The development of Conservative Party policy in the early postwar years has provided one of the keystones upon which the ‘house’ of consensus has been built. According to the traditional narrative, the Party responded to the combined experiences of war and electoral defeat in 1945 first, by broadening its membership base and promoting a younger, more progressive generation, and secondly, by
... [Show full abstract] accepting the broad strands of what is often called ‘the postwar settlement’:1 the mixed economy, the welfare state, full employment policy and Keynesian economic management. Indeed, it has been argued that this was already the case in the spring of 1945, and that the ‘trouble was that people did not believe that the Conservatives meant what they said, whereas they thought on the whole that Labour did’.2 This credibility gap was closed by R.A. Butler, who oversaw the development of a ‘new Conservatism’, which he later explained as a ‘humanised capitalism’, ‘adapted to the needs of the postwar world’.3 Lord Blake has explained that
Once in office the Conservatives had a golden opportunity to show that they were not only the party of freedom but that they could combine it with full employment, rising prosperity and the preservation of the welfare state….[T]he Party did not throw away its advantage. Whatever long term opportunities were missed in terms of restructuring British industry and taking the lead in Europe…Tory freedom did appear to work. Restrictions were relaxed. Living standards rose. Taxation fell. Employment remained high. The welfare state was not dismantled. The housing pledge was fulfilled.4
