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Transitional Justice Review
Volume 1 |Issue 1 Article 11
2013
Civil Society Activism and the Ghanaian National
Reconciliation Commission: e case of the Civil
Society Coalition on National Reconciliation
Seidu Alidu
University of Ghana, seidualidu@gmail.com
Robert Ame
Wilid Laurier University, rame@wlu.ca
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Recommended Citation
Alidu, Seidu and Ame, Robert (2013) "Civil Society Activism and the Ghanaian National Reconciliation Commission: e case of the
Civil Society Coalition on National Reconciliation," Transitional Justice Review: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 11.
DOI: hp://dx.doi.org/10.5206/tjr.2012.1.1.5
Available at: hp://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss1/11
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.1, 2012, 104-136
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.1, 2012, 104-136
Civil Society Activism and the Ghanaian National
Reconciliation Commission:
The case of the Civil Society Coalition on National
Reconciliation1
Seidu Alidu, University of Ghana
seidualidu@gmail.com
and
Robert Ame, Wilfrid Laurier University
rame@wlu.ca
Introduction
Ghana became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to attain
political independence from Britain in 1957. Since then, it has
experienced a chequered political history with power alternating
between military and civilian governments till 1992. It has gone
through four successful military rules,2 several attempted coups
d’état and three transitions.3 In all these instances, especially
1 Dr. Joanna Quinn, Dr. A.A. Apusiga and Dr. Hardi Bolaji provided valuable
comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. We are also grateful to the
anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and recommendations.
2 The National Liberation Council under A.A. Afrifa (24/02/1966 to
30/09/1969); the National Redemption Council and the Supreme Military
Council I &II under I.K. Achaempong and F.W. K Akuffo (13/01/1972 to
03/06/1979); the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council under J.J. Rawlings
(04/06/1979 to 23/09/1979); and the Provisional National Defence Council
also under J.J. Rawlings (31/12/1981 to 06/01/1993).
3 From the National Liberation Council military regime to the democratic
government of Prime Minister K.A. Busia ushering in Ghana’s Second
Republic; from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council military regime to
the democratic government of Dr. Hilla Limann marking the beginning of
the Third Republic, and from the Provisional National Defence Council
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during the military regimes, grave human rights abuses were
believed to have been committed, including rape, confiscation of
properties, unlawful detentions, torture and widespread
disappearances.4 These violations have not only left a mark of
hatred in the relationship between victims and perpetrators of
the crimes but have also created huge deficits in the human
rights records of the country.
The decision of the Provisional National Defence
Council (PNDC) regime to return the country to constitutional
rule in 1992 was influenced to some extent by the dedication
and resourcefulness of civil society organizations.5 Indeed, the
role of civil society organizations in policy making in Ghana has
developed gradually from insignificant involvement to extensive
engagement over the last two decades.6 This pattern of
development is similar to what happened at the international
level where Moore and Pubantz7 have argued that it was not till
the 1980s that the United Nations saw an explosion in the
quantity and quality of NGOs.8 In this spirit, the Ghana Bar
Association, religious bodies and other civil society
organizations have all worked relentlessly in ensuring that Ghana
did not only return to democratic rule but have also initiated
measures aimed at reconciling the nation through the granting of
military rule to the democratic government of Flight Lieutenant Jerry John
Rawlings signifying the beginning of the Fourth Republic.
4 Robert Ameh, “Uncovering Truth: Ghana’s National Reconciliation
Commission Excavation of Past Human Rights Abuses,” Contemporary Justice
Review 9.4 (2006): 345-368.
5 Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, “Civil Society in Africa: the Good, the Bad, the
Ugly,” CIVNET, 1.1 (May 1997).
6 AbdulGafaru Abdulai and , Ruby Quantson “The Changing role of CSOs
in Public Policy making in Ghana,” Ghana Social Science Journal, 5/6.1/2
(1999): 114-151.
7 John A. Moore and Jerry Pubantz, The New United Nations: International
Organization in the Twenty-First Century (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson
Education Inc./Prentice Hall, 2006).
8 In Ghana, the introduction of the 1992 Constitution and return to
constitutional rule led to the proliferation of civil society organizations in the
1990s.
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amnesties to Ghanaian exiles, the release of political prisoners
and the repealing of draconian laws in the country.9 After the
transition to democracy, civil society groups also played an
active role in monitoring government policies, providing services
and consolidating the little gained in the country’s democratic
dispensation through advocacy work. Therefore the role civil
society organizations played in the work of the National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) came as no surprise from the
time the idea was introduced into the political discourse of the
country until the time the Commission completed its work and
even beyond.10 The Civil Society Coalition on National
Reconciliation was established to help actualize government’s
commitment towards reconciliation via the platform of the
NRC. While their formation is informed by variety of reasons,
coalitions provide a lot of benefits to their members. Generally,
civil society coalitions have increased access to information,
expertise and financial resources which in turn enhance their
level of efficiency and increase their operational impact.11
In terms of structure, coalitions can be formal or
informal associations and may operate at different levels; from
local to international. There is no criterion on how and why
networks develop but formation can be instigated by external or
internal sources, or for practical or value-based reasons.12
9 H.J.A.N. Mensa-Bonsu, “Gender, Justice and Reconciliation: Lessons
from the Ghana’s NRC,” Unpublished paper delivered at the CDD-CI
Workshop on Gender, Justice and Reconciliation, at the Fiesta Royale
Hotel, Accra, 7 June 2007.
10 Prof. Mike Ocquaye, Second Deputy Speaker of Ghana’s Parliament, was
the first person to introduce the concept of national reconciliation into
Ghana’s academic and political discourse in his article, “M. Ocquaye,
“Human Rights and the Transitional to Democracy under the PNDC in
Ghana,” Human Rights Quarterly 17.3 (1995): 556-573.
11 Seidu Alidu, “CSO Networks and Policy Influence in Ghana,”
Research Report, ISSER-CIDIN Civil Society Research Facility Ghana,
2012.
12 Claudia Liebler and Marisa Ferri, “NGO Networks: Building Capacity in a
Changing World,” Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation (November
2004).
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Depending on the issue that needs their attention, coalitions may
be formed to be sustainable in the long run or as a response to a
very specific stimulus and are designed to be time-bound. The
CDD-led Civil Society Coalition on National Reconciliation was
a national one formed to influence the work of the Ghanaian
TRC and was therefore time-bound. It consisted of twenty-six
civil society organisations drawn largely but not exclusively from
the media, the trade union, religious and other professional
associations including teachers, lawyers, students and traditional
leaders. It was chaired by a retired High Court Judge, Mr Justice
V.C.R.A.C Crabbe. Largely drawn from different professional
backgrounds, the Civil Society Coalition on National
Reconciliation was able to work together throughout the NRC
mandate period. Certainly, Weible argues that advocacy
coalitions are able to hold on together and coordinate their
activities through a belief system.13 The core belief that
bounded these different organizations together was their desire
to advance the course of human rights and reconciliation in the
country.
Though there is no shortage of academic literature on
the role of civil society organizations in policy making and
international development, there is a dearth of information on
the role of Ghanaian civic groups in the country’s reconciliation
process. This paper aims at bridging that gap by assessing the
contribution of the Civil Society Coalition to the formal
Ghanaian national reconciliation process, which was set in
motion when the National Reconciliation Act was passed in
2002. In this vein, the paper seeks to answer the following
questions: How did the Civil Society Coalition on National
Reconciliation contribute to the work of the Ghana National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC)? How effective was the
Coalition in advancing the goal of reconciliation in Ghana? What
challenges did the Coalition encounter? What was the impact of
13 Christopher M. Weible, “Beliefs and Policy Influence: an Advocacy
Coalition Approach to Policy Networks,” Political Research Quarterly, 58.3
(2005): 461-477.
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such participation to policy making in Ghana? This paper is
based on the analysis of secondary data on both the work of
transitional justice in general and the NRC in particular. It also
draws a little from an interview with the former Program Officer
in charge of the Transitional Justice Unit at the CDD which
formed the Civil Society Coalition on National Reconciliation.
The paper is broadly divided into four sections. Section one
examines the Ghanaian transition from the perspective of Ní
Aoláin and Campbell’s typology of “paradigmatic” and
“conflicted democratic” transitions. 14 While the second section
looks at the Ghanaian transitional justice programme, the third
appraises the role of the Civil Society Coalition on National
Reconciliation and its contribution to the transitional justice
programme. The last section assesses the work of the Civil
Society Coalition on National Reconciliation vis-à-vis the NRC
and makes a recommendation for similar programmes in the
future.
The Ghanaian Transition
Several literatures abound on democratic transitions. While
majority of these focuses on the causes and outcomes of
democratic transitions, others emphasize the pre-requisites for
democratization including socio-economic development,
political culture and the role of civil society in such process.15
Guo discusses four major approaches to the study of democratic
transitions: 16 the first assumes that economic development,
political culture, social structures and other conditions explain
the outcome of a particular transition; the second approach
concentrates on the strategic choices that elites make and how
that influences the transitional process; the third approach
focuses on the impact of institutions in determining the
14 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Christine Campbell, “The Paradox of Transition
in Conflicted Democracies,” Human Rights Quarterly, 27 (2005): 172-213.
15 Helga A. Welsh, “Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern
Europe,” Comparative Politics, 27.379 (1994): 379-394.
16 Sujian Guo, “Democratic Transition: A Critical Overview,” Issues and
Studies, 35.4 (July/August 1999): 133-148.
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parameters of political actions and eventual transition, and the
fourth approach emphasises the interaction between politics and
the economy as explanatory variables determining variations in
political outcomes.17 Similarly, many democratic transition
theorists have all explained democratic transitions using the
actor-induced model. 18 This model assumes that democratic
transitions are inspired by strategies, beliefs and calculations of
the ruling elites who spearhead the transition process at critical
times in their rule. Such critical times may come about due to
internal or external pressures or social, economic and political
challenges.
Arguably, the Ghanaian democratic transition in the
early nineties was influenced so much by the socio-economic
dynamics of the country than any other factor. The economic
challenges the PNDC regime faced after its overthrow of the
Peoples’ National Party in 1981 led to its adoption of a World
Bank-initiated Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) to
stabilize an ailing economy.19 Though the results of the World
Bank-led SAP was mixed,20 a lot of analysts believed its social
consequences was unbearable to the ordinary Ghanaian
17 Ibid., 135-137.
18 See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth
Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). See also Guillermo
O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,” in Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule, eds. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and
Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986).
19 K. Boafo-Arthur, “Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) in Ghana:
Interrogating PNDC’s Implementation,” West Africa Review, 1.1 (1999): 1-19;
S. Appiah-Opoku, “The World’s Bank Structural Adjustment Programs in
Africa: the case of Ghana,” Notes (Cornell University, 1998): 6-10; K.
Konado-Agyemang, “The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Structural
Adjustment Programs and Uneven Development in Africa: the case of
Ghana,” Professional Geographers, 52.3 (2000): 469-483.
20 Boafo-Arthur, “Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) in Ghana,” 1-
19; K. Boafo-Arthur, K. “Ghana’s Politics of International Economic
Relations under the PNDC, 1982-1992,” African Study Monograph, 20.2 (June
1999): 73-98; Konado-Agyemang, “The Best of Times and the Worst of
Times,” 469-483.
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resulting in the implementation of the Programme of Action to
Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD).21
Following international pressure (mainly from the World Bank
and the IMF) and domestic discontent from the implementation
of SAP, the top hierarchy of the PNDC made a strategic choice
in the late eighties to return the country to democracy by first
lifting a ban on the activities of political parties. While the
decision to return the country to democracy was not voluntarily
initiated by the ruling class, it nonetheless benefitted them since
power was handed to Jerry John Rawlings again (this time as a
civilian rather than a military leader). O’Donnell and Schmitter’s
argument that it is difficult to predict the outcome of democratic
transitions since much depends on the short-time calculations
and the immediate reaction of strategic actors to the unfolding
event seems very accurate in the Ghanaian case.22 The PNDC
regime was able to calculate well by providing for themselves
blanket amnesty for all the crimes they have committed under
the military regime and formed a civilian party that allowed them
to continue to stay in power for another eight years. 23
However, the incoming National Democratic Congress
(NDC) (a vestige of the PNDC regime) did not deem it
appropriate to investigate human rights violations that occurred
before the transition to democracy. This was partly due to the
fact that most of the human rights violations committed before
the transition to democracy in 1992 was under the watch of the
same leader, Jerry John Rawlings. Rather, the NDC government
preferred an “opaque reconciliation agenda” that covered only
“selective de-confiscation of properties illegally seized in the
21 Boafo-Arthur, “Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) in Ghana,” 1-
19; Boafo-Arthur, “Ghana’s Politics of International Economic Relations
under the PNDC, 1982-1992,” 73-98.
22 O’Donnell, and Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule,” 456.
23 K. Boafo-Arthur, “National Reconciliation or Polarisation: The Politics of
the Ghana National Reconciliation Commission,” in The Crisis of State and
Regionalism in West Africa: Identity, Citizenship and Conflict, eds. W.A. Fawole and
C. Ukeje, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2005).
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previous Rawlings-led regimes.”24 The NDC preference for an
“opaque” reconciliation agenda rather than a comprehensive
reconciliation process using a TRC was informed by the
constant anxiety among the rank of the NDC that such an
exercise will deliberately harm them collectively or individually.25
The New Patriotic Party (NPP), an arch-rival and also
victim of the Rawlings-led military regimes, opted for a truth
commission after winning the 2000 election. Indeed, Gyimah-
Boadi argues that the decision to establish a truth commission
was a political manifesto of the NPP on which they campaigned
widely. 26 Although it was a campaign promise of the NPP to
establish a truth commission, it was not however the intention
of the party to protect Rawlings from accountability – at least
not of the decisions he made as both chairman of the AFRC and
the PNDC, which led to several human rights violations. The
period after the political transition till the time the NRC was
established can be aptly captured by Ní Aoláin and Campbell
categorization of political transitions.27 They distinguish
between two types of political transitions after violent conflicts
and political repressions: “paradigmatic” and “conflicted
democracies.” The paradigmatic transition involves the
aspiration and attempts of non-democratic states to practice
democracy after violent conflict or rule by an “illegitimate”
government. The state practices what Ní Aoláin and Campbell
call “procedural” democracy. This meets only the “minimal
requirements” needed for a state to become democratic. For
example, paradigmatic democratic states may aspire to have a
majoritarian rule by holding regular elections, which although
not necessarily fair or transparent might just conform to the
norm of engaging in a form of democratic process. In
paradigmatic transitions, therefore, the state in question emerges
24 Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, “National Reconciliation in Ghana: Prospects
and Challenges,” CDD-Ghana Briefing Paper, 4.1 (2002): 2.
25 Ibid., 3.
26 Ibid.
27 Ní Aoláin and Campbell, “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted
Democracies,” 172-213.
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from a repressive past or a destructive conflict, where
democracy was never practiced or could not have been
operational, to a procedural democracy.
Conflicted democratic transition, on the other hand,
involves the efforts of states to move from the minimal form of
democracy that characterized the pre-transition period to a more
advanced level of democracy after the transition. Such states
practice “substantive” democracy, which goes beyond the
holding of only regular elections (which at times may not be free
and fair). Substantive democracy encompasses free and
transparent elections, and the provision of requisite democratic
institutions such as the legislature, executive, judiciary, free press
and vibrant civil society needed to sustain the process. Therefore
in conflicted democratic transition, the country in question
already practices a form of democracy by observing the ritual of
holding regular elections though there may still remain firmly-
established divisions within the country in the form of racial,
ethnic, religious, class or ideological struggles.
This distinction between the two types of transitions is
very helpful in understanding Ghana’s transition and in
particular why a transitional justice programme was necessary in
the country. Arguably, the Ghanaian transition to the Fourth
Republic is both paradigmatic and conflicted. Unlike others, the
Ghanaian transition already had vibrant civil society
organizations (CSOs) as well as strong state institutions in
place.28 This was a result of the late start of the transitional
justice program – almost a decade after the return to
constitutional democracy from military rule. Yet, there was
some level of apathy and near confrontationist attitude between
the CSOs and state institutions regarding aspects of peace-
building. This conflict could be understood within the context
of Bombande’s argument that governments regard civil society
organizations as “competitors rather than collaborators” when it
28 A.F. Odora, “Rising from the Ashes: the Rebirth of Civil Society in an
Authoritarian Political Environment,” International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law,
10.3 (2008): 79-91.
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comes to issues related to peacebuilding. 29 The major problem
has to do with the process/manner of peace building. While
politicians operating under the façade of the state seek quick
“peace dividends”30 that “put them in good light in public
opinion,”31 civil society organizations prefer a systematic,
innovative and careful intervention that do not only address the
issues at the heart of the problem but which will also forestall
future repetitions. Also, having emerged from authoritarian rule,
some new democratic states still retain the vestiges of patronage
politics. In a situation of limited resources and the duplication of
roles between the state and civil society organizations,
governments can monopolize the former and stifle political
opportunities to gain control over civil society groups. The
consequence of such a situation is the limited roles that civil
society groups choose to play at crucial periods in their
developments and expansion. They tend to avoid human rights
29 E. Bombande, “Conflicts, Civil Society Organizations and Community
Peacebuilding Practices in Northern Ghana,” in Ethnicity, Conflicts and
Consensus in Ghana, ed. S. Tonah, (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 2007),
221. This assertion stems from the frustration the Inter-NGO Consortium—
a group of several local and international peace building and other civil
society organizations—encountered in their attempt to help at peace building
efforts in Northern Ghana at the height of the “guinea fowl” war in 1994.
See Bombande, “Conflicts, Civil Society Organizations and Community
Peacebuilding Practices in Northern Ghana,” 221.
30 “Peace Dividends” refers to the tendency or desire to rapidly show
progress or successes vis à vis security and relief work in fragile and conflict-
affected situations which has a tendency to patch over deep-seated
problems. For more discussion on this issue see M.A. Rocha, “’State-
building for Peace’: Navigating an Arena of Contradictions,” Overseas
Development Studies Briefing Paper, No. 52 (London: Overseas
Development Institute, August 2009). See also Roland Paris and T. Sisk,
Dilemmas of State-Building: Confronting the Contradiction of Post-War Peace
Operations (London: Routledge, 2009).
31 Bombande, “Conflicts, Civil Society Organizations and Community
Peacebuilding Practices in Northern Ghana,” 221.
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and democratic issues and focus on issues related to welfare and
the provision of services.32
Ní Aoláin and Campbell note that in a paradigmatic
transition, the state engages with the legacy of the previous
regimes’ massive human rights violations.33 As mentioned
earlier, the military has intermittently interrupted the Ghanaian
democratic dispensation on four occasions, all of which were
characterized by widespread violations of human rights. Though
the Commission found that overall trend of human rights
violations spread across both constitutional and unconstitutional
governments,34 the coming to power of military regimes were
marked by sharp rises in human rights violations. Specifically,
the periods under the AFRC and the PNDC witnessed
particularly extensive use of repressive measures.35 Under these
two regimes, abductions and torture were very common. So
were “disappearances” and the use of “kangaroo courts” to
expedite death sentences on the regime’s “enemies.” There were
many occasions under the PNDC when market women were
publicly flogged by the military for the minimal crime of selling
commodities at prices that were thought to be greater than the
regime’s controlled prices. The unrestrained behaviour of the
military further led to the infamous “house cleaning” campaign
in which three High Court Judges, two former Heads of State
and many citizens were arrested and subsequently murdered. 36
These arrests and murders developed into a “culture of silence”
in which people were afraid to criticize the policies and excesses
of the PNDC regime.
32 Odora, “Rising from the Ashes: the Rebirth of Civil Society in an
Authoritarian Political Environment,” 79 – 91.
33 Ní Aoláin and Campbell, “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted
Democracies,” 172-213.
34 Report of the National Reconciliation Commission, Vol.3, Chapter 3,
(2004), 168.
35 Ibid., 170.
36 The “house cleaning” campaign referred to a time when the abduction and
disappearance of people who were thought to be enemies of the regime
became common.
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Several reasons explain the astronomic rise of human rights
violations committed under the AFRC and PNDC regimes
(which together constitute 84% of all violations committed
under the Commission’s mandate period).37 The report of the
Commission notes that the record of high incidence of human
rights violations under the AFRC and the PNDC could have
been influenced by the fact that majority of witnesses who
testified before the Commissions were victims of those regimes
since they were the last military governments in the country
before its return to constitutional rule. It may also have been
that victims of some of the oldest governments in the country
were no more available to testify against those regimes as a result
of loss of lives or memory lapses.38 Despite the reasons that
influenced human rights violations under these two regimes, the
Commission finds (and as indicated in Figure 1) that majority of
violations occurred under the PNDC. It started rising from 1981
when the regime came to power and reached its peak in 1982
when it struggled to consolidate its grips to power in the face of
threats to its rule.
37 Report of the National Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 3, Chapter 3,
(2004), 170.
38 Ibid., 151.
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0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Years
Number of violations
Figure 1:
Patterns of human rights violations in Ghana (1957- 1993)
(Source: Report of the National Reconciliation Commission,
October 2004)
Therefore, it is right to argue that while Ghana has been a
democratic state since independence, the period between 1979
to 1992 was characterized by political repression and the
suppression of the people’s freedom to speech and associational
life.39 Such a situation, especially under a military government,
makes it difficult to practice even the procedural form of
democracy. Under constitutional rule, mass human rights
violations are likely to attract wide condemnation from human
rights groups and other civic organization within the state and
may lead to dwindling electoral fortunes. However, under
military regimes, it may be dangerous to openly display outrage
or condemn such abuses because of the suppression of dissent
and also the consequences of taking such a decision. On this
basis, the Ghanaian transition to the Fourth Republic could
arguably be classified as paradigmatic.
Perhaps more controversial, however, is the definition
of Ghana as a conflicted democracy. The controversy does not
39 M. Ocquaye, “Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy under the
PNDC in Ghana,” Human Rights Quarterly 17.3 (1995): 556.
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lie in the fact that the country is plagued with “deep social
cleavages, rancour and bitterness” which could easily be
identified as conflictual, but in the assumption that Ghana is a
“procedural” and not a “substantive” democracy following the
transition in 1993 and before the commencement of the
transitional justice programme in 2002.40 The country had
established all the relevant democratic institutions needed to
qualify it as substantive. It had a hierarchical court structure, a
vibrant parliament, active civil society organizations, horizontal
institutions of accountability such as the Commission on
Human Rights and Administrative Justice and the National
Commission for Civic Education among others. Ghana had
also conducted regular elections mostly adjudged as being free
and fair by both local and foreign observers and, has in the
past decade, also witnessed the alternation of power between
governing and opposition political parties. Notwithstanding all
these, however, Ní Aoláin and Campbell argue that Ghana, like
many other conflicted democracies, already has some kind of
“...ideological commitment to, and therefore claims adherence
to, ‘democratic values’.”41 Therefore, the “self-definition” of
being a democracy and the “commitment” to democratic tenets
paradoxically makes transitional justice programmes in such
countries seem irrelevant. However, Ghana’s “self-definition”
of being a democratic state could not hide the “deep-seated”
divisions42 the country faced, nor could it wipe clean its legacy
40 J.R.A. Ayee, “Political Leadership and Democratic Consolidation,” in
Voting for Democracy in Ghana: The 2004 Elections in Perspective, ed. K. Boafo-
Arthur, Thematic Studies, Vol. 1 (Accra: Freedom Publications, 2006), 84.
41 Ní Aoláin and Campbell, “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted
Democracies,” 174.
42 These divisions take the form of political antagonism between the
National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party; inter and intra-
ethnic as well as chieftaincy tensions especially in the three Northern parts
of the country, and religious tensions. For a detailed analysis of these
tensions, see D. Tsikata and W. Seini, “Identities, Inequalities and Conflicts
in Ghana,” Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and
Ethnicity (CRISE), Working Paper No. 5 (Oxford, November 2004).
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of past human right violations. The NRC was essentially
established to address this situation.
The National Reconciliation Commission
Many transitional justice analysts argue that coming to terms
with the past after gross human rights violations is an essential
part of the process of social, legal and moral reconstruction of a
society.43 It is a common feature during transitions to establish
officially sanctioned bodies to investigate and document
patterns of human rights violations in the past and also to make
recommendations on how similar abuses can be prevented in
future.44 While truth commissions are not substitutes for other
forms of accountability, they nonetheless are essentially
43 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Civil Society in Process of Accountability,” in Post-
Conflict Justice, ed. M. Cheriff Bassiouni (New York: Transnational Publishers,
2002); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “State Responsibility to Investigate and
Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law,” California
Law Review 78.2 (1990): 449; Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000); Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Jurisprudence,” The Yale
Law Journal 106.7 (1997); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness:
Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998);
Nigel Biggar, , ed. Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil
Conflict (Georgetown University Press , 2001). In fact, the literature abounds
with such arguments. See also Carlos S. Nino, “The Duty to Punish Past
Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of Argentina,” Yale Law
Journal 100 (1991): 2619; Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: The Duty
to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime,” Yale Law Journal
100 (1991): 25-37; Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle
for Global Justice, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: The New Press, 2002); and
Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).
44 Priscilla Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions: A Comparative
tudy,” Human Rights Quarterly, 16.4 (1994): 597-655; Priscilla Hayner,
“Commissioning the Truth: Further Research Question,” Third World
Quarterly, 17.1 (1996): 19-29; Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths:
Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2004);
Priscilla Hayner, ‘Truth Commissions: A Schematic Review,”
International Review of the Red Cross, 862 (2006): 295-360.
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complementary measures of same.45 The relationship between
the Sierra Leonean TRC and Special Court offers a classic
instance. Even though there were documented instances of
tension in the working relationship between these transitional
justice processes, it nonetheless proved that these two
accountability mechanisms can operate side-by-side. Truth
Commissions are generally understood as “non-judicial or
quasi-judicial investigative bodies, which map patterns of past
violence, and unearth the causes and consequences of these
destructive events.”46 These bodies have gained much currency
as influential policy tools for national healing after armed
conflict and following the end of brutal and repressive regimes
given the relative success of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. Truth Commissions are not the
same everywhere, given that they are set up because of different
precipitating factors including the end of repressive regimes,
entrenched structural segregation and after violent armed
conflict. They can also differ with regards to the sponsor of the
Commission which could be the national government of the
country concerned, the United Nations or non-governmental
organizations. Finally, Truth Commissions’ source of authority
45 For a detailed analysis of this relationship see Marieka Wierda, Priscilla
Hayner, and Paul van Zyl, “Exploring the Relationship between the Special
Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone,” rev.
24 June 2002, original paper presented to the “UN Expert Group on the
Relationship between the TRC and the Special Court,” New York, December
20-21, 2001. See also William Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone,” Criminal Law Forum, 15.1-2 (2004): 3-54; William Schabas,
“The Relationship Between Truth Commissions and International Courts:
The Case of Sierra Leone,” Human Rights Quarterly 25.4 (2003): 1035-1066;
and, Suzannah Linton “Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone:
Experiments in International Justice,” Criminal Law Forum 12.2 (2001): 185-
246.
46 United Nations “United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice,”
Guidance Notes of the Secretary-General, March 2010:8 accessed at
http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf,on
13/08/2011 and Priscilla Hayner’s “Fifteen Truth Commissions” and
Unspeakable Truths give a good definition of TRCs.
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could be a distinguishing factor since some derive their
legitimacy from legal and/or political power of subpoena, yet
others permit voluntary cooperation from participants.47
The mandate of the Ghanaian National Reconciliation
Commission was to “…seek and promote reconciliation among
the people of Ghana”48 and to “make recommendations to the
President for redress.”49 Specifically, Section 4 (a-e) of Act 611
empowers the Commission to:
• Investigate human rights abuses related to killings,
abductions, disappearances, detentions, torture, ill-
treatment and seizure of properties during past military
regimes in Ghana;
• Investigate the causes and contexts within which those
abuses occurred;
• Identify perpetrators and victims of such abuses;
• Make appropriate recommendations for redressing such
abuses; and,
• Make the work of the Commission a source of public
education.
This TRC process was necessary in the Ghanaian context
because there were a lot of deceit and negation concerning
human rights violations – especially with regard to cases relating
to abduction and disappearances.50 Ghana’s political history,
especially the part that has to do with violence and human rights
violations, vary depending on the political leanings (whether
NPP or NDC) of the narrator. Thus, while members of the
NPP generally think the 1966 military coup d’état that toppled
Ghana’s first president was legal but the coups d’état staged by
47 Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions,” 597-655; Hayner, Unspeakable
Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity.
48 Republic of Ghana National Reconciliation Commission Act (Act 611) (2001),
Sec. 3.1.
49 Ibid., Sec. 3.1.b.
50 The abduction and subsequent murder of the three High Court judges,
which became the central issue during the work of the NRC, is a case in
point.
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military strongman JJ Rawlings in 1979 and 1981 were illegal,
members of the NDC see it the other way round.51 A
consequence of the different perceptions of violence in the
country was the great controversy generated by the creation of
the National Reconciliation Commission in 2001; especially
volatile was which period in the country’s history should be
investigated by the Commission.52 Thus, the political posturing
of the NDC and the NPP in the Ghanaian Parliament during the
debate of the National Reconciliation Commission Bill was not
only a reflection of a long-held belief by the two dominant
political traditions in the country but also a rehearsal of the sort
of politicization that will characterize the Commission’s work.
As noted by Ignatieff, truth commissions have the potential to
limit the number of truths circulated unchallenged in the
political and historical discourse of a country.53 However, in the
Ghanaian case, the nature of political tensions between the two
main political parties in the country made it little less impossible
to agree on a shared truth about the history of human rights
violations.54 However, paramount to all these, is the
demonstration of political leadership on the part of the NPP
administration regarding national reconciliation. One of the key
points in the NPP’s manifesto going into the 2000 general
election was to set up a reconciliation commission to unearth
51 Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana: 1946-1966 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1964); G. Bing, Reap the Whirlwind: An account of Kwame Nkrumah’s
Ghana: 1950-1966 (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968).
52 Robert Ameh, “Uncovering Truth: Ghana’s National Reconciliation
Commission Excavation of Past Human Rights Abuses,” Contemporary Justice
Review 9.4 (2006): 345-368; and Robert Ameh, “Doing Justice after Conflict:
The Case for Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission,” Canadian Journal
of Law and Society, 21.1. (2006): 85-109.
53 Michael Ignatieff, “Articles of Faith,” Index on Censorship, 25.5
(September/October 1996): 110-122.
54 See, for example, Austin, Politics in Ghana: 1946-1966 and Bing, Reap the
Whirlwind: An account of Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana 1950-1966. See also Ameh,
“Uncovering Truth,” and Ameh, “Doing Justice after Conflict,” for a
discussion of some of these controversies and the political contexts that
generated them.
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past atrocities; so once they won the election, they did not
renege on their promise to the electorate.55 It was in the light of
these and several other reasons that the Ghanaian truth
commission was deemed to be necessary.
Though widely criticized for being over-politicized56 and
even controversial,57 the Commission was able to achieve some
of its objectives as mandated in Act 611. The report implicated
the security institutions as the major perpetrators of human
rights violations during the country’s troubled times; uncovered
some graves and paid reparations to selected victims of human
rights violations. The most valuable contribution of the
Commission towards reconciliation in the country, according to
some victims interviewed, was the cathartic experience they
went through after being given the opportunity to ventilate their
grievances on such a public platform. These achievements were
widely propagated by an active media and other civil society
organizations. The section that follows discusses the extent to
which Ghanaian civic groups participated in the Commission’s
process.
Civil Society Organizations
Variously known as “non-governmental organizations”, “social
movements”, and “citizen action” or “advocacy networks”, civil
society organizations have been defined by Marlies Glasius58 as a
deliberate get-together of people with the aim of influencing
their society. Glasius identifies three main functions of civil
society organizations: (i) paradigm-shifters who influence people
55 New Patriotic Party Manifesto (2000), 37.
56 S. Alidu, G. Fairbairnand D. Webb, “‘Truths’ and ‘Re-Imaging’ in the
Reconciliation Process,” Peace Review, 21.2 (2009: 136- 143; Boafo-Arthur,
“The Quest for National Reconciliation in Ghana,” 127-155; Nahla Valji,
“Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission: A Comparative Assessment,”
New York: International Center for Transitional Justice Occasional Paper
Series (2006).
57 Ayee, “Political Leadership and Democratic Consolidation,” 79-99.
58 Marlies Glasius, “Global Civil Society and Human Rights,” in Human
Rights: Politics and Practice, ed. Michael Goodhart (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 149.
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to shift their minds and beliefs; (ii) law-making: persuading and
lobbying law-makers at both the domestic and international
levels to make laws favourable to the causes they champion; and,
(iii) human rights monitors who have the will and courage to
fight for the implementation of laws and policies where
governments and policy-makers fail.59
McConnachie60 has identified the following roles that
civil society organizations can play during transitions: in the
drafting of legislations for truth commissions and also lobbying
to improve them; convening national discussions on
international best practices within the field of transitional justice;
holding preparatory conferences and also training the media on
the coverage of the accountability process; and researching
alternative models for reconciliation. Similarly, Roht-Arriaza has
highlighted the following as “points of intervention” for civil
society organizations during transitions: in the overall design of
accountability measures including aspects of reparations; in the
naming of punishable crimes and the type of sanctions to be
used, and in the obtaining of witnesses.61 Each of these roles
should be performed within the authority of the constitution of
the state in question and according to the principles and spirit of
international law. This may seem like subjugating civil society
organizations to the mercy of the state. Yet, each of these
groups – state and civil society – has roles they can play best
notwithstanding the relatively ‘symmetric’ power relations
between them. Further, Marlies Glasius62 has rightly pointed out
that the relationship between civil society organisations could be
conflictual as conflict arises between the aims and mode of
operation of different CSOs. Hence, it sometimes makes sense
for national laws to circumscribe the functions of CSOs.
59 Ibid.
60 Kristen McConnachie, “Truth Commissions and NGOs: the Essential
Relationship,” International Center for Transitional Justice and CDD-Ghana
Occasional Paper Series (April 2004).
61 Roht-Arriaza, “Civil Society in Process of Accountability,” 97–114.
62 Glasius, “Global Civil Society and Human Rights,” 147-163.
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The CDD and the Civil Society Coalition on National
Reconciliation
The Ghana Centre for Democratic Governance (CDD) assumed
a lead-role in mobilising other non-state actors to influence the
work of the Commission. The CDD is an autonomous, non-
political and not-for-profit research, advocacy and research-
based think-tank in Accra-Ghana. Established in 1998, it is
dedicated to the promotion of democracy, good governance and
the development of a liberal political and economic environment
in Ghana and the African continent at large. Since its
establishment, the CDD has engaged in a number of activities
related to governance, peace and security, and human rights,
among others.63 Many of the Centre’s capacity building projects
can be classified broadly under the banner of peace building,
including civil-military relations, land conflict management and
issues related to security and crime.64 It also focuses on issues
related to good governance, free and fair election, and matters
that border on improving civil society capabilities and/or its
relations with government.65 Based on these objectives, the
63 “Services: Training/Capacity-Building,” CDD-Ghana; available from
http://www.cddghana.org/service.asp?cnid=15; accessed 10 Feb. 2011.
64 Ibid. For example, in 2000, the Centre organised a workshop with
representatives from the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative
Justice (CHRAJ), the Ghana Bar Association, African Security Dialogue and
Research and commanders from the Ghana Armed Forces to review a draft
report on “Civil-Military Relations in Ghana.” Similar fora have been held to
facilitate dialogue between the military and civil society relations in the
country; peace building and conflict management (as exemplified by the
1998 seminar on “Conflict and Conflict Management in Africa” facilitated
by Professor Donald Rothchild of the University of California); the role of
civil society in conflict resolution and reconciliation (as per the one
organised for members of the GHANEPO on “Conflict, Peace and
Reconciliation”); issues related to crime and security ( as demonstrated by
the seminar on “Crime and Security in West Africa Sub-region) that brought
together security experts from Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
65 Ibid. Cases in point include workshops and trainings organised for these
bodies on several occasions. For example in 2000 the Centre organised a
workshop on “Strengthening Civil Society Advocacy in Expenditure
Monitoring” in an attempt to bring together civil society closer to
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CDD brought other civil society organizations to form the Civil
Society Coalition on National Reconciliation in March 2001.
The Coalition developed a national transitional justice
framework in three main areas: conceptualization of national
reconciliation, public and legislative consultations, and public
space.66
Conceptualization of National Reconciliation
The CDD in conjunction with the Coalition conducted a
nationwide survey67 on the opinions of the public about a
prospective reconciliation commission in the country. The
results of the survey indicated an overwhelming support among
Ghanaians (89% of respondents) for such an exercise. This
indication from the public led the CDD and the Coalition to
organize a national conference, followed by a series of focus
groups in the Northern, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Volta
regions in the country to discuss ways in which such a
Commission could productively function.68 The result of these
government’s day to day policy making. Members who attended the
seminar were CIVICSOC/SAPRI and the Parliamentary Finance
Committee.
66 Franklin Oduro, “NGO Relationship with Truth Commission in Ghana,”
in Kristen McConnachie, “Truth Commissions and NGOs: the Essential
Relationship,” International Center for Transitional Justice and CDD-Ghana
Occasional Paper Series (April 2004).
67 CDD-Ghana, “Public Opinion on National Reconciliation in Ghana:
Survey Evidence,” Research Paper No. 10 (2001). The survey captured the
views of 1000 Ghanaian between 25 years and over in all the ten regions of
the country in May 2001 about their attitude and opinions towards national
reconciliation and perceptions of human rights abuses of past governments
from 1957-2000.
68 The theme for the conference was “National Reconciliation: International
Perspectives” and was aimed at encouraging discussion on the Ghanaian
reconciliation process. Among those who attended were Dr. Alex Boraine,
then Deputy Chair of the South African TRC and later President of the
International Center for Transitional Justice; Priscilla B. Hayner from the
International Center for Transitional Justice; then-Attorney General and
Minster of Justice in Ghana, Mr. Nana Akufo-Addo; then-Speaker of the
Ghanaian Parliament, Rt. Hon. Peter Ala Adjettey; then-Chief Justice of
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events was the drafting of a twelve-point declaration that
outlined how the government should proceed with its plans of
national reconciliation and which also formed the basis of the
legislation that eventually gave birth to the Commission.69
Law-making and Advocacy Role
In partnership with the Parliamentary Committee on
Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, the Coalition
organized an international conference on the “Technical Review
of the National Reconciliation Bill” at Elmina in the Central
region to critically review the draft Bill of the NRC and also to
recommend, where necessary, modifications and additions to the
Bill before its Second Reading in parliament.70 Participants to
this conference included Parliamentarians from the Ghanaian
Parliament, members of the Council of State and civil society
organizations. Also, representatives from the International
Centre for Transitional Justice collaborated with local experts to
help in reviewing the Bill. The review process was followed by a
nation-wide consultations and information campaign that saw
the publication of the Commission’s draft legislation in major
newspapers in the country. Following the passage of the
National Reconciliation Commission Bill into an Act, the
Coalition organized series of workshops for media practitioners
on how to productively cover the proceedings of the
Commission. Experts to these workshops were invited from
South Africa, Nigeria, England, and the USA.71 These
workshops were followed by an aggressive nationwide publicity
campaign through television and radio talk shows, dramas, and
public forums to raise awareness and encourage discussion and
understanding among citizens. Also, abridged versions of the
National Reconciliation Act were also printed and widely
Ghana, Justice E.K. Wiredu; national political parties, opinion and religious
leaders and members of the civil society.
69 Oduro, “NGO Relationship with Truth Commission in Ghana.”
70 CDD-Ghana, “NRC: Matters Arising,” in Democracy Watch, 4.1
(March 2003): 1-5.
71 Ibid.
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distributed. The Coalition also embarked on a “nation-wide
mopping exercise” after the closure of the Commission’s Zonal
Offices throughout the country, to give chance to victims who
still wanted to petition the Commission to do so.72
In this way, the CDD also provided a platform for civil
society discussions. This platform, in addition to the focus group
discussions organized earlier, provided Ghanaians an
opportunity to openly express their opinions on a very
important national exercise and also created a modern direct
democracy that bridged the wide gap between members of the
civil society and government. The CDD notes that members of
the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional and Legal affairs
and other parliamentarians led discussions on national
reconciliation at the above forums and an average of 300
participants mainly from civil society groups and the general
public attended.73
Provision of Expertise and Training for members of CSOs
The media—the Ghana Journalist Association—was part of the
civil society organizations that formed the Civil Society Coalition
on National Reconciliation in Ghana. As part of the Coalition,
journalists were not only trained on how to report issues of
human rights violations but also how to do that ethically. A code
of conduct—which became known as the “Spirit of
Akosombo”—was developed to help journalist report the
Commission’s process in an ethical manner. The “Spirit of
Akosombo”, as noted by Sarpong, was adopted by the
National Consultative Committee of the Ghana Journalists’
Association, following fears that unregulated coverage of the
Commission’s proceedings could be more “divisive and
potentially deepen conflict” at the communal and national
72 K. Appiagyei-Atia, K. “Ghana: the Road to Peaceful Co-existence and
Reconciliation,” Transitional Justice Monitor, 1.2 (2008): 4-6.
73 CDD-Ghana, “NRC: Matters Arising.”
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levels.74 In a cautionary fashion, the code addresses some prime
aspects of the relationship between the media and the work of
the Commission including reporting of proceedings, the target
audiences and roles and attitude of the press during the work of
the Commission.75 Thus, the CDD helped circumscribe the
parameters of media reporting during the reconciliation process
in the country.
This is indeed an applauded role of paradigm-shifting
except the little challenges that the Coalition encountered with
media reporting of the event afterwards. The main concern of
the Coalition as far as the media was concerned was
irresponsible reportage and therefore concentrated on
promoting an “ethical media behaviour” and not substantial
media coverage of the proceedings.76 This action was based on
the assumption that the Commission’s work will self-generate
media interest and trigger extensive coverage. the National
Media Commission, however, later realized that the media was
not as interested in the Commission’s proceedings as they
initially assumed and had to quickly work with the Coalition and
the Ghana Journalist Association to lobby media managers and
editors to take on board pertinent issues arising from the work
of the Commission.77
However, this did not bring to an end the challenges
encountered by the Coalition in relation to media reportage of
the Commission’s proceedings. The media was perceived, in
many regards, as a pawn in a politically-charged reconciliation
process. As a result, some media houses were suspected to be
influenced politically, to report the work of the Commission in a
74 George Sarpong, “NGOs, Media and Truth Commissions: the Ghanaian
Experience,” in Kristen McConnachie, “Truth Commissions and NGOs: the
Essential Relationship,” International Center for Transitional Justice and
CDD-Ghana Occasional Paper Series (April 2004), 22.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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manner that favoured their partisan leanings.78 Valji points out
that some newspapers selected stories from the Commission
that either added to the political capital of their parties or were
very damaging to rival political parties. 79 The politicization of
the reportage of the Commission’s hearings took away the
important lessons that the citizens were supposed to learn from
the work of the Commission and rather heightened the
accusations that the establishment of the Commission was
politically motivated.80 This did not only breach the “Spirit of
Akosombo” but also undermined the credibility of the media as
an independent democratic institution.
Assessment of the Civil Society Coalition on National
Reconciliation
Undoubtedly, the work of the Coalition brought policy making
to the door steps of average Ghanaians whose representatives in
parliament took a rather partisan approach to this important
national exercise. By engaging the public to contribute to the
direction of the reconciliation process, it became more
participatory and people-centred. The then programs officer in-
charge of the transitional justice unit at CDD, Abigail Gyimah
notes that the Coalition was a “useful conduit for the exchange
of information instrumental in articulating, on one hand, public
sentiments and perceptions on the Commission’s performance
78 This partisan influence also motivated the alleged act of some employees
of the Commission leaking damaging stories to newspapers sympathetic to
their parties. The CDD (2004) condemned the leaking of sections of the
final report, which were very damaging to both the then-opposition NDC
and the PNDC, to pro-government newspapers. See CDD-Ghana, “NRC
Report Leakage: Reparation and the Way Forward,” Democracy Watch, 5.4
(December 2004): 11.
79 Valji, “Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission: A Comparative
Assessment.”
80 Valji notes that the work of the Commission was plagued with accusations
of bias in the way witnesses perceived to be pro-Rawlings or PNDC were
treated. She further notes that the chairman of the Commission, Justice
Kweku Etrew Amua-Sekyi was in particular alleged to have put up this
behaviour.
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to the Commission; and, on the other hand, enlisting public
support for the Commission by fostering a wider societal
appreciation of the Commission’s enabling statute, its work and
the challenges and prospects it faced.”81 This two-way flow of
information created consensus and unity of purpose between the
Commission and Ghanaian civic groups which was lacking
among the country’s political elite.
It is important to state that though the CDD-led
Coalition on National Reconciliation did a great job, the
political-leaning of the CDD has been questioned. For example,
Frank Ohemeng points out that two executive members of the
CDD are card-bearing members of the New Patriotic Party and
thus their political neutrality as a think-tank cannot be
guaranteed. 82 Arguably, having two executive members of the
organization as card bearing members of a political party is not a
problem since they can clearly demonstrate impartiality as far as
their responsibility towards reconciliation in the country is
concern. Yet, a lot of concerns were raised regarding this. For
example, it was believed that since the NDC was not interested
in establishing a TRC (one of the reasons for the delay in
starting the reconciliation process in Ghana as stated earlier) but
the NPP did, it stands to reason that the enormous support that
CDD gave to the creation and work of the NRC was mainly
because of their political support for the NPP. The NPP
government of the time initially wanted only military regimes
(except that of 1966, which the NPP supported) to be
investigated by the NRC and not civilian regimes (which would
have included previous NPP governments) even though it is
generally agreed that human rights violations have been
committed by both civilian and military regimes in Ghana.
Ameh has discussed the “door of hope” versus the “window of
opportunity” debate that resulted from this stance of the then
81 Interview with Abigail Gyimah, former program officer in charge of the
transitional justice unit, at the CDD in Accra, Ghana on 10 Feb. 2008.
82 Frank Ohemeng, “Getting the state right: think tanks and the
dissemination of New Public Management ideas in Ghana,” Journal of Modern
Africa Studies, 43.3 (2005): 443-465.
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ruling NPP government.83 In the end, the position of the
government left many wondering if the NRC was only created
to witch-hunt functionaries of their rival NDC party.84
Understandably, the consequence was that many pro-NDC civil
society groups and individuals were unwilling to be part of the
Coalition and did not lend support to its work either nor that of
the NRC. Therefore, any further review of the Coalition’s role
in the National Reconciliation Commission must contend with
this perceived bias.
Further, despite the large representation shown by civil
society groups in the Ghanaian transition process, there was,
however, no identifiable women group among the Coalition or
outside of it that represented their interest. Like many
transitional justice processes,85 the Ghanaian one was gender
supportive in both its design and public hearings. Among the
Commissioners were three respectable women: Professor
H.J.A.N. Mensa-Bonsu, law professor at the University of
Ghana; Professor Abena Dolphyne, former Pro Vice-Chancellor
of the University of Ghana; and Dr. Sylvia Boye, an educator at
the West African Examination Council. Another woman who
held a high position within the NRC was Dr. Araba Sefa-Dede, a
Professor of psychology at the University of Ghana Medical
School, who led the Counselling Unit and was supported by
other female staff. This is very significant given that women
have mainly been excluded from decision making process in the
83 Ameh, “Uncovering Truth: Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission
Excavation of Past Human Rights Abuses,” 345-368.
84 Seidu Alidu, “The NRC and Reconciliation in Ghana: an Assessment,” The
Review of International Affairs 1138-1139.LXI (2010): 153-177; Ayee, “Political
Leadership and Democratic Consolidation,” 79-99.
85 See the cases of South Africa, Peru and Sierra Leone which widely
incorporated gender perspectives into the work of their Commissions
through a gender-based analysis of human rights violations and a
recommendation for an engendered reparation programmes. For a detailed
analysis of these TRCs, See The World Bank (2006) Gender, Justice and
Truth Commissions, New York.
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country from the informal household/family level to the formal
national policy making level.86
Even though this was designed to give confidence to
female victims to come forward and petition the Commission
and also discuss their problems with Commissioners and
counsellors, it was also in tune with the United Nations Security
Council resolution 1325 and related resolutions87 which called
for an “increased women representation and participation in
decision making processes that are aimed at preventing,
managing and resolving conflicts.”88 However, the mere
inclusion of women as Commissioners in the NRC does not
necessarily guarantee that women’s grievances would be
addressed. This requires strong women’s groups to lobby for it
which unfortunately was missing.89 Mensa-Bonsu believes that
the political tension surrounding the establishment and
proceedings of the Commission as well as illiteracy among
majority of women in the country could partially explain the lack
of women lobby group during the NRC’s proceedings.90
However, majority of women were part of the victim group that
benefitted from the government’s reparation programme. If
inadequate information (about the work of the Commission)
could explain the general lack of participation from women
groups in the Commission’s process, it is amazing how women
86 A.A. Apusigah, “Gender, Vulnerability and the Politics of Decision-making
in Ghana: the case of the Upper East Region,” Ghana Journal of Development
Studies 1.2 (2005): 6-25.
87 See Resolutions 1820 passed in 2008, 1888 passed in 2009 and 1889
passed in 2009.
88 S/RES/1325 passed on 31 Oct. 2000.
89 For example, during the Ugandan Juba peace negotiation process in 2006,
the Ugandan Women’s Coalition for Peace was formed to “attain
sustainable peace in Uganda” through acts of “lobbying” for women’s
“inclusion” in all the five agenda items of the peace process. See A.M.
Goetz, “Guidance Note: Identifying Women’s Peace and Security Priorities:
Building Voice and Influence,” UNIFEM (2010).
90 Mensa-Bonsu, “Gender, Justice and Reconciliation: Lessons from the
Ghana’s NRC.”
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became so involved in the reparation stage of the Commission’s
work.
What could be a possible explanation, besides the
politicization factor, is the general belief held by many victims
that they have moved beyond the crimes committed against
them and would not want to re-live those horrible experiences
by participating in the Commission’s proceedings. This view
reflects one of Ameh’s typologies of attitude of Ghanaians
towards the establishment of a reconciliation commission in the
country.91 Labelled as ‘passive’, this group of Ghanaians (made
up of mainly victims of past human rights violations) admitted
that the country has witnessed severe human rights violations.
Yet, they do not support any form of formal investigation into
such crimes. They believed such a task will only rake the old
wounds of victims who have attempted to live above those
crimes committed against them.
Conclusion
The Ghanaian TRC was a very unique one not only in the nature
of the precipitating factors but also regarding the time taken to
institute justice and accountability measures for victims. Yet, this
delay suggests that it is not only in fragile states or those
emerging from destructive violent armed conflicts that the TRC
process is deemed to be necessary. It also demonstrates that
civil society groups can become a force to reckon with in
periods of transitions when they portray a unity of purpose and
collaboratively work together through coalitions than each trying
to single-handedly influence the work of the transition in line
with its mandate – i.e., pro-rule of law, pro-democracy and pro-
gender. On the other hand, it also shows that coalitions of the
nature formed in Ghana has the tendency of either limiting the
number of civil society organizations that participate in the
transitional processes or it may completely become ambitious
91 Ameh, “Doing Justice after Conflict: The Case for Ghana’s National
Reconciliation Commission,” 85-109.
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and perform tasks outside the original mandate of its coalition
members. This may happen when such coalitions are not
representatively done or where some civil society groups may be
unwilling or unable to join such groups for whatever reason.
While the Commission has concluded its work, the
country is still desperate to sustain what little reconciliation gains
it made following the work of the Commission. The numerous
religious,92 political93 and ethnic94 conflicts still ongoing in the
country cast a shadow of doubt on the achievements of the
NRC and by implication, that of the Coalition. Worst of all, civil
society organisation think-tanks such as the CDD, the Institute
for Economic Affairs (IEA) and IMANI are not helping matters
by their perceived support for particular political parties even as
they choose not to comment on actions and utterances of their
favourite political parties that are perceived in negative light by
the general public or even hide research findings that do not
portray a positive image of their parties. Even as we conclude
this paper, a huge controversy has erupted in the country about
the neutrality of these think-tanks. It started with a Ghana News
Agency (GNA) news item on the abuse of incumbency by the
previous NPP government in the run-up to the 2008 general
elections. According to the GNA, the source of the news item
92 These religious disputes have been recorded between intra-Muslim groups
such as the Sunnis and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission; inter-religious such as
those skirmishes between Christians and the Ga traditionalist over a ban on
drumming.
93 Political conflicts include those fought mainly between the New Patriotic
Party and the National Democratic Congress across the length and breadth of
the country and also within each of these political parties such as the agitation
and acts of vandalism committed by NDC foot soldiers; and within the NPP
is mainly between the Alan Kyeremanteng and Nana Akufo-Addo factions.
94 These type of conflict also manifest in two different ways: inter –ethnic
conflict such as those fought between the Kusasis and the Mamprusis, the
Konkombas and the Nanumbas; and also at an intra-ethnic level such as
those fought between the Abudu and the Andani royal gates to the Dagbon
skin.
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was a report posted on the website of the IEA.95 The IEA
allegedly removed the report from its website and denied ever
writing and posting such a report on its website.96 Yet the IEA
indeed had posted the report on its website, although it was
removed after the GNA news item was published.97 Clearly, the
IEA did not want ordinary Ghanaians to be made aware of its
negative research findings about the NPP government.
Ironically, several days into the controversy, IEA announced its
code of conduct for political parties during the up-coming 2012
general elections.98 With its credibility deficit in the above case,
one wonders if the IEA would be taken seriously by all political
parties in the country.
The state has set up a National Peace Architecture,
through the National Peace Council Act 2010, consisting of
National, Regional and District levels Councils that will help
prevent, manage and resolve religious, political and ethnic
conflicts. Since the Council has barely started its work, it may be
too early to measure its impact. However, the establishment of
such a structure almost seven years after the NRC has finished
its work indicates that Ghana still needs some healing.
95 Ghana News Agency, “IEA Slams NPP for ‘Abuse’ of Incumbency in
Election 2008,” Ghana Home Page, available from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?I
D=216387; accessed August 15, 2011.
96 Citifmonline, ‘IEA Denies NPP Incumbency Abuse Story, Ghana Home
Page, available from http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/
NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=216436; accessed August 16, 2011.
97 Ghana News Agency, “GNA Wins Credibility Battle with IEA: Truth
Stands,” Ghana Home Page, available from http://www.ghanaweb.com/
GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=216546; accessed August 1
7, 2011.
98 Ghana News Agency, “IEA Reviews Code of Conduct Ahead of Election
2012,” Ghana Home Page, available from http://www.ghanaweb.com/
GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=216860; accessed August
22, 2011.
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Reconciliation is both a process and a goal.99 Ghana has finished
with the former; however, the latter is still in the works.
99 D. Bloomfield, “On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation,” The Berghof
Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, Report No.
14 (2006).
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