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The Influence and Illusion of China's New Left
... In China, the New Left had a result of opposing economic views and, even, the New Left is categorized within the China's left-wing. Yet, the China New left was more 'keeping up with current issue' by adopting postmodernism as their approach and most of them are intellectuals and Western graduated scholars (Freeman III & Yuan, 2012). ...
Student organizations have been acknowledged as vanguards and agents of social and political change in some parts of the world. In America, the dynamic student organizations cannot be set apart from American history. The upheaval of the 1960s signaled the advent of the New Left movement, comprising the Free Speech Movement (FSM) and Students for A Democratic Society (SDS). While, in the Indonesian experience, there was somewhat of a similarity of thought and spirit related with the role of student movements historically. Therefore, the study is intended to discover the emergence of the New Left in Europe and America, and expose the cultural hybridity-similarities and reasons of occurrence-of the American New Left and Indonesian student movement in the 1970s. This research is written under the American Studies discipline, specifically related to Transnational American Studies by employing cultural hybridity and border discourse. The finding shows that the ideology of the American New Left in the 1960s comprises of a means of globalizing the New Left in Europe and America, involving the universal ideas of inequality, communication, people migration, and social phenomena in the 1960s and the cultural hybridity of the ideology of the American New Left in the 1960s and the Indonesian student movement of the 1970s evidently showing that the New Left is a ‘third ideology’ by resisting two globalized ideologies during the 1960s, capitalism and communism. In addition, the locality or sustained values, which are democracy and social justice and the universal values shared of the American New Left, FSM and SDS, and the Indonesian student movement in the 1970s are anti-establishment and anti-capitalistic society.Keywords: New Left, ideology, cultural hybridity, border discourse, minority.
... Has the concept of 'global' become de rigueur? In China, however, where political and cultural narratives emphasize the importance of a strong state and China's national distinctiveness, 'global' banks simply do not enjoy the same freedoms they may experience elsewhere (Callahan, 2014;Freeman & Yuan, 2012). Moreover, at the organizational and individual level, a friction between the two groups is clearly observable, not just in policy discourse but in the perspectives and experiences of managers and executives themselves. ...
... The term "New Left", originally adopted by Chinese liberalists to criticize an intellectual group that defended Maoism in one way or another, refers to a loosely organized school of thought critical of capitalism and China's economic reform policies. Despite sharing a general reluctance to accept this label, the new leftists have increasingly become so prominent that they are not 3 simply public intellectuals or academics but also informal advisors for the Chinese government, and attract attention from the western academy and media (Freeman and Yuan 2012;Vukovich 2012: p. 63 (Mulhern 2012). Gan Yang, very active and prominent during the "cultural fever" in the 1980s, continues his influence among intellectuals through his writings and lectures after he returned to China from his studies at the University of Chicago. ...
European thought, rather than an overarching ideology imposed on the colonized, offers a concatenation of keywords and narratives for people to imagine their national community, yet, sometimes serving as political prison for the others, especially those internal and neighboring ones. Henceforth, coloniality does not reside merely in European or US domination but also in multiple relationships and scalar dynamics of the non-European context. In this article, I analyze the discourse of the Chinese New Left, who repudiate the West and affirm a new Chinese sovereign power, thereby resonating with concerns and orientations originating in the new world situation that puts China back in the global power center. I argue that their discourse, despite its left-wing rhetoric, is an expression of agony over national–imperial identity rather than of the powerless. It has found favor among academic conservatives who render ancient Chinese imperial concepts into conceptual tools available for the state to consolidate its legitimacy and political order. A new Chinese sovereign power is discursively envisioned in the co-formations and interconnectivity of the imperial imaginaries of the short-lived German Empire, Pax Americana, and the legacy of Qing Empire.
This book discusses the use of the internet in China, the complicated power relations in online political communications, and the interactions and struggles between the government and the public over the use of the internet. It argues that there is a "semi-structured" online public sphere, in which there is a certain amount of equal and liberal political communication, but that the online political debates are also limited by government control and censorship, as well as by inequality and exclusions, and moreover that the government rarely engages in the political debates. Based on extensive original research, and considering specific debates around particular issues, the book analyses how Chinese net-users debate about political issues, how they problematize the government’s actions and policies, what language they use, what online discourses are produced, and how the debates and online discourses are limited. Overall, the book provides a rich picture of the current state of online political communication in China.
Political scientists and economists fundamentally disagree in their assessment of ideology in contemporary Chinese reform. Whereas the former emphasize its functional value legitimizing the overall course of reform, the latter warn of indoctrination and negative welfare effects. We argue that ideology is pervasive in China’s political economy of reform—past, present, and future. Moreover, a common assessment is both necessary and feasible. The presented case studies (loyalty signaling, message control, policy learning, and anti-corruption) underline the highly ambiguous role of ideology oscillating between alignment and adaptation. In the end, ideology can unite or divide Chinese society as well as increase or diminish economic efficiency.
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