No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Comparative Political Corruption
... Examinar las características de la microdinámica de la corrupción y de las prácticas relacionadas con la corrupción nos da información importante sobre la gobernanza real en contraposición con la formal, de los objetivos reales en contraposición a los objetivos formalmente declarados de la organización (Perrow 1986), de la forma real en contraposición a la forma oficial en que se distribuye el poder (Scott 1972) y de para quién es beneficioso o funcional. En el caso de los nombramientos por patronazgo, Panizza, Peters y Ramos-Larraburu (2018) diferencian entre confianza partidista y no partidista y argumentan que el tipo de confianza que predomina nos proporciona información sobre quién tiene el poder sobre los nombramientos, lo que es indicativo del tipo de sistema político formal o informal existente (150). ...
... Conceptualizamos la corrupción política como un sistema político informal en el que se abusa sistemáticamente del poder oficial para obtener beneficios partidistas o personales (Key 1936) y como un sistema político con patrones específicos institucionalizados de acceso y exclusión (Scott 1999(Scott , 1972. Para comprender el papel funcional que puede estar cumpliendo la corrupción es importante entender los patrones de acceso y exclusión en un entorno social: ¿quién se beneficia? ...
... ¿Cómo se accede al poder? (Scott 1972). La corrupción puede tener efectos marginales cuando es una excepción o efectos decisivos cuando la corrupción es omnipresente, dando lugar a la distorsión de los procesos gubernamentales formales (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). ...
Este artículo explora el papel de la confianza en las redes de corrupción y en las redes que la facilitan: ¿Cuál es el papel de la confianza en sostener las redes de corrupción? ¿Cómo se refleja la base de la confianza en la lógica de la corrupción y con qué efectos? A partir del análisis de 50 entrevistas a profundidad en dos ciudades mexicanas, analizamos dos tipos de confianza que vinculan a los actores en las redes informales: la confianza basada en la afiliación política y/o las relaciones personales y la confianza derivada de la complicidad, o la coparticipación en actividades ilícitas. El análisis sugiere que la base de la confianza y las dinámicas que surgen de ella, tienen diferentes efectos en el funcionamiento y la estabilidad de las redes informales, y que éstas, a su vez, reflejan los sistemas de gobernanza informal existentes. Este documento aporta más pruebas empíricas sobre el rol central que desempeña la confianza particularista en los entornos de baja confianza generalizada, destacando la importancia de comprender estas dinámicas para el desarrollo de programas anticorrupción.
Este documento es una traducción de la versión preliminar del artículo: Pérez-Chiqués, Elizabeth & Meza, Oliver. 2021. "Trust-based corruption networks: A comparative analysis of two municipal governments," Governance 34: 1039-1056. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12554
... To answer these questions, we approach systemic corruption as a form of social organization (Arellano-Gault, 2018;Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006;Rothstein, 2011) or an informal political system (Scott, 1972;Strach et al., 2019), that is rooted in and reflects a particularistic political culture that privileges certain groups rather than a universalistic political culture, which treats everyone similarly (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006). ...
... Therefore, trust-based dynamics take on a different character, one of more importance, as survival might be at play. Behaviors that can be classified as corrupt-be them market-corruption or networked types of corruption-can be serving important social functions, such as providing the means to access public services, providing a route for social mobility, or serving as a survival mechanism or coping strategy in response to an arbitrary government (Arellano-Gault, 2016;Arellano-Gault, 2018;Jancsics, 2019;Lomnitz, 1988;Marquette & Peiffer, 2018;Persson et al., 2013;Rothstein & Stolle, 2008;Scott, 1972). Some of these practices can be classified as "social bribes," given that in addition to the material benefits gained, the fulfillment of social obligations is an important motivator, and that those involved are often bound by very powerful normative systems that dictate behavior (Jancsics, 2019, p. 530). ...
... Given the stronghold that these networks of political-elites have held over the municipality, they have been able to institutionalize their interests, legalizing or giving the appearance of legality to many of their actions (Scott, 1972;Strach et al., 2019). These characteristics, common in environments of systemic and in captured states (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006;Zamudio-González, 2020), make corruption in City-A very difficult to detect and almost impossible to denounce. ...
This article explores the role of trust in corrupt networks and networks that facilitate corruption. Specifically, we ask what is the role of particularized trust in the operation of systemic corruption? How is the basis of trust reflected in the logic of corruption and with which effects? Based on the analysis of 50 in‐depth interviews in two Mexican cities, we analyze two types of particularized trust that bind actors in informal networks: trust based on political affiliation and/or personal relationships and trust derived from complicity, or the co‐participation in illicit activities. Analysis suggests that the basis of trust and the dynamics that arise thereof have different effects on the functioning and stability of the informal networks and that these, in turn, reflect the informal governance systems in place. This article provides further empirical evidence to the central role that particularized trust plays in contexts of systemic corruption, highlighting the importance of understanding these dynamics for the design of anti‐corruption efforts.
... Electoral competition and tight races have often been seen as factors that increase the likelihood of malpractices. In close races, the argument goes, malpractices have a greater chance of impacting who wins or loses, and less of it is needed, thus making malpractices more likely to occur (Scott 1972, Molina and Lehoucq 1999, Alvarez and Boehmke 2008. Despite this, in many unconsolidated democracies, electoral malpractices often occur even when it is patently not needed to secure victory. ...
... Furthermore, in these areas it is more difficult for perpetrators to secure needed cooperation in the polling station to carry out overt malpractices, forcing them to consider alternative strategies. making malpractices more likely to occur (Scott 1972, Molina and Lehoucq 1999, Lehoucq 2003, Alvarez and Boehmke 2008. This study shows that electoral competition and support, when measured at lower levels of aggregation, may also structure the trade-offs for different types of malpractices which in turn influences where such malpractices are most likely to occur. ...
... Instead, the likelihood of malpractices occurring on Election Day are often expected to increase considerably as the race tightens and when candidates' support levels are more evenly matched. In tight races, the argument goes, malpractices have a greater probability to determine who wins or loses, and less of it is needed to make a consequential impact, thus increasing the incentives for malpractices (Scott 1972, Molina & Lehoucq 1999, Lehoucq 2003, Alvarez & Boehmke 2008, see also Simpser 2013, pp. 61-65). ...
The thesis studies challenges to electoral integrity in unconsolidated democracies and seeks to examine possible strategies or remedies that can alleviate these. I present three empirical studies on the topic. The first empirical study focuses on female electoral participation and disenfranchisement in Pakistan and examines whether the presence of election observers at female-only polling stations can influence this. The study makes use of the random allocation of domestic observers to individual polling stations during the 2008 Pakistan general elections, to estimate causal effects of observer presence on turnout in female-only polling stations. The second study analyses electoral malpractices in individual polling stations in Ukraine and examines the association between existing local support for the fraudulent party and the use of malpractices to either inflate or suppress votes. The study compares polling station data between two consequent presidential elections in 2004 in Ukraine and uses election forensics methods to measure the occurrence and type of different malpractices. The third and final study considers politicians’ evaluations of electoral integrity in Malawi and analyses the impact of partisanship and concerns raised by election observer in determining these evaluations. To gauge politicians’ evaluations on electoral integrity, the study makes use of an elite-level survey in Malawi with an embedded experiment. The findings of the empirical studies point to some potentials but also trials when it comes to alleviating challenges to electoral integrity in unconsolidated democracies.
... declarations of government policy, how it influences the character and composition of the political elite over time [9]. The role played by political decision-makers who use the political power that they are armed with to sustain their power, status and wealth, associates political corruption with the state. ...
... Whereas party manifestos, general legislations, and policy declarations are the formal façade of the political structure, corruption stands in sharp contrast to these features as an informal political system. For most nations at some point in their history, and for many nations today, however, the surreptitious politics of this arena is so decisive that an analysis which ignored it would be not simply inaccurate but completely misleading [9]. In the 1700s, Britain was viewed by American colonists as very corrupt [12]. ...
... As an informal political system, often have similar causes, patterns, and consequences in different political contexts. We can discern similar forces at work, for instance, in the bribe a Chinese peasant might have paid a mandarin bureaucrat to escape the annual head tax a century ago and in the money a Ghanaian farmer gives a tax official to underpasses his annual income [9]. Corruption exists in all bureaucracies and political systems around the world. ...
... Such an interpretation of nondemocratic systems infuses the concept of corruption with unnecessary normative meaning, which naturally limits the capacity to explore the true nature and evolution of corruption. Even James C. Scott's [79] thought-provoking term 'proto-corruption' (i.e. corruption which was considered legitimate under past legal systems) fails to provide a way to engage productively in historical and intercultural comparisons, leaving corruption plainly as that which the law says it is. ...
... But the assumption remained that corruption belonged to the public sector, to the point that it was commonly employed as shorthand for 'political' corruption. This is how Scott [79] (followed by [59]) understood it when he pointed out that alternative definitions related to public interest, public opinion, and legal norms. ...
... However, as institutional evolution gave birth to advanced social/economic/ political functions, and as specific ethical principles emerged for the execution of new roles, the manifestation of integrity became an increasingly contentious matter. In particular, during the past two centuries, the development of meritocracy [26], government responsibility [79], and public welfare [32] brought about a steep demand for ethical behavior tuned to progressively specialized environmental cues. The pursued congruence between organizational goals and individual behavior-as embodied in the ideals of modern administrative systems articulated by Max Weber [102]-takes the form of what will be referred to hereafter as integrity-in-office. ...
Although the study of corruption has received increasing attention over the past decades, the theoretical progress of its earlier years has been increasingly relegated to a passive comment, resulting in an underdeveloped field as a whole. To address this issue, this paper explicitly adopts a prevalent definition of corruption—i.e. the abuse of entrusted power for private gain—and explores its meaning, nature, and theoretical evolution from the earliest human bands to the present era. The result is an examination of corruption’s constitutive elements and the way they open the door for a historical account based on the social evolution of political agency and the development of increasingly specialized ethical duties. The arguments presented here aim to provide a road map for future comparative historical research on the subject, and the potential identification of social patterns which sustain corruption tolerance today.
... Tal teoria, de acordo com Filgueiras (2004), entende que a corrupção consiste em um problema funcional e estrutural de determinada sociedade. Os principais pesquisadores dessa teoria são Wertheim (1963), Leff (1964), Leys (1965), Abueva (1966), Bayley (1966), Tilman (1970, McMullan (1970), Scott (1972), ), Médard (1986 e Johnston (1986), . ...
... Tal teoria, de acordo com Filgueiras (2004), trata a corrupção como um problema funcional e estrutural de determinada sociedade. Os principais pesquisadores dessa teoria são Wertheim (1963), Leff (1964), Leys (1965), Abueva (1966), Bayley (1966), Tilman (1970, McMullan (1970), Scott (1972), , Médard (1986); Johnston (1986) e . ...
A corrupção implica em uma série de conseqüências danosas para o sistema democrático que é a base do desenvolvimento político e social nos Estados contemporâneos. A busca imoral e ilegal pela satisfação de interesses privados em detrimento do interesse público pode ocasionar, entre inúmeras consequências, rombos no erário, prejudicando políticas públicas e acentuando a desigualdade social, além de favorecimentos a determinados grupos econômicos e políticos capazes de gerar efeitos desastrosos na gestão pública e na economia. No Brasil, foi deflagrada em 2014 pela Polícia Federal a maior investigação de corrupção já realizada no país, descobrindo práticas de crimes financeiros e de desvio de recursos públicos. Nesse sentido, o presente trabalho tem como objetivo desenvolver e aplicar um modelo teórico para análise da corrupção como um fato social durkheimiano com o intuito de interpretar e compreender
o caso da Operação Lava Jato. Os objetivos específicos são: realizar um estudo de natureza descritiva para compreender a Teoria do Fato Social, associando, de modo sistemático, os conceitos, métodos e aplicações encontradas nas obras do próprio autor e, por conseguinte, elaborar um modelo teórico de análise da corrupção; verificar como o fenômeno da corrupção tem sido observado na administração pública
brasileira por meio da teoria do fato social de Durkheim; e aplicar o modelo teórico para o estudo da corrupção como um fato social, coercitivo, externo e geral, para analisar e compreender o caso da Operação Lava Jato, por meio de uma concepção durkheimiana das ciências sociais. A importância deste estudo reside na possibilidade de analisar o fato social da corrupção no cenário da Operação Lava Jato a partir de uma concepção funcionalista, capaz de promover uma interpretação da corrupção diante da estrutura das instituições
e normas sociais, não tratando, portanto, o fenômeno apenas como uma faceta psicológica do indivíduo. Entender a essência macrossocial do ato da corrupção na sociedade brasileira possibilita desenvolver políticas capazes de atuar sobre o problema de modo adequado, considerando sua amplitude e suas causas, potencializando as possibilidades de êxito. A dissertação está dividida em três artigos. O primeiro consiste em um ensaio teórico que tem objetivo realizar um estudo de natureza descritiva para compreender a Teoria do Fato Social, associando, de modo sistemático, os conceitos, métodos e aplicações encontradas nas obras do próprio autor e, por conseguinte, elaborar um modelo teórico de análise da corrupção. No segundo artigo é realizado um ensaio teórico com o escopo verificar como se desenvolveu o fenômeno da
corrupção na administração pública brasileira, defendendo a tese de que tal fenômeno consiste em um fato social por meio da concepção durkheimiana. Por derradeiro, o terceiro artigo consiste em um estudo para análise e compreensão da Operação Lava Jato por meio da aplicação de um modelo teórico para o estudo da corrupção como um fato social durkheimiano.
... Moreover, "corruption tends to be used as an umbrella term for a wide range of complex phenomena" (Ledeneva et al., 2017, p. 4). Several authors (Nye, 1967;Leff, 1970;Gerring and Thacker, 2004;Philp, 2002;Kurer, 2015;Heywood, 2015;Johnston, 2005;Gardiner, 1993;Scott, 1972, among many others) have developed their own concepts of corruption. In addition to academics, international organisations such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the World Bank, as well as nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) such as Transparency International (TI), have developed their concepts or approaches to corruption in order to comprehend this phenomenon and to promote anti-corruption policies. ...
... Three of the most common categories of models or concepts of corruption found in the literature are those created by Heidenheimer and Johnston (2011); these are public office-centred, 14 market-centred, and public interestcentred definitions of corruption. Two other influential perspectives on corruption are the legal approach (Gardiner, 1993;Scott, 1972; the International Conventions against Corruption) and the concept of private-to-private corruption (the OECD/the ADB, 2009;Argandoña, 2003). Table 1 summarises the different categories of the concepts, as well as their strengths and weaknesses. ...
Despite the growing literature on corruption, knowledge on how to control this phenomenon is still limited. Many scholars and policymakers suggest that social accountability (SAcc) initiatives may help to strengthen public accountability and combat corruption. SAcc is understood as citizen-based initiatives, beyond voting, aiming to prevent, detect or expose corruption by holding the State accountable and seeking direct or indirect sanctions by triggering horizontal accountability. In this vein, success depends heavily on the efficiency of control agencies in officially investigating and sanctioning corrupt acts. Furthermore, evidence suggests that outcomes of SAcc initiatives to fight corruption depend heavily on the context in which they are implemented. This thesis aims to build on the knowledge of how SAcc works in controlling corruption in practice. On this basis, this thesis focuses on three core points. First, it analyses the current debates and scholarship on corruption and how this problem has triggered many policy responses, including SAcc. It also discusses both the scholarship and empirical cases on SAcc to reach a broad understanding of its complementary role in controlling corruption. Second, this thesis offers an in-depth study of SAcc’s place in the Ecuadorian anti-corruption institutional framework firmament. Ecuador is an interesting case study due to its innovative and favourable SAcc and anti-corruption institutional framework. However, the way in which SAcc is carried out depends not only on a conducive framework, but also on how it works in practice. In this context, this research also analyses how the institutionalisation of SAcc may undermine SAcc’s main objective, holding the State accountable. Third, our understanding of how SAcc is practised is sharpened with an empirical analysis of two SACC initiatives: a citizen oversight initiative (veeduria in Spanish) in the city of Cuenca and the participatory budget in the province of Tungurahua. Taking these specific cases, this research analyses the interrelationship between citizens, control agencies and the State, at different levels, to understand SAcc’s capacity to sanction corruption in the Ecuadorian context. The findings of the research show that veedurias can be an effective mechanism for detecting corruption, but this outcome may be hampered by horizontal agencies’ inefficiency in investigating signs of corruption. Additionally, the process of participatory budgeting in Tungurahua is mainly based on the actions of local governments and does not offer many opportunities for citizens to control budget expenditure. Furthermore, there are several structural problems in the framework that weaken SAcc’s capacity to hold the State accountable. Without sanctions, there is no accountability. Furthermore, these weaknesses can make SAcc mechanisms vulnerable to being captured by the State and used to legitimise public actions.
... La première se concentre sur les causes structurelles ou contextuelles, comme la structure et l'historique du régime politique, la culture, les valeurs, les normes, les allégeances. Il existe une abondante documentation concernant l'État patrimonial (Weber 1964 ;Scott 1972), les relations sociales (Cartier-Bresson 1997 ;Fitchett et Ignatius 2002 ;Yao 2002) et le gouvernement non contrôlé (Scott 1972 ;Johnston 1997 ;Moore et collab. 1999). ...
... La première se concentre sur les causes structurelles ou contextuelles, comme la structure et l'historique du régime politique, la culture, les valeurs, les normes, les allégeances. Il existe une abondante documentation concernant l'État patrimonial (Weber 1964 ;Scott 1972), les relations sociales (Cartier-Bresson 1997 ;Fitchett et Ignatius 2002 ;Yao 2002) et le gouvernement non contrôlé (Scott 1972 ;Johnston 1997 ;Moore et collab. 1999). ...
L’équivalent de plus du quart du PIB mondial est dépensé chaque année par les divers paliers de gouvernement. Cela représente plus de 20 000 milliards de dollars qui font l’objet de budgets annuels planifiés, débattus, adoptés et exécutés dans plusieurs milliers d’administrations publiques sur le globe. Un tel niveau de dépenses exige d’examiner le contenu des budgets et de surveiller les gens qui les administrent. Dans cet ouvrage, nous décrivons les institutions de contrôle budgétaire dans les Parlements de la Francophonie. Nous procédons ensuite à l’élaboration de trois indices de capacité de contrôle (selon les statuts, les pratiques et les ressources) permettant de comparer 23 pays de la Francophonie, 23 pays du Commonwealth et 9 pays non-membres de ces organisations, en vue de répondre à la question suivante: les Parlements du Commonwealth ont-ils une plus grande capacité de contrôle que ceux de la Francophonie et ont-ils le même niveau d’efficacité (ou d’inefficacité) pour contrer la corruption ?
... Under this definition, behavior becomes corrupt when it deviates from the official rules in order to further private interests or monetary gains. Corruption is then defined in terms of "misuse of public power for private gain" (Johnston, 2005;Karklins, 2005;LaPalombara, 1995;Philp, 2016;Scott, 1972;Transparency International, 2009. Scholars acknowledge that: although corruption comes in many shapes, shades, and sizes, and with different degrees of tolerability, corruption is always defined with one feature -the inappropriate mix of public and private as it is corrupt for officials to profit personally from public office. ...
... The revisionist branch of the structural approach attempts to explain what causes corruption by looking at the functional needs for corruption, that is, how corruption fulfills a specific need not met by the government (Leff, 1964;Merton, 1968;Scott, 1972). The main assumption of revisionists is that corruption can promote a more efficient functioning of dysfunctional political and economic systems, consequently sustaining the corruption and dysfunction of the system. ...
This article reviews the main corruption literature trends and theoretical foundations and points out the challenges of existing explanations of corruption. The emphasis on broad national-level variables limits our understanding of corruption and anti-corruption processes at the local level. Corruption studies also suffer from the bias of focusing on developing countries and nation-states. These shortcomings can be remedied by using an integrated approach to studying corruption in western countries and cities.
... It follows from this line of reasoning that good governance is key to fostering a country's climate change policy performance (Congleton, 1992;Welsch, 2004). An early study by Scott (1972) reveals that the prevalence of corruption in much of the developing world is attributable to parochial ties and gift-giving practices that nurture interpersonal relationships. Additionally, collectivism represents a cultural trait characterized by in-group favoritism. ...
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the extent to which the cultural dimension of individualism/collectivism matters for international differences in climate change policy performance. This study postulates that individualistic societies, relative to their collectivistic counterparts, are more likely to address global climate change.
Design/methodology/approach
The main hypothesis is tested using data for a world sample of up to 92 countries. To achieve causal inference, this study isolates exogenous sources of variation in individualistic cultures, based on blood distance to the UK and historical pathogen prevalence.
Findings
The core results suggest that individualistic countries are characterized by greater climate change policy performance. This study also finds evidence that individualism affects climate change policy adoption through enhancing governance and female political representation. Subnational analyses based on data from the World Values Survey indicate that survey participants with an orientation toward individualism tend to self-report positive attitudes to pro-environmental policies.
Research limitations/implications
The main findings help improve the understanding of the deep origins of climate change policy performance, which is relevant for formulating policies that help mitigate the consequences of changing climate conditions.
Originality/value
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first study to link cultural traits of individualism and climate change policy performance across countries.
... Explanation of corruption as a mechanism of political influence, widespread in societies with a low level of development and literacy, a high concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a small elite, with little opportunity for the majority of the population to influence politicians at the "decision implementation stage", that is, after the adoption of laws, (and not at the stage of preparation of legislation, when the activities of such influence groups as associations of entrepreneurs or trade unions are more effective) proposed by J. Scott [21][22][23]. The author believes that corruption can often be seen as one of the many processes of equalizing the opportunities of elite and non-elite groups, and not as a simple abuse of power and violation of the norms of society. ...
... James Scott (1972) offers a definition that goes against Heidenheimer's objection. He sees corruption as "acting against the laws pertaining to it, or acting against what the public opinion deems integrity, or again, acting against general interest". ...
The aim of this article is to construct a New Testament concept and definition of the phenomenon of corruption. It contends that current definitions which are based on the World Bank’s and Transparency International’s political-materialistic definitions either miss or ignore the “unique” position adopted by New Testament writers whose focus is on the protection of the ideal, that is, the “common good”, against disruptors’ destructive actions. Pursuant to its
aim and with some assistance from socio-literary criticism, the article pays special attention to Luke-Acts, the epistles and Greek terminology for corruption. It then concludes that while there is no direct reference to abuse of material resources or public office in the New Testament,
any behaviour that is tantamount to subverting the vision of the common good is viewed as corruption; it is no different from the “destruction of the city” or “burning of the fields”.
... Karya Weber menggambarkan bagaimana suatu masyarakat secara efektif menahan bentukbentuk perilaku tertentu dan mendorong orang lain (Scott, 1972). Fokus utamanya adalah pada hubungan sosial antara, misalnya, penguasa dan yang diperintah, bagaimana mereka berhubungan satu sama lain, dan bagaimana mereka membentuk pemahaman tentang tatanan yang sah. ...
The sale and purchase of positions as a form of corruption in the selection process for local government positions in Indonesia is a violation of law and public morals. Corruption is a complex social phenomenon that requires an objective study and can be studied from various fields, one of which is sociology. This study aims to explain the sociological perspective on buying and selling positions as a form of corruption in local government. The method of this study is a literature study with seven steps based on the Cornell University model. This study helps to understand corruption through selling and purchasing positions from a sociological perspective. So far, corruption studies have been mostly from a legal and political perspective. Based on the study conducted, there are three theories to explain this reality, namely social exchange theory, rational choice theory, and Weber's theory of bureaucracy. Social exchange theory sees the phenomenon of corruption as a form of the exchange relationship between actors involved in buying and selling positions that tend to be corrupt. The rational choice theory sees the buying and selling of positions and corruption as models of human behavior are the results of the selfish preferences of individuals. Weber's model explains the sale and purchase of positions and corruption as a form of deviation from public officials in the legal-rational system (bureaucracy). Based on the explanations of the three theories, the sociological explanation of corruption through the sale and purchase of positions in local government may contradict the legal and political explanations.Keywords: Corruption, Buying And Selling Positions, Sociology Perspective
... This means that they encompass outputs or outcomes that could be evaluated as unfavorable, depending on whether they produced costs to society as a whole or to third parties who had no control over the deviant conduct or process that generated them. Such externalities could be even regarded as positive or, at least, not sufficiently harmful under certain circumstances-an argument connected to the functionalist approach toward corruption (Bayley, 1966;Ford, 1904;Huntington, 1968;Leff, 1964;Saj o, 2003;Scott, 1972). ...
Studies on perceptions of corruption have grown in recent years but are still struggling with several conceptual and measurement issues. This scoping review provides an analysis of the peer-reviewed literature on perception-based corruption. From a total of 1,374 articles surveyed, ninety ultimately met inclusion criteria. We found two main quantifiable trends when exploring our sample: publications in high-impact journals were slow in addressing perception-based corruption, and perceptions of corruption are of interest not only to political science and sociology but to other disciplinary traditions. In more qualitative terms, we observe that the explicit or implicit definitions of “corruption” behind these studies tend to fall into two categories: corruption as a “Deviant Process” or as a “Deviant Outcome,” while measurements can be typified in a two-dimensional scheme: “Sociotropic” vs. “Egocentric” and “Generic” vs. “Specific.” Most measurement approaches surveyed tend to use a “deviant process” definition, whereas the measurement of corruption as a “deviant outcome” still lacks development. This might represent a challenge for future research focusing on the social understanding of corruption in various contexts (administrative, organizational, political, economic, legal, etc.).
... Corruption by a public servant, in its most restrictive form, can be defined as a behavior that deviates from his/her formal duties for personal gain to self or other persons with whom the public servant is associated (Scott 1972;Huntington 1968;Nye 1967;Kurer 2005; Transparency ...
Corruption, militarism, and conflict are bedfellows, and their coexistence feeds a vicious circle of violence and instability. Every dollar spent on the military is a dollar not spent on welfare-generating services such as education and healthcare. Yet, military spending makes up a bulk of government spending in several countries, and it is often shrouded from public purview. Rent-seeking behavior fostered within corrupt practices incentivize public officials to accept bribes from military suppliers, while the secrecy surrounding defense procurements allows them to act with perceived impunity. In this paper, I conduct a quantitative study using panel data from 175 countries from 2000 to 2020 to argue that corruption causes a distortion in public expenditure distribution by diverting valuable resources from social spending to military spending. Highly corrupt countries tend to spend a higher percentage of their GDP on the military, freeing up less of the finite resources for investment in education and healthcare. I find that corruption drives up military spending causing a crowding out of social spending.
... Според Scott (1972) в традиционните общества родовите връзки и практиките на размяна на насрещни подаръци са проникнали междуличностните отношения и могат да обяснят често наблюдаваната корупция в развиващите се икономики. По сходен начин Tanzi (1994) прави наблюдението, че в публичната сфера на колективистичните общества обикновено могат да бъдат открити множество клиентилистки мрежи, действащи според правила за насрещни услуги, водещи началото си от социалната организация на основата на родовите връзки. ...
INDIVIDUALISM, COLLECTIVISM, AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS This article summarizes findings in the contemporary economic literature related to the cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism and its impact on economic growth and development. The relative economic advantages of both types of cultures are being laid out. The channels through which individualist or collectivist self-perception and cultural beliefs influence economic outcomes are most often cited to be behavioral specifics, different institutional development paths, the motivation to compete and innovate, the quality of governance, the implications for economic activity of social capital and insurance networks. As successful economic examples rooted in both types of cultures exist in the past and present, the question which culture will dominate the economic future seems to have a less obvious answer than usually assumed by Western authors in the past decades.
... (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950:152) Questions of power and authority, of leader and boss, are as old as politics-and as unresolved as ever. But although unresolved, in most polities the tension between the legitimate and the illegitimate exercise of power is widely recognized and frequently addressed in political study (Scott 1972;Caro 1974;Tarrow 1977). In Japanese studies this relationship is intriguing less for its lack of resolution than for its lack of acknowledgement. ...
Those who do not read Japanese seldom have access to analytic studies of the fascinating and surprisingly diverse world of contemporary Japanese political leadership. This volume constitutes a step toward bringing to the English reader some sense of the norms, beliefs, styles, and modes of exercising power of Japanese political leaders and the organizational and political contexts which are changing leadership role expectations. The second volume in this series concentrates more explicitly on leadership recruitment, although the subject is also addressed here.
All of the essays in this volume highlight specific politicians, while attempting to develop analytic categories to understand the broader significance of these types of leaders. Included are the following: a Liberal Democratic Party prime minister and faction leader (Fukuda Takeo) who rose "almost effortlessly" to the pinnacle of power on the basis of an elitist educational and bureaucratic career background and another (Tanaka Kakuei) who took advantage of the chaotic wartime and immediate postwar period to overcome the limitations of his commoner background by developing an entrepreneurial style that makes him even today "the most powerful in Japan"; a younger conservative leader (Kono Yohei) who, with certain others of his generation, found life within the restrictive but predictable career paths of ruling Liberal Democrats less attractive than the risky option of forming his own New Liberal Club; an unconventional Socialist chairman (Asukata Ichio) who bucks the pull toward coalition making among the opposition parties in favor of his belief that this major but perpetual opposition party must first reconstruct itself and structure a new popular consensus that can legitimize a coalitional alternative to the Liberal Democrats; parliamentary leaders (like lower-house speaker Maeo Shigesaburo, directors of the House Management Committee, and heads of the Diet policy committees of the various parties) who are projected into increasingly influential roles by changing electoral trends and popular expectations; an innovative and dynamic mayor (Suzuki Heizaburo) who, taking advantage of the considerable authority afforded by Japan's "presidential" system of local chief executives, pursues his own priorities, mobilizing the requisite support despite the lack of national guidance and the oppositions of former backers; and the "power behind the throne" (Matsunaga Yasuzaemon and Komori Takeshi) whose visions move prime ministers and governors as well as their own followers in powerful public and private bureaucracies. [intro]
... Practices such as clientelism and vote brokerage are held to be especially effective in contexts in which landed elites employ a large segment of the labor force (Anderson, Francois and Kotwal, 2015;Scott, 1972;Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). Consequently, in agrarian settings with dominant landowners, voters are often induced to vote for the politicians that elites prefer, typically conservative politicians inclined to defend the extant property rights regime (Baland and Robinson, 2008;Gingerich, 2020;Gingerich and Medeiros, 2020;Mares, 2015). ...
Do pandemics have lasting consequences for political behavior? We address this question by examining the consequences of the most deadly pandemic of the last millennium: the Black Death (1347-1351). Our claim is that pandemics can influence politics in the long run if they impose sufficient loss of life so as to augment the price of labor relative to other factors of production. When this occurs, labor repressive regimes (such as serfdom) become untenable, which ultimately leads to the development of proto-democratic institutions and associated political cultures that shape modalities of political engagement for generations. We test our theory by tracing out the local consequences of the Black Death in German-speaking Central Europe. We find that areas hit hardest by the pandemic were more likely to: (1) adopt inclusive political institutions and equitable land ownership patterns; (2)exhibit electoral behavior indicating independence from landed elite influence during the transition to mass politics.
... Larreguy et al. 2016;Stokes et al. 2013) as well as in often-related debates on clientelism, machine politics and patronage (e.g. Arias 2006;Calvo and Murillo 2004;Hilgers 2012;Müller 2013;Sidel 1999;Scott 1972;Szwarcberg 2012). While this literature often mentions brokers, the term remains rather undefined. ...
... Cvadrantul D identifică un alt tip de corupție: beneficiarii sunt cetățeni fără rang public, iar agenții sunt indivizi care folosesc ca intermediari grupuri de brokeri. Acest tip de tranzacții poate fi mai ușor acceptat în societate și prin urmare valorizat pozitiv pentru ca permite identificarea unor soluții rapide pentru probleme care altfel ar crește costurile (îndeosebi de timp) (Scott 1972; Rose-Ackerman 1978; Fisman și Golden 2017). Studii recente au identificat mecanisme de adaptare locală a indivizilor pentru a minimiza costurile în interacțiunea cu autoritățile publice. ...
Organizația internațională Transparency International propune anual un studiu comparativ cu privire la percepția asupra extinderii corupției în țările lumii. Publicat anual începând cu anul 1995, studiul folosește sondaje cu experți și manageri efectuate de 13 organizații internaționale pentru a produce un indice compozit. Acesta a identificat pentru anul 2019, un nivel perceput al corupției în România cu un scor de 44 din maxim 100 (în scădere de la scorul de 47 înregistrat în 2018), maximul reprezentând cea mai scăzută corupție (în Danemarca și Noua Zeelandă, cu un scor de 87), iar minimul reprezentând cea mai ridicată corupție (Somalia, cu un scor de 9) (Transparency International 2019). Media corupției percepute măsurată în țările vest europene și cele membre ale Uniunii Europene a fost de 66 în anul 2019, cele mai corupte țări fiind percepute Ungaria, România și Bulgaria, cu scoruri de 44 respectiv 43. Metodologia de calcul a Indicelui de Percepție a Corupției (CPI al Transparency International) include soliditatea instituțiilor, statul de drept, dezvoltarea economică, acordând o atenție specială corupției din sectorul public prin analiza detaliată a nivelului de extindere a folosirii mitei, deturnarea fondurilor publice, conflictul de interese și nepotismul, folosirea fondurilor publice pentru beneficii personale, capturarea statului de grupuri, și mecanismele implementate pentru prevenirea corupției, cum ar fi de exemplu, dar nu limitat la, protecția avertizorilor de integritate, lupta eficientă anticorupție împotriva persoanelor ce dețin funcții de reprezentare și guvernamentale. Apartenența la Uniunea Europeană pare să fie asociată cu perceperea nivelului corupției. Dacă analizăm țările din Estul Europei care nu sunt membre în Uniunea Europeană, și țările din Asia Centrală putem constata că media scorului de percepție a corupției este de 34, aproape la jumătate din media Uniunii Europene (65 din 100), sau a țărilor membre OECD (68 din 100). Cu toate acestea, democrațiile, cum sunt cele din Uniunea Europeană, nu sunt imune la dezvoltarea corupției. Populismul este o soluție oferită de o parte a elitelor politice pentru rezolvarea corupției și salvarea democrației, deși, argumentează unii autori (Urbinati 2019) este de așteptat ca odată ajunse la putere partidele populiste să crească corupția fiind nevoite să răsplătească așteptări sociale, economice și politice mari din partea susținătorilor, subminând astfel însăși democrația. Populismul este definit fie ca o trăsătură ideologică a competitorilor politici care opun cetățenii elitismului partidelor politice tradiționale și pluralismului grupurilor de interese. Astfel, este subliniată în discursul public opoziția dintre puritatea cetățenilor și corupția elitelor (Golder 2016; Mudde 2007; Mudde și Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). Alegerea unor politicieni populiști în funcții guvernamentale și vulnerabilizarea instituțiilor prin schimbări legislative neagreate de toate forțele politice și care intră în contradicție cu standardele organismelor internaționale, sunt mecanisme prin care democrațiile pot să alunece pe panta corupției și să își slăbească stabilitatea politică, socială și economică (Lessig 2013; Philp și Dávid-Barrett 2015). Opoziția societății civile poate ajuta la oprirea slăbirii democrației, mai ales atunci când prin acțiunile sale determină scăderea sprijinului popular pentru politicienii populiști sau corupți. Protestele societății civile din România, în 2015, 2017, 2018 și 2019, au criticat guvernele pentru acceptarea și promovarea practicilor de corupție la nivel înalt și pentru încercările de a slăbi instituțiile și legislația anticorupție, și au determinat atitudini de reținere, retragerea unor proiecte de legi controversate, sau chiar demisia guvernului. Corupția reprezintă o temă importantă de studiu în științele economice sau științele politice (Heath, Richards, și de Graaf 2016; Olken și Pande 2012; Thompson 2018). Perspectivele sociologice asupra corupției au primit o atenție substanțial mai redusă. În acest capitol voi analiza câteva aspecte ale corupției și voi încerca să explic
... As such, the existence of corruption per se indicates only that these groups participate in the decision-making process to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case. To Scott (1972) corruption involves a deviation from certain acceptable standards of behaviours. ...
One of the greatest crimes against humanity that is particularly subversive of the economic and social life of a developing society like Nigeria is corruption. It has been two decades when Nigeria returned to democratic system of government in1999 and almost the same time when institutional fight against corruption started. Using systems theory as the framework, the purpose of this paperwas toassess the efforts of institutional frameworks in anti-corruption crusade in the two decades of Nigeria's democratic rule by the successive governments. The paper followed comparative approach and used content analysis of secondary data to assess the effectiveness of these institutional frameworks with particular focus on the achievements and challenges of successive administrations in Nigeria in relation with its global and regional positions between 1999 and 2020.The major finding among others is that the institutional frameworks on anti-graft war had recorded less achievements and more failures rather than success despite the rapt attention given to the issue by each successive government in the last two decades. Based on the above findings, the paper concluded that the country's fight against corruption as has being prosecuted by successive government is not gaining any achievement, instead the country is losing more grounds. The paper therefore, recommended among others, that there should be an improved inter-agency synergy; enactment of effective laws and adequate welfare for personnel, closure of implementation gap between anti-corruption legislations, practice and enforcement, and no corruption case should be left to linger for a long time; all should be promptly investigated and those found culpable should be punished.
... According to Olarinmoye (2008), this establishes the intimate link between the subversion of the electoral process or electoral fraud and poor governance of political society as electoral fraud facilitated by godfathers or go-between deny voters control of a valuable political resource; the giving or withholding of their votes which is at the core of indirect or direct representative democracy where people "participate in taking and implementing decisions on the common affairs of the community indirectly, through their representatives, elected or selected for the purpose" (Agbaje 2005, and Scott 1973). ...
ELECTORAL COTRADICTIONS IN NIGERIA'S FORTH REPUBLIC -CHALLENGES FOR POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL GLADIATORS
... However, the variables responsible for corruption are correlated 14 and have impacted on economic development and growth of a country, we will focus only on the relationship between literacy rate, public spending, Gini coefficient, and international integration, government expenditure, trade, and investment and corruption. Scott (1972) contended that when an economy possesses broader equal income distribution, then most of the population in the country belongs to the middle class that created a lower level of corruption in the country. You and Khagram (2004) stated that in a state where inequality is higher, then few wealthy people have more considerable incentive and chances to practice bribery and deception to reserve and improve their position, freedoms, and concerns. ...
Misuse of public power is generally known as corruption, and this issue becomes an international dilemma in the economic world. However, different levels of corruption exist in developing and developed countries. This study attempts to identify the economic determinants of corruption in Pakistan and investigate the impact of trade openness on corruption. This study empirically inspects these impacts by using data for the period 1987–2017. This study is based on time series analysis; augmented dickey fuller test (ADF), Tobit Model of Censored Regression, and Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) are used to estimate significant economic determinants of corruption in Pakistan. It is found that literacy rate, GDP growth, and economic integration have a negative effect on corruption, whereas Inflation is found to have a positive effect on corruption in Pakistan. However, investment, an extensive index, public spending, and income distribution are statistically insignificant as economic determinants in the case of Pakistan.
... A corrupção pequena, ou "mesquinha", ocorre nos níveis mais baixos, em que há o contato direto entre funcionários públicos e a população em geral. Esses subornos, embora envolvam menores quantias de dinheiro, são cumulativos (Scott, 1972 Em geral, no que se refere aos estudos empíricos sobre corrupção, Kotera et al. (2012) ressaltam que eles seguem basicamente duas direções: uma corrente enfatiza os efeitos da corrupção sobre o crescimento econômico ou as implicações de gastos públicos específicos, ao passo que outros pesquisadores investigam os determinantes da corrupção. Quanto a estes, embora haja consenso, o impacto de alguns fatores sobre a corrupção ainda não está bem-definido. ...
The article analyzes the effects of government size on corruption in Brazilian municipalities between 2005 and 2016. An objective corruption measure is used, constructed from data provided by the Federal Comptroller General (CGU), using the panel data technique. The results revealed a significant and inverse relationship between government size and corruption in Brazilian municipalities. Therefore, corruption in Brazilian municipalities may not be related to the government’s size. In this sense, the issue of good governance in conjunction with the effectiveness of legal rules is highlighted as a way of inhibiting activities related to corruption in Brazilian municipalities.
... Повеќе за оваа поделба може да се види во Законот за вработените во јавниот сектор на РСМ. Општо гледано, лица со посебни овластувања се оние кои имаат право со себе да носат огнено оружје, да лишат лица од слобода, да задржат лица и слично.44 За волја на вистината, спомнатата разлика околу кадрите на специјализираните антикорупциски тела е пред сѐ поврзана со мерките кои тие можат да ги применат, односно овластувањата кои им се доделени врз основа на закон. ...
Учебникот по антикорупциско право е првиот универзитетски учебник за студенти по право кои се заинтересирани да посетуваат таква настава на Правниот факултет во Скопје. Тоа е сеопфатна алатка за учење, која ќе овозможи на студентите по право да се стекнат со знаење и вештини поврзани со правните и институционалните аспекти на антикорупцијата. Учебникот се осврнува на концептот и типологијата на корупцијата; концептот, предметот и изворите на антикорупциското право; антикорупциската институционална рамка и, потребата од реформа на антикорупцискиот систем во Република Северна Македонија, вклучувајќи практични примери, статистички анализи и компаративни искуства.
... Practices such as clientelism and vote brokerage are held to be especially effective in contexts in which landed elites employ a large segment of the labor force (Anderson, Francois and Kotwal, 2015;Scott, 1972;Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). Consequently, in agrarian settings with dominant landowners, voters are often induced to vote for the politicians that elites prefer, typically conservative politicians inclined to defend the extant property rights regime (Baland and Robinson, 2008;Gingerich, 2020;Gingerich and Medeiros, 2020;Mares, 2015). ...
Do pandemics have lasting consequences for political behavior? We examine the consequences of the most deadly pandemic in recorded history: the Black Death (1347-1351). Our claim is that pandemics can influence politics in the long run if they impose sufficient loss of life so as to augment the price of labor relative to other factors of production. When this occurs, labor repressive regimes become untenable, which ultimately leads to the development of proto-democratic institutions and associated political cultures that shape modalities of political engagement for generations. We test our theory by tracing out the Black Death’s consequences in German-speaking Central Europe. We find that areas hit hardest by the pandemic were more likely to:(1) adopt inclusive political institutions and equitable land ownership patterns;(2) exhibit electoral behavior indicating independence from landed elite influence during the transition to mass politics; and (3) have significantly lower vote shares for Hitler's National Socialist Party.
... An important body of work has considered the possible impact of the I-C dimension on governance. Scott (1972) explains that in traditional societies, parochial ties and gift-giving practices permeate inter-personal relationships and explain the high incidence of corruption in developing countries. Similarly, Tanzi (1994) states that the public sphere in collectivist societies is characterized by clientelistic networks that act according to rules of reciprocity that have their origin in a kinship-based social organization, something that fuels patronage and corruption (see also, Chabal andDaloz, 1999 andSmith, 2003). ...
... El uso y reflexión sobre categorías de análisis como "redes clientelares" (Wolf, 1966;Gellner y Waterbury, 1977;González Alcantud, 1997) o "corrupción" (Scott, 1972) nos parecen relevantes para comprender el mundo actual de lo patrimonial. Davide Torsello argumenta que la antropología ha sido pionera en mirar procesos de intercambio, reciprocidad, solidaridad, transacciones económicas informales, economía moral, redes clientelares… La cuestión es que estos mismos mecanismos son el caldo de cultivo de prácticas de corrupción. ...
Fiction has been used as a tool for experimental ethnographic writing in an assiduous manner since the crisis of representation in anthropology in the 1980s. In this article we analyze a less discussed aspect of ethnographic fiction: the possibilities it offers to think, from another angle, the problem of the anonymity of the sources and the ethical responsibility towards the people who are the subjects of ethnographic research. Specifically, a fictional account is proposed to account for the use of participatory processes in heritage management, “Memoires of Agripina”. The protagonist narrates in first person a wide repertoire or experiences related to heritage. The genre of “ficto-criticism” is considered as a methodological, theoretical and political device that questions and reflects on heritage and social reality.
... In many discourses that relate the Roman experiences on patron-client relationship to those of contemporary politics (Olarinmoye, 2008: 066-073; Olarinmoye, 2006;Scott, 1973, Ibrahim,2006; Akinboye, 2015: 1-22), the role of the patron is often confused with that of a middleman, broker, or boss. Serving as an intermediary to arrange an exchange or transfer between two parties who were not in direct contact can be described as acting as a middleman or broker. ...
Most modern scholarship on clientship or patronage system simply construe the concept as an exchange relationship between a socio-politically influential man (patron) and a free inferior client. In ancient times, however, the system (clientela) was a special case of dyadic ties in which a person of privileged socioeconomic and political eminence (patronus) used his influence and resources to provide security, legal protection or material benefits for a person of lower social status (cliens) who, for his part, reciprocated by offering wide-ranging services to the patron as needed. Patron-client relationship was uniquely Roman in origin; but over the centuries, the practice metamorphosed in varying measures, motives and methods across different climes and societies. Approached chronologically through a method of content analysis of relevant archival materials, this paper reviewed the basic principles and practice of patron-client relationship in ancient Roman Republic with a view to showing how the Roman phenomenon has, indeed, mutated in time and space. To prop the foregoing claim, the paper focused on how the patron-client relationship resonates in the socioeconomic and political dynamics of African societies, especially of Ghana and perhaps Nigeria. It concluded that clientship relationship is a transcultural phenomenon that has penetrated deeply into the fabrics of many contemporary societies just as it did in classical antiquity.
... The most widely applied academic definitions of corruption (for examples of a long-running debate, see Nye 1967;Heidenheimer 1970;Scott 1972;Philp 2002) have rested long on the law or other formal standards governing the actions of public officials and those with whom they deal. But Plunkitt gives us an enduring example of the ways in which meanings of corruption can be contested, negotiable, quite congenial to some and unsatisfying for others. ...
“Legal corruption” may strike many scholars as a contradiction in terms, but in fact the concept can be essential if we are to understand the sources and consequences of corruption issues in politics. The analytical definition of corruption, as such, is not settled. Legal standards likely are preferred to those based on social values, public opinion, or notions of the public interest. But those conceptions of corruption omit many kinds of activities that, while legal (or not clearly illegal), capitalize on abuses of public trust and official powers to produce outcomes regarded widely as unjust. Those sorts of activities help explain the recent rise of “populism” and its links to diffuse, but intense and broadly shared, senses of unfairness and elite excess. “Legal corruption” as a category has definitional problems of its own, but recent data show that it is worth close study and refinement because it offers critical insights into political issues that—while they may not fit traditional conceptions of corruption—nonetheless increasingly are important aspects of contemporary politics.
... Any reference to the character of the state as an arena for corruption is in reference to the institutions that comprise the state such as the political executive, legislature, judiciary, army, police, and public administration. For a few nations this hidden arena is only of marginal importance and, although worth of study, would not appreciably change an evaluation based on what takes place in public [84]. In Africa and elsewhere, it is the distribution of political power which serves to focus and structure corruption. ...
This Element presents newly-collected cross-national data on reelection rates of lower house national legislators from almost 100 democracies around the world. Reelection rates are low/high in countries where clientelism and vote buying are high/low. Drawing on theory developed to study lobbying, the authors explain why politicians continue clientelist activities although they do not secure reelection. The Element also provides a thorough review of the last decade of literature on clientelism, which the authors define as discretionary resource distribution by political actors. The combination of novel empirical data and theoretically-grounded analysis provides a radically new perspective on clientelism. Finally, the Element suggests that clientelism evolves with economic development, assuming new forms in highly developed democracies but never entirely disappearing.
Corruption is one of the biggest barriers to sustainable development. Several objectives of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are directly linked with the fight against corruption, as it has an influence on the achievement of every single development goal. The aim of this research is to examine decision-making patterns in a typical corruption situation. The following research questions have been formulated: (1) what kind of decision-making approaches are effective against partners maintaining different strategies, and how do these relate to certain generations? (2) Is there a difference between the behavior patterns of employees of SMEs, large corporations, and the public sector in a situation that provides the opportunity for corruption? To answer these research questions, an agent-based corruption experiment was conducted, building on the prisoner’s dilemma. The relationship between cooperation and corruption was examined through the analysis of decision-making situations to uncover when and with which partners (artificial agents) the participants first start to cooperate or become corrupt. The results show that there is a significant difference in the propensity to cheat among different generations. Furthermore, the behavior patterns of employees of large corporations, SMEs, and the public sector also show deviation in a corruption situation.
This paper considers the genealogy of the “revisionist” approaches to corruption. The core of the approaches is the idea that practices deviating from formal rules or “accepted norms” with the objective of serving private ends may have a positive aggregate-level impact. No less important, the approaches are skeptic about anti-corruption attempts. In interrogating the revisionist approaches, the paper demonstrates that corruption studies have ignored important ideas, causing it to remain intertwined with moralism, despite proclamations otherwise. The paper thus argues that incorporating revisionist ideas might ease the discontent in corruption studies and improve public integrity.
Does democracy reduce corruption and improve quality of government? While the corrup tion-reducing effect of democracy may be seemingly self-evident in light of theoretical ex pectations, a wealth of empirical literature suggests that democracy is not always as ef fective as theories predict. Studies consistently demonstrate that newly democratized countries exhibit, on average, higher levels of corruption than more established democra cies but also than some autocracies. This chapter takes stock of recent advances in ef forts to understand how, whether, and when democracy contributes to weeding out cor rupt leaders and government corruption more generally. While research has made no table advances, we suggest that a closer examination of the underlying theory of change and assumptions upon which the beneficial effects of democracy rest can identify new ways forward. We point to a need for greater attention to how, for example, state capaci ty, transparency, and experiences with different forms of corruption influence civic and electoral engagement against corruption.
After release in early 2009 of an initial set of two volumes in the GofS Research Paper Series, the editorial board is proud to issue a set of two more volumes, comprising papers (again all reviewed by international peers, the list of which is set out in the appendix) clustered around two well-profiled research axes. Volume 4 focuses on topical issues in EU and International Crime Control. Its table of contents is provided below the brief description of the papers comprised in the current book, which constitutes Volume 3, providing new empirical data, theories and analyses on Safety, Societal Problems and Citizens’ Perceptions. Some articles in Volume 3 focus especially on issues of conceptualisation and measurement of key constructs in the study of security in its broadest meaning (from fear of crime to corruption) some articles present tests of theoretical models derived from theoretical criminology, and finally some articles focus on different institutional reactions towards crime and drug-related problems (e.g. policing, the conflict of interests between private companies and authorities and restorative justice).
In this chapter, a general idea of the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is explained jointly with the role of the CPI in national and international economics, business, and corporate diplomacy. This chapter also contains an explanation about the construction of the CPI and the information used in the index system jointly with the methods for its construction. It contributes with an understanding of the CPI regarding its impact, considering national and international contexts, and guiding decision-making for governmental authorities and for managers and directors of organizations. Next, diverse important concepts about corruption, its types, and its consequences are presented. Corruption involves “primordial attachments in the award of contracts and appointments, embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds, inflation of contract sums” (Chimdi, .Journal of Gender, Information and Development in Africa 8:195–219, 2019a, p. 198), it reduces the development and the economic growth (Sari, Science and Engineering Ethics 23:1673–1688, 2017), damages diverse global sectors including the global health (Mackey et al., BMC Medicine 14:1–12, 2016), and “thrives on bad governance and chronic exploitation” (Maxwell et al., Disasters 36:140–160, 2011, p. 157). Subsequently, a discussion about the results of the studies related to the appropriateness of the indicators of the CPI is presented. Finally, some conclusions and recommendations for future research are presented.
What explains failures of large-scale anti-corruption campaigns in reducing corruption? Theories on developing country corruption see corruption as either a problem of weak formal institutions that incentivize naturally opportunistic actors or as remnants of traditional behaviors that persist despite changing modern state boundaries and regulations. Neither helps explain how participants continuously strategize to reframe and articulate the morality of those questionable transactions. This paper, through multi-year fieldwork and 34 interviews with business elites in China’s Guangdong province, examines how officials and businesses reconfigured their strategies of corruption during a recent anti-corruption campaign. We find that key actors engaged in ‘moral articulation’–devising moral repertoires and realigning common exchange practices to accepted meaning frames to safeguard interests and obfuscate their activities. In doing so, they challenged some aspects of state-initiated definitions of corruption while embracing others. Rather than eliciting conformity, the campaign prompted new ingenious action frames that helped internally justify corruption and allowed questionable exchange practices to continue on.
Students graduating from the accounting department are future auditors and accountants, who are more likely to encounter illegal acts throughout their careers. The aim of the study is to explain the effect of ethical sensitivity of professional accountant candidates on their whistleblowing intentions and the relationship between whistleblowing intentions and ethical sensitivity. In this context, findings were obtained by applying a questionnaire to Aksaray University, Vocational School of Social Sciences, Accounting and Tax Applications students.
According to the results of the analysis, it was determined that the students were undecided about the whistleblowing intention, but they had ethical sensitivity. No statistically significant difference was found between gender, ethical sensitivity and whistleblowing intention, among demographic factors. Statistical differences were determined in the averages examined on the basis of the class of education. It has been determined that second year students have higher ethical sensitivity and whistleblowing intention averages than first year students. In addition, within the framework of the answers given by the participants, it was determined that ethical sensitivity affected the whistleblowing intention by 57.2%. However, it has been determined that there is a strong positive relationship between ethical sensitivity and whistleblowing intention.
On the basis of the comparison of conflict of interest regulation in Great Britain, France and Sweden, this dissertation set out to understand how anti-corruption policy became a case of what I have termed ‘divergent convergence’. Indeed, while conflict of interest regulation in the three countries grew increasingly alike between the 1990s and the 2010s with the adoption of similar instruments (public interest registers and codes of conduct), these instruments were actually implemented in strikingly different ways in the three contexts, resulting in significant divergence in practice. To do so, it uses a theoretical framework grounded in constructivist institutionalism and building on the notion of policy translation, drawing on primary empirical materials from archives, a range of documentary sources (official, media and civil society, national and international), participant observation and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in the making of conflict of interest regulation. The dissertation shows that policy convergence is here the result of the emulation of powerful pioneers in the Anglosphere reinforced by the emergence of a transnational anti-corruption community. International policy brokers created institutional tools to encourage anti-corruption reforms reflecting their policy preferences in member-states. They also shaped the cognitive framework of domestic policy-making through knowledge production and argumentation. This research however also shows that policies are translated as they travel into new political contexts and institutions. Intermediaries and national policy-makers indeed transform international templates as they put flesh on them, leading not to a linear process of convergence (of conflict of interest regulation) but to a more complex ‘divergent convergence’.
Corruption in contemporary era has dent growth and economic sustainability in developed and especially developing economies. Such is evidence in the Nigerian context. In 2013 cum 2014 the economy was rated one of the fastest growing in relation to her vision 2020:20. The reverse is the case owing to corruption undermining economic growth and sustainability in Nigeria. This study then, scrutinize the extent upon which corruption have undermine economic growth provide by (GDP) as its prime objective. The study adopts the Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) by means of secondary data from 1999-2016 with an array of other universal/customary and analytical tests. The R2 of the CLRM result shows that 94% of the variation in GDP is explained by the prime regressors. Corruption, and exchange was established positive and significant affiliation, while unemployment, and inflation rate negative and non-significant affiliation. The above therefore conforms to empirical and conventional theoretical viewpoint to corruption undermining growth and sustainability habitually and globally.
Keywords: Corruption, economic growth, sustainability, model stability
This major comparative study of the social mobility of ethnic minorities in the US and UK argues that social mobility must be understood as a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon, incorporating the wealth and income of groups, but also their political power and social recognition. Written by leading sociologists, economists, political scientists, geographers, and philosophers in both countries, the volume addresses issues as diverse as education, work and employment, residential concentration, political mobilisation, public policy and social networks, while drawing larger lessons about the meaning of race and inequality in the two countries. While finding that there are important similarities in the experience of ethnic, and especially immigrant, groups in the two countries, the volume also concludes that the differences between the US and UK, especially in the case of American blacks, are equally important.
In this paper, factors affecting fiscal corruption, especially economic freedom, have been analyzed using three panel data models for 73 countries during 2000-2003.
The results show three main components of economic freedom; i.e., legal structure and property rights, sound money and freedom to exchange with foreigners, have positive effect on fiscal corruption. Two other component of economic freedom, i.e., size of government and regulation in credit, business and labor markets, have not significant effects on fiscal corruption.
Expert declaration of Jan-Michael Simon and César Bazán Seminario in support of plaintiffs’ supplemental memorandum of law in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.