sys-
tems. When the demand for replacement products becomes
high, the price of such parts increases providing counterfeiters’
opportunities for profit. In addition, replacement of obsolete
products often leads to purchases from less reliable sources
such as part brokers1 and online exchange services instead of
franchised2 or independent3 distributors. In cases of brokers and
online exchange services, the actual sellers are often unidenti-
Risks from Counterfeit Electronics
It is estimated that legitimate electronics companies miss out
on about $100 billion of global revenue every year because of
counterfeiting (Pecht & Tiku, 2006). That figure takes into ac-
count only the profits that counterfeiters siphon off from man-
ufacturers; it ignores the added repair and maintenance costs
necessitated by defective bogus parts and the expenses of trying
to identify and intercept suspected counterfeiters.
The economic repercussions of counterfeit products reach far
beyond the cost of merely replacing the items. For example, an
electronic component that may be worth only $2 can cost as
much as $20 to replace if it is detected to be counterfeit after it
is mounted onto a circuit board (Sullivan & Graham, 2001),
and failures of systems that use counterfeit electronics can
cause loss of mission, safety problems, and significant mainte-
nance and logistics costs.
For the consumer, the failures of systems that use counter-
feits can lead to safety and security problems. Even if the fake
part works, at least initially, it still poses reliability risks, be-
cause it hasn’t undergone the legitimate manufacturer’s rigor-
ous quality assurance processes (Pecht & Tiku, 2006).
When counterfeit parts make their way into safety related
applications, there is risk to the system manufacturers since the
original counterfeit part manufacturer(s) may not be identified
or be brought into any legal or regulatory system. Even in cases
of failures of electronics in commercial applications, the final
products manufacturer will remain liable for failures due to
counterfeit parts. They will have little chance to recoup the cost
of such liabilities from a counterfeit part manufacturer. It will
be hard to locate, prosecute or even recover the penalties from
Part brokers are scouting agencies for “hard to find” replacement parts and
components that hold inventory of possible sources of parts and not the parts
themselves and may also search for parts only when the need arises.
2The term “franchise” refers to a continuing commercial relationship be-
tween the franchisee and the franchiser. Franchisee distributors are those
who have signed selling and marketing contract with part manufact
urers for
the distribution of goods or services identified by the franchiser’s trademark
or trade name.
Independent distributors are aftermarket sources of parts that offer end
users parts and service. They make a one-
time purchase of parts without
continued commercial relationship with the manufacturer/supplier.
Open Access
Counterfeiting issue can also be seen as a part quality prob-
lem. Counterfeit parts can have a major variation from the ori-
ginal parts in material, construction and electrical properties.
Even when the counterfeit parts are close to the original parts in
quality—they are still not manufactured and evaluated in ac-
cordance with the manufacturer’s standard qualification and ac-
ceptance procedures. These counterfeit electronic parts can be
copies of original parts but can also be re-labeled or repackaged,
and even be recovered from scrap and recycled.
Counterfeit parts pose another type of risk to the system ma-
nufacturers besides quality. The parts may not meet the safety
or environmental rules for the market in which the product is
marketed. For example, the European Union’s Restriction of
Hazardous Substance (RoHS) bans the use of lead and five
other substances from being used in electronics equipment sold
in Europe. If counterfeit parts that claim to be RoHS compliant
does contain the banned substances, the company making prod-
ucts with those parts may be liable for breach of the law. Some
analysts think that huge demand for RoHS compliant parts in
Europe will lead to shortages, which would indirectly facilitate
the entry of counterfeit RoHS parts in the supply chain through
part brokers (Carbone, 2006).
Detection of Counterfeits
The actual extent of counterfeit electronics is difficult to es-
timate. For an electronics equipment manufacturer, it is chal-
lenging to identify counterfeit product from among the thou-
sands of products used to assemble a system. In some cases, the
counterfeit may have been introduced several steps earlier in
the supply chain, and is part of a module or assembly sold by a
reputable company. Most manufacturers do not have the re-
sources to trace the actual origins of every part in the product.
Those who put counterfeit products in the supply chain go great
lengths to duplicate materials, part numbers, and serial numbers
to coincide with authentic products, making counterfeits hard to
detect. Sometimes the parts may actually work, at least in car-
rying out some functions for a short period of time. Thus, without
an anti-counterfeiting inspection procedure or construction ana-
lysis whereby the product is carefully analyzed, counterfeit pro-
ducts can enter into the supply chain undetected and be used in
a variety of applications.
The detection of counterfeit products usually occurs when
there is a system failure, and the subsequent root cause failure
analysis investigation reveals that a part is counterfeit. However,
failures are not always easily traceable and there can often be
confusion as to whether the part was defective, was damaged
(in assembly or use) or is counterfeit. In many cases, without
proper root cause analysis, the failure can be attributed incor-
rectly to other causes (Thomas, Ayers, & Pecht, 2002). Further-
more, if the counterfeit functions as the original, it can be near-
ly impossible to detect, until a problem occurs. It would even
be harder to detect a counterfeit RoHS part since it would not
necessarily lead to system failure.
Examples of Counterfeit Electronic Products
Some examples of counterfeit products that have been pub-
licly reported are discussed in this section. These examples il-
lustrate the ease with which counterfeit electronics can find
their way into electronic systems. We have grouped the exam-
ples into three categories: relabeling, illegal manufacturing, and
scrap salvaging.
Examples of Relabeling
This section describes examples of counterfeiting where lo-
wer priced or lower grade items have been relabeled to appear
as a costlier or a higher grade item. This type of counterfeiting
largely occurs when new version products are introduced into
the market. Counterfeiters buy a different version of the parts at
a lower price, relabel them, and then resell them as the version
required by the customer at a higher price.
As early as in 1998, counterfeiters were repackaging 266-
MHz Pentium IIs as 300-MHz chips since 300-MHz Pentium II
chips cost $375 per processor, while 266-MHz Pentium II chips
cost $246 per processor. If a 266-MHz rated processor is oper-
ated at 300 MHz, it runs, but reliability becomes an issue since
it becomes hotter at 300 MHz and can then give incorrect an-
swers to instructions (Cnet Networks, 1998).
In May 2003, RAM Enterprises, a distributor, was convicted
for manufacture and resale of counterfeit parts, falsifying doc-
uments, making false statements and providing counterfeit parts
to companies for use in commercial and military aircraft and
weapons systems. RAM was found to have knowingly sold
counterfeit connectors that were allegedly manufactured by Tri-
Star Electronics International Inc. by including a “false certificate
of conformance” for part number M39029/4-112. In another in-
stance, RAM had used a solvent to remove color bands from
approximately 6500 connectors procured from Air-Electro Inc.
(a maker of mil-spec connectors) to make them appear of a
higher grade (Sullivan, 2003).
In the Fall of 2003, AMD conducted some raids in Europe,
where some of its low speed, low priced microprocessors were
being relabeled as high speed, high priced chips. On investiga-
tion it was found that some resellers in Shenzhen, China were
performing the remarking. AMD also purchased some micro-
processors from the resellers and found them to be fakes (Ta-
kahash, 2004).
Examples of Illegal Manufacturing
This section describes examples where complete parts have
been manufactured and labeled to appear to come from an ori-
ginal manufacturer. These parts are then sold as being manufac-
tured by the legitimate manufacturer.
On October 23, 2006, GIDEP issued an alert about a silicon-
controlled rectifier, JAN2N1774A, of General Electric (GE)
with lot code 9240. Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control
had experienced a high failure rate of these parts with the GE
logo. Failure analysis of the devices by Lockheed Martin re-
vealed poor materials and workmanship in numerous areas (e.g.,
nail bonds to die, lead crimps, marking permanence and die at-
tach) (Government-Industry Data Exchange Program, 2006).
In early 2006, BAe Systems and Platform Solutions received
104 pieces of the CY37032P44-125AI parts, (Cypress Semi-
conductors with date code 0223 and the mark lot number
709673) from Aztec Components, a part broker. This lot of
parts exhibited a high reject rate during programming at a test
laboratory. Cypress Semiconductors checked the date code and
lot number and the logo on the top surface of the parts and
found that the markings were all forged (Government-Industry
Data Exchange Program, 2006).
Open Access
BAE Systems and Platform Solutions found another problem
with 500 pieces of Linear Technology M38510/14802BXA
parts they bought from Electronic Components Inc., a broker in
2006. On visual inspection, it was found the parts to be laser-
marked rather than ink-stamped as is the case with Linear Te-
chnology’s parts. The die of the suspected part was compared
with that of a known good part and found to be 50% smaller.
Also the mask set and wire bonding material were found to be
different (Government-Industry Data Exchange Program, 2006).
On February 24, 2003, Maxim Integrated Products and its
wholly owned subsidiary, Dallas Semiconductor, posted an alert
on its website regarding counterfeit Maxim/Dallas Nonvolatile
Static Ram (NVSRAM) modules (DS1230, DS1245, DS1250)
being sold in Asia. The parts had been disguised and marketed
under the Dallas Semiconductor label, using Dallas Semicon-
ductor marked shipping tubes and boxes. The alert stated that
the customer returns for these imitation modules revealed a
wide variation of components and assembly techniques, quite
different from the authentic parts (Electronics Supply and Ma-
nufacturing, 2003).
In some cases, the copies of products had comparatively easy
to identify mistakes in their labels. On Sep 28, 2005 X-bit labs
reported that forged hard disk drives similar to Maxtor Corps
MaXline II HDDs were being sold in the Japanese markets. The
counterfeit hard disk drives had incorrect font on the label and
used lower case “X” letter in the brand name of MaXLine II
(Shilov, 2005). Similarly, in 2003, Agilent Technologies Inc.
had an experience with counterfeit parts when a customer re-
turned an optocoupler for failure analysis. The part, which was
bought through a broker, came under suspicion when the cus-
tomer found the word “Singapore” spelled incorrectly on the
part (Sullivan, 2003).
Examples of Scrap Salvaging
This section describes examples where defective or outdated
items meant for scrap have been salvaged and then re-circulated
into the supply chain. Electronic parts that are scrapped but not
destroyed are cleaned, reworked and returned to the supply
On September 28, 2004, GIDEP issued an alert regarding un-
authorized distribution of Philips Semiconductors Part number
PCD3311CT (musical tone generator IC) (Government-Indus-
try Data Exchange Program, 2004) after L-3 Communication
SystemsEast of Camden, N.J. reported numerous failures.
Philips Semiconductors found that the parts appeared to be
scrap material that had somehow showed up on the gray market.
Philips also indicated that they have received other similar cus-
tomer complaints for parts with this part number purchased
from unauthorized resellers.
On April 15, 2003, GIDEP issued an alert about a precision
operational amplifier, LT1097S8 of Linear Technology Corp.
(LTC) with lot code 0103. Textron Systems had experienced a
high failure rate of these parts. LTC’s visual and destructive
physical analysis revealed the parts to be counterfeit. LTC also
noted that the top of some parts appeared to have been sanded
down and remarked; indicating that the parts were eight years
older than they actually were date coded (Government-Industry
Data Exchange Program, 2003).
In January 2005, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), working
in cooperation with Taiwanese authorities, seized a total of
60,000 counterfeit AMD microprocessors worth US $9.46 mil-
lion during a raid on an electronics company in Tainan, south-
ern Taiwan. The raid turned up suspect AMD microprocessors,
including K7 [AMD Athlon XP] and K8 [AMD Athlon 64]
models. The defective microprocessors, which were meant for
scrap had been stolen from one of AMD’s three packaging
plants in Asia and shipped to Taiwan for remarking (Shilov,
On June 04, 2003, GIDEP issued an alert regarding the pres-
ence of a non-Cypress die within a Cypress military package
5962-8871305RA/PALC16L8-30DMB (a 20 pin CDIP, digital
memory, lot code TAH9949). This part had become obsolete in
1999, and Telephonics had purchased more than 100 parts from
two different brokers in April 2003. Since Telephonics engi-
neers could not program the part with the Cypress algorithm,
they performed a failure analysis that revealed a smaller die
than that of a similar part with lot code THA9916. Also, while
the THA9916 part had the Cypress logo, TAH9949 part had the
MMI logo. Cypress has since indicated that traceability desig-
nators for military parts were missing in the purchased parts
and that the “country of origin” code was wrong (TAH instead
of THA for Thailand) (Government-industry Data Exchange
Program, 2003).
Prevention Efforts
There are organizations that monitor and report on counter-
feit products. One of the most active is the US Department of
Defense Government-Industry Information Exchange Program
(GIDEP); others include the US Department of Energy (DoE)
Lessons Learned Program, the US Defense Industrial Supply
Center, the Electronic Resellers Association International (ERAI),
and the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC)
(Science Applications International Corporation, 2002). These
programs have been effective in alerting companies of known
counterfeit products, but do not solve the cause of the problem.
To stop counterfeit products being introduced into assembled
systems, manufacturers of critical systems must use checks and
safeguards to ensure that the parts and modules contained within
their systems are not counterfeit. These safeguards can range
from specially designed tests, to aggressive overt and covert au-
thentication techniques. Such overt or covert product protection
makes counterfeiting harder and more expensive. Effective
overt authenticating technologies enable the public to recognize,
avoid, and report instances of counterfeiting, and covert tech-
nologies can alert company representatives and enforcement
authorities to counterfeiting activity. Anti-counterfeiting tech-
nologies also provide evidential support in a court of law,
where issues of product genuineness and liability may have to
be determined (Tiku, Das, & Pecht, 2004). Different types of
authentication techniques are available like data matrix codes,
RFID tags, photonic inks, and microtaggants which can be used
for rapid product authentication. We go over these techniques
briefly and understand their interesting features.
A tool for supply chain management and retail inventory
control is radio frequency identification (RFID) (SATO America,
2006). Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an automatic
identification method, relying on storing and remotely retriev-
ing data using devices called RFID tags or transponders. RFID
system consists of a tag, reader and a database. Chip-based
RFID tags contain microchip and an antenna and are used to
store and transmit authenticating data such as manufacturer
name, brand name, model and a unique serial number. RFID
tags are attached to or incorporated into a product for the pur-
Open Access
pose of identification using radio waves. RFID reader, an an-
tenna packaged with a transceiver and decoder, emits radio
wave activating the RFID tag so it can read and write data to it.
The reader decodes the data encoded in the tags integrated cir-
cuit (silicon chip) and the data is passed to the host computer or
the database. RFID tags have many applications in automated
manufacturing and logistics control. But use of RFIDs demands
that companies agree on a standard encoding scheme; to date
that hasn’t happened (Pecht & Tiku, 2006).
Another tool is data matrix code, which is a 2D code used for
storing product specific information like identification number
of the manufacturer, identification number of the part type, and
the serial number of the specific part (Agapakis & Stuebler,
2006). The term matrix code applies to 2-D codes that code the
data based on the position of black spots within a matrix. Each
black element is of the same dimension and it is the position of
the element that codes the data. Data matrix codes are applied
with lasers directly on the part and are durable and typically
lasts the life of the part. These codes are read with a reader,
which can be linked to shop floor computer networks and ac-
cessed from remote locations. They have numerous advantages
over barcodes. They don’t require any labels for marking. Also,
they occupy one-tenth of the space of the 1D barcode while sto-
ring greater amount of information and thus can identify very
small components and dense sub-assemblies, which have no
space for labels.
Photonic inks are manufactured to first be invisible, and se-
condly to photo-decay at precise wavelengths and are used in
anti-counterfeiting measures (Bastia, 2002). Apart from authen-
tication, photonic inks can also be used to embed a 2-D barcode
into the product, or the product packaging in a covert fashion.
These barcodes may contain data such as point of manufacture,
distribution or even product specific data such as product type
or other signature data.
Microtaggants is a covert tool for product authentication.
Several different taggants are available. The taggants are used
to create unique code that can serve as a unique fingerprint for a
product. Examples of taggants include polymer based and rare
earth material based. An example of a complete system using
taggants is described in next section.
Authentication technologies should be used at each and every
level of the supply chain from die to the final product packag-
ing so that counterfeit parts don’t find their way into the prod-
uct. In-built authentication technologies not only help in track-
ing and tracing of parts through the supply chain but also aids
in identifying counterfeit parts. Although no authentication te-
chnique is full proof but in many cases if the cost of fraud to the
perpetrators can be made high enough then that can be a deter-
Each of the anti-counterfeiting methods has a cost and an as-
sociated effectiveness. Nevertheless, the International Anti-
counterfeiting Coalition (IACC) reported in 2001 that Fortune
500 companies each spend between $2 million and $4 million
(some companies are reported to be spending up to $10 million)
annually to combat global counterfeiting (Sullivan, 2002). The
goal is to keep counterfeit products out of the consumers’ hands
and the reseller channels.
Summary and Future Directions
Counterfeiting is an infringement of the legal rights of an
owner of intellectual property. High profits, low risk of detec-
tion, and weak prosecution contribute to the supply of counter-
feit parts. Counterfeiting of electronic parts causes potential
hazards including safety and loss of profits to companies, as
well as maligning the reputation of manufacturers and distribu-
tors. All types of parts and part manufacturers are susceptible to
counterfeiting, as illustrated by the examples provided in this
paper. A number of laws have been enacted in the United States
to penalize counterfeit activities and other IP violations. Several
private and public organized groups have also taken notice of
and created technological and information-sharing tools to help
the industry detect and avoid the use of counterfeit parts. But
these measures do not solve the cause of the problem.
As illustrated by most of the examples of counterfeiting pro-
vided in this paper, parts bought through sources other than the
manufacturers or authorized distributors have turned out to be
counterfeit. The original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) should
particularly avoid purchasing from unauthorized sources like
part brokers since they have no direct relation or any commit-
ment to the manufacturer or the buyer of the parts. Part brokers
have negligible control over their supply and can be duped into
purchasing and selling counterfeits. Furthermore, brokers can
close shop at any time after supplying the parts, leaving the cus-
tomer without the possibility of any follow-up action (Tiku,
Das, & Pecht, 2004).
There are two complementary and parallel technical efforts
in mitigating the impact of counterfeit parts. The first one is
driven by the part manufacturers who can make their products
harder to copy and make it easier to detect duplicates. The se-
cond effort comes from the point of view of part users whose
effort is self protective in making sure that they can reduce the
chances of buying counterfeit parts. The authentication techno-
logies can work for both types of efforts. The direction of sci-
entific research needs to ensure that the authentication methods
can be made compatible with the production processes without
major modifications or economic impacts. The research also
needs to ensure that the addition of such methods do not result
in unintended quality and reliability problems for the users.
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... In addition to the risk of being unintentionally involved in social and environmental sustainability issues, a lack of supply chain transparency also increases the probability of counterfeit components being introduced into a supply chain. For example, the counterfeiting of electronic parts causes potential risks including safety and loss of profits to companies, as well as maligning the reputation of manufacturers and distributors [4][5][6]. According to Machado et. ...
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Supply chains have become increasingly complex, making it difficult to ensure transparency throughout the whole supply chain. In this context, first approaches came up, adopting the immutable, decentralised, and secure characteristics of the blockchain technology to increase the transparency, security, authenticity, and auditability of assets in supply chains. This paper investigates recent publications combining the blockchain technology and supply chain management and classifies them regarding the complexity to be mapped on the blockchain. As a result, the increase of supply chain transparency is identified as the main objective of recent blockchain projects in supply chain management. Thereby, most of the recent publications deal with simple supply chains and products. The few approaches dealing with complex parts only map sub-areas of supply chains. Currently no example exists which has the aim of increasing the transparency of complex manufacturing supply chains, and which enables the mapping of complex assembly processes, an efficient auditability of all assets, and an implementation of dynamic adjustments.
... Due to the complexity of global supply chains, it increasingly becomes difficult to maintain the traceability of all components even from very reputable authorised distributers. This increases the probability of counterfeit components being introduced into a supply chain [28][29][30]. ...
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Globalisation, shorter product life cycles, and increasing product varieties have led to complex supply chains. At the same time, there is a growing interest of customers and governments in having a greater transparency of brands, manufacturers, and producers throughout the supply chain. Due to the complex structure of collaborative manufacturing networks, the increase of supply chain transparency is a challenge for manufacturing companies. The blockchain technology offers an innovative solution to increase the transparency, security, authenticity, and auditability of products. However, there are still uncertainties when applying the blockchain technology to manufacturing scenarios and thus enable all stakeholders to trace back each component of an assembled product. This paper proposes a framework design to increase the transparency and auditability of products in collaborative manufacturing networks by adopting the blockchain technology. In this context, each component of a product is marked with a unique identification number generated by blockchain-based smart contracts. In this way, a transparent auditability of assembled products and their components can be achieved for all stakeholders, including the customer.
... The origin of the counterfeit electronics problem has been exemplarily explained in [2,3], and how it is threatening health, safety, security and why it is causing significant harm to the economy has been reported in [1,4,5]. Its risk priority aroused when some counterfeit devices were identified in military systems, aerospace applications, medical devices, radiation detectors, high-speed trains brakes and airport landing light system with a high risk to the safety of the people involved [6][7][8][9]. ...
Counterfeit electronics pose reliability risks and severe harms. The failures of systems that use counterfeits can cause safety and security problems. Lack of caution on the part of buyers, obsolescence, lower prices, costly inspection procedures, absence of origin verification tools is contributing to the widespread of counterfeit electronics. Two case studies are proposed to add a piece of information in this context supporting evidence regarding the capillary penetration of the counterfeit devices. It should contribute to arise some concerns.
In 2019–2020 in the RUE “Institute of Fruit-growing” research was carried out to determine the apple-tree fruits of early ripening period suitability to storage and processing. The objects of research were the fruits of seven apple-tree species of early ripening period (Aksamit, Kovalenkovskoe, Mechta, Palanez, Papirovka, Ranak, Slava pobeditelyam), grown in the department of selection of fruit crops of the RUE “Institute of Fruit-growing”. The storage period for the apple-tree fruits of early ripening period ranged from 44 to 110 days, depending on the species and storage option. The application of the “Fitomagˮ preparation before storage allowed to achieve the best indicators in terms of storage duration – from 73 to 110 days depending on the species. The change of the gas composition in a closed package allows to reduce the natural weight loss on average for species by 2.8 % and to increase the output of healthy fruits in all the species. The suitability of the species Ranak, Mechta and Papirovka for the frozen applesauce production has been established.
In 2019–2020 in the RUE “Institute of Fruit-growing” research was carried out to study the effect of the modified gas environment (MGE) on the preservation of quality and consumption period extension of the fresh apple-tree fruits of early ripening period. The objects of research were the fruits of seven apple-tree species of early ripening period (Aksamit, Kovalenkovskoe, Mechta, Palanez, Papirovka, Ranak, Slava pobeditelyam), grown in the department of selection of fruit crops of the RUE “Institute of Fruit-growing”. The change of the gas composition in a closed package makes it possible to reduce the natural weight loss for species by 2.9 % average and to increase the output of healthy fruits in all species. The use of MGE minimizes losses from physiological disorders in the apple-tree fruits of early ripening period by 1.7–2.5 times and reduces losses from fungal diseases by 2.0–7.3 %, depending on the species. Storage in MGE increases the safety of the fruits after removal from storage (residual effect) by 3–6 days, depending on the species.
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Une forte demande des fabricants industriels et des agences gouvernementales concerne le développement de technologies permettant d’authentifier les produits sensibles tout en y inscrivant des informations de traçabilité. Dans ce contexte, l’objectif de cette thèse est d’élaborer une nouvelle génération de marqueurs « graphiques » de type QR code à base de nano-objets photoluminescents. Des quantum dots colloïdaux d’InP@ZnS et de PbS de quelques nanomètres de diamètre ont été synthétisés pour générer deux émissions de photoluminescence non couplées dans les domaines du visible et de l’infrarouge proche. Afin d’élaborer les marqueurs à partir de ces quantum dots, deux procédés complémentaires ont été développés : (i) l’assemblage dirigé des quantums dots par nanoxérographie via la technique de microcontact printing électrique et (ii) la microstructuration d’un nanocomposite à base des quantum dots par nanoimpression assistée par UV. Le premier procédé consiste à injecter des charges électrostatiques dans un matériau électret sous la forme du marqueur souhaitée, puis à piéger électrostatiquement les quantum dots sur ces motifs de charges. Le marqueur formé est alors intégré au produit via une étape de transfert. Le deuxième procédé consiste à incorporer les quantum dots dans une matrice de colle époxy photosensible, puis à microstructurer le nanocomposite à même le produit sous la forme du marqueur souhaitée. L’ajustement précis des paramètres de chacune des étapes de ces deux procédés a permis de finement contrôler la taille latérale (de quelques micromètres à un centimètre) et les propriétés de photoluminescence des marqueurs. L’étude réalisée a révélé que la nanoimpression assistée par UV permet d’accéder à une plage d’intensité de photoluminescence nettement plus importante que la nanoxérographie, mais que cette dernière offre des tailles latérales de marqueurs plus réduites. Les développements menés ont finalement été mis à profit pour intégrer des marqueurs sur des produits sensibles variés et liés en particulier au domaine de la Défense, tels que des documents officiels, matériaux textiles, composants électroniques ou encore munitions pour armes à feu.
Permanently renewing security and tracking technologies is mandatory to fight the worldwide growing problem of conterfeiting, doped by the development of e-commerce and the consequences of social/sanitary crisis. In this context, a versatile microimprinting technology is proposed herein to directly tag the surface of an object of interest. The resulting photoluminescent micropatterned tags, based on an adhesive epoxy loaded with quantum dots, emit a specific optical signal when excited with UV light. The design of the tags is fully tunable and can authenticate a product and/or store secured traceability data with a lateral resolution of patterns down to 5 μm. Obtained tags are photostable up to 100°C. This technology is compatible with numerous surface configurations (flat/curved, horizontal/vertical, etc.), substrate materials (polymer, metal, glass, fibers, etc.), and various types of quantum dots or nano-objects. It can be used manually or implemented in a production line. Demonstration of the technical capabilities is made with various types of quantum dots. The key experimental parameters influencing the photoluminescence signal and the tag signal contrast are investigated in the case of [email protected] ones. As a proof of concept, three concrete tagging use cases are finally illustrated: electronic components, textiles, and ammunition for firearms.
The goal of this paper is to automate the process of IC counterfeit detection using Non-destructive Imaging Techniques. The defects targeted in this study are the most prevalent die-level defects with possible multi-dimensional features, making their non-destructive detection challenging. Non-destructive X-ray microtomography is a powerful tool to obtain 3D internal information on microelectronics but usually results in large datasets and a stack of more than a thousand 2D images requiring a subject matter expert to investigate them individually for potential defects. Such detection method is time-consuming, costly and subjective being largely dependent on the level of expertise, experience and diligence. Our method addresses those challenges by incorporating machine vision instead of human input for detection.
The RFID tags and Data Matrix Code can create a total quality package by eliminating both process and product defects. The mandate requires a unique tracking number to be marked directly on the item with a Data Matrix code that will last the life of the part. This code must include the identification number of the manufacturer, the identification number of the part type, and the serial number of the specific part. All pallets, containers and boxes for transporting the items must carry an RFID tag for tracking purpose. The 2D Data Matrix codes are applied with a laser, along with dot peening and ink-jet printing. An RFID system contains three main components which are a transponder tag, an antenna and a transceiver. The tags transmit information to and from the transceiver via the antenna. The Data Matrix codes contain part-specific data, while RFID tags track the movement of the finished assembly through the entire manufacturing process, the supply chain and use in the field.
Business and National Security Implications of CounterfeitingExamples of Counterfeit Electronic PartsLegislative Initiatives and Organized Activities Against CounterfeitingPreventing Counterfeiting of Parts: Recommendations for Electronic Part ManufacturersPreventing Supply of Counterfeit Parts: Recommendations for OEMsSummary
In some cases, a failure occurs that cannot be verified, replicated at will, or attributed to a specific failure site, mode, and mechanism. Terms used to describe this phenomenon include trouble not identified (TNI), no trouble found (NTF), cannot duplicate (CND), `re-test ok' (RTOK), no-fault found (NFF), and intermittent malfunctions.This paper discusses the concept, causes, and impact of the “trouble not identified” phenomenon on the automotive electronics industry. A case study is presented to clarify the issues. The key conclusion is that a manufacturer should assume that all field returns are field failures, unless some alternative reason can be verified. In fact, any company that produces a safety or emission regulated product should assume that every complaint or return of that product is a failure, and take on full responsibility for ascertaining the root cause. It must not be assumed that a returned module that passes tests associated with an engineering specification is good.
Counterfeiting is now a global problem that accounts for close to 9% of all worldwide trade, according to the International Anti-Counterfeiting Association (IACA). Unfortunately counterfeiting is no longer restricted to clothes, designer watches, and stereos. The high technology industry has been hugely impacted by this activity. The reason is simple, economics, and availability. Counterfeiters, many of whom are agents of organized crime, wage campaigns that do little more than steal the intellectual property of large technology firms. Fortune 500 technology companies currently employ teams that do little less than conceive ways to protect the companies IP and secure their products - but most importantly secure their brand. Many of these programs entail the use of covert, or invisible, technologies to mark authentic product. How serious is this issue, important enough to have some of the worlds top CEOs spend an entire day at the World Economic Forum discussing how to combat the counterfeiting issue. In today's world, many companies are turning to new "Covert" technologies to mark their products. Tools such as chemically altered dyes and inks are employed to invisibly label authentic products, and to foil the efforts of counterfeiting criminals
This paper discusses the growing concern over the counterfeiting of electronics components and systems. Three key factors are identified as the root cause of this problem: the shift of manufacturing to China where intellectual property laws are not strictly enforced and supply chains are convoluted; the growing sophistication of technology that enables cheaper and more convincing fakes; and the rise of the Internet as a marketplace, allowing buyers and sellers make fast trades without ever meeting face to face. As many companies are learning the hard way, counterfeiting requires a constant, deliberate, and multifaceted effort, vigorous monitoring of potential trouble spots, and judicious use of anticounterfeiting technologies.
Maxim spots counterfeit parts selling in Asia
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Unauthorized distribution/sale of defective product, microcircuit. GIDEP Document No
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Fake maxtor hard disk drives hit the market
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Only 60 thousands fake AMD chips seized, million already shipped
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Fake parts plague industry. Electronics supply and manufacturing
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