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Abstract

The anti-terror public media campaigns started in Iraq around 2004 and was called ‘Terror has no Religion’ in order to combat the threats of sectarianism and Al-Qaeda. After the withdrawal of the US forces from the country in late 2010, the campaign stopped, but a new and similar one emerged that is called ‘Say no to Terror’ whose advertisements mostly targeted the Saudi public. Several Pan-Arab regional channels like Al-Arabiya and Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) were part of airing its advertisements. This study focuses on the ‘Terror has no Religion’ and ‘Say no to Terror’ campaigns by critically examining their websites and videos to understand the nature of messages sent to the public. Further, the study examines the effectiveness of the two campaigns with special emphasis on ‘Say no to Terror’ by analyzing comments posted on YouTube and discussing the counter campaign. Over 350 videos were found containing counter arguments to ‘Say no to Terror’ campaign, and about 60% of YouTube commentators viewed the campaign negatively, expressing suspicion about its real intentions. The paper concludes that the success of such public service advertisements is doubtful due to the format of the message as well as cultural and political reasons that are linked to the region.
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The anti-terrorist advertising
campaigns in the Middle East
Ahmed K. Al-Rawi
Published online: 10 Oct 2013.
To cite this article: Ahmed K. Al-Rawi (2013) The anti-terrorist advertising campaigns in the Middle
East, Journal of International Communication, 19:2, 182-195
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2013.833534
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The anti-terrorist advertising campaigns
in the Middle East
AHMED K. AL-RAWI
Abstract: The anti-terror public media campaigns started in Iraq around 2004 and was
called ‘Terror has no Religion’ in order to combat the threats of sectarianism and Al-Qaeda.
After the withdrawal of the US forces from the country in late 2010, the campaign stopped,
but a new and similar one emerged that is called ‘Say no to Terror’ whose advertisements
mostly targeted the Saudi public. Several Pan-Arab regional channels like Al-Arabiya and
Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) were part of airing its advertisements. This study
focuses on the ‘Terror has no Religion’ and ‘Say no to Terror’ campaigns by critically
examining their websites and videos to understand the nature of messages sent to the public.
Further, the study examines the effectiveness of the two campaigns with special emphasis on
‘Say no to Terror’ by analyzing comments posted on YouTube and discussing the counter
campaign. Over 350 videos were found containing counter arguments to ‘Say no to Terror’
campaign, and about 60% of YouTube commentators viewed the campaign negatively,
expressing suspicion about its real intentions. The paper concludes that the success of such
public service advertisements is doubtful due to the format of the message as well as cultural
and political reasons that are linked to the region.
Keywords: public campaign, ‘Say no to Terror’, ‘Terror has no Religion’, Arab media, PSA
INTRODUCTION
Government-sponsored public service advertisements (PSAs) are widely utilized for educa-
tional, health, tourism and public safety programmes, and despite the importance of studying
PSA in the Arab world, no research has been conducted on them. The most important and
relevant public campaigns to the focus of this study is related to combating violence and
terrorism in troubled countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia and, more recently, Bahrain. The
Saudi government, for example, runs Assakina Campaign for Dialogue that is supervised by
the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The campaign monitors Al-Qaeda-affiliated websites that
aim at recruiting Muslims online especially those living in the diaspora (Assakina 2012).
Also, the Jordanian government ran a public campaign against Muslim extremists, following
Al-Zarqawi’s hotel bombing in Amman in 2005 (Zayani 2005, p.21; Lynch 2006, p.39). In
Bahrain, the government is fiercely combating a Shiite uprising that was inspired by the
events of the Arab Spring, but the official frame used to define the protest is terrorism. For
example, a TV advertisement that was aired on the official Bahraini TV shows the negative
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consequences of the actions of young men shown to be burning tyres and creating chaos, and
by the end of the PSA, a statement is shown stating ‘Together to extinguish the fire of
Terrorism’ (Bahrain TV 2012). Another TV campaign is sponsored by the Syrian government
to combat extreme salafists who happen to be fighting against Bashar Assad’s Alawite
government (Al-Dunya 2012).
In Iraq, the Future of Iraq Campaign worked on strengthening the ties between the
different Iraqi ethnic and minority groups especially between Sunnis and Shiites due to the
tensions that were created after the 2003 War that culminated in the civil war that erupted
in 2006 after bombing the Shiite holy shrine in Samara city. The organization’s website,
which is not functioning any more, was created around 2004, and it carried the slogan of
‘Future Iraq Assembly One Nation, promising future’. The organization produced tens of
videos advertisements that called for unity. On its website, which was accessed through ‘My
Way Back Machine’, the organization’s objectives are the following: ‘(1) To convince all our
fellow Iraqis that we have the will and the capability to progress; (2) To adopt a value system
that has at its very heart openness and acceptance of the other; (3) To eradicate pessimism,
fear, hesitation, and isolation from our fellow Iraqis’ hearts and reinforce trust, initiative, and
honest competition for the sake of a future Iraq that is worthy of the sacrifices we’ve made to
regain our right to a decent living’ (Future of Iraq 2004). It is not clear, however, the real
impact of these advertisements that used to be aired repeatedly on different Iraqi channels.
The videos posted by the Future of Iraq were mostly well produced which indicate a high
budget and professional and specialized staff who are mostly lacking in Iraq; hence, it seems
that the US administration was responsible for sponsoring its media campaigns. The US
involvement in propaganda activities in the Middle East is not new. During the cold war, for
example, the USA was concerned with the threat of the spread of Communism in the Middle
East. As a result, the USA helped some governments with whom it enjoyed good relationships
in fighting Communism. For example, Iraq, which was an ally of the USA during the
monarchy rule, opposed Communism and got US assistance in producing and disseminating
promotional materials like anti-communist pamphlets and films (Al-Rawi 2012). After 2003,
the cooperation resumed between the two governments but the mutual enemy changed as
the new campaign focused on combating terrorism.
1
The Future of Iraq aired a famous advertisement on the dangers of civil war with a
message ‘In order not to be a lesson for history’ in which scenes of causalities of civil wars
and the number of people killed and maimed are shown from different countries like Bosnia,
Rwanda and Lebanon (Future of Iraq 2007). Another advertisement shows an Iraqi man
packing a suitcase to go to the hospital to meet his newly born baby as his wife is giving birth,
while the other scene shows a terrorist preparing his booby-trapped car to explode it. The two
men meet on the street, and we hear an explosion. The new father is survived, and he finally
meets his wife and new baby at the hospital. The message says: ‘When divided, we’ll be
defeated; when united, we’ll defeat it’ (Future of Iraq 2009a). One of the ads that called for
voting during the governorates elections on the 31 January 2009 shows US soldiers
departing from Iraq while Iraqi kids watch them. With music in the background, the kids
start playing football while a subtitle says: ‘They leave and we stay’ and ‘Freedom is a
responsibility, so practice it with awareness’ (Future of Iraq 2009b). The message
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communicated to the Iraqi public is that US forces are leaving soon, so it is better to build the
country rather than fight them. In brief, the PSAs produced for the Future of Iraq campaign
are meant to increase awareness and convince the public about the importance of unity and
peace.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
PSAs are broadly defined as ads aired to the public with the intention of changing their
attitudes and educating them about certain issues. PSAs are widely used by governments and
non-governmental organizations. For example, in the USA, after 9/11, the media and PSAs
played important roles in bringing Americans together to enhance unity (Merolla &
Zechmeister 2009, p.75). Some scholars argue that these PSAs are another form of
ubiquitous propaganda; behind this persuasive communication practice, advertisers aim at
achieving some benefits such as encouraging people to vote or creating positive or negative
feelings towards some serious societal issues (Jowett & O’Donnell 2012, p.151). When there
is one-way communication, the PSA turns into propaganda, which was a practice widely
followed by the US and German governments in times of crises especially during the First and
Second World Wars (O’Barr 2012). Other countries like China widely uses PSA in today’s
world by focusing on television (Landsberger 2009), while the Indian government airs PSAs
to tackle some social problems, though they are mostly mistrusted by the public
(Nanjundaiah 1999, p.280).
One of the ways of making advertising effective is the by use of shocking images in order
to attract the attention of viewers. Dahl, Frankengerger, and Manchanda (2003, p.269)
confirm that shock advertising ‘attempts to surprise an audience by deliberately violating
norms for societal values and personal ideals’. Some advertising scholars stress that ‘the use
of shocking (unusual, provocative, controversial, intrusive) images in advertising [is] for the
purpose of attracting attention and debate’ (Pickton & Broderick 2005, p.234), while Grazer
and Keesling (1995) regard attention-grabbing as the first step in persuasion. In this regard,
David Bevan refers to the example of showing dead bodies on PSAs designed to reduce car
accidents. He asks the following question: ‘Do the images of dead and seriously wounded
people evoking a violently traffic accident cause public offence?’ (2012, p.230) It is difficult to
determine the right answer here because of psychological differences among people and the
fact that the effectiveness of ads is also related to the viewers’ cultural values (Ve
´zina & Paul
1997; Fam & Waller 2003). Similarly, William O’Barr (2012) discusses the Australian and
British PSAs that show graphic and explicit images to raise awareness about the dangers of
smoking. One might ask whether the car accidents awareness campaigns and anti-smoking
advertisements could produce less harm though the reduction of car accidents and achieve
better health results. If yes, these shocking scenes ‘would be beneficial to the society’,
according to Bevan (2012, p.230).
However, Dervin and Foreman-Wernet (2012, p.151) emphasize that raising awareness
does not necessarily guarantee compliance since ‘people are willing to listen to that which
collides with or is new to their worlds when those communicating at them change to
communicating with them’ (2012, p.153). Again, cultural values play an important role
here. Further, as advertising is mostly viewed as a deceptive means to persuade the public, it
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becomes mostly ineffective in changing ‘existing behaviour’ or due to ‘plain old scepticism’
(Jowett & O’Donnell 2012, p.156) especially when advertising deals with sensitive topics that
touch on people’s core religious values and beliefs. Further, the public usually resist
advertisements as part of a natural defensive mechanism that does not only apply to political
ads but also to commercials dealing with market products. The reason behind is related to the
viewers’ selectivity in terms of ‘attention, perception, interpretation, and retention’ (Tellis
2004, p.32). The two campaigns discussed in this study relied on presenting shocking images
apparently to attract more attention and become more effective. However, other factors like
the source and nature of the messages sent must be taken into account in judging whether a
campaign is effective or not. In the following section, a discussion on the campaigns of
‘Terror has no Religion’ in Iraq and ‘Say no Terror’ in Saudi Arabia is presented.
TERROR HAS NO RELIGION
Iraq had an anti-terrorist campaign running around 2006 which was called ‘Terror has no
religion’ (Terror has no religion 2006). The video and print advertisements produced for this
campaign were aired and published on state-run and pro-Iraqi government media channels
like Al-Iraqiya TV and Assabah newspapers. According to the campaign’s website which is
not functioning any more, the mission statement reads:
Our Mission is to expose the fallacy of the distorted and politicized Islamic teachings used by
ungodly extremists to sanctify and justify terrorism.
It has become crucial to inform the Muslim and Arab people -particularly the Iraqi people- about
the deceptions terrorists employ in distorting the peaceful teachings of Islam. These terrorists, who
claim to follow the Islamic Faith, are in truth only drowning in an abyss of mistaken beliefs.
(Terror has no religion 2006)
It seems that the main goal of the ‘Terror has no religion’ campaign was to highlight
‘extremist ideology that breeds terrorism’, according to the campaign’s unknown sponsors;
‘we use Quranic Verses in their true Islamic meaning; free of the distortion committed by the
misguided malicious terrorists’ (Terror has no religion 2006). The reason behind following
this strategy was to show ‘the true image of Islam and combat extremist ideology’ as well as
to ‘reveal the true and ample doctrines of Islam, and expose the contempt these terrorists hold
for the spiritual essence of our religion. These terrorists and their ungodly ways are the ones
responsible for making Islam an easily marked target in the eyes of the world, as well as
causing Muslims to be the subject of criticism before the world community (Terror has no
religion 2006).
In the first advertisement, a suicide bomber explodes himself in a busy market. The
explosion is produced with elaborate details and presented with carefully produced special
effects (Terror has no religion 2007a). On the English website, the advertisement is described
as follows: ‘Even the word, ‘‘War’’ does not justify attacking secure civilians and turning the
streets into a heinous scene that is open for the slaughter of both innocent women and
children. The ethics of war any war refute this mass elimination, and we have, in the
form of the Prophet, a decent example to follow’ (Terror has no religion 2006). The
advertisement which seems to be filmed in Morocco offers graphically violent scenes; for
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example, as the suicide bomber ignites his bomb in the market, dead bodies are scattered
everywhere including the little boy whose shoe is the only thing that is left and shown due to
the impact of the explosion. The advertisement seems to be mostly directed against Sunni
salafists who also fought the US-led coalition forces. Another advertisement shows a
mysterious and sinister-looking man wearing black cloak crossing the Iraqi border to suggest
that those bombing themselves are not truly Iraqis. It is described as follows: ‘Be alert people
of Iraq. Terrorists trespass our borders to sow the seeds of death in our land’ (Terror has no
religion 2006). In it the man who walks around searching for a suitable target is watched by
other fellow Iraqis with suspicion, indicating that the presence of such persons must be
reported to authorities. The man later ignites a bomb in the market, and the lethal
consequences of his murderous act are highlighted (Terror has no religion 2007b).
Similar to the Future of Iraq main focus, ‘Terror has no religion’ concentrated on unity
among Iraqis. One of the advertisements is entitled ‘Know your enemy’ and is described as
follows: ‘For every disease there’s a cure. The disease spreading in Iraq plants the seeds of
fear, hatred, dissension and terrorism among its people. The cure to this disease is the unity of
citizens in the face of those who compromise security, values and life. Know your enemy is a
call for a unified front in refusing the criminal practices that endanger Iraqis’ (Terror has no
religion 2006). The advertisement starts again with kids playing football and people
seemingly living in peace when suddenly a convoy of cars filled with armed men enter the
neighborhood. Everyone starts fleeing as bearded men who look like Sunni insurgents start
shooting randomly and beating people. Suddenly, an Iraqi man who appears to be a tribal
Sheikh stands alone to confront the armed men and he is later joined by other religious
clerics who come from different sects based on their costumes. Afterward, a group of ordinary
Iraqis join and hold hands to show unity while someone from the crowd lifts the Iraqi flag
from the ground to stress the nationalist spirit. When the armed men see the number of
people gathered who were advancing towards them, they start retreating. The advertisement
then shows the messages ‘know your enemy’ and ‘terror has no religion’ as well as ‘terrorism
has no country’ (Terror has no religion 2007c).
The second advertisement uses football as its theme, aiming at generating positive
feelings and associations due to the game’s popularity in Iraq and the fact that the Iraqi
national football team won the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Asian Cup Champions in
2007. The first advertisement is described as follows: ‘Terrorism feeds on the division of
people, wanting to subjugate even the most basic of daily pleasures. The fight against
terrorism is all the more potent when people come together in strength and when they refuse
to allow sectarianism to divide their ranks’ (Terror has no religion 2006). The advertisement
starts with a subtitle ‘In a dark day, terrorism wanted to defeat Iraq’ shows football players
from Iraq’s national team playing against terrorists, wearing dresses similar to the Afghan
Mujahideen ones which look like Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi’s outfit. In the match, the terrorists
use explosive devices, machine guns and hand grenades which are all thrown away by the
football players who win the match in the end. The message reads in the end: ‘Terror has no
country’ (Terror has no religion 2007d). Another advertisement was produced using
testimonies from famous Iraqi football players who claim that there were doubts about their
performance during the Asia Cup tournaments, but they managed to win with perseverance
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and unity. The advertisement highlighted the following message: ‘We came from all around
Iraq united under one dream’ (Terror has no religion 2007e).
Finally, the most controversial advertisement was related to a kidnapping theme. On its
English website, the advertisement is described as follows: ‘Terrorists are criminals who try to
garner political gain by terrorizing people. They function devoid of morals or conscience.
They nurture the illusion that they are fighting for a higher cause when in reality they use
sectarianism to divide and conquer the Iraqi people’ (Terror has no religion 2006). The
advertisement starts in the market showing ordinary Iraqis shopping in peace when all of a
sudden a speeding car filled with armed men enters the marketplace and the men start
shooting randomly and kidnapping few men. One of the kidnapped men whose name is Tariq
is taken as a hostage and is severely beaten with the butt of a machine gun. One of the
masked men whose face is not apparent starts shouting repeatedly: ‘Answer me!’ Are you
Sunni or Shiite?’ As the kidnapped man struggles to answer, flashback scenes show serene
and peaceful images to be later contrasted with the violence shown. In the end, the man
responds: ‘I am Iraqi’ after which he is summarily executed, and the message reads: ‘Sedition
is worse than murder’ (Terror has no religion 2007f).
All of the advertisements show either verses from the Quran or Prophet Mohammed’s
sayings that urge Muslims to resort to peace and reject violence. Indeed, the Islamic texts
inserted are meant to function as advertising appeals to increase the favorability and
credibility of the messages sent to the public. One of the problematic issues about the
campaign as a whole was its focus on the Sunni sect rather than Shiites in Iraq who were
also involved in the insurgency. The reason is probably related to the fact that the majority of
attacks against the US-led coalition forces were organized and conducted by Sunni fighters
(Baram 2005). Indeed, this kind of bias enhances the stereotypes in the Iraqi society against
the Sunni sect as a whole as is shown below.
Since ‘Terror has no religion’ has neither an official Facebook page nor a YouTube
channel, it is difficult to see the online reaction towards this campaign.
2
Several
commentators like ‘sikmadeforreal’ and ‘Khaled891987’ revealed that the ads are ‘definitely’
‘American production’ (YouTube 2007; Iraqi 2009). Other comments highlighted other
negative aspects of the campaign. For example, ‘MoroccanAnwar’ commented in English on
one of the clips, saying: ‘fuck this propaganda shit weve [sic] had enough of it from the
west....’, (YouTube 2008b). As the campaign seems to target Sunnis more than Shiites,
some YouTubers used the clips to enhance the idea that Sunnis are involved in terrorism.
Two YouTubers each uploaded a video from ‘Terror has no Religion’ campaign. One of them
tagged the video as ‘killing terrorism Wahhabi Religion’ with a homophobic tone; the
clip generated 14,781 views and 35 comments (YouTube 2008a), while the other one
indicated that terrorists are sectarian (YouTube 2011a). The two videos which attack
Wahabis and associate them with Iraqi Sunnis generated a great deal of inflammatory
discussions that are filled with hateful remarks against Sunnis and Shiites. In other words,
some of the video clips had negative influences on peoples’ perception of the other. After the
end of ‘Terror has no religion’ campaign in Iraq which coincided with the US withdrawal
from the country, a new campaign emerged targeting mostly people in Saudi Arabia which is
discussed below.
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SAY NO TO TERROR
The second anti-terrorist campaign is called ‘Say No to Terror’ whose unknown sponsors
produced over 20 videos that are posted on YouTube and repeatedly aired on the Saudi-
owned Pan-Arab Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) and Al-Arabiya channels. As the US
Army withdrew from Iraq, it seems that the interest shifted to Saudi Arabia whose
conservative society is well known to breed many salafists who adhere to a conservative
version of Islam called Wahabism. For example, most of the ArabAfghan fighters who went
to Afghanistan in the 1980s were from Saudi Arabia and most of the 9/11 hijackers were
from the same country (Hegghammer 2006). It is important to note that the USA and Saudi
Arabia have had a very close relationship for a very long time which is based on mutual
interests. First, the USA was directly involved in financing and helping the ‘Arab Afghans’
who mostly came from Saudi Arabia to fight a jihadi war against the Russian invasion of
Afghanistan in 1980s (Scott 2007, p.122). Second, the USA, on the one hand, provides
intelligence and protection for Saudi Arabia against external threats such as the danger of Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula that claimed responsibility for several attacks against US
interests in the region or to safeguard the Kingdom from external threats such as the case of
the 1991 Gulf War. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, which is the largest oil producer in
OPEC, continues providing oil to the USA and other markets which helps in stabilizing prices
(Long 1985; Hart 1998; Pollack 2002). In other words, the need to address religious
extremism in Saudi Arabia is of a major interest to the USA and the Saudi government that
are both keen to maintain the status quo.
Except for two videos, all the other ones are designed to target the Saudi society. The new
campaign is clearly a continuation of ‘Terror has no religion’ because both have the same
style in terms of their anonymous sponsors, video production, print format, religious citations
used and similar objectives. Also, one of the videos used in the new campaign contains the
same message content found in the previous Iraqi campaign such as ‘know you enemy’
followed by messages like ‘there’s no life where terrorism resides’. In this new advertisement,
a convoy of cars filled with armed men enters a neighborhood and terrorizes it which is very
similar to one advertisement described above (Say no to Terror 2010a). Even the choice of
text font and style is similar. In comparison to the modest production efforts found in
Assakina’s promotional materials that are sponsored by the Saudi government, the ads of
‘Say no to Terror’ campaign are far more superior in quality.
The campaign has a website; however, it is hosted in Montenegro probably to conceal its
real sponsors due to the anti-American attitudes in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi public as well as
other Arabs targeted in this new campaign will not accept messages directly sent by the USA
due to several reasons. There is a general mistrust in foreign and Western intervention to
change the hearts and minds of the locals as well as a general anti-American sentiments that
are not only confined to Saudi Arabia but stretches to other parts of the Arab and Muslim
countries mostly due to the US foreign policy in the region (Esposito & Mogahed 2007, p.156;
Baxter & Akbarzadeh 2012).
3
On the website, there are a total of 13 videos, but three of them are highlighted: ‘The
Remorseful Terrorist’, ‘The Mother’, and ‘The Terrorist Returnee’. The first and third
campaigns deal with the problem of Afghan-Arab fighters who returned to their homeland in
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Saudi Arabia but are facing difficulties adapting to normal life after long years of jihad.
Basically, each campaign has at least one video and some posters that include the following:
‘Awakened consciousness’; ‘Open your eyes’; ‘The cry’ where small children are used, ‘The
Clowns’, ‘I’m innocent from what from your crimes’, ‘Charity’, and ‘There is no life where
terrorism resides’. Finally, there is the campaign on E-jihad wherein a young man is shown
being radicalized and recruited to join a militant Islamic group (Say no to Terror 2010c). The
main target groups of these advertisements seem to be potential ‘terrorists’, their family
members as well as their neighbors.
WHY SAUDI ARABIA?
As mentioned above, the Saudi government is supported by the USA in the attempts to
combat extremist ideology represented in the hardline advocates of Wahaibism. This kind of
conservative view is manifested in different ways. For example, on 21 December 2012,
Mohammed Al-Arefi, a well-known Saudi cleric, called for boycotting MBC3, a popular
Arabic channel for children because it contains ‘unacceptable programmes’ that might
‘negatively affect children’s lives’. Al-Arefi’s impact is tremendous as he has a religious
programme on Dubai TV that is viewed by thousands of people and has over 3,489,147
followers on Twitter as of December 2012 which is among the highest numbers of followers
in the Arab world. On 24 December 2012, MBC Group responded angrily by referring to a
previous decree issued by Al-Arefi in which he called on fathers not to sit alone with their
daughters least they should be tempted to have a sexual contact with them. In a press
release, MBC said: ‘Reason is not the means to discuss matters with such a person especially
that such decrees are coming from someone who should be placed in a mentally ill hospital to
be cured from his deviant thoughts instead of issuing fatwas’ (MBC.net 2012). The tension
between the moderates and conservatives is one of the characteristics of the Saudi society. In
a meeting between US diplomats and Khalid Al-Matrafi, the regional director of the Saudi-
owned Al Arabiya news channel, Al-Matrafi revealed that MBC, which owns Al-Arabiya and
many other entertainment channels, targets young Saudis because they are ‘particularly
vulnerable to the calls of extremists, and that the station now targets its moderate news
broadcasts to the 14- to 18-year-old demographic in short presentations of three minutes or
less’ (Wikileaks 2009). Also, the regional director mentioned that there were concerns over
the Qatari Al-Jazeera channel influence in the region; hence, MBC channels aimed at
presenting programmes that ‘counters the influence of al-Jazeera and fosters ‘‘moderate’’
perspectives among the country’s youth’ (Wikileaks 2009). In another meeting with the chief
editor of the Saudi Gazette newspaper, Mohammed al-Shoukany, and his deputy, Abdallah al-
Shehri, the two elaborated on the change in the Saudi government’s media policy:
The government is pushing this new openness as a means of countering the extremists ... It’s still
all about the War of Ideas here, and the American programming on MBC and Rotana is winning
over ordinary Saudis in a way that ‘Al Hurra’ and other US propaganda never could. Saudis are
now very interested in the outside world, and everybody wants to study in the US if they can.
They are fascinated by US culture in a way they never were before. (Wikileaks 2009)
According to US accounts, there is some anti-American tone in the coverage and editorial
policy of Al-Jazeera Arabic TV. Mike Maples, the US director of Defense Intelligence Agency,
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once said that Al-Jazeera ‘creates an environment of legitimacy for terrorists and appears to
lend credibility to their international call for attacks on US homeland and US interests in the
Middle East. As a result, this kind of skewed news coverage has the potential to incite anti-US
violence among segments of the station’s viewing audience’ (Wikileaks 2006). Al-Jazeera
appears to be more concerned with Pan-Arab issues rather than addressing US demands
which probably explains why it has never aired advertisements from ‘Say no to Terror’
campaign.
Based on the above accounts, one can conclude that the Saudi government felt the need
to counter the extremist ideology in the Saudi society with a moderate version of Islam that is
done by opening up to the outside world and by using the media as a basic tool. This is mostly
achieved through American entertainment programmes and assistance in producing public
advertisements like the ones discussed in this paper. Ironically, the USA helped in organizing
jihad in Afghanistan in 1980s and now it is assisting the Saudi government in fighting jihad
in Saudi Arabia itself. In brief, the Saudi and American goals are mutual since it is in the
interest of the US government to have a stable Saudi society to ensure the continuous and
steady flow of oil which will ultimately help the world’s economy. In the following section, an
analysis of the online response to the ‘Say no to Terror’ campaign is presented in order to
have an understanding of the way the public viewed the campaign.
ONLINE RESPONSE TO ‘SAY NO TO TERROR’
The official Facebook page of ‘Say no to Terror’ that was created in August 2009 has over
954,000 likes, though it is not clear whether real people actually like the page. In addition,
there is also a Twitter page with only 224 followers and 253 tweets (Say no to Terror n.d.).
The analysis below is limited to YouTube comments made on 17 video clips posted by the
campaign organizers since the Facebook page does not have negative comments which do
not seem normal. Incidentally, this is supported by other YouTube commentators. For
example, one user called ‘mimed ilyes’ said: ‘Those dogs, when I commented on their
[Facebook] page that Al-Qaeda is affiliated to the CIA, they deleted my comment. This
campaign is financed [and has an agenda]. America is the sponsor of terror in the world’.
Since commentary on its YouTube channel is not deactivated, it allowed others to freely post
their views.
The researcher mined the details on the videos and comments using a webometric tool
(Thelwall 2009) that was done on 26 June 2013. The YouTube channel, which was first
created in August 2010, has over 20 videos as videos are still being uploaded into the
YouTube channel. For this study, 17 video clips that have a total duration of 792 seconds are
analyzed. These videos have had over 281 comments and 1,348,791 views as of 26 June
2013 (Say no to Terror 2010b). There are two video clips that generated most of the
comments. The first one is ‘The Terrorist Returnee’ featuring an invalid Iraqi man that
garnered 177 comments followed by ‘The Deviated Terrorist’ (80 comments) which discusses
a Saudi man who realized that his captors from the Saudi government are as faithful as he is.
The 281 comments were posted from 16 August 2010 to 14 June 2013. Amongst the
commentators, 96 of them identified their geographic location, and most of them 50% (n
48) were from Saudi Arabia, 15% (n15) from Egypt and 10% (n10) from the USA.
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The analysis of these comments showed that 60% (n170) had negative tone against
the campaign, while 20% (n57) were positive, and 18% (n52) were either neutral or
posted irrelevant comments. One significant feature that characterized the negative
comments was the kind of anger, mistrust and even threats posted against the campaign’s
sponsors. Instead of changing views, it seems that the advertisements enhanced stereotypes
about the US government and its allies in the region. For example, tens of comments
mentioned: ‘Terrorism, I’m Muslim and I’m with it’ or ‘Proud to be a terrorist’ or ‘if Jihad is
regarded as a form of terror, then I’m a terrorist’... etc. Another interesting fact is that
several posters indicated that the advertisements are produced and sponsored by the USA. For
example, some YouTubers posted anti-American and anti-Israeli views such as ‘these [videos]
are made by dirty American-Jewish companies’, or they are ‘CIA production’, or ‘Damn to
America in whatever it does to convince the world’, or ‘America is the first terrorist’. Several
others expressed their suspicion towards the videos such as ‘misryeen’ who said:
Warning: The website, the video clips posted on YouTube and Vimeo and other social media
outlets including this page do not contain any reference to the sponsors of this campaign or the
side that promotes it. Further, there is no information that can be obtained from the Internet
which makes the campaign suspicious having in mind the great efforts and size of propaganda
which relies on sending negative but implicit messages on Islam...
Several other commentators preferred to attack Al-Arabiya channel for airing these ads. In
fact, Al-Arabiya was called Al-Abriya (Hebrew) in many incidents to suggest that the
channel serves IsraeliUS interests. Other comments reveal that the videos were regarded as
inflammatory because they insult Islam by associating it with terrorism. For instance, some
posters mentioned that ‘the terrorist is the one who uploaded this video’, or ‘this video is
racist and it links Islam to terrorism. Whoever made this video must be tried’, or ‘Terrorism is
what America does in killing women, children, and innocent people without any judgment or
conscience’. Finally and apart from the other cynical comments made, one poster ‘loooos99’
referred to the effectiveness of such a campaign, saying: ‘The one who uploaded this video is
either naı
¨ve or stupid, thinking that people are still living in the 1970s not in 2012. People
are now more aware of reality and events taking place ...
The ‘Say no to Terror’ campaign seems to have motivated several others to make parodies
or initiate a counter-campaign. By using the webometric tool to mine relevant video clips,
359 videos were found with search terms like ‘I’m a Muslim; I’m with it’ instead of ‘I’m
against it’ (187 videos), or ‘Jihad, I’m a Muslim; I’m with it’ (169 clips), and ‘Occupation, I’m
a Muslim; I’m against it’ (24 clips). These terms were either used in the titles or in tagging the
uploaded videos which had 397,255 views, and 2879 likes, making up 1067 seconds. This
means that the counter-campaign, which has a clear jihadist tone, far exceeded the number
of advertisements made by the sponsors of ‘Say no to Terror’.
Similar to what is found in the analysis of the comments, many video posters changed the
word ‘terrorism’ into ‘jihad’ (YouTube 2011c,2011d,2012). In some cases, they changed
the motto into ‘[Foreign] occupation, I’m a Muslim; I’m against it’ (YouTube 2011b)in
reference to the US interference in the region. The latter video is described by the person who
uploaded it as ‘a reaction against the campaign to distort the image of Mujahideen by paid
and distasteful advertisements that are aired on distasteful channels’. These ‘distasteful’
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channels refer to the Saudi-run Al-Arabiya and MBC channels. To sum up, the high number
of videos found and the negative tone of comments posted to combat ‘Say no to Terror’
clearly show that there is suspicion and anger against the sponsors of this campaign.
CONCLUSION
The main aim of ‘Terror has no religion’ and ‘Say no to Terror’ is to combat terrorism. The
campaigns are run by the US government in coordination with the Saudi and, previously,
Iraqi governments in the hope of combating extremism in their societies. In order to raise
awareness and attract attention, the advertisements contained shocking images and had
seemingly expensive and professional production. Further, these PSAs were aired in some
of the most popular TV channels in the Arab world such as Al-Arabiya, MBC, and Abu
Dhabi TV, indicating that the sponsors are keen to disseminate the messages to as many
people as possible. In this respect, the campaign has succeeded as more awareness is
achieved; however, this does not mean that the campaign is effective for the following
reasons.
First, concealing the identity of the real sponsors is understandable because of the
unpopularity of US policies in the region. Based on the YouTube videos and comments
posted, the US role is very obvious to the public, but it is hidden to avoid immediate rejection
of the campaign due to the anti-American attitudes and the awareness that the public will
reject the idea that the US government is dictating to them what they should think about.
Further, this concealment negatively affects the credibility of the messages sent because the
public starts viewing the messages with suspicion. Second, some of the messages are
problematic as they seem to dictate to the public basic facts about Islam; sometimes these
messages are misunderstood because some think that the campaign associates Islam with
terrorism or encourages sectarianism in the society due to its focus on certain groups. Third,
the format of PSAs itself does not help as direct messages look like propaganda, making many
people defensive especially if some messages challenge their cultural or religious values or are
regarded as foreign intrusion into their core beliefs. Finally, there is a clear lack of
interactivity between the campaign sponsors and public which is evident from the Facebook
page that does not contain any negative comments. As mentioned above, raising awareness
does not necessarily guarantee compliance since ‘people are willing to listen to that which
collides with or is new to their worlds when those communicating at them change to
communicating with them’ (Dervin & Foreman-Wernet 2012, p.153). Instead of having
campaign sponsors communicating with the public, they are communicating at them,
making the whole communication process monodirectional rather than multidirectional.
Besides, would-be insurgents are already framed as terrorists which obstructs the chance for
reasonable and equal debate between the two sides.
Ahmed K. Al-Rawi (PhD) is an assistant professor at Department of Media and Commu-
nication, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Correspondence: Email: alrawi@
eshcc.eur.nl
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NOTES
[1] More recently and part of its public diplomacy efforts, the US State Department is
running a media campaign in the Arab world with the help of its ‘Digital Outreach
Team’ that is supervised by the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications
(Dewey 2013).
[2] There is only one Iraqi YouTuber calling himself ‘Iraqi Sumer’ (In Arabic) who
uploaded 26 relevant videos entitled ‘Iraqi Advertisement’ collected from this
campaign as well as ‘Future of Iraq’ (Iraqi 2009). However, he does not seem to be
directly affiliated with the campaign as he uploaded various other irrelevant videos.
[3] Another popular campaign that seems to be sponsored by the same side is called
Ummati (ummati.me) that has a website hosted in Montenegro, too. Yet it is not
included in this study because it does not soley focus on terrorism-related issues.
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... Television in the Arab world emerged as another primary medium for statebacked anti-extremism messaging. Shortly after the US invasion of Iraq and the rise of militant activity in the country, Iraqi tv channels aired Terror Has No Religion campaign videos, which set a precedent for media interventions on Saudi, Bahraini, and Syrian-funded stations (Al-Rawi, 2013). Following the rise of isis, Arab tv stations aired satirical shows and series that ridiculed and discredited the group attacking Arab armies and law enforcement. ...
... Borrowing from existing entertainment-education research (Bouman, 2004;Hether et al., 2008), the study conducted a textual analysis of the plot and key characters to highlight how the show features fictional, religious-political conversions (RQ1) and adopts an entertainment-education approach (RQ2). To gauge audience engagement with the episodes (RQ3), the study employed a quantitative content analysis of online metrics used in previous studies, such as views, likes, dislikes, and comments (Al-Rawi, 2016;Al-Rawi, 2013). To understand how al-Siham al-Marika narrativized theological arguments to discredit damanhoury isis (RQ4), the study utilized a contextual and historiographic analysis of the show's labeling of extremists, flag depictions, and cross-gender interactions. ...
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isis’s media projected the group’s vision of an Islamic utopia upon declaring its so-called Caliphate in 2014. In response, many counter-messaging campaigns have emerged. Although many examine isis’s media and anti-extremism interventions, very few assess faith-based initiatives in Arab countries. Integrating two bodies of scholarly literature on religious and political conversions and entertainment-education, this study explores al-Siham al-Marika, a faith-based Arab drama portraying life under isis. The study uses mixed-methods to analyze the show’s religious underpinnings, the depiction of positive/negative role models, and the portrayals of religious-political conversions. Focusing on spiritual outcomes, the show illustrates cross-cultural differences in conceptualizing rewards and punishments and uses drama to bolster the persuasive power of religious-political conversion narratives. The study concludes with a discussion on the implications of faith-based entertainment-education in combating extremism and its potential role as a catalyst for bridging the perceived schism between religion and popular culture in some Muslim societies.
... and the study design. For example, there were many studies which did not meet a specific design criterion (see Al-Rawi, 2013;Frennett & Dow, 2015), and arguments could be made for both their inclusion and exclusions. Any disparities between reviewers were resolved by discussion and consensus, before the final studies were decided. ...
... Similar disparities arose due to design. Many studies made claims to "determine the effectiveness" of counter-narrative interventions (Al-Rawi, 2013;Frennett & Dow, 2015) but, instead, described interventions in detail without sufficient statistical evidence of effect. ...
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Executive summary/Abstract Background In the field of terrorism research, the violent radicalisation of individuals towards perpetrating acts of terror has been the subject of academic enquiry for some time. One core focus by social scientists has been the role of narratives in this process. Narratives have the ability to present a socially constructed version of reality which serves the interest of the narrator(s). In the context of terrorism, by depicting violence as a viable antidote to individual vulnerabilities, the narratives purported for propagandistic purposes have the potential to thwart perceptions of instrumentality (a key characteristic of violent radicalisation). In order to prevent this from happening, researchers and counter‐terrorism practitioners have increasingly sought to explore the potential for counter‐narratives; targeted interventions that challenge the rationalisation(s) of violence purported in dominant narratives which, in turn, reconstructs the story. However, there is overwhelming consensus in both government and academic spheres that the concept of the counter‐narrative is underdeveloped and, to date, there has been no synthesis of its effectiveness at targeting violent radicalisation‐related outcomes. Objectives The objective of this review was to provide a synthesis of the effectiveness of counter‐narratives in reducing the risk of violent radicalisation. Search Methods After a scoping exercise, the literature was identified through four search stages, including key‐word searches of 12 databases, hand searches of reference lists of conceptual papers or books on the topic of counter‐narratives, as well as direct contact with experts and professional agencies in the field. Selection Criteria Studies adopting an experimental or quasiexperimental design where at least one of the independent variables involved comparing a counter‐narrative to a control (or comparison exposure) were included in the review. Data Collection and Analysis Accounting for duplicates, a total of 2,063 records were identified across two searches. Nineteen studies across 15 publications met the inclusion criteria. These studies were largely of moderate quality and 12 used randomised control trial designs with varying types of controls. The publication years ranged from 2000 to 2018, with the majority of studies published after 2015. The studies represented a range of geographical locations, but the region most heavily represented was North America. In most cases, the dominant narrative(s) “to‐be‐countered” comprised of hostile social constructions of an adversary or “out‐group”. The majority of studies challenged these dominant narratives through the use of stereotype‐challenging, prosocial, or moral “exemplars”. Other techniques included the use of alternative accounts, inoculation and persuasion. Results In terms of risk factors for violent radicalisation, there was some disparity on intervention effectiveness. Overall, when pooling all outcomes, the intervention showed a small effect. However, the observed effects varied across different risk factors. Certain approaches (such as counter‐stereotypical exemplars) were effective at targeting realistic threat perceptions, in‐group favouritism and out‐group hostility. However, there was no clear reduction in symbolic threat perceptions or implicit bias. Finally, there was a sparse yet discouraging evidence on the effectiveness of counter‐narrative interventions at targeting primary outcomes related to violent radicalisation, such as intent to act violently. Authors' Conclusions The review contributes to existing literature on violent radicalisation‐prevention, highlighting the care and complexity needed to design and evaluate narrative‐based interventions which directly counter existing, dominant narratives. The authors note the challenges of conducting high‐quality research in the area, but nonetheless encourage researchers to strive for experimental rigour within these confines
... Two studies focused on an online intervention that had former extremists reach out directly to extremist users via Facebook Messenger (Frenett and Dow, 2014;Davey, Birdwell, and Skellett, 2018) while others examined counterextremist speech on Facebook (Bartlett and Krasodomski-Jones, 2015). Only one of these studies was published in a peer-reviewed journal (Al-Rawi, 2013). By and large, the studies we reviewed examined basic process characteristics of the communication campaign. ...
... Al-Rawi, for example, analyzed 281 comments from a YouTube-based counterterrorism campaign and determined that many commenters expressed suspicion toward a campaign presumably funded by a western government. Commenters also suggested that the campaign was preachy in tone and appeared to dictate basic facts about Islam to the public (Al-Rawi, 2013). Such a process measure, if used early in the campaign, can presumably help identify needed improvements to video content. ...
... To reach a broader segment of the population, however, the Arab world has also incorporated entertainment narratives as a potent tool for spreading anti-extremism messaging over the past two decades. Arab television stations have aired and produced anti-terror video campaigns, satirical shows, songs, films and drama series (Al-Rawi, 2013;Aly et al., 2014;Jaber & Kraidy, 2020;Khader, 2017;Lindsey, 2005;Navarro, 2019;Ratta, 2018;Stephan, 2015). ...
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... Current counternarratives focus on challenging terrorist narratives, for example, by revealing incongruities and contradictions (Braddock & Horgan, 2015). Another popular theme in anti-terrorism messages is to depict horrific and gruesome consequences of violence and pointing at its unethicalness (e.g., Al-Rawi, 2013). Most anti-terrorism endeavors miss the opportunity to address the goals the violent behavior serves by presenting alternative means. ...
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The present research demonstrates how support for political violence can be reduced by providing peaceful alternatives to produce social change. In Study 1, participants watched a video documenting the activities of a violent activist group, and then either watched a video of a peaceful activist group supporting the same cause or a control video. Participants that watched the peaceful activist group reported less support for the violent activist group than participants in the control condition. Study 2 replicated and extended Study 1 by testing the underlying psychological mechanism. In line with goal systems theory, providing participants with a peaceful alternative to produce social change (vs. no alternative) reduced the perceived instrumentality of the violent group to further the ideological cause, leading to lower support for the violent group. Implications for anti‐violence campaigns are discussed.
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