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The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation

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... Carem Alexejem Michajlovičem přislíbená autonomie a respektování dosavadních kozáckých práv a svobod, jež byly základem fungování Hetmanátu (i předchozích forem kozáckých společenstev Záporožské Siče a Slobodské Ukrajiny), postupně zanikaly dle vůle jednotlivých carů a celý region byl postupně inkorporován do centralizovaného systému samoděržaví s centrem ve vzdálené Moskvě a později Sankt Petěrburgu (k definitivnímu zrušení Hetmanátu dochází za Kateřiny Veliké roku 1775). A i když je za vlády některých carů (zejména raná fáze vládnutí Petra I.) podporována kultura a vzdělanost, s centralizací moci (tu zde vykonává carem jmenovaný gubernátor) přichází také postupná rusifikace a omezování svobod (Kohut 2001;Wilson 2009). ...
... Na opačném pólu se profilují tři oblasti, které jsou charakteristické vysokou podporou proruských stran a kandidátů -Autonomní republika Krym, Luhanská a Doněcká oblast. V prvně jmenovaném případě dokonce převažovali odpůrci ukrajinské nezávislosti (počítáno z celkového elektorátu dané oblasti, nikoliv platných hlasů), což se projevilo i v separatistických snahách krymských Rusů v polovině devadesátých let a permanentním politickým napětím po celou dobu od vyhlášení nezávislé Ukrajiny (Wilson 2009;O'Loughlin 2001;Kuzio 2015). Třetí prostorově výrazný shluk oblastí se profiluje na východě a jihovýchodě Ukrajiny -Charkovská, Záporožská, Chersonská, Oděská a Mykolajivská oblast, kde převažovala mírná podpora proruských a levicových politických subjektů, ale zároveň zde již byla zřetelná podpora nezávislosti (tento shluk se částečně překrývá FR 7). ...
... Vysoká nezaměstnanost, ztráta sociálních jistot a příslušnosti k světové velmoci jsou pro řadu obyvatel (nejen Rusů) průmyslových regionů na východě hlavní argumenty pro podporu proruských stran (hlavně komunistické strany a Strany regionů). Zde se také jasně projektují odlišné představy o historii a jejích symbolech při formování identit a politické kultury (Wilson 2002(Wilson , 2009. Příkladem za všechny budiž odlišné regionální vnímání dvou osobností, jež se významně otiskly do novodobých ukrajinských dějin -Stepana Bandery a Vladimira Iljiče Lenina. ...
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The term phantom border or region is used in current political-geographic literature to describe situations in which the original political boundaries in a region are abolished de jure, but still appear in the form of different social and political cleavages within the population, even though the historical continuity of the settlement may have already been disturbed. Ukraine is a very good case for studying this effect for its complicated territorial development. The contribution analyses historical conditions of current political, cultural and socio-economic structures in Ukraine. It uses statistical tests to verify the occurrence of the so-called phantom boundary effect - whether the original historical boundaries correspond to the spatial patterns of current political and socioeconomic differences of the Ukrainian society. The analysis partially confirmed the existence of phantom boundaries in Ukraine's political and cultural-demographic aspects, but in a number of economic characteristics the phantom effect could not be found. © 2017 Institute of International Relations. All rights reserved.
... Indeed, Ukraine lacked a real independence movement capable of shaping the new state after the 1991 independence; moreover, the country's political machine was at its early stages of development (A. Wilson: 2015). Finally, Ukraine lacked an organized civil society capable of mobilizing individuals or any previous experience of communist popular resistance as witnessed in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. ...
... Going back to the political players of the newly independent Ukraine, we see how the country lacked a strong majority able to rule the country autonomously. Even though the left could count on the biggest popular support, it was still very much disoriented and hoped for a Union between Ukraine, Belarus and Russia (A. Wilson: 2015). On the other hand, the right showed good organizational levels, ...
... As a result, the run for independence ended with the 'Great Bargain' (A. Wilson: 2015) between the Ukrainian nationalists and communists. Rukh agreed to allow the Socialist Party of Ukraine to stay in power as long as support for independence was granted, and in return the right party promised to behave less as an opposition party. ...
Thesis
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Since its independence, Ukraine has continuously tried to separate itself from its Soviet cultural inheritance and dominance, introducing different policies that tried to achieve such independence, and at the same time constructing for itself a unique national identity. This process has not always been simple and quick, and at times it was even reversed depending on who was in power of the country. Indeed, to this day, policies of national and identity character are hardly unchallenged. As a consequence, the country appears divided between two contrasting blocks who pull the country apart, stalling its process of democratic development. This thesis, relying on modernist and ethno-symbolist studies of nationalism, aims to analyze the various nationalistic policies introduced in the country since 1991, and tries to construct a different picture as to the effects of such policies. While acknowledging that the country has internal differences, at the same time this dissertation tries to refute the common understanding that Ukraine is a divided country, claiming that such division is not the product of internal differences but rather an effect of identity politics. Indeed, past events and opinion survey reveal that the majority of the population is indifferent and even against such an ethnic form of nationalism, preferring its civic counterpart. Therefore, if Ukraine is really committed to address the actual demands of its citizens, it should become a prerogative for any Ukrainian leader to focus on strengthening the country’s state system and recognize that the country’s multiculturalism is here to stay.
... Divorces, alcoholism or domestic violence are rather unfortunate developments that were always present in this context (Bridger and Pine 1998, Tolstokorova 2010, Gerber 2012, Rajkai 2014). Looking, for example, at the case of migrants from eastern Europe in the 90s, the collapse of the economy, the loss of peoples' careers and occupational identity led to a series of social problems that directly affected the relationships within the family (Wilson 2000, Satzewich 2002, Parelli-Harris 2008, Solari 2010. ...
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The article establishes a theoretical approach to migrant exclusion based on recent research and focuses on the importance of the experience and organization of work. The holistic approach recognizes three important stages in the process of exclusion: i) the preparation of future migrants in the country of origin through the integration and cultural acclimatization to casual and low-status work, ii) the allocation of migrant workers in low-status jobs in the host countries and iii) the habituation of migrant workers to the characteristics and demands of their work which leads to the reproduction of their social position.
... With over 9000 deaths, 20,000 injured, more than 1.6 million people displaced domestically and internationally and five million in need of humanitarian assistance (European Commission, 2016), the Ukrainian crisis has become the largest humanitarian tragedy Europe has witnessed since the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s. While having complex roots in Ukraine's post-communist developments, including continuous power struggles between competing oligarchs, weak state structures, a poor economy and profound inequality and social insecurity (Ishchenko, 2014;Wilson, 2009), the conflict also has major international dimensions. Hence, against a background of long-standing disputes between Western powers and Russia concerning the economic and military alignment of formerly socialist countries and Soviet states -and the eastward spread of both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Haukkala, 2015;Sakwa, 2015), the close involvement of perceived superpower interests in Ukraine have rendered geopolitical interpretations integral elements in explaining the Ukrainian conflict (e.g. ...
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The conflict in Ukraine has prompted analyses about the return of cold war divisions to Europe. This study focusses on the role the news media plays in the conflict by examining how the visual and textual practices of news framing help constitute geopolitical rationality and legitimise foreign policy. We analyse how the framing of the conflict in Die Welt, Dagens Nyheter, Helsingin Sanomat and The Guardian developed through four key events between February 2014 and February 2015. The analysis indicates that by promoting particular news frames the newspapers contributed to the legitimation of European Union policies, which are premised upon supporting the Ukrainian government in its military campaign in eastern Ukraine and placing responsibility for the conflict onto Russia. Hence, we argue that the news framing eventually contributed to the naturalisation of the ‘new cold war’ as a geopolitical rationality, orienting and legitimising foreign policy in Europe.
... 11. On national identity in Ukraine see Wolchik (1999), Arel and Ruble (2010), and Wilson (2015). 12. ...
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This article explores nation-building processes in the Transnistrian imagined community. While some scholars describe Transnistria’s nation-building strategy as a civic, multicultural project, the analysis of recent demographic and educational data corroborated with the close examination of local media content and official discourses—all point to the emergence of a distinct political culture marked by the increasing use of the Russian language in the public sphere, and the politicization of the Moldovan identity. Discourses about ethnic and national identity in the region have evolved as the Transnistrian elites reimagine the political community as part of the Russkii Mir. These circumstances suggest that, in the long run, the breakaway region might function as the southeastern frontline of Russian irredentism with the elites of the Pridnestrovska͡ia Moldavska͡ia Respublika continuing to call on the Russian Federation to annex the parastate instead of seeking a peaceful reintegration into Moldova.
... (WILSON, 2000, p. 208) There is also a strong belief among Ukrainian speakers that while Ukrainians who speak Russian may give lip-service to political independence, and many historic symbols, they are, in cultural and linguistic terms, "Russian" in nature, that is biased against Ukrainian language and culture regarding it as low-status and peasant-like. (WILSON, 2000) In sum, Ukrainian cultural nationalism classifies Russian speaking Ukrainian as agents of the aforementioned "Creole nationalism," that is, proponents of a transcendent Russian culture both in its higher manifestations, but also with the popular culture of mass fiction, rock music, game shows. The politics of identity raises the issue of whether political independence can be fully realized without cultural independence. ...
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p>The distinguishing characteristic of cultural policy in countries characterized by a legacy of coloniality is the importance of the identity formation and the politics that are involved in formulating its definition. At root, coloniality is an experience involving dominating influence by a stronger power over a subject state. However, this is not just a matter of external governance or economic dependency, but of a cultural dominance that creates an asymmetrical relationship between the ‘center’ and the ‘periphery,’ between the ruling ‘hegemon’ and the marginalized ‘other.’ In these circumstances, what constitutes an “authentic” culture, and how this informs national identity, is a central political and social concern.</p
... Moreover in recent decades we have also observed an offensive by evolutionary biologists (cf. Edward O. Wilson (2013) The Social Conquest of Earth. Liveright, New York) as well as evolutionary psychologists (cf. ...
Article
The article traces the cultural heritage of inter-cultural contexts, which have had profound impact over long time. It takes its departure in antique and culturally complex environments in the eastern Mediterranean. One millennium later corresponding inter-cultural conditions are explored in the western part of the Mediterranean. Both cases demonstrated their wide and long lasting influences on posterity. The cultural heritage implied the deep effects of cross-fertilization and ensuing cultural enrichment as the conflation of several well-endowed cultures took place. A similar, more powerful outcome followed the Radical Enlightenment in Leiden around 1650s and in Vienna some centuries later.
... Ukraine is a fascinating case study in civil disobedience because it has experienced several significant political movements in the last decade and a half. Ukraine differs from many other countries both by its geography and its tumultuous history over the last several hundred years (Plokhy, 2015;Sakwa, 2016;Wilson, 2000). Ukraine straddles the divide between Europe and Eurasia, and, consequently, European Union and Russian influence (Beisswenger, 2007). ...
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Cyberspace has dramatically affected social and political movements over the last 10 years. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest a strong role for information communications technologies (ICTs) in a changing landscape of organization and mobilization for large-scale social and political movements in countries around the world. This paper analyzes the 2013–2014 Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine using big data collected from open source content including blogs, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, forums, and news sites and mixed methods and assess the ramifications and impact of social media on social mobilization. This work compares digital and physical engagement directionality and finds the impact of social media on physical protest turnout is significant and leads to increased numbers of protestors in the streets. The analysis also highlights means of developing and assessing social mobilization through the use of linguistically and regionally categorized social media.
... For a detailed description of the political and social process in Ukraine between 1986 and 1994 s.Kuzio, Wilson 1994, Wilson 2002 ...
... For a detailed description of the political and social process in Ukraine between 1986 and 1994 s.Kuzio, Wilson 1994, Wilson 2002 ...
... The sources of this section areKing, 2000;Wilson, 2009;Kuzio and Wilson, 1994. 3On langauge and identity politics in Moldova see alsoSocor, 2014.The paradox that the Soviet period saw the growth of a national intelligentsia exists in both countries. ...
Article
Unlike their luckier neighbors to the west, Ukraine and Moldova did not enjoy a convenient geographical location, a national consensus, a clear identity or the state traditions to make their transition effective after the meltdown of the Soviet empire. Their initial transformation was gradual, with leaders at the helm inherited from the communist past. Thus began an evolution, in many ways similar to that of many other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, that led to an oligarchic but pluralistic Ukrainian and a captured oligarchic Moldovan state. So far, reform efforts have not been successful, demonstrating the strength of the new systems that came into being. In Ukraine two revolutions aimed at radical reforms but the first one failed and so far the second did not deliver the kind of liberal state that demonstrators and Western partners expected alike. The case of Moldova is similar but here mistakes of the Western partners also contributed to the current, unreformed outcome. Increasingly, the issue centers around the rule-of-law, the establishment of a competent and independent judiciary – in a geopolitical space that could not be further away from what Luttwak 26 years ago imagined with his description of a transition to geoeconomics. In large parts of the world, including Eastern Europe, bad old traditional geopolitics is very much alive and shapes everyday life in the most dramatic way.
... In Ukraine, political trends have traditionally dominated the landscape, with policy processes often operating in the absence of strategic oversight (Wilson, 2000). With powerful interest groups intervening in policy creation (Åslund, 2009), and the influence of international politics and contrasting policy objectives of Ukrainian presidential administrations preventing coordinated policy action (Åslund, 2005;Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009;Protsyk, 2003), policy arenas such as small business conditions have been left without clear leadership. ...
Article
Traditional frameworks for assessing policy implementation have been developed almost exclusively in the context of market-based, pluralist democracies. This research explores policy processes in more diverse contexts, testing the applicability of existing implementation measurement models in the socio-political context of a post-Soviet country. Fieldwork conducted in Ukraine examines the factors affecting implementation of the Simplified Single Tax policy and considers the impact of formal and informal institutions on policy processes and small business conditions. Results include an expanded model for assessing policy implementation in non-pluralist conditions, an original contribution to the fields of policy, small business, and development studies. The research further contributes to the literature concerning policy transfer, policy advocacy, and tax reform in developing nations. For theoreticians, this research may inform design considerations when conducting policy research outside of a pluralist democracy. For practitioners, it may inform efforts to mitigate implementation obstacles in diverse socio-political contexts.
... The political mobilisation of Romanians in Bukovina paralleled those of Ruthenians in neighbouring Galicia. After the 1772 incorporation of Galicia into the Habsburg Empire, the Greek Catholic Church acquired a prime role in asserting Ruthenian consciousness (Himka 1999: 6;Wilson 2002;Snyder 2003;Plokhy 2015: 163). 7 On 2 May 1848, around 300 Ruthenians gathered in the chancery of Saint George's Cathedral in Lemberg and established the Supreme Ruthenian Council (Holova ru'ka rada), an organisation which opposed the Poles' National Council (Rada Narodova). ...
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Bukovina, a predominantly Eastern Orthodox land, today divided between northern Romania and southwestern Ukraine, was the outmost frontier of the Habsburg Empire. Between its incorporation into the Empire in 1774 and Greater Romania in 1918, Bukovina produced an unusual Church. Rather than support a mono‐ethnic Orthodox community, as evident across nation building processes in Southeastern Europe, in 1873, Romanians, Ruthenians and Serbians (in Dalmatia) established a multi‐ethnic Church which rejected association with that of their Romanian brethren in Habsburg Transylvania. This article explores the lead up to the establishment of the church in 1873 and argues that, under the leadership of Bishop Eugen Hakmann, the Metropolitanate of Bukovina and Dalmatia was a novel ecclesiastical institution in which the clergy refused national identification while laypeople supported the growing rise of nationalist movements. This multi‐ethnic Church became one of the most intriguing Orthodox structures which would impact upon the emergence of national churches in nineteenth‐century Romania, Serbia and Ukraine.
... 1. Among many outstanding qualitative studies, see D'Anieri (2007), Hughes and Sasse (2002), Kuzio (2006), and Wilson (2002). Other outstanding works do employ quantitative analysis other than survey data in attempting to demonstrate the nature or salience of ethnic divides in Ukraine, using indicators such as patterns of rebellion against Soviet power or voting for parties with particular orientations (Darden forthcoming). ...
Article
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Building on past survey-based studies of ethnic identity, we employ the case of Ukraine to demonstrate the importance of taking seriously the multidimensionality of ethnicity, even in a country that is regarded as deeply divided. Drawing on relational theory, we identify four dimensions of ethnicity that are each important in distinctive ways in Ukraine: individual language preference, language embeddedness, ethnolinguistic identity, and nationality. Using original survey data collected in May 2014, we show that the choice of one over the other can be highly consequential for the conclusions one draws about ethnicity’s role in shaping attitudes (e.g. to NATO membership), actions (e.g. participation in the Euromaidan protests), and the anticipation of outgroups’ behavior (e.g. expectations of a Russian invasion). Moreover, we call attention to the importance of including the right control variables for precisely interpreting any posited effects of ethnicity, making specific recommendations for future survey research on ethnic identity in Ukraine.
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This article uses a paired comparison of ethnic politics in postcommunist Romania and post-Soviet Ukraine to explore the example of language policy implementation, empirically speaking. It argues that the (variable) behaviours of linguistic minority elites—the Hungarians in Romania and the Russophones in Ukraine—are driven by elites’ ideas (or ideational elements), theoretically speaking. In Romania, a politics of interethnic compromise and the quid pro quo gained the upper hand. In Ukraine, a politics of confrontation carried the day. In these two cases, the divergence—in behavioural terms—had had far-reaching political consequences, the latter affecting the level of cooperation and the amount of trust amongst the ethnic groups. These findings enrich our understanding of the behaviour of these particular groups in politics and of the policies toward them.
Book
From the Soviet perspective, Eastern Europe was the near abroad - more accessible than the capitalist West, yet also unambiguously foreign. Observing their western neighbours, citizens of the USSR developed new ideas about the role of states, borders, and national identities in the Soviet empire. In The Near Abroad, Zbigniew Wojnowski traces how Soviet Ukrainian identities developed in dialogue and confrontation with the USSR's neighbours in Eastern Europe. The author aptly challenges the dominant chronologies of late Soviet history by arguing that patriotism framed heated debates about the future of the Soviet state even amongst the rising tide of cynicism and disengagement from public life. Wojnowski's insightful analysis illuminates the mental geographies that continue to shape relations and conflicts between Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe to this very day. Unlike most other histories of Ukraine, The Near Abroad does not reduce Ukrainian nationalism to anti-Soviet views and behaviours.
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The article is dedicated to the 210th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States of America and Russia and casts light upon their genesis and development. It provides an acute insight into the key issues of US-Russian agenda within a time span of more than 200 years. Along with giving a holistic picture of the subject, the author focuses on specific cases crucial for understanding the current geopolitical juncture shaped by the interaction of the two nations. With an emphasis on differences in political culture, he outlines the important role of cross-cultural communication within the framework of the respective cases. The findings derived from the historical analysis give grounds for a certain degree of optimism in terms of further development of the relationship between the US and Russia.
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Turkey is impacted by the humanitarian, political, economic, and social aspects of the ongoing wars in its surrounding countries due to its geostrategic location. Yet, Turkey is also working to the end for the creation of peace in all conflict zones, and it is doing so using a rhythmic diplomacy approach in all of these processes. The war in Ukraine, in particular, has become the primary foreign policy concern of Turkey, as the country has developed significant relations with both sides in many areas. These emerging developments changes prompted scientists to analyze the foreign policy processes and instruments that should be followed properly during this time of Turkish foreign policy for the sake of the common good. The scientists evaluated the war’s dimensions by emphasizing that the future is conditional and avoiding generalizations during the “Russian Invasion of Ukraine and the International Relations Workshop” organized by TÜBA on March 28, 2022. Following the workshop analyses, this Final Report was made accessible to the public. In this report, academics in the field of international affairs debate and offer their thoughts on the Russia-Ukraine War, based on their knowledge, experience, and future expectations. The report begins by discussing the pre-war period’s tipping points and then discusses the war’s consequences on the system, region, and national levels, after defining the extent and nature of the conflict. The last title “Results” contains twelve paragraphs summarizing the findings of the workshop.
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This paper argues that an important concept of authoritarian learning is missing. This is how leaders learn from domestic experience. Using Yanukovych's defeat in the Orange Revolution, the paper illustrates how he adapted to stop a new Colour Revolution. Through using Party of Regions resources, Yanukovych improved his image, developed Party of Region's electoral success, controlled institutions and the political system, coerced the opposition, built-up security forces and pro-regime groups and created a family. While the paper finds that Yanukovych adapted to the failure of the Orange Revolution these adjustments contributed to the Euromaidan and the learning from domestic experience resulted in ultimate failure.
Chapter
The strategies and decisions taken by the new leaders were shaped, as in Russia, by Soviet traditions of governance, because most of the new leaders had learned their trade within the Soviet nomenklatura. This chapter provides a survey of the histories of the non-Russian PSIERS, before 2000, with the occasional glance beyond that date. It begins with the Slavic republics, Belarus and Ukraine, then move on to the Central Asian republics and ends by discussing Xinjiang and Mongolia, two regions that had not formally been part of the Soviet Union but were part of Inner Eurasia. Real independence came to a reluctant Belarus leadership as a result of the December 1991 meeting at Belovezhkaia in western Belarus between Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and the new Belarus communist leader Stanislaw Shushkevich. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan by some of the most arbitrary of the Soviet-era boundaries, there were ethnic riots in Uzbek regions in 1989.
Chapter
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, as the Russian Federation struggled to find its new place as a reduced Great Power within post-Cold War Eurasia, its relations with the newly-independent state of Ukraine were a matter of prime concern to Moscow. What had been its chief partner in the 293 million-strong Soviet Union was now its largest post-Soviet neighbour with a population of around 52 million as compared to Russia’s reduced population of 154 million. Moreover 11 million (22%) of Ukrainian citizens were Russian, constituting almost half of the 25 million who then found themselves outside the borders of the new Russia, while Ukraine enjoyed a largely unregulated 2,063-km common border with Russia, not to speak of a 1,720-km Black Sea coastline. Unfortunately, Ukraine soon came to be seen as a geopolitical ‘pivot state’ on the Eurasian chessboard, its status derived not from its internal strength but from the deep divisions within its borders between communities enjoying different civilizational identities, its sensitive strategic position, and its vulnerability to manipulation by Great Power diplomacy (Chase, Hill & Kennedy, 1996, pp. 33–37; Brzezinski, 1997, pp. 40–41). The potential for Ukraine to become the focus of an international struggle for influence, with the risk that it might be torn apart by a combination of internal or external forces, was therefore high.
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Die Ukraine, das Land mit der größten Fläche in Europa nach der Russischen Föderation, ist ein multiethnischer Staat. Ihre Bevölkerung – 48,5 Millionen Menschen – setzt sich der Volkszählung von 2001 zufolge aus etwa 78 % Ukrainern zusammen, 17 % Russen, 0,6 % Weißrussen, und jeweils 0,5 % Moldauern und Krim-Tataren. Entsprechend der nationalen Zusammensetzung ist die Ukraine zwar konfessionell gemischt, Zweidrittel der Ukrainer sind jedoch orthodoxer Glaubenszugehörigkeit. Bei einer 2007 in der Ukraine vom angesehenen Razumkov- Zentrum durchgeführten Umfrage erklärten 40 % der Befragten, sie seien religiös, ohne einer Denomination anzugehören, während sich 36,5 % einer bestimmten religiösen Gemeinschaft zugehörig fühlten. Von Letzteren bekannten sich 33 % zur Ukrainischen Orthodoxen Kirche Kiewer Patriarchats (UOK-KP), 31 % zur Ukrainischen Orthodoxen Kirche unter Moskauer Jurisdiktion (UOKMP), 18 % zur unierten (griechisch-katholischen) Kirche und 2,5 % zur Ukrainischen Autokephalen Orthodoxen Kirche (UAOK). Weniger als 5 % der Befragten bezeichnen sich als römisch-katholisch, protestantisch, als muslimisch und jüdisch; dazu kommen weitere kleinere Denominationen.
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Kyiv (formerly Kiev) was the centre of the Rus principality in the 11th and 12th centuries and is still known as the Mother of Russian cities. The western Ukraine principality of Galicia was annexed by Poland in the 14th century. At about the same time, Kyiv and the Ukrainian principality of Volhynia were conquered by Lithuania before being absorbed by Poland. Poland, however, could not subjugate the Ukrainian cossacks, who allied themselves with Russia. Ukraine, except for Galicia (part of the Austrian Empire, 1772–1919), was incorporated into the Russian Empire after the second partition of Poland in 1793.
Chapter
Kyiv (formerly Kiev) was the centre of the Rus principality in the 11th and 12th centuries and is still known as the Mother of Russian cities. The western Ukraine principality of Galicia was annexed by Poland in the 14th century. At about the same time, Kyiv and the Ukrainian principality of Volhynia were conquered by Lithuania before being absorbed by Poland. Poland, however, could not subjugate the Ukrainian cossacks, who allied themselves with Russia. Ukraine, except for Galicia (part of the Austrian Empire, 1772–1919), was incorporated into the Russian Empire after the second partition of Poland in 1793.
Chapter
Kyiv (formerly Kiev) was the centre of the Rus principality in the 11th and 12th centuries and is still known as the Mother of Russian cities. The western Ukraine principality of Galicia was annexed by Poland in the 14th century. At about the same time, Kyiv and the Ukrainian principality of Volhynia were conquered by Lithuania before being absorbed by Poland. Poland, however, could not subjugate the Ukrainian cossacks, who allied themselves with Russia. Ukraine, except for Galicia (part of the Austrian Empire, 1772–1919), was incorporated into the Russian Empire afer the second partition of Poland in 1793.
Chapter
Kyiv (formerly Kiev) was the centre of the Rus principality in the 11th and 12th centuries and is still known as the Mother of Russian cities. The western Ukraine principality of Galicia was annexed by Poland in the 14th century. At about the same time, Kyiv and the Ukrainian principality of Volhynia were conquered by Lithuania before being absorbed by Poland. Poland, however, could not subjugate the Ukrainian cossacks, who allied themselves with Russia. Ukraine, except for Galicia (part of the Austrian Empire, 1772-1919), was incorporated into the Russian Empire after the second partition of Poland in 1793.
Chapter
Kyiv (formerly Kiev) was the centre of the Rus principality in the 11th and 12th centuries and is still known as the Mother of Russian cities. The western Ukraine principality of Galicia was annexed by Poland in the 14th century. At about the same time, Kyiv and the Ukrainian principality of Volhynia were conquered by Lithuania before being absorbed by Poland. Poland, however, could not subjugate the Ukrainian cossacks, who allied themselves with Russia. Ukraine, except for Galicia (part of the Austrian Empire, 1772–1919), was incorporated into the Russian Empire after the second partition of Poland in 1793.
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This article is devoted to the roots of the developments that have taken place in Ukraine since Autumn 2013 and up to the Russian invasion. It stresses the historical differences between Ukraine and Russia, presents the international milieu of Ukrainian independence in the years 1991–2013, and ends with a description of the nature of the Maidan revolution and the pan-European challenge created by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The main thesis is that the struggle for Ukraine ends the post-Cold War epoch marked with an illusion of eternal peace in Europe and with the groundless hope for Russian imperialism to expire.
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This article asks: ‘What was the Ukrainian revolution?’ It questions the nationalist narrative of an intelligentsia‐led movement in favour of independence by revealing some of the many strands that made up the revolution in Ukraine: the peasant struggle for the land and its produce, the urban and proletarian revolutions, the Ukrainian leftist intelligentsia's pursuit of national and social liberation, and the restless violence of the otamans. It also studies the fraught relationship between Eastern Galicia and Dnipro Ukraine. In this way, it seeks to counter current attempts to detach entirely the Ukrainian developments from those in Russia.
Chapter
This chapter focuses on the 10 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, though occasionally it looks towards the first decade of the twenty-first century. It describes some general trends, and then focus on the Russian Federation, the largest and most influential of the new post-Soviet states. The neoliberal reform model was associated with the "Washington consensus", a series of economic strategies applied to Latin American countries by the international monetary fund (IMF). Leaders in much of eastern Europe, and also in the Russian Federation, lurched violently towards market reforms, before making the many course corrections needed to balance market forces against local traditions and realities. The collapse of Soviet-era borders, ideologies, and structures of legitimation forced a new generation of leaders to look for new forms of legitimacy and elite cohesion. The chapter also describes the rebuilding process in the Russian Federation.
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Kyiv (formerly Kiev) was the centre of the Rus principality in the 11th and 12th centuries and is still known as the Mother of Russian cities. The western Ukraine principality of Galicia was annexed by Poland in the 14th century. At about the same time, Kyiv and the Ukrainian principality of Volhynia were conquered by Lithuania before being absorbed by Poland. Poland, however, could not subjugate the Ukrainian cossacks, who allied themselves with Russia. Ukraine, except for Galicia (part of the Austrian Empire, 1772–1919), was incorporated into the Russian Empire after the second partition of Poland in 1793.
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