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POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE
The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association
Volume 10 • Number 3 • December 2014 • ISSN1801-3422
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE Volume 10 • Number 3 • December 2014
Central European Policies compared
with other regions
ESSAYS
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among Romanian Migrants in Italy and Spain
Paul E. Sum and Gabriel Bădescu
In the Shadow of Empire. Refl ecting on the Political-Strategic Position of the Small
States in Europe and the Caribbean Basin during the Cold War
Mitchell Belfer
The Polish and Spanish Roads to Democracy over the Last 25 Years: A Comparative Analysis
Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
European Tax Policy and the Single Common Market
Monika Bušovská
POLITICS
in Central Europe
The Journal of the Central European
Political Science Association
Volume 10 Number 3 December 2014 ISSN1801-3422
Central European Policies compared
with other regions
ESSAYS
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among Romanian Migrants in Italy and Spain
Paul E. Sum and Gabriel Bădescu
In the Shadow of Empire. Reflecting on the Political-Strategic Position of the Small States
in Europe and the Caribbean Basin during the Cold War
Mitchell Belfer
The Polish and Spanish Roads to Democracy over the Last 25 Years:
A Comparative Analysis
Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
European Tax Policy and the Single Common Market
Monika Bušovská
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CONTENTS
ESSAYS
Paul E. Sum and Gabriel Bădescu
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among Romanian
Migrants in Italy and Spain 7–26
Mitchell Belfer
In the Shadow of Empire. Reflecting on the Political-Strategic Position
of the Small States in Europe and the Caribbean Basin during Cold War 27–45
Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
The Polish and Spanish Roads to Democracy over
the Last 25 Years: A Comparative Analysis 47–56
Monika Bušovská
European Tax Policy and the Single Common Market 57–70
GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS 71–75
ESSAYS
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 7
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among
Romanian Migrants in Italy and Spain
PAUL E. SUM AND GABRIEL BĂDESCU
Abstract: Generalized trust is associated with many positive political outcomes including
enhanced social cohesion. Theory explains generalized trust as acombination of cultural
and experiential factors. We consider sources of generalized trust among Romanian
migrants, adynamic population confronting anew environment. What factors within
their new cultural context explain the level of trust they have toward strangers? Using
data collected from Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain, we address this question.
Our model includes exposure to an ethnically diverse environment, the presence of
family, perceived hostility from host country citizens, personal crises, and illegal work
status. We find that interpersonal experiences contribute to the level of generalized
trust among migrants. Most importantly, negative social interactions or episodes cor-
relate with lower levels of trust. We show that generalized trust is malleable among
migrants suggesting that the experience of migration overrides the normally rigid level
of trust that individuals hold. Our findings further suggest that successful integration
of migrants, acollective good for the host country, can be eectively advanced through
minimizing triggers of social vulnerability.
Keywords: generalized trust, migration, social intergration, Romania, Italy, Spain
The Importance of Generalized Trust
Generalized trust is the faith you place in people who you do not know. Trusting
strangers increases the possibilities that groups will overcome collective action
problems and encourages cooperative behavior among people who do not oth‑
erwise have a relationship (Coleman 1990; Newton 1999; Putnam 1993; Uslaner
2002). In addition, generalized trust has been shown to serve as a bond that
enhances social cohesion, bringing and keeping people together with a sense
of community (Marschall – Stolle 2004; Putnam 2000; Uslaner 2002; Woolcock
2001). When people trust in strangers, they promote a host of other desirable
outcomes. ese include norms of reciprocity, tolerance, and civic morality, all
of which contribute to good governance under democratic institutions (Letki
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among Romanian Migrants Paul E. Sum and Gabriel Bădescu
8
2006; Sullivan – Transue 1999). Aside from governing outcomes, generalized
trust improves the likelihood of task completion within a broad range of social
and economic group activities (Colquitt – Scott – LePine 2007).
Benets associated with generalized trust are desirable for any society but
as populations become increasingly mobile, trust is especially important. As
a pervasive trend, migration creates challenges for migrants and natives alike,
including increasing the potential for social discord. Generalized trust softens
the edges of social conicts (Uslaner 2000). us, generalized trust can assist
in the integration process for migrants and contribute to social cohesion within
host countries.
Recognizing its importance, a large number of studies, both experiemental
and survey ‑based, have modelled the determinants of generalized trust. In
reviewing these works, Hardin concludes that “there is relatively little to learn
about trust from these two massive research programs” (2006: 74). Nannestad
(2008) laments the fact that the eorts have produced little consensus about
generalized trust and its correlates. Indeed, no clear consensus has emerged
regarding the malleability of generalized trust. If trust is to assist in integra‑
tion, we need better information regarding the extent to which trust can be
inuenced, and by what factors. We evaluate these questions with regard to
Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain.
Experiential and cultural theories of generalized trust
Dierences regarding the conceptualization of generalized trust extend to how
rigid generalized trust can be and what factors contribute to its development
(or erosion). Do we trust strangers based on our assessment of the people to
whom, and contexts to which, we are exposed? If so, generalized trust can be
explained through experiential theories, which emphasize generalized trust as
a product of our experiences (Dinesen 2012; Glanville – Paxton 2007). Our dif‑
ferent encounters within a new environment accumulate so that similar levels
of generalized trust might be reached through quite dierent sets of life inter‑
actions and events, and these experiences may pull our willingness to trust in
dierent directions (Delhay – Newton 2005). e process is likely more diuse
than the sum total of our day ‑to ‑day experiences. e faith we place in stran‑
gers may be based on favorable perceptions held by the truster about others,
and these perceptions reect in part one’s assessment regarding the breadth
and depth of shared social values among members of a community based on
interpersonal encounters (Dinesen 2013). Experiences are culturally ‑bounded
but this theoretical frame expects individual level variance within a community
based on social interactions and experiences of daily life.
Cultural theories posit generalized trust as a stable character trait formed
early in life through cultural transmission and resistant to later inuences.
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 9
Sources of stability include societal level characteristics that tend to be rigid,
for example the level of income equality (Uslaner 2002). e level of ethnic
diversity, the presence of hierarchical religious traditions, and a legacy of com‑
munism are other structural societal features that are resistant to change and
have been considered cultural inuences that hold trust relatively constant.
Bjørnskov nds that each of these features correlate with generalized trust
and concludes that, “the ndings unambiguously lead to the conclusion that
generalized trust is a fairly stable cultural feature of society” (2007: 17).
Cultural and experiential theories are not diametrically opposed but instead
explain dierent kinds of variance that are manifest in generalized trust. Cul‑
tural factors such as ethnic diversity or religious tradition, because they change
only slowly over long periods of time, may better account for cross ‑country
dierences. However, what can we say about experiences that alter our funda‑
mental cultural orientations? e type of experience we investigate here is that
of migration, specically we study Romanian migrants who have resettled in
Italy and Spain. Although we do not have the capability to analyze longitudinal
data, we can observe variance among migrants who share ethnicity within a dif‑
ferent context and evaluate the extent to which diverging migrant experiences
correlate with variance in trust.
Generalized trust and migration
For migrants, cultural factors in the host country are perceived dierently as
for natives. Migrants are exposed to signicantly dierent macro conditions
in the time it takes to y to a new destination. us, for migrants such societal
features are not a priori cultural but vary according to exposure as part of the
migration experience (Voicu 2014). We know that exposure to host coun‑
try institutions alters, usually increases, generalized trust among migrants
(Dinesen 2013; Dinesen – Hooghe 2010; Kumlin – Rothstein 2010). We also
know that cultural legacies can be transported with migrant communities but
this varies by country of origin, and to a lesser extent host country contextual
factors (Uslaner 2008). Our analysis contributes to the literature in this vein,
investigating factors related to an individual migrant’s experience rather than
aggregate contextual attributes of the host country.
We expect that trust results from a preponderance of social and natural
processes interacting with the circumstances of experiences. For this reason,
isolating specic populations within specic contexts for analysis, and testing
theoretical assertions, is appropriate. We focus on social features of migra‑
tion that might impact levels of generalized trust. Migrants often face adverse
conditions within the destination country. Frequently, they confront a reality
within the host ‑country that does not meet their expectations. Upon arrival,
many are ill ‑prepared to deal with the stress associated with relocation to a new
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among Romanian Migrants Paul E. Sum and Gabriel Bădescu
10
country. Overt discrimination and other uncontrollable events (e.g. criminal‑
ity or violence) conspire to intensify a sense of disillusionment and isolation,
leading some to feel that they have lost sight of their life goals, all of which
contribute to lower levels of trust (Ryan – Dooley – Benson 2008). Such nega‑
tive encounters occur on an individual level and impact people dierently. Fur‑
thermore, the act of migration severely strains existing social networks within
the migrant’s country of origin, and thus migrants arrive with low stocks of
social capital but this too is experienced on an individual level with substantial
variance across a migrant population (Espinosa – Masey 1998; Akcapar 2010).
us, there is reason to believe that migrants face a number of challenges that
may erode trust.
For some, alternatively, migration may be associated with increased levels
of generalized trust. Migration is consistent with “lifelong openness rather than
the persistence perspective on the development of attitudes” (Dinesen 2012:
507). Migrants may have a heightened sense of adaptability and willingness to
conform. Indeed, generalized trust among migrants tends to gravitate toward
the destination country mean (Dinesen – Sønderskov 2012). Moreover, Heller‑
man (2006) shows that if a migrant travels with family members, we can expect
an increase in social capital and subsequently trust. We consider the role that
migrant experiences have in shaping generalized trust among this population.
Our model includes exposure to ethnic diversity, the presence of family in the
household, perceived hostility from host country citizens, personal crises, and
one’s work status (legal or illegal).
Among European Union countries, Romanian citizens are the most mobile.
Of the 44.7 million immigrants in the EU, approximately one ‑third (32.8 %)
come from other member countries, and Romanians make up the plurality
(33.6 %) of this group (European Commission 2011: 18). Romanian migration
has been a mass phenomenon since the fall of the communist regime in 1989.
As many as one ‑third of Romanian households have a member who resides or
has resided abroad, some of whom follow a circulatory pattern (Daniel 2011).
Common destinations are Italy with approximately 997,000 Romanians (Isti‑
tuto Nazionale di Statistica 2011) and Spain with just over 895,000 Romanians
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2012). ese two countries attracted more
than 40 % of all migrating Romanians (Rolfe 2013: 7).
Levels of generalized trust in Romania are relatively low compared to other
European Union countries but evidence suggests that trust among Romanian
migrants is higher than among Romanians who do not migrate (Bădescu – Sum
2009). Without longitudinal data, we are unable to fully evaluate how stable
generalized trust levels are as migrants move from country of origin to destina‑
tion. Nevertheless, studying Romanian migrants oers an excellent opportunity
to assess various factors related to a migrant’s experience that may contribute
to generalized trust.
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 11
e possibility that those who choose to migrate are a self ‑selected group of
high ‑trusting individuals poses a threat to the validity of our design. However,
this potential danger is not a major concern for three reasons. First, similar
studies have found no evidence of self ‑selection of high ‑trusting migrants
(Dinesen 2012: 503). ere is no reason to believe Romanians are any dierent
in this respect. Second, since 2004 Romanian migration has included all rel‑
evant social categories of people, so we can infer that the characteristics extend
to trust (Lazaroiu – Alexandru 2005). ird, the level of trust among migrants
who have returned to Romania is nearly identical to the Romanian population
who never left (Bădescu – Sum 2009). More generally on this third point, Careja
and Emmenegger (2012) nd that the attitudes of returned migrants toward
their domestic environment are similar to those who never migrated although
returnee attitudes toward other countries and the EU tend to be more positive.
We evaluate how migrant experiences correspond to levels of generalized
trust. We expect that migrants have both positive and negative experiences
(Mara 2012). What kind of experiences might be associated with lower levels of
generalized trust? Exposure to diversity, perceived hostility from host country
citizens, personal crises, illegal work status, and the presence of one’s family
are considered. Each of these elements speaks to an aspect of migrant experi‑
ences that may inuence the extent to which they trust strangers. us, we are
poised to enhance our understanding of how generalized trust develops under
the circumstances of migration. Generalized trust is a valuable commodity
for migrants because it can assist in building social relationships in the host
country, and as a result, enhance their quality of life. An easier adjustment for
migrant resettlement oers benets to the host country as well.
Research Method and Design
We evaluate generalized trust among Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain us‑
ing survey data. Migrant populations are dicult to sample due to their transient
nature resulting in few studies which utilize quantitative analyses. When studies
have employed survey data, researchers tend to consider migrants as a subset of
the larger population of a country, allowing little room for evaluating variance
among migrants due to their small number in national samples (Dinesen –
Hooghe 2010). While providing useful comparisons between migrant and na‑
tive citizens, such studies are unable to evaluate the impact of a migrant’s legal
status, ability to speak the local language, and a host of other variables that
might inuence attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. In this way, our analysis
adds our understanding of how trust might change among migrants.
Our sample of Romanian migrants consists of 1,168 total respondents in
Italy and 1,357 respondents in Spain. Since no sampling frame for Romanian
migrants is available, we relied on a selection method that combined snowball
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among Romanian Migrants Paul E. Sum and Gabriel Bădescu
12
sampling with a proximity criterion. e selection process in both countries
produced a sample that is geographically proportionate and has balance among
basic demographic indicators. We treat the two samples as a single aggregate
data set of 2,525 respondents and add a dichotomous host country control vari‑
able, Italy or Spain, to our analysis to control for any systematic country eects.
e Romanian Agency for Governmental Strategies, under the Romanian
Government, commissioned the surveys in 2008. Metro Media Transilvania ap‑
plied the survey in Italy and Totem Communications applied the survey in Spain.
Each sample was stratied by region (20 regions in Italy, 7 regions in Spain)
and proportion of Romanians in a locality as determined by the two countries’
national statistical institutes so that 58 localities were selected in Italy and 62
in Spain. Using a snowball sample meant that after an immigrant household
was located, additional households were approached based on references from
respondents. e proximity criterion meant that regardless of additional leads,
interviewers randomly selected other households to approach close to the origi‑
nal interview. e selection of households for proximity interviews were limited
to no more than two from the same building and no more than ve from the
same street. Once a household was selected, operators used a „last birthday“
method and interviewed respondents at their residence. Replacements were
found when a respondent remained unavailable after three visits.1 All surveys
were conducted in Romanian.
Our main line of inquiry concerns the theoretical distinction between cultural
and experiential theories related to generalized trust. Recent studies show that
the level of trust among migrants tends to be more dynamic compared to native
populations (Kumlin – Rothstein 2010). Moreover, trust levels among migrants
tend to approximate those found among the destination country population
(Dinesin – Hooghe 2010). Yet, we know relatively little about the variance in
trust levels among migrants.
e faith we place in strangers is inuenced in part by the favorable per‑
ceptions held by the truster about others in the community. As a form of self‑
‑identication, our moral values guide these perceptions and project them onto
others in the community so that we imagine a community of shared values
(Uslaner 2002). Given these parameters, the extent to which individuals extend
trust to strangers also will depend on contextual dierences, and for migrants,
the dierence in context interacts directly with the life ‑changing experience of
relocation (Dinesen 2011).
In the absence of panel data, we concentrate on factors that relate directly to
a migrant’s experience. Although we cannot estimate the impact of migration
1 The response rate (RR1, as defined by AAPOR at www.aapor.org) was 65 percent in Italy and 68 percent
in Spain. The refusal rate (REF1) was 24 % in Italy and 18 % in Spain. Data and reports can be found at
http://www.publicinfo.gov.ro/pagini/sondaje -de -opinie.php (15 December 2014).
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 13
with before and after measurements, we can infer that factors directly related
to one’s experience as a migrant account for a portion of the variance among
this population.
e relationship between generalized trust and diversity has attracted a great
deal of scholarly attention. Mounting empirical evidence suggests that “most
analyses nd a (small) negative eect of diversity on trust” (Dinesen – Sønder‑
skov 2012: 275). Putnam draws a similar conclusion arguing that, at least in
the short ‑run, people “hunker down” with people like themselves when they
perceive demographic shifts within their communities (2007: 144). Network
analysis shows that under many circumstances, individuals are attracted to
people like themselves, in an eort to “best guess” who would be the most
productive partners or team members in collective endeavors (McPherson –
Smith ‑Lovin – Cook 2001). Based on this largely sub ‑conscious gravitational
pull, and especially when one perceives signals of low social conict and dense
social networks, people expect trustworthy behavior from people they perceive
to hold similar values, irrespective of their own social position, and they recip‑
rocate based on this expectation (Öberg – Oskarsson – Svensson 2009).
Romania is a relatively homogenous society with 88.6 percent of the popula‑
tion classied as ethnic Romanian. us, many Romanian migrants have not
been exposed to ethnic diversity. e lack of familiarity with diverse cultures
leads us to believe that Romanians abroad may indeed tend to “hunker down”
other Romanians, if given the chance, in response to a diverse environment.
Consequently, we develop the following hypothesis:
H1: Migrants exposed to greater degrees of diversity will have lower levels of
generalized trust.2
Extending Putnam’s observation to migrants, we expect similarly that if a mi‑
grant has family members in the host country, clustering among other Ro‑
manians would be a particularly easy option. us, migrants who have fam‑
ily members living within the household would necessarily operate in a less
diverse context despite the larger community in which they live. As Dinesen
and Sønderskov assert, “when the surroundings consist of people like oneself,
whose cultural codes are intelligible, trusting others is easier” (2012: 275).
Also, family members may increase social capital within the household which
is what is needed to gain access to social networks, assisting a migrant in other
2 Generalized trust is derived from the question asking respondents if they think “most people can be
trusted” where 10=trust strangers very much (valid responses = 2480; mean 4.80; s.d. = 2.23). Diversity
is derived from abattery of questions that asked respondents to report if these groups live in their
neighborhood (Italian/ Spanish; Roma; Africans; Arabs). Questions were aggregated into an index re-
flecting the number of groups so that the range is 0 to 4 with “4” meaning that all these groups live in
the respondent’sneighborhood (valid responses = 2435; mean =.689; s.d. =.914).
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among Romanian Migrants Paul E. Sum and Gabriel Bădescu
14
ways and countering negative experiences with locals with more positive experi‑
ences (Hellerman 2006: 1142; Menjívar 2000). Moreover, just over 50 percent
of Romanians in Italy identify strained relationships with family members as
a negative aspect of migration (Mara 2012: 71). us, we generate the follow‑
ing hypothesis:
H2: Migrants who are living with family members will have higher levels of
generalized trust compared to those with no family in the household.3
e ethnic make ‑up of one’s neighborhood and the presence of one’s family
speak to migrant encounters with social contextual factors. e migrant expe‑
rience is not limited to the new environment but extends to day ‑to ‑day experi‑
ences, particularly ones that pose adversity. We conceptualize these experiences
is three ways. e rst is based on the level of hostility Romanians perceive from
the host country. e second considers extreme diculties that the respondent
recalls over the last three months. A third factor aecting a migrant’s experience
is the working visa status in the country. ose who are working without ocial
papers are in a much more precarious position than migrants who are legally
employed. us, illegal work status is likely to adversely color one’s experience
and perceptions of the host country. Negative aspects of the migrant experience
are encapsulated in three complementary hypotheses.
H3: Migrants who perceive hostility from host country citizens will have lower
levels of generalized trust.4
H4: Migrants who have experienced extreme diculties in their new environ‑
ment will have lower levels of generalized trust.5
H5: Migrants who are working illegally will have lower levels of generalized
trust than those who are in legal compliance.6
3 Respondents reported the number of family members who live in the residence. We coded any positi-
ve response, regardless of the number of family members as “1” and no family members as “0” (valid
responses = 2388; mean =.534; s.d. =.499).
4 Perceived hostility from host country is derived from three survey questions that asked respondents
about the frequency with which they have been exposed to negative stereotyping or derogatory state-
ments about Romanian migrants with the context of 1) reading in public places, 2) hearing people talk
in public places, or 3) through the media. The three questions used afour -fold classification so that 3
= multiple times; 2 = several times; 1 = once; 0 = never. The resulting index has arange of 0 to 9 (valid
responses = 2328; mean = 2.076; s.d. = 2.384).
5 Needed help from Romania is derived from the question: Has the respondent ever had acrisis so severe
that they needed to turn to family or friends in Romania for assistance? where 1 = yes; 0 = no (valid
responses = 2045; mean =.316; s.d. =.465)
6 Illegal work is derived from respondents reporting his or her “status” in the country. Among the nine
possible categories, three were coded as illegal: working without acontract, working on my own without
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 15
Our model includes several other variables. We created a dummy variable for
country to control for any systematic dierences between the countries. We also
control for language skills, including prociency in the local language and Eng‑
lish language prociency. Having a command of language likely will change the
nature of the migrant experience. We control for gender and education as well.
Results
We rst consider aggregate levels of generalized trust among Romanian mi‑
grants in relation to levels in Italy, Spain, and Romania. We report the ndings
in Table 1. e mean of generalized trust among Romanian migrants approxi‑
mates that which Italians and Spanish exhibit in their respective countries. e
dierence between Romanian migrants and their compatriots who remain in
Romania is more dramatic.
At rst glance, the nding is consistent with experiential theories of gener‑
alized trust. Dinesen and Hooghe (2010), for instance, nd that generalized
trust among migrants from low ‑trust societies converge on the level of trust in
their destination countries. ey account for this change based on factors that
are present in the host country, including cultural norms and governing institu‑
tions. Trust among Romanian migrants in Italy exceeds the host country gure
while Romanians in Spain have lower levels of trust than Spanish nationals.
However, the dierences are minimal and in the aggregate might be attributable
to any number of factors aecting migrants or host country citizens. Migrants
are not a monolithic group. We have hypothesized that individual ‑level experi‑
ences will account for variance of trust among our population.
state authorization; and day laborer. Any of these three categories are coded as “1” and other categories
are coded as “0” (valid responses = 2496; mean =.398; s.d. =.490).
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among Romanian Migrants Paul E. Sum and Gabriel Bădescu
16
Table 1: Trust among Romanian migrants, Romanians, Italians and Spaniards
Mean s.d. Percent who trusta
Romanian migrants
Pooled: 4.80 2.23 24.80 %
Italy: 5.90 2.17 29.60 %
Spain: 4.55 2.25 20.70 %
Trust in Italy 4.54 2.34 20.90 %
Trust in Romania 3.79 2.67 17.30 %
Trust in Spain 4.90 2.20 24.20 %
a= Calculated as the percentage who were above the midpoint on the scale
Sources: Romanian migrant data from the Romanian Agency for Governmental Strategies (http://www.
publicinfo.gov.ro/pagini/sondaje -de -opinie.php). Country data are from the European Social Survey (http://
www.europeansocialsurvey.org/): Italy from the second wave; Romania and Spain from the fourth wave.
Table 2 reports the results from OLS regression showing unstandardized coe‑
cients with indications of signicance. We ran ve iterations of the model to test
each hypothesis. e last column presents a model with all ve variables loaded.
With regard to diversity (H1), Romanian migrants who perceive a diverse
neighborhood environment tend to be less trusting than those who perceive
less diversity. is result only becomes signicant at the p <.05 level in the full
model (last column). us, the eect of a diverse context likely interacts with
other factors although the interaction was not with any of variables included in
our data set. We tested for interaction using our available variables and found
no signicant eects. We also hypothesized a positive relationship between the
presence of one’s family and generalized trust (H2). Table 2 veries this result.
Our next three hypotheses consider other aspects of a migrant’s experience
that might negatively impact generalized trust. e rst (H3) is a respond‑
ent’s perception of hostility from host country citizens and authorities. Table 2
shows that this to be a signicant factor. Trust is lower among migrants who
perceive hostility through more frequent confrontations with negative stereo‑
typing or derogatory statements about their group. Migrants who report having
problems so severe that they needed to turn to supportive contacts back in Ro‑
mania (H4) also tend to display lower levels of trust. e nding suggests that
a personal crisis, dened subjectively by respondents, correlates with generalized
trust. Lastly, table 2 shows that respondents who are working in Italy or Spain
illegally (H5) are less trusting.
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 17
Table 2 Determinants of generalized trust: Coefficients (b) from OLS
regression
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 Full model
Diversity in
neighborhood -.089 -.141*
Family present .302*** .266*
Perceived hostility
from host country -.055** -.046*
Needed help
from Romania -.528*** -.463***
Illegal worker -.231* -.221*
Italian/Spanish
speaker -.115 -.083 -.128 -.054 -.098 -.005
English speaker .517*** .506*** .566*** .667*** .507*** .690***
Country
(1 = It; 2 = Sp) -.525*** -.537*** -.471*** -.493*** -.518*** -.377**
Gender (female +) .170 .189 .197 .085 .197 .170
Education .117** .107** .091* .113** .106** .089*
Constant 4.826*** 4.645*** 4.226*** 5.037*** 4.859*** 4.402***
R2.032 .033 .031 .056 .034 .062
N 2363 2249 2185 1907 2346 1646
* = p <.05
** = p <.01
*** = p <.001
Among the control variables, two results deserve attention. e positive relation‑
ship between education and generalized trust, found in many previous studies,
holds for our analysis as well. With regard to language prociency, having com‑
mand of the local language did not prove to be a signicant factor; yet, English
speakers tended to possess higher levels of generalized trust.
In summary, the experiences associated with migration have independent
eects on generalized trust but such experiences are multifaceted. e presence
of family members in the household is positively correlated with trust. Perceived
diversity, perceived hostility, severe problems, and illegal status are negatively
associated with trust. Taken together, the results suggest that individual experi‑
ences inuence levels of generalized trust among Romanian migrants in Italy
and Spain. We discuss below interpretations and implications of these ndings.
Discussion
Experiential and cultural theories of generalized trust oer dierent, but com‑
plementary explanations of the development of generalized trust. Experiential
theories emphasize the variability of our faith in strangers correlating with
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among Romanian Migrants Paul E. Sum and Gabriel Bădescu
18
our daily encounters, contacts, and observations of the social world. Cultural
theories also focus on experiences but stress structural and cultural factors that
are quite stable over long periods of time. us, economic conditions, diversity,
and other relatively permanent social features contribute to levels of general‑
ized trust that remain largely static within a country. However, we know that
even if aggregate measures of trust tend to be stable overtime, variance across
individuals exists. Our study has sought to uncover systematic factors that might
account for variability in generalized trust among migrants. is population
encounters new experiences within a new context and thus, we expect trust
among migrants to be more uid. However, we are not suggesting that “migra‑
tion” per se has a systematic eect; rather, we test several factors that contribute
to an explanation of generalized trust: perceived diversity, presence of family,
perceived hostility, personal hardship, and illegal work status.
Among our sample population, exposure to diversity had a small, negative
impact on generalized trust. On face value, the nding is consistent with a num‑
ber of other studies that show exposure to diversity leading to less trust (e.g.
Dinesen – Sønderskov 2012). Why this relationship holds is subject to debate.
One interpretation is that individuals draw social comfort through recogniz‑
ing and reinforcing the importance of socially ‑constructed characteristics, for
example ethnicity or religion. Social comfort encourages trust in strangers
based on perceived social congruence to others along such objective factors
(Oberg – Oskarsson – Svensson 2009).
A second interpretation relaxes the importance of physical attributes in
favor of the perception on the part of the truster that relative strangers share
his or her expectations about socially relevant issues and outcomes. We might
imagine a conceptualized moral community based entirely on shared values
(Uslaner 2002). Alternatively, we might more modestly imagine individuals
basing trust on subjective criteria, no less arbitrary than ethnicity or religion,
but not as widely recognized as an identity community as well (McPherson –
Smith ‑Lovin – Cook 2001).
In either case, diversity is about perceptions. We estimated exposure to
diversity based on the self ‑reporting of respondents. Do all individuals per‑
ceive diversity similarly? If not, any number of causal mechanisms may be at
work here other than the perceived relative proportions of ethnic make ‑up of
one’s neighborhood. Diverse communities, especially those that are heavily
populated by dierent migrant groups, possess any number of other common
characteristics that might account for the nding. For example, such neighbor‑
hoods tend to be more transient and thus social networks, and by implication
social capital, are necessarily weaker. In diverse neighborhoods, one is more
likely to nd lower values on socio ‑economic indicators such as income, and
fewer public institutions per capita. Unfortunately, we were unable to test for
these contextual factors of our respondents.
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 19
Despite the limits on what we might conclude about diversity and trust, the
nding does point to variance in generalized trust among Romanian migrants.
Unless lower trusting individuals settle systematically in more diverse neighbor‑
hoods, and there is no reason to believe this is the case, the nding suggests
that this aspect of a migrant’s experience aects trust. Nevertheless, in the
stepwise analysis, diversity does not prove signicant unless other experiential
factors are present suggesting that diversity interacts with context and other
perceptions and experiences.
We found that respondents who had family members living in their house‑
hold tended to have higher levels of generalized trust, which is consistent with
our expectations. We hypothesize that the presence of family members operates
parallel to the attitudinal disposition we see with exposure to diversity. If gener‑
alized less trust is due in part to alienation from a sense of shared community
values, family would reinforce one’s moral community. Despite this assertion,
the causal mechanism remains opaque. We see some evidence that particular‑
ized trust (trust of those we know well) is causally related to generalized trust
(Freitag – Traunmüller 2009; Håkansson – Sjöholm 2007). is assertion could
apply to Romanian migrants with their family present. However, the relation‑
ship between family and trust might speak to a larger phenomenon of how
individuals perceive in ‑groups and out ‑groups when responding to the question
about generalized trust.
e extent to which respondents perceive generalized trust to apply to in‑
‑groups and out ‑groups varies cross ‑nationally, with Romanians referencing an
in ‑group connotation when articulating their level of trust (Delhay – Newton –
Welzel 2011). In other words, Romanians have a comparatively short radius in
response to who is conceptualized, so much so that trust in family members,
Romanian ethnicity, and Orthodox religious members correlate more favorably
to civic attributes than the traditional generalized trust question about stran‑
gers (Bădescu 2003: 127). us, our nding regarding family may apply more
to Romanian migrants than other groups.
More information is needed before we can infer that the presence of family is
a form of particularized trust, perhaps as a manifestation of a short conceptual
radius, feeding generalized trust. Our data reveals nothing about the relation‑
ships among family members and respondents or the level of particularized trust
(not all people trust their family members). Other causal mechanisms are pos‑
sible. For example, family oers an element of continuity for migrants, a source
of social support, and can contribute to recreating home life more quickly, all
of which allow individuals to take advantage of the social capital available to
them building generalized trust in the process. If migrants are less trusting in
more precarious situations, having one’s family present might abate the sense
of vulnerability. us, the presence of family members may insulate a migrant
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among Romanian Migrants Paul E. Sum and Gabriel Bădescu
20
from some of the negative impacts of the experiences. Hellerman (2006) nds
that both increased contacts and brighter disposition applied to her sample.7
Our last three hypotheses addressed elements of the migrant experience that
would capture vulnerability in a more direct way relative to diversity and family.
We hypothesized that respondents who perceived hostility from native citizens
in the host country, who experienced some form of personal hardship, or who
were working illegally would have lower levels of generalized trust. e three
hypotheses allow us to test the extent to which trust is shaped by negative ex‑
periences related to the act of migration. If we see correlation, we can infer that
these types of experiences for this population aect generalized trust. Indeed,
the results meet the expectations from our hypotheses but not without limits
on our ability to specify causal mechanisms and generalize beyond migrant
populations.
Respondents who perceive hostility from host country citizens tend to be less
trusting of strangers. We measure the perception through self ‑reported obser‑
vations of negative comments among Romanians in public spaces (written or
verbalized) and the media. e logic of the hypothesis is that individuals who
receive negative cues will respond accordingly and be less trusting of individu‑
als generally. However, we must qualify this assertion in two ways. First, people
who trust are more likely to give others a second chance or the benet of the
doubt (Rotter 1980: 7). us, our high trusting respondents may experience the
same negative cues but process them, and subsequently report them, dierently
than those who are less trusting.
Secondly, we assume that negative observations or experiences are occurring
before the (lower) level of generalized trust is manifest. However, the cross‑
‑sectional design prevents us from verifying this. Despite ambiguity regarding
causal direction, the correlation between low trust and exposure to negative
statements has implications for host country immigration and integration poli‑
cies. e extent to which a host country environment is welcoming inuences
trust among migrants. New arrivals who have faith in strangers contribute to
the social goods of a trusting society.
We also hypothesized that migrants who experience personal hardship in the
host country would exhibit lower levels of trust. Our measurement was derived
from asking respondents if they had experienced problems so great that they
needed help from Romania to address them. We expect that the vulnerability
associated with hardship, nancial or emotional, would correspond to lower
levels of generalized trust. We can show the correlation but drawing inferences
remains dicult. We do not know the nature of the problems or the type of help
7 We tested for interaction eects between diversity and family presence and found no eects suggesting
that the presence of one’sfamily is not systematically correlated with the extent to which one perceived
diversity.
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 21
that was received, only that the problem was severe enough that they needed
to get assistance from Romania. One possible explanation is that the measure
captures how socially embedded a migrant is within the host country, and not
personal crises per se. In addition, we do not know what characteristics are as‑
sociated with those Romanians who have access to assistance from Romania.
ey may be systematically distinct in terms of physical or social resources
related to their background in Romania. us, the nding may capture a social
network eect as opposed to specic encounters. Yet even though the data
limit our ability to interpret, we see a link between aspects of the experience
and generalized trust.
We further found that migrants who were working illegally were less trusting
than other migrants. e result suggests another dimension of vulnerability that
has an adverse eect on generalized trust. e faith one has in strangers may
be partly structured by one’s status, or how one perceives himself or herself
within the community, based on that status. e nding opens the possibility
that changes in status through life experiences shape trust among migrants.
However, we cannot entirely eliminate the possibility that low ‑trusting indi‑
viduals tend to be those who operate in the margins and are willing to maintain
illegal status, thus reversing the causal ow.
Conclusion
Generalized trust is associated with many valuable outcomes including facilitat‑
ing cooperation within groups and contributing to social cohesion. Signicant
evidence exists to show that generalized trust is a rigid concept, suggesting
that the benets of trust may be dicult to attain for some societies. Structural
factors such as the level of economic equality or cultural factors such as ethnic
diversity do not change rapidly. e stringency of such determinants has led
many to see generalized trust as an unchanging part of an individual’s social
disposition. However, experiential theories encourage us to consider the impact
of more immediate and varied social interactions as an additional inuence
on levels of generalized trust. Clearly, all experiences operate within a cultural
context yet, studying migrants allows us to decouple respondents from their
accustomed environment.
Romania produces the largest number of migrants among European Union
member states and Romanians form the plurality among migrant groups in
Italy and Spain. Romanian migrants leave a low ‑trusting country that has strug‑
gled economically and politically during the post ‑communist era. Despite this
legacy, Romanians abroad tend to exhibit similar levels of generalized trust
compared to those we see in their host countries when we consider aggregate
levels. Considering individual attributes, we nd that more immediate experi‑
ences signicantly inuence generalized trust.
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among Romanian Migrants Paul E. Sum and Gabriel Bădescu
22
Our analysis shows that, in particular, experiences linked to aspects of social
vulnerability shape generalized trust among Romanian migrants. Exposure to
diversity, being without family, perceptions of hostility, a personal crisis, or
working illegally are not part of the cultural baggage brought from Romania;
they are encounters some Romanians have within their destination country. We
should not be surprised that social vulnerability negatively colors a migrant’s at‑
titudes about the people around them. e clear connection we see between
the experiences of migrants and trust accentuates how much generalized trust
is culturally bounded, and how social interactions become more relevant in
generating (or eroding) trust outside one’s cultural context. Once we exit from
the familiar, we can expect much more variability in trust levels, at least until
a new cultural orientation is adopted. However, as globalizing forces continue,
more and more individuals nd their cultural context changing without taking
a decision to emigrate. Will trust become more uid because of it?
Considering experiences that challenge our notion of cultural stability begs
other provocative questions. Do certain cultural traits “travel” better than oth‑
ers? We have been considering Romanian migrants; however, we do not know
the extent to which our ndings extend to other ethnicities within Italy and
Spain. We also do not know the extent to which these ndings would apply to
other European cases, and if they would hold outside the European context.
Our analysis cannot estimate the eects of the Italian and Spanish contexts
that might be specic to those countries, including immigration policies and
services available to migrants.
e analysis does demonstrate the importance of state policy in minimiz‑
ing the negative factors faced by migrants. ose who perceive a more secure
environment have higher levels of trust. Alleviating social vulnerability among
migrants can boost generalized trust, which in turn will facilitate the integra‑
tion process producing benets for migrants and host countries.
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Paul E. Sum is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and
Political Science at the University of North Dakota. His research agenda addresses
the determinants and consequences of citizen attitudes within contexts of political
transition related to citizen mobilization, voting, and civil society development with
ageographic interest in post ‑communist Europe, especially Romania.
Gabriel Bădescu is Professor and Chair of the Political Science Department at
Babes ‑Bolyai University, and the director of the Center for the Study of Democracy.
His main fields of research are democratic and economic transitions, social capital,
educational policies, research methodology, income inequality and labor migration.
Between 2011 and 2013, he was amember of the Romanian National Research
Council. E ‑mail: badescu@fspac.ro
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 27
In the Shadow of Empire. Reflecting on the
Political -Strategic Position of the Small States
in Europe and the Caribbean Basin during
the Cold War
MITCHELL BELFER
Abstract: Revisionist takes on the Cold War have entered public discourses and rendered
understanding of the lead -up to, and unfolding of, the long game of brinkmanship
between the US and USSR unintelligible. While this work does not seek to redress the
meta -problems of current treatments of the Cold War, it does seek to examine some of
the undercurrents during that period of international relations history. Specifically, this
work presents atheoretical assessment of the small states that comprised the rank and
file members of the Cold War blocs. The states of the Caribbean Basin, Latin America
and Central and Eastern Europe are used to illustrate the theoretical underpinnings
of this work. Ultimately, this work deviates from more conventional understandings
of the Cold War by intellectually reflecting on the manner in which small states were
treated by their bloc leaders.
Keywords: Small States, Cold War, Latin America, Caribbean, Central and Eastern
Europe, Revolution
Introduction
Any evaluation of 20th century international political and socio ‑economic en‑
gagements inevitably draws heavily on the literature depicting the relations
between and within the Cold War blocs. Such cognitive benchmarking has
become so extensive that even the earth ‑shattering World Wars, which pre‑
ceded US ‑Soviet brinkmanship, have been sewn together to the Cold War so
as to produce a meta ‑narrative as a means of understanding the dynamics of
international relations themselves. For instance, WWI has not merely entered
the history books for what it produced; it has also come to be seen as produc‑
ing the right conditions for Russia’s communist revolution and the US’s rise to
In the Shadow of Empire Mitchell Belfer
28
inherit the position of Western leadership—two necessary prequels to the half
century of Cold War. But not before these two ideologically opposed blocs join
forces to rid the world of fascism and the German pivot in European aairs.
WWII has come to represent three chapters in the story of civilisation: the story
of genocide (re: Nazi Germany’s quest to exterminate world Jewry), the story of
non ‑nationalistic secular ideological struggles and the story of power beyond
the pale of power (re: the nuclearisation of power). In other words, WWII has
also, largely, been included as a necessary chapter to the Cold War. And certainly
it was. Without WWII it is dicult to imagine how, or if, the USSR would have
driven west and occupied Central Europe, whether the West European states
would not have deployed East, if the US would have deepened its engagements
to Europe or any number of dynamics would have unfolded. It is clear that the
Cold War is a dening period of international relations history.
Yet, such grandstanding, by its nature, implies the imbalance of global power
to the point that only two state ‑blocs are said to have dominated international
political life for the better part of a century. While this may be empirically veri‑
able in terms of deployments, engagements and projections there are fatal aws
with such generalisations; they tend to overstate the roles of the superpowers
and under ‑appreciate the roles of smaller states and the alliances and competi‑
tions that dened their global position and foreign policy orientations. ese
too were – and are – important and deserve both recognition and exploration.
is work takes a stab at redressing the instinctive neglect of the small states
that aected the Cold War system of transatlantic and transpacic competition
and has bled over to more recent times. While delving into the dynamics of
small states in a world system dominated by superpowers requires exhaustive
investigations, this work provides only a modest baby ‑step. Its intention is to
dene, conceptually, small states and demonstrate how these have come to
occupy the proverbial “shatterbelts” that exist in the “friction zones;” the over‑
lapping spaces of super‑ and great powers’ spheres of inuence. Since the Cold
War was (roughly) divided into two main blocs, and given that the exibility
of small states to determine their own foreign policy direction was severely
restrained by their bloc ‑leader, explorations of small state relations during
the Cold War are limited to the intra ‑bloc level. For the purposes of this work,
examples are drawn primarily from the superpowers’ immediate geopolitical
spheres of inuence – the US and Central and South American states and the
USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries – since this work is concerned with how the
small states, in the shadow of empire, determined their relations. ese regions
are also important since the USSR sought to check US power in the Americas
through the sponsorship of communist military, paramilitary and political ac‑
tivities while the US reinforced anti ‑communist governments in Western and
Southern Europe and spent considerable energies galvanising NATO. In short,
the Caribbean was to the USSR what Western (and Southern) Europe was to the
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 29
US; a pressure point on the geostrategic body of its adversary. Additionally, the
geographical, cultural, socio ‑political and economic dierences between the
US’s and Soviet’s spheres render comparison both interesting and stimulating.
is work is organised accordingly.
Theorising on Small States
e importance of small states in the preservation of a regional or even the inter‑
national balance of power should not be understated. Just as Belgian neutrality
helped preserve the pre ‑WWI balance of European power, so Georgia’s more
recent attempts to enter Western security organisations prodded Russian aggres‑
sion. Large and superpowers go to great lengths to anchor small states into their
security architecture and jealously defend the status quo whether the people of
such small states agree or not. Democracy is a luxury for states obsessed with
their perceived geopolitical survival. With this in mind, it is necessary to dene
small states and evaluate their specic behaviours vis ‑à‑vis the world’s great and
superpowers. Since this work is devoted to understanding the political nuances
during the Cold War years, attention is paid to the period 1945–1991. Addition‑
ally, this section is not exclusively focused on relations between the members
of the Soviet’s two pincers – the Warsaw Pact states and the “stragglers of the
Caribbean” – but seeks to provide a wider understanding of small states.
What are Small States?
A distinct body of international relations literature focuses on the nature, be‑
haviour and policy orientations of small states and small powers (Belfer 2014).
is collection of texts provides a solid arch between historic (re: the Republic of
Venice) and more contemporary examples of small states (re: e Grand Duchy
of Luxembourg). However, such treatments tend to be generalisations in that
many of their assumptions are time ‑specic and seldom appreciate changes to
the fabric of international relations. In other words, many of the scholars who
examine small states tend to act as historians, rather than international rela‑
tions scholars, and freeze ‑frame the small states of their investigations. e idea
that there are small and medium, large, great and superpowers operating in the
international arena is hardly novel; international relations scholarship has been
concerned with such distinctions from its inception. erefore, to determine
precisely what a small state is, it is essential to take a theoretical back ‑step, to
the ‘last year of the Napoleonic Wars. Previously […] “the assumption had been
that all sovereign and independent states were in theory equal, whatever might
be their responsibilities or physical strength” (Nicolson 1961).
From this initial point, the assumption was that all states had been consid‑
ered equal and the principle of non ‑intervention into the domestic aairs of
In the Shadow of Empire Mitchell Belfer
30
other states was set as an iron rule. However, such iron rules are typically bent
by the raw muscle of great powers, which, in their determination to extend
their power ‑bases and projection capacities often got involved in others’ aairs;
small and large alike.
Indeed, Rothstein recalls that the
presumed equality of all states did not, of course, prevent the Great Powers from
treating weaker states instrumentally. Small Powers threatened by neighbour‑
ing Great Powers, or intent on security benets for themselves in the course
of Great Power conicts, were forced to play a perilous game: moving quickly
from the lighter to the heavier side of the balance as soon as an apparent victor
in any contest could be discerned (Rothstein 1968).
Such sentiments point to pragmatic leadership as the pillar for national ‑state
longevity since – if small states were treated instrumentally and were forced
to quickly shift their alliances – only prudent leaders are able to recognise
power shifts and rapidly realign to ensure survival. Yet, small states do not
operate from within a political vacuum and they are not blessed with having
only to deal with regional balancing in an eort to defend their interests and
ensure their survival. Often, small states are themselves the issue which inspires
great power competition and, at times, conict. Cuba’s chapter in communist
revolution is a reminder of the intensity great powers may be willing to go in
order to project themselves and absorb small states into their spheres of inu‑
ence; the international community had never before – or since – been closer
to nuclear Armageddon as the US quarantined the Island and actively deterred
further Soviet expansion. Castro understood how antagonistic his regime was
to the US, and made his alignment choices accordingly. However, he could not
anticipate the length the US was willing to go in order to preserve the regional
balance of power—and terror. Castro’s pragmatism was less than optimal and
Cuba has suered economically as a result. But yet, it has survived. e same
could be said of a later attempt to set up a (claimed) radical communist regime
in Grenada following the 1983 assassination of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.
e US’s Operation Urgent Fury amounted to the rendering of an independent
Grenadine state to the humiliating position of pseudo ‑puppet of the US. When
small states act imprudently and without regard for their role in preserving
a regional balance of power, they risk their national sovereignty and survival.
So, small states must not only be concerned with regional balancing, they
must also attempt to keep a ‘low prole’ since those small states that ‘came to
the attention of the Great Powers […] were only noticed when they became an
object of desire for a Great Power, or when they intruded too noticeably in the
diplomatic game’ (Rothstein 1968).
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 31
For Rothstein, small states are understood to be dened according to three
important benchmarks. Firstly, that they are treated instrumentally, that there
is an invisible hand which determines their freedom of action and limits the
extent of their independence in terms of developing an foreign policy entirely
rooted in national interests dened according to the demands of the population
and political classes. Secondly, that small states are forced into a perilous game
of constant balancing, expending tremendous political and economic energies
(and resources) to ensure that they are on the ‘winning’ side of a balance and
do not get caught ‑up in regional and international competitions beyond their
capabilities. And, nally, that small states are specically restricted in foreign
policy making in that larger powers’ foreign policies act as the basis for small
states’ decision ‑making.
Even a cursory glance at many of the Latin American, Caribbean and Central/
Eastern European states – in the shadow of the US and Soviet empires – conrms
the validity of Rothstein’s observations. e Soviets were less concerned with
the Cuban revolution and social justice in that country than they were of o‑
‑setting US power in the Northern Caribbean region, just like the US was hardly
concerned with the fallout of the coup d’état against Allende and the emergence
of the Pinochet regime in Chile (Kornbluh 2003). Such instrumental treatments
of allies was hardly conned to Latin America; Central and Eastern European
states faced similar conditions as the 1956 Russo ‑Hungarian conict and the
1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia attest. But whereas Rothstein
suggested that ‘an invisible hand’ determined small states’ freedom to formulate
an independent foreign policy, the Cold War superpowers were not subtle; the
hand was visible and clenched.
In terms of being ‘forced into a perilous game of constant balancing […] to
ensure that they are on the ‘winning’ side of a balance and do not get caught ‑up
in regional and international competitions beyond their capabilities,’ the level
of instrumentalism precluded alliance uidity among the small states during
the Cold War. Sure, both Albania and Romania abandoned the Warsaw Pact,
and it is true that France withdrew from military cooperation in NATO, how‑
ever in no case did such alliance defections threaten bloc political security and,
besides, these episodes served more as exceptions than the rule. For the most
part, the Cold War was a grand balancing act and the small states were largely
locked into it as a result of their instrumental treatment by the superpowers.
ere were few avenues of recourse. Albania had to tie itself to an invigorating
China, Romania had to irt with the US, France and Italy while France had to
remain committed to the US on a bilateral level. In each case of Cold War bloc
adjustments, balances were rearmed rather than disregarded (Gartho 1995).
Finally, that small states are specically restricted in foreign policy making
in that larger powers’ foreign policies, act as the basis for small states’ decision‑
‑making was a very important observation. When the USSR sought inroads
In the Shadow of Empire Mitchell Belfer
32
into Latin America, it enlisted its Czechoslovak ally since the latter retained
(relatively) good relations in the region. Czechoslovakia’s acceptance of play‑
ing the role of trailblazer had less to do with instinctive Czechoslovak policy
preferences and more to do with the fact that foreign policy decisions were
increasingly made in, and by, Moscow (Pelant 2013).
In the heat of the Cold War, Rothstein remarked that ‘for Small Powers […]
the solution to any “security ‑dilemma” must come from an outside source’
(Rothstein 1968: 24). In the breakdown of US hegemony this is again a key
feature of being a small state, however at this time in history being able to
solve a security dilemma is much more dicult owing to the nature of regional
competitions, especially in dangerous regions. e Caribbean Basin, Latin
America and Central/Eastern Europe were – throughout the 20th century – ter‑
ribly dangerous. Whether referring to the Maoist Shining Path insurgency in
Peru, the incessant interstate conicts in Central America, notably the famous
Postage Stamp War of 1937 between Nicaragua and Honduras, the 1969 Football
War between El Salvador and Honduras and the simmering (often erupting)
tensions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over the San Juan River, to name
a few, there is a disproportionate level of political violence in and around the
southern 3/4ths of the Americas. is is mostly due to the high proportion of
small states and their security requirements only able to be fullled through the
enlisting of large regional or international powers. Hence, while the solution
to their security dilemmas must come from an outside source, such exogenous
actors may be, at least partially, responsible for the initiation of the security
dilemmas in the rst place since the exogenous state treats the small state in‑
strumentally; in pursuit of its own interests. Small state conict may, very well,
be the residue of great powers’ pursuits of their interests.
Indeed, similar to the pre ‑WWI/WWII periods,
Small Powers must, therefore, rely on essentially ambiguous external aid for
the accomplishment of the basic goal of all states: survival. If they have learned
anything from history, it is that external support usually arrives late, and that
it is given only in expectation of future benets (Rothstein 1968: 24).
Additionally, there is a ‘narrow margin of safety which a Small Power possess‑
es. With a small territory (normally), with few resources, and with uncertain
friends, it has very little time in which to correct mistakes. Fearing to take risks,
caution is enjoined’ (Rothstein 1968: 25). e Hungarian revolution serves as
a case in point (Granville 2004). While the US and its Western European allies
certainly encouraged the Hungarians to rebel against the USSR for the pur‑
pose of fracturing the communist presence in Central Europe, there would be
no support when Hungary needed it most (Granville 2004). Instead, Hungary
had to absorb all the risk and paid for its miscalculations in blood and harsh
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 33
political and economic restrictions following the Soviet invasion. And, to add
insult to injury, it seems that the manner in which the US sought to empower
Hungary’s more moderate communists, may have directly contributed to the So‑
viet decision to invade the country and depose Nagy (Granville 2004: 200–201).
Meanwhile, by the time the US had mobilised its allies to even agree on lending
support to the Hungarians, the war had already been concluded. e West, it
seems, was ready to ght the USSR to the last Hungarian.
Small states are not only vulnerable owing to their dependence on unreliable
and selsh allies, they are additionally – owing to the size of their territory – made
vulnerable based on their geopolitical position and, importantly, the shortened
timeframe they are forced to operate from. Political life is simply accelerated
because patience is a luxury small states can ill ‑aord. Indeed, ‘few Small Powers
enjoy the luxury of possessing enough strength to handle all the problems on
their political horizons; at best, they may be able to confront and survive the most
serious problems, provided they perceive them accurately’ (Rothstein 1968: 25).
So, an additional aspect of small states, recognised as the central pillar for
their survival rests on leadership and decision ‑making. It is as though all small
states are permanently on war ‑footing, rapidly altering policy as new informa‑
tion streams in. Foreign and defence ministries, the oce of Prime Minister
and, basically, the entire spectrum of executive and legislative personnel, are
forced to work constantly, and prudently, if their state is to survive. is may,
perhaps, oer a partial explanation as to the forms of government adopted in
both Central/Eastern Europe and Latin America during the Cold War; strong
leadership, cults of personality and raw populism.1 Often the internal dimen‑
sions of policy ‑making lay beyond the scope of adequate investigation, however,
in small states there is a prevailing national feeling of fear that a policy choice
is inadequate or that certain regional tides are too strong to resist and ‘the psy‑
chology of fear leads Small Powers in conicting directions,’ (Rothstein 1968:
28) which are very dicult to reconcile.
What Makes aSmall State Small? Two Variables
For all the previous discussion about the intrinsic vulnerabilities, which dene
small states, it is also important to clearly indicate particular aspects of a state
which render it small and hence prone to the vulnerabilities highlighted above.
For the purposes of this work, there are two main approaches to understand‑
ing what makes a small state small, an absolute and a relative, both of which are
reected in the interaction of two variables.
1 For areading into economic populism in Latin America see Edwards (2010). While this work is geared
towards explaining the manner in which policy orientations and ideologies have largely plagued Latin
American economic growth, it hints at the forms of nepotism and sectoral empowerment that is oen
areflection of both paranoid and cultish leaders. For areading into the cult of personality and leadership
in communist Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War see Fowkes (1999).
In the Shadow of Empire Mitchell Belfer
34
ese are:
1. Population Size: the total number of residents (citizens and non ‑citizens
alike) of a given state;
2. National Territorial Area: the geo ‑strategic depth of the state and the
resources available to it.
ese are borrowed (though rened) from East’s four variable depiction of the
‘conventional model’ of a small state where he suggests that
is conventional model generally assumes that small states are characterised
by one or more of the following: (1) small land area, (2) small total popula‑
tion, (3) small total GNP (or other measure of total productive capacity, and
(4) a low level of military capabilities (East 1973: 557).
e decision to omit GNP and the level of military capabilities was made on the
basis that GNP refers to the size of a country’s economy and not its geopolitical
dynamics. At the same time, international relations and security are much more
nuanced and the strict criteria of maintaining a low level of military capabilities
is not an indication of national size, or power (for that matter). Instead, while
not considered a variable, this work recognises the variance of national demands
and the capabilities to satisfy them as indicative of a small state since it seems
that small states feel national (and sectorial and sub ‑national) demands much
more acutely than larger entities. Owing to the fact that a small state is terri‑
torially small and contains a small population, it follows that there will be less
demands and more opportunity to satisfy such demands. Or, alternatively, there
may be more demands and less opportunity to satisfy them, implying that small
states are forced to behave dierently than larger entities owing to the inherent
internal tensions that are derived from the variance between demands and na‑
tional capabilities. However, since such situations arise as a symptom of being
small and not a cause, demands vs. capabilities are understood as symptomatic.
Variable 1: Population Size
Population size continues to matter in terms of elding adequate numbers of
citizens for political, military, social, diplomatic and economic activities. While
using population as an indication of “small” or not small has been the centre of
many international relations debates, it is a key determinate deployed through‑
out this work (Maass 2009: 70–74). Sawyer notes that
Of all national characteristics, size is probably the most obvious—but this
makes it no less important. And although population is the most prominent
representative of size, such variables as a nation’s energy resources, arable
land, and GNP also load highly on this factor (Sawyer 1967: 152).
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 35
is work also recognises that other factors may be considered for the over‑
all understanding of what makes a state small or large (or other sizes for that
matter), though maintains that population size is the most relevant since only
through the elding of individuals into a states’ political structures, its armed
forces and its economic agents and bodies can national mobilisation occur.
Given that small states have a smaller pool of individuals to ll such positions
and roles, it stands to reason that small states are characterised by small pools
of individuals and hence size does matter; if a state has less politically capable
persons to draw on, less soldiers to conscript or enlist, and less economic actors
then the entire national apparatus will be aected even if the state in question
is wealthy and controls signicant natural resources.
It is also useful to note that population size does not positively reect power –
small states may be relatively powerful or weak – it depends on a wide assortment
of interacting variables. In this, despite the fact that ‘merely possessing a larger
army, more advanced weapons, or a modern economy does not guarantee the
ability to achieve desired ends – the relationship between tangible power and the
achievement of national goals has become more and more indirect and obscure’
(Rothstein 1968: 19–20). So, small states may retain power and large states may
be weak. However, the size of the national entity does impact on the way the state
behaves since small states tend to rely on alliances and are more acutely aware
of their vulnerabilities than larger states are. Hence, understanding the role that
population size plays in national political cultures and behaviours is an important
task. Unfortunately, discussion in this section departs from such theorising to
return to the task at hand; determining the criteria required to dene a state as
being small (or otherwise).
e Absolute Approach—looks at the total number of a state’s inhabitants – citi‑
zens and residents – and if the population size is 1.5 million or less it is considered
a small state. is number is not arbitrarily ascribed, it has been selected since
the vast majority of recognised national state enterprises consist of populations
which number more than 1.5 million and thus states with (or less than) such
a population base are in the clear minority.2 Additionally, in states with (or less
than) such a population base it may be assumed that less than one million are
eligible members of the state’s economic, political, social and military life. So,
a population of one and a half million, after deducting the number of aged, young
and incapacitated, results in a population of roughly one million contributing
persons. Although such states are comparatively rare, there are still numerous
examples of them, though for the case at hand, these tend to be found in, or
2 Of the 193 current members of the United Nations General Assembly, 150 have populations that exceed
1.5 million people implying that less than aquarter of all recognised states retain populations smaller
than 1.5 million.
In the Shadow of Empire Mitchell Belfer
36
proximate to the Caribbean region – both island states and along the littoral –
not among the Central and Eastern European states during the Cold War.3 Con‑
sider for example: Anguilla (UK, 12,000), Antigua and Barbuda (73,000), Aruba
(Netherlands, 100,000), e Bahamas (310,000), Barbados (270,000), Belize
(256,000), Bermuda (UK, 82,000), Cayman Islands (UK, 40,000), Dominica
(79,000), French Guiana (France, 178,000), Grenada (80,000), Guadeloupe
(France, 440,000), Guyana (765,000), Martinique (France, 393,000), Montser‑
rat (UK, 4000), Netherlands Antilles (Netherlands, 221,000), St. Kitts and Nevis
(42,000), St. Lucia (149,000), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (120,000), Surinam
(435,000), Trinidad and Tobago (1.3 million), Turks and Caicos Islands (21,000),
Virgin Islands (UK, 21,000) and the Virgin Islands (US, 111,000). ese account
for roughly half of the international community’s absolutely small states (Atlas
of the World 2011: 18–37).
So, for a state to qualify as absolutely small it needs to have a population of
1.5 million or less and an active, participating population of between 8 hundred
thousand and 1.2 million people. In the Caribbean basin region, the vast majority
of the states and territories are absolutely small. Hence, the depiction of small
state behaviour (above) may be applicable since few of these states retain adequate
means of self ‑defence and hence are treated instrumentally by the dominant
regional power, the US. ere were, to be sure, times where some of the more
enterprising regional powers such as Cuba and Venezuela have attempted to
disrupt the regional balance of power – a.k.a. US regional hegemony – but such
attempts were only half ‑witted and haphazard.
e Relative Approach—is, in contrast, based on a 10 per cent rule, where
a state is considered small relative to any one of its territorial neighbours or,
in the case of island states, a state sharing the immediate littoral of the body of
water surrounding it. is approach oers important insights regarding small
states since it is based on relative power assessments derived from a states’ de‑
mographics which – while not always a fair assessment – allows researchers to
hypothesise on capabilities since states with larger populations should (in most
cases) be able to enlist greater numbers of its citizens for political assignments,
active armed services and economic life. Certainly, there are problems with such
an approach since it does not automatically suggest power imbalances; many
additional factors must be considered. For instance, large states may be more
fractured, less cohesive and have fewer resources available to the state render‑
ing it relatively weaker than a smaller adversary. While such lines of thinking
is surely valuable, it is not relevant for the current discussion which narrowly
3 It should be remembered that as some of the larger states fragmented, notably Yugoslavia, the suc-
ceeding states may have had populations of less than 1 million. For instance, Montenegro’spopulation
is just over 600 thousand people.
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 37
seeks to illustrate what a small state is, not its power capabilities. So, with this
approach in mind, when a state retains a population 10 per cent the size of
a neighbour it is relatively small. With few exceptions, the states that bordered
on the US (237 million in 1985) and USSR (277 million in 1985) were often less
than 10 per cent their size. In the Caribbean and Latin America only Mexico,
Argentina and Brazil retained (in 1985) populations that exceeded the 10 per
cent rule. In contrast, during the same period, only Poland was more than 10
per cent of the USSR’s total population.
Variable 2: National Territorial Area
As a variable, the national territorial area indicates two key ingredients of ca‑
pabilities that may render a state small or not: levels of geo ‑strategic depth and
the presence of a sustainable resource base (including resource accessibility,
conversion and mobilisation options4. Unlike the manner in which popula‑
tion was treated above – in terms of presenting both the absolute and relative
approaches separately – this subsection blends the absolute and relative ap‑
proaches into the main arguments.
Geo ‑Strategic Depth—determining the geo ‑strategic depth of a state is a daunt‑
ing task since it is an ambiguous variable with few mechanisms of measurement
available to social scientists.5 Often, the phrase geo ‑strategic depth is deployed
in a reied manner and no clear denitions oered. is work oers an imper‑
fect denition, though hopes that this endeavour is further developed in other
works. For the purposes at hand, geo ‑strategic depth is considered the amount
of territory a state may cede to an invading military force before having to cede
ultimate sovereignty. In other words, the percentage of territory that would
need to remain under the control of government “A” for that government to
legitimately claim to extend sovereign control over country “A.”
Consider a counterfactual situation to illustrate this point. Imagine that the
Nicaraguan civil war occurred at a time of US determination to advance the
cause of human rights in Central America and hence brought the superpower
in to allay the dangers to the civilian population.6 In the event that the US were
to construct a 10 kilometre “humanitarian corridor” within Nicaraguan terri‑
4 These sub -variables are borrowed from Hart (1976: 289–305).
5 Most scholars tend to view strategic depth as an abstraction rather than areality of astate’sgeopolitical
thinking. See, for instance Yalvac (2012: 165–180). While Yalvac certainly contributes to the discipline of
international relations through this article, it does not oer many clues as to how geo -strategic depth
may be universalised as aconcept and deployed in the political orientations of states. At least Yalvac
attempts to understand geo -strategic depth; most others simply assume broad knowledge of the theme
and omit defining it.
6 Please note that this is acounterfactual argument. Historically, the US’ssupport to President Somo-
za’sdictatorial regime is oen cited as amain cause of the 1978/1979–1989 civil war since it empowered
In the Shadow of Empire Mitchell Belfer
38
tory – adjacent to the Costa Rican border – for the sake of oering civilians
a safe haven and thereby forcing the Sandinistas 10 kilometres back from their
sovereign boundaries. Nicaragua would not cease being an independent and
legitimate state as a result of such an intervention. Nicaragua’s geo ‑strategic
depth is greater than 10 kilometres. Alternatively, if the US (in this hypotheti‑
cal) were to extend its corridor 250 kilometres to include the major part of
Nicaragua’s population and its industrial capabilities Nicaragua would cease
being Nicaragua in its current form and be forced to adjust to being a smaller
entity, say centred around Managua, or seek to regain its lost territories through
guerrilla conict. In either case, the country and its leadership would be deemed
illegitimate leaders of Nicaragua, though may still be regarded as the legitimate
leaders of Nicaraguans.
In this hypothetical example, Nicaragua’s strategic depth vis ‑à‑vis the US is
something around 250 kilometres. Yet even this is not a rule. If, for instance,
Honduras would have militarily intervened in our Nicaragua story – to end the
inevitable migration of eeing civilians – it would not require a 250 kilometre
occupation zone in order to deconstruct Nicaragua, it would only need to oc‑
cupy the capital, Managua. If Honduras would successfully do so, the Nicara‑
guan authorities would either be deposed (killed, arrested, exiled) or forced
into the hinterland to carry on the conict using asymmetric means. In any
case, this would imply that Nicaragua’s leaders could not eectively develop or
implement policies for the country and hence the state would no longer exist
as a unit. From this example it is clear that there are two main determinates of
geo ‑strategic depth. Firstly, a kilometre ‑based determinate whereby a state’s geo‑
‑strategic depth is measured according to how much of its national territory it
must retain in order to remain the same state. Or, how much ground can it lose
before it ceases being a state.
e second determinate is based around the control of the state in ques‑
tion’s capital city since doing so has tremendous symbolic and practical mean‑
ing; it indicates that a government has lost direct control of the state’s decision‑
‑making apparatuses and institutions and that the state has ceased to exist in
its previous form. Consider that the USSR did not have to occupy all of Hungary
to force the latter to surrender in 1956; it needed only reach Budapest and ex‑
ile, kill, imprison or co ‑opt members of the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government. While this may serve as an example of the capital
city of a state as a key determinate to its geo ‑strategic depth, it should also be
noted that threats made against a capital city can act as an eective tool in the
exercise of power.
one bloc against the country’scivil society, rural classes and the intelligentsia. The civil war only ended
with the signing of the Tela Accord of which the US’srole was only marginal.
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 39
e above theorising intended to play with some of the ideas attached to
geo ‑strategic depth. However, these have been limited to large(r) state entities
and have, so far, excluded small states. While the general theory being applied
here is valid for small states, the point is that retaining a small territorial sur‑
face implies retaining a more limited geo ‑strategic depth. Nicaragua’s loss of
10 kilometres would not automatically end its sovereignty. However, if the US
would invade 10 kilometres of Grenada (as it did), the latter would cease to exist
and be forced to accept US domination (which it also did). For the purposes of
this work then, small states naturally have a smaller geo ‑strategic depth than
larger entities, owing to the territorial surface of the state. Hence, small states
are intrinsically vulnerable since foreign occupation is made easier by small
territorial surfaces and the lack of adequate geo ‑strategic depth.
For instance, Cuba is a relatively small island state and Czechoslovakia (was)
a small territorial state and Quester’s remark that chief among the vulnerabili‑
ties of such states is that ‘there is no hinterland for the inhabitant of the island
to retreat to, there is no second line of defence, no backup position from which
to repulse such foreign aggression’ (Quester 1983: 161) is relevant. Islands are
even more vulnerable than continental small states since there are no porous
borders to sneak across for asylum, no safety nets and no safe havens.
Sustainable Resource Base—examines the ability a state has to practise autarky
in terms of providing essential resources for the sustainability of its population
based on extraction from the national territorial surface. In the contemporary
international environment, complex as it is, the necessary ingredients for socio‑
‑political survival remain relatively constant. ere are ve. Firstly, arable land is
required for hygienic living spaces and to meet dietary needs such as adequate
agriculture and raising livestock for consumption. Secondly, but no less impor‑
tant, people require potable water; the fresh, puried water for consumption,
food preparation, enabling agriculture and for ensuring sanitary conditions
(cleaning of living spaces and people). Water is also an essential ingredient in
modern medicines and industrial activities. irdly, access to energy sources
adds an important dimension to the list of required resources for any political
community. Energy resources may be more archaic, such as lumber. ey may be
oil and gas or even more sophisticated sources such as biomass. Communities
need energy to light and warm their homes, prepare foods, for sterilisation of
daily and medical utensils and, in more advanced societies, to power their cit‑
ies, run the transportation links and provide the luxuries attached to modern
living. Fourthly, human resources are required to full the basic operation of
a community (no matter the size). People need to be able to eld key positions
related to public services (police, armed forces, government, farmers, etc.) and
sectors related to resource extraction, conversion and mobilisation. Finally, all
political communities require adequate living spaces, places where individu‑
In the Shadow of Empire Mitchell Belfer
40
als and families may habitat and public spaces where social interactions and
exchanges may occur. ese are the basic resources required of any commu
‑
nity. As societies advance, so do required and desired resources; educational,
industrial, commercial and social. In terms of retaining a sustainable resource
base, it is clear that small states are (nearly always) at a disadvantage owing to
their territorial surface size. While there is no way to determine what makes
a state small according to a strict square kilometre assessment, it is possible
to hypothesise according to the blend of relative and absolute understandings
of territorial size comparing inhabitants per kilometre to territorial area size.
Territorial Size as aDeterminant of Small States
Population size was deployed as a variable that can be operationalised in order
to, partially, determine whether or not a state is small. is section seeks to do
the same with the use of territorial size. While the variable itself was explained in
some depth above, this subsection presents the absolute and relative approaches
required for its operationalisation. Both approaches are more concerned with
the actual and potential strategic depth of states rather than a state’s sustainable
resource base. is selection is based on the premise that even large states may
not have adequate resources for national sustainability and therefore engage in
international trade to that end. At the same time, small states may, very well,
retain sustainable resources for their population’s needs. So, while the amount
of resources is important, particularly in competitive environments, it is not
utilised or further developed in the subsequent section since it may only com‑
plicate being able to comprehensively identify a state as being small.
By way of illustration, consider the example of Peru with a population of
some 28 million, stretched over more than 700 thousand square kilometres.
Despite its size, only a fragment of its territory is arable owing to the Andes
Mountains and the protected rainforests. Hence, Peru requires international
trade relationships in order to meet the basic needs of its population.7 At the
same time, Costa Rica’s population is situated at approximately 4.5 million on
a minute territorial surface, of which roughly 35 per cent is arable, implying that
Costa Rica has sucient agricultural capabilities.8 is disparity in sustainable
resources does not indicate either the absolute or the relative size of Peru or
Costa Rica. Instead, it only exposes one dynamic. erefore, resource sustain‑
ability is omitted from further discussion here though accepts the assumption
that small states tend to have more acute diculties in meeting the resource
demands of their population. is is a point of reection rather than a rule.
7 This information is based on the CIA Factbook 2013: available at: www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the -world -factbook/geos/eg.html (7 September 2013).
8 CIA Factbook 2013: available at: www.cia.gov/library/publications/the -world -factbook/geos/eg.html
(September 2013).
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 41
e following points then, indicate the absolute and relative territorial size of
a state for the purpose of indicating its strategic depth.
Absolutely—small implies that the state in question contains territories smaller
than 5000 square kilometres. is territorial determinant was selected due to
a maximum 222.5 kilometre depth of the state in question. In other words, being
able to enter a state from its frontiers and reach the geographic centre within
222.5 kilometres implies minute strategic depth and therefore indicates that
the state is absolutely small. Topographical features may certainly facilitate or
impair an invading military and certainly if a state has 5001 square kilometres
it is in no better position, however there seems to be a major leap statistically
from states that have less than 5000 square kilometres to those that retain 7000
and more. In other words, there are few states with 5000–7000 kilometres and
therefore it seemed natural to place the threshold at 5000 square kilometres.9
In terms of topography, it should be noted that technological innovations over
the past fty years, particularly in aircraft and missile technologies, implies
that territorial obstacles are more easily overcome. In this way, 5000 square
kilometres oers next to no protection from air operations since such states
can be over ‑own in less than 20 minute. Such states are, therefore, absolutely
vulnerable. In Central and Eastern Europe all countries have landmasses that
exceed the 5000 square kilometre rule. In the Caribbean and Latin America,
on the other hand, most of the island states retain signicantly less territorial
surfaces. For instance, Dominica (751 square km), Saint Lucia (616 square km),
Antigua and Barbuda (442 square km), Barbados (430 square km), Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines (389 square km), Grenada (344 square km) and Saint Kitts
and Nevis (261 square km), are all absolutely small states.
Relatively—small states are those with a territorial surface that amounts to
10 per cent or less than any of its neighbours. is 10 per cent “rule” is based
on the relative strategic advantages that may be enjoyed by the greater state in
terms of strategic depth and relative vulnerability. In a conictual dyad marked
by relative asymmetry in territorial size, the smaller state is less capable of
threatening the entire larger state than a situation in the inverse. e ability of
a relatively small state to occupy a territory (and population) 90 per cent or more
its size is nearly impossible. Contrarily, states that are 90 (+) per cent larger
than an adversary is more capable of occupying the entire small state. is is
because of the relative strategic depth of the actors. Perhaps this explains the
more aggressive policies of some small states vis ‑à‑vis larger neighbours where
a small state is more likely to embark on a limited aims strategy of buer ‑zone
9 CIA Factbook 2013: available at: www.cia.gov/library/publications/the -world -factbook/geos/eg.html
(September 2013).
In the Shadow of Empire Mitchell Belfer
42
building; not to conquer its larger adversary, but to occupy areas of its territory
to establish a buer so that future combat would occur on the conquered ter‑
ritories rather than on the national territory of the small state with its inherent
vulnerabilities and lack of strategic depth. In Central and Eastern Europe, none
of the members of the Warsaw Pact had a population greater than 10 per cent of
the USSR, hence they were all relatively small. At the same time, in the Caribbean
and Central America, all the states were less than ten per cent of the US, Brazil,
and Mexico while in Latin (South) America, the majority of states are not less
than 10 per cent the size of the US; though Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana,
Uruguay and Paraguay do t the criteria for being relatively small compared to
the US (and Brazil).
ASummary of Small States
It should be noted that being a small state, no matter whether absolutely or
relatively small may be more vulnerable though this does not necessarily indicate
weakness; small states can be powerful even if at a demographic or territorial
disadvantage.10 However, in the clear majority of cases, small states retain very
limited power and hence tend not to be aggressive; they tend to rely on alliances
and alliances are, more often than not, restrictive. Or, to use the logic adopted
by Aron and echoed by Maass, ‘small states have to have a defensive “mind‑
set” and focus almost exclusively on their own security [… they are] unable to
pursue an agenda vis ‑à‑vis other states – because they lack the power to do so
[…]’ (Maass 2009: 73). is is conrmed with the cases of Central and Eastern
European and Caribbean and Latin American states during the Cold War. With
very few exceptions – and restraints and political violence against internal ac‑
tors notwithstanding – the Cold War period was one of interstate peace in the
regions in question. While some may point to the manner in which the Cold War
superpowers reined over the smaller states in their respective blocs, this work
argues that the reason for (largely) peaceful relations between small states in
the same bloc was the defensive nature of the international system at the time.
Rewards for aggression were not worth the consequences of political abortion.
Yet, the point of this work was not to illustrate the capabilities of small states
or to highlight the relative importance of such actors but rather to clearly note that
Small Powers are not simply weaker Great Powers […] they must be dened in
terms of something other than their relative power status […] there is a psycho‑
logical, as well as material, distinction between Great and Small Powers. e
latter earn their title not only by being weak but by recognising the implications
of that condition (Rothstein 1968: 29).
10 This is the main line of argumentation adopted by Handel (1981).
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 43
So, small states are still states and not annexes to larger entities, they partici‑
pate in international economic, diplomatic and political exchanges with others
and contribute to their local and regional security environments. In this way, by
dening small states according to their capabilities for dealing with domestic
and international aairs, emphasis shifts to issues of security whereby the small
state or small power cannot greatly aect the internal dynamics of its larger
neighbours and therefore opts to focus its political energies on enhancing its
own security position.
Hence, for this work, a small state
recognises that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabili‑
ties, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions,
processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power’s belief in its inability
to rely on its own means must also be recognised by the other states involved
in international politics (Rothstein 1968: 29).
And that a small state is
dened by its limited capability to: (1) inuence the security interests of, or
directly threaten, a great power; and (2) defend itself against an attack by an
equally motivated great power (Elman 1995: 171).
ese are based on the denition of small states developed above which notes
that they are either absolutely or relatively small in terms of population and
territorial size.
To be clear, small states are dened according to their demographic and ter‑
ritorial size. eir population size must not be larger than 1.5 million (absolute)
or 10 per cent of any one neighbouring state (relative). At the same time, the
territorial area of a small state must not exceed 5000 square kilometres (abso‑
lute) or be greater than 10 per cent than its neighbours.
Given these parameters, states that are deemed to be small also tend to have
certain behavioural and political traits: risk aversion, alliance dependent and
retain limited international inuence in pursuit of self‑ and international inter‑
ests. In short, small states retain limited international power based on limited
internal capabilities and the means of projection. e small state recognises its
own security vulnerabilities, as do others, and therefore the world is divided
into allies (potential or actual security providers) and adversaries (potential
or actual security diminishers); there are few international nuances. is may
explain the manner in which the states of Latin America, the Caribbean and
Central/Eastern Europe adjusted themselves following the demise of the USSR;
most quickly realigned to Washington. ere was little hesitation. Hungary,
Poland and the Czech Republic had, within the rst post ‑Soviet decade, done
In the Shadow of Empire Mitchell Belfer
44
a 180° turn, joined NATO and in 2004, the EU. en came the others, until the
sweeping majority of Europe emerged as a unied political and strategic bloc,
a process that had less to do with Euro ‑Atlantic values and more to do with the
tenuous conditions of being small states seeking adequate alliance xtures to
reduce vulnerabilities. In Latin America and the Caribbean as well. e vast
majority of states, and the people they contain, have polarised to the US with
only Cuba, Venezuela and, recently, Brazil, attempting to resist US inuence;
but only half ‑heartedly.
Small States in the Shadow of Empire
Small states matter in international relations; they always have. Whether refer‑
ring to Cuba – a fraction the size of the US and an even slimmer fraction of the
former USSR – Grenada, Czechoslovakia or Hungary (etc), it is clear that domi‑
nating small states and governing their ability to exercise control over foreign
and security policies has assumed a rite of passage for the world’s great and
superpowers. e Cold War may have gone down in history as being a stando
between the US and the USSR, between the alliances of NATO and the Warsaw
Pact, parliamentary democracy versus centrally planned communism, however,
beneath the shroud of ideology and brinkmanship are the actors that enabled
and denied the superpowers their international clout. e small states of the
Cold War were just as important as the superpowers that claimed to represent
them and their interests.
While this work was primarily based on evaluating the nature of small states
in the international shatterbelt during the Cold War, its more subtle ambition
was to classify the small state intellectually. Certainly, the eclipse of such actors
in mainstream discussions and discourses is the natural outcome of having
limited roles to play in a world governed by transnational engagements. How‑
ever, the essence of the Cold War was for the superpower blocs to nd ways to
dominate small states either directly (occupation) or via proxy. In Latin America,
the Caribbean Basin (and littoral) and throughout Central and Eastern Europe,
many of the small states assumed international signicance as a result. And now,
decades removed from that epoch, and international scholarship is only mar‑
ginally more aware of the impact small states produce in international systems
based on the quest for power. is works contribution then, is to be found in
how it viewed the political life of states forced to bask in the shadow of empire.
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 45
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belfer@mup.cz.
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 47
The Polish and Spanish Roads to Democracy over
the Last 25 Years: AComparative Analysis
AGNIESZKA KASIŃSKA METRYKA
Abstract: In contemporary Spain, we can observe the turbulence of the political system.
This is closely connected with ‘de -democratisation,’ which describes the erosion of exist-
ing values and the search for new forms of political participation and the organisation
of power. The main questions of this study refer to historical similarities in the transfor-
mation/transition of Poland and Spain and the nature of changes during the economic
crisis, and try to predict future events in these two countries. Geopolitical factors and
historical similarities enable us to use comparative methods to study the development
of the Polish and Spanish systems and the direction of changes. The research hypoth-
esis points to aweakening of ideological determinants and the growing importance of
economic factors (especially in Spain). Current issues in Spain help us draw the conclu-
sion that existing dierences between Poland and Spain aect thinking about politics.
Keywords: Spain, Poland, transition, elites, democratisation, de ‑democratisation
Introduction
Modern democracy is not a monolith – across European countries, it diers
both in terms of the level of democratisation of their political systems and the
way they treat achievements attained in ideological and functional contexts. e
aim of this study is to show the Polish and Spanish roads to democracy, which
are often compared because of the many similarities that have appeared in these
countries’ processes of recovery from non ‑democratic regimes.
In terms of theory, it is worth mentioning Giuseppe di Palma’s concept of
‘transition through transaction.’ is highlights a sequential model of transition
based on negotiations between the outgoing political power and new political
forces. Moreover, W.W. Rostow’s theory of democratic transition indicates
the existence of a preliminary phase (preparation), a decision ‑making phase
regarding the nature of the new system and a political normalisation phase.
In both the Polish and the Spanish examples, we can speak of such a model of
‘entering’ democracy and the gradual takeover of power.
The Polish and Spanish Roads to Democracy over the Last 25 Years Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
48
Similarities in the geopolitical situation and history of the two countries
were spotted by Joachim Lelewel (2006) as early as at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. As well as being traditionally Catholic and having shared
borders with Islamic empires in the past, both countries had lost territories and
their national identities and were, thus, shaped by other cultures, including the
Judaic culture (Sephardic Jews were expelled from Spain at the end of fteenth
century, and a small number of them settled in Poland).
Furthermore, Poland and Spain are located on opposite sides of Europe,
and for many years, the two countries each had a deep ‑rooted complex about
standing out by European standards (Górski 2012: 33). Being peripheral also
meant economic backwardness, and here the contribution of Franco’s govern‑
ment in Spain and the Communist government in Poland played an important
role. e desire to join or ‘return’ to a modern, dynamic Europe took hold like
a peculiar myth in both countries, and this was then reected in aspirations to
enter European Union structures. e balance of Polish and Spanish successes
and failures in the European Union is therefore another area which compels
us to make comparisons, especially since both states fall among the so ‑called
larger countries. In these assessments, however, the adopted census ends in
2009, when the economic crisis and the transformation of the political system
in Spain brought a close to the period of parallelisms.
Poland coped well with the global recession, and the consolidation of de‑
mocracy is still in progress in its political sphere. Spain, on the other hand, is
on the list of countries most aected by the crisis, a result of José María Az‑
nar’s decisions (which expanded the building sector excessively) and those of
his successor as Prime Minister, socialist J.L.R. Zapatero, elected in 2004. In
the political sphere, we can also note the turbulence of the political system in
Spain, and this is closely connected with the term ‘de ‑democratisation’, which
indicates the direction of these changes. e term describes a gradual change
from the previously adopted rules of the political game, the erosion of existing
values and the search for alternative forms of organising and exercising power.
As this process in Spain is in statu nascendi, it is worth analysing.
e three most important questions in this study concern:
– historical similarities in the transformation processes in Poland and Spain
– the nature of the changes that took place in both countries during the crisis
– forecasting trends for systemic changes in the compared countries
e research hypothesis implies a weakening of ideological determinants and
the growing importance of economic factors as drivers of change within a lib‑
eral democracy.
Historical similarities in the transformation processes require us to shed
some light on the background of those events both at micro and macro levels.
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 49
From Non -democracy to Democracy
It is assumed that the beginning of the Polish road to democracy was in 1989,
i.e. during the ‘Round Table Talks’ and the arrangements made subsequently at
that time, however that date is rather symbolic. e entropy of the system was
actually under way from its very beginning – it had gradually been losing capac‑
ity due to the dysfunction of both the adopted ideology and attempts to make it
a reality, especially in economic respects. Politics had primacy over economics
(as is clear from the slogan ‘a centrally controlled economy’); conicts between
the government and citizens were increasing; and so ‑called ‘safety valves,’ that
is, means to articulate social discontent, were missing. e above factors, and
in particular, subsequent economic crises and reactions to them in the form
of social mobilisation (e.g. through the multimillion ‑strong ‘Solidarity’ trade
union) led eventually to the reaching of a consensus between the government
and the opposition. What dened the transfer of power from the existing elite
was the peaceful nature of the old regime’s dismantling of processes and the
fact that the new foundations were built based on the implementation of some
of the existing establishment. Joining the government and the opposition, the
Catholic Church was the third partner at the meeting whose representatives
were to be guarantors for the arrangements then being made.
It should be noted here that the position of the Catholic Church in Poland had
never been as strong as it was during the country’s ght to become a democratic
country. It gave spiritual and nancial support to the opposition and, at the
same time, its representatives were able to establish a dialogue with the exist‑
ing government, which turned out be an important asset when the opposition
won the parliamentary elections in 1989 and needed to learn the rules of the
political game. As Antoszewski has noted: ‘Poland entered a path which had
never been followed by anyone before. e negotiations between the communist
government and the opposition, which became part of the political practices
of 1980–1981, were an experiment with an unknown conclusion’ (2004: 159).
Public support for the ongoing changes is well indicated by the size of the
Solidarity social movement, which at the peak of its activities drew 10 million
people, or 80 percent of workers. However, social acceptance for these shifts was
weakening gradually, which was a result of all the changes taking place at once
in politics, the economy and on social grounds. Deprived of the care functions of
the state, a large part of the population could not adapt to a free market economy.
Frustration was deepened by the dysfunctions of the newly ‑built system, among
which Poles most often mention: unemployment (33 %), health care problems
(13 %) and the struggle to make a living (9 %) (9 September 2014).
In politics, we observed political system transformations (the state was
renamed and the principle of sovereignty of the people restored), legislative
transformations (the senate was restored along with free elections), trans‑
The Polish and Spanish Roads to Democracy over the Last 25 Years Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
50
formations of the executive (the president’s oce was restored) and changes
to the judiciary and local government (local authority was given to the local
governments of cities and municipalities). In the economic realm, there was
a slowdown in ination, the elimination of price controls, currency convert‑
ibility, the opening up of the domestic market, promotion of private enterprise,
privatisation of state ‑owned enterprises, and modernisation of the tax system
and so on. What was dierent about these changes was the fact that they were
introduced simultaneously. is ‘shock’ transformation was very dierent from
the ‘moderate’ version that occurred in Hungary among other places.
As a result of the parliamentary elections in 1989, the current opposition
party gained power, and General Wojciech Jaruzelski became president, which
had been one of the points of agreement at the Round Table. In the general elec‑
tions in 1990, he was replaced by Solidarity movement leader Lech Walesa. It
was a great surprise for some Western observers to see that subsequent authori‑
ties were subject to change based on the swing of the pendulum between elites:
President Aleksander Kwasniewski, elected in 1995, had a left ‑wing provenance
and was the opposite of his predecessor (Kasińska ‑Metryka 2014).
It can therefore be concluded that by implementing democratic transforma‑
tions, Poland launched a process in Central and Eastern Europe whose results
were unpredictable. e presence of an appropriate geopolitical structure and,
above all, the determination of the opposition and the fact that the existing
authority was aware of the failure of the system, led to a peaceful shift through
the transition period – that is, the dismantling of the old regime in order to
build a formal basis for the new one.
is peaceful scenario failed to play out in many other countries which had
previously been in the orbit of the Soviet Union. While international conditions
predispose us to make comparisons with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, it should be noted here that both the economic situation and the role
of the opposition in countries such as Poland, Hungary and the former Czecho‑
slovakia were dierent. We can speak, therefore, about various transformations,
dynamics and depths of transitions taking place even in the same part of Europe.
e paradox of the Polish transformations was that power passed into the
hands of a trade union, an organisation that by denition does not rule but only
aects those in power (as a pressure group). In Spain, this role was played – in
another paradox – by King Juan Carlos, a follower of Franco’s non ‑democratic
regime, who, in fact, turned out to be its gravedigger.
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 51
The Spanish Transition (Transición la española)
e Spanish transition from non ‑democratic rule to democracy began earlier
than its Poland counterpart: it dates to 1975, when General F. Franco died. Under
the Generalissimo’s will, his vision of the state was to survive and be continued
by then prime minister Arias Navarro and Franco’s successor, Juan Carlos, the
grandson of Alfonso XIII.
e new monarch’s speech to the Cortes on 22 November 1975 signalled that
his plans were far from the guidelines left by Franco: ‘e idea of Europe would
be incomplete without reference to the presence of the Spaniards and without
the consideration of many of my predecessors’ actions. Europe should count
on Spain, and we, Spaniards, are Europeans.’1 It was the king’s determination,
along with support from his advisor Professor Torcuato Fernández ‑Miranda and
Adolfo Suárez, who was ‘born ‑again’ after being a Francoist that led to gradual
democratic changes. As analysts of that period recall, the monarch’s statement
that he wished for Spain to become a modern democracy and for subsequent
governments to be an expression of the free will of the majority of Spaniards,
became a self ‑fullling prophecy.
As in Poland, recovering from an authoritarian system was a step ‑by ‑step
process. It all started with the establishment of a bicameral parliament, and
this was followed by a referendum, which ratied the new, democratic consti‑
tution. e latter formally established the monarchy, guaranteed civil liberties
and formed a regional government. Further transformations of the political
scene concerned the party system, which – as in Poland – had ranged from
a multi ‑party set ‑up to one with two dominant parties. What distinguished Spain
was that this meant not so much the creation of new parties as the rebirth of
a multiparty system. In time, Spain gained a stable party scene (this happened
faster than it did in Poland), and its long ‑term activity has been unremarkable.
Current Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy is only the sixth prime minister to serve
since the beginning of the transition, whereas in Poland the ruling side has
changed frequently (Donald Tusk was the thirteenth president of the Council
of Ministers) with the rst re ‑election only taking place in 2011.
Another dierence concerns the role and position of conservative and so‑
cialist political parties. In Spain, the Socialists are a large and viable political
force while in Poland the lack of eective leadership in the left ‑wing parties
blocks their way to becoming independent authorities. Nevertheless, for many
Polish politicians, Spain’s Zapatero and his reforms became synonymous with
the modern Left. Both left ‑wing and right ‑wing politicians were eager to refer
to the Spanish example: Kwaśniewski tried to follow Spain’s Socialist Work‑
1 Membership of the European Community (EC) was aforeign policy priority, and in July 1977, Suarez’sgov-
ernment submitted an application to join the EC (Górski 2012).
The Polish and Spanish Roads to Democracy over the Last 25 Years Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
52
ers’ Party (PSOE – Partido Socialista Obrero Español); Buzek and Balcerowicz
pointed to the achievements of its People’s Party (PP); Marcinkiewicz declared
that Poland, as a result of its reforms, would ‘overtake Spain in the space of
the next four to ve years’ and Napieralski was even referred to as the ‘Polish
Zapatero.’ Zapatero’s rule ended when Spain entered the crisis period faced
with growing political disenchantment. e same young Spaniards who, at
the time of the new prime minister’s election, chanted, ‘Just do not fail us,’ in
2011 formed the ‘Indignants Movement,’ which went beyond Spain’s borders.
It is important to note that the wave of ‘indignation’ did not redirect to Poland.
Young Poles gathered in 2012 during the Anti ‑Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA) protests, but they did not follow the slogan ‘Be outraged!” is may sup‑
port the hypothesis that the absence of a direct threat to the economy weakens
willingness to decide about the political system.
e position of young people in Spain, i.e. those below 25 years old, is
particularly dicult because unemployment rates are highest among this age
group (at 46 %), and there is a lack of alternative political choices. e stable
two ‑party system, which Poles have been jealous of, has proved to be a trap in the
minds of young Spaniards. Currently, however, this state of aairs is changing.
e latest elections to European Parliament surprised both Spain and Poland.
A rather young group called ‘Podemos’ emerged as a third political party in
Spain. It is critical of the main groups and opposed to social inequalities; it also
calls for a new model of redistribution of nancial resources, the combating of
corruption and the provision of social guarantees for citizens. A pro ‑European
party, it is sceptical of the functioning of the European Union though not as
sceptical as Janusz Korwin ‑Mikke’s outt, which was successful in Poland and
saw its representatives enter European Parliament. Both parties based their
programmes on opposition to the status quo and channelled their message to
‘young, dissatised’ people. However, while Podemos’s Pablo Iglesias is a young
man who came to politics from the academic world, Korwin ‑Mikke is a 72‑year‑
‑old political veteran, who has repeatedly held state positions.
While the increasing number of Eurosceptics does not have a major impact
on current politics in the European Union, it is a trend that cannot be under‑
estimated. At this point, it should also be recalled that when Spain joined the
European Community in 1986, its citizens were less sceptical of the idea of
integration than the Poles were on their accession in 2004. Currently, it is the
Poles who strongly support the cause of European integration, which is also
a product of economic factors. Yet another area where Poles and Spaniards have
dierent attitudes to the European Union is ideas about inuencing decisions
made within the Community. In the days of the Spanish EU presidency in 2010,
more than half of Spain’s population was of the opinion that its citizens could
only have a slight impact on the decisions of the Union. A year later, when
Poland held the presidency, 35% of Polish respondents said that their country
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 53
probably had some inuence on EU politics and almost the same number (i.e.
34%) said it probably did not (Sroka 2012: 84–85). e scepticism of Span‑
iards may come as a surprise, especially given the information that ‘Spain has
received the biggest amount of funding from the Structural Funds” (Piecuch
2004: 250). Growth of the Spanish economy accelerated in the ’90 s thanks
to the huge injection of funding from the EU budget, but as subsequent years
showed, these funds were not always properly spent. Insucient modernisation
of the country, overinvestment in construction, and above all, excessive ease
when it came to taking out bank loans, led Spain into crisis.
e economic collapse revealed the dysfunction of the whole system, and
this is where we can observe the parting of ways in the Polish and Spanish
transformations. e most pressing problem in Spain – as in Italy and Greece
– was corruption, which was growing at all levels. e media began to disclose
information about unethical behaviour both at regional level Catalan Presi‑
dent J. Pujol had been hiding a fortune inherited from his father for 30 years
(Lipczak 2014: 43–45) – and in the central government: according to news on
10 September 2014, the People’s Party was being funded by the construction
sector, and this included current Prime Minister Rajoy, who had for many years
received additional remuneration.
Arguably. the economic crisis caused a domino eect that did not spare even
the monarchy. is – it seemed – timeless symbol of historical continuity and
aspirations to state democratisation, was equally susceptible to moral scandals
and to inuence from other state institution. e acts considered unethical were
an expensive hunting trip to Botswana by Juan Carlos and the embezzlement of
funds from Noos Foundation, which had been founded and led by his son ‑in ‑law,
with the participation of the king’s daughter Cristina. at Spain’s princess was
facing trial was an unprecedented event for Spaniards and the end of an era.
e abdication of the king in June 2014 fullled the image of a country strug‑
gling with internal problems. Even so, it was forced by Prime Minister Rajoy to
pursue an ‘austerity policy’ as part of the battle against the crisis.
Conclusion
In Poland, we are still observing a long ‑term stalemate between the Civic Plat‑
form (PO) government and the right ‑wing Law and Justice Party (PiS – Prawo
iSprawiedliwość), whereas in Spain there is pressure to ‘unlock’ the two ‑party
political scene and give it a new spin. A party called ‘Vox’ founded in December
2013 by former Partido Popular members; the Podemos group led by leftist
Pablo Iglesias; and the Indignants Movement, are just some examples of the
changes taking place in Spain. eir common feature is citizens disillusioned
by politics, whatever their ideological stripe. It is also a feature that sets Spain
apart from Poland because in the latter, political provenance – whether Com‑
The Polish and Spanish Roads to Democracy over the Last 25 Years Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
54
munist or opposed – still (though to a lesser extent than at the beginning of
the transformation) determines dividing lines among the electorate. Economic
determinants aect the current level of support for the government, but not
as profoundly as they do in Spain. We can therefore conclude that the Spanish
and Polish roads away from non ‑democratic regimes to democracy have many
features in common, but in recent years, we have also seen some dierences
that demonstrate dierent ways of functioning in a hard ‑won democracy. e
common features are:
– the peaceful and gradual nature of the transition from non ‑democracy to
democracy
– the fundamental role of political leaders endowed with strong personali‑
ties in initiating and implementing changes. In the case of Poland, it was
an ordinary worker who was elevated to the role of president; in Spain,
it was the monarch himself who limited his authority by adopting a new
constitution
– the participation of ancien regime activists in implementing democratic
changes: In Poland, politicians from the old system perceived the need
for its reform, while in Spain, former Francoist ‘converts’ became the
closest associates of the king
– uncertainty about the results of the initiated transition, which could end
in the restoration of the old order or reconstruction of society
– public support for the direction of the implemented changes, especially
in the axiological (moral) layer of the culture
– the need to redene the role of the Catholic Church in the new reality
Among the distinguishing features of the compared systems, we should men‑
tion:
– the dierent positions of the Catholic Church: Franco gave the church
privileges while in Poland, it was persecuted in the early stages of Com‑
munism
– the relative speed with which the party scene stabilised in Spain and the
great variability of the Polish party system
– the stability of oce in Spain and the frequent exchange of ruling elites
in Poland
– the ideological divergence of the PP and PSOE in Spain, and the ‘mixing’
of ideologies and values in the programmes of the two largest Polish par‑
ties that may be seen as right ‑wing and centre ‑right respectively
– the political and social activism of Spanish youth in times of crisis and
the lack of comparable activism in Poland
It can therefore be concluded that while the historical comparison of mecha‑
nisms of peaceful transformation in Poland and Spain is justied, and it is
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 55
true that both countries have struggled with the ‘spirit’ of previous regimes,
the economic crisis has initiated dierent processes in these systems. When it
comes to politically stable Poland, the state has managed to maintain a good
and steady level of development, and the bipolar division of its political scene
has not prompted further fragmentation. Voting patterns of the electorate have
been predictable, and the PO and PiS have fought each other to align the neg‑
ligible dierences in their percentages of the nation’s support. A large number
of young Poles have found employment abroad, adapting more eciently to the
conditions of the open European labour market.
e Spanish nancial crisis, on the other hand, has unveiled increasing dys‑
functions in the local system in both the political and economic domains. is
has given rise to separatist eorts coming from Catalonia and social frustration.
For the rst time since Spain embarked on the road to democracy, it has not
been relevant whether power rests in the hands of PSOE or PP since Spaniards
(especially in the younger generation) feel discouraged by politics in general.
Revocation of the trust vested in the monarchy until now has tipped the scales
of social discontent. It is an open question whether the new king, Philip VI and
the parties debuting on the political scene will ‘re ‑enchant’ Spanish politics. It
is also highly uncertain whether Rajoy’s austerity measures will translate into
the recovery of Spain’s position on the map of a united Europe.
References
Antoszewski, Andrzej (2004): Wzorce rywalizacji politycznej we współczesnych demokracjach
europejskich. Wrocław, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
Dwornik, Bartłomiej (2010): Historia bezrobocia: pracę traciło nawet 9 tysięcy osób dziennie,
Money (13 January), available at http://www.money.pl/gospodarka/raporty/artykul/historia;
bezrobocia;prace;tracilo;nawet;9;tysiecy;osob;dziennie,17,0,575761.html (9 September 2014).
Górski, Eugeniusz (2012): Polska iHiszpania w integrującej się Europie w perspektywie histo-
rycznej ifilozoficznej, in Sroka, A.M.– Torres Kubrían, R.D., eds., Polska iHiszpania w Unii
Europejskiej. Doświadczenia iperspektywy. Warszawa, INP UW.
Kasińska -Metryka, Agnieszka (2014): Dilemas del liderazgo contemporáneo. Annales Universitatis
Mariae Curie -Skłodowska 21 (1).
Lelewel, Joachim (2006): Historyczna paralela Hiszpanii zPolską. Warszawa, Wyd. DiG.
Lipczak, Aleksandra (2014): Kłopoty ojca niezależnej Katalonii. Polityka 34: 43–45.
Piaseczny, Jan (2013): Plaga korupcji w Hiszpanii, Przeglad, available at http://www.przeglad-
-tygodnik.pl/pl/artykul/plaga -korupcji -hiszpanii (9 September 2014).
Piecuch, Jakub (2004): Hiszpania w Unii Europejskiej. Aspekty rozwoju regionalnego. Warszawa,
Wyd. Twigger.
The Polish and Spanish Roads to Democracy over the Last 25 Years Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
56
Rostow, W. (1962): The Stages of Economic Growth. London, Cambridge University Press.
Sroka, Anna (2012): Hiszpańskie ipolskie przewodnictwo w Radzie Europejskiej: porównanie, in
Sroka, A. M. and Torres Kubrían, R.D., eds., Polska iHiszpania w Unii Europejskiej. Doświadczenia
iperspektywy, 84–85, Warszawa, INP UW.
Agnieszka Kasińska ‑Metryka is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Management
and Administration, Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Poland. Since 2000, she
has been the President of Polish Political Marketing Association. The core areas of
her research are political leadership, political marketing, and social communication.
E ‑mail: agnieszkakm@wp.pl
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 57
European Tax Policy and the Single Common
Market
1
MONIKA BUŠOVSKÁ
Abstract: Achieving asingle and common market is one of the main priorities during
theEuropean Union (EU) integration process. For this purpose, it was planned to unify
tax rules throughout theentire Community of 28 countries. Subsequently, the original
purely economic -oriented cooperation gave rise to aCommunity that is now working
together in anumber of areas, of which taxation is one. The main question of this paper
is whether European Union tax policy hasmet the objective of asingle common market.
This research focuses on the issue of whether tax systems converge in the areas of tax
burdens and tax rates. Beta- and sigma -convergences are used to meet the goals of
the paper. Anumber of models are created as proof of this convergence. The results
suggest evidence of convergence in the areas of tax burdens and tax rates during the
analysed period.
Keywords: convergence, tax burden, tax rates, EU, beta ‑convergence, sigma ‑con‑
vergence
Introduction
Currently the European Union is a unique community that combines both eco‑
nomic and political partnerships. e rst step in European integration was
to strengthen economic cooperation among the member states whose goal it
was to establish a single market (Adamkova 2003). is means the free move‑
ment of goods, persons, services and capital (European Commission 2010)
and a common currency, the euro (see Helisek 2013 for a detailed discussion).
If a country wants to join the European Union, it rst needs to complete ac‑
cession negotiations. ese basically consist of an agreement on how and when
the candidate country will adopt and implement the rules and procedures of
1 This paper was published in relation with Project IGA F1/2/2013, The Project of Department of Public
Finance, Faculty of Finance and Accounting with the number IGA F1/2/2013 named “The public finance
in developed countries“.
European Tax Policy and the Single Common Market Monika Bušovská
58
the current members of the Community. However, the negotiations also include
nancial matters (e.g. concerning the new member’s contribution to the EU
budget) and possible transitional measures and exceptions. As a result, the
original purely economically ‑oriented cooperation gave rise to a Community
that is now working together in a number of areas. ese include a tax policy
that – through harmonisation – can contribute to the creation of a single market
by eliminating the distortions that arise from movements between individual
member states.
Tax coordination, as a tool for preventing the emergence of very diverse
policies, and tax ‑harmonisation, as a means of approximating tax rates, have
been subjects of much debate since the beginning of European integration. e
issues of coordination, approximation and harmonisation of tax systems in
the EU are discussed, for instance, in several works (Kubátová 2010; Láchová
2007) that may familiarise readers with the various directives and regulations
that aect the tax systems of the member states.
e main tax policy provisions are articles 95–99 (European Commission
2010). ey prohibit the imposing of non ‑domestic (or similar) taxes on prod‑
ucts imported from other EU members and state that tax reimbursements must
not be higher than the originally imposed tax. In addition, there is a limit on
disadvantages arising from the use of cascading sales tax and a ban on the
favourable treatment for exports of member states through tax relief. Lastly,
indirect tax legislation is harmonised so that the single common market can
become eective.
Among the main tools of European tax policy are tax approximation, co
‑
ordination and harmonisation. Tax approximation moves in the direction of
tax cooperation, which may not meet the nal aim of tax convergence among
EU members and should only bring their tax systems closer to each other. Ap‑
proximation is usually used if EU members reject greater harmonisation and
are trying to leverage tax law dierences to attract foreign investment.
Tax coordination is an international procedure leading to tax system con‑
vergence. Another aim is to ensure the exchange of data about tax residents
between individual states. is is pursued by creating bilateral or multilateral
taxation agreements. As part of the contracts, recommendations are made to
amend tax laws, especially those on harmful tax competition. In contrast with
tax harmonisation, tax coordination does not lead to uniform taxation.
Tax harmonisation is the process of tax system unication in the EU. e
aim is not total but only partial harmonisation, dened as the harmonising of
provisions that disrupt the smooth functioning of the single market.
is is based on the creation of common rules for all members of the Euro‑
pean Union. is has three main phases although the harmonisation process
need not pass through all of them. e rst phase is the selection of the tax
which needs to be harmonised; the second is the harmonising of the tax base;
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 59
and the third is the harmonising of tax rates. Indirect taxation is addressed at the
highest level of harmonisation, and a value ‑added tax was created especially for
the single common market. Tax harmonisation is based on the slow unication,
otherwise known as convergence, of taxation in the EU (Vondrackova 2012).
Avi ‑Yonah (2010) believes that convergence is a positive phenomenon be‑
cause it reduces the scope for ‘unfair’ tax arbitrage and adds the price of higher
transaction costs. All member states can benet from a single tax system, and
no distortions will emerge. However, tax convergence has its opponents as well
as its supporters. Cultural dissimilarities and the need for freedom to adopt tax
laws based on dierent structures, are the main arguments for rejecting tax
convergence. Another negative aspect is the loss of the tax competitiveness of
individual member states.
Mach (2004) points to the need to preserve tax competition because without
this competition, governments can behave like monopolies and impose exces‑
sive tax. Tax competition leads to a decrease in tax rates, but lower tax rates do
not necessarily mean a decline in tax revenues; on the contrary, such revenues
can increase due to the wider tax base. is is conrmed by the experience in
the US, where the tax system consists of federal and national taxes without any
tax harmonisation and the common market is not disrupted.
Nevertheless, the European Union has persisted in its eorts to harmonise
taxation, which should help speed up the creation of the single common mar‑
ket. is goal should produce a single tax system for the entire Community in
which all members enjoy the same advantages.
is paper aims to verify whether there is convergence across the tax systems
of the member states. In other words, it evaluates, quanties and illustrates the
process of integrating European taxation.
Beta ‑convergence is used to verify the objective of this study (Barro 1992).
is approach is usually used for the analysis of gross domestic products (Bau‑
mol 1986; Boyle 1999). Esteve (2000) studied the tax burden for the six main
subdivisions of the OECD tax classication for 1967–1994 by using unit root
tests with modications. Delgado (2006) deals with the total tax burden for
1965–2004 by taking several benchmarks whose results suggest a reduced
number of convergence paths.
Data
e level of the tax burden can be measured and compared using various indi‑
cators. e important points are that statutory tax rates may include not only
nominal tax rates but also temporary or permanent rates or any additional
relief applied in particular countries at various levels of government, and their
construction is dierent across EU countries. Statutory tax rates cannot play
the role of objective indicators in international comparisons (Blechova 2008).
European Tax Policy and the Single Common Market Monika Bušovská
60
e paper uses implicit tax rates that measure the average eective tax burden
for dierent types of economic income or activities and reect the impact of
taxes on economic activities according to their functions (Petranova 2004).
e net personal average tax rate is a measure of an employee’s total wage‑
‑based tax burden. It is the sum of personal income tax plus employee social
security contributions minus cash benets, and is expressed as a percentage
of gross wages. e net personal average tax rate is represented diagrammati‑
cally and applied to personal income tax. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of
net personal average tax rate.
e tax burden is understood as the overall tax burden, which is determined
as a proportion of total tax revenue (including social security contributions)
to GDP at current prices. Put otherwise, it is a macroeconomic indicator which
reects the overall eective level of the tax burden (Becker – Elsayyad 2012). e
tax mix refers to the structure of the tax burden, or alternatively, the proportion
of taxation in the total tax revenue. is indicator may be used, for instance,
when examining whether a country tends to prefer direct or indirect taxation.
e source of the data is secondary information provided by the OECD
(2012) and the European Commission (2007 and 2012). Tax mixes are divided
into classes according to OECD classications, and missing data were left out
for the purpose of subsequent analysis. e paper uses abbreviations for the
individual groups of taxes: ‘TB’ denotes the tax burden; ‘TOI’ stands for taxes
on income and benets (numbered 1000 in the OECD classication); ‘SSC’ is
social security contributions (2000); ‘TOW’ is taxes on payroll and workforce
(3000); ‘TOP’ is property taxes (4000); ‘TOG’ is taxes on goods and services
(5000); and ‘OT’ is other taxes (6000).
e currency used is the United States dollar for the reason that the euro did
not exist for all of the reference period. e purchasing power parity rate (PPP)
estimates the monetary amount which has the same purchasing power in dif‑
ferent countries. e term ‘European Union’ includes 27 of the member states.
Croatia was not included in the sample due to the absence of data.
Methodology
e methods used were comparison and sorting for the specication and instanti‑
ation of each tax system as well as a deductive approach to determine the general
theoretical background and formulate concrete conclusions. An analogy ‑based
method was also used to resolve the question of similarities and dierences
across tax systems. e most important methods were analysis and synthesis.
e analytic method uses regression analysis applying a least ‑squares meth‑
od. e time period 1965–2001 was analysed; time lines were stationary and
autocorrelation of residuum was ruled out. To analyse the tax rate convergence,
only a limited time frame was used due to the unavailability of data. ese time
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 61
periods are always mentioned, and they are also longer than ten years. e only
limitation here was that beta ‑convergence speed was not comparable. e mean
was used to determine average values for the whole EU (27 member states due
to the unavailability of data for Croatia) (Bušovská 2014).
• Beta ‑convergence
is method was also used by Barro (1992), Sosvila Rivero (2006), Furcedi
(2005) and Slavik (2007). Beta ‑convergence considers the growth of variables
which depend on initial values (the so ‑called Barro regression). e concept
of convergence focuses on the fact that countries with initial values that vary
more from the European average approach it faster than countries with values
closer to that average. e current study, thus, deals with the approximation
of the tax burden and tax rates of individual countries to European average
values. is approach allows for the estimation of the annual growth rate or
rate of β ‑convergence:
(1) where t is the last year of analysis (2011); 0 is the initial year of analysis
(1965 or the year of the country’s EU accession); y represents the value of tax
mixes during dierent time periods or the tax burden; α is a level constant;
β is the regression coecient whose signicant negative value indicates beta‑
‑convergence (in other words, the approximation of observed variables); and
ε is a random component.
Twenty observations were used for tax mixes and the tax burden, and the
missing values were abstracted. e number of observations used for the tax
rate analysis is shown under the result tables because available data varied.
Furthermore, it should be emphasised that beta ‑convergence is a condition for
sigma ‑convergence where the latter uses absolute values. is relationship does
not necessarily apply conversely, however (Slavik, 2007).
Unit root tests were used to test the stationary nature of the time series; to
exclude the autocorrelation of the residuum, the Durbin ‑Watson test was ap‑
plied. All results were veried with graphic residuum tests. All models passed
the above tests. We can therefore say that they are robust enough to be satisfac‑
tory and conclusive.
• Sigma ‑convergence
Sigma ‑convergence is based on the development of variance over time. is
variance can be analysed using dierent indicators; here, standard deviation
was chosen.
In statistics and probability theory, the standard deviation measures devia‑
tions from the average (mean) value. A low standard deviation indicates that the
data points tend to be very close to the mean; a high standard deviation shows
European Tax Policy and the Single Common Market Monika Bušovská
62
that the data points are spread over a large range of values. Standard deviation
is the most widely used measure of variability. erefore, the lower the standard
deviation, the higher the convergence will be.
(2)where the standard deviation, ai is the amount of the tax mix for the i ‑th
year and n ‑th state, and E(a) represents the arithmetic mean for the EU. e
sigma ‑convergence is constructed in order to obtain additional information
about the development of the beta ‑convergence since the latter cannot itself
provide that information (Slavik 2007). e lower the standard deviation, the
greater the convergence (and vice versa).
Results
• European Tax Burden and Tax Mixes
A summary of the results is provided in Table 1. e negative slope coecient β
represents the convergence of the tax burden. e determining coecient also
points to the fact that the initial values in the model can explain about 75 %
of the variance rate for convergence in the period analysed. e analysis of the
tax burden presents the convergence of variables for the entire period. is ap‑
proximates the tax burden in the member states in the time frame 1965–2011.
e table above also shows convergence of the groups of tax mixes over the
whole period between 1965 and 2011. is means that the tax burden and its
structures converged.
As mentioned above, sigma ‑convergence completes the picture of beta‑
‑convergence and is used to obtain additional information about the develop‑
ment of that beta ‑convergence. e graphs above provide information about the
development of the sigma ‑convergence in the period analysed. Large values for
the standard deviation indicate a higher level of divergence and vice versa. An
increasing slope of the curve depicts divergence while a decreasing tendency
reects the convergence of the tax burden, tax mixes and implicit tax rates.
Since the mid‑1980 s, the EU area has been a ‘high’ tax zone. As can be seen
from Figure 2, the increase in the overall levels of the tax burden took place in
two successive waves. e rise in total revenue as a share of GDP was driven
with a lagged eect by rapid growth in government expenditure that began
in the 1960 s and continued until the mid‑1990 s. While diering in size and
composition across countries, the general growth in expenditure was mainly
the result of increased social transfers in the ’70 s and ’80 s. ese were trig‑
gered by political measures a decade earlier as well as by the need to confront
a sharp economic downturn and an increasing level of unemployment after the
rst and second oil price shocks.
Figure 3 also shows that the growing trend in the standard deviation changed
in 1987; from this point, there is convergence of the overall tax burden and tax
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 63
mixes in the EU as well (Figure 4). is was caused, inter alia, by the tax com‑
petition begun by Ronald Reagan in the US (CNN Money 2010) and Margaret
atcher in the UK (BBC 2014).
Another area of interest is the end of the analysed period (the period 2007 –
2011) when the global economic crisis shocked the EU and taxation diverged.
e crisis (together with scal policy measures adopted nationally) had a strong
impact on the level and composition of tax revenue between 2009 and 2011,but
the rst eects were already visible in 2008. It should be noted that even when
accrual methods are used for recording, changes in legislation and economic
activity tend to have a delayed impact on tax revenue. In 2011, tax revenues
increased substantially in terms of GDP; this was due to the absolute amount
of tax revenues with nominal GDP growing less than those revenues. is is
at least partially due to the proactive tax measures taken by member states in
recent years to correct their decits. Active revenue ‑raising measures in some
states include increasing the VAT rate and introducing new taxes such as mem‑
ber states such as increasing the VAT rate and introducing new taxes including
additional taxes on nancial institutions (bank levies, surtaxes, payroll taxes),
air passenger duties and property taxes. When specic historical events occur,
the tax burden increases in the whole Community, but divergences may also be
seen in the tax systems of individual states.
Up to the ’70 s, there is noticeable divergence in the tax mixes for SSC, TOI
and TOG. e reasons for this are the same as those inuencing the tax burden:
oil price shocks and special legislative arrangements. In the period up to 1985,
this divergence turns into convergence. e cause of the turnaround for indirect
tax mixes may also be the mandatory introduction of a value ‑added tax in EU
member states, which took place in the 1980s (Bušovská 2012).
According to the sigma ‑convergence, the tax mixes for TOP and OT do not
meet the convergence objective. In this case, however, it cannot be claimed that
there is divergence since sigma‑ convergence is not a condition for conrmation
of beta ‑convergence, and the latter was not refuted by the data about these taxes
for the period 1965 – 2011 (Slavik 2007).
European Implicit Tax Rates
To verify whether personal income tax rates tax converged, net personal average
tax rates were analysed for the period 2000–2011. Table 2 shows results of beta‑
‑convergence. ese rates were established for employees in dierent income
groups according to their specic social situation. e analysis conrmed the con‑
vergence of net personal average tax rates for all taxpayers who earned an average
or below ‑average wage, regardless of whether or not they had children and whether
or not they were married. In contrast, the convergence was not veried for high‑
‑income residents who earned more than the average wage in their member state.
European Tax Policy and the Single Common Market Monika Bušovská
64
Implicit tax rates provide a measure of the eective average tax burden on
dierent types of economic income or activities. e implicit tax rate on con‑
sumption is dened as all consumption taxes divided by the nal consumption
expenditure of private households in the economic territory. e implicit tax
rate on employment is dened as the sum of all direct and indirect taxes and
social contributions by employees and employers applied to employment in‑
come divided by the total remuneration of employees working in the economic
territory. e implicit tax rate is calculated as total capital taxes divided by total
prot and property income from corporations and households (EC 2012).
For implicit tax rates, the least ‑squares method was also used but with 25 ob‑
servations. β ‑convergence was veried for implicit tax rates on consumption
and labour at a 1% level of signicance – Table 3. ese taxes cover the largest
share of tax mixes in the member states. is means that convergence was veri‑
ed in this area. Convergence was not conrmed for the implicit tax rates on
capital. is was largely due to the dierent attitudes that EU members take to
taxing prots.
e sigma ‑convergence of implicit tax rates conrms the results of the
beta ‑convergence analysis. Figure 5 shows results of sigma ‑convergence. e
standard deviations of implicit tax rates for labour and consumption decreased
over the whole period analysed, which suggests empirical evidence of the con‑
vergence of these implicit tax rates. In the context of tax mixes, tax revenues
from indirect taxes on labour (personal income tax, social contributions, etc.)
represent the main share of tax mixes in EU countries (EC 2012).
Conclusion
e results presented reect traditional neo ‑classical methods used to determine
the convergence of tax systems in European countries. is paper, thus, deals
with the question of whether the European Union’s tax policy fulls the objec‑
tive of creating a single common market.
To meet this objective, regression analysis with a least ‑squares method
was used, and beta‑ and sigma ‑convergence were also deployed. e beta‑
‑convergence between 1965 and 2011 for the group of 27 member states conrms
the convergence of the tax burden and tax mixes (graded according to OECD
classications). e sigma ‑convergence completes the overall picture of con‑
vergence of the tax mix and tax burden. In this case, using sigma ‑convergence
conrmed the convergence of the tax burden since 1985, as well as the same
result for the tax mixes for income tax and indirect taxes.
Since, however, the convergence of the tax burden and its structure do not
imply the convergence of overall taxation, an analysis of tax rates was also per‑
formed. Of importance here is the fact that statutory tax rates may include not
only nominal tax rates but also temporary or permanent rates or any additional
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 65
relief applied in particular countries by various levels of government, and their
construction is dierent across EU countries. Such statutory tax rates cannot
full the role of objective indicators for international comparisons (Blechova
2008). For this reason, implicit tax rates were used. Implicit tax rates measure
the average eective tax burden of dierent types of economic income or ac‑
tivities and reect the impact of taxes on economic activities according to their
functions. For personal taxation, net personal average tax rates were used. ese
rates measure an employee’s total wage ‑based tax burden. is is the sum of
personal income tax plus employee social security contributions minus cash
benets and is expressed as a percentage of gross wages.
e beta ‑convergence veried the convergence of net personal income tax
rates established for dierent income groups of employees according to their
specic social situation. e only exceptions were high ‑earning taxpayers who
were part of a couple. An analysis of implicit tax rates for consumption and
labour conrmed the convergence using beta‑ and sigma ‑convergence methods
as well.
e result of this analysis is the nding that taxation has been converging
in the European Union. e evidence of converging tax burdens, tax mixes and
tax rates also serves as proof that the EU’s tax policy for member states has
succeeded in creating a single common market where there are no distortions
and all member states enjoy the same benets.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is no academic consensus on the
question of whether convergence through tax harmonisation is the right ap‑
proach considering the issues that surround the dierent economic structures,
political preferences and national scal autonomy of member states, as well as
their dierent needs and objectives (Emerson 1992).
References
Adamkova, V. (2003): Ekonomická apolitická integrace Evropy: vybrané kapitoly. Praha: Oeco-
nomica.
Avi -Yonah, Reuven (2010): Tax Convergence and Globalization. Michigan Law, University of
Michigan Law School, No. 214: available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
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Barro, R.J.– Sala -I-Martin, X. (1992): Convergence. Journal of Political Economy 100 (2): 223–251.
Baumol, W. (1986): Productivity Growth, Convergence and Welfare: What the Long -run Data
Show. American Economic Review 76 (5): 1075–1085.
BBC (2013): More Information about: Margaret Thatcher: available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
history/people/margaret_thatcher (15 December 2014).
European Tax Policy and the Single Common Market Monika Bušovská
66
Becker, J.– Elsayyad, M. (2012): The Evolution and Convergence of OECD Tax Systems. Verein
für Socialpolitik, 13, No. 1– 2, pp. 4– 18: available at intereconomics.eu/downloads/getfile.
php?id=676 (15 December 2014).
Blechova, B. (2008): Charakteristika přístupů používaných vEU pro hodnocení efektivního
daňového zatížení příjmů korporací, in Teoretické apraktické aspekty veřejných financí.
Praha, Oeconomica: available at kvf.vse.cz/storage/1215673776_sb_blechovbeata.pdf (15
December 2014).
Boyle, G. E.– McCarthy, T. G. (1999): ASimple Measure of Beta Convergence. Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics 59 (2): 257–264.
Busovka, M. (2012): Convergence of VAT Rates within EU Integration, in Teoretické apraktické
aspekty veřejných financí. Praha, Nakladatelství Oeconomica,
Busovska, M. (2014): Convergence of Tax Burden, Tax Revenues and Implicit Tax Rates in Euro-
pean Union Countries. Ekonomický časopis 4.
CNN Money (2010): Taxes: What People Forget about Reagan: available at http://money.cnn.
com/2010/09/08/news/economy/reagan_years_taxes/ (15 December 2014).
Delgado, F. J. (2006): Are the Tax Mix and the Fiscal Pressure Converging in the European Union?
Working Papers, No. 11–06. Oviedo, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales.
European Commission (2007): Taxation Trends: available at: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_cus-
toms/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_structures/article_5171_en.htm (15 Decem-
ber 2014).
European Commission (2010): Konsolidované znění smlouvy ofungování Evropské unie: avail-
able at http://eur -lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:cs
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toms/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_structures/index_en.htm (15 December
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Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union. Brussels, Oxford
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Esteve, V.– Sosvilla -Rivero, S.– Tamarit, C. (2000): Convergence in Fiscal Pressure across EU
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Furcedi, D. (2005): and -convergence: AMathematical Relation of Causality. Economics Letters
89 (2): 212–215.
Helísek, M. (2013): How Far Along is Euro Adoption in the Czech Republic? Benefits for Businesses
Still Remain. Central European Business Review 2 (1): 21–27.
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Mach, P.(2004.): Daňová konkurence musí být zachována: available at http://www.petrmach.
cz/node/52 (15 December 2014).
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Petranova, L. (2009):Implicitní daňové sazby vČR – komparace se státy EU. Praha, Academic
thesis supervised by Květa Kubátová.
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cuni.cz/dokumenty -download/1404045094/ (15 December 2014).
Appendix
Figure 1: The net personal average tax rate
Source: http://comparativetaxation.treasury.gov.au/content/report/html/06_Chapter_4-08.asp
European Tax Policy and the Single Common Market Monika Bušovská
68
Table 1: Beta convergence of fiscal pressure in the EU area during 1965–2011
TB TOI SSC TOW TOP TOG OT
α3,188 -0,682 -0,17 -2,298 -1,393 -0,905 -0,619
β–0.879 –0.537 –0.262 –0.529 –0.394 –0.905 –0.619
t–7.563 –3.622 –1.956 –1.911 –3.151 – 4.675 –2.610
P-value <10–4 0,002 0,065 0,098 0,005 1,6*10–4 0,026
R20,751 0,422 0,168 0,342 0,343 0,535 0,405
Source: OECD (2012), own processing
Figure 2: Development of tax burden in the EU during 1965–2011 (%)
Source: OECD (2012), own processing
Figure 3: Sigma convergence of tax burden in the EU during 1965–2011 (%)
Source: OECD (2012), own processing
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 69
Figure 4: Sigma convergence of Tax Mixes in the EU during 1965–2011 (%)
Source: OECD (2012), own processing
Table 2: Beta convergence of net personal average tax rates during 2000–20112
67 % of
average
earnings-
single
100 % of
average
earnings-
single
167 % of
average
earnings-
single
67 %
average
earnings
100 %
average
earnings
100 %
average
earn-
ings2
children
100 %
average
earnings
2 children
+ 67 %
other
incomes
100 %
average
earnings
2
children–
single3
2
children–
single4
+ 33 %
other
incomes – couple
+ 33 %
other
incomes
– couple – couple
α0,551 0,612 0,55 1,12 0,535 0,059 0,135 0,034
β-0,187 -0,192 -0,187 -0,514 -0,202 -0,061 -0,161 -0,087
t-2,38 -2,197 -2,38 -2,167 -3,27 -0,415 -1,467 -0,956
P-value10,028 0,041 0,028 0,053 0,005 0,683 0,159 0,351
R20,23 0,203 0,223 0,299 0,386 0,009 0,102 0,046
1 P -value for coefficient
2 21 observations
3 13 observations
4 14 observations
Source: EC (2007 and 2012), own processing
European Tax Policy and the Single Common Market Monika Bušovská
70
Table 3: Beta Convergence of Implicit Tax Rates in the EU during 1995–20111
Consumption Labor Capital
α-1,851 -0,873 -1,997
β–0.341 –0.340 –1.151
t–2.874 –4.238 –1.638
P-value28.57*10–3 0,0003 0,132
R20,264 0,439 0,212
1 P -value for β coefficient
2 25 observations
Source: EC (2007 and 2012); own processing
Figure 5: Sigma Convergence of Implicit Tax Rates in the EU during 1965–2011 (%)
Source: OECD (2012); own processing.
Ing.Monika Bušovská, Department of Public Finance, University of Economics
Prague, Czech Republic. E ‑mail: xbusm04@vse.cz.
Politics in central euroPe 10 (2014) 3 71
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CHAPTERS FROM MONOGRAPHS:
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Excerpts From the Pentagon’s Plan: Prevent the Re ‑Emergence of a New Rival (1992) The
New York Times (9 March).
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Cooper, Robert (2002): Why We Still Need Empires, The Guardian Unlimited (7 April):
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4388915,00.html (2
November 2003).
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POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE
The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association
Volume 10 • Number 3 • December 2014 • ISSN1801-3422
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE Volume 10 • Number 3 • December 2014
Central European Policies compared
with other regions
ESSAYS
Culture and Experience: Generalized Trust among Romanian Migrants in Italy and Spain
Paul E. Sum and Gabriel Bădescu
In the Shadow of Empire. Refl ecting on the Political-Strategic Position of the Small
States in Europe and the Caribbean Basin during the Cold War
Mitchell Belfer
The Polish and Spanish Roads to Democracy over the Last 25 Years: A Comparative Analysis
Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka
European Tax Policy and the Single Common Market
Monika Bušovská