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After Ethnic Violence in the Caucasus: Attitudes of Local Abkhazians and Displaced Georgians in 2010

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Abstract

The paper combines the results of two nearly simultaneous surveys in 2010 to provide a unique, rather comprehensive picture of the attitudes of (a) current residents of Abkhazia and (b) largely ethnic Georgian former residents of Abkhazia now living in forced displacement in Georgia following the 1992-1993 war. More specifically, it probes the views of these two groups about each other and the sensitive question raised by the disputed return of displaced Georgians to breakaway Abkhazia. Also investigated are the potential conditions for possible return in the future, including issues relating to property ownership. The authors conclude by discussing the policy implications of the survey results. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: D740, I310, J600, O150. 13 figures, 24 references.

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... The existing literature points to several reasons why refugees and displaced persons will either return home or integrate into a new environment. Previous studies focusing on displaced persons and refugees in Bosnia (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005;Sert 2008), the South Caucasus (Toal and Grono 2011), Kazakhstan (Kus°c¸u 2014), Colombia (Iba´nez and Moya 2010) and Turkey itself (Ayata and Yu¨kseker 2005;Ç elik 2005b;Kurban et al. 2006) have identified specific factors which victims of displacement prioritize, including economic opportunities, security provisions or prospects of residing among co-ethnics. ...
... The integration hypothesis argues that displaced persons are less likely to return home after the passage of time and after successfully settling in a new environment when such an option exists in the first place (see also Zolberg 1989: 406;Zetter 1999;ICG 2002;Iba´nez and Moya 2010). There could be several related indicators of integration, including a permanent job, property, and language proficiency (Wahlbeck 1999;Annan et al. 2011;Toal and Grono 2011). If this hypothesis is correct, displaced people with permanent jobs, good knowledge of the majority language and high education levels will be less likely to return. ...
... While many scholars have focused on ethnic cleansing (e.g. McGarry 1998;Carmichael 2002;Mann 2005), only a handful of academic studies have examined voluntary return (Vasileva 1992;Koinova 1999;Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005;Iba´nez and Moya 2010;Toal and Grono 2011). And among these, the general assumption is that forced migrations and displacements are irreversible once new demographic facts are established on the ground (e.g., Kaufmann 1996) with few scholars emphasizing successful cases of return Forced Migration and Voluntary Return in Turkey 13 (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005;Belloni 2008). ...
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What influences the decisions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return home after prolonged displacement? This article investigates the attitudes of victims of forced migration by analysing survey data on Kurdish displaced persons and returnees in Turkey. In an attempt to give a voice to displaced persons, we survey the conditions under which IDPs return home despite continuing tensions, lack of infrastructure and risk of renewed violence. The findings suggest that integration into a new environment in Western Turkey, measured by economic advancement and knowledge of Turkish, reduces the likelihood of return. Yet contrary to conventional wisdom, more educated IDPs demonstrate a stronger desire to return to their ancestral communities, suggesting that education increases available options for displaced persons. The findings are relevant in informing global responses to forced migration as well as understanding the local experiences and perceptions of IDPs in conflict-ridden societies.
... 3 The second strand is a multi-disciplinary literature focusing on the refugees' perceptions of and willingness to cooperate with integration or aid policies and rehabilitation projects; for example, Pottier (1996). Third is a smaller literature, rooted in the social sciences, analysing the views of the displaced on issues related to conflict resolution; for example, property issues and physical return (Toal & Grono 2011). The fourth strand is social science research on the dynamics of intra-and inter-group identities and trust in the aftermath of violent conflict. ...
... More specifically, there is also empirical evidence of IDPs exhibiting more political knowledge or political interest. Toal and Grono, for instance, found that Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia were more aware of the bigger security context of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict than the resident Abkhaz in Abkhazia (Toal & Grono 2011). However, in this case, the displaced represented a distinctive ethnic group, thereby blurring the effects of displacement and ethnic cleavages. ...
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Based on original survey data, this essay analyses the political attitudes of individuals displaced by the war in eastern Ukraine. We systematically compare attitudinal differences and similarities along three axes: the displaced relative to the resident population; the displaced in Ukraine relative to the displaced in Russia; and the displaced from the (non-)government-controlled areas relative to the resident population in the (non-)government-controlled areas of Donbas. This fine-grained comparative analysis highlights the variety of attitudes held by the displaced, similarities in attitudes across displacement locations, and the effect of war casualties on attitudes and self-declared political interest.
... The integration hypothesis argues that forced migrants are less likely to return home after the passage of time and after successfully settling in a new environment (see Zolberg, 1989:406;Zetter, 1999;ICG 2002;Ib anez and Moya, 2010). Several related factors could influence decisions to relocate or return, including permanent jobs, property, and language proficiency (Wahlbeck, 1999;Annan et al., 2011;Toal and Grono, 2011). Better-educated forced migrants should be able to use their human capital to integrate into an urban economy. ...
... For a related study on the transnational aspects of return to Bosnia see Eastmond (2006) as well as discussion in the introduction to the special issue also defining transnational return 'as a dynamic and open-ended process. . ..involving mobility between places and active links to people and resources in the country of asylum ' Eastmond (2006: 141 (Dahlman & O Tuathail 2005;Sert, 2008), the South Caucasus (Toal & Grono, 2011), Kazakhstan (Kus ßc ßu, 2014), Colombia (Ib anez & Moya, 2010), Turkey (Celik, 2005) and Northern Uganda (Joireman et al. 2012) 5. The data collection was done by Sarajevo-based IPSOS BH, with funding provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, as a part of the project 'The Way Home: Peaceful Voluntary Return' (SMU Research Ethics Board Certification: # 12 -224). ...
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This article questions the conventional wisdom which claims forced migration is irreversible following massive ethnic cleansing campaigns, by investigating durable returns to pre-conflict home communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We formulate a set of novel hypotheses on the demographic determinants of return as well as on the role of social capital, nationalist ideology, integration, and war victimization. We use a 2013 Bosnian representative sample with 1,007 respondents to test our hypotheses. The findings support the expectation that gender and age have a major impact on return. Net of other factors, women and those experiencing wartime victimization are less likely to return. Older Bosnians with positive memories of pre-conflict interethnic relations are more likely to return than younger persons or those with negative memories. Finally, ethnic Bosniacs are more likely to return than ethnic Croats or Serbs. More nationalistic internally displaced persons (IDPs) are less likely to return.
... Тем не менее существуют исследования, где отчасти затронуты вопросы взаимосвязи исторической памяти и нарратива о войне в регионе и событиях, рассматривающих значительный временной интервал -от депортации чеченцев и ингушей с территории Чечено-Ингушской АССР в 1944 г. вплоть до грузино-южноосетинского конфликта в 2008 г.: работы профессора Высшей школы общественных и международных отношений Университета Оттавы К. Цюрхера 9 , конфликтолога и участника второго трека урегулирования конфликта между Грузией и Абхазией С. Э. Нан 10 , статья в соавторстве Дж. Тола и М. Ф. Гроно об отношениях местного абхазского населения и перемещенных грузин в 2010 г. 11 , исследование нарратива о политическом заговоре как инструменте в международной политике представлено на примере российско-грузинской войны 2008 г. в авторстве Р. Саквы 12 , о распространении конкурирующих нарративных линий о вооруженных действиях в Чечне (кейс захвата заложников в Беслане 2004 г.), о символах и процессе реконструкции памяти о прошлом в Чечне с 1991 г. в исследовании А. Кампаны 13 , и другие. ...
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The article examines the strategic war narrative as a tool used by the state after 1989 to justify the start of a war or justify its end. Based on the understanding of this term, introduced into the popular science turnover by M. Vlahos, the author of the article expands the conceptual framework by referring to the narrative principle of collective memory by J. Verch. It is concluded that the war narrative is partly similar to the concept of mnemonic security (as well as other hegemonic forms of memory), which is tested on the A. Pető's concept. A review of key domestic and foreign research works on the topic is carried out. The key elements of the war narrative (symbols, sacrifice, etc.) within political dimension are identified, as well as the victory narrative, which was in demand in the first months of V. V. Putin (coinciding with the outbreak of hostilities in Chechnya in the period since 1999 and the continuation until 2009 in the form of counter-terrorism measures on the territory of the republic and the border regions of the North Caucasus).
... As noted above, displaced persons are less likely to return to their former homes if they successfully settle in a new environment (see Zolberg, 1989:406;Zetter, 1999;ICG, 2002;Ibánez & Moya, 2010). If they have found permanent jobs, acquired property and developed their language skills (Wahlbeck, 1999;Annan et al. 2011;Toal and Grono, 2011), they may have less inclination to leave. Another factor is accommodation in the place of exile: looking at the case of Northern Uganda, Joireman et al. (2012) point to the relocation of displaced persons in close proximity to roads, suggesting the centrality of access to social aid and provisions. ...
Chapter
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This chapter examines how the right of return has been defined, negotiated and implemented in post-conflict societies. It draws on new research on post-conflict returnees aiming to identify the conditions under which displaced persons choose to return often despite opposition from new occupants and hostile local authorities. The chapter integrates diverse contributions across the social sciences focusing on the role of institutional design, emerging legal practices, inter-ethnic contact, trust and social capital to demonstrate the potential for and limits of community effort in reversing the effects of displacement and to suggest possible policy directions.
... This large DK ratio was the subject of a multiple imputation based on cupola methods in the article by Bakke et al. (2014) but as we discuss below, this imputation was based on statistical principles and almost certainly underestimates the negative Georgian responses, given the precarity of Georgians in Abkhazia. The difficult double-peripheralisation of that group by both the state of Georgia and the de facto authorities of Abkhazia results in high sensitivity regarding the subject of the possible return of most of the Georgian minority that was displaced as a result of the wars of the early 1990s (Toal & Frichova Grono 2011). Based on Little's test that rejects the null hypothesis of MCAR (see Table 2), the graphs for Transnistria in 2014 with a smaller range of missing values among the sub-groups and for southeast Ukraine (see Figure 2) potentially illustrate MAR distributions. ...
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Respondents often answer ‘don’t know’ to sensitive survey questions to avoid revealing their true opinions, especially in post-conflict societies, thus requiring difficult decisions for analysing affected survey data. Using the same five sensitive questions in ten surveys from conflict-affected societies in the former Soviet Union in the period 2005–2014, methods for coping with missing data resulting from ‘don’t know’ responses are presented. Many commonly applied missing data treatments are shown to be incompatible with the missing data mechanism for politically sensitive questions, while also significantly affecting statistical results and conclusions. Ultimately, knowledge of local context is paramount for choosing proper missing data treatments.
... However, it can also be explained by government desires to exclude these groups from central city districts with higher land values and concentrations of capital. 13 Government concerns that IDP integration would weaken geopolitical arguments associated with return (Toal and Grono 2011) have further led to state decisions that structurally produced or exacerbated the negative neighbourhood effects of IDP collective centres. For example, rather than integrate the management of IDPs with that of their new host communities, since the early 1990s a parallel system of social infrastructure specific to IDPs has been operating. ...
Article
Since 1991, armed conflicts in regions of Georgia have forced over 300,000 people to become internally displaced persons (IDPs). Many settled on the outskirts of cities in state-provided, non-residential buildings called collective centres, which function as distinct neighbourhoods with their spatial segregation and community networks. This article charts the impacts of social and spatial insularity on IDPs in these centres and frames it within the concept of neighbourhood effects. Research on neighbourhood effects has shown that physical and social isolation can exacerbate issues of health, education, living conditions, and employment, present in particular areas. Although IDPs are a vulnerable, socio-economically disadvantagedpopulation often living in concentrated poverty, to date this concept has not been applied to their conditions. This article addresses that gap by examining the neighbourhood effects of collective centres. The work provides a meta-analysis of existing research on Georgian IDPs and complements it with two years of first-hand data collected through a representative survey. The results show that IDPs within Georgia are at multiple disadvantages as a result of their isolation in collective centres. The article concludes with a call for greater government consideration of IDP isolation in situations of protracted conflict, so as to resist such detrimental effects.
... Almost three in five say the situation seems "better" or "much better" in Abkhazia than in Georgia. While this comparison question is interesting and worth examining, it is potentially problematic as it is mainly the Georgian population living in Gal(i) who ever travels to Georgia (Toal and Grono 2011). To assess people's lived experience of public goods provision, the survey asks the respondents to rate their family's income level. ...
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The concept of the Russian world (Russkii mir) re-entered geopolitical discourse after the end of the Soviet Union. Though it has long historical roots, the practical definition and geopolitical framing of the term has been debated and refined in Russian political and cultural circles during the years of the Putin presidency. Having both linguistic-cultural and geopolitical meanings, the concept of the Russian world remains controversial, and outside Russia it is often associated with Russian foreign policy actions. Examination of official texts from Vladimir Putin and articles from three Russian newspapers indicate complicated and multifaceted views of the significance and usage of the Russkii mir concept. Surveys in December 2014 in five sites on the fringes of Russia – in southeastern Ukraine, Crimea, and three Russian-supported de facto states (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria) – show significant differences between the Ukrainian sample points and the other locations about whether respondents believe that they live in the Russian world. In Ukraine, nationality (Russian vs. Ukrainian) is aligned with the answers, while overall, attitudes toward Russian foreign policy, level of trust in the Russian president, trust of Vladimir Putin, and liking Russians are positively related to beliefs about living in the Russian world. In Ukraine, the negative reactions to geopolitical speech acts and suspicions about Russian government actions overlap with and confuse historical linguistic-cultural linkages with Russia, but in the other settings, close security and economic ties reinforce a sense of being in the Russian “world.”
... 2 Yet with the tacit approval of the Abkhaz de facto authorities, some 45,000-60,000 Georgians have returned to the Gali district of southeastern Abkhazia, an area that prior to the war was mainly populated by Georgians (Tarkhan-Mouravi 2009). The unresolved status of Abkhazia makes return unsafe, and returning ethnic Georgians face unemployment and dire living conditions in addition to discrimination and difficulties in claiming both civil and property rights from the Abkhazian de facto government (Human Rights Watch 2011; Toal and Grono 2011). ...
Article
Around 250,000 people are internally displaced within Georgia today as a consequence of violent conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s and the Georgian-Russian war in 2008. The majority of the internally displaced persons originate from Abkhazia, which declared independence in 1999. While the conflict is still unresolved, the majority of those who fled remain displaced, most of them living in the vicinity of the capital Tbilisi, or in Zugdidi and the Samegrelo region bordering Abkhazia. The aim of this article is to study factors that impact on young people’s intentions to return to Abkhazia, with a focus on youth presently living in the Tbilisi and Zugdidi areas. The study is based on a quantitative survey (n = 131) with youth aged 18–25 years, who were displaced when very young, or who were born in displacement, have few or no memories of prior residences, and may have different opinions on returning from their parents. A chi-square analysis was used to measure differences among the respondents’ intentions to return permanently to Abkhazia withinx five years, in relation to their reasons for returning and factors in the past and the present. There was a significant association between return intentions and the current place of residence (Tbilisi or Zugdidi), with Tbilisi respondents more inclined towards return. Separate chi-square analyses for the two cities showed that different factors (birthplace, property in Abkhazia, socio-economic conditions, reasons for return and so on) have different impact on the return intentions of the respondents from the two cities, which allows us to conclude that place matters in thinking about post-conflict return trajectories. Download and read: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23761199.2016.1162569
... There has been some exploration of popular attitudes and analysis of survey data on sensitive topics such as violence and conflicts in the North and South Caucasus (Kolossov and Toal 2007;O'Loughlin, Toal, and Kolossov 2008;Bakke, O'Loughlin, and Ward 2009;O'Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal 2011;Toal and Grono 2011;Toal and O'Loughlin 2013), as well as research analyzing popular understandings of the Soviet era in Russia (Rose and Carnaghan 1995;Mendelson and Gerber 2005Sullivan 2013). Other related research has examined a wide range of topics, from measuring the power of nostalgia for the Soviet Union (Munro 2006;Popov 2008;Lee 2011;Sullivan 2013) to documenting the attitudes of Russian youth toward the United States (Mendelson and Gerber 2008). ...
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Recently, there has been a renewed focus on analyzing post-Soviet memory, including the rekindling of debate on contemporary perspectives of Josef Stalin. Most notably, the publication of The Stalin Puzzle has helped bring attention to the persistence of positive accounts and admiration, along with ambivalent and contested images, of the former dictator of the Soviet Union. Using survey data and multivariate statistical methods, we test five broad hypotheses – socialization, structural, ideological, nationalist, and gender – to ascertain what factors might shape people's attitudes toward Stalin in Georgia. Our analysis reveals that elderly, poor men from rural areas have the most positive associations of Stalin, whereas young, wealthier women from cities, those who are open to privatization, and perceive Russia as Georgia's biggest threat judge Stalin negatively. Counterintuitively, non-Georgian minorities show higher esteem for Stalin than Georgians. We envision that the effects of cohort replacement, economic development, and urbanization will decrease positive perceptions of Stalin in years to come.
... 22 These are not the first opinion surveys carried out in these territories, but they are perhaps unique in terms of the scope of the information gathered across all four de facto states within a short period. 23 For a study cross-referencing survey findings from 2010 among both current residents of Abkhazia and those displaced from Abkhazia in 1992-3, see Toal and Frichova Grono (2011). 24 The possibility of a travel ban was already the case much before 2008. ...
Article
De facto states in the South Caucasus have presented a range of theoretical and empirical challenges for both scholars and policy-makers for some 20 years. This article charts the trajectories of different concepts, theories and paradigms deployed over this period to understand de facto states in this region, and in particular their internal dynamics. It is argued that while external factors are central to the sustainability of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh, scholarship on these entities has increasingly over time asserted the relevance of their internal politics. The article discusses how over the last decade this analysis has increasingly conflicted with the revival of the region’s central state authorities, whose conceptual reading and policy repertoires vis-à-vis de facto states remain focused on their external support structures. The article finishes by discussing some of the implications of this disjunction for policies enacted towards to de facto states of the region by both central state authorities and the international community.
... They have been mostly marginalized over the past two decades relative to fellow citizens in Georgia and Azerbaijan (Mitchneck, Mayorova, and Regulska 2009;World Bank 2011). The reasons for this are complex, but in both states, reluctance to adopt best practices concerning long term displaced personsnamely full integration and citizenship rightsare avoided because the authorities seek to use them as instruments of their politics with revanchist aims (Toal and Grono 2011). ...
Article
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In the wake of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013-2014, renewed attention has been given to the earlier so-called “frozen conflicts” of the successor states of the Soviet Union. In Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, national conflicts of the early 1990s resulted in establishment of four breakaway regions, the de facto states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorny Karabakh. While the first three are supported by Russia, the latter is supported by Armenia. Such support as well as growing internal legitimacy has enabled these republics to retain separate status for almost 25 years. Though appearing quite similar from an external perspective, the populations of the de facto states are quite diverse in composition, geopolitical preferences, and support for political institutions and persons. Large representative public opinion surveys conducted by the authors in 2010-2011 in the four de facto states allow a deeper comprehension of internal political and social dynamics. Three main dimensions of their current status and orientation (relations with Russia, support for local institutions, and possibilities of post-war reconciliation) are examined using nine key comparative questions. Nationality is the main predictor of divergent opinions within the republics, and results are reported along this dimension. Close relations with the external patron, support for the legitimacy and identity of the respective de facto republics, and little interest in returning to the parent state testify to the longevity and successful promotion of state and nation in the de facto republics in the Caucasus-Black Sea Region.
... Almost three in five say the situation seems "better" or "much better" in Abkhazia than in Georgia. While this comparison question is interesting and worth examining, it is potentially problematic as it is mainly the Georgian population living in Gal(i) who ever travels to Georgia (Toal and Grono 2011). To assess people's lived experience of public goods provision, the survey asks the respondents to rate their family's income level. ...
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De facto states, functional on the ground but unrecognized by most states, have long been black boxes for systematic empirical research. This study investigates de facto states’ internal legitimacy—people's confidence in the entity itself, the regime, and institutions. While internal legitimacy is important for any state, it is particularly important for de facto states, whose lack of external legitimacy has made internal legitimacy integral to their quest for recognition. We propose that the internal legitimacy of de facto states depends on how convincing they are to their “citizens” as state-builders. Using original data from a 2010 survey in Abkhazia, we examine this argument based on respondent perceptions of security, welfare, and democracy. Our findings suggest that internal legitimacy is shaped by the key Weberian state-building function of monopoly of the legitimate use of force, as well as these entities’ ability to fulfill other aspects of the social contract.
Chapter
The chapter focuses on how populist claims to historical truth reached “new heights” in the framework of the ideological construct of the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) that has proved a fertile field for yielding post-truths. The authors observe president Vladimir Putin’s historical justifications of Russia’s military interventions and presence in Georgia and in Ukraine (defending Abkhaz and Ossetian ethnic minorities and “compatriots” in the eastern Ukraine from aggressions of the NATO’s “marionette” governments of Kyiv and Tbilisi). They also cover Ukrainian and Georgian counter-narratives which portray conflicts with contemporary Russia as battles against their aspirations to “re-join” the West
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Focusing on the motivations of ethnic Abkhazians travelling ‘to Georgia’, this article examines the changing dynamics of enemy relations and state belonging in the contest of contested, de facto statehood. Drawing on ethnographic data collected among ordinary Abkhaz, I argue that while it can be certain limitations of life in a de facto state that motivate people to cross the conflict divide, it is simultaneously their belonging to the Abkhazian state that equips them with the confidence to encounter the ‘enemy’. This challenges the assumption that de facto statehood is necessarily detrimental to peacebuilding, instead showing how it can facilitate ‘normal’ relations.
Thesis
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Since the end of the Georgian-Abkhaz war, the often-precarious status of the Georgians displaced from Abkhazia has received significant academic attention. In contrast, the consequences of displacement from the reverse perspective—how it has affected the people who stayed behind—remains underanalyzed. Drawing on narratives collected during several months of ethnographic fieldwork, this article argues that although ethnic Abkhazians see themselves as victims of ethnic violence rather than perpetrators, the re-distribution of Georgian property nevertheless caused significant distress. Many condemned the practice of appropriation, suggesting that taking what is not one’s own is not only a violation of the property of the original owner, but also of the Abkhaz moral code and therefore shameful. To them, the trophy houses were a curse, both literally—as spaces haunted by former occupants—and metaphorically, as a source and reminder of a certain “moral corruption” within Abkhazian society. However, while the stories around the trophy houses reflect substantial intra-communal divisions, I suggest that they are also an expression of a shared postwar experience. Like the horror stories of Georgian violence, and the tales of Abkhaz heroism, they have become part of an intimate national repertoire constitutive of Abkhazia’s postwar community.
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Why one should not ignore the 'don't know' answers in surveys in contested and post-conflict regions
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Academic and policy literature on the post-Soviet region’s protracted conflicts frequently assumes that trade is an effective confidence-building measure (CBM) and as such also has the potential to facilitate progress toward conflict settlement. We probe these assertions through a detailed empirical comparison of the effects that regulated and unregulated forms of trade have had in the cases of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. Relying on a wealth of primary and secondary sources, including 29 semi-structured interviews, as well as direct and participant observation, we find that, absent political will by authorities on the ground and their respective international partners, trade remains by-and-large unregulated and has limited and generally not sustainable confidence-building and stabilizing effects, as evidenced by the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Where local and geopolitical conditions are more conducive, trade becomes more regulated and significantly contributes to confidence building and stabilization and has some positive spill-over effects into non-economic areas of confidence building, as is evident from Transnistria. This finding has potentially important implications for other cases in which governments and relevant regional and international actors are faced with difficult choices over whether and how to engage with unrecognized entities, such as in Ukraine.
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The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict (1992–1993) resulted in the displacement of thousands of ethnic Georgians from the Abkhazia region of Georgia. IDPs as a “mnemonic community” have a shared experience of hardship from civil wars and forced migration that somehow serves as common source of their memories of homeland. To illustrate the recollections of IDPs, the author interviewed 20 IDPs (in January 2014) living in collective centers in Tbilisi and nine IDP historians (in September 2014) affiliated with Sokhumi State University (in exile). He proposes to analyze all gathered accounts within the theoretical framework that is a useful research strategy to reflect on nostalgic idealization of pre-war Georgian–Abkhazian relationships, reconstruction of supposed reasons for the conflict, and imagining the future of reconciliation with Abkhazians. All these key elements of IDPs’ recollections and expectations generally fit into Georgian “memory project” and “national narrative”, which stress Russia’s role in fueling, escalating and maintaining the conflict. Apart from this, the author employs the theory of “communicative” and “cultural” memories to mark typically different sources of IDPs’ recollections – on the one hand, personal experience and on the other hand, institutionalized national narrative.
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Two noted political geographers examine the results of surveys in the "de facto" states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia conducted in 2010. They assess the migration intentions of their residents, the likely destinations and motivations for planned departures, as well as the dramatic population decline due to emigration and expulsion of Georgian residents after wars in the early 1990s. Discussed are economic dislocations, the breakaway republics' uncertain geographical status, as well as improvements in security and economic conditions due to Russian military guarantees and massive economic aid that followed the 2008 wars with Georgia. The authors utilize key predictors derived from hypotheses about the push and pull forces affecting the decision to migrate (socio-demographic, war experiences, and attitudes about the "de facto" state prospects) to develop explanatory models of migration for each territory before deriving a pooled set of explanations. Both surveys suggest the likelihood that the majority of potential migrants have already left. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: F220, F510, I300, J110, O150. 1 figure, 7 tables, 59 references.
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An essay by an experienced scholar-practitioner of conflict resolution in the Caucasus examines the narratives of the interlocking conflicts involving Georgia. The author argues that more complex narratives are necessary for forging constructive paths toward conflict resolution. After outlining the stereotypical arguments presented by the different sides, the author urges a multi-track diplomacy that creates opportunities for the development of more complex narratives. Research, whether by conflict insiders or by external investigators, is presented as a potential contributor to the larger peace processes. In addition to comments on the three preceding articles in the symposium published in Eurasian Geography and Economics, the paper highlights the utility in understanding local context and complexities in order to create more inclusive and complex narratives that can support confidence-building activities and eventual progress on outstanding issues plaguing the conflict-affected populations in the region. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: F510, H560, H770, O180. 11 references.
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The establishment of country's borders is both a political and a legal determination. The brief Russian-Georgian War of 2008 not only suspended diplomatic relations between the two countries but also caused international confusion about the definitive border between them. In 2012, with the help of creative Swiss diplomatic activity, a breakthrough took place that allowed the Russian Federation to finally become a member of the World Trade Organization. This article will examine how five years after a major conflict that left hundreds if not thousands of casualties and the declared independence of two separatist regions from Georgia, the Russian Federation and Georgia were able to agree on a border between the two countries for customs while still not agreeing on the definitive border between them.
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A noted political geographer presents an analysis of the August 2008 South Ossetian war. He analyzes the conflict from a critical geopolitical perspective sensitive to the importance of localized context and agency in world affairs and to the limitations of state-centric logics in capturing the connectivities, flows, and attachments that transcend state borders and characterize specific locations. The paper traces the historical antecedents to the August 2008 conflict and identifies major factors that led to it, including legacies of past violence, the Georgian president's aggressive style of leadership, and renewed Russian "great power" aspirations under Putin. The Kosovo case created normative precedents available for opportunistic localization, The author then focuses Oil the events of August 2008 and the competing storylines promoted by the Georgian and Russian governments. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: H10, 131, O18, P30. 7 figures, 2 tables, 137 references.
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Two U.S.-based political geographers survey the current state of affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), characterized by increasing political tensions between its two constituent entities—the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska (RS). The authors examine ways in which recurrent calls for a referendum on RS's self-determination/independence (from BiH) have charged the political atmosphere in both entities, delayed the formation of a central government in the aftermath of inter-entity elections in October 2010, and thus precipitated claims of BiH's unsustainability. In a concluding section, they explore the broader implications of renewed conflict and territorial fragmentation in BiH, which include the mobilization of seccessionist movements (and possible ethnic cleansing) in other contested regions in the Balkans and the former USSR and the possibility of renewed EU/NATO military engagement, with the attendant risks involving the EU's relations with Russia and member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 1 figure, 2 tables, 38 references.
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Testing claims about a region often glibly described by outsiders, thus checking assumptions upon which policy recommendations are based, this article examines residents' attitudes in the de facto state of Abkhazia. The results of a nationally representative social scientific survey in Abkhazia in March 2010 are presented in five themes-security and perceived well-being, the life-world identifications of respondents, views of state-building principles, the state of reconciliation between the divided communities and the potential for displaced-person returns, and views on current and future geopolitical relations with Russia and Georgia. The findings shed light on the broad contours of the internal legitimacy of the Abkhazian state and society.
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Three noted political geographers examine the geopolitical entanglements of the republic of North Ossetia in Russia's North Caucasus, where the country's first violent post- Soviet conflict occurred. The dynamic history of administrative border changes in the region is reviewed against the backdrop of population movements (most dramatically Stalin's 1944 deportation of the Ingush people) and shifting federal-local alliances. The primary focus is on the unresolved territorial dispute in Prigorodnyy Rayon, affected strongly by population dis- placement from Georgia in the early 1990s. After reviewing the causes of this dispute, which flared into open warfare in late October 1992, the paper examines two of its outcomes: the localized geopolitics of displacement and return on the ground in Prigorodnyy, and the impact of North Ossetia's geopolitical entanglements in general on ethnic attitudes. Results of a pub- lic opinion survey (N = 2000) in the North Caucasus conducted by the authors revealed high levels of ethnic pride among Ossetians and a generally positive attitude toward relations with other nationalities. Duly noted is the August 2008 confrontation involving Russia and Geor- gia over neighboring South Ossetia, which generated a new flow of refugees. Journal of Eco- nomic Literature, Classification Numbers: H10, I31, O18, P30. 5 figures, 1 table, 43 references. Key words: North Ossetia, Russia, South Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Georgia, Prigorodnyy, internally displaced persons, deportations, returns process, inter-ethnic rela- tions, territorial claims, Beslan tragedy, ethnic cleansing, nomenklatura, radical Islamists.
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This book is an authoritative account of ethnic cleansing and its partial undoing in the Bosnian wars from 1990 to the present. The book combines a bird's-eye view of the entire war from onset to aftermath with a micro-level account of three towns that underwent ethnic cleansing and later the return of refugees. Through the lens of critical geopolitics, which highlights the power of both geopolitical discourse and spatial strategies, the book focuses on the two attempts to remake the ethnic structure of Bosnia since 1991. The first attempt was by ascendant ethnonationalist forces that tried to eradicate the mixed ethnic structures of Bosnia's towns, villages and communities. While these forces destroyed tens of thousands of homes and lives, they failed to destroy Bosnia-Herzegovina as a polity. The second attempt followed the war. The international community, in league with Bosnian officials, tried to undo the demographic consequences of ethnic cleansing. This latter effort has moved in fits and starts, but as the book shows, it has re-made Bosnia, producing a country that has moved beyond the stark segregationist geography created by ethnic cleansing.
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The 2005 UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons articulate the right of refugees and displaced persons to repossess property lost as the result of armed conflict. These principles are significant because they reverse the international community’s explicit approval of permanent war-time deprivation of property during the first half of the twentieth century. They consolidate the norm of post-conflict restitution of property and they also provide a set of standards for property repossession regimes to be applied worldwide. However, examined in the context of two of the most extensive attempts to restore property to refugees and displaced persons—Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, post-1995—the Principles do not adequately address six key issues. These are: the lack of desire of many of those dispossessed to return to their pre-war place of residence, the displacement of secondary occupants, where responsibility lies for property during its occupation, temporal limitations on repossession, differing conceptions of property, and co-ordinating regional restitution regimes. This article proposes further consideration of these six issues and their refinement in the Principles in order to enhance the Principles’ effectiveness and applicability.
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Abkhazia during the Stalin era was at the same time a subtropical haven where the great leader and his lieutenants built grand dachas and took extended holidays away from Moscow, and also a key piece in the continuing chess match of Soviet politics. This paper will examine how and why this small, sunny autonomous republic on the Black Sea, and the political networks that developed there, played a prominent role in the politics of the south Caucasus region and in Soviet politics as a whole during the Stalin period.
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Earned sovereignty is a conflict resolution process that creates an opportunity for the parties to agree on basic requirements that the emerging entity must meet during an intermediate phase in order to attain or discuss final status. Rather than forcing the negotiating parties to determine during negotiations whether the sub-state entity may or may not be capable or allowed to exist as an independent state, earned sovereignty allows the parties to make evaluations of the effect of independence on the parent state as well as emerging state’s success at meeting certain benchmarks before determining final status. The core elements of earned sovereignty – shared sovereign power, institution building, and final status – form the structure of this process.The process of earned sovereignty has evolved without name or structure through its use by international negotiators and state parties to agreements. State parties to peace agreements to peace agreements have already used this process in an attempt resolve the conflicts in Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Serbia/Montenegro, East Timor and Papua New Guinea.The purpose of this article is two-fold. It attempts to first define and add structure to this evolving process and second to spur interest and debate among those involved in the field. Section one provides an overview of the different core and optional elements that make up the earned sovereignty process. Section two outlines fundamental principle that sovereign authority and functions are both plentiful and severable as internal and external autonomous rights rather than an all or nothing grant of independence.
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The Abkhaz civil wars and continuing territorial conflicts in Georgia have resulted in the long-term displacement of more than 200,000 people since the early 1990s. Although the international and local discourse is about integrating internally displaced persons (IDPs), little research has documented the meaning of isolation or integration for the daily lives of the IDPs or the local population. We engage the discourse about integration and isolation by analyzing the composition, size, and density of social networks in the “post”-conflict environment and the socio-spatial characteristics of social interactions and social networks. We combine a formal social network analysis with a daily path analysis to explore how socio-spatial patterns are formative of social networks and explore how various demographic factors, including gender, dwelling status, and employment status, may be related to the nature of social interactions and social networks. Our results are initially puzzling and suggest the need to rethink the meaning of isolation and integration within postconflict situations. We had expected to find greater diversity of social interactions in both populations, especially IDPs in private accommodations, because they are generally thought to have more diverse social interactions. The social network and daily path analyses, however, suggest evidence of social isolation within social networks among the entire population, not only among IDPs. We find a high degree of social isolation in two ways: (1) the persistent dominance of family and kin in all social networks and (2) highly dense (or closed) social networks in the entire population across gender, dwelling, and migrant status. The only demographic factor that appears to distinguish patterns is whether an individual engages in income-generating activity. Finally, using narrative interviews, we also explore the meaning of integration and isolation during displacement in the Georgian context.
Article
The issue of housing and property restitution for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) has received considerable attention in the past decade. Conflicts and wars in different parts of the world have shown how housing and property rights are systematically violated during armed strives. Intentional destruction of property, arbitrary confiscation of housing and secondary occupation are just some of the most common practices in violation of individual property rights. In addition to being an individual's right, the international community has increasingly considered post-conflict housing and property restitution as a key component of the broader objective of peace building, and as a means of promoting restorative justice within society. Both at operational and at normative level, several initiatives have contributed to enforcing property restitution rights: from the establishment in the mid 1990s of institutions mandated to resolve conflicting property claims to the adoption in 2005 of the so-called ‘Pinheiro Principles’, the first international standard exclusively addressing property restitution rights. This paper explores the strengthening of international norms in the field of individual property restitution for refugees and IDPs over the past decade, and argues that the currently available normative standards reflect a partial understanding of displacement and restitution. With an almost exclusive focus on individual real property restitution, and an explicit preference for return among solutions to displacement, such standards undervalue the importance of alternative remedies and overlook the rights of non-returnees. After a brief overview on the emergence of a right to individual property restitution in international law and policy (part 1), this paper will concentrate its attention on three legal documents addressing property and displacement: the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of 1998, the International Law Association Declaration of Principles on IDPs of 2000, and the Pinheiro Principles of 2005 (part 2). The first two documents confine their scope to displacement within national borders, whereas the Pinheiro Principles encompass restitution rights for both IDPs and refugees and represent the most recent and comprehensive standard on the topic. Despite the remarkable developments at normative level, epitomized by the approval of the Pinheiro Principles, this paper highlights the following problematic areas: the role played by physical return in the conceptualisation of property restitution; the supremacy given to individual real property restitution over other types of remedies; and the impact of the passage of time on restitution rights (part 3). The paper concludes by arguing that restitution must be conceived independently from return and must consequently go beyond individual real property restitution, in order to provide effective redress to refugees and displaced persons (part 4).
Two Sons of One Mother': Nested Identities and Center-Periphery Politics in Post-Soviet Georgia
  • Laurence Broers
A More Proactive US Approach to the Georgian Conflicts
  • Samuel Charap
  • Cory Welt
The Problem of Providing Security for the Border Population of the Gal District of Abkhazia
  • Arda Inal-Ipa
Speech at the Ceremony for the Presentation of Foreign Ambassadors' Letters of Credentials
  • Dmitriy Medvedev
Transitional Justice and Georgia's Conflicts. Breaking the Silence
  • Magdalena Frichova
After the August War: A New Strategy for US Engagement with Georgia
  • Lincoln Mitchell
  • Alex Cooley