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Religious Nationalism in a New Era: A Perspective from Political Islam
Abstract
Nationalism is an ideology that has taken different forms in different times, locations, and situations. In the 19th century, classical liberal nationalism depended on the ties between the nation state and its citizenship. That form of nationalism was accompanied by “the state- and nation-building” processes in Europe. In the 20th century, nationalism transformed into ethnic nationalism, depending on ideas of common origin; it arose especially after World War I and II and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, at the beginning of 21st century, nationalism began to integrate with religion as a result of global political changes. The terrorist attack on the United States, and then the effects that the United States and its allies have created in the widespread Muslim geography, have added new and different dimensions to nationalism. The main aim of this study is to investigate the intersection points between religion and nationalism, especially in the case of political Islam.
By analysing Khomeini’s words during the war, this chapter focuses on Khomeini’s views on nationalism. This chapter, first, analyses the use of journey metaphors in Khomeini’s discourse during the war and then it argues why the Ayatollah’s usage of these metaphors demonstrates that he was neither a nationalist nor a religious nationalist. Then, it looks at the labels that Khomeini used during the Iran-Iraq war. To this end, first, this chapter reflects on what Khomeini meant by millat (nation) because Khomeini’s usage of the term millat is the reason that authors like Grinberg (in: Litvak (ed) Constructing nationalism in Iran from the Qajars to the Islamic Republic, Routledge, London, 2017) and Gieling (Religion and war in revolutionary Iran, I.B. Tauris, 1999) wrongly conclude that nationalism is part of Khomeini’s ideology. Second, this chapter reveals how other labels that Khomeini used during the war (For instance, country of IslamIslam, the warriors of Islam and the children of Quran.) reinforced the idea that Khomeini’s main concern was not nationalism. Finally, This chapter discusses why Khomeini’s interdiscursive and intertextual use of Islamic sources illustrates that he was not a nationalist.
This chapter focuses on the former leader M.H.M. Ashraff’s speeches in parliament and how Muslim politics are presented in these speeches. As described above, the political conditions during the period of 1989–1992 were to a large extent dominated by the civil war. This chapter will therefore be divided into parts that correspond to different phases in the civil war and to when Islamic references are notable.
The author proposes an analysis of the common and differentiating elements of contemporary nationalist ideologies based on the starting assumption that the character of nationalist discourses in the building of nations is not merely exogenous and expressive, but rather endogenous and productive. The study, which is centred on the internal structure of the concept of nation and the political nature and the relationships between its principal elements, employs a frame analysis approach. Three main types of framing strategies present in contemporary nationalist ideologies are highlighted: 1) an organicistic strategy, which is articulated around a concept of nation as an homogenous ethnic group shaped by the presence of thickly ethnic objective elements (race, spirit, mission, physical space, etc.); 2) the culturalist strategy, which is the result of a purging of the determinism found in the organicistic model and which is based on other objective but thinly ethnic elements (culture, language, tradition); and 3) a strategy based on the emergent model of pluralistic nationalism, which competes with the two previous models by considering the nation as an always-in-the-making political-cultural community, integrated by majorities and minorities, and as an open environment for democratic deliberation and accommodation. The analysis demonstrates how, as a last resort, only the third model, which significantly moves away from the classical formulation of nationalist ideologies, turns out to be compatible with the normative demands of contemporary democratic theory, but at the cost of losing the mobilizing efficiency of the two traditional models (organic and cultural) and the heuristic efficiency of the binary opposites: we/they, insider/outsider, friend/enemy.
Para‐Arabism and Pan‐Islamism each aspire to provide a supranational ideal transcending individual states as a focus of indentity capable of shaping ends and means of foreign policy. In practice, however, while Pan‐Arabism and Pan‐Islamism continue to exert real influence as cultural forces, the independent state as part of a framework of inter‐state relations constituted according to the norms of international law is likely to dominate the politics of the region.
Anthony Smith has criticized my conclusion that most of the peoples currently recognized as constituting nations acquired national consciousness only in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries. He traces our disagreement to fundamental differences concerning the essence of the nation. A comparison of our definitions confirms profound differences, and it is contended that Smith's definitions, by joining two quite dissimilar and often conflictual identities (civic and ethnic) preclude a dialogue concerning the nature and the history of ‘the nation’. A rejoinder to Smith's specific criticisms is followed by a restatement of the factors that make calculating when a given nation emerged so difficult. Finally, it is noted that the issue of when a nation came into being is not of key significance: while in factual/chronological history a nation may be of recent vintage, in the popular perception of its members, it is ‘eternal’, ‘beyond time’, ‘timeless’. And it is not facts but perceptions of facts that shape attitudes and behavior.
Central to assertions of national identity in the contemporary world is a sense of collective mission and destiny. This is clearly manifest in the recent spate of religious nationalisms, but it is also present as a component of secular nationalisms. In both cases, it is possible to trace the origins of the sense of collective destiny to much earlier beliefs in ethnic chosenness. In some cases a strict ‘covenantal’ form of the myth of ethnic election, such as was found in the Old Testament, has survived more or less intact into the modern era. In many other instances, a looser sense of ethnic election by the deity has continued to influence the outlook and purposes of secular nations. While there is no strict covariance between the earlier myths and modem national ideals, the ancient beliefs in divine election have given modern nationalisms a powerful impetus and model, particularly among peoples in the monotheistic traditions.