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Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability:
The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
Number 16 | October 2014
Issues in
Energy and Environmental Policy
Issues in
Energy and Environmental Policy
Executive Summary
e Canadian province of Québec has the largest reserves of shale gas in Eastern Canada, but Québeckers are in the midst of a heated debate
over the desirability of exploiting this resource. At issue is the controversial technique of hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking.” e provincial
government has decided to proceed cautiously. In 2011, Québec instituted a temporary moratorium, still in eect, on shale gas development in
order to conduct consultations with experts and members of the public that has continued to present day. Recently, the government released
the results of the experts’ report, the Strategic Environmental Evaluation. is paper highlights the report’s key ndings about the potential
economic benets, environmental risks, and public acceptability of shale gas development. Québec’s balanced approach to the complex,
technical issue of shale gas development represents a deliberative approach to governance that emphasizes extensive public engagement.
Introduction
Since the 1990s, natural gas from shale has risen to the fore of the public debate over energy production. At the core of the discussion lie
the main techniques of the exploitation of natural gas from shale (“shale gas”): hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) and horizontal drilling.
Shale gas extraction is ecient and economically viable only when these methods are used in tandem, but the practice has attracted
attention for the uncertainty surrounding the long-term consequences of fracking on human health and environmental quality.
As a result of the concern over fracking, many governments around the world are weighing the costs and benets of allowing shale
gas development in their jurisdictions. e Canadian province of Québec has taken this process particularly seriously, banning shale
gas development until the completion of a public consultation on the acceptability of the prospective economic and environmental
consequences of fracking. is stands in contrast to the governments of Alberta and the American state of Pennsylvania, which are
evaluating the impacts of fracking with drilling already well underway, having encouraged development since the mid-2000s.
is paper examines the Canadian province of Québec and the factors in its cost/benet analysis of shale gas development. It rst explores
Québec’s culture, history, geophysical situation, and scientic and public engagement on the issue of shale gas to provide context for a discussion
of Québec’s evaluation of fracking as a policy issue. e report then turns toward an investigation of the potential economic benets and
environmental risks of shale gas development, including both the substantial natural risks and technological risks related to fracking. Finally,
it explores how public opinion on the benets and risks of shale gas development has evolved over recent years among Québeckers, arriving
at a near-consensus that these risks may outweigh the relatively moderate economic gains that may be realized from shale gas exploration in
Québec. While Québec’s conclusion regarding the desirability of shale gas development will be the product of a unique combination of Québec’s
history, economy, and environment, this experience provides a valuable framework for other jurisdictions considering the impact of fracking.
Author
Michael Lerner
Research Associate
Environmental Law Institute
lerner@eli.org
2www.closup.umich.edu
The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
Background
Québec, the “Rest of Canada,” and the Environment
To unfamiliar observers, one of the most striking things
about Québec is the degree to which its history inltrates
and inuences all aspects of Québec society. Even issues as
practical as energy policy are oen understood in Québec as
just one episode in a long, contentious, and oen emotional
series of cultural skirmishes running from its colonial era
to today. At the center of this struggle lies a fundamental
skepticism about the legitimacy of “Canada” as a political
unit. For many Québeckers, the concept of “Canada” is
fundamentally awed; yellowed, cracked glue binding two
fundamentally dierent peoples: the Francophones of Québec
and the Anglophones of the “Rest of Canada,” or ROC.
Despite federal provisions aording the Québec government
greater powers than other provincial governments, the
question of autonomy continues to act as the gravitational
center of Québec politics. e province voted in 1980 and
1995 on ballot propositions proposing negotiations leading
to Québec’s sovereignty from the ROC, but these were
rejected by margins of 19.22% and 1.16%, respectively.1
e Parti Québecois, which led Québec’s government
from September 2012 to April 2014, favors a third vote on
sovereignty in the near future.2
In April 2014, however, the Parti Québécois lost heavily to
the Parti libéral du Québec. e Liberals are a centrist party
that supports a large degree of autonomy for Québec, but
rejects the idea of a sovereign Québec. While a third ballot
proposition will not occur under the current government,
Québec’s relations with the ROC will continue to be a
constant source of tension.
Québec’s history of policy-making with an eye toward
autonomy has at times dovetailed with its strong, proactive
engagement with the environmental movement. Starting in the
1940s, the province embarked on a series of large investments
in hydropower. e underlying purpose of these projects was to take
advantage of the province’s formidable water resources to create an independent electricity grid, a necessity for an independent Québec.
An inadvertent, but happy consequence of this eort is that Québec is among the cleanest energy economies in the world today.
Hydropower provides over 95% of Québec’s electricity, leaving it more or less independent of hydrocarbon imports.3 By way of
comparison, the United States obtains approximately 10% of electricity from renewable energy sources, and petroleum and natural gas
supply 25% of its electricity4. ese dierences are illustrated in Figure 1. Other Canadian provinces have also made use of their water
resources, with Newfoundland and Labrador, Manitoba, and British Columbia each producing over 80% of their electricity through
hydroelectric power.5
Québec and the U.S. have similar patterns of total energy consumption,
but 97.3% of Québec’s electricity is produced renewably while the U.S.
only produces about 10% of electricity from renewable sources. In
contrast, coal is not used to produce electricity in Québec, but accounts
for 45% of U.S. electricity production. Data Sources: Ministère des
Ressources naturelles. (2014). Quebec City, Québec: Ministère des
Ressources naturelles. Retrieved from http://www.mern.gouv.qc.ca;
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2014). Washington, DC: U.S.
EIA. Retrieved from ht tp://www.eia.gov/
Québec Energy Consumption by Form (2010)
U.S. Energy Consumption by Form (2010)
Electricity
41%
Electricity
40%
Conventional Gas
38%
Conventional Gas
36%
Natural
Gas
38%
Natural
Gas
17%
Biomass Coal-1%
Coal-2%
Hydroelectricity
95.8%
Other Renewable
1.5%
Nuclear
2.0%
Petroleum
Products
0.6%
Natural Gas*
0.1%
*Shale Gas included in Natural Gas
7%
Biomass
4% Hydroelectricity
6%
Other Renewable
4%
Nuclear
20%
Petroleum Products
1%
Natural Gas*
24%
Coal
45%
*Shale Gas included in Natural Gas
Figure 1
Comparison of Quebec and U.S. Energy Mixes.
3
Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
Another example of Québec’s eorts to dierentiate itself from the ROC aligning with environmental priorities is its cap-and-trade
market for carbon emissions, the only one in Canada. Since January 2013, Québec has forced large carbon emitters—those producing
25,000 metric tons of CO2 or greater per year—to buy emissions allowances at auction. In addition,6 Québec joined the Western
Climate Initiative (WCI) in 2008, a coalition of American states and Canadian provinces with the aim of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.7 ough the WCI’s once substantial membership has suered through the economic downturn and encountered political
backlash in some states, Québec has remained committed to reducing its environmental footprint through its carbon market.
The Utica Shale
Since 2010, when the discovery of gas reserves in Québec sparked interest among investors and drilling companies, the political debate
in Québec has come upon a new issue: shale gas.8 ough Québeckers have drilled for conventional oil and gas wells since the late
19th century, the discovery of substantial reserves of shale gas in the southern half of the St. Lawrence Lowlands, an area spanning
approximately 2,900 square miles, has given new impetus to the question of development.9 As shown in Figure 2, the most promising
geological formation in the area of interest within the St. Lawrence Lowlands is the Utica Shale, a thin layer of rock topped by a mile-
thick layer of quasi-impermeable rock.10 Exploratory wells drilled in the Utica suggest it contains a total volume of 155 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas, of which approximately 31 trillion cubic feet is technically recoverable.11 is ranks the Utica as the most signicant
shale gas deposit in Eastern Canada, and Canada’s h largest overall.
Figure 2
Area of Interest for Shale Gas Extraction.
The area outlined represents the area of potential shale gas exploitation in the St. Lawrence Lowlands, Québec. The Utica shale
becomes progressively shallower to the north, with the northern edge of the area of interest representing the point where the Utica formation
reaches the surface. The greatest reserves of shale gas are located on the southern bank of the St. Lawrence River, which runs southwest-
northeast through the area. Source: Google Earth. (Build 7.1.2.2041). [Software]. Mountain View, CA: Google Inc. (2014). Available at
http://earth.google.com; Semantic Science Integrated Ontology. [Software]. Mountain View, CA: Google, Inc. (2014). Retrieved from
http://semanticscience.org; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2014). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Retrieved from http://noaa.gov/; U.S. Navy. (2014). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved from http://navy.mil; U.S. National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (2014). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved from ht tp://nga.mil; General Bathymetric
Chart of the Oceans. (2014). Liverpool, UK: British Oceanographic Data Centre. Retrieved from htt0p://gebco.net; Image: U.S. Geological Survey
Landsat. (Build GEBCO_08). [Software]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior. (2014). Available at ht tp://landsat.usgs.gov/
4www.closup.umich.edu
The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
Shale gas is a “tight” gas, meaning the reservoir rock holding the gas is ne-grained, rendering the gas dicult to extract. However,
there are two factors that have made the exploitation of the Utica Shale economically attractive. e rst is the improved eciency of
exploiting shale gas and other “tight” gases through the combination of horizontal drilling and fracking (see Fig ure 3). Traditional (or
“conventional”) wells only drill vertically, limiting the well’s production to the immediate vicinity. Perfected only recently, horizontal
drilling increases production per well by creating multiple well shas extending in dierent directions from one wellhead.12 For
example, a typical six-well drilling platform using horizontal drilling techniques would have 36 individual well shas instead of one
well sha per well. Such a set-up would be capable of draining nearly 4 km2 of rock from just one drilling platform.13 is leads to
substantial eciency gains, and thus prot margins, over traditional techniques.
e other technological development is the spread of sophisticated fracking techniques. Fracking involves injecting large volumes of
“frack uid,” a mix of water, sand, and chemicals, into a well at high pressure to crack open the rock and free gas deposits. ough the
North American oil and gas industry has used this technique for the past few decades, the eectiveness of fracking has dramatically
increased recently due to changes in the exact chemical composition of the “frack uid” mix and its use in combination with
horizontal drilling.14 Due to the low porosity of shale, the exploitation of shale gas and other “tight” gas deposits is only economically
viable through the combination of these two techniques.
Figure 3
Schematic of a Well using horizontal drilling and fracking.
The well shaft descends vertically until it reaches the rock layer containing hydrocarbons. The shaft then turns
horizontally and the well operator performs successive hydro-fractures to increase the permeability of the hydrocarbon-
laden rock. Figure adapted from Government of Québec. (2011, February). Sustainable development of the shale gas
industry in Québec: Inquiry and public hearing [BAPE] report 273, p. 31. Québec City: Minister of Natural Resources.
5
Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
Given these factors, the physical characteristics of the Utica Shale make exploitation particularly cost-eective. e Utica is composed
of relatively large, porous grains compared to other shales.15 is means it is both easier to fracture the Utica and each “frack” frees up
more gas than in other geological deposits. e surrounding rock formations are more or less impermeable, meaning the gas formed
in the Utica is a concentrated source of natural gas with low rates of migration into neighboring rocks.16
Despite these advantages, exploiting the Utica’s natural gas is not cheap. Roughly 15 individual fracks are required to create a well of
average yield, three billion cubic feet over a lifetime of 25 years.17 Each frack requires about 400,000 gallons of water, totaling to just
over 5.2 million gallons of water per well.18 Typically, these millions of gallons of water must be brought in by truck, causing the cost of
a fracked exploratory well, created to discover if an area contains accessible hydrocarbon reserves, to reach approximately $20 million,
double that of a conventional exploratory well.a is cost dierence endures to a smaller degree during the exploitation phase.19 While
only a handful of shale gas wells have been drilled in Québec up to now (see Figure 4), hundreds, perhaps thousands more wells stand
to be drilled and fracked if Québec allows development of the Utica Shale to proceed.20
Figure 4
Oil and Gas Wells Drilled in the St. Lawrence Lowlands, QC (1980-2012).
Number of Oil and Gas Wells Drilled
0
2
4
6
8
10
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
Since 1980, the number of wells drilled in the St. Lawrence Lowands of Québec has never exceeded 10 wells per year (solid black
lines). The moratorium on new well drilling came into effect in 2011 (grey dashed line). Source: Système d’information géoscientifique
pétrolier et gazier. (2014). Québec City: Ministère des Ressources naturelles. Retrieved from http://sigpeg.mrn.gouv.qc.ca/
C. Québec’s Evaluation of Shale Gas and Its Controversy
Following the discovery of Québec’s accessible hydrocarbon reserves in 2010, the Québec government has reacted cautiously to
the sudden surge of interest in exploiting shale gas in Québec, seeking out comments and advice from both scientists and the lay
public. e provincial government’s rst step was to request a public consultation on the sustainable development of shale gas
under the auspices of the Bureau of Public Hearings on the Environment (BAPE).b is organization is among the most widely
known and respected governmental organizations in Québec, with 65% of Québeckers having heard of the BAPE and 93% of those
respondents judging the BAPE to be credible.21 e BAPE, charged with informing and consulting the public on projects liable to
have signicant impacts on the environment, concluded in early 2011 that it was unable to fully complete its consultation because,
“For certain fundamental [scientic] questions, the answers are either incomplete or nonexistent.”22 e BAPE’s report asked for
more time and information.
a All monetary amounts in this paper are in Canadia n dollars.
b All tran slations of titles and quotes in t his report are the author ’s translations.
6www.closup.umich.edu
The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
e Québec government responded to the BAPE’s recommendation, imposing a moratorium on exploratory drilling in the St.
Lawrence Lowlands in June 2011. e ban was contingent upon the completion of an environmental impact study, called a Strategic
Environmental Evaluation (EES), in order to provide the BAPE with the information necessary to inform and consult the public.23 is
temporary measure, in place to the present day, halted all new oil and gas activities, though the handful of wells in production at that
time were allowed to continue to operate.
e EES is similar to the United States’ federal and state Environmental Impact Statements, but with a more holistic emphasis. In
addition to evaluating the eect of hydraulic fracturing on the environment, the EES has commissioned 78 expert reports over three
years evaluating its inuence on the economy, human health, and other quality of life concerns. e EES is purely informational,
containing no concrete recommendations. Instead, its purpose is to empower the BAPE to perform a more comprehensive public
consultation.24 e EES submitted its nal report to the Québec government in December 2013 and the BAPE has begun a second
public consultation scheduled to conclude in November 2014, in response to which the National Assembly is due to produce shale
gas legislation.
ere are two controversial elements in this process. e rst is the question of whether the outcome of this process has been
predetermined. Québec’s National Assembly already adopted a resolution in favor of a ban on gas and oil extraction in Québec before
the EES was even submitted.25 As in the United States, this resolution was an expression of the ocial will of the legislature, without
the binding force of law. e Parti Québecois pushed for the passage of a legally enforceable ban, but this was defeated following
Liberal protests that such a bill would moot the years-long evaluation process. Now that the Liberals have taken power in Québec, it
seems unlikely that the evaluation process will be short-circuited.
Nevertheless, the Liberals were part of the unanimous approval of the resolution supporting the principle of a ban.26 In addition, the
National Assembly extended the expiry date of the moratorium on drilling in the St. Lawrence Lowlands to 2018, though the BAPE’s
report is due at the end of 2014.27 It is unclear why the moratorium lasts well beyond the deadline for the BAPE report. Taken together,
these signs suggest that many politicians have already made up their minds. As Martine Ouellet announced in September 2012, less
than 24 hours aer taking oce as Minister of Natural Resources, the Parti Québecois’ “position is very clear on shale gas: a complete
moratorium on exploration and exploitation.”28
e second controversial element of this process is that the moratorium did not provide compensation for the lost prots of companies
that bought gas exploitation permits from the Québec government.c e legal doctrine for compensating the loss of the right to use
land, called “regulatory takings,” is extremely narrow in Canada. Canadian law explicitly excludes interests in land from individual
property rights and Canadian courts have consistently required the loss to be permanent to qualify for compensation.29 e temporary
nature of the ban makes it unlikely Canadian companies could obtain compensation through Canadian courts.
Companies in the United States and Mexico, on the other hand, may have a better chance of obtaining compensation by suing
Québec through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which includes strong language requiring compensation for
expropriating the property of foreign investors.30 An oil and gas company incorporated in Delaware, Lone Pine Resources Inc., led
suit through NAFTA’s arbitration system in late 2012, arguing the Québec government expropriated the company’s permits without
compensation despite their multi-million dollar investment.31 However, the case’s future looks bleak for two reasons. e rst is
that, like Canadian courts, NAFTA arbitration boards also require a permanent transfer of land use rights from the landowner to
the government for compensation.32 Second, the ability of Lone Pine Resources to pursue the lawsuit itself is uncertain following the
company’s bankruptcy in September 2013.33
c In Canada, surf ace rights are severed fro m mineral rights . Private citi zens can own the surface rights to land, bu t the government owns all mineral rights. P rivate comp anies can buy leases from the
government to extract underground resources.
7
Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
Approaches to Fracking Elsewhere
In Other Canadian Provinces
While Québec currently produces very little natural gas, Canada as a whole is the fourth largest producer of natural gas in the world.
As shale gas makes up an increasingly large share of Canada’s natural gas production, Canadians in other provinces have weighed
the cost of accessing this resource and reached varied conclusions.34 In Western Canada, fracking has become an accepted practice.35
Alberta, the epicenter of the Canadian fracking industry, gives primacy to industry development but allows municipal governments
to regulate the industry. British Columbia created the Oil and Gas Commission to balance industry and local interests, with the
possibility of appeal to the Surface Rights Board, a conict resolution body.
While Canada’s western provinces have long been accustomed to living with the excesses and benets of the oil and gas industry,
the industry has historically le a light footprint in the east, specically in Québec and the Maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador. Unsurprisingly, it is in eastern Canada that proposals for shale
gas development sparked the greatest furor.
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador have both banned fracking to the widespread approval of their residents. New
Brunswick gives municipalities complete control over oil and gas development, but limits this authority to urbanized areas. Partly as
a result of this distinction and partly due to a controversial court decision allowing companies to drill in less populated areas, rural
residents of New Brunswick took to the streets to protest the arrival of the shale gas industry. In one New Brunswicker indigenous
community, the Elsipogtog First Nation’s protests turned violent, with police cars burned and dozens arrested.36
Around the World
Governments all over the world are increasingly skeptical of fracking. France and Bulgaria have explicitly banned fracking and there is
a de facto ban in Germany. e anti-fracking movement has also gained momentum in the United States, the world’s leading producer
of shale gas. Vermont is the only U.S. state to explicitly ban fracking, though New York has imposed a de facto ban on fracking that,
similar to Québec, depends on the publication of a long-awaited evaluation of the impacts of shale gas development.37 While some
states have not followed this trend, such as Pennsylvania, representatives in 19 U.S. states proposed at least 119 bills during the 2012
legislative session alone.38
ere is an important dierence between the approaches to fracking elsewhere and the situation in Québec, however. Since most of the
jurisdictions that have acted against fracking contain only marginal shale gas reserves, government ocials oen have relatively little
to lose by banning the practice. Québec, on the other hand, has substantial reserves of shale gas. e next two sections will consider
the economic benets and the environmental risks of developing these shale gas reserves, the largest in Eastern Canada.
The Benefits of Shale Gas Development
Why develop and exploit shale gas in Québec? One argument oen made in the United States in favor of shale gas is its positive
environmental impact. Specically, when burned to produce electricity, natural gas releases only half the CO2 and one-third the
nitrogen oxide compared to coal.39 Moreover, shorter pipelines from well to furnace would lead to lower greenhouse gas emissions
resulting from pipeline leaks relative to shipping natural gas from Western Canada.40 However, all of these benets are based on an
erroneous comparison. Québec does not use coal to produce electricity, but hydropower. When compared to hydropower, natural gas
is clearly not the environmentally-friendly option. erefore, the only reason to develop and exploit the shale gas contained in the
Utica Shale is for economic benet.d
e EES explored three clear economic benets that stand to be gained by developing shale gas in Québec. e rst is reduced
prices on natural gas. In 2010, the last data year available, Québec spent approximately $1.815 billion dollars, or 5.8% of total energy
expenditures, importing 195 billion cubic feet of natural gas from Western Canada. While this gas is inexpensive relative to crude
d Altho ugh the EES did not e valuate the profit potent ial for private a ctors, economic benefit w ould derive fro m natural gas exports, particularly to nearby pr ovinces depe ndent upon na tural gas for energy,
such as Nova Sc otia, New Bruns wick, and Ont ario.
8www.closup.umich.edu
The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
oil, which sells at roughly six times the price, Québec has to pay the extra cost of transporting the fuel roughly 2,000 miles across the
greater part of Canada. As a result, the price of natural gas in Québec is more than twice the price in Alberta, where most Canadian
natural gas is produced.41
By producing natural gas, Québec and its businesses would likely save hundreds of millions of dollars even without selling any gas
through exports. If prices fell to those seen in Alberta, the government’s savings alone would equal $900 million per year. Since
Québec both has the largest shale gas reserves in Eastern Canada and is one of the few provinces not to ban its exploitation, Québec’s
neighbors would also hold considerable demand for locally produced, and thus competitively priced, natural gas.
A second economic advantage from the production of shale gas is job creation. Well drilling, preparation, and operation are labor-
intensive, with the potential to create thousands of new, well-paid jobs. Estimates of just how many jobs this might entail vary greatly.
One report found that a $1.5 billion investment by the shale gas industry over 10 years would support approximately 11,000 workers.42
is works out to just over $135,000 per job. Another report found a $7 billion investment over 25 years would support approximately
200,000 jobs, an average of $35,000 per job.43 What might explain this discrepancy is the former estimate does not consider the three
to four low-pay jobs that are indirectly created for every high-pay job directly supported by the industry.44
As there are only 330,000 unemployed people in Québec, these new, well-paying jobs will likely attract job-seekers from all over
Canada.45 Unfortunately, this migration can come at the cost of straining the local community. As people ock to the St. Lawrence
Lowlands, prices and rents will be vulnerable to large, volatile increases. Individuals on xed incomes may be squeezed and even
forced to leave the area in order to survive.46 Political tensions may also rise with the arrival of large numbers of non-Francophone
workers.47 It is worth noting that the Québec government’s own analysis of the impacts of shale gas gives these concerns greater weight
than the industry’s job-creation potential.
Finally, shale gas development could lead to a small nancial windfall for the provincial government in the form of licensing fees
and royalties. A report commissioned by the EES examined three potential development scenarios and their eect on government
revenues (see Figure 5). e rst envisions small-scale development, with only 1000 wells created over 10 years (starting in 2016).
Québec’s revenues from industry-related fees and royalties would sharply spike over the seven years between 2019 and 2025, reaching
a maximum of approximately $800 million in 2021 and 2022 respectively. By way of comparison, Québec’s revenues from forests,
mining, and hydropower equaled approximately $2.2 billion in 2013-2014. Cumulatively, provincial revenues from industry-related
fees and royalties would equal roughly $2.5 billion over 10 years, with an additional $500 million over the next 20 years.
In the medium-scale scenario, 3350 wells are drilled over 10 years. Québec would see annual revenues rise to a maximum of $2.7
billion in 2024 within a period of signicant collections ranging from 2022 to 2028. Overall, Québec would gain a total of $10 billion
in revenue by 2028, with an additional $3 billion between 2028 and 2050.
Finally, large-scale development of the Utica Shale would entail the construction of 9,000 wells. Revenues would peak in 2027 at nearly
$5 billion and there would be an eight-year period of revenues greater than $1 billion between 2024 and 2031. Cumulatively, Québec
would receive $25 billion by 2036 and an additional $5 billion from 2036-2066.
While these sums appear large, they should be understood in the context of the government’s other revenues. Even if annual revenues
from fees and royalties were to reach $5 billion, the peak revenue from the most intensive development scenario, this would equal just
7% of Québec’s 2013-2014 budget.48 Shale gas revenues would make an even smaller contribution to Québec’s nances when taking
into account the anticipated expansion of Québec’s budget between today and 2027, when this peak would occur.
Overall, these estimations suggest that, while shale gas development would lead to lower gas prices, more jobs, and a boost in Québec’s
revenues, these benets are not overwhelming and may even destabilize local communities. Given these advantages, limited though
they may be, the question of shale gas development now turns to its prospective environmental impacts.
9
Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
Figure 5
Graphs of Well Drilling and Provincial Revenues in Three Natural Gas Development Scenarios.
0
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6
large-scale
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Clockwise from bottom left: Cumulative number of wells drilled in the small-scale, medium-scale, and large-scale development
scenarios. Number of wells drilled per year for each of the three scenarios. Amount of additional provincial revenue from fees and
royalties per year resulting from shale gas development for each development scenario. Cumulative amount of additional provincial
revenue per year for each of the three development scenarios. Source: Bureau of Public Hearings on the Environment. (2014,
April). L’industrie du gaz de schiste dans les Basses-Terres du Saint Laurent: scénarios de développement [Strategic Environmental
Evaluation report], p. 23, 25, 27. Québec City: Ministère de Développement durable, Environnement, Faune et Parcs.
Annual Wells
Cumulative Wells
Annual Revenues
Millions of Dollars (CAN)
Number of Wells
Number of Wells
Millions of Dollars (CAN)
Cumulative Revenues
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The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
The Environmental Risks of Shale Gas Development
Shale gas is certainly present in the St. Lawrence Lowlands. But the risks of accessing and exploiting this resource are not negligible.
ese risks come in two forms: natural risks and technological risks. Natural risks are inherent to any sort of development, gas
or otherwise, in the region. ey are events that would happen without any direct human action, though humans may indirectly
inuence their frequency or severity. Technological risks, on the other hand, are anthropogenic hazards directly related to the
techniques and practices of shale gas extraction. ese are events that would never occur without human intervention. is section
explores each of these in turn.
Heightened Natural Risks
Even without direct human inuence upon the terrain, the natural features of Québec introduce “considerable exploration and
completion risk” for natural gas extraction in Québec.49 ese include the risks of land subsidence, increased frequency and intensity
of earthquakes, and the release of naturally present contaminants.
Land Subsidence
Perhaps the most serious of these risks is land subsidence. ere are hundreds of landslides every year in Québec, 80% of which occur
in clay deposits, such those that exist in the St. Lawrence Lowlands.50 A very signicant proportion of these landslides, some 40%,
are indirectly precipitated by human activity.51 As shown in Figure 6, wells are oen drilled in areas that have experienced strongly
retrograde landslides, a highly destructive form of land subsidence (see Figure 8).
In some places, the mere presence of gas activities necessarily results in subterranean pressure shis following the extraction or
migration of gas deposits, overloading of surface water basins, and the erosion of vulnerable slopes.52 ese eects lead to landslides in
areas where the soil is extremely sensitive to vibration. As demonstrated in Fig ure 7, this is the case in the St. Lawrence Lowlands.
Figure 6
Map of strongly retrograde landslides in relation to existing gas well locations.
Many existing wells are in areas vulnerable to strongly retrograde landslides. Figure adapted from Transports Québec. (2014,
April). Glissements de terrain. Exploration et exploitation des gaz de schiste, p. 17. Québec City: Government of Québec.
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Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
Figure 7
Photos demonstrating the sensitivity of the St. Lawrence Lowlands’ soil to vibration.
A = intact soil capable of holding 90 lbs without cracking. B = If vibrated, the soil becomes a low-viscosity mud.
From Transport Québec’s report Glissements de terrain. Exploration et exploitation des gaz de schiste, p. 14.
Figure 8
Photos of strongly retrograde landslides: Saint-Liguori (1989) and Saint-Jude (2010).
Note the size of the trees in the foreground of the Saint-Liguori photo for a sense of
scale. The green roof of a home destroyed on May 5 when it was buried under several
meters of mud is visible in the Saint-Jude photo. Pictures from Transports Québec’s
report Glissements de terrain. Exploraiton et exploitation des gaz de schiste, p. 13.
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The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
While the risk of land subsidence is not unique to Québec, few shale plays in North America have a topography and climate
comparable to that of the St. Lawrence Lowlands, a mix of steep inclines, substantial precipitation, and a harsh freeze-thaw cycle. is
risk is particularly pernicious because it is dicult to generalize the conditions that lead to landslides.
Québec’s current regulations attempt to do this, forbidding all construction within 100 meters of a vulnerable slope. Unfortunately,
this distance proved to be insucient when, on May 5, 2010, a family of four was killed when a crevasse one kilometer long and 500
meters wide opened in St. Jude, near St. Hyacinth (see Figure 8). e family was watching ice hockey in their basement when mud
swept over the house, which was located in an area thought to beyond the landslide danger zone. e adults and children suocated
to death under several meters of mud.53 While this incident was unrelated to drilling, it stands to reason that a well would pose
considerable risk to the environment under similar circumstances.
Earthquakes
A second, related risk is that of earthquakes. Earthquakes can either directly damage a well or induce damaging landslides. In 1983, an
earthquake in Québec measuring M4.1 on the Richter scale occurred six weeks aer the injection of uid into a well lubricated nearby
faults.54 Similarly, scientists believe well exploration was the cause of M4 earthquakes in Wilmington, California that caused damage
to several wells.55 In April 2014, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources explicitly connected fracking in the Ohio section of the
Utica Shale with M3 and M4 earthquakes.56
Earthquakes in Québec tend to fall between M2 and M4 on the Richter scale, with most between M2 and M3.57 At this intensity, there is
practically no risk of damage. However, the micro earthquakes generated by exploratory drilling and hydraulic fracturing can increase the
frequency and intensity of dangerous earthquakes.58 In order to trigger a landslide, an earthquake has to be above M4.5.59 While this has
not been observed in Québec, the BAPE report notes that “the injection of uids into the crust can, on occasion, produce seismic events that
can reach a magnitude of M5.”60 In addition, the many inactive faults in the St. Lawrence Lowlands pose a risk of reactivation if widespread
fracking occurs. erefore, increased shale gas development in Québec would introduce increased risk of earthquakes and landslides.
Natural Contaminant Release
Finally, the highly acidic and oxidizing conditions in wells pose a third risk. Fracking may precipitate the release of contaminants
naturally residing in the Utica Shale, regardless of the composition of the “frack uid” used. ese potential releases may include
signicant amounts of dissolved solids, barium, and very high concentrations of chlorides.61 e resulting contamination of reux
waters would require costly treatment in order to ensure the health of local surface waters.
Technological Risks
Shale extraction involves a number of techniques that involve risks that are generally rare but severe. Of the most recent shale gas
development in Québec (2006-2010), 85% has taken place in rural settings (60% agricultural, 25% forest).62 is means the risks and eects
are primarily rural questions, concerning, in order of decreasing exposure: workers on drill sites, residents in direct proximity to drill sites,
and communities in which these activities take place. e risks of shale gas exploitation may be inherent to the activity or simply stem from a
failure to follow best practices. ere is a wide variety of potential impacts on human and environmental health, including explosions, water
pollution, air pollution, and nuisances in the form of light, noise, and trac. is section will discuss each of these eects in order.
Explosion
e most spectacular risk when exploiting shale gas is the violent eruption of aming gas at the wellhead. is was particularly
prevalent around the turn of the 20th century, when oil and gas extraction was rst introduced to Québec. In 1883, the log of the
Cabane Ronde well noted, “A column of liquid, rocks, and gas coming out of the well and rising more than 50 feet could be observed
for 48 hours.” Fiy years later, the well log for Lanoraie Oil and Gas Syndicate No. 1 tersely observed, “When drilling reached the gas
pocket, a column of mud erupted to a height of 75 meters. Gas owed for 24 hours before being controlled.”e
e These well logs are acc essible on the website of the Système d’in formation gé oscientifi que pétrolier et gazier (sigpeg.mrn.gouv.qc.ca).
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Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
Explosions occur when gas surges, leaks, or otherwise escapes containment during drilling or exploitation. ese events have become
rarer with advances in gas-containment technology. Nevertheless, one gas district in California using fracking experienced explosion
rates during exploitation as high as 1:1000 between 1995 and 2005.63 e 2011 BAPE report concluded that a sizable proportion of
recently drilled wells in the St. Lawrence Lowlands experience unexpected leakages of natural gas in volumes large enough to present a
risk of explosion.64
Water Pollution
A less dramatic, but similarly concerning risk is the inltration of contaminants into surface structures and aquifers. is can
happen when oil, frack uid, or reux sludge spills at the surface or leaks underground. Reux sludge, the mix of frack uid, natural
contaminants, and mud that returns to the surface aer fracking, is particularly dicult to manage safely. Shale gas extraction
produces a large volume of reux sludge, with a single well producing approximately 2000 cubic feet of sludge per day.65 is liquid can
contain heavy metals, certain chemical products,f non-biodegradable products, such as suspended polyesters, long-lasting pesticides,
and radioactive contaminants.66
Reux sludge requires substantial treatment before it can be released safely back into the environment or reused in other wells. Reuse
is the most environmentally-friendly option in terms of minimizing water use and preserving environmental quality, but it is costly to
do so. In terms of treatment, it is unclear whether municipal water treatment facilities could adequately purify the liquid, but, in any
case, there are not enough of these facilities in the region to treat waste from more than a handful of wells.
While there are alternatives to water use in fracking, such as liqueed natural gas or liqueed carbon dioxide and nitrogen, these gases
are dangerous to transport. It is also possible to frack only with water and do without chemical or physical additives. While this liquid
would still require treatment, it would be simpler to do so. e main disadvantage is that fracking without additives is less ecient.
Nevertheless, some 1200 wells have been drilled in the United States and Canada with these methods.67 is means it is at least
technically feasible to frack with lower-risk methods than those predominantly in use today, albeit with reduced production.
Subterranean seepage of uids into surface structures and aquifers is a particularly worrisome concern, as this is oen not directly
observable. In order to isolate the target rock and prevent uid migration, workers seat a cement casing around a well.68 If this cement
sealant is improperly installed, meaning there are gaps in the cement, or in the casing cracks, methane migration into surface aquifers
or nearby structures is possible (see Figure 9).69
A recent study of the wells in the St. Lawrence Lowlands found that some 15% of wells have unsafe concentrations of methane.70 e
failure of the cement in these wells would pose a material risk to human health, either due to explosion or poisoning. In addition, there
is also the possibility of tainted crops, as 80% of the target area is agricultural.71
In the worst-case scenario for subterranean uid migration, as much as 30,000 cubic feet of gas could leak every year into the nearby
area aer only 10 years of abandonment.g Fracking increases the speed and volume of leaks, as the technique involves placing the
production tubes under several multiples of pressure. Fracking amplies weaknesses in the cement.72 Improperly installed casings
made of low-quality cement will break down at an accelerated pace, soon posing a substantial risk to the surrounding environment. In
contrast, well-seated casings made of fresh, high-quality cement are unlikely to fail, even aer fracking.73
f Includin g acetylene alcohol, vola tile organic comp ounds, alkyphenols, ammonium chloride, tr imethyl chlo ride, and quinoxifen.
g This is an es timate for a con ventional well. T his means the ef fect of frack ing is not factored into the calculation.
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The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
Figure 9
Schematic of Well Cementing and Means of Failure.
Gas, natural contaminants, and frack fluid may escape through gaps or fractures (A-D), as well as
directly through deteriorated cement (E). Adapted from Vidic, R. D., Brantley, S. L., Vandenbossche,
J. M., Yoxtheimer, D., & Abad, J. D. (2013). Impact of shale gas development on regional water
quality. Science, 340(6134), p. 8. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1235009
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Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
Air Pollution
A third risk is one that has the potential to aect a larger population: air pollution. Potential sources of air pollution include the use
of diesel internal combustion engines, boiler systems, torches and incinerators, and reux sludge storage basins, as well as fugitive or
ventilated gas. A typical shale gas project in Québec releases approximately 250 million pounds of carbon dioxide (CO2), 25 million
pounds of methane (CH4), 6 million pounds of nitrogen oxides (NOx), and 5.5 million pounds of carbon monoxide (CO) every year for
25 years.74 In terms of annual emissions, every three wells drilled are roughly equivalent to opening one new coal-red power plant.h
In a situation wherein a company were to use the least environmentally-friendly practices, local air pollution would likely exceed
several norms and air quality standards, particularly for nitrogen dioxide (NO2), ne particulate matter (PM2.5), and formaldehyde.75
When water storage basins are le uncovered, there is an additional risk of extreme excesses in terms of concentration and spread of
BTEX (benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, exylene) and hydrogen sulde (H2S). Frack uid also contains chemicals that can pollute the
air, most notably hydrogen chloride (HCl). While most operators use HCl at a 15% concentration, some frack uid recipes call for
HCl in concentrations as high as 28%. HCl is volatile, meaning it may form a toxic gas cloud if spilled, with immediate, dire health
consequences for exposed workers, residents, and vegetation. In addition, odors from shale gas operations are emitted regularly, some
which may travel as far as ve kilometers away.76
is is, as mentioned above, the worst-case scenario. ere are some basic mitigation measures that can signicantly reduce air pollution
resulting from shale gas extraction.77 Equipment should be run on electric power and their chimneys raised several meters above ground level.
To eliminate the risk of evaporation and volatilization of reux sludge and frack uid, water storage basins should be covered. Other techniques
include the use of air capture systems while setting the well casing, burning low-sulfur coal in boilers, treating gas with condensation and
thermal oxidation methods, and the installation of micro-leak detection and repair systems. Such measures, when implemented, can reduce the
emissions of volatile organic compounds and H2S by more than 90% and avoid nearly all excesses of air quality standards. ese measures may
also limit odors to a 500-meter radius from the drill site during the roughly two-and-a-half months required to frack a well.
Nuisances
As perceived by the public, the most serious problems brought by shale gas development are light, noise, and trac pollution.78 e construction
of a typical multi-well site requires between 500 and 1180 “noisy” days, when daytime trac raises sound levels above safe limits.79 Even if
individuals avoid suering the physical health consequences of these nuisances, constant loud noises and bright lights in residential, commercial,
and recreation areas may lead to negative psychological eects.80 ese deleterious eects can be reduced through the creation of buer zones,
the construction of adequate roads, the adherence to strictly dened operating hours, and the application of sound-dampening technology.81
It is clear that shale gas extraction threatens to detract from the quality of human life and the environment in Québec. e twin risks
of land subsidence and earthquakes pose a serious risk to the physical integrity of wells constructed in the St. Lawrence Lowlands.
Shale gas extraction poses an inherent risk of explosion and there is a constant risk of water pollution. e treatment of reux sludge is
complicated by the risk of contaminating surface waters with chemicals naturally residing in the Utica Shale, as well as those included
in frack uid. Sealant failure may lead to the subterranean migration of chemicals threatening aquifers and surface structures. Light,
noise, and trac nuisances pose a danger to human physical and mental health.
Companies that follow best practices may be able to reduce their environmental impact to a large extent. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to ensure that these measures are implemented properly. Human error, slipshod work, and, of course, unavoidable natural
disasters mean the risk of serious, lasting damage to the environment that cannot be eliminated. With these facts in hand, the
question of shale gas development then hinges upon public perceptions of acceptable levels of risk.
Public Opinion of Shale Gas Development
Public perceptions of shale gas are in constant evolution as public awareness grows and new, relevant information becomes available.
Since the institution of the moratorium in June 2011, Québeckers have taken an increasingly negative outlook toward fracking. is
evolution can be measured in terms of municipal actions, public forums, and surveys.
h According to the Environmental Protection Agency’s calculator at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-resources/calculator.html.
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The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
In the rst case, the Council of Canadians, a non-partisan civic organization, reports at least three of Québec’s county-level
governments (MRCs) and 29 municipal governments have passed motions or submitted ocial requests to the provincial government
calling for a moratorium on fracking (see Figure 10).82 All three MRCs and 23 of the municipalities are located within the zone of
interest for shale gas development (see Figure 2).
As the EES notes in terms of public input, “e debate on shale gas generally goes beyond local conicts or factors of proximity. It
has taken on national dimensions…”83 Indeed, more than 50% of the participants in the BAPE’s rst round of public consultations
came from outside of the area of interest. In addition, over 10,000 Canadians from all parts of the country have signed a petition
circulated by the Council of Canadians calling for a moratorium on all fracking in Canada until the federal government completes an
environmental impact statement. While this petition became moot with the publication of the Council of Canadian Academies’ report
on May 1, 2014,i its strong support is notable.
Figure 10
Map of Municipalities and MRCs That Have Passed Anti-Fracking Resolutions within the Area of Interest.
This map shows the municipalities (blue) and MRCs, or county-level governments (teal) that have passed motions calling for a
moratorium on fracking in their jurisdictions and the municipalities (red) and MRCs (orange) that have sent the Québec government
an official request for a moratorium on fracking in Québec. Color variations do not signify qualitative differences between shaded
regions of the same colors. Data from Council of Canadians. (n.d.). Fracker tracker. Ottawa: Council of Canadians.
Retrieved from http://www.canadians.org/fracking/fracker-tracker; image from Google Earth. (Build 7.1.2.2041). [Software].
Mountain View, CA: Google Inc. (2014). Available at http://earth.google.com;
U.S. Geological Survey Landsat. [Software]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department
i The report finds that at pre sent, data is both insuffi cient and inconclusive about t he prospective environmental cos ts of fracking within the div ergent geogr aphical, geological, and ecological contex ts
of different Areas of In terest for f racking within Canada. See Council of Can adian Academie s. (2014, May 1). Environmental im pacts of shale gas in Canada: T he expert p anel on harnes sing science
and technolo gy to underst and the environmental impacts of shale gas extrac tion. Ottawa: Council of C anadian Academies.
Retrieved from http://www.scienceadvice.ca/uploads/eng/assessments%20and%20publications%20and%20news%20releases/shale%20gas/shalegas_fullreporten.pdf
Key
A - Arthabaska (MRC)
B - Bécancour (MRC)
C - Vallée-du-Richelieu (MRC)
1 - Batiscan
2 - Calixa Lavallée
3 - Champlain
4 - Charet te
5 - Lac-Etchemin
6 - Lanoraie
7 - Notre-Dame-du-Mont-Carmel
8 - Otterburn Park
9 - Pierreville
10 - Saint-Antoine-sur-Richelieu
11 - Saint-Denis-sur-Richelieu
12 - Saint-Didace
13 - Saint-Edmond-de-Grantham
14 - Saint-Hyacinthe
15 - Saint-Jude
16 - Saint-Louis-de-Blanford
17 - Saint-Luc-de-Vincennes
18 - Saint-Marc-sur-Richelieu
19 - Saint-Ours
20 - Saint-Pie-de-Guire
21 - Saint-Pierre-les-Becquets
22 - Saint-Prosper
23 - Saint-Sylvère
24 - Sainte-Madeline
25 - Saints-Martyrs-Canadiens
26 - Val-Alain
27 - Villeroy
Not Shown
Amqui
Saint-Gédeon
17
Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
e BAPE engaged three main actors in its rst consultation: business, agriculture, and citizens’ collectives. ese three groups largely
reject the notion of expanded shale gas development in Québec.84 e promise of economic benets from development did not appear
to signicantly inuence the various participants’ views, as there was no dierence between those coming from economically healthy
areas and those from economically depressed municipalities.85 As suggested in Figure 10, people in many of the communities in which
shale gas has been exploited or may be in the future feel negatively about the industry. is contradicts the idea that familiarity with
the industry breeds its acceptance. On the contrary, the strongest condemnations of shale gas development came from areas where the
industry was already present.
e results of public opinion surveys echo these ndings.j Public support of fracking, only tepid at rst, slipped quickly over less than a
year’s time (see Figu re 11.1). In January 2012, Québec tied Alberta as the province most supportive of fracking, with slightly more than
half of Québeckers in favor of a national moratorium on fracking (55%).86 By November 2012, 72% of Québeckers came out against
shale gas extraction of any kindk, a 17-point swing.87
Montpetit and Lachapelle nd that Québeckers are generally hostile to the shale gas industry.88 e word “fracking” is widely believed
to have negative connotations (see Figure 11.2), and nearly two-thirds of Québeckers believe the advantages of shale gas development
will be outweighed by its costs in the future (see Fig ure 11.4). Even if the highly-respected BAPE were to publish a report showing the
risks of shale gas development to be low, the public’s risk perception would still be above-average (see Figure 11.3).
is skepticism is tied to Québeckers’ concern that shale gas development will lead to negative environmental consequences. is is
demonstrated by the nearly linear relationship between risk perception and support for development (see Fig ure 11.5). As some three-
quarters of respondents strongly or somewhat agree that natural gas drilling represents a major risk to water resources (see Figure
11.6 ), it is unsurprising that Québeckers are largely hostile to the shale gas industry.
Québeckers’ take toward the shale gas industry might be explained by their ambivalence toward the desirability of atomistic
competition, or that between individuals (see Figure 11.8), relative to their clear opposition to private prots from exploitation (73%)
and concomitantly overwhelming belief that natural gas reserves are a public resource whose development should benet citizens, at
92% (see Figure 11.9). Québeckers likewise prize environmental protection, with two-thirds in support of restraining economic growth
to solve environmental problems (see Figure 11.7). For a further investigation into the relation between shale gas development and the
values, beliefs, and perceptions of Québeckers, please refer to Montpetit and Lachappelle (2013).
e EES commission considered these three measures of public opinion and concluded that the public acceptability of shale gas
development is waning quickly. It is evident that, if development were to proceed in Québec, the industry would be obliged to improve
their communication practices to convince the public of the desirability of their industry. As the climate of public opinion stands
today, shale gas development is perceived to have little to oer in Québec.
j For technical information r egarding thes e polls, refer to th e caption in F igu re 11 .
k Alb eit in response t o slightly dif ferent ques tions. The question in Januar y 2012 was, “Woul d you strongly support , somewhat support, so mewhat oppo se, or strongly oppose a moratorium on all
fracking fo r natural gas unt il all the federal environment al reviews are complete?” while t he question in No vember 2012 was, “I n general, would you say that you s trongly agre e, somewhat agree,
somewhat disagree, or st rongly disagree with the ex traction of n atural gas through shale wells in Q uébec?” (my tran slation).
18 www.closup.umich.edu
The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
Figure 11
Québec Public Opinion Poll Results.
55%
72%
Jan 2012 - QCs in favor of a
national moratorium in Canada
Nov 2012 - Opposed to shale
gas extraction in QC
% Agreement
11.1 - Québeckers' Support For
Anti -Shale Gas Action Has Increased
15%
70%
Positive Word Negative Word
11.2 - Fracking Is A ...
7.1
6.3
8.1
0
10
Pre-Treatment Low-Risk BAPE Report High-Risk BAPE Report
Risk Perception
11.3 - BAPE Reports & Risk Perception
30%
63%
More Advantages More Problems
11.4 - In The Future, Shale Gas
Development Would Lead To...
0
0.5
1
012345678910
Level of Support
Perception of Risk
11.5 - The Probability of Support Decreases As
An Individual's Perception of Risk Increases
19
Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
www.closup.umich.edu
Data are from Montpetit & Lachappelle (2013) except “Jan 2012 – QCs in favor of a national moratorium in Canada,” which comes from the Council of Canadians poll. Montpetit
& Lachappelle survey data are from a telephone poll conducted in Québec by Léger Marketing from October 29 to November 14, 2012, n=1531, margin of error +/-2.5%. Council of
Canadians poll data from a nationwide (Canada) telephone poll conducted by Environics from January 5-15, 2012, n=2000 (Québec n = 500), margin of error = +/- 2.19%. (Québec margin
of error = 4.38%). Source: Lachapelle, E., & Montpetit, É. (2013). Gaz de schiste: Lorsqu’une valeur politique alimente la crainte des risques. In L’État du Québec 2013-2014 (380-386).
Montréal: Boréalet Institut du Nouveau Monde. Environics Research Group (2012). Omnibus National Telephone Survey, January 5-15, 2012. Toronto: Environics Research Group.
7
44%
31%
15%
5%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Fracking poses a major risk to Québec's water resources
11.6 - Québeckers Believe Fracking Poses A
Major Environmental Risk
Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
24%
43%
23%
9%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
It is acceptable to slow economic growth to resolve environmental problems
11.7 - Québeckers Prize Environmental
Quality Over Economic Growth
Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
17%
30% 30%
20%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Society functions better when individuals compete with each other
11.8 - Québeckers Are Ambivalent About
The Benefits of Competiton Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
63%
48%
29%
25%
5%
16%
2%
9%
0%
100%
The natural gas reserves are a public
resource that ought to profit the
citizens of the province
The natural gas reserves are a private
resource that should profit private
concerns
11.9 - Québeckers See Shale Gas As
A Public, Not Private, Resource
Strongly AgreeSomewhat AgreeSomewhat Disagree Strongly Disagree
20 www.closup.umich.edu
The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
Conclusion
e potential economic and environmental consequences of development are integral to any response to the question of shale gas in
Québec. In addition, it is crucial to account for the “X-Factor” that is Québec’s desire to exercise its autonomy. Québec’s politicians
have exploited policy questions at the intersection of energy and the environment in the past to take positions that draw a contrast
between Québec and the “Rest of Canada,” especially Alberta. is occurred with the creation of hydroelectric power generation and
carbon markets. It may occur once again with shale gas.
In this case, the desire to “stick it” to the ROC may align with the results of Québec’s cost/benet analysis and public consultation on
the acceptability of shale gas. Allowing the development of shale gas to proceed appears to promise minimal economic benets and
threaten social upheaval. Québec’s natural features introduce considerable risk into a process that is already rife with uncertainty.
While there is little doubt fracking and exploitation can be done in an environmentally responsible manner, the unavoidable risks of
inconsistent adherence to best practices and human error make it dicult to impossible to ensure environmental integrity. Finally, the
public acceptability of shale gas has plummeted over time, especially in areas in which the gas industry is already present.
Québec’s cautious approach may serve as an example for other jurisdictions weighing the merits of shale gas development.
Democracies oen struggle to balance democratic decision-making with informed decision-making, but, in this case, Québec
managed to do just that. By rst gaining the expert opinions of scientists on the potential risks and rewards and then consulting the
public on the issue, Québec’s process is an excellent model of how a dicult and complex policy issue can be evaluated in a way that
both respects the opinion of technical experts while closely hewing to the public will.
e EES’s conclusion that, “From the point of view of social value, the context is not favorable for the development of the shale gas
industry in Québec,” will only have strengthened support for a ban on fracking.89 As the BAPE’s second consultation comes to a
close at the end of this year, it appears likely that Québec will reject shale gas development with a hostile public, little to gain, and
so much to lose.
21
Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
Endnotes
1. Parti Québecois. (n.d.). Indépendance. Parti Québecois. Retrieved March 21, 2014, from pq.org/independance
2. McKenzie, D., 21, T. C. P. M., & 2014. (n.d.). Quebec referendum: Marois refusing to rule out one in next mandate.
www.ottawacitizen.com. Retrieved March 21, 2014, from
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Quebec+political+leaders+jockey+votes+rst+televised/9638657/story.html
3. Ministère des Ressources naturelles. (n.d.-c). Production d’électricité. Statistiques énergétiques - L’énergie -
Ministère des Ressources naturelles. Retrieved February 14, 2014, from
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4. U.S. Energy information Administration. (2013). Electric Power Annual 2012 (Annual Report) (p. 37). Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Energy. Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf
5. Government of Canada, S. C. (2014b, April 15). CANSIM - 127-0009 - Installed generating capacity, by class of electricity producer.
Statistics Canada. Retrieved April 29, 2014, from http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26
6. Ministère de Développement durable, Environnement, Faune et Parcs. (n.d.). A Brief Look at the Québec Cap and Trade System
for Emission Allowances. Gouvernement du Québec. Retrieved from http://www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/spede-
enbref-en.pdf
7. Ministère de Développement durable, Environnement, Faune et Parcs. (2009). Western Climate Initiative. Ministère de
Développement durable, Environnement, Faune et Parcs. Government Website. Retrieved March 21, 2014,
from http://www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/WCI-en.htm
8. Fortin, M.-J., & Fournis, Y. (2013). Facteurs pour une analyse intégrée de l’acceptabilité sociale selon une persepctive de
développement territorial: l’industrie du gaz de schiste au Québec (Synthesis No. S4-1) (p. 2). Rimouski, Québec: Université du
Québec à Rimouski.
9. Kuuskraa, V. A., Stevens, S. H., & Moodhe, K. D. (2013). Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment
of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States (p. I-53). Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy: U.S.
Energy information Administration.
10. Lavoie, D. (2010). DB3 - LE SHALE D’UTICA. CONTEXE GÉOLOGIQUE. Powerpoint presented at the BAPE 273 - Développement
durable de l’industrie des gaz de schiste au Québec, Québec.
11. Kuuskraa, Stevens, and Moodhe, 2013, p. I–53.
12. Comité de l’évaluation environnementle stratégique sur le gaz de schiste. (2012). L’industrie du gaz de schiste dans les Basses-Terres
du Saint Laurent: scénarios de développement (No. P-1) (pp. 7-8). Québec: Comité de l’évaluation environnementale stratégique
sur le gaz de schsite.
13. Ibid.
14. Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement. (2011). Développement durable de l’ industrie des gaz de schiste au Québec
(Rapport d’enquête et d’audience publique No. 273) (p. 208). Québec, Québec: Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement.
15. Nibbelink, M. (2011, June 27). Utica Shale + Lorraine Shale = High Interest on Both Sides of the Border. drillinginfo. Retrieved
from http://info.drillinginfo.com/utica-shale-lorraine-shale-high-interest-on-both-sides-of-the-border/
16. Séjourné, S., Lefebvre, R., Malet, X., & Lavoie, D. (2013). Synthèse géologique et hydrogéologique du Shale d’Utica et des unités sus-
jacentes (Lorraine, Queenston et dépôts meubles), Basses-Terres du Saint-Laurent, Québec (Dossier public No. 7338) (p. 3). Québec:
Commission géologique du Canada.; Lavoie, 2010.; Nawamooz, A., Lemieux, J.-M., & errien, R. (2013). Modélisation numérique
22 www.closup.umich.edu
The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
de la migration du méthane dans les Basses-terres du Saint-Laurent (No. E3-10) (p. iv). Québec, Québec: Département de géologie
et de génie géologique, Université Laval.
17. Comité de l’évaluation environnementle stratégique sur le gaz de schiste, 2012, pp. 7–8.
18. Service des eaux industrielles et le Service des eaux, & Service des eaux municipales de la Direction des politiques de l’eau. (2012).
Élaboration de diérents scénarios de gestion des eaux de reux et évaluation de leurs coûts (No. E4-1) (p. 3). Québec, Québec:
Ministère du Développement durable, de l’Environnement, de la Faune et des Parcs.
19. Comité de l’évaluation environnementle stratégique sur le gaz de schiste, 2012, p. 13.
20. Comité de l’évaluation environnementle stratégique sur le gaz de schiste. (2014a). Rapport Synthèse (p. 25). Québec, Québec.
Retrieved from
http://ees-gazdeschiste.gouv.qc.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/EES-rapport-synthese_nal_web_janv-2014.pdf
21. Montpetit, É., & Lachapelle, É. (2013). L’opinion des Québécois sur les gaz de schiste : une comparaison avec la Pennsylvanie et le
Michigan (No. S4-3a) (p. 3). Montréal, Québec: Centre de recherche sur les poliqiues et le développement social, Université de
Montréal.
22. Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement, 2011, p. 245.
23. Normandeau, N. Loi limitant les activités pétrolières et gazières, Pub. L. No. 18 (2011). Retrieved from
http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=5&le=2011C13F.pdf
24. Comité de l’évaluation environnementle stratégique sur le gaz de schiste. (n.d.). Mandat. Évaluation environnementale stratégique
sur le gaz de schiste. Retrieved February 12, 2014, from http://ees-gazdeschiste.gouv.qc.ca/le-comite/son-mandat/
25. Poirier, C., Bédard, S., Moreau, P., Deltelll, G., & Khadir, A. Séance du 26 Novembre 2013, Pub. L. No. 96 (2013). Québec, Québec:
Gouvernement du Québec. Retrieved from
http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/assemblee-nationale/40-1/journal-debats/20131126/102055.html
26. Nadeau, Je. (2014, April 9). Gaz de schiste: le projet de moratoire renaît. Le Devoir. Newspaper. Retrieved April 9, 2014, from http://
www.ledevoir.com/politique/quebec/393745/gaz-de-schiste-le-projet-de-moratoire-renait
27. Beaudin, M., 17, G. E. R. M., & 2014. (n.d.). BAPE to hold public hearings on shale gas development. www.montrealgazette.com.
Retrieved April 8, 2014, from
http://www.montrealgazette.com/BAPE+hold+public+hearings+shale+development/9626576/story.html
28. Bertrand, M. (2012, September 20). Le PQ ferme dénitivement la porte à l’industrie du gaz de schiste. Le débat sur le gaz de schiste
- ICI.Radio-Canada.ca. Retrieved April 29, 2014, from
http://ici.radio-canada.ca/regions/quebec/2012/09/20/002-martine-ouellet-moratoire-complet-gaz-de-schiste.shtml
29. Schwartz, B. P., & Bueckert, M. R. (2010). Chapter 4 - Canada. In R. Alterman (Ed.), Takings International. A Comparative
Perspective on Land Use Regulations and Compensation Rights (pp. 98-100). Chicago: American Bar Association.
30. Ibid., pp. 97–98.
31. Grey, J. (2012, November 22). Quebec’s St. Lawrence fracking ban challenged under NAFTA. e Globe and Mail. Retrieved
February 12, 2014, from
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/quebecs-st-lawrence-fracking-ban-challenged-under-naa/article5577331/
32. Schwartz and Bueckert, 2010, pp. 97–98.
23
Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
33. ompson & Knight LLP. (2013, September 30). Lone Pine Files for Bankruptcy. e Insolvency Blog. Blog. Retrieved February 12,
2014, from http://www.tkinsolvencyblog.com/2013/09/lone-pine-les-for-bankruptcy.html
34. is section relies upon the following source unless otherwise noted: Comité de l’évaluation environnementale stratégique sur le
gaz de schiste. (2014b). Connaissances acquises et principaux constats (p. 38). Québec, Québec. Retrieved from
http://ees-gazdeschiste.gouv.qc.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/EES-rapport-synthese_nal_web_janv-2014.pdf
35. Ibid., 36.
36. Vincent, D. (2013, October 25). Protests have reignited debate over the issue of fracking. Will the natural gas extraction boost the
economy or just harm the environment? e Toronto Star. Retrieved from
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/10/25/new_brunswick_fracking_economic_boost_or_environmental_danger.html
37. Tabak, R. (2014). State of the Debate: Natural Gas Fracking New York’s Marcellus Shale (No. 5) (p. 1). Ann Arbor, MI: Center for
Local, State, and Urban Policy. Gerlard R. Ford School of Public Policy. Retrieved from
http://closup.umich.edu/les/ieep-2014-new-york-debate.pdf
38. Pless, J. (2012). Natural Gas Development and Hydraulic Fracturing. A Policymaker’s Guide (p. 4). National Conference of State
Legislatures. Retrieved from http://www.ncsl.org/documents/energy/frackingguide_060512.pdf
39. United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2013, September 25). Natural Gas. Clean Energy | US EPA. Retrieved March 21,
2014, from http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/aect/natural-gas.html#footnotes
40. Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement, 2011, p. 154.
41. Ministère des Ressources naturelles. (n.d.-a). MRN - Prix du gaz naturel. Statistiques énergétiques - L’énergie - Ministère des
Ressources naturelles. Retrieved February 14, 2014, from
http://www.mrn.gouv.qc.ca/energie/statistiques/statistiques-energie-prix-gaz.jsp
42. Comité de l’évaluation environnementale stratégique sur le gaz de schiste, 2014b, p. 36.
43. Comité de l’évaluation environnementle stratégique sur le gaz de schiste, 2014a, p. 223.
44. Ibid., p. 196.
45. Government of Canada, S. C. (2014a, January 10). Labour force, employment and unemployment, levels and rates, by province
(Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba). Statistics Canada. Retrieved March 26, 2014, from
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/labor07b-eng.htm
46. Comité de l’évaluation environnementle stratégique sur le gaz de schiste, 2014a, p. 167.
47. Centre de recherche sur la gouvernance des ressources naturelles et des territoires (CRGRNT). (2013a). Description et
documentation des impacts sociaux que pourraient avoir les infrastructures gazières sur les collectivités locales en lien avec
l’exploitation et le transport du gaz de schiste (No. S3-6) (p. 29). Gatineau, Québec: Université du Québec en Outaouais.
48. Finances Québec. (2013). Budget At A Glance (p. 12). 3: Finances Québec. Retrieved from
http://www.budget.nances.gouv.qc.ca/Budget/2013-2014/en/documents/budgetglance.pdf
49. Kuuskraa, Stevens, and Moodhe, 2013, p. I–52.
50. Transports Québec. (2013). Glissements de terrain. Exploration et exploitation des gaz de schiste (No. R-1, R-2) (p. v). Québec:
Transports Québec.
51. Ibid., p. vi.
24 www.closup.umich.edu
The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
52. Ibid., p. vii.
53. Radio-canada.ca. (2010, May 12). Une n atroce pour la famille. Zone Regions- ICI.Radio-Canada.ca. Retrieved February 14, 2014,
from http://www.radio-canada.ca/regions/montreal/2010/05/11/001-crevasse-st-jude.shtml
54. Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement, 2011, p. 149.
55. Ibid., p. 158.
56. Associated Press. (2014, April 11). Regulator: Fracking causes earthquakes. CNBC.com. Retrieved April 30, 2014, from
http://ww w.cnbc.com/id/101576489
57. Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement, 2011, p. 157–158.
58. Transports Québec, 2013.
59. Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement, 2011, p. 157–158.
60. Ibid., p. 158.
61. Triault-Bouchet, G. (2013). Évaluation des contaminants d’origine naturelle présents dans le schiste et susceptibles de se retrouver
dans les eaux de reux (No. E3-6) (pp. 17-18, 24, 28). Québec, Québec: Centre d’expertise en analyse environnementale du Québec,
Ministère du Développement durable, de l’Environnement, de la Faune et des Parcs., 17–18, 24, 28.
62. Comité de l’évaluation environnementle stratégique sur le gaz de schiste, 2014a, p. 26.
63. Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement, 2011, p. 161.
64. Ibid., p. 145.
65. Service des eaux industrielles et le Service des eaux, & Service des eaux municipales de la Direction des politiques de l’eau, 2012, p. 3.
66. Ibid., p. 4.
67. Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement, 2011, p. 140.
68. Lacoursière, J.-P., & Lacoursière, S. (2013). Étude de risques technologiques associés à l’extraction du gaz de schiste (No. E3-4) (p. 1).
Repentigny, Québec: JP Lacoursière Inc.
69. Nawamooz, A., Lemieux, J.-M., & errien, R., 2013, pp. iii–iv.
70. Pinti, D. L., Gélinas, Y., Larocque, M., Barnetche, D., Retailleau, S., Moritz, A., … Lefebvre, R. (2013). Concentrations, sources et
mécanismes de migration préférentielle des gaz d’origine naturelle (méthane, hélium, radon) dans les eaux souterraines des Basses-
Terres du Saint-Laurent (No. 3-9) (p. 61). Québec: Université du Québec à Montréal, Université Concordia, INRS-ETE..
71. Comité de l’évaluation environnementale stratégique sur le gaz de schiste, 2014b, p. 39.
72. Lacoursière and Lacoursière, 2013, p. 1.
73. Nawamooz, A., Lemieux, J.-M., & errien, R., 2013, p. iii.
25
Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
74. Piché, S. (2013). Détermination des taux d’émission et modélisation de la dispersion atmosphérique pour évaluer l’impact sur
la qualité de l’air des activités d’exploration et d’exploitation du gaz de schiste au Québec: Détermination des taux d’emission
(Environnement et Eau No. A-1) (p. 7). Québec, Québec: SNC Lavalin.
75. Attarmigiroglu, N., & Delisle, E. (2013). Détermination des taux d’emission et modélisation de la dispersion atmosphérique pour
évaluer l’ impact sur la qualité de l’air des activités d’exploration et d’exploitation du gaz de schiste au Québec: Étude de dispersion
atmosphérique (Environnement et Eau No. A-2) (pp. iv-v). Québec, Québec: SNC Lavalin.
76. Ibid., p. viii.
77. Ibid., p. viii–ix.
78. Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement, 2011, p. 183.
79. Mackenzie, R. (2013). Évaluation de l’ impact sonore associé aux activités d’exploration et d’exploitation de la production du gaz de
schiste en fonction du project type et de scenarios de développement potentiels (No. S2-6) (pp. 57, 59). Mont Royal, Québec: SodB.
80. Ibid., pp. 13.
81. Ibid., pp. 56, 59.
82. e Council of Canadians. (n.d.). Fracking. e Council of Canadians. Retrieved February 12, 2014, from
http://www.canadians.org/fracking
83. Comité de l’évaluation environnementale stratégique sur le gaz de schiste, 2014b, p. 29.
84. Fortin, M.-J., & Fournis, Y., 2013, pp. 8–9.
85. Ibid., pp. 6.
86. e Council of Canadians. (2012, February 2). Fracking Poll Results. e Council of Canadians. Retrieved March 12, 2014, from
http://canadians.org/media/water/2012/06-Feb-12-backgrounder.html
87. M Montpetit, É., & Lachapelle, É., 2013, p. 7.
88. Ibid., p. 3.
89. Comité de l’évaluation environnementale stratégique sur le gaz de schiste, 2014b, p. 36.
26 www.closup.umich.edu
The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
27
Opportunity, Risk, and Public Acceptability: The Question of Shale Gas Exploitation in Québec
28 www.closup.umich.edu
The Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy
Reports from Issues in Energy and Environmental Policy
Shale Governance in the European Union: Principles and Practice (October 2014)
Public Perceptions of Shale Gas E xtraction and Hydraulic Fracturing in New York and Pennsylvania (September 2 014)
Public V iews on a Carbon Tax Depend on the Proposed Use of Revenue (July 2014)
American Acceptance of Global Warming Retreats in Wake of Winter 2014 (June 2014)
Public opinion on climate change and support for various policy instruments in Canada and the US:
Findings from a comparative 2013 poll (June 2014)
Environmental Policy in the Great Lakes Region: Current Issues and Public Opinion (April 2014)
Shale Gas and Hydraulic Fracturing in the Great Lakes Region: Current Issues and Public Opinion (April 2014)
Wind Energy Development in the Great Lakes Region: Current Issues and Public Opinion (April 2 014)
The Decline of Public Support for State Climate Change Policies: 2008-2013 (March 2 014)
Using Information Disclosure to Achieve Policy Goals: How Experience with the Toxics Release Inventory Can Inform
Action on Natural Gas Fracturing (March 2014)
State of the Debate: Natural Gas Fracking in New York ’s Marcellus Shale (January 2 014)
The Chilling Ef fect of Winter 2013 on American Acceptance of Global Warming (June 2013)
Public Opinion on Fracking: Perspectives from Michigan and Pennsylvania (May 2013)
NSEE Findings Report for Belief-Related Questions (March 2013)
NSEE Public Opinion on Climate Policy Options (December 2012)
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