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RUNNING HEAD: Moral Status Influences Judgments of Other’s Social Suffering
Bad Guys Suffer Less (Social Pain):
Moral Status Influences Judgments of Others’ Social Suffering
Paolo Rivaa, Marco Brambillaa, & Jeroen Vaesb
aUniversity of Milano-Bicocca, Italy
bUniversity of Trento, Italy
Total Word Count: abstract (200 words); text (7910 words).
Authors’ Note: Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paolo Riva,
University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Psychology, Piazza Ateneo Nuovo, 1, 20126 –
Milano (Italy). E-mail: paolo.riva1@unimib.it
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
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Abstract
Research on pain judgment has shown that several features of a target influence empathy for others’
pain. Considering the pivotal role of morality in social judgment, we investigated whether
judgments of others’ social and physical suffering varies as a function of the target’s moral status.
Study 1 manipulated the moral characteristics of an unknown other and found that participants
ascribed less social (but not physical) suffering to a target depicted as lacking moral status rather
than to a target high in morality. Study 2 added a control condition in which no information about
the target’s moral qualities was provided, and showed that the effect of morality on social pain
judgments was driven by the depiction of the target as lacking moral traits. Study 3 revealed the
specific role of morality, as information on another evaluative dimension (i.e., competence) had no
effects on pain judgments. Study 4 showed that social targets perceived as lacking moral qualities
are thought to experience less social pain than highly moral targets because of their perceived lower
level of humanity. Overall, our findings suggest that social (but not physical) pain might represent a
capacity that is denied to social targets that are perceived low in morality.
Keywords: Social pain; physical pain; morality; attributions of humanity; person perception.
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Bad Guys Suffer Less (Social Pain):
Moral Status Influences Judgments of Others’ Social Suffering
Humans witness the suffering of others on many occasions. From schools to workplaces,
from hospitals to prisons, among family and friends, people often observe that others are in pain. In
these cases, the first step toward taking action is to recognize the degree of pain that the other
suffers. Depending on the type of pain—either physical or social—various features of the observer
and the sufferer are known to influence the ability of the observer to detect and identify the other’s
pain, such as race (Avenati, Sirigu & Aglioti, 2010; Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Riva & Andrighetto,
2012), gender (Riva, Sacchi, Montali & Frigerio, 2011), and political views (Cikara, Bruneau &
Saxe, 2011). In this paper, we propose a new dimension that may affect the observer’s evaluation of
the suffering of others: the sufferer’s moral qualities. In light of findings on social pain (e.g., the
pain of ostracism, exclusion, and rejection; see MacDonald & Leary, 2005), we propose that the
moral qualities of a sufferer might influence an observer’s estimate of social rather than physical
pain. Perhaps not surprisingly, in a prison context, guards (as every other witness) might be aware
of whether or not an inmate is experiencing the pain of a broken bone while missing the sting of a
broken heart.
Social and Physical Pain
Pain and the suffering that accompanies it are multidimensional phenomena that involve
sensory and emotional components (Price, 2000). Physical pain—the pain caused by physical
injury—has been defined as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with
actual or potential tissue damage” (Merskey, 1979). Another important type of pain that is currently
attracting research attention is social pain, i.e., the pain caused by the threatened or actual loss of
social connections (Eisenberger, 2010). Instances of social pain include feelings caused by
ostracism, exclusion, rejection, betrayal, humiliation, loneliness, and social loss.
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Past research suggests that social and physical pain have both common and distinctive
features. Accordingly, social and physical pain have been shown to overlap in terms of their
evolutionary function (Macdonald & Leary, 2005) and to involve part of the same underlying neural
circuits in the brain (DeWall, et al., 2010; Eisenberger, Lieberman & Williams, 2003; see also
Eisenberger, 2012). Along the same line, focusing on the psychological implications of the social-
physical pain overlap, researchers showed that both forms of pain can evoke similar emotional
reactions (e.g., fear and anxiety; Riva, Williams, & Gallucci, 2014), and cause analogous
psychological consequences (Riva, Wirth, & Williams, 2011; Riva, Wesselman, Wirth, Carter-
Sowell, Williams, 2014).
However, recent neuroimaging studies showed that social and physical pain have also
distinct patterns of brain activity (Bruneau, Pluta, & Saxe, 2012). Behavioral studies showed that
people relive and re-experience social pain more easily and more intensely than physical pain
(Chen, Williams, Fitness, & Newton, 2008).
While these studies have concentrated on people’s first-hand experiences of social and
physical pain, second-hand experiences of pain such as witnessing or observing others’ suffering
are currently emerging as an important research area. Scholars have argued that in many
circumstances observers witness the suffering of others, and the ability to become aware of the pain
of others is key to the evocation of empathy and subsequent prosocial behavior (Masten, Morelli, &
Eisenberger, 2011). Nevertheless, recent research has identified several factors that might bias the
ability to recognize and understand both physical and social pain in others. For instance, observers
tend to underestimate pain or detect it in a biased way when the sufferer is a woman (Riva et al.,
2011), an elderly person (Horgas, & Elliott, 2004), or when s/he is socially distant (Batson &
Ahmad, 2009; see also Cikara et al., 2011). Parallel findings have been reported for social pain. For
instance, a study showed that people perceived socially, but not physically painful events as more
painful when the target was an in-group rather than an out-group member (Riva & Andrighetto,
2012; see also the work on oneness by Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, Neuberger, 1997). Similarly,
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Meyer and colleagues (2013) looked at the proximity of the suffering target to observers showing
that people tend to underestimate social pain (e.g. social isolation) of psychologically distant rather
than close others.
Overall, these studies indicate that inferring other people’s pain highly depends on target
characteristics. The current research aimed to investigate whether a fundamental dimension of
social perception, that is, morality, would affect the observer’s evaluation of a target’s pain. Thus,
we sought to extend the work on the factors that influence the judgment of the suffering of others by
integrating research on social and physical pain judgments with recent evidence showing that moral
characteristics are decisive in shaping social judgment (for reviews, Brambilla & Leach, 2014).
Morality, Social Perception, and Pain
Morality (e.g., honesty, trustworthiness, and fairness) permeates human social life and plays
an important role in a wide range of processes, choices, and evaluations (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).
Indeed, research has shown that moral characteristics dominate social judgment and shape both
person and group evaluations (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). A
growing body of research has shown that overall impressions and behaviors of both real and
hypothetical targets are better predicted by information about the target’s moral character than by
information pertaining to non-moral characteristics (for a review, Brambilla & Leach, 2014; see
also Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007). In a similar vein, individuals throughout the world view
morality as the most important guiding principle in their lives and as a central component of their
individual identity (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002). The reason why individuals
are highly concerned regarding the moral character of others is because understanding the morality
of others is an important factor in defining whether someone’s intentions are beneficial or harmful,
i.e., whether they represent an opportunity or a threat (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Willis & Todorov,
2006). At the group level, moral traits are key in developing a group level self-concept and are
crucial for maintaining a positive group image (Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013;
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Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008). Indeed, immoral ingroup members are perceived as
posing a threat to the integrity of the group (Brambilla, Sacchi, et al., 2013).
Despite the centrality of morality in shaping various judgments, no prior research has
investigated how moral characteristics affect social and physical pain judgment of social targets.
The Present Studies
We anticipate that observers may be less prone to recognize and understand the social
suffering of targets when the latter are perceived as lacking (compared to having) a moral status.
Indeed, moral traits are conceived as prosocial traits (Ellemers & Van de Bos, 2012) and highly
moral individuals are perceived as individuals sensitive to others’ instances and needs. By contrast,
individuals lacking moral qualities are usually perceived as insensitive to others’ needs. Based on
these assumptions, one would reasonably expect that moral characteristics should be associated
with the attribution (or the denial) of the capacity to experience the sting of social rejection.
We hypothesized that this effect would emerge stronger in the context of social pain
judgments, compared to that of physical pain judgments. In other words, we expect the gap in the
pain attributed to an individual lacking moral qualities and that attributed to a highly moral target to
be larger for social than physical pain.
Two processes might lie at the basis of this expected difference in people’s pain judgments
of moral (vs. immoral) individuals. First, social pain—compared with physical pain—has been
considered a hallmark of humanness (Riva & Andrighetto, 2012) and might thus be more typical of
individuals equipped with moral qualities. Accordingly, a good deal of research reveals a close
connection between moral behavior and dehumanizing perceptions (Bastian, Jetten, Chen, Radke,
Harding, & Fasoli, 2013; Bastian, Jetten, & Haslam, 2014, see Haslam, & Loughnan, 2014, for an
integrative review). Even though nonhuman animals (e.g., primates) can show emotional reactions
to social threats (MacDonald & Leary, 2005), previous research on pain attribution found that
people consider the experience of social pain to be more uniquely human than that of physical pain
(Riva & Andrighetto, 2012). In a similar vein, prior research showing that people attribute higher
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cognitive abilities to animals revealed that this happens mainly when people endorse an
anthropomorphic view of the animals (e.g., dogs and cats; Eddy, Gallup, & Povinelli, 1993). Thus,
people seem to reserve the capacity to experience instances of social pain to humans and to
anthropomorphized animals. By contrast, physical pain can be regarded as a basic response that
brings together humans with the great majority of other animals1. Considering that observers infer a
lack of humanity based on observations of immoral behaviors, we argue that social pain would be
denied to those who are perceived low in morality. However, we think that morality would have a
reduced impact on the inference of physical pain, considering that many nonhuman species (e.g.,
fish; Sneddon, Braithwaite, & Gentle, 2003) are hardwired to detect physical threats.
A second mechanism that might explain why immoral (vs. moral) targets are expected to be
attributed less social (than physical) pain is perceived similarity. One might expect that people feel
more similar to highly moral individuals rather than those who lack moral qualities. Morality is a
highly valued trait and people tend to feel similar to those they like (Byrne, 1971). At the same
time, an increased similarity with the suffering target makes it easier for people to project their own
feelings in similar situations on the target especially for those types of suffering that are less visible
and more abstract, like social pain (Eisenberger, 2012; Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009). Some
initial evidence in this direction stems from Meyer et al. (2013), who showed that observing a
friend’s social exclusion felt as if it happened to the self, the more participants perceived self-other
overlap with the friend. In addition, group membership affects both the perceived similarity and
humanity of social targets. In-group members are generally seen as more similar to the self
(Schubert & Otten, 2002) and more uniquely human (Vaes et al., 2012), compared to out-group
members. Accordingly, the results of Riva and Andrighetto (2012) might be interpreted in terms of
both perceived humanity and similarity. Social, but not physical pain was mostly attributed to the
more human and similar in-group members compared to out-group members (see also Robbins &
Krueger, 2005).
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In sum, we hypothesized that observers would ascribe lower levels of social pain to targets
lacking moral qualities than to those that are perceived as highly moral. In contrast, we anticipated
that this gap would be reduced when considering physical pain judgments. This hypothesis was
tested in four studies. The first study counted as a first test of this general hypothesis and measured
the estimated social and physical pain intensity suffered by a target described as either highly moral
or lacking moral character. The second study added a control condition to test whether it is the
depiction of a target as immoral vs. high in morality that drives the effect. In Study 3, we aimed to
show that social pain judgments only differ as a function of the moral character of the suffering
target testing its effects compared to another important social dimension, that is, competence.
Finally, in Study 4, both proposed underlying mechanisms were tested to determine why people
attribute less social pain to a target that is lacking moral traits. Is it because they dehumanize such
social targets and see him or her as insensitive to social suffering? Or is the lowered inference of
social pain the result of perceived dissimilarity with the suffering target?
Study 1
Study 1 was designed as a first test of our hypothesis that individuals would ascribe a lower
capacity to experience social pain, but not physical pain, when they perceive a target lacking moral
qualities compared to a target possessing a high moral status. To test this hypothesis, we asked
participants to estimate the pain intensity suffered by a target described as either highly moral or
lacking moral character.
Method
Participants
Participants were 35 undergraduate students (17 female; Mage=23.74 years, SD=4.09) at a
large University in Italy. The study employed a 2 (Morality level: high vs. low) × 2 (Pain type:
social vs. physical) mixed factorial design, with the first factor varying between subjects and the
second factor varying within subjects.
Materials and Procedure
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Participants completed a questionnaire that described a series of painful events experienced
by a target. Depending on the experimental condition, the target was described as high or low with
respect to three moral traits (i.e., honesty, sincerity, trustworthiness) (see Leach et al., 2007; see also
Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012). More specifically, participants read a
brief description of a target (i.e., “Paolo an Italian guy who is 27 years old”) followed by a table
showing the three moral traits and, for each trait, its corresponding level (‘high’ or ‘low’) was
marked. Then, participants were presented with a series of twenty painful events. Half of the events
were related to social pain (see Appendix) (e.g., losing touch with one’s fellows; learning about the
death of a former classmate - alpha=.96), and the remaining half of the events concerned physical
pain (e.g., receiving an injection in the mouth; a strong slap in the face - alpha=.89). The socially
and physically painful events were presented in a random order. Participants indicated the pain that
each event could cause the target. In this and in the following studies, responses were recorded on a
0 (no pain) to 10 (most intense pain) scale and averaged to create two overall indexes.
Finally, as a manipulation check, participants rated the target on perceived morality (i.e.,
“How likely is it that the target is moral?”) on seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7
(extremely), and completed demographic questions before being thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
First, to check the effectiveness of the moral trait manipulation, we computed an
independent sample t-test. The analysis revealed that in the high morality condition participants
perceived the target as more moral (M=6.06, SD=1.12) than in the low morality condition (M=1.79,
SD=1.03), t(33)=11.72, p<.001, d=3.9 (95% confidence interval (CI)=[2.80, 5.13]).
Next, we computed a 2 (Morality level: high vs. low) × 2 (Pain type: social vs. physical)
ANOVA, with the first factor varying between subjects and the second factor varying within
subjects (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). The analysis yielded a main effect of the morality
level, F(1,33)=15.37, p<.001,
p2=.32, indicating that participants in the high morality condition
rated all of the events as more painful (M=6.67, SD=1.17) than participants in the low morality
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
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condition (M=4.70, SD=1.69). Moreover, we found a main effect of pain type, F(1, 33)=18.16,
p<.001,
p2=.36, indicating that social pain (M=6.32, SD=2.61) was perceived as more painful than
physical pain (M=5.20, SD=1.60). Importantly, these main effects were qualified by a significant
interaction, F(1,33)=32.28, p<.001,
p2=.50. A series of t-tests revealed that participants ascribed
lower ratings of social pain to the target who lacked moral qualities compared with the highly moral
target, t(33)=5.87, p<.001, d=2.04 (95% CI=[1.16, 2.80]). No differences emerged between the two
targets when physical pain was considered, t(33)=0.56, p=.577, d=0.18 (95% CI=[-0.47, 0.86]). In
sum, Study 1 provided initial support to our hypothesis by showing that the moral characteristics
ascribed to an unknown social target affected social but not physical pain judgment.
Study 2
Study 2 was designed to test whether the effect of morality on social pain judgments was
driven by the depiction of a social target as highly moral, that of the same target as lacking moral
status, or both. To do so, in Study 2 we added a control condition in which no information on the
moral qualities of the targets was provided.
Method
Participants
Participants were 56 undergraduate students (40 female; Mage=24.04 years, SD=5.47) at a
large University in Italy. The study employed a 3 (Morality level: high vs. low vs. control
condition) × 2 (Pain type: social vs. physical) mixed factorial design, with the first factor varying
between subjects and the second factor varying within subjects.
Materials and Procedure
Participants completed an on-line survey. They were presented with a description of one of
three targets. The target could be depicted as high or low on three moral traits (i.e., honesty,
sincerity, trustworthiness). In the control condition, no morality information about the target was
given. Then, similar to Study 1 (see Appendix), participants indicated on a ten-point scale ranging
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from 0 (no pain) to 10 (most intense pain) how much pain they thought a series of twenty socially
and physically painful events would cause to the target (social pain =.95; physical pain =.91).
Finally, as a manipulation check, participants rated the target on perceived morality (i.e.,
“How likely is it that the target is moral?”) on seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7
(extremely), and completed demographic questions before being thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
First, to check the effectiveness of the moral trait manipulation, we computed a one-way
ANOVA. The analysis [F(2,53)=27.64, p<.001] revealed that in the high morality condition
participants perceived the target as more moral (M=5.76, SD=1.30) than in the control (M=4.86,
SD=1.28; t(37)=2.16, p=.037, d=0.70 (95% CI=[0.41, 1.35]) and the low morality condition
(M=2.53, SD=1.38; t(32)=7.05, p<.001, d=2.42 (95% CI=[1.51, 3.30]).
Next, we computed a 3 (Morality level: high vs. low vs. control condition) × 2 (Pain type:
social vs. physical) ANOVA, with the first factor varying between subjects and the second factor
varying within subjects (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). The analysis yielded a main effect of
morality level, F(2,53)=3.29, p=.045,
p2=.11, indicating that participants in the high morality
condition rated all of the events as more painful (M=6.95, SD=1.25) than did participants in the low
morality (M=5.80, SD=1.47; t(32)=2.45, p=.020, d=0.84 95% CI=[0.13, 1.54]). However, the
scores provided by participants in the high morality condition did not differ from those provided by
participants in the control condition, t(37)=1.92, p=.062, d=0.62 95% CI=[-0.31, 1.27]. Similarly,
the low morality and the control condition did not differ between each other, t(37)=0.54, p=.59,
d=0.17 95% CI=[-0.45, 0.81]. As in Study 1, we also found a main effect of pain type, F(2,
53)=22.69, p<.001, p2=.30 95% CI=[0.46, 1.25], indicating that social pain (M=7.31, SD=2.07)
was perceived as more painful than physical pain (M=5.68, SD=1.71). These main effects were
qualified by a significant interaction, F(2,53)=6.34, p=.003, p2=.19. Specifically, we found that
participants ascribed lower ratings of social pain to the target who lacked moral qualities compared
to the highly moral target (t(32)=3.74, p<.001, d=1.28 95% CI=[0.53, 2.01]) and the control
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
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condition (t(37)=2.12, p=.041, d=0.68 95% CI=[.028, 1.33]). By contrast, the difference between
the highly moral target and the control condition was not significant (t(37)=1.45, p=.15, d=0.62
95% CI=[-0.03, 1.26]). Considering physical pain, the analysis showed no differences among the
three moral targets, F(2,53)=1.91, p=.16, p2=.07.
In sum, Study 2 replicated our previous findings and showed that the effect of moral
character on social pain judgments is stronger for targets that are low compared to high in morality.
In other words, it is the perception that an individual lacks moral qualities that leads perceivers to
ascribe them a lower capacity to experience pain following social threats such as ostracism,
exclusion, social loss and rejection. By contrast, physical pain seems to be considered equally
plausible for targets that are either low and high in morality.
Study 3
Studies 1 and 2 supported the hypothesis that observers are influenced by the perception of a
target’s moral status when making judgments on the target’s potential social (but not physical)
suffering. Study 3 was designed to further replicate and extend these findings by considering
another meaningful dimension implied in social judgment, that is, competence (e.g., intelligent,
capable, skillful) (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005).
Indeed, research has shown that social perception is driven by two critical questions: Are other
individuals beneficial or harmful? Are social targets able to enact their intentions? (Cuddy, Fiske, &
Glick, 2008). A good deal of work revealed that the need to detect others’ intentions and abilities
are captured by moral and competence information, respectively (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; see
also Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011). Based on these argumentations, competence has been
typically employed as a control condition in research on morality (Ellemers et al, 2008; Pagliaro et
al., 2011). Thus, Study 3 tested whether individuals relate the attribution of social pain (versus
physical pain) to a target’s morality level but not to a target’s competence level. Thus, our aim was
to test the specificity of the link between social pain attribution and the target’s moral status ruling
out the hypothesis that any type of positive (vs. negative) information regarding a social target
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
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might result in the hypothesized effect. As in the previous studies, we predicted that observers
would ascribe a higher level of social pain to a highly moral target compared with a low moral
target, whereas such difference would be absent for the attribution of physical pain. Furthermore,
we predicted that the perception of the target’s competence level would not affect the perception of
the target’s ability to experience social or physical pain.
Method
Participants
Participants were 53 undergraduate students (24 female; Mage=22. 91 years, SD=2.55) at a
big Italian University. The study employed a 2 (Trait: morality vs. competence) × 2 (Trait level:
high vs. low) × 2 (Pain type: social vs. physical) mixed factorial design with the first two factors
varying between subjects and the last factor within subjects.
Materials and Procedure
As in Study 1 and 2, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire in which a target
was described. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. To
manipulate morality (i.e., honest, sincere, trustworthy) and competence (i.e., intelligent, competent,
skillful) we used six traits carefully balanced for favorability (in order to rule out that our findings
might be due to a general effect of valence; see Brambilla et al., 2012) and for their relatedness with
the morality versus competence dimensions respectively (see Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, &
Cherubini, 2011; see also Leach et al., 2007). Thus, similar to our previous studies, participants read
a table showing three traits of the selected dimension and, for each trait, its corresponding level
(‘high’ or ‘low’) was marked.
Next, following the same procedure of Study 1 and 2 (see Appendix), participants indicated
on a ten-point scale ranging from 0 (no pain) to 10 (most intense pain) how much pain they thought
a series of twenty painful events would cause to the target (social pain =.93; physical pain =.85).
Finally, two items were included to check the success of the experimental manipulations.
Participants rated the target on perceived morality (i.e., “How likely is it that the target is moral?”)
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
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and competence (i.e., “How likely is it that the target is competent?”) on seven-point scales ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
Results and Discussion
To check the manipulation, the morality and competence scores were submitted to a 2 (Trait:
morality vs. competence) × 2 (Trait level: high vs. low) × 2 (Dimension of judgment: morality vs.
competence) ANOVA, with the first two factors varying between subjects and the third factor
varying within subjects. The analysis did not yield a main effect of trait, F(1,49)=0.42, p=.839,
p2=.00. Instead, we found a main effect of the trait level, F(1,49)=78.72, p<.001, p2=.62,
indicating that high trait levels resulted in higher morality and competence scores (M=5.64,
SD=1.07) than low trait levels (M=2.96, SD=1.08). This main effect was qualified by a three-way
interaction, F(1,49)=55.88, p<.001,
p2=.53. The analyses revealed that higher ratings of morality
were found for the highly moral target (M=6.40, SD=.91) compared with the targets low in
morality (M=1.91, SD=1.30), t(24)=10.38, p<.001, d=4.12 95% CI=[2.71, 5.50]. By contrast, no
difference emerged on competence scores t(24)=1.54, p=.136, d=0.61 95% CI=[-.19, 1.40].
Similarly, higher ratings of competence were attributed in the high competence condition (M=6.58,
SD=.67) compared to the low competence condition (M=2.27, SD=1.33), t(25)=10.20, p<.001,
d=3.95 95% CI=[2.61, 5.26]. No difference emerged on morality scores t(25)=1.60, p=.122, d=0.62
95% CI=[-.16, 1.39].
We then computed a 2 (Trait: morality vs. competence) X 2 (Trait level: high vs. low) × 2
(Pain type: social vs. physical) ANOVA, with the first two factors varying between subjects and the
third factor varying within subjects (see Table 3 for descriptive statistics) on participants’ pain
judgments.
The analysis did not yield a main effect of Trait, F(1,49)=1.92, p=.17, p2=.04. Instead, we
found a main effect of trait level, F(1,49)=5.95, p<.018, p2=.10, indicating that the target depicted
in a positive way was perceived to be able to suffer more pain overall (M=6.07, SD=1.17) than the
target depicted in a negative way (M=5.28, SD=1.47). Also, a main effect of pain type was found,
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
15
F(1,49)=63.95, p<.001, p2=.57, indicating that social pain (M=6.75, SD=1.97) was perceived to be
more painful than physical pain (M=4.61, SD=1.57). As expected, a significant three-way
interaction among Trait, Trait Level, and Pain type qualified these main effects, F(1,49)=18.21,
p<.001,
p2=.27. The analyses indicated that lower ratings of social pain were found for the target
who lacked moral qualities compared with the highly moral target, t(24)=8.22, p<.001, d=3.26 95%
CI=[2.05, 4.45]. No differences emerged between the two moral target conditions when physical
pain was considered, t(24)=1.04, p=.305, d=0.41 95% CI=[-.37, 1.19]. Importantly, we found no
differences in the competence conditions for social (t(25)=0.24, p=.810, d=0.09 95% CI=[-.66,
0.85]) or physical pain (t(25)=0.60, p=.553, d=0.23 95% CI=[-0.53, 0.99]).
Thus, Study 3 confirmed the findings of our previous studies and showed that participants
perceived social painful events to be less severe when the target was depicted as low in morality.
No such differences emerged when physically painful instances were rated. Furthermore, these
findings suggested that the tendency of the observers to ascribe a lower capacity to experience
social pain to a target is specific to the moral domain, given that the manipulation of another
fundamental dimension of person perception (i.e., competence) did not exert any effects.
Study 4
Study 4 aimed to expand the findings in two main ways. First, in Study 3, participants
received information about the target only on one dimension. In contrast, in Study 4, we provided
each participant with information on both morality and competence. In addition to being more
realistic, the fourth study’s design enabled us to examine the conjoint effects of the information in
predicting social and physical pain judgments (for a similar argument, see Brambilla et al., 2012).
As in the previous studies, we predicted that social pain judgments should depend to a higher
degree on morality than on competence information. We expect no effects of both traits on physical
pain judgments.
Moreover, we aimed to uncover the mediating mechanism that drives the effect of morality
on social pain judgments. Two mechanisms were measured and their relative importance in
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
16
explaining the morality effect was tested. First, we considered dehumanization as a potential
mediator. In fact, previous studies support the idea that individuals attribute a lesser degree of
humanity to those who lack moral status (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011;
Haslam, Bastian, Laham, & Loughnan, 2011). Furthermore, prior research has found that social
pain (but not physical pain) is a hallmark of humanness and more typical of those who do not
engage in immoral acts (Riva & Andrighetto, 2012). Moreover, it has been shown that individuals
who infringe moral norms are viewed as less human than those who comply with moral norms
(Bastian et al., 2013). This finding suggests a close connection between the perceptions of morality
and the attribution of humanness. Based on previous research indicating that social pain is mostly
attributed to fully human targets (Riva & Andrighetto, 2012), we anticipated that observers would
attribute lower levels of social pain to targets lacking morality (compared to highly moral targets).
Secondly, we considered perceived similarity as another potential mediator. Based on the
idea that individuals tend to view themselves as more moral (even though not necessarily more
intelligent) than others (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989; van Lange & Sedikides, 1998) one
could speculate that observers might perceive a target low in morality as more dissimilar to
themselves and therefore attribute lower ratings of social suffering caused by socially distressing
events. Indeed, lowered similarity makes it more difficult to imagine one’s own feelings in a similar
situation and generalize them to the suffering target. Such a process will especially make a
difference in the attribution of social pain, given that its suffering is less visible and more abstract
(Eisenberger, 2012; Williams et al., 2009; Zhong, & Leonardelli, 2008) and thus might require
more emphatic qualities to be fully recognized.
Method
Participants
Participants were 96 undergraduate students (52 female; Mage=22.58 years, SD=2.59) from
a large Italian university. The study employed a 2 (morality: high vs. low) X 2 (competence: high
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
17
vs. low) × 2 (pain type: social vs. physical) mixed factorial design with morality and competence as
the between-subject factors and pain type as the within-subject factor.
Measures and Procedures
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions and provided with information regarding
the levels of morality (i.e., honesty, sincerity, trustworthiness) and competence (i.e., intelligence,
competence, skillfulness) of an unknown target. Subsequently, participants indicated on a ten-point
scale ranging from 0 (no pain) to 10 (most intense pain) how much pain they thought a series of
twenty painful events would cause the target (social pain
=.93; physical pain
=.83).
To measure dehumanization, we used a series of ten characteristics that included positive
and negative traits (i.e., deeply human, high minded, barbaric, robotic, machine-like, unfeeling,
monster-like, subhuman, beast-like, emotionless -
=.74). We asked participants to use a 1 (not at
all) to 7 (very much) rating scale to indicate how well each characteristic described the target2.
To measure the perceived similarity of the observers with the target, we used four items
(“The target and I are two similar people”; “The target and I are alike”; “I think I have a lot in
common with the target”; “The target and I are very different (reverse-scored)” -
=.89). Responses
were recorded on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) scale and averaged to create a composite score.
Finally, we included two items to check the success of our experimental manipulations. The
participants rated the target on perceived morality (i.e., “How likely is it that the target is moral?”)
and competence (i.e., “How likely is it that the target is competent?”) on seven-point scales ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation check. To check the manipulation, the morality and competence scores were
submitted to a 2 (morality: high vs. low) × 2 (competence: high vs. low) × 2 (manipulation check
type: morality vs. competence) ANOVA, with the first two factors varying between subjects and the
third factor varying within subjects. The analysis yielded a main effect of morality, F(1,91)=347.51,
p<.001,
p2=.79, indicating that the high morality condition resulted in higher manipulation check
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
18
scores (M=5.69, SD=1.29) than the low morality condition (M=3.17, SD=1.42). Similarly, we
found a main effect of competence, F(1,91)=318.56, p<.001,
p2=.78, which again indicated that
the high competence condition resulted in higher manipulation check scores (M=5.58, SD=1.25)
than the low competence condition (M=3.27, SD=1.62). These two main effects were qualified by
significant two-way interactions between morality and the manipulation check (F(1,91)=428.39,
p<.001,
p2=.82), and between competence and the manipulation check (F(1,91)=477.68, p<.001,
p2=.84). The analysis revealed that higher ratings of morality were found for the highly moral
target (M=6.69, SD=.58) than the low moral target (M=1.98, SD=.93) (t(94)=29.54, p<.001,
d=6.03 95% CI=[5.06, 6.98]), whereas no such effect emerged for competence scores, t(93)=0.54,
p=.587, d=.11 95% CI=[-0.29, 0.51]. Similarly, the analyses indicated that higher ratings of
competence were awarded in the high competence condition (M=6.83, SD=.42) than the low
competence condition (M=2.11, SD=1.16) (t(93)=26.33, p<.001, d=5.40 95% CI=[4.51, 6.27]),
whereas no such effect was found on morality scores (t(94)<0.01, p=1.00, d=.11 95% CI=[-0.0008,
0.00009]).
Pain judgments. To test the main prediction of the current investigation, we computed a 2
(morality: high vs. low) X 2 (competence: high vs. low) × 2 (pain type: social vs. physical)
ANOVA, with the first two factors varying between subjects and the third factor varying within
subjects (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics). This analysis yielded a main effect of morality,
F(1,92)=12.93, p=.001, p2=.12, which indicated that participants ascribed a lower capacity to
suffer pain in the low morality condition (M=5.28, SD=1.29) than in the high morality condition
(M=6.18, SD=1.17). In contrast, the analysis did not yield a main effect of competence on pain
scores, F(1,92)=2.28, p=.134, p2=.02. Finally, we found a main effect of pain type on pain scores,
F(1,92)=20.55, p<.001, p2=.18. Similarly to what we found in the previous studies, social pain
(M=6.19, SD=2.08) was considered to be more painful than physical pain (M=5.27, SD=1.44).
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
19
There was no a significant interaction between competence and pain type (F(1,92)=1.51,
p=.222, p2=.01) nor between morality and competence (F(1,92)=0.590, p=.445, p2=.00).
Similarly, the three-way interaction among morality, competence, and pain type was not significant,
F(1,92)=0.86, p=.358, p2=.00. However, as predicted, we found a significant interaction between
morality and pain type, F(1,92)=48.08, p<.001, p2=.34. The analyses indicated that lower ratings
of social pain were found for the target lacking moral qualities than the highly moral target,
t(94)=6.54, p<.001, d=1.34 95% CI=[0.88, 1.77]. No differences emerged between the two moral
target conditions when physical pain was considered, t(94)=1.71, p=.090, d=0.34 95% CI=[-0.05,
0.75].
Perceived similarity. Next, we considered the effect of our manipulation on ratings of
perceived similarity with the target. We computed a 2 (morality: high vs. low) X 2 (competence:
high vs. low) between subjects ANOVA on similarity scores (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics).
The analysis yielded a main effect of morality, F(1,92)=72.11, p<.001, p2=.44, which indicated
that participants in the high morality condition perceived a higher degree of similarity with the
target (M=3.79, SD=1.54) than in the low morality condition (M=2.03, SD=1.03). Similarly, we
found a main effect of competence, F(1,92)=59.88, p<.001, p2=.39, which indicated that the high
competence condition resulted in higher perceived similarity (M=3.71, SD=1.53) than the low
competence condition (M=2.10, SD=1.18). These two main effects were qualified by a significant
interaction between morality and competence manipulation, F(1,92)=5.58, p=.020, p2=.06. The
analyses revealed that participants provided higher ratings of similarity when the target was highly
moral than when the target lacked moral qualities (t(94)=6.56, p<.001, d=1.34 95% CI=[0.89,
1.78]) or when the target was high in competence than when the target was low in competence
(t(94)=5.75, p<.001, d=1.17 95% CI=[0.73, 1.60]).
Dehumanization. To test the effect of our manipulation on dehumanization ratings, we
computed a 2 (morality: high vs. low) X 2 (competence: high vs. low) between-subjects ANOVA
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
20
for dehumanization scores (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics). This analysis yielded a main
effect of morality, F(1,92)=29.01, p<.001, p2=.24, showing that participants ascribed a higher
degree of humanity to the target in the high morality condition (M=3.99, SD=1.38) than in the low
morality condition (M=2.68, SD=.88). In contrast, the analysis did not yield a main effect of
competence on dehumanization ratings (F(1,92)=.02, p=.890,
p2=.00) or an interaction between
morality and competence (F(1,92)=.93, p=.336,
p2=.01).
Mediation analysis. Last, we examined whether participants’ perceived similarity with the
described target and/or participants’ perception of target’s humanity mediated the relationship
between the morality manipulation (high vs. low) and the attribution of social suffering (see Table 5
for correlations between variables). We used a bootstrapping procedure (Hayes, 2013) estimating
direct and indirect effects with multiple potential mediators. First, we found that the manipulation of
morality (coded as: low=-1, high=1) predicted the dependent variable (i.e., social pain scores),
B=2.31, SE=.35, p<.001. Moreover, morality predicted both perceived similarity (B=1.76, SE=.27,
p<.001) and dehumanization (B=-1.57, SE=.29, p<.001).When perceived similarity and
dehumanization were included in the regression equation, dehumanization predicted social pain
(B=-.40, SE=.11, p=.009), whereas the direct effect of the manipulation of morality on social pain
was decreased (B=1.47, SE=.43, p=.01). The analysis provided support for the idea that
dehumanization (B=.64, SE=.18; CI=LL: .28; UL .99, 5000 bootstrap samples) mediated the
relationship between the morality manipulation and the perception of social pain. In contrast,
perceived similarity neither predicted the perception of social pain (B=.11, SE=.12, p=.40), nor did
it play any mediation role (B=.19, SE=.19; CI=LL: -.16; UL .61). Further analyses revealed that
neither similarity (CI=LL: -.29; UL .50) nor dehumanization CI=LL: -.24; UL .34) played a role in
the relationship between morality and physical pain.
Study 4 thus confirms the findings obtained in Studies 1, 2 and 3. We provided each
participant with information on morality and competence. Social pain judgments were more
strongly influenced by information regarding the morality of a social target than information on the
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
21
target’s competence. Whereas in Study 3 our manipulation of morality marginally affected
competence scores, in the present study, our results confirm that morality and competence
manipulations affected only morality and competence scores, respectively. More importantly, the
attribution of humanity partially mediated the interactive relationship between the perception of
morality and social pain judgments.
Meta-Analysis
In four studies, we have shown consistent evidence that perception of morality influences
social pain judgments. By contrast, we found consistent null effects of morality on physical pain
judgments. The mean directions of the relationship between morality and physical pain judgments
have been mixed. Indeed, in Study 1 and 2 the statistical means seemed to suggest that higher
ratings of physical pain could be associated with the highly moral target (see Table 1 and Table 2)
whereas in Study 3 and 4 the direction of the means seemed to suggest that higher physical pain
judgments could be associated with low moral targets (see Table 3 and Table 4). As we pointed out,
such differences on physical pain judgments have always turned out to be nonsignificant. Yet, it
might still be possible that in aggregate, multiple nonsignificant effects could accumulate to show
an overall but modest evidence of a link between perception of morality and physical pain
judgments. To test this possibility, we meta-analytically combined the results from the effect sizes
reported in Studies 1 – 4 (N=213).
The meta-analysis showed that the weigthed combined Z-score for social pain judgments
was statistically significant (Z=8.54, p<.001) whereas that for physical pain judgments was not (Z=-
0.78, p=.96). Furthermore, the effect size for social pain judgments was large (r=.61, d=1.56),
whereas that for physical pain was close to zero (r=-.02, d=.049). These findings are particularly
relevant considering that both the manipulation of the target’s moral qualities and the measures of
social and physical pain judgments were kept identical across the four studies. In sum, social pain
judgments seem to be reliably linked to the perception of a target’s moral qualities. By contrast,
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
22
subjective impressions of physical pain judgments do not seem to correspond to different
perceptions of a target’s morality.
General Discussion
Although knowledge on the experience and consequences of social pain has increased
during the last decade (Eisenberger et al., 2003; MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Riva et al., 2011),
much less is known about beliefs regarding the social pain of others. Four studies provided
consistent support for our hypothesis that individuals ascribe a lower capacity to experience social
pain (but not physical pain) to those who are believed to lack moral qualities compared with those
who are perceived to be highly moral. Our findings are in line with recent evidence showing that
second-hand experiences of social and physical pain are indeed inferred differently (Meyer et al.,
2013, Nordgren et al., 2011; Riva & Andrighetto, 2012). At the same time, the present data extend
these findings showing that a target’s moral status can influence the inference of the target’s pain of
isolation, rejection, or betrayal more than the pain of physical assault or injury.
While Study 1 tested this general hypothesis, Study 2 corroborated these findings showing
that the effect of morality on social pain judgments is driven by the depiction of a target low in
morality (compared to a control condition and a highly moral target). This latter finding is
consistent with prior research showing that negative moral information has a stronger impact in
predicting impressions than positive moral information (Brambilla et al., 2011; Reader & Brewer,
1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). Indeed, moral traits are hierarchically restrictive traits: honest
individuals are expected to behave almost exclusively honestly, while dishonest individuals could
engage in both honest and dishonest behaviors (see Trafimow & Trafimow, 1999). As a result,
negative moral traits are more diagnostic of an individuals’ underlying moral character. Indeed, if a
person steals money, s/he will be perceived as dishonest. By contrast, if someone pays the train
ticket, this does not necessarily result in a perception of morality. Our findings confirm the salience
of negative moral information (or negative information more generally, Baumeister, Bratslavsky,
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
23
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001) and extend its effects from the impression formation domain to the
attribution of social suffering.
Study 3 enabled us to disentangle the effects of perceived morality from those of
competence, another important evaluative dimension. Indeed, this study confirmed the specific role
of morality given that differential perceptions of perceived competence had no comparable effects
on pain judgments. Study 4 further replicated our findings and revealed a possible psychological
mechanism for the relation between moral qualities and pain judgments. Indeed, the study revealed
that the attribution of humanity (rather than perceived similarity) partially mediated the relationship
between the morality manipulation (high vs. low) and the attribution of social suffering.
Classic work on dehumanization (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Kelman, 1976)
emphasizes a strong link between aggression, violence, evil and dehumanization, and subsequent
research has established a strong relationship between moral status and the attribution of humanity
(Bastian et al., 2013). This prior research suggests that when we perceive others to be fully human
we also feel compelled to consider their needs, care about them, and alleviate their suffering (Staub,
2011). In agreement with this research, our findings suggest that when observers perceive that
someone lacks moral qualities and therefore deny this person full humanness (Bastian et al., 2013;
Bastian et al., 2014), they downplay the experiences this person might feel as a consequence of
ostracism, exclusion, and rejection.
In this regard, our results are based on a unidimensional conceptualization of
dehumanization. This might be seen as a departure from previous studies that mostly used a two-
dimensional conceptualization of dehumanization (i.e., animalistic and mechanistic
dehumanization; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). However, recent research that focused on the link
between morality and humanity in an interpersonal context showed that both forms of
dehumanization correlated strongly and were therefore analyzed in a single construct (Bastian,
Jetten, & Radke, 2012; Bastian et al., 2013). Our research fit with this perspective and applied a
similar conceptualization to interpersonal pain perception.
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
24
Based on our data, one way to prevent perpetrators from engaging in a downward spiral of
social suffering might be to refrain from perceiving the victim as lacking moral status. Similarly,
one way to motivate individuals to hold firmly to moral standards is to make the effect that
perceived immorality has on empathy for social suffering salient. A further implication of our
findings is that diminished attributions of the capacity to experience social pain may decrease the
perceived need to provide the support that human targets typically elicit (see Cuddy, Rock, &
Norton, 2007) because the perception of suffering triggers prosocial behavior (Batson, Chang, Orr,
& Rowland, 2002; Batson & Moran, 1999).
Concerning physical pain judgments, we did not find any effects of morality on pain
attributions. Although previous work suggested that witnessing the physical pain of a distant other
(e.g., an out-group member) elicits fewer neural activity and physiological reactions than a close
other, our findings are similar to past research on racial bias that did not find an intergroup bias on
explicit judgments of physical pain (Avenanti et al., 2010; Riva & Andrighetto, 2012). However,
future research should employ measures different from self-report (e.g., physiological markers and
neuroimaging technology) to explore potential effects of moral perception on social and physical
pain at the implicit level.
As they stand, our findings are the first showing that morality and the attribution of social
pain are inherently linked. Clearly, future studies could expand our insights adopting a more fine-
grained analysis. Indeed, in the current set of studies, we considered morality mainly in terms of
trustworthiness and honesty (see also Ellemers et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2007, for a review,
Brambilla & Leach, 2014). Even if the moral domain might be conceived more broadly than this
definition implies (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), trustworthiness and honesty are more generally
and more strongly considered moral than are other relevant traits (Brambilla & Leach, 2014).
Notwithstanding, one direction that would be interesting to take in further research is to investigate
how moral qualities such as harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity (that have recently been
described as the “foundations” of moral judgment; see Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, &
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
25
Ditto, 2011) relate to pain attribution. In a similar vein, in light of the recent distinction between
agentic and experience components of the moral character (Gray & Wegner, 2011) one interesting
direction for future research is to investigate how these two components impact the attribution of
social and physical pain. Indeed, although a good deal of work has investigated the link between
moral agency vs. patiency and the perception of sufferance in general (Gray, Young, & Waytz,
2012; Gray & Wegner, 2011), no prior investigation has examined how these moral components
impacts the inference of social and physical pain in others. Furthermore, going beyond morality,
future research might also investigate whether other prosocial traits ascribed to the target – such as
his/her friendliness and kindness - affect the attribution of social and physical pain.
So, as many questions as we have hoped to answer, there are many more that we could ask.
For instance, one intriguing question that stems from the current research regards the accuracy of
observers’ perception of the link between morality and social suffering. Does the effect we found
reflect just a biased perception of witnesses and observers or does it somehow mirror an accurate
perception of reality? In other words, are more morally disengaged people less sensitive to the pain
of social rejection? Future studies should explore this possibility. For instance, it might be possible
to prime people with an immoral behavior (e.g., asked to remind a time when they behaved in moral
way vs. immoral ways) and then measure their sensitivity to social pain.
In this sense, we argue that ascribing lower levels of social pain to targets low in morality
might reflect a functional response. Given the key role of morality for individual and group
survival, people might be more sensitive when distressing social events, such as ostracism,
exclusion, rejection, isolation, betrayal, and other forms of social disconnection, occur to someone
who is perceived to have a low moral status, that is, someone who constitutes a threat for group life
(De Waal, 1996). In other words, a person low in morality is someone who might be expected to
undergo frequent and prolonged experiences of social threats and, when they happen, the
consequences of such experiences (e.g., the betrayal of a low moral person, such as a thief or a
murderer) are likely to be perceived as less severe and intense. In contrast, observers might be more
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
26
sensitive in cases in which experiences of social threats occur to a person who is equipped with
moral qualities, that is, someone who typifies the ideal image of the self.
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
27
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Footnotes
1. A similar reasoning has been used to differentiate primary from secondary emotions in
intergroup research (Demoulin et al., 2004; Vaes, Leyens, Paladino, & Miranda, 2012).
2. The literature on dehumanization has typically differentiated two senses of humanness.
Human uniqueness traits set humans apart from other species, while human nature defines
the core features of what makes us human (see Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Even though
our dehumanization measure includes terms that refer to both senses of humanness, a
principal component analysis (PCA) confirmed that they represented a single underlying
construct. Similar single construct measures of dehumanization have been used in other
research, especially those that have studied morality in an interpersonal context like the
current study (e.g., Bastain et al., 2013). Therefore, a global index of dehumanization was
created.
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Appendix – Items related to social (from 1 to 10) and physical pain (from 11 to 20) (Studies 1-4)
1. Being ignored by a friend.
2. Feeling betrayed by someone who is important.
3. Feeling unappreciated by someone who is important.
4. Being excluded from a group of friends.
5. Being betrayed by one’s partner.
6. Losing touch with one’s fellows.
7. The exclusion from one’s group.
8. Losing the trust of one’s parents.
9. Being humiliated in front of one’s fellows.
10. Learning about the death of a former classmate.
11. Receiving an injection in the mouth.
12. Taking a cold shower.
13. Getting soap in the eyes under the shower.
14. Be burned on the face by a lit cigarette.
15. Have a leg cramp.
16. A punch to the face.
17. A strong slap in the face.
18. The deprivation of food and water for two days.
19. Being beaten on the back.
20. Getting hit in the head.
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Table 1 – Mean ratings of social and physical pain for the two targets (Study 1). Standard
deviations are provided in parentheses.
Pain type
Morality
Social
Physical
Low
4.64 (2.26)a
5.06 (1.61)a
High
8.33 (1.19)b
5.36 (1.63)a
Note: Means with different subscript in a given column are significantly different from each other at
p < .001.
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Table 2 – Mean ratings of social and physical pain for the three targets (Study 2). Standard
deviations are provided in parentheses.
Pain type
Morality
Social
Physical
Low
5.86 (2.29)a
5.96 (1.54)a
Control Condition
7.35 (2.06)b
5.14 (1.68)a
High
8.14 (1.03)b
6.11 (1.83)a
Note: Means with different subscript in a given column are significantly different from each other at
p < .05.
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
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Table 3 – Mean ratings of social and physical pain for the four targets (Study 3). Standard
deviations are provided in parentheses.
Morality
Competence
Social Pain
Physical Pain
Social Pain
Physical Pain
Low
4.74 (1.23)a
4.56 (1.02)a
6.68 (2.34)a
4.78 (1.66)a
High
8.21 (.92)b
4.01 (1.49)a
6.87 (1.39)a
5.20 (1.85)a
Note: Means with different subscript in a given column are significantly different from each other at
p < .05.
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
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Table 4 – Mean ratings of social pain, physical pain, similarity and dehumanization for the four
targets (Study 4). Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.
Low
Morality
High
Morality
Low
Competence
Social Pain
5.54 (2.18)a
7.47 (1.16)b
Physical Pain
5.59 (1.51)a
5.08 (1.49)a
Similarity
1.47 (.57)a
2.74 (1.3)b
Dehumanization
4.07 (2.25)a
2.21 (.95)b
High
Competence
Social Pain
4.52 (1.64)a
7.22 (1.69)b
Physical Pain
5.45 (1.23)a
4.96 (1.53)a
Similarity
2.58 (1.10)a
4.83 (.95)b
Dehumanization
3.83 (.92)a
2.54 (1.17)b
Note: Means with different subscript in a given row are significantly different from each other at p
< .05.
SOCIAL PAIN & MORALITY
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Table 5 – Correlations between variables (Study 4).
M
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
1. Morality
.50
.50
1
.00
.56**
-.49**
.56**
-17
2. Competence
.50
.50
1
.51**
.01
-.15
-.05
3. Similarity
2.91
2.90
1
-.32**
.39**
-.06
4. Dehumanization
3.16
3.16
1
-.52**
.05
5. Social Pain
6.19
6.18
1
.08
6. Physical Pain
5.26
5.27
1
Note: ** p<.01.