The Åland Example as Norm Entrepreneurship

Abstract

The Åland Example has generated considerable international attention as a successful solution to a complicated ethno-territorial dispute. This article looks at how it has been used as a basis for norm entrepreneurship by political actors in both Åland and Finland. For Åland itself, the Åland Example provides normative capital that is used to influence domestic politics. As such, the article shows how norm entrepreneurship may provide a useful political device for a minority or an autonomous region as it strives to preserve or develop its status and identity vis-à-vis the majority and host country. Herein the case of the Åland Example also shows how norms are a strategic asset that can be used for different political purposes and how this may create conflicting agendas between domestic interests with a stake in the international advocacy of the norm. For Finland, the Åland Example provides a potential asset when constructing its foreign policy profile. Yet, it has been used relatively sparingly as such a brand-enhancing device in Finnish foreign policy. The article finds two main reasons for this. First, being a minority solution, it does not generate the sort of emotional attachment that would get Finnish policy-makers to invest in its full potential. As such, it is being somewhat ignored. Second, from the perspective of state diplomacy, the Åland Example has its drawbacks. Under some circumstances, visibly marketing it can do more harm than good for Finnish diplomacy, which is why Finnish foreign policy-makers choose to tread carefully with promoting the Åland Example. The article thus provides a glimpse of the partly overlapping, partly conflicting agendas between majority and minority actors in their international advocacy of norms.

Full text

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI ./-
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013)
67–84 brill.com/ijgr
The Åland Example as Norm Entrepreneurship
Mikael Wigell
Researcher, The Finnish Institute of International Afairs, Helsinki, Finland
Abstract
The Åland Example has generated considerable international attention as a successful solution
to a complicated ethno-territorial dispute. This article looks at how it has been used as a
basis for norm entrepreneurship by political actors in both Åland and Finland. For Åland itself,
the Åland Example provides normative capital that is used to inuence domestic politics.
As such, the article shows how norm entrepreneurship may provide a useful political device
for a minority or an autonomous region as it strives to preserve or develop its status and
identity vis-à-vis the majority and host country. Herein the case of the Åland Example also
shows how norms are a strategic asset that can be used for diferent political purposes and
how this may create conicting agendas between domestic interests with a stake in the inter-
national advocacy of the norm. For Finland, the Åland Example provides a potential asset
when constructing its foreign policy prole. Yet, it has been used relatively sparingly as such a
brand-enhancing device in Finnish foreign policy. The article nds two main reasons for this.
First, being a minority solution, it does not generate the sort of emotional attachment that
would get Finnish policy-makers to invest in its full potential. As such, it is being somewhat
ignored. Second, from the perspective of state diplomacy, the Åland Example has its draw-
backs. Under some circumstances, visibly marketing it can do more harm than good for Finnish
diplomacy, which is why Finnish foreign policy-makers choose to tread carefully with promot-
ing the Åland Example. The article thus provides a glimpse of the partly overlapping, partly
conicting agendas between majority and minority actors in their international advocacy of
norms.
Keywords
norm advocacy; autonomy arrangements; conict resolution; diplomacy; centre-autonomy
relations
1. Introduction
The Åland Example has generated considerable international attention as a
successful solution to a complicated ethno-territorial dispute. Though lacking
ocial denition, it is usually characterised by the combination of demilita-
risation and neutralisation, the autonomy and the institutions protecting the
E.g. A. Gross, Positive experiences of autonomous regions as a source of inspiration for
conlict resolution in Europe, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Report Doc. 9824,
3 June 2003.

68 M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84
language and culture of the Åland Islands. The islanders themselves have actively
worked to portray Åland as a model that can provide lessons and inspiration more
generally when looking for negotiated solutions to dicult minority issues.
This article looks at the Åland Example from the theoretical perspective of
norm entrepreneurship. The theory of norm entrepreneurship has often been
used to explain the international activism of small states such as the Nordic coun-
tries. By actively seeking to establish and advocate global norms of cooperation,
the Nordics have been able to gain inuence in international organisations and in
world politics more generally. It is from such a perspective that Finland’s recent
activities in the eld of international peace mediation can be understood. By tak-
ing on a more active role in peace processes Finland tries to portray itself as
humanitarian nation, generating ‘normative power’ that can be used to inuence
international organisations and issues of peace and security, which normally per-
tain to the domain of the leading powers. To this end, the Åland Example may
provide a useful resource for Finland. By marketing it internationally, Finland can
add to its international reputation as an innovative, experienced and reliable part-
ner in conict resolution. Conscious about this brand-enhancing potential,
Finland has sponsored high-level international seminars on the Åland Example
with the purpose of promoting its use as a point of reference in international con-
ict resolution.
Yet, a closer examination of the way the Åland Example is being promoted
reveals certain ambivalence in the attitudes of Finnish policy-makers toward mar-
keting the Åland Example internationally. In fact, it does not so much seem to be
Finnish actors that strive to promote it internationally, but the Ålandic actors
themselves. The Åland government has made eforts to persuade Finland to
For a discussion of the concept of the Åland Example, see S. Spiliopoulou Åkermark (ed.),
The Åland Example and Its Components – Relevance for International Conlict Resolution (The
Åland Islands Peace Institute, Mariehamn, 2011).
For a list of all activities in relation the promotion of the Åland Example internationally, see
Kontakgruppen mellan utrikesministeriet och Ålands lanskapsregering, ‘Förteckning over
besök, seminarier etc. med anknytning till Ålandsexemplet i kronologisk ordning’, March 2012,
on le with the author.
E.g. A. Björkdahl, ‘Swedish Norm Entrepreneurship in the UN’, 14:4 International Peacekeeping
(2007) pp. 538–552; C. Ingebritsen, ‘Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics’,
37:11 Cooperation and Conlict (2002) pp. 11–23.
See Ministry for Foreign Afairs of Finland, Action Plan for Mediation, Publications of
the Ministry for Foreign Afairs 12/2011. For a discussion of Finland’s motives for engaging in
peace mediation, see M.Wigell, K. Joenpolvi and M.-M. Jaarva, ‘Matching up to demands:
New trends in the eld and Finnish strategy’, in T. Piiparinen and V. Brummer (eds.), Global
Networks of Mediation: Prospects and Avenues for Finland as a Peacemaker (FIIA Report
32, Finnish Institute of International Afairs, 2012); and T. Piiparinen and M. Aaltola, ‘Peace
mediation as a reection of Finnish foreign policy: What does mediation mediate about
Finland’, in T. Piiparinen and M. Aaltola, Global Networks of Mediation: Prospects and
Avenues for Finland as a Peacemaker (FIIA Report 32, Finnish Institute of International Afairs,
2012).
Kontaktgruppen, supra note 3.

M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84 69
embrace the idea of the Åland Example and to promote it more vigorously abroad.
The Åland government has also directly itself engaged in diplomatic eforts to pro-
mote the Åland Example.
From a theoretical point of view, this Ålandic advocacy of the Åland Example is
interesting because it shows how also autonomous regions act as norm entrepre-
neurs, in addition to states and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on whom
the literature on norm entrepreneurship usually has tended to focus. Åland
engages in norm entrepreneurship partly for altruistic reasons and, as such, advo-
cating the Åland Example forms part of a genuine efort to contribute to interna-
tional conict resolution. At the same time, the research for this article also
shows how Åland uses norm entrepreneurship as a means to inuence domestic
politics, in contrast with what usually has been considered the purpose with norm
entrepreneurship, i.e. to inuence international politics. By drawing international
attention to the Ålandic autonomy solution, and building up a network of diplo-
matic contacts and goodwill, the Åland Example serves the purpose of strength-
ening Åland’s claims to further develop its autonomy vis-à-vis Finland. As such, it
shows how the norm entrepreneurship of an autonomous region may come to
bear direct relevance for autonomy-state relations.
That the Åland Example is used by Ålandic actors as an ‘international card’ in
their negotiations with the Finnish government raises the question whether this
can actually explain the Finnish ambivalence toward promoting the Åland
Example. It being used to undercut Finnish control of the Åland Islands, it should
not come as a surprise if Finnish policy-makers feel reluctant to promote the
Åland Example. Yet, the research undertaken for this article cannot substantiate
such a hypothesis. While there are some ‘hardliners’ amongst Finnish parliamen-
tarians and other decision-makers in reference to the question of the Ålandic
autonomy and who therefore nd little reason for Finland to promote the Åland
Example internationally, they are not prominent among the Finnish foreign policy
making elite and thus have relatively little direct inuence over the matter.
More important is the emotional detachment from the Åland Example amongst
Finnish policy-makers and therefore also their lack of enthusiasm for spending
much time and resources on it. The Åland Example being based on a minority
solution, it does not gure as an object of identication for most Finnish policy-
makers and thus tends to be ignored. But this does not account for the whole
picture.
According to the research for this article, an important reason for the Finnish
ambivalence is that the Åland Example is often either not seen by Finnish diplo-
mats as particularly useful in international conict resolution or it is sometimes
See also J. Granlund, Det internationella kortet – altruism och egennytta som skäl till att föra
fram Ålandsexemplet, Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute, No. 2 (2010).
Ibid.
Ibid.

70 M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84
even viewed as harmful if promoted too vigorously. Their exact reasoning will be
analysed in more detail below; here it suces to say that it seems to explain a good
part of the Finnish ambivalence towards the Åland Example and why Finnish dip-
lomats do not always seem to embrace it wholeheartedly. What is more, it also
provides a glimpse of the sometimes conicting agendas between majority and
minority actors in their international advocacy of norms.
This article will proceed as follows. The rst section will discuss the theoretical
perspective of norm entrepreneurship. The second section looks at how the Åland
Example has been used as a basis for norm entrepreneurship. It looks in turn at
both the Finnish and the Ålandic eforts in promoting the Åland Example. The last
section analyses the Finnish ambivalence toward promoting the Åland Example
internationally. The bulk of the data for this research comes from ten in-depth
interviews with current and former policymakers in both Finland and Åland.
The interviews were conducted as conversations on the basis of a semi-structured
questionnaire, in which all questions were open-ended to let the informants ofer
their own nuanced responses. The questionnaire was not adopted as such during
every interview, but modied beforehand depending on the position of the par-
ticular respondent. In addition, the analysis draws from a number of less informal
discussions with experts and stakeholders in both Åland and Finland. These dis-
cussions and interviews served two main purposes. First of all, they helped clarify
how the Åland Example has been promoted internationally. Secondly, they pro-
vided an understanding of the diferent goals and interests of the key stakeholders
with a view to the Åland Example.
2. Small Powers and Norm Entrepreneurship
Small states have limited capabilities to inuence world politics. Seen from a tra-
ditional realistic perspective it is material power that underpins inuence over
international politics. Yet, time and again small actors such as the Nordic states
manage to exercise considerable inuence in the global arena. Clearly, material
power is not the only form of power that matters for the ability to inuence world
afairs. As a consequence, scholars in international relations have begun to re-
examine the denition of power and how states may exercise inuence beyond
their economic and military capabilities. ‘Soft power’ as a concept refers to the
For a list of these interviews, see the Appendix. Most interviews were conducted in a con-
dential manner so I will not cite them in the text or they will be referred to in very general
terms. The notes from the interviews are on le with the author and can be requested. However,
the author reserves the right to protect the anonymity of the respondents by omitting anything
from the notes that may jeopardise this requirement.
Björkdahl, supra note 4; A. Björkdahl, ‘Norm advocacy: A small state strategy to inuence
the EU’, 15:1 Journal of European Public Policy (2008) pp. 135–154; M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink,

M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84 71
way actors may culturally, ideationally and ideologically inuence world politics.
The concept of ‘normative power’ rests on similar assumptions about the power
of ideas and norms but is usually more specically associated with actors of lim-
ited traditional power resources. These alternative ideational and normative
conceptualisations of power are better able to capture the ability of small, periph-
eral and materially weak states to punch above their weight in international
afairs.
The Nordic states are often taken as examples of small states with considerable
ideational impact in the international arena. By deliberately acting as ‘norm entre-
preneurs’ in global politics, the Nordics have helped change ideological percep-
tions and strengthen codes of conduct – referred to as ‘norms’ – in areas such as
international environmental policy-making, peacekeeping and development aid
policy. That such norms and ideas play an important role in international society
by shaping the interests, behaviour and identity of even the most powerful states
has been amply demonstrated by scholarship in the constructivist tradition.
Among both scholars and practitioners of international relations there is a
growing recognition that states not only pursue immediate materialist goals that
have to do with wealth accumulation and territory, “but are also concerned with
reputation, identity and community”, issues for which norms play a signicant
role.
Norm entrepreneurship is thus a strategy to gain inuence in international
society often used by actors with limited traditional power resources. It relates to
the practice of ‘niche diplomacy’ whereby small powers, being unable to exercise
inuence across the board, make themselves relevant on the international stage
by concentrating their eforts in certain key areas. Norm entrepreneurs contribute
to shape the global agenda by bringing particular issues to the forefront and by
introducing new ideas and solutions to global problems. They can be character-
ised as agenda-setters, policy-makers or moral entrepreneurs that are strongly
committed to a certain idea or policy that they try to persuade others to embrace.
When circumstances are favourable for their particular idea to catch on, they step
forward to present it onto the global agenda as an ideal solution to the particular
problem at hand.
‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 52:4 International Organization (1998)
pp. 887–917; M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program
in International Relations and Comparative Politics’, 4 Annual Review of Political Science (2001)
pp. 391–416; Ingebritsen, supra note 4.
J. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (Basic Books, New York,
1990).
Björkdahl, supra note 11.
E.g. Björkdahl, supra note 4; Ingebritsen, supra note 4; P. Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to
Peacekeeping Operations: A New Model (Routledge, London, 2006).
Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘Taking Stock’, supra note 11.
Ingebritsen, supra note 4, p. 12.

72 M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84
However, while the literature agrees on the centrality of norm entrepreneur-
ship for the emergence of norms, there is much less agreement over what drives
actors to invest so much energy and resources to exercise norm entrepreneurship.
Finnemore and Sikkink claim that “it is very dicult to explain the motivations
of norm entrepreneurs without reference to empathy, altruism, and ideational
commitment”. Indeed, the international activism of the Nordic states is usually
seen as driven by genuine humanitarian concerns and a long-standing commit-
ment to internationalist values. The Nordics are portrayed as emphatic, altruistic
and moral actors in international politics. Yet, as pointed out by Björkdahl,
there may also be a deeper self-interest at work in their norm promoting activi-
ties. By creating a niche for themselves in world politics, the Nordics have been
able to assert themselves in the world order. As such, norm entrepreneurship may
also be used to serve more traditional foreign policy goals. For example, Finland’s
active advocacy for norms of conict mediation, ranging from its role in the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)/Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) process during the Cold War to its
more current activism in the UN initiating (together with Turkey) the rst
ever General Assembly resolution on mediation, has rested on more than just a
desire to ‘do good’. It has provided a channel for establishing diplomatic contacts
and making Finland known internationally. Enhancing Finland’s international
status through this kind of niche diplomacy not only serves to raise its clout
in international organisations but is also considered by many Finnish decision-
makers as a way for Finland to acquire some staying-power in its relations with
Russia.
Analysing the motives behind the promotion of the Åland Example by policy
elites in both Finland and the Åland Islands can add to the theory on norm entre-
preneurship and help answer the question about the driving factors behind the
use of normative power. As we shall see, analysing the case of the Åland Example
also shows how norms are a strategic asset that can be used for diferent political
purposes and how this may create conicting agendas between domestic interests
with a stake in the international advocacy of the norm. In the case of the Åland
Example not only a state but also an autonomous region uses it as a basis for its
norm entrepreneurship. Few studies have looked specically at how autonomous
regions may act as norm entrepreneurs and on their motivations for engaging
in norm advocacy. As such, the Åland case also has more general implications
for the theory of norm entrepreneurship. The normative construction of the
Åland Example and its international advocacy as a point of reference in interna-
tional conict resolution thus provides an interesting case study through
Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics’, supra note 11, p. 898.
Björkdahl, supra note 4.
UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/65/283 (2011).
See Wigell et al., supra note 5; and Piiparinen and Aaltola, supra note 5.

M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84 73
which the driving forces behind norm entrepreneurship can be analysed and
which may reveal interesting ndings with regard to it being potentially a source
of contestation in domestic politics, particularly when it comes to autonomy-state
relations.
3. Advocating the Åland Example
Scholars have found norm entrepreneurship to be typically exercised in three
steps: “First, the norm entrepreneur selects a morally convincing idea as a foun-
dation for its foreign policy and norm-building exercise. Second, the norm entre-
preneur then uses norm advocacy, which is the combination of diplomacy,
communication and coalition-building to persuade other states to embrace the
norms … Third, the norm entrepreneur strives to nd an organizational home for
the newly established norm in order for it to become self-sustaining.”
The case of the Åland Example ts this schematic. Åland is framed as embody-
ing a successful solution to a dicult ethno-territorial dispute. As such, it suggests
a model for international conict resolution. This idea was born out of discussions
among the islanders themselves in the 1980s. In an international peace conference
arranged by the Red Cross and Red Crescent in Mariehamn in 1984, Åland gave
itself the nick-name ‘Islands of Peace’, branding itself as a success-story in conict
resolution. The idea gained international currency from the end of the Cold War
onwards, when ethno-political conicts became a major concern for the interna-
tional community. Amidst the rising ethno-political tensions of the 1990s, Åland
provided hope that conicts revolving around identity politics could be managed.
That the Åland case seemed to demonstrate the importance of democracy, human
rights and the rule of law in managing such conicts served to strengthen its moral
appeal.
3.1.Åland as a Norm Entrepreneur
The islanders themselves have consistently tried to persuade Finland to embrace
the idea of the Åland Example and to promote it internationally. In 1986, Gunnar
Jansson, the Ålandic member of the Finnish Parliament, submitted a written ques-
tion to Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen urging Finland to promote Åland as an
example in international conict resolution. While Väyrynen reacted largely
Björkdahl, supra note 4, p. 540. See also Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm
Dynamics’, supra note 11.
See L. Gruessner (ed.), Röster från fredens öar: En åländsk fredsantologi (Ålands freds-
förening, Marihamn, 1986).
See M. Weller and S. Wolf (eds.), Autonomy, Self-Governance and Conlict Resolution
(London, Routledge, 2005).
SS/KK 440/1986.

74 M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84
positively to the idea and basic know-how about the Åland solution was incorpo-
rated into the training of diplomats, in practice Finland did little to actively pro-
mote the Åland Example on the international scene.
To activate the promotional work, the idea of a co-operative forum between
Åland and the Ministry for Foreign Afairs of Finland for promoting the Åland
Example internationally was discussed among Ålandic ocials in the mid-
1990s. In December 1995, Åland’s Head of Government, Roger Jansson, met with
the Finnish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to discuss the idea. Foreign
Minister Tarja Halonen then took the initiative to establish the so-called ‘contact
group’ between the Åland government and the Finnish foreign ministry with the
explicit purpose of promoting the use of the Åland Example in international
forums.
The contact group started its work in 1998 and the general aims for its activities
include the mapping of hotbeds and conict zones around the world where the
Åland Example could be of relevance, developing the use of Ålandic resources in
civilian crisis and conict management by promoting peace negotiations, interna-
tional study visits and research about the Åland Example, as well as actively mar-
keting the Åland Example as a minority and crisis management solution. The
contact group consists of delegates from Ålandic institutions and representatives
of the Ministry for Foreign Afairs, who meet between two to ve times a year to
discuss current developments afecting Åland and initiatives with regard to the
promotion of the Åland Example. The Ålandic representatives in the contact
group, both current and former ones, generally view it as a useful informal forum
for discussing current developments afecting Åland and as a platform for launch-
ing initiatives relating to promoting the Åland Example, although they lament the
lack of a budget for its activities. Some also think that the larger atmosphere at the
Ministry for Foreign Afairs is not genuinely supportive of the contact group and
its agenda.
Simultaneously with these joint Finnish-Ålandic eforts, Åland has also taken
more independent steps to promote the Åland Example internationally. Although
foreign policy and international relations are formally not competences of the
Ålandic regime, the Åland Islands has its own representation in the Nordic Council
and upholds other interstate contacts through which such promotion takes place.
From November 1992 to April 2012, Åland has hosted, often in cooperation with or
on an initiative from the Finnish Government, around 250 foreign delegations of
varying levels from political leaders to journalists, diplomats and academics with
Ministry for Foreign Afairs of Finland, Internal Memo, on le with the author.
Kontaktgruppen mellan utrikesministeriet och Ålands landskapsregering, Verksamhetsplan
2012, 21 September 2011.
See also S. Stepan, ‘The Autonomy of the Åland Islands’, in S. Spiliopoulou Åkermark (ed.),
The Åland Example and Its Components – Relevance for International Conlict Resolution (The
Åland Islands Peace Institute, Mariehamn, 2011) pp. 44–45.

M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84 75
the purpose to inform them about the Åland Example. The government of Åland
currently has the intention to extend this work with promoting the Åland Example.
It has, for instance, made ‘Åland in the World’ the main theme for the year of
celebrating its 90th anniversary of the autonomy. The islanders themselves
have also visited other countries and conict areas to spread knowledge about
the Åland Example. The Ålandic members of the Finnish Parliament have also
talked about the Åland Example using inter-parliamentary channels. Åland’s cur-
rent MP acts as a deputy member of the Finnish delegation to the OSCE parlia-
mentary assembly and in that capacity has worked actively to draw attention
to the Åland Example. Outside these more formal diplomatic channels, the
Åland Islands Peace Institute (ÅIPI) as an NGO has also been active in dissem-
inating the idea about the Åland Example by organising events and hosting
a number of foreign groups, perhaps most famously parliamentarians from
Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan who came together under the aus-
pices of the ÅIPI for peace talks in 1993. So, as Granlund argues in his research
report, although Åland is not a sovereign state and signicantly smaller than most
so-called ‘small states’ to which the theory of norm entrepreneurship is usually
applied, it clearly act as a norm entrepreneur in promoting the Åland Example.
Why?
Some Ålandic actors seem to have genuinely altruistic reasons for advocating
the Åland Example. They consider the Åland Example to be a success story, a posi-
tive example of an internationally agreed solution of a minority issue that they
want to share internationally so as to help with the nding of negotiated solutions
to ethno-territorial disputes. While they all recognise that the Åland solution can-
not be replicated as such, as all ethno-territorial disputes have their specic char-
acteristics, they think that the Åland Example can function as a source of
inspiration for discussions, perhaps even a platform for concrete negotiations over
peace or power-sharing agreements. Granlund, who in his interviews with Ålandic
policy-makers conducted in 2008 found such altruistic motivations behind the
promotion of the Åland Example, suggests that Åland in working for the peaceful
resolution of conict through norm entrepreneurship can thus be seen as part of
the larger tradition of Nordic Internationalism.
Indeed, as with this broader Nordic foreign policy tradition, Åland’s interna-
tional activism also needs to be understood in relation to its identity-political
dimensions. Respondents emphasise how promoting the Åland Example helps
strengthen the Ålandic identity. The Åland Example is a source of pride for the
islanders and a means to gain international recognition. As such, it also helpsin
the production of a particular identity for the Åland Islands, particularly by
Kontaktgruppen, supra note 3.
Granlund, supra note 7.
Ibid.

76 M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84
strengthening its self-image as the ‘Islands of Peace’. Here, one notes a transforma-
tion of the islanders’ political subjectivity from having once been linked to Sweden
and the Swedish nation into a dual identity or ‘in-between’ state of liminality.
The labelling of Åland as the ‘Islands of Peace’ and conceptualising it as an exem-
plary case testies to a search for a moral high ground or perhaps a form of post-
modern identity, which “does not depart from some lost unity and an emphasis on
some organic ties to Sweden but leans instead on a positive form of liminality, i.e.
a departure grounding their special character”.
So, along the way, the old longing for Sweden has been replaced by a fresh will
for preserving the current state of semi-sovereignty. What at rst was seen as
major loss – having to pertain as an autonomous region within Finland – has now
been turned into a source of strength. In relation to this, another powerful motive
for advocating the Åland Example can be discerned from both Granlund’s inter-
views as well as the interviews conducted for this article – the will to maintain and
develop the Ålandic autonomy. Promoting the Åland Example internationally is
seen as a means to this end and is thus not only being driven by altruism but also
direct political self-interest. It is presumed that by making the Åland solution bet-
ter known, the appreciation, both in Finland and internationally, for Åland’s spe-
cial status will increase. The islanders consider it important to promote this sort of
goodwill in order to uphold and develop the autonomy arrangements further and
ofset what they perceive as a tendency within Finland and, more broadly, the
European Union (EU) of a weakened acceptance for the sort of special arrange-
ments that Åland enjoys. Importantly, the islanders do not want to have to rely
ononly Finnish goodwill, but seeks to anchor its position with the international
community. Finland cannot be entirely trusted to protect the interests of the
P. Joenniemi, ‘The Åland Islands: Neither Here nor There’, Cooperation and Conlict
(forthcoming).
Ibid.
Here it can be noted how the original ‘Åland Agreement’ retained a supervisory function for
the Council of the League of Nations (LN) that was thwarted with LN’s dissolution in 1946.
When the Guarantee Act herefore was repealed in 1951, the Government of Finland, in order to
placate both Ålandic and Swedish worries that Finland would backtrack on its commitments,
suggested that a provision would be incorporated in the revised Act on Autonomy according to
which Finland would strive to nd new international guarantees for those provisions that pre-
viously had been under LN’s supervision. Yet, in the end, the proposition was not included in
the revised Act on Autonomy that was adopted in 1954, because the Soviet Union opposed to
Finland subsuming to such international guarantees. Still, for a long time afterwards, the
islanders stood by the position that international guarantees should be sought and that Finland,
when the time is ripe, should declare itself ready to subject disagreements regarding the
Ålandic autonomy and the Swedish language to the International Court of Justice in the Hague.
See L. Hannikainen, De folkrättsliga grunderna för Ålands självstyrelse och svenskråkighet
(Institutet för mänskliga rättigheter vid Åbo Akademi, Åbo, 2004). While the idea of seeking
formal international guarantees is no longer on the table, the worries that Finland would not
honour its commitments have not fully subsumed. This point was brought up by Holger
Rotkirch in a private conversation.

M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84 77
islanders and therefore negotiations continuously need to be undertaken to
uphold the autonomy. In these negotiations, the Åland Example can serve as the
islanders’ ‘international card’. Drawing international attention to the Åland solu-
tion, raising goodwill and maintaining wide international diplomatic contacts
helps Åland acquire some normative capital in relation to Finland, which can be
used to put pressure on the Finnish government if need be.
Hence, the normative power Åland gains through the promotion of the Åland
Example can thus be used to inuence its domestic relations with the Finnish
government. This sets it apart from most other norm entrepreneurs including
small states and NGOs, who normally use norm entrepreneurship to wield
inuence on the international stage. This argument, previously articulated by
Granlund, nds direct support from the interviews conducted for this article, in
which all respondents, both Finnish and Ålandic, saw domestic political benets
for Åland with promoting the Åland Example. Most respondents agreed that it is
way for Åland to anchor its special status with the international community, rais-
ing the bar for Finland to backtrack on its commitments and help strengthen
claims to further develop the autonomy arrangements.
In sum, the interview data gathered for this article shows that the branding of
the Åland Islands as exemplifying a peaceful settlement of conicts has had
important domestic political uses for Åland itself. It has provided Åland with an
image and some normative capital that is used both as a means for identity poli-
tics as well as in its domestic political relations with Finland at large.
3.2.Finland as a Norm Entrepreneur
Finland, for its part, has also contributed to the international promotion of the
Åland Example, particularly through the sponsoring of seminars. High-level pan-
els have been organised by the Ministry for Foreign Afairs in places such as
New York, Brussels and Geneva with the aim of bringing it to the attention of key
international organisations such as the UN as well as the broader diplomatic com-
munity. Through the contact group, the Ministry for Foreign Afairs is also
co-operating with Ålandic actors in promoting the Åland Example. Some Finnish
diplomatic and political heavyweights are also known to have brought up the
Åland Example when taking part in negotiations over peace settlements.
According to anecdotal evidence, Harri Holkeri, when co-chairing the Northern
Granlund, supra note 7.
Besides this political self-interest in relation to its autonomy, Granlund also notes an eco-
nomic self-interest at play with the Ålandic norm entrepreneurship. The increased interna-
tional interest that the promotion of the Åland Example generates may also help attract
business, immigration, and tourism. Granlund, supra note 7.
Ibid.
Kontaktgruppen, supra note 3.

78 M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84
Ireland peace talks that eventually led to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, though
without explicitly bringing up the Åland Example made sure information about it
was at hand in the negotiation room. As chairman of the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly Team on Moldova, Kimmo Kiljunen explicitly brought up the Åland
Example when outlining possible solutions for the conict between Moldova
and the breakaway Transdniestria region and helped set up a seminar on the
Åland Example that brought together negotiators of all the main parties to the
dispute. Also Heikki Talvitie, in his capacity as EU Special Representative for
the South Caucasus, is known to have agged with the Åland Example in the
Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations. While diplomats and politicians such as these
are usually careful to point out that the Åland Example cannot serve as a model
in solving ethno-territorial disputes, it is talked about as a source of inspiration
for constructive discussions and resource for Finnish public diplomacy and
brand-building.
Yet, on a closer look, certain ambivalence can be discerned in the behaviour
and attitudes of Finnish policymakers with regard to promoting the Åland
Example. Apart from the few diplomats and politicians mentioned above, rela-
tively little energy and resources are being spilt on promoting the Åland Example
within the Ministry for Foreign Afairs. The contact group, while created on a deci-
sion of former Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen, has no xed nancial resources at
its disposal, but needs to nd resources on an ad hoc basis for the seminars and
events it wants to organise, which, according to some actors involved, may some-
times prove time-consuming and dicult. The contact group is also conned to
the Department for Legal Services within the Ministry for Foreign Afairs and as
such can hardly be seen as a prominent feature of Finnish public diplomacy. While
recognising the potential of the Åland Example as a brand-enhancing tool, o-
cials and ex-ocials at the Ministry for Foreign Afairs note that it fails to generate
much enthusiasm within the Ministry and is used relatively sparingly in Finnish
public diplomacy. Several of the respondents thought it pertained more to the
islanders themselves and not so much to Finland. Martti Ahtisaari, former
President of Finland and ex-ocial at the Ministry for Foreign Afairs himself,
who has helped mediate numerous peace processes, has also publicly expressed
his doubts about the usefulness of the Åland Example in international conict
resolution, on one occasion explicitly saying that “I think we should be a bit
careful with our love with the Åland Islands solution”. The staf in his organisa-
tion, the Crisis Management Initiative, an NGO that works with conict resolu-
tion, is also loath to mention the Åland Example in their activities around the
world.
Pekka Mykkänen, ‘Suomi-Finland Presents: The Åland Show’, Helsingin Sanomat,
International Edition, 22 March 2005, <www.hs./english/article/Suomi-Finland+Presents+The
+%C3%85land+Show/1101978893069>, retrieved 17 October 2012.
Based on the author’s informal discussions with staf members of the CMI.

M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84 79
Interesting to note is also how there is no mentioning of the Åland Example in
Finland’s new Action Plan for Mediation. This may seem particularly strange as
it lists Finnish capabilities in the area of mediation, talks about how to build on
Finland’s own experiences in conict resolution when engaging in mediation
and how to make use of its already previously acquired prole when striving to
enhance its credibility as a mediator. Based on the Åland Example, Finland could
claim considerable hands-on experience in resolving inter-cultural diferences. It
could also directly contribute with a set of potential tools for Finland when engag-
ing in international peace mediation. Yet, it would appear that the Ministry for
Foreign Afairs has been somewhat reluctant to use the political capital that
Finland has at its disposal through the Åland Example. The Action Plan also men-
tions a few specic areas where Finland will focus its mediation activities. These
include South Caucasus and Transdniestria, areas in which the Åland Example
has attracted considerable attention and from which representatives of the con-
icting parties have even been to the Åland Islands to study its regime. Still, there
is no mention in the Action Plan of utilising the Åland Example as a resource
when Finland tries to engage in these areas. Why?
The next section will look closer at this apparent Finnish ambivalence with
regard to using the Åland Example for its own international mediation engage-
ment and more broadly with regard to promoting it internationally as a means for
its public diplomacy.
4. Explaining the Finnish Ambivalence towards the Åland Example
In a written question submitted to the Minister for Foreign Afairs, Erkki Tuomioja,
the Ålandic MP Elisabeth Nauclér asked why the Åland Example is not mentioned
in the Action Plan for Mediation. While Foreign Minister Tuomioja in his answer
assured that “the possibility of utilizing the Åland Example forms part of Finland’s
mediation engagement”, he did not provide any explanation as to why it had been
omitted from the Action Plan.
One of the main purposes with the research for this article was to explain this
seemingly strange omission and more broadly the Finnish ambivalence with
regard to advocating the Åland Example. The research departed from the hypoth-
esis that the Finnish ambivalence has to do with the Åland Example serving as the
Ministry for Foreign Afairs, supra note 5.
In a previous document, on which the Action Plan builds, the Åland Example is mentioned
in brief terms. See Ministry for Foreign Afairs, ‘Peace Mediation – Finland’s Guidelines’, 2010,
<formin.nland./public/download.aspx?ID=59769&GUID={8CA2CDB5-BA89-4928-A7C4
-E8094C3B757B}>, retrieved 23 October 2012.
SS/KK 160/2012.
Ibid.

80 M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84
islanders’ international card in their relations with Finland and that by promoting
it Finland would undercut its own negotiating position vis-à-vis the Åland Islands.
So, from the perspective of realpolitik, not promoting the Åland Example too vig-
orously would make sense. However, the interview data gathered for this article
cannot substantiate such a hypothesis, although within the broader circle of
Finnish policy-makers there are some who seem to think along those lines. One
Finnish MP interviewed for this study was annoyed with how the islanders lay
more and more claims on Finland and how they try to receive international back-
ing for these claims. Therefore, while recognising that the Åland Example may
have some limited brand-enhancing potential for Finland, the MP thinks it is not
in Finland’s interest to too vigorously promote the Åland Example. Yet, most o-
cials within the state administration do not seem to think along those lines. The
Ålandic actors themselves concede as much and testify to not having noticed
such reasoning amongst Finnish ocials. They bring up other reasons for the
Finnish ambivalence with regard to promoting the Åland Example internation-
ally. Indeed, the interviews with ocials at the Ministry for Foreign Afairs give no
indication of such realpolitik reasoning standing behind the Finnish ambivalence.
Instead, from the research undertaken for this study, two alternative factors can be
discerned.
To begin with, it seems that the Åland Example tends to simply be ignored
because few Finnish policy-makers are emotionally attached to it and therefore
little energy is being spilt on promoting it. Most Finnish respondents interviewed
for this study thought of the Åland Example as something that mainly pertains to
the islanders and that they are welcome to promote it themselves, but that Finland
has many things on its plate and therefore cannot focus too much on it. Indeed,
Ålandic actors often complain that it is not so much that Finnish policy-makers
do not want to or would be directly hostile toward promoting the Åland
Example,but that they are ignorant about it and that they do not seem to under-
stand its worth.
Being a minority solution that directly tries to protect Åland from the Finnish
language and culture, it should perhaps not come as a big surprise that Finnish
policy-makers feel emotionally detached from it. It simply does not t easily with
the Finnish nation-state identity construct and clearly does not form part of the
narrative on Finnish identity. In general, national identity politics tend to make
relatively little use of devices such as the Åland Example that deviate from
majority culture. The national identity markers that help dene Finnish public
diplomacy and drive its foreign policy also predominantly relate to this majority
For a discussion of such devices in Finnish politics, see P. Saukkonen, Suomi, Alankomaat ja
kansallisvaltion identiteettipolitiikka: Tutkimus kansallisen identiteetin poliittisuudesta, empi-
irinen sovellutus suomalaisiin ja hollantilaisiin teksteihin (Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura,
Helsinki, 1999).

M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84 81
culture and history. So instead of pertaining to a rational calculation about the
Åland Example complicating Finland’s relations with the Islands, as the original
hypothesis had it, Finland’s perceived ambivalence has more to do with Finnish
policy-makers not feeling suciently attached emotionally to it for them to invest
lots of energy and resources on promoting it.
But the Åland Example is not only being ignored because of such identity-
related reasons. According to the informal discussions and interviews conducted
for this article, diplomats, in particular, also have more functionalistic reasons
for feeling ambivalent about promoting the Åland Example. On the one hand,
many recognise that the Åland Example may in some respects add favourably
to Finland’s foreign policy prole. Together with its constitutionally entrenched
bi-lingual institutions, it allows Finland to present itself as a pluralist and tol-
erantstate that supports multi-cultural developments and rejects excluding vari-
ants of nationalism. On the other hand, they nd compelling reasons why Finland
needs to be cautious with promoting the Åland Example internationally. Why?
Firstly, it is not all clear to them that the Åland Example is as useful for interna-
tional conict resolution as the islanders themselves tend to think. Many of these
diplomats consider the Åland regime to be an exceptional solution that cannot be
replicated and used in other ethno-political disputes. Operating a territorial
autonomy on an island is much easier compared to when the area is not well
delimited. Some of the respondents also argued that for mediating conicts the
Åland Example may actually make it more dicult getting the belligerent parties
to agree on a peace settlement. Here, the Aceh peace process served as a warning
example, which may help explain Ahtisaari’s somewhat lukewarm attitude to the
Åland Example as it was referred to above and also why it is not included in
Finland’s Action Plan for Mediation. During the Aceh process, the Åland Example
had been taken up, but with negative consequences for the peace talks, according
to some of the Finnish actors that were involved. It complicated the eforts to get
the government-side representatives to trust in the peace talks, as the Åland solu-
tion to them appeared as overly generous to the minority side. According to one
respondent, who was closely involved in the Aceh process, Ålandic actors exacer-
bated this problem by showing little sensitivity for such considerations as they
willingly displayed the excellency of the Ålandic case from a minority point of
view. In general, some Finnish diplomats argue, autonomy arrangements are often
viewed as a stepping-stone for independence, making it unacceptable to the gov-
ernment side. At the same time, the Åland Example with its strong institutions
of minority protection and territorial self-government may lead to increased
V. Harle and S. Moisio, Missä on Suomi? Kansallisen identiteettipolitiikan historia ja geo-
politiikka (Vastapaino, Tampere, 2000).
That there nowadays exists a party whose utmost goal is independence for Åland can
strengthen such views, according to one respondent.

82 M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84
demands and expectations on the rebel/minority side. So, instead of bringing the
belligerents closer to each other and to accepting a negotiated solution, the Åland
Example may actually have the opposite efect. Hence, as a tool for mediating con-
icts the Åland Example is far from straight-forward, these diplomats argue.
According to them, it is even considered a curse by many conict parties, espe-
cially on the government side, and a straight dead-end from a mediating perspec-
tive in many conict situations. As such, many ocials like to see it more as a tool
that can be displayed if somebody asks for it, but that should not actively be
promoted.
Secondly, some diplomats are also concerned that promoting the Åland
Example may harm Finland’s diplomatic relations with certain states in which
minority issues are sensitive, such as Spain or Turkey. That Finland has co-
operated actively with Turkey on peace mediation, together setting up the ‘Friends
of Mediation Group’ at the UN and co-sponsoring the UN General Assembly reso-
lution on mediation, may also serve as another reason why the Åland Example
does not feature in the Action Plan for Mediation. The Turkish government,
being highly sensitive with regard to its own Kurdish question, can be suspected
not to view the Åland Example favourably and Finland may therefore consider
it prudent to tread carefully with it, so as not to put in jeopardy its close co-
operation with Turkey in this area. In any case, these are concerns that are taken
seriously within some quarters of the Ministry. According to the interview evi-
dence, the Embassy of Finland in Spain strongly advised Ålandic actors involved
with organising a seminar on the Åland Example in the Basque region to bury
these plans. Indeed, ocials at the Ministry testify to having been concerned over
these plans and noted how Finland needs to take care in not appearing to be sup-
porting separatists in any way, so as not to jeopardise its relations with countries
such as Spain, Turkey and the like.
From the discussion of these more functionalistic reasons behind the Finnish
ambivalence one can note a more fundamental conict of interest between
Finland and Åland as to the promotion of the Åland Example. While both sides
take an interest in promoting the Åland Example, their interests difer as tothespe-
cic features of the Åland Example that they want to promote. Here, one also sees
how the Åland Example, far from being a norm with a xed denition, lends itself
to diferent conceptualisations that may be politically exploited. Above the Åland
Example was said to lack ocial denition, but usually characterised by the com-
bination of demilitarisation and neutralisation, the autonomy and the institu-
tions protecting the language and culture of the Åland Islands. Herein, the
islanders take a particular interest in promoting the components of the Åland
Example that directly have to do with minority protection, i.e. the autonomy and
Supra notes 18 and 19.
For a recent discussion of the concept, see Spiliopoulou, supra note 2.

M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84 83
the language and culture safeguards. These are precisely the features of the
Åland Example that appear most problematic from the Finnish point of view, as
we saw above. From the Finnish perspective, it is the demilitarisation and neutral-
isation components that are least controversial, and most interesting with regard
to Finland’s engagement in international conict resolution and mediation.
Indeed, participant observation in seminars with both Ålandic and Finnish actors,
informal discussions and the interviews conducted for this article seem to testify
to such, with the islanders putting relatively more emphasis on the minority pro-
tection components, and Finnish policymakers highlighting the neutralisation/
demilitarisation features of the Åland Example. Both entities are trying to exploit
the Åland Example for their own partly overlapping, partly conicting agendas.
5. Conclusions
This article provides support for the claim by Finnemore and Sikkink that “what
we often see is a process by which domestic ‘norm entrepreneurs’ advocating a
minority position use international norms to strengthen their position in domes-
tic debates”. It shows how norm entrepreneurship may provide a device for a
minority or an autonomous region as it strives to preserve or develop its status and
identity vis-à-vis the majority and host country. By anchoring its status and iden-
tity within the international community, the autonomous region can acquire nor-
mative capital that has its domestic political uses both for conducting its relations
with the host country as well as for the production of a strong self-image and iden-
tity. In the case of Åland, the Åland Example provides for such a minority diplo-
matic device, which has had a direct bearing for both Åland’s relations with
Finland as well as for the internal identity-building process.
Looking at the Åland Example from the theoretical perspective of norm entre-
preneurship thus reveals interesting aspects of the autonomy-state relationship. It
shows how a “two-level game” is being played by both the autonomous region
and the state, which sometimes pits the two parties against each other while at
other times it induces them to cooperate. Finland also makes use of the Åland
Example, but as a diplomatic device its usage is much more ambiguous from the
Finnish perspective. It deviates from the usual national identity markers that help
This point was rst brought up by a respondent with a long-standing experience with
Ålandic afairs and can also be noted from texts written for a marketing purpose by Ålandic
actors. E.g. see S. Eriksson, ‘The example of Åland: autonomy as a minority protector’, This is
Finland, April 2007, <nland./Public/default.aspx?contentid=160122&nodeid=41800&culture
=en-US>. In the text there is no mention of the demilitarisation and neutral isation aspects. It
focuses instead on the minority safeguards as the essence of the Åland Example.
Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics’, supra note 11, p. 893.
R. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 42:3
International Organization (1988) pp. 427–460.

84 M. Wigell / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20 (2013) 67–84
drive Finnish foreign policy and is thus often ignored. Importantly, as a tool in
international conict resolution, the Åland Example has its drawbacks that may
not seem as pertinent from the perspective of the autonomous region itself but
which induces Finland to take a more cautious posture in promoting the Åland
Example internationally. This explains Finland’s perceived ambivalence in mak-
ing the Åland Example part of its foreign policy prole. It also shows how norms
and norm advocacy can become a contested device between the majority and
minority, and therefore the importance of developing a mutual understanding
and sensitivity for each other’s concerns so as to be able to nd common ground.
In addition to the interviews listed here, a number of more informal discussions with
policy-makers and experts were conducted by the author.
Appendix
List of Interviewees
Name Date of interview Position
Anonymous 5 September 2012 Ex-senior ocial at the Ministry for
Foreign Afairs
Heli Kanerva 26 September 2012 Special representative for mediation
and UN 1325 at the Ministry for
Foreign Afairs
Päivi Kaukoranta 17 September 2012 Head of legal services at the Ministry
for Foreign Afairs
Kalle Liesinen 10 September 2012 Ex-executive director of the Crisis
Management Institute, Ex-senior
ocial at the Finnish Defence
Forces, Ex-middle level ocial at the
Ministry of the Interior
Elisabeth Nauclér 12 September 2012 Member of Parliament (representative
for Åland), Ex-head of administra-
tion in the Government of Åland.
Anonymous 10 September 2012 Middle-level ocial at the Ministry for
Foreign Afairs
Holger Rotkirch 6 September 2012 Ex-head of legal services at the
Ministry for Foreign Afairs
Anonymous 24 September 2012 Member of Parliament
Pär Stenbäck 20 September 2012 Ex-Minister for Foreign Afairs
Britt-Inger Wahe 18 September 2012 Information ocer in the Government
of Åland, Åland Oce in Helsinki