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Ukraine: A History.

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... The eastern part of current Ukrainian territory was under the influence of Russian tsardom that later became the Russian Empire in the 17th century (a more detailed account of the history of Ukraine is in Appendix 2.B.). The regime of the Russian Empire was highly oppressive and unpredictable, characterised by harsh rules, pervasive orthodox religion and serfdom (Åberg, 2000;Subtelny, 2005;Riabchuk, 2008). Ukrainians in the East were subject to constant persecutions (Subtelny, 2005), which is likely to have had an adverse effect on their civic capital. ...
... The regime of the Russian Empire was highly oppressive and unpredictable, characterised by harsh rules, pervasive orthodox religion and serfdom (Åberg, 2000;Subtelny, 2005;Riabchuk, 2008). Ukrainians in the East were subject to constant persecutions (Subtelny, 2005), which is likely to have had an adverse effect on their civic capital. ...
... After it was devastated in 1240 by the Mongols, the successor became a Western Kingdom of Galicia and Volhynia (Magocsi, 2010). The Kingdom played an important role in the region for the next 100 years, when it was dismayed and the territory came under control of Poland and Lithuania (Subtelny, 2005). The Eastern part was constantly under attack by the Golden Orde, the Mongolian and Tatar nomads, when the Grand Duchy of Muscovy started uniting Russian lands (Magocsi, 2010). ...
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This dissertation presents empirical evidence on how individual preferences, such as risk attitude and social trust, affect economic choices. Social trust transmitted through generations is likely to have a causal effect on choice of economic and political systems. If there is little trust in the society, systems with low government control are inefficient. Therefore, societies that suffered from repressions hundreds of years ago, are more likely to support a strongly regulated economic and political system nowadays. Risk preference is an important factor that affects labour market choices, such as occupational choice, the choice of employment status and job mobility. Risk-averse individuals are prepared to accept lower wages as long as the stability of their earnings is guaranteed. This finding illustrates how important is the first choice of occupation, since people who are sorted in “wrong” occupations, are more likely to experience stress and be forced to switch. Human capital accumulated during the years of studying and working in the original occupation decreases its value. This brings negative economic (and emotional) consequences for employees and for society, which has to pay for these choices. Apart from that, various measures for promoting self-employment will only be successful in risk-tolerant populations. Risk-averse individuals are much less likely to become self-employed, unless they have access to information and skills that can diminish the riskiness of entrepreneurship. Risk attitudes are likely to affect job mobility decisions. Changing jobs is a way of receiving new experience and developing new competencies. However, risk-averse people will change jobs only if the risk of changing jobs is generously compensated. This finding has an implication for the policy that intends to stimulate people to remain vital and mobile on the labour market. Since people, as they grow older, tend to become more risk-averse, the measures stimulating job mobility, especially among older workers, should take into account that more risk-averse people will need a larger compensation for changing jobs than more risk-tolerant individuals.
... Also, the Bolshevik's emphasized education, a move which was in contrast to Tsarist polices. Thus, ten years after Red October the country's literacy rate among urbanites had risen from 40% to 70% [1]. Despite the achievements of the Bolshevik policies, it was not without growing resistance among Ukrainians who still hoped for independenceespecially in the Galician and Volhynian regions of Northwest Ukraine. ...
... As Nikita Krushchev said, "For Stalin, peasants were scum." (Subtelny, 2009, p. 404) [1] For the Bolsheviks, they represented 'petty bourgeois', and these peasants or "small independent producers" support the bourgeois, i.e., the owners of production and employers to the wage earners [3]. In adhering to Marxist doctrine, the Bolshevik's believed both classes had to be destroyed. ...
... As Nikita Krushchev said, "For Stalin, peasants were scum." (Subtelny, 2009, p. 404) [1] For the Bolsheviks, they represented 'petty bourgeois', and these peasants or "small independent producers" support the bourgeois, i.e., the owners of production and employers to the wage earners [3]. In adhering to Marxist doctrine, the Bolshevik's believed both classes had to be destroyed. ...
... With a series of rebellions in the early 1600s underscoring the growing power of the frontier-land dwelling Cossacks and their popularity amongst the peasantry, the major Cossack rebellion of 1648 upended the Polish control of the estate system and threatened the largest Ukrainian land-owners who de facto ruled over the Ukrainian lands (Kamiński, 1977). In the short-term, the Cossack rebellion was seen as a victory for property rights across the whole spectrum of society, as they immediately restored the rights of land transfer to the peasantry and removed the labor obligations that had been imposed (Subtelny, 2009). But in reality, the establishment of the Cossack Hetmanate merely swapped out one set of elites for another, changing the ownership of the state monopoly but effecting little change in the political structure. ...
... Moreover, the Cossack rebellion succeeded through assistance from the Russian Empire, a deal which was to have long-term consequences for property rights in the country: absorption by the Russian Empire after the Treaty of Pereyaslav and the de facto split of Ukrainian lands after 1667 led to a steady loss of property rights across every class in the new Ukraine. Indeed, the new Russian administration wholeheartedly supported the Cossack nobility's moves to circumscribe the property rights of the peasantry (Subtelny, 2009), including the reforms of 1786, where the Cossack hierarchy defined perpetual grants to land and blocked off large swathes of Ukrainian estates from ever being disposed of. Throughout the 19th century, the Tsar also used property rights as a way to buy-off incipient political opposition, as the abolition of serfdom in 1861 was used to buy the loyalty of the peasantry vis-àvis the Polish nobility who still tended to dominate economically, granting more power to the peasants to counterbalance the enemies of the Tsar (Volin, 1943). ...
... And despite the re-acceptance of some private ownership during the Second World War and in the months immediately following (Hessler, 1998), the tightening of Stalinist policies, in tandem with the expansion of communism throughout Central and Eastern Europe, meant that both large-scale formal and small-scale economic property rights had indeed been eradicated in Ukraine. The Soviets were able to complete collectivization by 1951, with nearly all of the region's 1.5 million peasants concentrated on 7,000 collective farms (Subtelny, 2009). It was only at the upper echelons of the Party that anything resembling property rights based on personal interest existed, where the rights of the nomenklatura allowed them to maximize their rents at the expense of the property and liberties rest of the country (Winiecki, 1990). ...
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North (1994) famously remarked that ‘it is the polity that defines and enforces property rights’. This paper traces the development of property rights in Poland and Ukraine and explores their divergence over the past three centuries using North's framework of economic calculation. In each country, the distribution of political power and political institutions had a profound impact on property rights. Indeed, while it was the Polish polity that defined the evolution of property rights from 1386 to 1795 and then from 1989 onward, due to diffusion of power, it was Ukrainian politicians that controlled the destiny of property rights for most of Ukraine's history. This situation has not changed despite the Maidan revolution in Ukraine, and recent moves in Poland show how tenuous property rights are in the face of political opposition.
... ('Little Russians') (19th century term for Ukrainians), and, in the final period of imperial history, as Ukrainians. 1 Ukrainian and Belorussian languages will be referred to as such, but it is important to remember that until the turn of the 20th century, these languages were commonly perceived as Russian dialects and Malorossy and Belorusy as dialect-speaking Russians-similar to Bavarians in Germany or Neapolitans in Italy-who had been forcibly separated from the Great Russians by the Poles (Berežnaja et al. 2007;Hosking 1997;Miller 2000Miller , 2008 for discussions of the development of Ukrainian national consciousness, see Krawchenko 1985;Magocsi 1996;Miller 2000;Snyder 2003;Subtelny 1994). ...
... Linguistic assimilation was also facilitated by migration flows linked to industrialization, urbanization, and colonization. The industrial revolution brought in an influx of Russian workers to Ukraine, Belorussia, and Bessarabia: factory owners found it more efficient to 'import' skilled Russian workers than to rely on unskilled local labor, while local peasants avoided cities and towns (Hosking 1997;Magocsi 1996;Subtelny 1994). As a result, rapidly growing, industrialized cities were dominated by Russian speakers: in Ukraine, in 1897, Poltava was the only city with over 50,000 inhabitants where Ukrainianspeakers constituted a majority (Berežnaja et al. 2007;Kappeler 2001;Saunders 1995a;Snyder 2003;Trojnickij 1905). ...
... Another factor assisting linguistic assimilation was colonization, which brought Russian, Ukrainian, Cossack, and German settlers to territories inhabited by indigenous populations, creating multi-ethnic environments and necessitating the use of Russian a lingua franca (Miller 2008). To give but one example, after the 1861 emancipation, Ukrainian peasants migrated in significant numbers to the Northern Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Siberia, and the Far East in the search of land (Berežnaja et al. 2007;Subtelny 1994). As a result, by 1897, Ukrainians constituted 9.4% of the population of Siberia, 33.6% of the population of the Northern Caucasus, and 47.4% of the population of Kuban' (Saunders 1992). ...
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The purpose of this paper is to question the traditional view of tsarist language management as a conscious, consistent and long-lasting policy of linguistic russification and denationalization and to consider the actual policies, their context, and impact. Drawing on recent historiographies, I will show that the Russian administration had no unified language policy: its strategies varied significantly across time periods and geographic regions and were mediated by political, ethnic, religious, and class concerns. When russification policies were adopted, the key aim was to establish the dominance of Russian as a high language over Polish, German, and Tatar. At the same time, the authorities never created a comprehensive primary education system and, as a result, failed to spread Russian to the majority of non-Russian peasants. Ethnic elites adopted Russian as an additional language, yet this adoption did not increase their loyalty to the empire: the key outcome of russification policies was the mobilization of emerging national movements.
... It is well known that the Ukrainian education system is inherited from the Soviet Union era and it was adopted without any major changes. In particular in the study plans of pedagogical specializations, the priority was given to the theoretical matters which very often it was held just formally, leaving no impression in the students' minds and had no connection to the future professional activity of the student (Subtelny, 2000), but after independence of Ukraine in 1991 the majority of research of modern Ukrainian researchers have dealt with the problems of moulding the informational competence of future teachers. Above all, evolution of creative thinking of future elementary school teachers to enhance the formation of knowledge and skills to design a learning process by selecting an appropriate teaching method has not yet been adequately evaluated (Bondar, 2005; Babanskii, 1982). ...
... While alternative hypothesis H 1 1 which was accepted indicates that there is significant difference between the pre and post-test mean scores of students studying through the combined (traditional plus active learning) teaching methods. Vol. 6, No. 6; 2016 Published by Sciedu Press 55 ISSN 1925-0746 E-ISSN 1925In this report strong evidence is given to support that the combined (traditional plus active learning) teaching methods is highly effective. To what extent the control group improved their scores, is interesting to consider, the comparison analyses were performed. ...
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The search for the best approach to business education has led educators and researchers to seek many differentteaching strategies, ranging from the traditional teaching methods to various experimental approaches such as activelearning techniques. The aim of this experimental study was to compare the effects of the traditional and combined(traditional plus active learning) teaching methods in the process of knowledge formation among future primaryschool teachers. Participants were randomly selected from available Ukrainian 5th year students. After they werepre-tested, randomly divided into two equal groups. The participants in the experimental group were instructedthrough combined teaching methods, while those in the control group were only taught through traditional lecture.Following the completion of the course, both groups were received their post-test. The results of both groups wereequal at the beginning of experiment. An investigation on the post-test indicated that both teaching methodsincreased the students’ post-test scores significantly. Also, the result of post-test scores in the experimental groupincreased statistically significant than that the control group. This study concluded that active learning plus thetraditional teaching method is a feasible alternative to the traditional teaching method only format.
... For decades after the Battle of Poltava, his name was stigmatized with the word Mazepist being used to denote 'enemy of the monarchy'. Andrii Bovgyra writes, "Thus, the tradition of associating Ukrainians with Mazepa, which began in the aftermath of Poltava, continued over the rest of the century, with the terms Mazepist and khokhol 2 Supporting the imperial narrative Tchaikovsky would be inspired by the poem for his opera in 1884 titled 'Mazeppa', which paints a similar picture of the hetman versus the heroic Peter. For Russian collective memory and identity, Peter remains one of the strongest hero archetypes -an absolute hero. ...
... Anathematize, i.e., cursed and condemned.2 Khokhol is a derogatory Russian term against Ukrainians. ...
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The purpose of the article is to highlight two pivotal events in Ukrainian history which contain archetypal figures for current Ukrainian national identity. The focus on telling the stories from the Ukrainian perspective and understanding the elements of the hero's journey within the stories, the archetypes at play, as well as the counter narrative adds a unique approach to understanding the complex history shaping Ukrainian identity and fueling the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and among the Ukrainian people. Understanding the main points of the stories from the Ukrainian perspective, and how they support Ukrainian national identity will help US policy makers in spotting and understanding the Russian counter narratives and how they are used to influence Russian, Ukrainian and western audiences.
... But referring to Russians who made a considerable part of population as to the «national minority» was used more and more often and neglectful context of this term was becoming more and more asked for on the political level. Ideological Russophobia (phobia of Russians) was leaving its marginal status; political projects using different versions of ideologies based on Russophobia were becoming more and more media popular and the amount of such projects in Parliament and state institutions was increasing (though in moderate amount they were always present there) 3 . But even the more sharp form of ethnic break-up was represented by a so-called language problem which is though connected to only with ethnic contradictions. ...
... As nowadays this break-up turned out to be the most significant, it should be viewed in detail. In the 1980s the Canadian historian of Ukrainian origin Orest Subtelniy (whose textbook was used to teach all schoolchildren in the 1990s) predicted the break-up of Ukraine because of «language border» [3]. The modern measurement of the language break-up lies in the fact that since 1991 there exist two Ukraines -Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking. ...
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The paper is devoted to sociological analysis of regional divisions in Ukraine. The social and political factors and preconditions of regional conflict are issued. The analyses of historical development of the social and political conditions of ethnic, religious, cultural, language break-ups, inartificial and constructed factors of development and deepening of these break-ups are studied. It is need to construct a consistent theory of multivariate conditionality of an Ukrainian modern social and political regional crisis and conflict. The hypothesis of inadmissibility of explanation of social and political situation over one group of factors justified and verified. Also it is incorrectly to use reduction of interregional break-ups problems in Ukraine to version of artificial political construction. It is useful to build this theory on basic concepts of «social anomie», «immoral majority», and «social madness». Статтю присвячено аналізу соціально-політичних витоків, факторів і передумов формування та розвитку регіональних розломів в Україні. Проведено аналіз історичного розвитку соціально-політичних умов регіональних розломів, природних і сконструйованих факторів їх актуалізації у сучасних умовах. Акцентовано увагу на необхідності саме соціологічного аналізу регіональних розломів як багатофакторного феномена, що не може бути зведений до суто політичних та/або технологічних пояснень. Розглядаються різні версії і типи регіональних розломів, робиться припущення про значний вплив на розвиток і поглиблення цих розломів таких факторів, як інтенсивність політичної боротьби і маскування існуючих протиріч пропагандистськими засобами. Пропонується перелік найбільш значущих розколів (насамперед етнічних, культурних, релігійних, мовних), що виступають як складові регіональних розломів. Підкреслюється, що сукупність цих розколів стає потенційним фундаментом громадянського протистояння (яке може бути як продовженням політичного, так і супроводжувати його). Висувається та обґрунтовується гіпотеза про неприпустимість пояснення соціально-політичної ситуації однією групою факторів або зведення проблематики міжрегіональних розломів в Україні до версії штучного політичного конструювання. Робиться висновок про необхідність побудови пояснювальної соціологічної концепції регіональних розломів в Україні. Пропонується варіант такої концепції з використанням понятійних конструктів «соціальна аномія», «соціальне безумство», заснованої на теоретичних розробках Р. Інглхарта, Є. Головахи, Н. Паніної та ін. Ключові слова: регіональні розломи; етнічні, релігійні, культурні, мовні, політичні розколи; пострадянська аномія; соціальний цинізм; соціальне безумство. Статья посвящена исследованию социально-политических истоков, факторов и предпосылок формирования и развития региональных разломов в Украине. Проведен анализ исторического развития социально-политических условий региональных разломов, естественных и сконструированных факторов их актуализации в современных условиях. Акцентируется внимание на необходимости социологического анализа региональных разломов как многофакторного феномена, несводимого к сугубо политическим и/или технологическим трактовкам. Рассматриваются различные версии и типы региональных разломов, делается предположение о значительном влиянии на развитие и углубление этих разломов таких факторов, как интенсивность политической борьбы и маскировка существующих противоречий пропагандистскими средствами. Предлагается перечень наиболее значимых расколов (прежде всего этнических, культурных, религиозных, языковых), выступающих в качестве составляющих региональных разломов. Подчеркивается, что совокупность этих расколов становится  Litovchenko A., 2015  Muradyan O., 2015
... For centuries, the current territory of Ukraine was divided between different empires. Most historians trace Ukraine's beginnings to Kyivan-Rus', the principality which existed from the 9th to the mid-thirteenth centuries, centered on what is now Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine (Reid, 1997;Subtelny, 1988). The place of KyivanÁRus' is contested among those who try to claim it in terms of contemporary political units. ...
... A few of these are portrayed in the national mythology (including national historiography) of Ukraine as continuations of the political entity begun with Kyivan-Rus' and leading up to Ukraine's independence in 1991. These include Galycia-Volhynia in the western regions (which endured for a century after the fall of Kyivan-Rus'), the Cossacks in central-eastern Ukraine (first appearing in the late fifteenth century, and achieving significant political organization in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), and the Ukrainian National Republic (centered in Kyiv, 1918Á1920) (Reid, 1997;Subtelny, 1988). Aside from these polities, Ukrainian territories were largely under the rule of non-Ukrainian ethnolinguistic regimes, although the issue of what was or was not 'Ukrainian' (or belonging to any other modern national unit such as 'Russia', 'Poland', or 'Lithuania') is murky in the era preceding the emergence of modern nationalism in Europe. ...
Language policy is a divisive issue in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in a tenuous balance. Many people see the choice between Russian and Ukrainian as symbolic of two polar political and cultural allegiances: with Russia, or with Europe and the West. Promotion of Ukrainian is meant to counteract its historical subjugation to Russian. At the same time, there is state support for minority languages and cultures, including Russian, to help develop a Ukrainian civic identity not restricted to Ukrainian ethnicity. Legislation designates Ukrainian as the sole state language while also supporting education in Russian and other languages, including Romanian, Hungarian, and Crimean Tatar. The previously low status of Ukrainian has risen greatly since the disintegration of the USSR, and this language is much more widely used than before in education, government, and public life in general. However, Russian continues to dominate in many spheres as it did during the Soviet era. Many people feel that the survival of Ukrainian is still threatened by Russian, and that the recent gains of Ukrainian in status and spheres of use are tenuous. In 2008, struggles over language policies persist and the implementation of existing policies continues to be uneven.
... The Tsarist authorities invited hundred of thousands of sett lers to the newly conquered territory. Migration was not spontaneous, as it had been to a lesser or greater extent at the time of the Cossacks (Subtelny, O. 2000). Until the beginning of the 19th century, successive waves of migrants -Germans, Serbs, Czechs, Bulgarians and Greeks -arrived in the region, but the Ukrainians and Russians were clearly the largest groups of sett lers. ...
... In the eastern half of the steppe region, heavy industry underwent rapid growth. Since industrialisation had begun earlier in the Ural Mountains (Russia, 17 th century), Russians from that region were overrepresented among arrivals in Ukraine's industrial regions and they made up the skilled workforce (Subtelny, O. 2000). Consequently, the share of the Russian population increased further in the early 20 th century. ...
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In his work the Clash of Civilizations S.P. Huntington classified Ukraine as a "cleft country." In our view, the current discord in Ukraine is rooted in the political divisions that have frequently characterised the post-communist countries. In Ukraine, owing to a history of divergent socio-economic development in the various regions, these divisions are strongly regional. The dichotomic socio-economic framework reflects not only ethnic and religious differences but also such factors as urbanisation, economic development, and even natural elements. The resulting political divide in Ukraine may be traced to the dichotomy of its national identity. The dividing line is between east and west, urban and rural, and Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking Ukraine. Politically, it is between "Maidan-Ukraine" and "Anti-Maidan-Ukraine". The divide runs along the Uman'-Kharkiv line between the forest zone and the steppe. In the 18th century the steppe - which had once been a corridor for the nomadic peoples - became a frontier territory for the Ukrainians and then for Tsarist Russia. The Russian ties of cities in the region were further strengthened by industrialisation in the 19th and 20th centuries and by Russification in the Soviet era. The Soviet-made famine (Holodomor) and the events of World War II (the actions of the UPA) heightened Ukraine's political dichotomy. Since independence Ukraine's political elite has failed to address the problem in an adequate manner. The recent escalation of the conflict is due to a lack of political cohesion in the young state and the gravitational effect of the major powers rather than primarily to some kind of civilizational difference. By accentuating Ukraine's economic and financial difficulties, the global crisis has made the country even more vulnerable.
... Ukrainian diaspora historians played an important role in changing paradigms of history writing. Before Ukraine produced its own post-Soviet history textbooks, Canadian historian Orest Subtelny's Ukraine: A History (Subtelny 1988; first published in Ukraine in 1991) often served as a textbook in Ukrainian schools and universities. Subtelny's book features only a couple of pages on the topic of the OUN and the UPA, but it was the first to fill in the blank spot on this topic. ...
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This chapter traces the history of the memory of the wartime Ukrainian nationalist movement, represented by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its military, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), from 1991 to the present. Via an analysis of the changing official political discourse over this period, the chapter investigates what role the issue of the history of the OUN and UPA has played in Ukrainian political debates, and how it has been instrumentalized by different political actors. It argues that post-independence Ukrainian memory politics have been shaped in crucial ways by the tension between two different frameworks of dealing with the past: reclaiming the past, and confronting the past (with an emphasis on a critical view on difficult aspects of that past).
... There was the lack of priests and the metropolitan Andrii Sheptytskyi sent to Canada three Ukrainian clergymen who were honored with the Order of St. Basil the Great. In 1910 he went for two months trip by himself to Canada and the promise was given to the followers to improve the divine service 5 . ...
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The historical and political aspects of the Ukrainian Diaspora forming are depicted in the article. The main attention is paid to the four waves of the Ukrainian immigration. The author analyzes the reasons of Ukrainian migration and shows the historical and political conditions of it formation.
... These variances in social and cultural contexts are linked to geographical differences. Ukraine, with its long and complex history, may share cultural characteristics with other Slavic and/or former USSR countries (Subtelny 2009). Variances in test performance could, for instance, arise due to different levels of familiarity with testing, including nonverbal tests (Ardila 1995). ...
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The study aims to establish demographically corrected norms for three computerized tasks measuring different aspects of visual short-term memory (VSTM) in Ukrainian schoolchildren. These tasks measure respectively visual STM (the Pattern Recognition Memory (PRM) test), spatial STM (the Spatial Span (SSP) task), and visual spatial STM (the Paired Associates Learning (PAL) task). All tasks were administered to n = 186 children aged 5.10 years to 14.5 years old to evaluate the influence of demographic variables. Relevant demographic factors that influence task scores (VSTM), i.e., age and level of parental education, are identified and in keeping with the current literature. No sex differences were found. Based on these data, regression-based, demographically corrected norms were established per task. This approach to constructing norms differs from how (worldwide) PRM, SSP, and/or PAL norms have been constructed traditionally. In the latter approach, norms are calculated for each age group separately and without correcting for level of parental education, whereas in the regression-based normative method, multiple regression models are used to compute the expected test scores of an individual (rather than the subgroup means that are used in the traditional approach). Consequently, the regression-based norms for the PRM, SSP, and PAL presented in this paper are individualized, taking into account the unique characteristics of the individual that is tested on these tasks. Last, the confidence intervals of the PRM scores of the Ukrainian schoolchildren and the western norm group largely overlapped, except for the youngest age group, which adds to the literature about cultural effects on cognition.
... Whilst state and institution building progressed quickly, footing on already existing Soviet institutions (Kuzio 1998;Withmore 2005), Ukrainian national identity turned out to be a more complex issue. The existence of a Ukrainian nation and a national consciousness has been documented by scholars (Kravchenko 1985;Subtelny 1989), but the issue in 1991 (and after) was that a Ukrainian nation (be this conceived in ethnic or civic terms) did not overlap, or at least approximate, Ukrainian state borders. The composition of the Ukrainian population is subject to debates and results are considerably different depending on who carried out the study. ...
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This introductory article of a special issue outlines the general theoretical background, formulates principles for a continuum of hot and cold ethnicities, gives a brief characterisation of the interethnic developments after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and provides an overview of the papers. This collection of contributions deals with a variety of case studies with a particular focus on the strength of members' emotional attachment to their group. Such a division of ethnicities can be categorised into two prototypes: ‘hot’ and ‘cold’. A ‘hot’ ethnic group is one whose members have a high emotional attachment to their group. ‘Cold’ ethnic groups are those whose members' emotional attachment to the groups is low, absent or latent.
... Inspired by the literary merit of this work, other writers began to produce works in the spoken language. The Kharkiv Romantics, a circle of ® Subtelny, (1988 writers based around Kharkiv university, produced stories which tended to be folksy in tone, and full of melancholy nostalgia for the lost great past of Ukraine.® These writers not only developed and refined the language, but aided in creating a sense of national consciousness and a desire for political self-determination, which manifested itself in the desire for a unique literary language for Ukraine.^® ...
Thesis
Before one even begins to discuss language in Ukraine, one basic premise must be understood: there are no easy answers. One may succeed best in identifying relevant, objective questions instead. This research offers few solutions or predictions concerning the competition between Ukrainian and Russian languages in Ukraine, and the national consciousness of Ukrainians with relation to their language and world view. At this stage in Ukraine's development, it is more useful to bring all the disparate trends of government language planning policy, social trends and politics into one cohesive body of work for analysis. Socio-linguistics provides an appropriate and objective methodological framework to discuss both the internal linguistic problems of the language and external social and political problems. This means the analytical viewpoints generally adopted by political science or theoretical linguistics may feature, but are not handled in any depth. Rather, the inter-relationship of language and society is examined in detail using a variety of reference points. These include education in Ukraine, Ukrainian media and the internal and external attempts to regulate the use and content of Ukrainian language. This research is unique in that most of the material here presented has not appeared together in any language, nor separately in English. Furthermore, the approach is a departure from traditional methods of either linguistic or historical study, and does not reflect the political science framework adopted by contemporary scholars. It is thus an attempt to collect subjective diagnostic and corrective work on the language situation in Ukraine, to combine this research with statistical data and to present an objective analysis of the status of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and its prospects for the future.
... Whilst state and institution building progressed quickly, footing on already existing Soviet institutions (Kuzio 1998;Withmore 2005), Ukrainian national identity turned out to be a more complex issue. The existence of a Ukrainian nation and a national consciousness has been documented by scholars (Kravchenko 1985;Subtelny 1989), but the issue in 1991 (and after) was that a Ukrainian nation (be this conceived in ethnic or civic terms) did not overlap, or at least approximate, Ukrainian state borders. The composition of the Ukrainian population is subject to debates and results are considerably different depending on who carried out the study. ...
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The end of the cold war prompted most of the former Soviet republics to face ethnic issues that had remained latent or intangible for decades. Whilst some ethnic groups were actively campaigning for their rights, some others seemed uninterested in being represented politically. The recent theory of hot and cold ethnicity has been conceived to explain modalities of ethnolinguistic vitality so to identify a pattern and reasons behind activism of an ethnic group in contrast with another. This paper engages with the debate in two ways. First, it questions how to measure ethnolinguistic vitality in order to get a picture that reckons not only with official narratives of a state but also gives an idea of how things are happening in practice. Second, it tries to answer the question by presenting a case study based on the city of Odessa. It will be suggested that informal policies, and informal engagement with policies, may be as relevant as formal ones and have an equally important impact. This paper advocates for a broader, and more inclusive, approach to data collection and analysis. This, in the end, will contribute to a better understanding of what ethnolinguistic vitality of a group means.
... branCi (Branch 1985: Sesavali); slovakuri aRorZinebisaTvis -broki (Brock 1976); kievis ruseTis istoriisa da kazakTa memkvidreobis aRorZinebisaTvis -subtelni (Subtelny 1994: Tavebi 1-2, 13); xolo didi zimbabves politikisaTvis -Cemberleni (Chamberlin 1979: 27-35 ...
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Introduction for Georgian Edition. As a country of ancient culture and traditions Georgia has always attracted the attention of western scholars. Modern Georgia is a subject of their interest as well. However the information one can find in the relevant literature is still scanty. The topics according to which historical descriptions or generalizations are usually arranged are sometimes disappointing for they ignore the theoretical achievements of modern social sciences. This prevents one from going deeper in perceiving the rich historical heritage of the country associated with the Golden Fleece and the Lord Tunic and modern Georgian state born as a result of the Rose Revolution. The reason for this undoubtedly lies in the long isolation of Georgian academics from western colleagues, in the fact that during the many years of Marxian social science, they practically had no alternative. When in the last year Professor Mary Chkhartishvili approached to me concerning the translation of my books into Georgian I chose for this purpose two of my recent publications: "Nationalism. Theory, Ideology, History" and "The Nation in History. Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism". The first of these is a present volume. This book aims to provide a short introduction to the concept of nationalism. My purpose throughout is twofold: in the first place, to outline the key debates in the field as clearly as possible, and, second, to offer my own ethno–symbolic account. I should like to record my gratitude to Professor Mary Chkhartishvili for her effort in translating my book. My thanks also to the Director of the International Center for Georgian Language, Mrs. Rusudan Amirejibi–Mullen, who being a professional linguist took the trouble of editing the Georgian text. I was told that the present publication is designed as a gift for the participants at the conference on National and Religious Identities. I salute them and would be indeed very happy if the translation will help Georgian academics and students in their professional activities. Anthony D. Smith
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The fight for Lwów/Lviv in 1918 was the first military conflict in the difficult twentieth-century history of Polish–Ukrainian relations. In the inter-war period, an impressive military memorial, the Eaglets Cemetery, was constructed in Lwów to honor the young defenders of the city. A monument to the Eaglets was also erected in the neighboring Przemyśl. In inter-war Poland, the Ukrainians, who had lost their cause for state independence, created their own cult of national heroes, the Sich Riflemen. Their graves in Lwów and Przemyśl, as well as in many smaller towns, became sites of public commemoration and national mobilization. This article traces the emergence, the development and the post-World War II decay of both competing memorial cults, focusing on their revival and political uses after 1989. It examines the trans-border aspects of memory politics in Lviv and Przemyśl and analyses the role of war memorials in (re-)establishing the link between ethnic communities and their homelands.
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The article discusses the main activities of the Russian authorities in Galicia during the First World War. During the war in Galicia successively occupied three of the occupying administration. This administration G. A. Bobrinsky, and F. F. Trepov, D. I. Doroshenko. Policy in the national question in each of these administrations differed in their specificity. The author of the article pays special attention to the evolution of this policy and monitors the relationship of the Russian authorities with the muscophiles and the Ukrainian national movement. The first stage Russia's policy in the region was characterized by the Providence administration Bobrinsky by relying on the Russophile movement forced Russification. Ukrainian language and culture at this stage was subjected to expulsion from the public sphere, the Ukrainian national movement was seen as an implacable enemy of Russia. In the second phase in years, the Governor-General Trepov has tended to weaken the political influence mosqueteros. In this case, the softening of the administration's policies towards the Ukrainian language and culture. The third stage of Russian policy, caused by the collapse of the monarchy, was marked by the legalization of the Ukrainian national movement and the transition of power in Galicia in the hands of his representatives, headed by Doroshenko. The Russophile movement in this period completely lost its former influence and marginalized. The work also gives a brief overview of the political situation in the region in the prewar period. Special attention is paid to the ecclesiastical policy of the administration Borinskoe because re in Galicia.
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Earlier German Views of Eastern EuropeConquest and First ImpressionsEstablishing AdministrationsGerman War AimsThe Experience of OccupationSeeming German Triumph in 1918RomaniaUkraineThe CaucasusFinlandEuphoric VistasFinal Collapse and ConsequencesReferences and Further Reading
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ABSTRAK Federasi Rusia merupakan aktor global yang menerapkan kebijakan tegas terhadap Ukraina. Guna mencapai tujuan politik nasional Rusia yang dikendalikan dari Moskwa, melalui operasi militer di tahun 2014, didefinisikan bagaimana negara tersebut berperilaku. Melalui kombinasi operasi militer dan non-militer, Rusia secara perlahan memperoleh kekuasaan melalui aneksasi Krimea. Efektivitas metoda ini dipergunakan untuk menentukan strategi perang Rusia saat ini. Dengan demikian menjelaskan bagaimana kebijakan luar negeri dan kebijakan pertahanan Rusia dari tahun 2000 hingga 2013 yang memiliki ketergantungan pada lingkungan strategis Ukraina terhadap Rusia, dan kepentingan nasional Rusia pada Ukraina. Fokus utama penelitian ini adalah pencapaian tujuan politik Rusia dalam operasi militer yang dilaksanakan di Ukraina dan menganalisa komponen keamanan nasional Rusia yang signifikan mempengaruhi interaksi konflik asimetrik.
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The article suggest a revision of the well-established historiographical thesis that considers the forced polonisation of Orthodox population to be a direct consequence of the 1569 Union of Lublin, whereby the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland. Instead of this simplistic concept, grounded in Ukrainian populist historiography of the 19th century, and buttressed with the elements of Polish nationalist and Russian imperial historiographical traditions, the author offers a new model, based on the assimilation formula. According to it, Orthodox noble conversions to Protestantism, and later to Catholicism, initiated a loss of self-identification with the Ukraine-Rus' cultural space. The process intensified as the Orthodox Church had its legitimate status taken away after the Church Union of Brest of 1596, and ended with the ultimate merger of this social group with the Polish Catholic elite in the early 17th century. Key words: historiography, Union of Lublin of 1569, Church Union of Brest of 1596, polonisation, religious conversion, self-identification.
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The conflict in Ukraine is largely considered to be a strong example of hybrid warfare, where the Russian Federation is using hybrid tactics to influence Ukraine and especially the civilian population. This paper focuses on answering the research question, how is the Russian federation using its informational warfare to influence civilian population in Ukraine? In this respect we will use the ASCOPE (Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events) analysis, in order to determine trough each field, the methods in which Russia seeks control over the specific area and manipulate how the civilian population of Ukraine perceives the cause and events within their country.
Thesis
One of the main foci in scholar debate on Ukraine is the overarching question, how ‘divided’ this country is. However politically important this matter might be, serious research has usually been surprisingly shallow, and more often than not ignoring a geographical dimension connected to this political issue. This dissertation reads a ‘division of Ukraine’ as a ‘spatial-political conceptualization’. It is seen as a product of ‘strategic spatial-political discourses’ offered by potent political actors and their shared interpretation in the mind of the voter, thus facilitating shared imaginary geographies of Ukraine. The outcome is a performative reification of these discourses through voting. This perspective allows for an analysis regarding who has which geography of Ukraine in mind (meaning, what kind of underlying ‘spatial-political conceptualization’ is preferred), and furthermore, if there are structural differences in the regions of Ukraine regarding the prevalence of these concepts (meaning, do similar voters subscribe to similar interpretations all over Ukraine or is there an independent locality aspect?). A theoretical framework has been developed, drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ and following Michael Vester’s thoughts: A relational ‘social space’ comprising several so-called ‘fields’ served hereby as the point of departure. One ‘field’ accommodated so-called ‘camps’ as vertically integrated (elite and commons), pillar-like segments in the event of an election. These ‘camps’ were based on a shared sense of order and sorting of the social. This field was found structured by certain cleavages; two have been identified for Ukraine 2012. Such a perspective allowed for inclusion of segments of societies regarding theoretically challenging polities in transition like Ukraine – and prevented a too narrow view focused exclusively on political actors. This has been combined with ideas brought forward by spatial sociologists, so that the above (virtual) ‘spatial-political conceptualizations’ of Ukraine appeared to be the spatial manifestation of shared principles of order and sorting of the social. Departing from this framework, the dissertation has been divided into three main parts: At first, preliminary studies have been conducted regarding the concrete structuring of the ‘field of camps’ in Ukraine around the time of the elections in question: As a result, three main camps have been identified. These were labeled the ‘government-camp’, the ‘democratic opposition-camp’ and the ‘nationalist-opposition-camp’. Secondly, however just for heuristic purposes, it has been analyzed that the most appropriate regionalization of Ukraine for the elections of 2012 would mean a peculiar, three region outlay based on a set of quantitative data like social structure and voting behavior. The synoptic use of these findings structured the selection of potential participants for the main part, which aimed at offering answers regarding above questions. For theoretical as well as practical reasons, the focus group chosen was a set of 45 graduate students from five Ukrainian ‘National Universities’, the highest echelon of tertiary education in Ukraine, based in a ‘western’, a ‘central’ and an ‘eastern’ region, and drawn from the respective three ‘camps’. It has been found that there was not one idea or conceptualization of ‘division’ among the participants from the ‘government camp’, but instead four different ones. The most x puzzling finding was, that such ‘division’ always meant some sort of special status for a quite fuzzy Ukrainian ‘East’. Among them, the meanwhile classic ‘partition-along-the-Dnipro’-conceptualization was the most rarely found idea. Also, however contrary to their own official stance, participants from the ‘democratic opposition’ seemed to systematically put less emphasis on national unity and balance than expected (at least in spatial perspective): Two consistent conceptualizations have been found here: A ‘unity-oriented’ one largely found with participants from this ‘camp’ from the ‘western’ and ‘central’ parts of Ukraine; and another, covertly ‘regionalist’ found with many participants from ‘eastern’ Ukraine. Participants from the ‘nationalist opposition’ preferred – besides the mentioned ‘unity-oriented’ conceptualization – also one that has been labeled ‘uniformity-oriented’: A unitary state based on an ethnic Ukrainian nation with authoritarian characteristics. In 2012, ‘conceptualizations of division’ have thus been found ‘one-sided’ at best, as they were exclusively aimed at a fuzzy ‘East’, but never at the (likewisely fuzzy) ‘West’ of Ukraine – meaning more or less historic Galicia. They have been found very consistently among participants from the ‘government-camp’ in several specifications; to a lesser extent also among participants from the ‘democratic opposition-camp’. Furthermore, it has been shown, that these ‘camps’ were mostly country-wide phenomena (acknowledging a non-specified degree of regional concentration, however): Concepts articulated by participants from one ‘camp’ in the ‘West’ were found generally comparable to those from participants of the same camp in the ‘eastern’ or ‘central’ parts of Ukraine. The only exception that implies a locality-aspect was found with the ‘camp of democratic opposition’: Participants from the ‘East’ tended to prefer the above ‘regionalist’ conception much more than those from elsewhere. All in all, Ukraine seemed from this perspective far less ‘divided’ or ‘partitioned’ than usually brought forward by commentators in public discourse or sometimes even by parts of the scientific community, whose arguments are usually based on ‘spatialized facts’ such as electoral geographies of past elections or distributions of social structure variables – which also had a huge impact on forming (shared) opinions in 2012. However, the above findings can lead to the assumption, that the actors behind ‘strategic-political discourses’ of ‘division’ – usually camouflaged as strive for regional self-governance or (linguistic) autonomy – had already by 2012 sown the seeds for making this a reputable idea, as some respective interpretations of such discourses seemed to match surprisingly well – and this was not solely confined to the ‘government-camp’. The outlined results shall contribute to better understanding the phenomenon of a ‘divided’ or ‘partitioned’ Ukraine, connecting a geographical dimension to a currently unsolved political problem. Nevertheless, as the main limitations stem from the chosen focus group and a narrow post-election time frame, this dissertation shall be understood as a case study and not as an elaboration regarding the overall population.
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This article discusses the development of a Canadian historiography of modern Ukraine. It argues that the early focus on Ukrainian nation building determined the range of topics that interested Canadian historians, but over the following years their methodology changed significantly. The development of social history provided indispensable tools for in-depth analysis of the Ukrainian national movement. The subsequent development of a new cultural history, post-colonial studies, and the “linguistic turn” allowed for a more subtle analysis of the Ukrainian patriotic discourse and practice. New scholarship focusing on the ambiguities of imperial projects and the everyday life allowed for a re-evaluation of the traditional emphasis on the national intelligentsia’s organic work. Because of its focus on the making of a modern Ukrainian nation, beginning in the 1990s Canadian historiography was well positioned to assist in the transformation of Ukrainian historical scholarship from Soviet models to new theoretical and methodological foundations. This often meant helping Ukrainian colleagues to revise the very “national paradigm” of history writing that early Canadian historians had helped develop. In the decades after an independent Ukraine emerged in 1991, the study of Ukrainian nation building became an increasingly global and collaborative enterprise, with historians from Ukraine studying and working in Canada, and with conferences on topics related to modern Ukrainian history involving scholars from around the world.
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West of the Urals, several different types of polity competed for control of the lands once ruled by the Golden Horde. This chapter discusses the Ottoman and Lithuanian empires only in so far as their activities shaped Inner Eurasian history. In Inner Eurasia, where resources were thin and scattered over vast areas, the mobilizational challenges of the agrarian smychka were particularly difficult. Before Batu's invasion, the principalities of Kievan Rus' were already using simple forms of the agrarian smychka to mobilize armies that could protect them against the loosely organized pastoral nomadic groups in the Pontic steppes. The civil wars of the mid-fifteenth century mark a critical turning point in the building of a Muscovite mobilizational machine. The conquest of Novgorod gave Moscow access to rich commercial networks linking the Baltic, Lithuania, and Europe to the fur quarries of Siberia and the far north.
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In the nineteenth century, the old rules of mobilization were transformed by the energy bonanza of fossil fuels. This chapter describes how the Russian heartlands were affected by the global changes of the late nineteenth century. Defeat in the Crimea forced Russia's rulers to take industrialization seriously. Before that war, the Russian Empire still looked like a global superpower. Russia's army was expensive because it was huge, and permanently under arms. In the decade after the Crimean War, the government of Alexander II launched a series of fundamental reforms known as the "Great Reforms". These reflected a widespread conviction in government circles that reform required more than the introduction of new technologies. In the 1860s and early 1870s most Russian revolutionaries were "populists". They had, as yet, little understanding of capitalism or industrialization, and their goal was to liberate the peasantry and create an egalitarian peasant-dominated socialist republic.
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The Russia Federation is global actor in applying strict policies against the Ukraine. In pursuing the state’s political goals from Moscow , the escalation of military operations in 2014 defined the way the state behaves. Through a combination of military and non-military operations, Russia is now slowly regaining its power through the annexation of the Crimea. The effectiveness of this method is used to determine Russia’s contemporary warfare strategy. It thus explains how Russia's foreign policy and defense policy from 2000 to 2013 has dependence on Ukraine's strategic environment on Russia, and Russia's national interest in Ukraine. The main focus of this paper is on the achievement of Russia’s political objectives in its military operation in Ukraine and analysis on Russia’s national security components that significantly influence the interaction of this asymmetric conflict. BAHASA INDONESIA ABSTRAK: Federasi Rusia merupakan aktor global yang menerapkan kebijakan tegas terhadap Ukraina. Guna mencapai tujuan politik nasional Rusia yang dikendalikan dari Moskwa, melalui operasi militer di tahun 2014, didefinisikan bagaimana negara tersebut berperilaku. Melalui kombinasi operasi militer dan non-militer, Rusia secara perlahan memperoleh kekuasaan melalui aneksasi Krimea. Efektivitas metoda ini dipergunakan untuk menentukan strategi perang Rusia saat ini. Dengan demikian menjelaskan bagaimana kebijakan luar negeri dan kebijakan pertahanan Rusia dari tahun 2000 hingga 2013 yang memiliki ketergantungan pada lingkungan strategis Ukraina terhadap Rusia, dan kepentingan nasional Rusia pada Ukraina. Fokus utama penelitian ini adalah pencapaian tujuan politik Rusia dalam operasi militer yang dilaksanakan di Ukraina dan menganalisa komponen keamanan nasional Rusia yang signifikan mempengaruhi interaksi konflik asimetrik.</p
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This paper is an analysis of the different ways in which feminism can be understood, using as examples the cases of the feminist movements Femen and Women of Liberia. Both are distinguished by using feminine features as political tools, and both have been an issue of interest for audiovisual productions. Each one is the main subject of two documentaries: Ukraine is not a Brothel, that concerns Femen movement; and Pray the Devil Back to Hell, that concerns Women of Liberia movement. I shall use this material in order to present each. After presenting them I will analyze them in light of the definition and division of feminism that Karen Offen, scholar of the University of California, does. I will then conclude that Femen is an example of what she calls 'individualistic feminism', and Women of Liberia an example of what she named 'relational feminism'. I will also conclude that the political position they achieve is also due to the branch of feminism they represent.
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Ukraine, Orthodoxy in the to Unmercenary Saints
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As vital aspects of genuine democracy and of widespread citizen participation, even in authoritarian nations/regimes, civil liberties and freedoms are important contextual factors affecting the development, growth, operation, and survival of nonprofit membership associations (MAs) and of individual formal volunteering in any society. Quantitative research on the prevalence of both formal volunteering and MAs supports this statement with solid empirical evidence on sets of most contemporary nations (Halman 2003:191; Schofer and Longhofer 2011:565; Smith and Shen 2002:115, 117). This chapter examines the role of civil liberties and freedoms as they affect volunteering and MAs, with primary emphasis on the interrelated freedoms of association and of assembly. Chapter contributors focus on these issues in their birth countries — the United States, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Philippines.
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In 2014, the Russian Federation unexpectedly produced a crisis in Crimea. Without a single shot, Putin's Russia illegally has occupied and annexed Crimea. This paper analyzes the historical background of the crisis with the emphasis on the Crimean Tatars. First, the history of Crimea briefly is presented. Second, the Crimean Tatars national struggle is explained by using peace studies and nonviolence concepts and theories. Third, the 2014 Crimean Crisis were explained by using not only geo-strategic and geo-economic concepts but also psycho-historical concepts, specifically chosen traumas of the Crimean Tatars and Russians. The article suggests that Russia invaded Crimea not only the strategic national interests of the Black Sea Fleet but most importantly the losing of Crimea in 1954 and 1990s as chosen traumatic events. Similarly, the Crimean Tatars were produced their national identities on their ―Sürgün‖, the forceful deportation of the Crimean Tatars by Stalin to Siberia and the Central Asia. Keywords Crimea; Crimean Tatars; Russia; Ukraine; Putin http://e-journaloflaw.org/?p=240
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persistent theme among critics of Jews—particularly those on the pre-World War II right—has been that the Bolshevik revolution was a Jewish revolution and that the Soviet Union was dominated by Jews. This theme appears in a wide range of writings, from Henry Ford's International Jew, to published statements by a long list of British, French, and American political figures in the 1920s (Winston Churchill, Woodrow Wilson, and David Lloyd George), and, in its most extreme form, by Adolf Hitler, who wrote: Now begins the last great revolution. By wresting political power for himself, the Jew casts off the few remaining shreds of disguise he still wears. The democratic plebeian Jew turns into the blood Jew and the tyrant of peoples. In a few years he will try to exterminate the national pillars of intelligence and, by robbing the peoples of their natural spiritual leadership, will make them ripe for the slavish lot of a permanent subjugation. The most terrible example of this is Russia.1 This long tradition stands in sharp contradiction to the official view, promulgated by Jewish organizations and almost all contemporary historians, that Jews played no special role in Bolshevism and indeed were specifically victimized by it. Yuri Slezkine's book provides a much needed resolution to these opposing perspectives. It is an intellectual tour de force, alternately muddled and brilliant, courageous and apologetic.
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