Article

Oligarchy and Democracy in Post-Suharto Indonesia

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  • Embassy of Japan in Malaysia
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Abstract

This article presents a systematic review of the literature of oligarchy in Indonesia, which offers a distinctive interpretation of political change in Indonesia. The article argues that this literature is significant in two important ways. First, it invites ongoing rethinking of the ways in which authoritarian regimes fall. In the mainstream literature of democratisation, the fall of authoritarian regimes is often portrayed as the triumph of pro-democratic civil society mobilisation. Whereas many Indonesianists embrace this mainstream account in explaining the fall of the Suharto regime, the oligarchy literature suggests that its fall was driven not so much by the rise of civil society forces as by tensions between Suharto and oligarchs, in which the former was abandoned by the latter. Second, the oligarchy literature also compels a reappraisal of the nature of Indonesia's new democracy. Unlike the mainstream account of democratisation, which holds an optimistic view that the country is in the 'consolidation' stage towards a liberal democracy, the oligarchy literature sees political transition in Indonesia as a journey to an illiberal type of democracy: namely, oligarchical democracy.

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... Economic & political tensions within the elite, and between the elite and the rest of the population, contributed to the fall of Suharto's government in 1998 (Fukuoka 2013). A new democratic constitution dramatically altered the formal structure of the central government, decentralized substantial amounts of power to district governments, formally recognized customary rights, and opened up new spaces for local political & economic entrepreneurs, as well as media & civil society actors to play a role. ...
... see Lang 2012). Although elements of the old oligarchy retain power, our finding that new actors are having a real impact on the governance process is in contrast to literature that argues that Indonesia remains stuck in a closed, oligarchical form of democracy (Fukuoka 2013). ...
... While decentralization certainly increased the number of actors engaged in governing Indonesia's forests, our analysis points to other factors -notably a continuation of a clientelistic system dependent on resource extraction to support elites and denial of rights to local people -as central to continued deforestation. This is consistent with broader arguments that democratization has not fundamentally changed the exploitative character of Indonesia's democracy (cf Arnold 2008;Fukuoka 2013). It also may imply that the failings of CPR governance in Indonesia are not the result of its large-scale (as argued by Araral), but instead the result of other factors which could potentially be present in small as well as large-scale cases. ...
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... Economic & political tensions within the elite, and between the elite and the rest of the population, contributed to the fall of Suharto's government in 1998 (Fukuoka 2013). A new democratic constitution dramatically altered the formal structure of the central government, decentralized substantial amounts of power to district governments, formally recognized customary rights, and opened up new spaces for local political & economic entrepreneurs, as well as media & civil society actors to play a role. ...
... see Lang 2012). Although elements of the old oligarchy retain power, our finding that new actors are having a real impact on the governance process is in contrast to literature that argues that Indonesia remains stuck in a closed, oligarchical form of democracy (Fukuoka 2013). ...
... While decentralization certainly increased the number of actors engaged in governing Indonesia's forests, our analysis points to other factors -notably a continuation of a clientelistic system dependent on resource extraction to support elites and denial of rights to local people -as central to continued deforestation. This is consistent with broader arguments that democratization has not fundamentally changed the exploitative character of Indonesia's democracy (cf Arnold 2008;Fukuoka 2013). It also may imply that the failings of CPR governance in Indonesia are not the result of its large-scale (as argued by Araral), but instead the result of other factors which could potentially be present in small as well as large-scale cases. ...
Full-text available
Article
While Common Pool Resource (CPR) theory has been widely applied to forestry, there are few examples of using the theory to study large-scale governance. In this paper we test the applicability of CPR theory to understanding forest governance and outcomes in Indonesia between 1965 and 2012. Indonesia contains one of the world's largest tropical forests, and experienced rapid deforestation during this time frame, with forest cover dropping from close to 85% to less than 50%. Using a mixture of within case comparison and process tracing methods, we identify key variables that influenced the levels of deforestation during two time periods: before 1998, when governance was dominated by the dictatorship of President Suharto, Evaluating the utility of common-pool resource theory 305 and after 1998, when democratic governance and political decentralization were initiated, and deforestation rates fell and then rose again. Our results point to the value of CPR theory in identifying important variables that influence sustainability at large scales, however they also illustrate important limitations of CPR theory for the study of forests with large spatial extent and large numbers of users. The presence and absence of key variables from CPR theory did emerge as important causes of deforestation. However, some variables, such as strong leadership and local rule-making, appeared to work in the opposite direction as predicted by CPR theory. In addition, key variables that may have influenced deforestation rates are not well captured in CPR theory. These include the intention of the governance system, the presence of clientelistic politics, the influences of international politics and markets, and the influence of top-down governance. Given that CPR theory does not fully explain the case at hand, its applicability, as is, to large-scale commons should be treated with some caution.
... Thus, Yudhoyono glorified his performance in corruption eradication, but there was not a single reformist effort that damaged the wealth of the capitalists (ibid). The condition in which electoral politics as a representation of the interests of capitalists also occurs in the elected president, namely Jokowi (Fukuoka 2013;Fukuoka and Djani 2016;Juliawan 2014;Mietzner 2018). Likewise, through the role of the media, participating corporate sources, Jusuf Kalla's (Jokowi vice presidential candidate pair) closeness to the Indonesian Employers' Association (APINDO) won Jokowi in the 2014 Election (Fukuoka and Djani 2016). ...
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... The oligarchs reorganized their power through control over political institutions and markets (Robison and Hadiz 2004). Not only did they adapt and reorganize their power, the oligarchs also dominated political contestations, which resulted in the marginalization of civil society (Fukuoka 2013). ...
... Overall, this book, which is based on the author's dissertation at Murdoch University, have complimented previous studies on the para-dox of democratization in Indonesia (Robison and Hadiz 2004;Hadiz 2010;Fukuoka 2013;Törnquist et al. 2017). This book's biggest contribution is its analysis on the role of intellectuals as agents who contribute to the paradox, as the subject of intellectuals have not been a major focus of studies in the field. ...
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This paper argues that the impact of "Islam" on the Indonesian political system is worth studying on three different levels: 1. society's political divisions; 2. the party system 3. parliamentary politics. I contend that there is a specifically Indonesian "consensus-oriented" democracy model involved in the process-which is not, however, without Western predecessors-wherein political Islam and Islamist parties act not as destabilising factors but rather as "Muslim democratic" forces that strengthen democratic consensus in a manner similar to some "Western" Christian democratic parties. This research is based partly on a historical and, implicitly, comparative approach. It builds strongly on the theoretical framework and methodology of Sartori's classic party system typology, Lijphardt's "majoritarian" and "consensus-based" democracy model, and the so-called neo-institutionalist debate on the possible advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary and presidential governments.
... Indeed, Rita Floyd has questioned whether securitisation theory even needs audiences (Floyd, 2010(Floyd, , 2011. If we place this argument in the context of Southeast Asia, audiences may appear to be secondary in importance to securitising actors because Southeast Asian democracies, where they exist, are regressive or unstable Waitoolkiat, 2020a, 2020b;Fukuoka, 2013;Huang, 2017;Jones, 2014;Peou, 2019). Thus, one may argue that powerful political elites can securitise any issue without an audience's permission (Vuori, 2008: 68), as exemplified by the Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia (Arifianto, 2009). ...
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... After the fall of Suharto, previously marginalised Islamist actors seized hold of the rhetoric of social justice and merged it with the language of Islamist politics in a populist fashion to create a divide between the 'pious' and the 'elite' (Hadiz 2016;Fukuoka 2013;Zarkasyi 2008). Despite this, Islamist parties have not been able to win a significant share of the vote in Indonesia (Barton 2010a). ...
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Populism has been on the rise in many countries. As a result, studies on populism have proliferated. However, there are very few studies that investigate and compare different types of populisms in a single nation-state. Furthermore, how these different populists in the same political milieu use cyberspace has not been comparatively studied. This study addresses these gaps by looking at a variety of populist forces within Indonesia that have emerged as major actors and identifying the uses of cyberspace in populist political mobilisation. This paper argues that the three main types of populism that predominate in political rhetoric (religious, chauvinistic, and technocratic) do not exist in isolation but rather borrow from each other. This is reflected in their cyberspace activities.
... Dalam konteks data primer, triangulasi sumber dilakukan dengan cara membangun intersubjektifitas antar informan perihal suatu konsep atau informasi, sehingga didapati pemahaman yang lebih komperhensif terhadap suatu kasus. (Fukuoka, 2013). Perubahan secara institusional yang terjadi dalam fase transisi demokrasi tidak diiringi dengan perubahan pada struktur politik ke arah yang lebih demokratis, di mana struktur oligarki yang berkuasa di era otoritarianisme dulu kini bertransformasi ke alam demokrasi dengan menggunakan instrumeninstrumen demokratis, seperti partai politik, pemilu, dll. ...
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Penelitian ini mencoba untuk mengkaji hubungan antara malpraktik pemilu dengan korupsi dengan berfokus pada analisis terhadap penyimpangan di dalam proses penghitungan dan rekapitulasi suara pada Pemilu Indonesia 2019, dengan fokusan pemilihan legislatif. Penelitian ini mencoba mengisi kekosongan literatur yang mengkaji malpraktik pemilu di Indonesia yang lebih banyak dilihat pada tahapan kampanye ketimbang tahapan penghitungan dan rekapitulasi suara di mana peran penyelenggara pemilu menjadi sangat sentral. Untuk menganalisis hal tersebut, penelitian ini menganalisis secara lebih spesifik pada keterlibatan Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) sebagai penyelenggara pemilu di dalam malpraktik pemilu. Menggunakan metode analisis dokumen dan studi kasus, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa tahapan rekapitulasi suara, khususnya pada tingkat kecamatan, merupakan fase paling rawan terjadinya malpraktik pemilu di mana keterlibatan penyelenggara pemilu ad-hoc dan saksi kandidat memiliki peran penting di sana.
... While religious political parties did not exist before 1998, Islamic civil society groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia/ICMI) played an active role in social life in Indonesia throughout the Suharto period (Nuryanti 2021). The sudden resignation of Suharto transformed Indonesian politics as the country began a transition to democracy, with Indonesian citizens allowed the liberty, for the first time in decades, to freely form political parties (Nuryanti 2021;Yilmaz 2020;Fukuoka 2013;Barton 2006Barton , 2011Barton , 2013Barton , 2015a. The change allowed religious parties to form and vigorously contest for the support of voters. ...
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The first quarter of the twenty-first century has witnessed the rise of populism around the world. While it is widespread it manifests in its own unique ways in each society, nation, and region. Religious populism, once rarely discussed, has come to take a more prominent role in the politics of a diverse range of societies and countries, as religious discourse is increasingly used by mainstream and peripheral populist actors alike. This paper examines the rise of religious populism in Indonesia through a study of the widely talked about, but little understood, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI—Front Pembela Islam). The case study method used to examine the FPI provides a unique insight into a liminal organization which, through populist and pro-violence Islamist discourse and political lobbying, has had an outsized impact on Indonesian politics. In this paper, we identify the FPI as an Islamist civilizationist populist group and show how the group frames Indonesian domestic political events within a larger cosmic battle between faithful and righteous Muslims and the forces that stand against Islam, whether they be “unfaithful Muslims” or non-Muslims. We also show how the case of the FPI demonstrates the manner in which smaller, liminal, political actors can instrumentalise religion and leverage religious rhetoric to reshape political discourse, and in doing so, drive demand for religious populism. The paper makes two arguments: First, the FPI is an example of a civilizationist populist movement which instrumentalises religion in order to create demand for its populist solutions. Second, that as Islamic groups and organisations in Indonesia increasingly rely on religio-civilizational concepts of national identity, they become more transnational in outlook, rhetoric, and organisation and more closely aligned with religious developments in the Middle East.
... Secondly, there has not been a consolidation of democratic forces post-Suharto. Instead, years of income inequality meant a handful of elites have entered the political arena, ushering in an era of oligarchs (Fukuoka, 2013). While Indonesia has seen improvements among many economic indicators, it still remains a developing country with major issues related to human development, unequal distribution of wealth, and growing threats from climate change. ...
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... Azonban rácáfolva minden korábbi aggodalomra és szkeptikus várakozásra, Indonézia Szuharto bukása és az 1998-ban megkezdődött "rendszerváltás" óta immár négy parlamenti és három közvetlen elnökválasztáson van túl, 1 melyeket a nemzetközi megfi gyelők és szervezetek egyaránt szabadnak és szabályszerűnek minősítettek (Ufen, 2018: 307.;Fionna-Tomsa, 2017: 5.), bár egyes szerzők továbbra is rendkívül kritikusak az indonéz demokráciával kapcsolatban: "stagnálónak", "alacsony minőségűnek" (Mietzner, 2012: 209-229.) vagy egyenesen "oligarchikusnak" (Robison-Hadiz, 2004;Fukuoka, 2013) minősítve azt. A magam részéről inkább azon a véleményen vagyok, hogy minden hiányosságával és diszfunkcionalitásával együtt a jelenlegi indonéz politikai rendszer mindenképpen kimeríti a demokrácia minimalista, procedurális kritériumait, 2 sőt azt sem tartom túlzásnak kijelenteni, hogy Indonézia immár túljutott a demokratikus átmenet fázisán és a kétezres évek derekától, legkésőbb a 2004-es választásoktól konszolidált demokráciának nyilvánítható (Barton, 2010: 476.). ...
... Demokrasi yang dianut Indonesia tercermin dalam sistem politik yang diterapkan dimana rakyat sebagai pemegang kedaulatan tertinggi terlibat dalam pengisian jabatan-jabatan politik. Namun demikian, meskipun stabilitas politik dan ekonomi telah dipulihkan, sistem politik baru dapat dicirikan sebagai "demokrasi oligarkis", di mana lembaga-lembaga formal demokrasi sebagian besar dibajak oleh elite oligarki yang mengendalikan konsentrasi besar sumber daya (Fukuoka, 2013;Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014;Hadiz, 2010;Robison & Hadiz, 2004;Winters, 2013) . Untuk memastikan demokrasi berjalan efektif maka disusun instrumen keterlibatan rakyat dalam proses pengisian jabatan politik tersebut. ...
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Partai Politik memiliki peran strategis dalam konsolidasi demokrasi setelah Indonesia merdeka khususnya setelah bergulirnya era reformasi. Kehadiran partai politik memiliki fungsi urgen untuk diperhatikan dan diberikan ruang. Salah satu fungsinya adalah pada recruitment politik dalam pengisian jabatan politik pada kekuasaan eksekutif dan legislatif di Indonesia. Fungsi tersebut akan dirasa berbeda karena sistem pemerintahan yang diterapkan di Indonesia agak berbeda dengan sistem negara lain sekalipun sama-sama menggunakan sistem presidensial. Fungsi recruitment dapat dilihat pada sistem pemilu yang diselenggarakan di Indonesia baik pada pemilihan anggota legislatif atau juga dalam pemilihan pasangan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden. Disamping itu terdapat perbedaan fungsi partai secara kelembagaan pada dua kekuasaan tersebut. Pada kekuasaan legislatif, partai politik diberikan ruang yang cukup fundamental dengan diberikannya hak membentuk fraksi sesuai afiliasi politik sehingga akan memudahkan dalam menjalankan fungsi-fungsi lembaga perwakilan. Sedangkan pada kekuasaan eksekutif, sekalipun partai politik tidak diberikan hak yang sama karena indonesia menggunakan sistem pemerintahan presidensial tetapi pengaruh partai politik pada kekuasaan eksekutif dilakukan dalam hubungan ketatanegaraan antara DPR dan Presiden dalam menjalankan wewenang masing-masing.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Political parties have a strategic role in consolidating democracy after Indonesia's independence, especially after the reform era. The presence of the political party certainly has a vital function to be considered and given space. One of its features is in political recruitment in filling political positions in the executive and legislative powers in Indonesia. This function is different because the government system implemented in Indonesia is somewhat different from other countries' systems even though they use presidential systems together. The recruitment function can see in the electoral system held in Indonesia both in the legislative elections and also in the election of the pair of Presidents and Vice Presidents. Besides that, there are differences in party functions institutionally in the two powers of eager. In legislative power, political parties are given a reasonably fundamental space by giving them the right to form a faction according to political affiliation so that it will facilitate the carrying out of the functions of representative institutions. While the executive power, even though political parties not give the same rights because Indonesia uses a presidential system of government but the influence of political parties on the executive power is carrying out in constitutional relations between the parliament and the President.
... Furthermore, several studies of democracy in Indonesia have also been carried out by researchers (see Antlov, Brinkerhoff, & Rapp, 2010;Aspinall, 2010;Mietzner, 2012;Fukuoka 2013aFukuoka , 2013bBeer, 2015;Wilson, 2015;Judge & Annahar, 2016;and Berenschot, 2018). Most of the studies show that there are still issues in the political practice of democracy in Indonesia such as the growing conflict, patronage, and clientelism. ...
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This article attempts to discuss the practice of democratic governance in contemporary Indonesia. This study is essential since Indonesia is one of the countries transitioning from authoritarianism towards democracy following the fall of Suharto’s regime. This study shall answer whether democratic governance in Indonesia experiences a crisis, with a focus of analysis on the four dimensions of democratic governance, namely: (1) rule of law, (2) human rights, (3) civil society, and (4) elections and political process. This study applies a qualitative method by collecting data from document studies and literary studies. The findings in this study indicate that democratic governance in Indonesia experiences a crisis as evidenced by the remaining-weak legal supremacy in Indonesia, and the existence of violations of the implementation of human rights, eventually led to horizontal conflicts. The inability of civil society organizations to carry out their functions in democratization as an intermediary between the community and the state as well as to influence government policies for the public interest. Another recent weakness is there are still strong issues related to primordialism in the occasion of General Elections. This crisis of democratic governance shall bring Indonesia to "the decline of democracy" instead of democratic consolidation.
... Pada sisi tertentu penelitian ini turut meneguhkan hasil studi oligarki yang dilakukan beberapa pemuka oligarki mulai dari Fukuoka (2013Fukuoka ( , 2012, Takashi (2014), Tapsell, Suaib & Zuada (2015, 2016, Achwan (2013), Agustino (2010), dan Kusman (2017), dimana dalam penelitian ini menemukan sejumlah bukti terkait adanya relasi bisnis-politik yang melibatkan para aktor-aktor berpengaruh di daerah dengan basis kepemilikan sumber daya material yang mumpuni serta memiliki akses penuh terhadap kekuasaan politik di daerah. Bahwa di bawah rezim oligarki kekuasaan akan cenderung didominasi dan dimanipulasi oleh para oligark untuk kepentingan kelompok mereka. ...
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Demokrasi Indonesia pascareformasi menunjukkan sebuah gejala politik oleh apa yang kini dikenal sebagai rezim oligarki. Rezim ini ditandai oleh menguatnya relasi bisnis-politik yang menempatkan para aktor pemilik basis sumber daya material terkuat sebagai figur paling dominan pada arena politik. Fenomena ini kini dengan mudah dijumpai di berbagai daerah seiring dengan terbukanya kran desentralisasi dan politik elektoral yang sarat politik uang. Salah satu di antara daerah di Indonesia yang tengah mementaskan praktik kekuasaan oligarki ini ialah Kota Batu, Jawa Timur. Tujuan penelitian ini ialah untuk memahami oligarki di Kota Batu berikut cara kerjanya dalam pembentukan kebijakan publik. Penelitian ini dilaksanakan di Kota Batu dengan menggunakan pendekatan penelitian deskriptif kualitatif. Teori yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah teori oligarki Winters dan Robison-Hadiz. Hasil penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa terdapat fenomena oligarki di Kota Batu yang menyerupai tipe oligarki penguasa kolektif dan oligarki sipil Winters serta oligarki predatoris Robison-Hadiz. Penelitian ini juga menemukan hal baru yang belum diteliti secara mendalam oleh Winters, Robison-Hadiz maupun para peneliti oligarki terdahulu, yakni terdapat sebuah fenomena oligarki di ranah lokal (Kota Batu) yang unik, dimana oligarki ternyata juga beroperasi dalam sistem relasi kuasa dengan ciri penyalahgunaan jabatan untuk menghapus beban pajak di kalangan para oligark serta terlibat dalam praktik korupsi.
... Factors on the Impeachment of Garut's Regent: Indonesia post-Soeharto was a hybrid of the concept of oligarchy and complex democracy, but somehow was stable to establish political structure responding public participation (winters, 2011). Even though, there was a political dynamic in locals because of the decentralization, but the political actor was dominated mainly by the oligarchy, the old political actors from New Order era who was willing to possessed the political power and did not share equal chance to non-state actors because of the scarce extractive resource to organize power for the local strategic position (Fukuoka, 2013). The power transition from Soeharto's New Order to the era of Reform was mainly formed by the significant roles of the low class of society. ...
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Moral and political are two things that cannot be separated. The marriage of a regent in Garut regency, Indonesia, with an underage girl eventually leads to community action, where people demand the regent to resign from his position as a regional head. It was not even four days of marriage the regent had divorced his young wife via a short message from his own mobile phone. Therefore, the people of Garut suddenly expressed their wrath through a large-scale demonstration which pushedthe Local House of Representative immediately to process the regent’s removal. This research utilized a qualitative approach with a case-study method, the data in this research relied on the practice of in-depth interviews, observations, and documentaries. This research succeeded to observe that the general factor which underlying the action of demonstration in Garut which demanded the resignation of the regent was caused by the political climate change of democratization in the national level which also impacted Garut Regency. The national politicalclimate change increased the unconventional public participation in Garut and provided political sphere for non-state actors to establish political-involvement balance between state actors and non-state actors themselves. In other hand, the specific underlying factor on this case is the regent’s behavior which was judged as the act of dishonorable humiliation on women’s dignity, especially his speech in some national television channels. The power of this study lies on its novelty, filling in lubrication and study originality, towards the moral and ethical behavior as the new object on Social Movement.
... However, belying all previous concerns and sceptical expectations, since the fall of Suharto and "regime change" in 1998, Indonesia has seen four parliamentary and three direct presidential elections, 2 which both international observers and organisers have qualified as free and fair (Ufen, 2018, p.307;Fionna & Tomsa, 2017, p.5). Although some authors remain highly critical of Indonesian democracy, qualifying it as "stagnant" or "low quality" (Mietzner, 2012) or explicitly "oligarchic" (Robison & Hadiz, 2004;Fukuoka, 2013), I would argue that despite all of its weaknesses and dysfunctions the present Indonesian political system meets the minimalist procedural criteria of democracy. 3 It is not too much to say that Indonesian democracy has passed the phase of democratic transition, and as such since the mid-2000s (at the very least, since the 2004 elections) the country can be regarded as having a consolidated democracy (Barton, 2010, p.476.). ...
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... Overall, many studies have sought to understand the civil-military relationship, military politics, and the political parties themselves in Indonesia during the democratic transition and the consolidation periods. Important subjects include the influence of indigenous military officers on the political direction of the military (Chandra and Kammen 2002) and the reorganisation of the power of the political elite and the patri-monial oligarchy (Hadiz 2003;Aspinall 2013;Webber 2006;Fukuoka 2013;Case 2007). Other studies have focused on political development, the cartelisation of parties, and democratic institutions undergoing change during the transition period (Ghoshal 2004;Slater 2004;Tan 2006;Ufen 2008;Liddle and Mujani 2009). ...
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This study examines the role played by purnawirawan (retired military officers) in political party development in post-authoritarian Indonesia from 1998 to 2014. The role of purnawirawan remains a critical research gap in the literature on democratisation in post-authoritarian Indonesia, particularly in studies which focus on civilian-military relations. The article finds that purnawirawan have had a significant impact on the creation of a new type of party -one which combines militarycentred leadership and civilian-controlled management. This new arrangement has enabled these former military officers to protect their interests. This study contributes to the existing literature on the impact of military reform on the increasing numbers of purnawirawan turning to civilian politics in order to maintain influence via electoral political contestation in the context of democratic transition. © 2017, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. All rights reserved.
... The greatest depth of research in the region on the political family is from the Philippines (McCoy, 2002), with an emerging scholarship on Thailand and Burma. The study of Indonesian political families is also a growing field of scholarship, including studies of dynasties in local government as well as at the national level (Aspinall, 2013;Buehler, 2010Buehler, , 2012Buehler, , 2013Case, 2010;Mietzner, 2010;Fukuoka, 2012). However, with few exceptions (McIntyre, 2005) these families are examined as a sub-set of corrupt and nepotistic practice, or within the role of elites and oligarchs in electoral politics (Choi, 2011). ...
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ABSTRAK Pasca reformasi di Indonesia telah mewujudkan satu perubahan di Indonesia. Hal ini adalah disebabkan oleh kejatuhan rejim Soeharto telah meninggalkan kesan yang mendalam terhadap demokrasi di Indonesia. Kewujudan golongan oligarki dan kartel yang diwarisi dari zaman Orde Baru menjadi pemerintah belakang tabir di Indonesia. Masalah ini jika dibiarkan akan menjadi barah kepada demokrasi di Indonesia apabila mereka yang menang dalam pemilihan umum serta ahli legislatif menjadi boneka kepada elit kapitalis (oligarki) dan elit politik (kartel) dalam menentukan hala tuju negara. Pelbagai langkah perlu diambil bagi menangani politik kartel dan oligarki di Indonesia. Metodologi kajian ini adalah kualitatif dengan menggunakan teknik kajian kepustakaan. Hasil kajian mendapati antara langkah yang boleh diambil ialah dengan menggalakkan partisipasi masyarakat dalam politik, merombak struktur dalaman parti, pemilihan atau rekrutmen ahli parti secara bebas, pengawalan terhadap politik kekerabatan dan pemerkasaan terhadap media bebas oligarki. Kata kunci: Oligarki, kartel, demokrasi, langkah mengatasi, parti politik
Article
This study aims to investigate the impact of political connection on sharia non-compliance risk of Indonesian and Malaysian Islamic Banks. The analysis of this study was based on annual reports, including state-owned and private Islamic banks, from 2006 to 2016. The data was then evaluated using panel data regression. The results show that politically connected Islamic banks in Indonesia could reduce their sharia non-compliance risk better than non-politically connected Islamic banks. However, we did not find any evidence for the case of Malaysian Islamic banks. This study aims to benefit policymakers on the sharia compliance supervision of Islamic banks. This study is also expected to provide information and contribution as a reference for the Indonesian and Malaysian society in using the services of Sharia-based financial institutions, particularly Islamic banks. The novelty of this study highlights the impact of political connection and sharia non-compliance risk of Islamic banks.
Chapter
From the discussion on the variants of institutional theory in this chapter, the historical institutionalism serves as one of the major theoretical anchors to comprehend the institutional creation of the Indonesian FSA as the rationale for the existing domestic implementation gaps. Consequently, this book uses an approach that expands the account of historical institutionalism. This expansion includes features that can incorporate both the bidirectional relationship and the surrounding structural context, or termed as the “agents-in-context” approach.KeywordsAgents-in-ContextInstitutional TheoryHistorical Institutionalism
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Recent studies have focused attention on the proliferation of plans in the Global South for massive infrastructure investment to accelerate peri-urbanization and link together networks of proximate cities. This paper proposes that a focus on the national politics of the infrastructure push is an essential starting point to understand this trend, both because the national state plays a constitutive role in the processes that are shaping emerging urbanity, and because national states are themselves being transformed by this moment. In pursuing infrastructure-driven extended urbanization, national state actors seek to capitalize on moments of opportunity presented by shifts in the investment priorities of transnational financial actors, and by advances in infrastructure and logistics technologies, to gain power through the formation of political regimes based on economic growth and the distribution of rents from land development. Hence extended urbanization proceeds not as a gradual and linear process, but is instead marked by waves of disruptive and politically contentious reforms and plans intended to enable real estate, infrastructure, and logistics megaprojects. The current wave of political projects around extended urbanization is marked by distinct features, including the increasingly fragmented and decentered nature of transnational finance, and geopolitical dynamics associated with the emergence of an increasingly polycentric global order. It is consequently marked by geopolitical competition to shape emergent state agendas of extended urbanization, and by increasing variegation in the models of infrastructure-driven extended urbanization that state actors adopt. The paper illustrates these arguments with examples from Southeast Asia's mega-urban regions.
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This study analyzed the contributing factors to the failure of the anticorruption civil society coalition movement in rejecting the revision agenda of Law No. 30 of 2002 concerning the Commission for the Eradication of Corruption (KPK Law) in 2019. This study combines Dough McAdam social movement theory (2004) consisting of three approaches, namely the approach of political opportunity structure, the theory of mobilization of resources, the theory of framing process with the framework of explanation of success and inhibiting factors of social movements from David A. Locher (2002). The research method used is qualitative with the primary data source of interview and secondary data processing. This research shows that social movements conducted by the anticorruption civil society coalition are quite difficult until in the end the movement does not succeed in achieving the movement's objectives, because the revision of the KPK Law was successfully passed by the DPR on September 17, 2019. The factors that led to the failure of the anticorruption civil society coalition movement were classified into two, namely external and internal factors of the movement. External factors identified from the findings of this research are also differentiating from previous years that the structure of political opportunity had a major contribution in the failure of social movements conducted by the coalition. It was indicated by various indicators, namely the momentum of agreement between the House of Representatives and the Government; relative unity of all legislatures; The House of Representatives accelerated the process of legislation; and political structures that close the movement's opportunities. Internally, there are resource problems identified; dissocies of community opinion; weaknesses in refuting framing; and less able to convince policymakers. External factors are the dominant cause of the failure of the anticorruption civil society coalition movement to reject the revision of the KPK Law. Keywords: Anticorruption Civil Society Coalition, Social Movement, Revision of KPK Law
Article
This research attempts to develop the reformist dimensions based on the case of successful political outsiders. Literature suggest that reformers are those perceived to be successful in serving the citizens through their capabilities on making changes. To achieve this goal, this study explores the brand images of Indonesia’s political outsiders who have strong image of reformers which are Jokowi, Ahok and Risma and investigate how they are being perceived to be successful in serving the citizens. The present research, which consist of three studies, conduct exploratory factor analysis using sequential mixed methods. The first two studies utilize qualitative paradigms with interview and document analysis to determine reformist dimensions using thematic analysis. Following this, a survey was launched (n = 453) for a reliability and validity test. The qualitative studies have delineated the reformist characteristics into three dimensions: perceived qualities (three items), implemented programs (four items) and engagement style with citizens (three items). The dimensions have adequate factor analysis values and high reliability scores. Findings suggest that reformist attributes have several traits such as ‘anti-corruption’, ‘innovativeness’ and a high rate and unique voter engagement style. This research contributes to the development of political marketing theories on candidates’ reformist branding attributable to the phenomenon of the rise of political outsiders. It explores the interplay of leadership and political brand image from the cases of successful rise of political outsiders. The leadership aspects relevant to shape the brand image of a reformist from voters’ perspective are discussed based on findings.
Article
This study investigates the risk allocation preferences of Indonesian government agents within a publicprivate partnership (PPP) scheme in electricity infrastructure projects. Full-factorial conjoint analysis is employed by introducing three groups of risk factors, namely, Policy, Legal, and Project residual risks, to form eight distinctive scenarios. A total of 37 respondents from a government agency and other public agencies participated in the experiment, and two distinct clusters within a single party (public entity/government) emerged. The two clusters agree on the order of importance of risk preferences but disagree on nearly everything else. The clusters diverge in the magnitude of risk importance, risk preference scores, profiles, and the most preferred scenarios. This study also determines that the risk preference profiles of both clusters do not consistently follow the optimum risk-sharing principles. Moreover, this study elaborates on the scientific contributions and practical implications of the findings. Results provide essential insights into the risk allocation preferences of the public agents. The findings contribute to the development of mutual understanding between the public and private entities.
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What is the present state of democracy among the Asian countries that were (re)democratized during the third wave of democratization? What makes the differences? Why some specific factors play prominent role on the deepening of democracy among them? These are the primary questions of this study. The findings from ten young Asian democracies are as follows. First, all the Asian countries that (re)democratized during the third wave of democratization are practicing democratic system at present. Six of them experienced the breakdowns, while four remain as a continuous democracy. Second, out of eleven structural and institutional factors, examined in this research, only the presidential system has clearer positive impact and economic development has a partial effect on the deepening of democracy. Indirect dictatorship or dominancy of family politics in the parliamentary democracies is found as main reason for the perils of parliamentarism among young Asian democracies.
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This study aims to explain the ideological confrontation, the role of intellectual figures, and the formative role text of Penembak Misterius by Seno Gumira Ajidarma uses sociology of literature as the approach of the study with the specialized implementation of hegemony theory by Antonio Gramsci. The results of this study are as follows. First, the ideological confrontation in Penembak Misterius aims at denying the absolute authority of the New Order's formal ideology, namely militarism, development, capitalism, authoritarianism, hedonism, and radicalism. Second, the role of intellectual figures in Penembak Misterius is played to criticize capitalism, materialism, hedonism, developments, national urbanization, also criticizing New Order government officials, the mysterious shooting policy, and at the same time criticizes violence and human rights violations for children. Third, the formative role of the Penembak Misterius text acts as an interrogative text based on the practice of critical memory. It does not only serve as a documentation of historical events but also intends to link the historical events as an emancipation effort.
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Timber sourcing is shifting from extraction from natural forests to forms of cultivation that are increasingly agricultural in nature. This book takes a multidisciplinary approach to examine the socio-political, biophysical and discursive dimensions of this divergence of wood production from forests. This analysis challenges the historical integration of wood production and forest ecosystem management exemplified by the institutions of forestry with their inherent wood/forest connection. This has significant implications for how wood and forest socio-ecological systems confront change and challenge ideas about how to achieve sustainability. Historically, the institutions of stewardship forestry were founded on ideals of sustainable systems in long-term equilibrium. However, these occur within rapidly evolving social and technological contexts that constantly challenge the maintenance of any equilibrium. This creates considerable tension within wood and forest socio-ecological systems and their institutions and governance. Moving beyond adaptation to transformation, however, requires a willingness to consider post-forestry conditions, such as integration of emerging wood cultivation systems into agricultural and landscape approaches, and increasing management of extensive forest ecosystems for non-wood values in the absence of wood production. This book includes four case studies: a global modelling of shifts in wood production and three national case studies (Australia, Indonesia and New Zealand), each analysing shifts in resilience in wood and forest socio-ecological systems using a different disciplinary approach. This book will be of interest to advanced students, researchers and professionals in forestry, land use, conservation, rural studies and geography.
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This chapter focuses on the international expansion of Indonesian capitalists across the region as a way of understanding the social forces and their coalitions in conditioning the political support for the regional economic integration project. The chapter moves beyond the methodological nationalism of existing literature on Indonesian capitalist formation which tends to emphasize their position within domestic political and economic structures. The chapter argues that Indonesian capitalists have continued to emerge into international fractions of capital, which are linked to the circuits of capital beyond the nation-state. Such a transformation denotes a shift from capitalists which are only interested in protecting domestic markets, to those with an interest in the unrestricted regional economy, especially through the project of ASEAN economic integration. In this context, regional trade governance is viewed as a new spatial fix for economic regulatory coordination beyond state territories. It is noteworthy that the regionalization of these capitalists has been facilitated by the state, specifically through foreign economic policies that support regional economic initiative as well as economic liberalization packages.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the hidden process of collusion among power holders in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in an emerging economy, which endures despite comprehensive reforms towards democracy and good governance. Why are mechanisms of checks and balances not functioning in the way they should? Design/methodology/approach The analysis is based on in-depth interviews with board members, executives, politicians, bureaucrats and representatives from auditing boards involved in the management of SOEs in Indonesia. Findings The findings reveal practices of collective conservatism, reciprocal opportunism and normalisation of corruption. The costs of getting into powerful positions are so high that conglomerate business owners gain control over the management of SOEs. The authors use the terms “wall-building and gatekeeping” to explain such cases. Research limitations/implications There is a continuous process of wall building and gatekeeping occurring among business oligarchs, bureaucrats and elected politicians in Indonesia. New entrants into the system are co-opted by the established elite. Practical implications This study shows collusion, rent-seeking and corruption among political and business elites as well as top officials in the government hinder good governance reforms in state-owned Indonesian enterprises. Social implications Collusion and illicit business practices in SOEs are clearly grounded on wall building and gatekeeping. Tackling this problem is a precondition for good governance and an improved legal and regulatory business environment in Indonesia. The ideal separation of powers and the checks and balances for good governance apparently need more than a democracy to break through. A further strengthening of the free press and critical academics will be one crucial contribution. Originality/value There is generally a lack of understanding of the context of corruption, such as the influence of institutional and organisational structures. The topic of corruption is also under-researched due to the difficulty of finding empire evidence. This paper contributes to explaining why new political and organisational structures, such as a democratically elected parliament and a particularly designed corruption eradication commission, are not able to hinder rent-seeking practices and illicit political business in state agencies.
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Despite growing concern about the low-carbon economic development, little is known about the role of political institutions, democracy, or the absence thereof, in controlling carbon intensity (carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP). This paper estimates the causal effects of democratic transition in Indonesia on its national carbon emission intensity. The synthetic control method is adopted to handle both time-invariant and time-variant confounding heterogeneity. Results show that Indonesia’s democratic transition increases on average 0.24 kg carbon dioxide emissions per constant 2005 US dollar in the post-transition period (1999–2010), a rise of approximately 25.34%. The placebo tests indicate this causal effect is significant and the leave-one-out sensitivity check also demonstrates its robustness. The evidence of Indonesia suggests that democratic transition may serve to intensify, rather than mitigate, the emissions of carbon dioxide. Therefore, policymakers should pay more attentions to the contextual fit of democratic transition.
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There is persistent concern that Southeast Asian economies may eventually fall into the ‘middle-income trap’ due to the slow upgrading of their technological capabilities. However, the five Southeast Asian countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam) covered by this volume have performed much better economically than many non-Asian middle-income countries although not as well as the four East Asian ‘tiger economies’ and China. Those Southeast Asian economies have derived an important part of their vitality by pursuing economic growth and competitiveness along lesser known or recommended pathways such as niche-oriented activities, natural resource processing, and cheap labour-based production, or a combination of these. In the final analysis the technological upgrading of industries and services, including resource-based and niche-oriented ones, will remain the most plausible way to continue catching up with the advanced economies and to stay competitive vis-à-vis emerging rivals. However, just as past development trajectories had been shaped by domestic socio-political configurations and the international/regional environment, so future prospects for these countries depend on how well they adapt to the fluid conditions of global competition and the uncertain state of global markets. They would also have to overcome a sort of ‘socio-political trap’ of oligarchic aggrandizement and populist pressures that result in fragmented interests without a national consensus for upgrading industries and services.
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Just a few months into his first term, the new president of Indonesia, Jokowi, began to disappoint his supporters who had expected his presidency to enhance the quality of Indonesia’s dysfunctional democracy.¹ Contrary to his campaign promise of establishing a ‘clean’ and ‘professional’ government without horse-trading, Jokowi granted strategic government positions to those with links to oligarchic interests, indicating that key decisions were largely dictated by his party patrons. Much of the literature, which has tended to portray the rise of Jokowi as a challenge to oligarchic interests, is not well placed to account for this ‘U-turn’. Against this backdrop, this article explores another dimension of Jokowi’s ascendance, arguing that it should also be understood in the broader context of oligarchic adaptation of ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives – measures to attract enlightened voters to compensate for increasingly ineffective clientelistic mobilisation. This is not to argue that Jokowi was simply made a ‘puppet’ of his patrons, but to suggest that more attention needs to be directed to the broader structural constraints placed on Jokowi in order to have a more nuanced understanding of the political context in which he must operate.
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This research studied the village regulation making process based on the Law No. 32/2004 and the relationships among head of village, administrators of Village Consultative Board (Badan Permusyawaratan Desa/BPD/BHP), and adat leaders in the village of Adat Saibatin community. The research was conducted in several villages of Cukuh Balak sub-district, Tanggamus district, Lampung province, Indonesia in 2012. The data were collected by employing interview and observation. The results of this study showed that the regulation making process in the village of Adat Saibatin community did not have clear stages to which the regulations were made unilaterally by the head of the village himself/herself. The adat leaders' participation as community leaders in the villages almost disappeared and unstated in the regulations. Furthermore, Village Consultative Board was also in a weak position due to the absence of deliberation and agreement as the core principle known as the villages' law in the process of making the regulations.
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Indonesian foreign policy has changed substantially since the fall of Suharto in 1998. Early post-Suharto governments were preoccupied with the business of democratic transition—establishing democratic institutions, withdrawing the military from politics, and resisting the various threats to reform. In more recent years, however, foreign policy has become a higher priority; the government has tried to improve Indonesia’s international image, and to enhance its role in Southeast Asia and in the world. Its foreign policy goals emphasize peace, prosperity and stability—in both the immediate region and globally—and Indonesia’s role in pursuing these goals. What explains the evolution of Indonesia’s foreign policy?
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This chapter aims to highlight the opportunities and challenges of Indonesia–China relations in the twenty-first century. Departing from the Cold War hostility, post-Suharto Indonesia has significantly strengthened its ties with China not only in the economic arena but also in the political and security arena. Looking at the evolution of economic relations, this chapter highlights that the growing ties with China have brought expanding opportunities for Indonesia, particularly in the form of China's investment, while at the same time exposing Indonesian manufacturers to greater economic competition. With particular attention to the implementation of the ACFTA, this chapter highlights that increased economic competition with China has driven segments of the Indonesian business sector to demand greater protectionism, deliberately provoking the perception of the ‘China threat’. It is emphasised that despite recent improvements, Indonesia–China relations have not entirely broken away from the difficult past as suspicions and sensitivity continue to characterise these relations. In fact, the perception of China's aggressive penetration in the Indonesian market, if not managed well, could combine with the long-standing resentments concerning the economic role of the Chinese minority to potentially destabilise the bilateral relationship.
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The much studied 1999 big bang of Indonesian government decentralization was, in the end, relatively muted and quickly undone in forestry. This paper assesses the big bang as it relates to forestry. It reviews the extensive body of literature that was produced in the years immediately after the big bang occurred, as well as siting it in the longer sweep of Indonesian forestry history. The paper finds that there has been a long-term centralizing tendency in forestry governance, with nation-building and assertion of power over resources in the periphery being key centralizing forces. However, there are valid reasons for decentralized forestry management, such as improving rural development and respecting traditional rights through more accountable and responsive institutional arrangements. It is suggested here that a number of changing factors in Indonesia and in forestry could provide opportunities for a more enduring decentralization in forestry. These include strengthening democratic institutions, a declining role for natural forests in wood production as plantations replace supplies, and a shift to forms of governance built on systems thinking. For these reasons, it is suggested that the promises of decentralized forest governance might be delivered, not as a central government-ordained big bang, but rather as a progressive, paradigmatic evolution.
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The documentary work of Malaysian director Amir Muhammad is characterised by the montage-like style of his films. This article will consider Amir's The year of living vicariously through Walter Benjamin's notion of montage found in The arcades project. The year of living vicariously is based on a variety of interviews carried out by Amir in 2004 on the set of the Indonesian film Gie. The interviews are with the cast and crew of the film and the film itself is organised around a split screen. In addition to the continuous simultaneity of the split screen, often the film situates the production of the past (in the filming of Gie) juxtaposed to anxieties of the present. In the interviews and stories presented by Amir a number of ambivalent themes emerge, including the future role and power of the military, the role of corruption in Indonesian politics, the unresolved questions and politics surrounding 30 September Movement (G30S), apathy, or consumption. I will argue that this film provides a limited yet insightful account of the ambivalence of post-authoritarian Indonesia and in doing so it highlights the potential for montage to serve as the foundation for new forms of documentary.
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Fifteen years after the fall of Suharto in Indonesia, scholars still continue to disagree over why he fell and what the subsequent process of political transition has actually entailed. A review of the literature reveals two competing interpretations. In the liberal camp, scholars draw on transition theories and argue that the fall of Suharto was caused by a “people power” mobilisation. Other scholars in the oligarchy literature who adopt theories of political economy, however, question this interpretation and argue that the fall of Suharto entailed a reorganisation of patrimonialism. The latter has been criticised by liberals for underestimating the significance of changes in post-Suharto Indonesia, though little engagement has taken place between these camps, which now constitute two “parallel universes.” This article argues that while the oligarchy camp tends to emphasise continuity, it still provides us with important insights into changes in post-Suharto Indonesia which are not adequately recognised by liberals. This is largely because their different theoretical roots prevent meaningful conversations. By reframing the oligarchy literature using the language of transition theories, this article clarifies the difference in the nature of change these two camps are respectively concerned with in the hopes of stimulating more constructive engagements between them.
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Surprisingly, the outcome of the 1999 and 2004 elections in Indonesia and the resultant constellation of political parties are reminiscent of the first Indonesian parliamentary democracy of the 1950s. The dynamics of party politics is still marked by aliran (‘streams’), i.e. some of the biggest political parties still have a mass base and are embedded in specific milieus. But politik aliran has lost a lot of its significance and re-emerged in a quite different form after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Starting with this observation, it is argued that parties are still socially rooted, so a modified aliran approach still has its analytical value. However, one can also witness a weakening of aliran (dealiranisasi) and a concomitant ‘Philippinisation’, which is indicated by the rise of presidential or presidentialised parties, growing intra-party authoritarianism, the prevalence of ‘money politics’, the lack of meaningful political platforms, weak loyalties towards parties, cartels with shifting coalitions and the upsurge of new local elites.
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The contributors to this volume, first published in 1997, address questions central to the development and survival of democratic rule. Brought together under the auspices of a Nobel Symposium on democracy, leading experts in the field examine historical experiences, social and cultural problems, economic development, constitutional issues, the impact of globalization, and the prospects for promoting democratic government. The coverage of the book is global, and the approach is multidisciplinary, providing a unique perspective from leading historians, political scientists, economists, and sociologists. The chapters thus provide an excellent survey of different facets of, and approaches to, democracy, including such fundamental issues as the nature of democratic citizenship, and its prevalence around the world; the relationship between economic development and the progress of democracy; and the influence of international interdependence on sovereignty and democratic accountability.
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Civil Islam tells the story of Islam and democratization in Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim nation. Challenging stereotypes of Islam as antagonistic to democracy, this study of courage and reformation in the face of state terror suggests possibilities for democracy in the Muslim world and beyond. Democratic in the early 1950s and with rich precedents for tolerance and civility, Indonesia succumbed to violence. In 1965, Muslim parties were drawn into the slaughter of half a million communists. In the aftermath of this bloodshed, a "New Order" regime came to power, suppressing democratic forces and instituting dictatorial controls that held for decades. Yet from this maelstrom of violence, repressed by the state and denounced by conservative Muslims, an Islamic democracy movement emerged, strengthened, and played a central role in the 1998 overthrow of the Soeharto regime. In 1999, Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid was elected President of a reformist, civilian government. In explaining how this achievement was possible, Robert Hefner emphasizes the importance of civil institutions and public civility, but argues that neither democracy nor civil society is possible without a civilized state. Against portrayals of Islam as inherently antipluralist and undemocratic, he shows that Indonesia's Islamic reform movement repudiated the goal of an Islamic state, mobilized religiously ecumenical support, promoted women's rights, and championed democratic ideals. This broadly interdisciplinary and timely work heightens our awareness of democracy's necessary pluralism, and places Indonesia at the center of our efforts to understand what makes democracy work.
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Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the Post-Suharto Era provides the first in-depth analysis of contemporary Indonesian party politics and the first systematic explanation why Golkar is still the strongest party in Indonesia. Applying a multi-dimensional conceptual framework of party institutionalization theory, the book examines Golkar's organizational infrastructure, its decisional autonomy and programmatic platform as well as the party's relations to the mass media. Strengths and weaknesses in the individual dimensions of institutionalization are then contrasted with the corresponding levels of institutionalization reached by Indonesia's other major parties. Tomsa argues that Golkar remains Indonesia's strongest party because it is better institutionalized than its electoral competitors. However, while highlighting the former regime party's strengths in key aspects of party institutionalization, he also shows that Golkar also has some considerable institutional weaknesses which in 2004 prevented the party from achieving an even better result in the general election. As an empirical study on Golkar, and Indonesia's other major political parties, this book will be of huge interest to students and scholars of Southeast Asian politics, political parties and elections and democratization.
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The disintegration of Indonesia's New Order regime in 1998 and the fall of Soeharto put an end to the crude forms of centralised authoritarianism and economic protectionism that allowed large Chinese conglomerates to dominate Indonesia's private sector. Contrary to all expectations, most of the major capitalist groups, though damaged considerably by the Asian Crisis, managed to cope with the ensuing monumental political and economic changes, and now thrive again albeit within a new democratic environment. In this book Christian Chua assesses the state of capital before, during, and after the financial and political crisis of 1997/1998 and analyses the changing relationships between business and the state in Indonesia. Using a distinct perspective that combines cultural and structural approaches on Chinese big business with exclusive material derived from interviews with some of IndonesiaâC™s major business leaders, Chua identifies the strategies employed by tycoons to adapt their corporations to the post-authoritarian regime and provides a unique insight into how state-business relationships in Indonesia have evolved since the crisis. Chinese Big Business in Indonesia is the first major analysis of capital in Indonesia since the fall of Soeharto, and will be of interest to graduate students and scholars of political economy, political sociology, economics and business administration as well as to practitioners having to do with Southeast Asian business and politics.
Article
For centuries, oligarchs were viewed as empowered by wealth, an idea muddled by elite theory early in the twentieth century. The common thread for oligarchs across history is that wealth defines them, empowers them and inherently exposes them to threats. The existential motive of all oligarchs is wealth defense. How they respond varies with the threats they confront, including how directly involved they are in supplying the coercion underlying all property claims and whether they act separately or collectively. These variations yield four types of oligarchy: Warring, ruling, sultanistic and civil. Moreover, the rule of law problem in many societies is a matter of taming oligarchs. Cases studied in this book include the United States, ancient Athens and Rome, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, medieval Venice and Siena, mafia commissions in the United States and Italy, feuding Appalachian families and early chiefs cum oligarchs dating from 2300 BCE.
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This article proposes revisions to the theory of political transitions by analyzing patterns of recent popular challenges to neopatrimonial rule in Africa. The approach is explicitly comparative, based on contrasts between Africa and the rest of the world and among regimes within Africa itself. Arguing against the prevalent view that transitions unfold unpredictably according to the contingent interplay of key political actors, the authors contend that the structure of the preexisting regime shapes the dynamics and sometimes even the outcomes of political transitions. They find that in contrast to transitions from corporatist regimes, transitions from neopatrimonial rule are likely to be driven by social protest, marked by struggles over patronage, and backed by emerging middle classes. Following Dahl, the authors compare African regimes on the basis of the degree of formal political participation and competition allowed. They find that regime variants—personal dictatorship, military oligarchy, plebiscitary one-party regime, and competitive one-party regime—are associated with distinctive transition dynamics. Whereas transitions from military oligarchies are typically managed from the top down and are relatively orderly, transitions from plebiscitary systems often occur discordantly through confrontational national conferences. A consolidated democracy is least likely to result from the abrupt collapse of a personal dictatorship and is most likely, though never guaranteed, from a graduated transition from a competitive one-party regime. In general, getting to democracy is problematic from all regimes that lack institutional traditions of political competition.
Article
This article presents an alternative theoretical framework to account for the political transition in Indonesia in 1998. Challenging the mainstream literature, which focuses on the presumed significance of civil society, the article claims that so-called democratization in Indonesia offered a mechanism through which to reorganize the distribution of patronage within the state. The transition was caused not by assertive civil society but Suharto's excessive centralization of patronage networks, which had the effect of alienating a significant proportion of the regime elite. Against this backdrop, democratization facilitated a decentralization of previously centralized patronage networks and a redistribution of spoils within the state towards elites that had been excluded from Suharto's inner circle.
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This article grapples with the tricky issue of democratic consolidation in post-Soeharto Indonesia. It recognizes the great strides the country has made toward establishing a rights-based democracy. This includes attempts to tackle the legacies of decades-long authoritarianism – for instance, those times when state elites have put self-interestedness aside to cooperate in the establishment of new institutions that promote genuine democratization. This article argues, however, that democratic consolidation in Indonesia will continue to be bedeviled due to the poor institutionalization of a democratic rule of law. Until state elites and government officials predictably can be relied upon to enforce democratic institutions, and are subject to the law themselves, then a meaningful deepening of Indonesia's elitist/electoral democracy will be unobtainable.
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In Indonesia, democratic transition has led to the ascendance of business in the political arena. A growing number of entrepreneurs-turned-politicians have captured the power of office, taking over positions which had previously been held by bureaucratic elites. In the existing literature, the ascendance of politically assertive business, often through democratization, is associated with the emergence of a less interventionist state. However, despite the expectation that post-Soeharto Indonesia would embark on a swift process of change towards a regulatory form of state, the patrimonial features of the Indonesian state continue to display more fundamental continuity. This article presents an alternative framework through which to better understand changing state-business relations in Indonesia. The article argues that the fall of the Soeharto regime in Indonesia has had the effect of facilitating the transformation of the patrimonial state: from a patrimonial administrative state to a patrimonial oligarchic state. Democratization has changed the old hierarchy of state-business relations over the distribution of patronage. In post-Soeharto Indonesia, business elites are no longer dependent on bureaucratic elites, as the former now enjoys direct access to state resources.
Article
Rethinking Civil Society TOWARD DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION Larry Diamond Larry Diamond is coeditor of the Journal of Democracy, codirector of the International Forum for Democratic Studies, and a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. Among his recent edited works on democracy are Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (1993) and (with Marc F. Plattner) Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (forthcoming, 1994). In this third wave of global democratization, no phenomenon has more vividly captured the imagination of democratic scholars, observers, and activists alike than "civil society." What could be more moving than the stories of brave bands of students, writers, artists, pastors, teachers, laborers, and mothers challenging the duplicity, corruption, and brutal domination of authoritarian states? Could any sight be more awe- inspiring to democrats than the one they saw in Manila in 1986, when hundreds of thousands of organized and peaceful citizens surged into the streets to reclaim their stolen election and force Ferdinand Marcos out through nonviolent "people power"? In fact, however, the overthrow of authoritarian regimes through popularly based and massively mobilized democratic opposition has not been the norm. Most democratic transitions have been protracted and negotiated (if not largely controlled from above by the exiting authoritarians). Yet even in such negotiated and controlled transitions, the stimulus for democratization, and particularly the pressure to complete the process, have typically come from the "resurrection of civil society," the restructuring of public space, and the mobilization of all manner of independent groups and grassroots movements. 1 If the renewed interest in civil society can trace its theoretical origins to Alexis de Tocqueville, it seems emotionally and spiritually indebted to Jean-Jacques Rousseau for its romanticization of "the people" as a force for collective good, rising up to assert the democratic will against a narrow and evil autocracy. Such images of popular Journal of Democracy Vol. 5, No. 3 July 1994 Larry Diamond 5 mobilization suffuse contemporary thinking about democratic change throughout Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa -- and not without reason. In South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, Poland, China, Czechoslovakia, South Africa, Nigeria, and Benin (to give only a partial list), extensive mobilization of civil society was a crucial source of pressure for democratic change. Citizens pressed their challenge to autocracy not merely as individuals, but as members of student movements, churches, professional associations, women's groups, trade unions, human rights organizations, producer groups, the press, civic associations, and the like. It is now clear that to comprehend democratic change around the world, one must study civil society. Yet such study often provides a one-dimensional and dangerously misleading view. Understanding civil society's role in the construction of democracy requires more complex conceptualization and nuanced theory. The simplistic antinomy between state and civil society, locked in a zero-sum struggle, will not do. We need to specify more precisely what civil society is and is not, and to identify its wide variations in form and character. We need to comprehend not only the multiple ways it can serve democracy, but also the tensions and contradictions it generates and may encompass. We need to think about the features of civil society that are most likely to serve the development and consolidation of democracy. And, not least, we need to form a more realistic picture of the limits of civil society's potential contributions to democracy, and thus of the relative emphasis that democrats should place on building civil society among the various challenges of democratic consolidation. What Civil Society Is and Is Not Civil society is conceived here as the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from "society" in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable. Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state. Thus it excludes individual and family life, inward-looking group activity (e.g., for recreation, entertainment, or spirituality), the profit-making enterprise of individual business firms...
Book
Three decades of authoritarian rule in Indonesia came to a sudden end in 1998. The collapse of the Soeharto regime was accompanied by massive economic decline, widespread rioting, communal conflict, and fears that the nation was approaching the brink of disintegration. Although the fall of Soeharto opened the way towards democratization, conditions were by no means propitious for political reform. This book asks how political reform could proceed despite such unpromising circumstances. It examines electoral and constitutional reform, the decentralization of a highly centralized regime, the gradual but incomplete withdrawal of the military from its deep political involvement, the launching of an anti-corruption campaign, and the achievement of peace in two provinces that had been devastated by communal violence and regional rebellion. © 2010 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. All rights reserved.
Article
This is the first section of a two‐part article investigating the relationship between civil society and the recent wave of democratization in developing countries. It highlights the ambiguity of the term ‘civil society’ and proposes a definition which may prove serviceable in discovering the political role played by civil society in facilitating or impeding democratization. In addition to the conventional distinction between civil society and the state, the article makes further distinctions between ‘civil society’, ‘political society’ and ‘society’. It specifies several commonly held expectations about the potential political influence exerted by civil society on the character of political regimes and the behaviour of the state, and generates certain historically rooted hypotheses about these relationships. These concepts and hypotheses are intended as an analytical framework to be applied to specific country case‐studies in the second part of the article to follow in a later issue of this Journal.
Article
As Egypt and Tunisia begin difficult democratic transitions, comparative political scientists have pointed to the world's largest Muslim nation, Indonesia, as a role model. Seen as a stand-out exception from the global recession of democracy in the pre-2011 period, Indonesia has been praised as an example of a stable post-authoritarian polity. But a closer look at Indonesia's record in recent years reveals that its democratization is stagnating. As this article demonstrates, there have been several attempts to roll back reforms introduced in the late 1990s and early 2000s. While not all of these attempts have been successful, Indonesia's democratic consolidation is now frozen at 2005–2006 levels. However, the reason for this democratic stasis, the article argues, is not related to Diamond's notion of societal dissatisfaction with bad post-authoritarian governance. Opinion polls clearly show continued support for democracy despite citizen disgruntlement over the effectiveness of governance. Instead, I contend that anti-reformist elites are the main forces behind the attempted roll back, with civil society emerging as democracy's most important defender. This insight, in turn, questions the wisdom of the decision by foreign development agencies – in Indonesia, but other countries as well – to reduce their support for non-governmental organizations and instead intensify their cooperation with government.
Article
The fall of Soeharto's long-entrenched authoritarian New Order regime in 1998 raised hopes among many about a transition in Indonesia to a liberal democratic system of politics. However, Indonesia's new democratic institutions have been captured and appropriated by predatory interests, many of which were nurtured and incubated in the New Order. These have merely now reconstituted and reinvented themselves in Indonesia's new democracy. The article assesses these developments in the light of many of the assumptions of the still influential and growing 'democratic transitions' literature and on the basis of case studies in two Indonesian provinces, Yogyakarta and North Sumatra. These show that gradual reform since the fall of Soeharto has allowed the rise in political fortunes of those formerly entrenched in the lower levels of the New Order's formerly vast system of patronage, including its political entrepreneurs and henchmen. On the other hand, those social forces that were marginalized under the New Order, for example organized labour, remain politically excluded.
Article
This article compares Indonesia's party systems of the 1950s and the post-Suharto period. It explores the question of why the party system of the 1950s collapsed quickly, while that of the contemporary polity appears stable. Challenging established assumptions that party systems fail if their individual parties are weakly institutionalised, I submit that the fundamental difference between the party politics of the 1950s and today's democratic system is related to the character of inter-party competition in both periods. While inter-party contestation in the 1950s took place at the far ends of the politico-ideological spectrum, the competition between parties in the contemporary democracy exhibits centripetal tendencies, stabilising the political system as a whole.
Article
This book is about how the design of institutional change results in unintended consequences. Many post-authoritarian societies have adopted decentralization—effectively localizing power—as part and parcel of democratization, but also in their efforts to entrench "good governance." Vedi Hadiz shifts the attention to the accompanying tensions and contradictions that define the terms under which the localization of power actually takes place. In the process, he develops a compelling analysis that ties social and institutional change to the outcomes of social conflict in local arenas of power. Using the case of Indonesia, and comparing it with Thailand and the Philippines, Hadiz seeks to understand the seeming puzzle of how local predatory systems of power remain resilient in the face of international and domestic pressures. Forcefully persuasive and characteristically passionate, Hadiz challenges readers while arguing convincingly that local power and politics still matter greatly in our globalized world.
Article
Opposing Suharto presents an account of democratization in the world’s fourth most populous country, Indonesia. It describes how opposition groups challenged the long-time ruler, President Suharto, and his military-based regime, forcing him to resign in 1998. The book’s main purpose is to explain how ordinary people can bring about political change in a repressive authoritarian regime. It does this by telling the story of an array of dissident groups, nongovernmental organizations, student activists, and political party workers as they tried to expand democratic space in the last decade of Suharto’s rule. This book is an important study not only for readers interested in contemporary Indonesia and political change in Asia, but also for all those interested in democratization processes elsewhere in the world. Unlike most other books on Indonesia, and unlike many books on democratization, it provides an account from the perspective of those who were struggling to bring about change.
Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space
  • E. Aspinall
Indonesia Today: Challenges of History
  • C. Fealy
Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia
  • Y. D. King
Unfinished Nation: Indonesia Before and After Suharto
  • M. Lane
Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region
  • J. Mackie
Democratization in Southeast and East Asia
  • A. Santoso
The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia
  • B. Anderson
‘Sirkulasi Suara Dalam Pemilu 2004’
  • A. Baswedan
Local Ethics and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia
  • C. Geertz
Democracy's Victory and Crisis
  • J. J. Linz
‘Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation’
  • L. Diamond
‘Indonesia Seven Years after Soeharto: Party System Institutionalization in a New Democracy’
  • P. Johnson Tan
Indonesia and the ‘Third Wave of Democratisation’
  • A. Uhlin