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Article
Blue Economy and
Competing Discourses
in International Oceans
Governance
Jennifer J. Silver
1
, Noella J. Gray
1
,
Lisa M. Campbell
2
, Luke W. Fairbanks
2
, and
Rebecca L. Gruby
3
Abstract
In this article, we track a relatively new term in global environmental governance:
“blue economy.” Analyzing preparatory documentation and data collected at the
2012 UN Confe rence on Sustainable Development (i.e., Rio þ 20), we show how
the term entered into use and how it was articulated within four competing dis-
courses regarding human–ocean relations: (a) oceans as natural capital, (b) oceans as
good business, (c) oceans as integral to Pacific Small Island Developing States, and
(d) oceans as small-scale fisheries livelihoods. Blue economy was consistently invoked
to connect oceans with Rio þ 20’s “green economy ” theme; however, different
actors worked to further define the term in ways that prioritized particular
oceans problems, solutions, and participants. It is not clear whether blue economy
will eventually be understood singularly or as the domain of a particular actor or
discourse. We explore possibilities as well as discuss discourse in global environ-
mental governance as powerful and precarious.
Keywords
global environmental governance, green economy, natural capital, oceans, Rio þ 20,
small island developing states, small-scale fisheries
Journal of Environment &
Development
2015, Vol. 24(2) 135–160
! The Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1070496515580797
jed.sagepub.com
1
Department of Geography, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada
2
Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, Beaufort, NC, USA
3
Human Dimensions of Natural Resources, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA
Corresponding Author:
Jennifer J. Silver, Department of Geography, University of Guelph, 50 Stone Road East, Guelph, Ontario,
Canada N1G 2W1.
Email: j.silver@uoguelph.ca
at UNIV OF GUELPH on May 21, 2015jed.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Oceans have been characterized as the common heritage of mankind (Pardo,
1984), as vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons (Berkes et al., 2006), and as a
significant ecological frontier (Steinberg, 2008). These constructions help to
reinforce United Nations (UN) leadership in oceans governance (Steinberg,
2001). At the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD;
herafter Rio þ 20 or the summit), ocean issues and questions of oceans govern-
ance were formally negotiated and less formally discussed in side events. The
interest in and attention to oceans at Rio þ 20 was described by many as broad
and unprecedented relative to previous internationa l meetings (Campbell, Gray,
Fairbanks, Silver, & Gruby, 2013). Catalysts include ocean acidification and sea-
level rise, overfishing a nd marine biodiversity loss, a growing consensus regard-
ing the conservation and development potential of the high seas, and , interest
from some countries in territorializing more ocean space (Ban et al., 2014;
Sua
´
rez-de Vivero, 2013; Veitch et al., 2012; Zalik, 2015). During Rio þ 20, we
tracked oceans negotiations and side events with particular attention to the use
of a relatively new term in the global environmental governance arena: “blue
economy.”
1
International events and meetings are critical to global governance. They
draw together people, making time and space for negotiations, side events,
and networking. Formally, they offer a sanctioned setting for the (re) configur-
ation of social relations and structures and the (re)codification of positions and
perspectives (Campbell, Corson, Gray, MacDonald, & Brosius, 2014;
Cle
´
menc¸ on, 2012; MacDonald & Corson, 2012). Participants and activists
often adopt one or more discourse—comprised of key terms, compelling
images, and structural devices such as metaphor (Dryzek, 2005)—to frame
and communicate their priority problem s and favored solutions (Espinosa,
2014; Suarez & Corson, 2013). Even if a binding agreement is not produced,
terms (such as blue economy) and broader discourses may evolve, permeate, or
be reinforced in ways that influence future funding, programs, policies, and
activism (e.g., Cle
´
menc¸ on, 2012; Suarez & Corson, 2013). Therefore, employing
qualitative research methods at large international meetings allows study of the
relationship between discourse, policies, practices, and transformation in gov-
ernance institutions and approaches (Brosius & Campbell, 2010). We used a
methodology called “Collaborative Event Ethnography” (CEE) to observe
and systematically gather data regarding ocean negotiations and discussions
across Rio þ 20.
2
Our attention to oceans governance and the term blue economy is moti-
vated by three factors. First, sheer extent and significance of oceans for
development: oceans cover 70% of the earth’s surface; fish provide a critical
source of protein for international markets and coastal communities; and,
new sectors like deep-sea mining and aquaculture are developing rapidly
(Campbell et al., forthcoming). Second, most ocean space lies beyond
national jurisdiction, where many resources are held in common and where
136 Journal of Environment & Development 24(2)
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UN-led governance is fragmented. Third, state and private interest in oceans
conservation and development is currently high, as reflected, for example, by
the recently launched World Bank Global Partnership for Oceans (Abbott
et al., 2014; Campbell et al., 2013). As our analysis demonstrates, a range
of actors employed the term blue economy at Rio þ 20 to bring oceans con-
servation and development to the attention of the broader global environ-
mental governance community and to advocate priority problems as well as
preferred solutions and participants.
First, we examine evidence from Rio þ 20 preparatory documents and events
that reveals key actors and motivations behind initial uses of the term blue
economy. Second, drawing on data gathered via CEE at the summit, we dem-
onstrate how blue economy was employed within four broader discourses
regarding human–ocean relations: (a) oceans as natural capital, (b) oceans as
good business, (c) oceans as integral to Pacific Small Island Developing States
(SIDS), and (d) oceans as small-scale fisheries (SSF) livelihoods. Across ea ch,
blue economy was consistently used to draw attention to oceans and connect
them to Rio þ 20’s green economy theme. However, when arguing for particular
oceans problems, solutions, and participants, many speakers worked to bring
more specific meaning to the term, often in ways that were inconsistent or
incompatible. As we will discuss, it is not clear wheth er the term blue economy
will come to be singularly underst ood as the domain of a particular set of actors
(e.g., SIDS) or as a short-hand reference to particular sets of governance mech-
anisms (e.g., market based) or ideologies (e.g., the “green economy”). To con-
clude the article, we consider various possibilities; address how more marginal
actors, organizations, and co untries have employed the term blue economy; and
offer comments on the powerful-but-precarious nature of discourse in global
environmental governance.
From Green Economy to Blue Economy
The term “green economy” has already ascended in global environmental gov-
ernance (Brand, 20 12; Onest i, 2012). Green economy proponents espouse a con-
servation and development vision organized around “new environmentally
friendly technologies” and “a global policy network of private and public
actors” (Haas, 2012, p. 95). More critically, however, the prominence of this
term, and the apparent popularity of governance practices and mechanisms
associated with it, can be read as part of a longer process, whereby the scientific
and social justice underpinnings of global ecology have given way to a manager -
ial ontology of natural capital (McAfee, 1999, 2012).
The desire to know nature in economic terms has “reverberated through
environmental policy, funding and program implementation” over the last
10 to 15 years (Suarez & Corson, 2013, p. 65), and though valuation methodol-
ogies are debated (Dempsey & Robertson, 2012), nature is now embraced as a
Silver et al. 137
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solution to socioeconomic crises. Protected areas, payments for ecosystem ser-
vices, biodiversity derivatives, and so on are seen as remedies to environmental
problems and flagship opportunities for accumulation (MacDonald & Corson,
2012; McAfee, 2012). Rather than needing to pay their way amidst competing
political–economic priorities (as in McAfee, 1999), species, resources, and eco-
systems are recast as “the driver for the global economic recovery” (Corson,
MacDonald, & Neimbark, 2013, p. 3). A core difference between green economy
and sustainable development is the former’s grounding in the logics of capitalist
growth rather than in recognition of its contradictions and inequalities (Corson
& MacDonald, 2012; Onesti, 2012).
However, through several publications, Corson and MacDonald have
demonstrated the contingent na ture of green economy (Corson et al., 2013;
MacDonald, 2010; MacDonald & Corson, 2012). Critically tracing the words
and interactions of governance actors, and relating this to institutional change
over time, their work reveals how the performance and circulation of market
ideas (e.g., about valuing nature) fertilize real opportunities for the adoption of
neoliberal governance practices (e.g., ca rbon banking). In other words, they
show that “the green economy” is produced as diverse actors claim and use
particular words, concepts and metaphors, and incrementally, shift priorities
and practices (i.e., “grabbing green”; cf. Corson et al., 2013).
Related criticism is growing that the international adoption of green language
(e.g., green economy as a formal theme of Rio þ 20) has helped to create the
conditions for “green grabbing,” a specific form of land grab whereby land and
resources are enclosed for development projects premised on global environmen-
tal improvement (cf. Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012). With nature recognized
as valuable to production (e.g., of ecosystem services) and accumulation (e.g., via
markets for ecosystem services), the private sector sees and seeks opportunity in
conservation, credit, biofuel, sustainable agriculture ventures, and so on (Leach,
Fairhead, & Fraser, 2012). For example, Leach et al. (2012) trace the discursive
construction of a carbon-rich soil substance “biochar” by scientists, venture cap-
italists, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as a novel green commodity,
noting the quick emerg ence of for-profit consultancies and pilot projects in Africa
that require smallholders to “modify and re-imagine their farming and everyday
practices” (p. 298). As interest in the conservation and development potential of
oceans grows (Abbott et al., 2014; Campbell et al., 2013), scholarly attention to
institutional contexts, discourses, and possible place-based cases relevant to “blue
grabbing” is warranted (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Steinberg, 2008).
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, est., 1982) formalizes
the right of coastal states to claim, access, and manage resources within 200-mile
exclusive economic zones (EEZs). It is through this arrange ment that nation-
states have enclosed and (re)allocated coastal seas and in-EEZ marine resources
over the last 50 to 60 years (Mansfield, 2001; Steinberg, 2008). Yet, EEZs
account for only 42% of total ocean space (Sua
´
rez-de Vivero, 2013).
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The remaining 58%, known as the “high seas,” is also regulated via numerous
UN-led sector-specific agreements (e.g. shipping via the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), fisheries via the Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO) and Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, and mining via
the International Seabed Authority).
3
The narrow nature of these arrangements
has drawn criticism that global oceans governance is too fragmented, with some
suggesting that high seas spaces and resources are at risk for ecological decline
and inequitable allocation (Ban et al., 2014; Veitch et al., 2012; Zalik, 2015).
As our analysis shows, many actors currently advocate new or increased
international attention to oceans and oceans governance institutions; a good
number suggest the need for further investment in oceans conservation and
development, and some see new opportunity for accumulation. In this sense
the emergence and circulation of the term blue economy might simply be
counted as an example of “grabbing green,” whereby ocean spaces and resources
are being discursively enrolled within the broader green economy agenda and
particular, neoliberal, ideals are ascending within global oceans governance. We
argue that it is more complicated than this, however, because our analysis
reveals that meaning was made of blue economy in many contradictory ways
at Rio þ 20, and in some prominent and uncontested instances, that articulat ions
diverged altogether from the “nature-as-capital” ontology. Our discus sion exam-
ines important points of divergence across discourses and consider possibilities
for blue economy to be defined by one set of actors in ways that reflect their
preferred governance practices and participants.
Methodological Approach
With more than 45,000 attendees participating in concurrent events and nego-
tiations, Rio þ 20 would be difficult for a lone researcher to cover. We there-
fore engaged in CEE, a methodology wherein a coordinated group of
researchers disperses to gain insights into the social dynamics and processes
at play (Brosius & Campbell, 2010; Campbell et al., 2014; Corson, Campbell,
& MacDonald, 2014). Fourteen affiliated academic researchers participated in
a CEE at Rio þ 20 and related sites throughout Rio de Janeiro between June
11 and 23, 2012. This article stems from the work of five team members (i.e.,
the authors) who focused on oceans negotiations and events. It also builds on
and was informed by our past experience working together, including previous
projects that used CEE (e.g., Gray, Gruby, & Campbell, 2014; Gruby &
Campbell, 2013). While author Gruby participated as an official delegate of
the Marshall Islands (with their informed consent), and we all research and
publish on various topics related to oceans governance, we acted as observers
rather than participants in the negotiations and side events. For example, we
did not contribute to discussions that frequently followed formal presentations
in side events.
Silver et al. 139
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As a team, we observed and recorded all four open negotiating meetings on
the oceans text of the Outcome Document (UN General Assembly, 2012) and 34
of the 35 scheduled ocean side events at Rio þ 20. This amounts to 58 recorded
hours explicitly about oceans, and an additional 14 hr at seven events where
ocean issues were included in a broader agenda. In addition, we gathered key
preparatory documents related to oceans released in the two years prior to
Rio þ 20. Each author is familiar with the full data set; in many cases, multiple
authors observed the same events. CEE is thus not merely an exercise in using
more people to collect more data; the approach seeks to maximize the benefits of
working together, extending the collaborative approach through to data analysis
and interpretation in ways that are both collective and reflexive (Campbell et al.,
2014; see also Mauthner & Doucet 2008). Using categories developed by Dryzek
(2005), our analysis began with collective discussion and coding focused on how
oceans were represented.
4
As four discernible discourses of human–ocean rela-
tions emerged, we narrowed in on oceans problems, causes and solutions, and on
how the term blue economy was employed within each.
The following section overviews uses of blue economy prior to Rio þ 20. This
review is not exhaustive but provides important context regarding who pro-
moted or debated the term and, in turn, how it began to be associated with
various oceans actors, issues, and approaches. Documentation from formal UN
preparatory meetings and from three UN reports is particularly informative.
The latter include the following: A Blueprint for Ocean and Coastal
Sustainability (hereafter Blueprint or the International Oceanographic
Commission of the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
[IOC/UNESCO], IMO, FAO, and UN Development Programme [UNDP],
2011), Green Economy in a Blue World (UN Environment Programme
[UNEP], FAO, IMO, UNDP, International Union for Conservation of
Nature (IUCN), WorldFish Center, & GRID-Arendal, 2012), and Why Value
the Oceans? (UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Duk e University Nicholas Institute for
Environmental Policy Solutions, UNEP TEEB Office an d UNEP Regional
Seas Programme, 2012). We also highlight two prominent events that purpose-
fully brought together an array of actors to discuss oceans outside of the formal
UN preparatory process.
Blue Economy in the Build Up to Rio þ 20
Sustained use of the term blue economy among governance actors became evi-
dent during the second of the three UNCSD preparatory meetings in March
2011. Blueprint quotes the UNCSD Secretary-General as saying that “a blue
economy approach was emphasized during the second session of the UNCSD
Preparatory Committee” and that this was welcome because it works “with the
twin focus [the green economy and institutional fram eworks] of Rio þ 20” (IOC/
UNESCO, IMO, FAO, & UNDP, 2011, p. 4). At the same meeting, Pacific
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SIDS delegates suggested that the alliance of global SIDS would adopt blue
economy to frame their interests at Rio þ 20 (IISD Reporting Services,
2011b). This strategy was debated internally, as questions circulated about
what the term implied. In June 2011, for example, Caribbean SIDS suggested
that “the terminology ‘Blue Economy’ was not required,” noting that it may not
adequately capture concerns about sea level rise and cautioning against “too
many colour economies” (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
2011, p. 10). Similarl y, participants in a September 2011 small-island develop ing
states preparatory meeting “did not agree” (IISD Reporting Services, 2011a)
whether adopting the term would benefit or detract from their interests at the
summit and beyond.
A submission by the Pacific SIDS to the November 1, 2011 round of submis-
sions to the draft UNCSD outcome document (also known during the prepara-
tory period as the “zero draft”) contained a section titled “Proposed Text on the
Blue Economy.” Suggested additions highligh t the relationship between oceans,
food security, and economic well-being globally and for small-island developing
states (Pacific SIDS, 2011, p. 3). At least 15 non-state members of the UN’s
“major groups” also referenced the term blue economy in zero draft submis-
sions.
5
The International Collective in Support of Fish Workers (ICSF, 2012, p.
4) comments, later published under the title Green, Blue and True, expressed
support for the Rio þ 20 green economy theme, “assuming” it recognizes “‘Blue
Economy’, or sustainable and equitable distribution of ocean resources,” the
value of SSF, and the need to protect fisher rights. At a late November 2011
informal preparatory oceans workshop convened by Prince Albert II of
Monaco, small-island developing states were commended by other attendees
for their promotion of blue economy.
6
January and February 2012 brought two additional oceans-focused
UN preparatory reports (UNEP et al., 2012; UNEP/GRID-Arendal et al.,
2012). Like Blueprint, Green Economy in a Blue World works to articulate the
connections between land-based society and the oceans. Using the term blue
economy only once, chapters highlight fisheries and aquaculture, maritime
transport, marine-bas ed renewable energy, ocean nutrient pollution, coasta l
tourism, deep-sea minerals, and SIDS as central to the green economy.
In this sense, the report serves as a catch-all into which many ocean sectors,
problems, and users were placed and tagged as relevant to Rio þ 20. Why
Value the Oceans proposes greater attention to marine ecosystem services and
offers discussion and possible methodological starting points for “main-
stream[ing] ocean and coastal ecosystems into national budgetary and plan-
ning processes” (UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Duke University Nicholas Institute
for Environmental Policy Solutions, UNEP TEEB Office and UNEP
Regional Seas Programme, 2012, p. 2). Together, these reports illustrate
UN interest in “bringing oceans in” to the green economy. However, that
they avoid extensive use of the term blue economy suggests a lack of
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consensus on its meaning, and perhaps, hesitance to distinguish blue economy
from green.
In February 2012, The Economist Magazine hosted its first “World Oceans
Summit.” The 300 participants included business elites, elected leaders, NGO
representatives, and senior UN executives. Two instances warrant attention for
their invocation of Rio þ 20 and attention to the perceived untapped economic
potential of oceans: a session hosted by Pavan Sukhdev and a keynote address
announcing the World Bank’s plans for its “Global Partnership for the Oceans”
(GPO). Sukhdev, notable for his leadership of The Economics of Ecosystems
and Biodiversit y (TEEB) initiative, headlined a session intended to “exami ne the
continued undervaluing of natural resources, particularly in the oceans.”
7
A
press release summarizes:
[i]n the year of the Rioþ20 Summit, the World Oceans Summit will highlight the
urgent need for improved information regarding systems and [ecosystem] services
such as ocean fisheries, coastal ecosystems and coral reefs, oceanic carbon processes
and polar seas.
8
The next day, in his speech announcing the GPO, then World Bank President,
Robert Zoellick (2012), asserted that the
[o]ceans are the home of an under-recognized and under-appreciated “blue
economy.” At a time when the world is looking for sources of growth,
there is huge potential for “blue growth”—wisely preserving and investing in
the value of ocean ecosystems to fight poverty and improve lives. (Zoellick,
2012)
Drawing parallels to green economy and green growth, Zoellick (2012) sug-
gested that “catalytic finance” needs to be mobilized to encourage “inves tment in
oceans.”
A wide range of actors sought to connect oceans with the green eco nomy
prior to Rio þ 20; some made the term blue economy central to their arguments,
while others debated its utility or avoided it altogether. Blueprint uses the term
while other UN preparatory reports focus on connecting a variety of ocean
problems, users, and activities to the green economy. SIDS debated whether
to use blue economy, and eventually, Pacific SIDS chose it as a subtitle in a
zero draft submission. Non-state major group members also began to use blue
economy in ways that highlighted their particular interests, some of which do
not align with dominant articulations of green economy (e.g., affirming the col-
lective rights of small-scale fishers). Meetings outside of the formal UN system
brought together various actors, including those from the private sector, who
asserted the significance of oceans to the international economy and announced
initiatives that might drive future “blue growth.”
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In sum, this section has shown that the use of blue economy increased prior to
Rio þ 20, but consensus regardi ng its meaning and utility did not. As the summit
approached, debate spread, and during an informal preparatory meeting held in
April 2012, the Group of 77 actually called to remove blue economy from the
zero draft. However, as shown next, these events, documents, and negoti ations
did help to popul arize oceans issues going into Rio þ 20.
Blue Economy and Human–Ocean Discourses at
Rio þ 20
On the second to last day of the summit, we were among a crowd of people
seeking entry into a side event hosted by the Principality of Monaco, the
Republic of Kiribati, and the World Bank.
9
Billed as the official launch of the
World Bank’s GPO, admission was initially limited. Author Gruby’s delegate
status garnere d us early entrance. Others were eventually permitted, and after
the approximately 150 seats filled a standing crowd overflowed into the hallway.
Unlike most oceans events we attended, journalists and camera people lined the
back wall.
The session began when Ban Ki Moon, the Secretary General of the UN,
entered. Introducing him, vice president (VP) of Sustainable Development at the
World Bank, Rachel Kyte, quipped: “this is a lesson for you Secretary General,
you cannot put oceans events in small rooms anymore!”
10
Congratulatory state-
ments that oceans were “on the Rio agenda” flowed freely. Speeches included
many mentions of the blue or green economy, and each of the four human–
ocean discourses evident in our data was invoked. However, little concern was
expressed that some suggested governance mechanisms and practices (e.g.,
marine protected areas [MPAs]) sat in tension with others (e.g., rights for
small-scale or subsistence fishers). Like many other less dramatic events we
observed, visions for human–oceans relations (and those who advocated
them) appeared to rest easily with one another. It is only through discour se
analysis that contradictions and contestations are revealed.
Oceans as Natural Capital
Speakers at several oceans side events, often representing NGOs, suggested
that “nature’s infrastructure” (e.g., coral reefs and mangroves) and ecosys-
tem services (e.g., climate regulation) offer important, but underrecognized,
benefits. These discussions focused on the challenge of measur ing and
accounting the economic value of oceans, in effect framing their governance
as technical rather than a challenge of reconciling diverse perspectives and
objectives.
In a session subtitled “Knowing Our Ocean, Protecting our Marine
Treasures,” one presenter said, “[w]e know biodiversity, but [we need to
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understand] ecosystem services and functions.”
11
In another, a speaker from the
Nature Conservancy (TNC) noted that
here is a picture of a restored oyster reef where [a]gain nature’s infrastructure is
providing some of these services and typically one would run to hard infrastructure
to provide [. . .] We need to get very precise and develop the kinds of economic and
engineering information so these kinds of natural solutions can hold their own.
12
The invocation of economic metaphors was striking and is evidence of the
transformation described by MacDonald and Corson (2012), whereby natural
capital is presented as an ontological entity; in this case, the oceans are the econ-
omy. In a session on implementing Rio þ 20 commitments, one presenter said,
You almost think of them [oceans] as a business enterprise with the amount of
goods and services, and the value they provide [...] you can put your money in the
oceans and become a shareholder and treat them differently.
13
Blue economy was used frequently during a panel regarding the Coral
Triangle Initiative (CTI), a multilateral marine conservation and development
effort. The chair introduced the session as focused on “building sustainable blue
economies,”
14
and over the following hour, the term was uttered another 20
times. Some panelists clearly defined blue economy in terms of natural capital.
Describing Conservation International’s “efforts to achieve a blue economy,”
15
one speak er noted: “valuing ecosystem services is fundamental to the approach
that CI brings to its work in [the Coral Triangle] countries.”
16
However, where
CTI donors suggested that this program was an important example of how
natural capital can contribute to blue economy, participating states seemed to
use the term in ways more comparable to other human–ocean discourses (espe-
cially Pacific SIDS and SSF). The Minister of Economy and Development from
Timor Leste emphasized “the importance of the marine and coastal biological
diversity that our people have depended on to sustain their livelihoods” and
suggested that “a blue economy can be made if all activities are about people-
centered biodiversity conservation.”
17
During the panel, there was little recog-
nition of these differences or their potential incompatibilities.
Speakers across a variety of events emphasized need for methods to quantify
the value of ecosystem services and, once determined, to protect or restore them
(often through MPAs or other enclosures). Some proponents further advocated
markets to commoditize and exchange services. In the UNEP-hosted event “Eye
on Earth: Eye on Oceans and Blue Carbon,”
18
panelists discussed the potential
of “blue” carbon sequestered by coastal ecosystems, including mangroves and
salt marsh grasses, endorsing the idea of markets as a climate change mitigation
mechanism. They emphasized the need to develop methods for measuring blue
carbon because, as one delegate suggested, “blue carbon may one day bring a
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premium to local communities who conserve marine resources.”
19
Also speaking
at “Eye on Earth,” celebrated marine scientist and oceans advocate, Sylvia
Earle, indicated her concern for dominant perceptions and values of fish: “we
think of them with lemon and butter on our plates; we think of them a s
commodities.” As she continued, she urged the audience to think of fish as a
different kind of commodity: “a carbon-based unit.”
20
Yet, markets were not universally understood or agreed upon as a solution. In
another session focu sed on establishing high seas MPAs, an audience member
asked whether payments for ecosystem services have any relevance for the high
seas.
21
The paneli sts paused, clearly unprepared to answer this query, then
acknowledged that it is “an important question”
22
and one “worth looking
at.”
23
The panel moderator finally suggested that the challenge on the high seas
is that “there is no one to pay.”
24
Oceans as Good Business
The strongest promoters of “oceans as good business” were representatives of
marine sectors like fishing and shipping and actors from UN agencies such as
UNEP, IOC-UNESCO, and the IMO. In this discourse, oceans and coastal zones
were described as the foundation of a proud and long-standing ocean-based econ-
omy, one that makes important contributions internationally. This discourse
generally accepted that existing sectors have contributed to the degradation of
oceans but suggested that public pressure and economic incentives now motivate
their substantive participation in governance, marine science, and monitoring.
A common refrain was that existing ocean sectors are ideally positioned to
lead the advance of “the green economy in the blue world” (as in UNEP et al.,
2012).
25
For example, Paul Holthus, Executive Director of the business forum
World Ocean Council, argued,
the world community has no hope of securing the future health and productivity of
the global ocean ecosystem without harnessing the proactive, constructive involve-
ment—the leadership and collaboration—of the private sector.
26
For Holthus and others advocati ng this view, human –ocean relations, and
blue economy more narrowly, ought to be structured through market relation-
ships and incentives an d overseen by cooperative regulatory and monitoring
activity.
Governance partnerships (state- firm, UN-firm, etc.) were particularly prom-
inent. For example, Wendy Watson-Wright, Assistant Director General of the
IOC-UNESCO, said,
[p]rivate sector use of the ocean is increasing rapidly in occurrence and diversity of
activities. As the primary user of the ocean, industry is well placed to take a lead.
27
Silver et al. 145
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She continued that public–private partnerships are a good way to reduce the
regulatory, financial, and even scientific burden of ocean governance shouldered
by state and UN agencies.
High seas tuna fisheries, the focus of one side event and highlighted in several
others, were offered as a guiding example. Since approximately 2009, the
International Seafood Sustainability Foundation, an organization of tuna
firms, NGOs, and fisheries scientists, has collaborated in management with
UN agencies. Describing the logic of a partnership approach, and the role of
Global Environment Facility (GEF) and FAO funding, a GE F representative
highlighted that member firms “avoid tuna from any boat listed by a RFMO
[UN-led Regional Fisheries Management Organisation] as being involved in
illegal or unregulated activity and share catch and purchase data with the
RFMO to prevent overfishing.”
28
Later in the session Arni Mathieson,
Assistant Director General of fisheries and aquaculture with the FAO, offered
congratulations to those working in this partnership:
[t]his is a program and project that are not just changing the part of the sector that
they are intended to change, but they are also a guiding light for other changes in
my department and in the [fishing] industry as a whole.
29
Here, we see that a strong industry role, including leadership in the provision
of fisheries data, is viewed favorably by at least some at the FAO.
However, questions about the legitimacy and implications of such partner-
ships were raised. At the high seas tuna sessi on, and noting that she was speak-
ing in her “private capacity” rather than as a representative of the International
Union for the Conservation of Nature, Kristina Gjierde asked,
I’m curious how you are justifying the rights-based approached [allocating high
seas tuna to private firms] on legal grounds with respect to a high seas resource [. . .]
also wondering how this is going to be applied with respect to the needs of small
island developing states who really don’t have the capital to compete with many of
the larger tuna industries.
30
As we will now see, references to open-access ocean space and lucrative
mobile resources raise questions of equity, especially for SIDS and small-scale
fishers.
Oceans as Integral to Pacific SIDS
A report from a July 2011 Pacific SIDS preparatory meeting related three of
their ocean priorities to blue economy: increasing benefits from their EEZs;
reducing overfishing, destructive fishing practices, and illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing; and building marine resource and ecosystem resilience to
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climate change (Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme,
2011). At the summit, Pacific SIDS often worked to align these prioriti es with
the green economy theme. For example, President Tong of Kiribati explained,
“ours is a green economy in the blue world [. . .] without a healthy ocean there
would be no places for our lives and livelihoods.”
31
Pacific SIDS’ assertions abou t oceans priorities were often coupled with sig-
nals to organizations that might be inclined to assist
[o]ur ocean territory is 3000 times our land territory. This is why we are forced to
think big and look for partners who understand what we are doing. This is why we
reach out to NGOs.
32
Although Pacific SIDS generally did not use the language of natural capital,
they did assert marine ecosystems as integral to their economy. In some settings,
international NGOs and other supportive governments and institutions (e.g.,
Australia, New Zealand, and the World Bank) also did so. At an event with
many small island states delegates, a representative of TN C went so far as to
assert that “the marine environment is an important bedrock of the economy. It
is not an extra, it is the very reason why ocean nations can su rvive and thrive.”
33
In fram ing oceans as integral to small island life and economy, Pacific SIDS
and their partners strongly advocated ending illegal, unreported, and unregu-
lated fishing in territorial waters, particular ly by foreign tuna vessels. This argu-
ment was often connected to calls for benefit-sharing agreements and other
governance mechanisms by which Pacific SIDS may capture more revenue
from territorial marine resources. The Deputy Secret ary of International
Development for New Zealand announced a US$23 million project to support
Pacific fisheries management, reasoning that
[t]he Pacific tuna fishery for example accounts for close to two thirds of the value of
the global tuna catch—some $4.3 billion. Yet the returns from their resource to
Pacific islands is only around 2% of the catch value. The message is clear: these are
Pacific island states’ resources, and we must recognize and accept the rights, inter-
ests and aspirations of Pacific SIDS.
34
In sum, Pacific SIDS’ use of blue economy at Rio þ 20 was ab out framing and
aligning their livelihoods and development priorities, strongly asserting connec-
tions to ocean territory, and identifying partners and funds to pursue their
objectives.
Oceans as Small-Scale Fisheries Livelihoods
The Commonwealth Human Ecology Council, the World Fishermen Forum,
the Icelandic National Association of Small Boat Owners, and the ICSF
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were clear advocates for SSF and promoted oceans as central to the liveli-
hoods and well-being of all coastal people and communities (i.e., not just
SIDS). In this discourse, which articulates human–ocean relations in terms
of poverty reduction and development, data regarding the ecological condi-
tion of marine environments received minimal attention. Advocates of these
ideas were not often in sessions related to the previous three discourses.
Representatives from the FAO, World Bank, UNEP, and SIDS did occa-
sionally espouse its key themes, although often with important differences in
emphasis.
Many presentations about SSF, like those during the “Oceans Day” fisheries
panel, began with a listing of statistics compiled by the FAO and WorldFish
Center (2008) that describe SSF as central to providing protein to the poor,
work an d income for women, and employment for fishers worldw ide. Small-
scale fishers were portrayed as embedded in community, and blue economy was
thus concerned with meaningful development:
we see fisher folks as key to the blue economy in the green economy, working to
provide decent work in context of a just transition, that is with policy being trans-
parent, evidence based, and seen as fair.
35
It would often follow that industrial, foreign, or illegal fishing threatens SSF,
as reflected in the words of a presenter from the Commonwealth Human
Ecology Council:
[o]ne of the lessons from the Commonwealth fisheries program was that decisions
were made frequently to grant industrial fishing licenses without a good under-
standing of impact when trawlers come into coastal communities, what that does to
social cohesion and livelihoods.
36
Here, we see how the marine environment was raised within the livelihood
discourse: if degradation or crisis was acknowledged, it was associated with
large-scale industrial fishing.
A “rights-based” approach was frequently advocated, and it is here that dif-
ferences emerge. For some SSF advocates, particularly civil society and worke r
groups, rights implied human and collective rights. With this interpretation,
tradition and justice are invoked to argue that small-scale fishers should have
rights to fish and to participat e in fisheries management. The rights demanded
are broad and include recognition of knowledge, participation in decision-
making processes, and territor ial access to ocean spaces. For other agencies,
particularly the World Bank and some representatives of the FAO, a rights-
based approach implied individual property rights. For these SSF advocates,
assigning indivi dual private rights to fish is necessary to solve uncertainty, over-
capacity, and inefficiency.
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While protests targeting the relationship between privatization, dispossession,
and the green economy occurred during Rio þ 20, we did not observe any that
raised ocean privatization specifically. One scathing interpretation was offered
during a side event by Vassen Kauppaymuthoo of the Commonwealth Human
Ecology Council:
whatever was before common heritage, common good, public property, is now
slowly becoming privatized, and this is having a large impact on societies and
the way the world will be tomorrow [. . .] We talk about land grabbing but there
is also ocean grabbing. The frontier today ...is the high water mark [. . .] we have
to give a deep reflection on what is going to happen to our oceans in near future,
because today we have to decide what is going to happen with this common
property.
37
However, while Kauppaymuthoo spoke clearly against “ocean grabbing,” he
did not explicitly link it to the blue or green economy.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our analysis de monstrates that the term blue economy emerged and circulated
before Rio þ 20 and that it was employed at the summit by a variety of actors.
We highlighted four prominent discourses of human–ocean relations and
showed that, despite advocating different ocean problems, solutions, and par-
ticipants, blue economy was defined and employed in support of each. Most
broadly, these findings agree with Corson et al. (2013) who argue that global
conservation and development discourses are “cultivated through, and coordi-
nated by international environmental policy institutions, organizations, activists,
academics, and trans national capitalist and managerial classes” (p. 3).
Evidence from the preparatory period showed that blue economy was used
sparingly by agencies of the United Nations. While agencies sought to highlight
oceans, this was often done in ways that connected them to the green economy (e.g.,
Green Economy in a Blue World). Simultaneously, SIDS debated the potential of the
term to advance their objectives; Pacific SIDS chose to use blue economy as a
subtitle to frame text in a zero draft submission. Although their proposed text
did not survive into the final UNCSD outcome document (United Nations
General Assembly, 2012), Pacific SIDS’ embrace of the term appears to have
encouraged even wider circulation (e.g., by ICSF and at the workshop hosted by
Prince Albert II of Monaco). The term blue economy was also used at The
Economist magazine’s first World Oceans Summit 4 months before Rio þ 20;
here, participants lauded the untapped “blue growth” potential of oceans.
Where green economy was the focus of visible protest and disagreement both
inside and outside Rio þ 20 (Co rson, Brady, Zuber, Lord, & Kim, in 2015),
blue economy was not overtly contested and actors espousing quite different
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human–ocean relationships freely used the term. For example, those highlight-
ing the relationship between human rights and collective ocean access/benefit
used and defined blue economy, as did representatives of UN agencies listed as
authors on preparatory reports that seemed to avoid it. Others still equated blue
economy with enclosure and market-based mechanisms. In sum, we observed
diverse uses of the term within single summit events, and in some cases, repre-
sentatives of the same organization using it in different ways across events.
Table 1 demonstrates how deeply contradictions run by summarizing how the
four discourses differed in terms of the problems identified, preferred solutions,
and governance actors.
To elaborate, proponents of oceans as natural capital framed oceans and
marine species as significant to ecological integrity and human well-being and
prioritized marine conservation (often via enclosure, valuation, and marketiza-
tion) as important development cornerstones. Though economic value resonates
with oceans as good business and oceans as integ ral to Pacific SIDS, the natural
capital discourse most clearly called for the development of new accounting
methods (e.g., to quantify fish as carbon storage units) and restoring “nature’s
infrastructure” (often through MPAs). On the other hand, en closure was viewed
suspiciously by many proponents of oceans as SSF livelihoods. Most specific-
ally, the property and economic relations underlying enclosur e (and marketiza-
tion) sit in tension with the cultural values and collective access/benefits
emphasized by SSF advocates and those who argued oceans as integral to
Pacific SIDS. There are, however, important differences between the Pacific
SIDS and SSF discourses. While both frame oceans as being for local benefit,
Pacific SIDS do not necessarily exclude large conservation enclosures or extract-
ive activities like industrial fishing or mining. Whereas the SSF livelihoods dis-
course emphasizes small-scale fishers and coastal communities as critical
participants or leaders in management, the Pacific SIDS discourse identifies
national governme nts, supported by large NGOs, as key actors .
To a degree, the structure of the summit helps to explain the apparent lack of
contestation regarding blue economy that we observed: side events regularly
featured “like-minded” speakers and attracted “like-minded” audience members
(Campbell et al., 2013). However, we suggest that the ease with which advocates
of different human–oceans discourses, and their articulations of the term blue
economy, appeared to rest with each other is more accurately understood in
terms of (a) differences between the histories and broader understandings of
green and blue economy, (b) attention to fragmented governance arrangements
and the high seas, and (c) the role of international meetings in global environ-
mental governance.
First, a core objective for Rio þ 20 was to achieve (the appearance of) inter-
national consensus regarding green economy ideals and implementation
(MacDonald & Corson, 2012; Onesti, 2012). Thus, disparate interpretations of
and outright objections to green economy had much more time and space to be
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Table 1. Summary of Oceans Problems, Solutions, and Leading Actors Advocated Within
Each Human–Oceans Discourse.
Problems Solutions Governance Actors
“Natural capital” Decision making does not
adequately account for
nature and the value of
ecosystem services
Identify ecosystem ser-
vices; develop stand-
ards and techniques
for measuring and
valuation; develop
ways to account for
them and protect or
restore them
Int’l organizations; gov-
ernments; NGOs; col-
laborating scientists &
experts
“Good Business” Unsustainable practices
by firms in past and
continued work
needed to incentivize
better behavior; failure
of government agen-
cies to engage private
sector as partners
Private sector leadership
and funding; public–
private partnerships
Individual firms; sectoral
coalitions; Int’l organ-
izations leading
partnerships
“Pacific SIDS” Int’l political–economic
system is inequitable;
failure to implement
int’l management and
benefit-sharing agree-
ments; all linked to
failure to recognize
links between SIDS
culture, economy, and
livelihoods.
Implement int’l agree-
ments and conserva-
tion programs
attentive to culture–
economy–livelihood
interconnection;
Benefit-sharing agree-
ments with regard to
SIDS share in industrial
fisheries and minerals;
Partnerships for tech-
nology transfer;
South–south regional
partnerships
SIDS governments; Int’l
community, esp. sup-
portive donor states
and NGOs
“SSF livelihoods” IUU fishing by industrial
fleets; small-scale fish-
ers lose access and
rights through enclos-
ure and privatization;
lack of attention to
cultural value and col-
lective benefits of SSF
Human rights approach to
fisheries; secure access
to and rights (some-
times private) for SSF;
participatory
governance
Fishers and fisher collect-
ives; governments
(national other sup-
portive donor states);
Int’l agencies for spe-
cific tasks (e.g., IUU
fishing)
Note. NGOs ¼ nongovernmental organizations; SSF ¼ small-scale fishers; SIDS ¼ small island developing
states; IUU ¼ illegal, unreported, and unregulated; Int’l ¼ international.
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aired, if not resolved, going into the summit. On the other hand, the term blue
economy only began to be used in specific reference to oceans governance during
later stages of the preparatory process. Here, we note again that reports like
Green Economy in a Blue World used blue economy sparingly, while Pacific SIDS
overtly claimed the term in a heading title in their negotiating agenda. Not only
does this demonstrate the degree to which blue economy remained undefined it
also offers an example where efforts to discursively enroll ocean spaces and
resources as the domain of green economy (i.e., efforts to “grab green”) were hin-
dered by the objectives, actions, and emerging discourses of others (e.g., Pacific
SIDS). Here, we begin to see the power and precariousness of discourse in global
environmental governance (MacDonald & Corson, 2012; Suarez & Corson, 2013).
Second, Rio þ 20 occurred amidst questions about UN-led oceans govern-
ance, particularly regarding fragmented institutional arrangements and the high
seas (Ban et al., 2014; Veitch et al., 2012). A variety of modified and new insti-
tutional arrangements and governance mechanisms were (and still are) “on the
table.” It is therefore likely that many actors wished to have their priorities
heard and be understood as cooperative and compatible. For example, the
choice by SSF advocates to use blue economy seems good strategy at a time
when (a) the FAO was developing SSF guidelines, (b) the World Bank’s GPO
had signal ed rights-based fisheries as a priority, and (c) consensus was building
that an oceans-specific Sustainable Development Goal should be crafted.
Moreover, many states, NGOs, and firms are intently focused on the possibilities
of territorial (e.g., extended EEZs), conservation (e.g., MPAs), and development
(e.g., seabed mining) enclosures in the high seas (Ban et al., 2014; Sua
´
rez-de
Vivero, 2013). Earning or maintaining the opportunity to be involved in discus-
sions and negotiations as they unfold may well have been a significant
motivator.
Finally, echoing World Bank VP Kyte’s quip about no longer putting oceans
events in small rooms, many discussions of oceans at Rio þ 20 were underlain by
a sense of excitement regarding the heightened visibility of oceans at this summit
and even among the global citizenry. We have written more about this unpre-
cedented attention elsewhere (Campbell et al., 2013), but note here that it may
well be the early stage of a longer, power-laden process whereby one discourse
about human–oceans relations (perhaps one of the four our research revealed or
perhaps something different) will come to be seen as obvious or logical. In this
sense, efforts to claim and define the term blue economy at Rio þ 20 reinforce the
contention that even when large international meetings fail to produce binding
commitments, ideas presented and relat ionships made can serve to codify ways
to think about—and in turn govern—nature and society (MacDonald & Corson,
2012).
The term blue economy has continued to circulate as Rio þ 20. Examples,
such as in an Executive Summary of The Economist magazine’s second World
Ocean Summi t in February 2014
38
or the African Union’s embrace of “the Blue
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Economy concept as a vital part of Africa’s future development” (Republic of
Seychelles, 2014), suggest it unlikely that differences summarized in Table 1 are
near resolution. The European Union has perhaps most overtly tied the term
blue economy to capitalization and accumulation by naming and prioritizing
five key “blue growth” sectors of the economy: biotechnol ogy, renewable energy,
coastal and marine tourism, aquaculture, and mineral resources (European
Commission, 2014). This development reminds that just as discourses shape
policies and governance practices, the reverse is also true; specific economic
sectors, development initiatives, or conservation programs may need the support
that a popular term or discourse can offer. Thi s, by virtue of funds, scientific and
managerial capacity, and political influence, is where some actors and organiza-
tions have greater potential to condition imaginations, direct project funding,
and in turn, narrow the sorts of governance mechanisms, instruments, and tech-
niques seen as most appropria te (cf. Corson et al., 2013). Scholarsh ip on green
grabs (e.g., Fairhead et al., 2012) suggests that we must be attentive to the
potential for “blue grabs,” and thus, continued scholarly and practitioner atten-
tion to the broad discourse(s) of ocean finance and capitalization and to local
case studies of project implementation are warranted (also see call from Franco,
Buxton, Vervest, & Feodoroff, 2014).
In closing, however, we return to the precariousness of discourse in global
environmental governance. As we have shown, a number of smaller and more
marginal actors, organizations, and countries employ the term blue economy
and, in so doing, have clearly influenced the direction of high-level debate about
oceans. For us, this suggests that opportunity remains to further adopt or sub-
vert the term in ways that advance diverse objectives, progressive politics, and
governance practices in the largest remaining contiguous common spaces in the
world.
Acknowledgments
Collaborative event ethnography would not be possible without the work and cooper-
ation of a strong network of colleagues. Each author on this article has participated in
various international environmental governance CEEs since 2008, and we would like to
thank all those involved for their intellectual support and camaraderie. We also gratefully
acknowledge funding from the University of Guelph, Duke University, and the Oak
Foundation. Any errors or omissions remain ours.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the University of
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Guelph Faculty Start-up Grant (J. J. S.: 071964 and N. J. G. 071961), a travel support
from the Duke University (L. M. C. and L. W. F.); and Oak Foundation (R. L. G).
Notes
1. Because of his book entitled Blue Economy: 10 Years, 100 Innovations, 100 Million
Jobs (2010), entrepreneur and consultant to the Club of Rome, Gunter Pauli, is
frequently connected with the term blue economy. While Pauli uses blue economy
to describe his vision and suggested paradigms for sustainable business (e.g., sectors
and productive processes modeled to mimic ecosystems), his work is not specific to
oceans. Moreover, our data did not provide any evidence to suggest that actors
closely involved with global oceans governance and/or negotiations and side events
at Rio þ 20 picked up or used the term blue economy through the influence of Pauli
or his work. Therefore, Pauli and his use(s) of the term blue economy fall outside the
scope of this research.
2. CEE relies on collaboration in field work, collecting and analyzing data, and writing
up results. All authors contributed substantively to each of these activities, and thus,
to this article.
3. EEZ and high seas proportions calculated from Figure 5 in Sua
´
rez-de Vivero (2013).
For simplicity, we counted pending extended continental shelf claims as high seas.
4. Core categories identified by Dryzek: basic entities recognized or constructed,
assumptions about natural relationships, agents and their motives, and key meta-
phors and other rhetorical devices.
5. Comments by all major groups on the November 2011 version of the zero draft
have been compiled and are available online at http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/
documents/compilationdocument/MajorGroups.pdf
6. The official outcome document from this workshop, “The Monaco Message,” calls
for the negotiation of a Sustainable Development Goal for the post-2015 (i.e., post-
Millennium Development Goal) agenda “focused on the sustainable development of
the oceans, and the importance of the blue economy” (UNCSD, 2011).
7. The 2012 TEEB press release titled “The UNEP Hosted TEEB Study Leader Pavan
Sukhdev Presents at the World Oceans Summit.”
8. The 2012 TEEB press release “The UNEP Hosted TEEB Study Leader Pavan
Presents at the World Oceans Summit.”
9. Side event: June 21, Global Partnership for Oceans: Coming Together for Healthy
and Productive Oceans.
10. Side event: June 21, Global Partnership for Oceans: Coming Together for Healthy
and Productive Oceans.
11. Patricia Miloslavich (Census of Marine Life): June 20, One Planet, One Ocean:
Knowing Our Ocean, Protecting Our Marine Treasures, Empowering Ocean Citizens.
12. Lynn Hale (The Nature Conservancy): June 19, Oceans at Rio þ 20: Toward
Implementation of the Rio Ocean Commitments.
13. Richard Delaney (Provincetown Center for Coastal Studies): June19th, Oceans at
Rio þ 20: Toward Implementation of the Rio Ocean Commitments.
14. Representative of WWF-International: June 21, CTI on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and
Food Security: Sustaining the Coral Triangle’s Extraordinary Marine Biodiversity
and Its People.
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15. Russ Mittermeier (CI): June 21, CTI on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security:
Sustaining the Coral Triangle’s Extraordinary Marine Biodiversity and Its People.
16. Russ Mittermeier (CI): June 21, CTI on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security:
Sustaining the Coral Triangle’s Extraordinary Marine Biodiversity and Its People.
17. Cristiano da Costa: June 21, CTI on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food
Security: Sustaining the Coral Triangle’s Extraordinary Marine Biodiversity and
Its People.
18. Side event: June 18, Eye on Earth: Eye on Oceans and Blue Carbon.
19. Mary Barton-Dock (Director, Climate Policy and Finance, World Bank): June 18,
Eye on Earth: Eye on Oceans and Blue Carbon.
20. Side event: June 18, Eye on Earth: Eye on Oceans and Blue Carbon.
21. Side event: June 13, High Seas Alliance: Towards an Agreement for Protecting the
High Seas.
22. Kristina Gjerde (IUCN High Seas Policy Advisor): June 13, High Seas Alliance:
Towards an Agreement for Protecting the High Seas.
23. Sophie Mirgaux (legal advisor, Belgian Ministry of Health and Environment): June
13, High Seas Alliance: Towards an Agreement for Protecting the High Seas.
24. Susan Lieberman (Deputy Director of International Environment Policy,
Pew): June 13, High Seas Alliance: Towards an Agreement for Protecting the High Seas.
25. These events included Greening the Blue World: Green Economy Approach for
Oceans, Coasts and SIDS (side event: June 14); High Stakes on the High Seas:
Sustainable Management of Global Tuna Fisheries (side event: June 16); Oceans
Day panel 5: Toward the Blue Economy and Society: Perspectives, Experiences
and Initiatives (side event: June 16); and, Sustainable Maritime Development—The
Contribution of Maritime Transport to Green Growth and Inclusive Development
(side event: June 20).
26. Side event: June 16, Oceans Day panel 6: Toward the Blue Economy and Society:
Perspectives, Experiences and Initiatives.
27. Side event: June 14, Greening the Blue World: Green Economy Approach for
Oceans, Coasts, and SIDS.
28. Side event: June 16, High Stakes on the High Seas: Sustainable Management of
Global Tuna Fisheries.
29. Side event: June 16, High Stakes on the High Seas: Sustainable Management of
Global Tuna Fisheries.
30. Side event: June 16, High Stakes on the High Seas: Sustainable Management of
Global Tuna Fisheries.
31. Side event: June 19, Pacific Islands: Applying the Green Economy in a Blue World.
32. Ronald Jumeau (Representative of the Seychelles to the UN): June 20, Securing the
island future we want: enabling steps toward achieving blue/green economy at re-
gional scale.
33. Lynne Hale (TNC): June 22, Blue Economy Leadership Event.
34. Amanda Ellis: June 16, Oceans Day Panel 4, SIDS and Oceans: Building Resilience,
Enhancing Social and Economic Benefits.
35. Nicholas Watts (Commonwealth Human Ecology Council): June 16, Oceans Day
panel 3, The Living Ocean: Enhancing Fisheries for Food Security, Social and
Economic Benefits.
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36. Nicholas Watts (Commonwealth Human Ecology Council): June 16, Oceans Day
panel 3, the Living Ocean: Enhancing Fisheries for Food Security, Social and
Economic Benefits.
37. Side event: June 19, Commonwealth and African Fisheries: Building a Coalition for
Sustainable Oceans Governance.
38. Accessed June 6, 2014: http://www.economistinsights.com/sites/default/files/World_
Ocean_Summit_Executive_ summary_WEB.pdf
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Author Biographies
Jennifer J. Silver is an assistant professor in the Department of Geography at
the University of Guelph, Canada. She researches the social dynamics and pol-
itics of oceans governance and oceanscape change. Her work currently focuses
on aquaculture, seafood certification, international oceans governance, and the
regulation of ocean space in the Pacific Northwest.
Noella J. Gray is an assistant profes sor in the Department of Geography at the
University of Guelph, Canada . Her research examines the politics and human
impacts of marine conservation and governance across scales, focusing on inter-
national institutions as well as marine protected areas and volunteer tourism in
Belize.
Lisa M. Campb ell is the Rachel Carson Professor in Marine Affairs and Policy
in the Nicholas School of Environment, Duke University. She studies the inter-
actions of marine policy making and practice across local, regional, national,
and international governance levels, and she is particularly interested in how
science informs such interactions.
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Luke W. Fairbanks is a PhD candidate in the Division of Marine Science &
Conservation at Duke University’s Nicholas School of the Environment. His
work explores the human geography of environmental policy and politics with a
focus on the oceans. He is currently engaged in projects examining marine aqua-
culture developm ent, marine spatial planning, and oceans conservation.
Rebecca L. Gruby is an assistant professor in the Department of Human
Dimensions of Natural Resources at Colorado State University. Her research
seeks to understand and inform contemporary transformations in ocean gov-
ernance, engaging human geography and new institutionalist theoretical
perspectives.
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