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The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy

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... Jeśli chodzi o rolę Kongresu, to wspomnijmy o silnym argumencie na rzecz tego, że wraz ze wzrostem roli spraw ekonomicznych w polityce zagranicznej (głównie wymiany handlowej), czyli od mniej więcej pierwszej połowy lat siedemdziesiątych XX wieku, mamy do czynienia z większą asertywnością ze strony Kongresu, a tym samym -los prezydenckich propozycji jest mniej oczywisty, niż to było przed tym okresem 17 . Jednym z wytłumaczeń takiego stanu rzeczy jest to, że mówimy w tym miejscu o zagadnieniach dość wyraźnie polaryzujących amerykańską scenę polityczną, co stanowi raczej naturalny stan rzeczy dla takiej instytucji jak parlament 18 . Co zaś tyczy się połączenia w ramach pola badawczego mediów i Kongresu, to okazuje się, że niezależnie od tego, czy mówimy o polityce zagranicznej, czy też wewnętrznej, rola prezydenta w ustalaniu polityki jest dość ograniczona 19 . ...
... Warto zauważyć już na wstępie, że względnie dobrze prezentuje się ona w próbie opisu sytuacji ze zmienną czasową. Co ważne, jest to technika należąca do wspomnianych już metod quasi-eksperymentalnych 18 . ITSA dotyczy zmian, które można podzielić według kryterium: (1) trwałości zmian (ich efekty mogą być stałe lub chwilowe) oraz (2) charakterystyki ich momentu początkowego (zmiany mogą być stopniowe lub też gwałtowne). ...
... ibidem, 227-228. 18 Omawiane podejście jest szczególnie przydatne w sytuacji, kiedy analiza wizualna rezultatów eksperymentu jest kłopotliwa ze względu na małą wielkość interwencji lub też ze względu na seryjną zależność obserwacji. ITSA uwzględnia w modelu tę kwestię poprzez badanie reszt modelu (residuals), które powinny być pozbawione zależność seryjnej, czyli wartości funkcji autokorelacji (autocorrelation function, ACF) i autokorelacji cząstkowej (partial autocorrelation function, PACF), powinny być pozbawione wysokich wartości na początku i powinny nie być istotnie różne od zera. ...
Book
„Amerykańska polityka zagraniczna zmienia się niczym wahadło (...). Uznani ame-rykańscy prezydenci zatrzymywali owo wahadło, aby wnieść istotny i trwały wkład w amerykańskie bezpieczeństwo i ideały” (Henry R. Nau, „Obama’s Foreign Policy. Th e Swing Away from Bush: How Far to Go?” Policy Review 160, (2010)). Taka konstatacja może budzić określo-ną refl eksję, tym bardziej że, zdaniem autora powyższych słów, na miano uznanych prezydentów zasługują w XX wieku jedynie Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman oraz Ronald Reagan. Pozostawiając na boku trafność takiej tezy, warto zapytać: czy każdy kolejny, każdy nowo wybrany prezydent faktycznie oznacza automatyczną zmianę kursu polityki zagranicznej Stanów Zjednoczonych? Czy istotnie mamy do czynienia z balansowaniem pomiędzy skrajnościami wyznaczonymi przez diachroniczne stanowiska ideowe (izolacjonizm–interwencjonizm, idealizm–realizm)? Czy amerykańska polityka zagraniczna jest wynikiem szerszego konsensusu społecznego legitymizowanego poprzez mechanizm wyborczy? Czy – spoglądając na czasy niezbyt odległe – rację mieli krytycy prezydenta George’a Busha Jr., kiedy opisywali założenia jego polityki zagranicznej wymownym akronimem ABC (Anything But Clinton), zaś krytycy prezydenta Baracka Obamy w konsekwencji piszą o polityce kierowanej pod szyldem ABB (Anything But Bush)? Czy polityka zagraniczna jest istotnie traktowana tak partykularnie jako przedmiot sporów politycznych? Celem pracy jest zatem próba skonfrontowania stanu rzeczy z powyższymi pytaniami. Odpowiedź twierdząca na choćby jedno z powyższych pytań stawia nas jednak przed kolejnym pytaniem: jak wobec tego należy spoglądać na wiarygodność globalnego gracza na arenie międzynarodowej? Skoro polityka zmienia się niczym wahadło wraz z kolejnymi administracjami i kaprysami wyborców, to czy można traktować Stany Zjednoczone jako stabilnego, przewidywalnego partnera? Powyższe dylematy z całą pewnością nie należą do łatwych, zarówno w kontekście praktyki politycznej, jak i w nas tutaj zajmującym wymiarze – naukowym.
... So far, we have seen evidence of how the decision maker's personality, beliefs, and style may shape his or her attitude to domestic political loss, but so too can the political environment, including the electoral cycle. Analyses of second-term US presidential foreign policy tend to emphasize the lame-duck effect of a president's declining power as he heads toward the exit (Quandt 1986;Rosati and Scott 2013, 71). But as Stern notes, a "'lame duck'" president may perceive himself to have been liberated from domestic political constraints" (2004,111). ...
... He faced considerable opposition within his own party to education reforms. With British troops still deployed in considerable numbers in Afghanistan and Iraq, dissent against his foreign policy remained high, especially in the Labour Party, and for his harshest critics, the London bombings on July 7, 2005, were a result of his policy in the war on terror (Pilger 2005). ...
Article
It has been argued that domestic political survival is key to political decision making, including in foreign policy. Poliheuristic decision theory claims that “Politicians will not shoot themselves in the foot by selecting alternatives that are likely to have a negative effect on them politically.” How then does one explain a foreign policy decision which causes grievous harm to the political position of the decision maker? The paper reviews existing research on personality and environmental factors which may reduce the significance of domestic political constraints on foreign policy decisions. It then examines Blair's response to the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict, in which his support for Israel triggered a backbench revolt forcing him to announce he would step down within 12 months. The account demonstrates that Blair was aware of the potential political costs of his position, but stuck to it regardless. By seeking to explain why this case diverges from theoretical expectations, the paper generates new hypotheses about how personality and environmental factors may lead to leadership convictions, and not domestic political survival, being the ‘essence of decision’.
... During their first year in office, presidents and their administrations may lack experience in foreign policy and in collaboration with Congress. Hence, they may seek to avoid the costs of active foreign policy engagement or the risk of foreign policy failure (e.g., Grossman et al., 1998;Quandt, 1999), meaning that there should be fewer new international cooperative agreements during a president's first year in office. ...
... Under divided government, presidents may be politically constrained in their pursuit of international cooperative agreements by significant congressional opposition and efforts by Congress to assert control over the policy process (Edwards, 1986;Fleisher et al., 2000;Martin, 2000). During their first year in office, presidents and their administrations may be politically constrained in their pursuit of international cooperative agreements by a lack of experience in foreign policy and collaboration with Congress, resulting in avoidance of costly and risky foreign policy initiatives (Grossman et al., 1998;Quandt, 1999). ...
Article
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Following previous scholarship on domestic sources of foreign policy, this study investigates the extent to which economic performance, political constraints, and other factors influence US international cooperation from 1953 through 1998. Using data on US international treaties and executive agreements, we estimate a set of event count models. We find that the US enters into more international treaties and executive agreements with increased inflation. There are fewer new international treaties and executive agreements under divided government and during a president's first year in office. Furthermore, there are fewer new international executive agreements during war involvement. Finally, the US substitutes international treaties and executive agreements for one another, and there are rising trends over time in the numbers of US international treaties and executive agreements.International Politics (2006) 43, 620-643. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800179
... It also stemmed from a keen grasp of domestic political rhythms. By meshing the rhythms of the four-year electoral cycle (Quandt 1986) 1 with demands for a global strategy, Obama pursued two clear foreign-policy goals that also would play well domestically: first, by repudiating the previous administration while simultaneously finishing its agenda and, second, by pivoting to Asia. ...
... n N O T E S 1. According to Quandt (1986), in the first year of a presidency, officials are learning the ropes. By the fourth year of a first-term presidency, officials are focused on reelection. ...
Article
The Puzzle of Obama’s “Small-Ball” Strategy: Caution, Retrenchment, and Realism - Volume 50 Issue 1 - Scott Waalkes
... Whether the level of public support influences presidential foreign policy choice, however, is unclear. Several studies employ an array of anecdotes to argue that self-interest motivates presidents (e.g., Nincic 1990;Quandt 1986). But only two studies employ statistical analysis to examine whether presidential decision making varies with public approval. ...
Article
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What explains presidential decision making on foreign policy? This question is addressed by assessing the relative influence of the international and domestic environments on presidential foreign policy choice. Unlike previous studies, which have focused on the relatively small number of presidential decisions to use force, the authors look at the broad range of conflictual and cooperative policies that presidents have pursued. Using data from the Conflict and Peace Data Bank, they estimate a model of presidential foreign policy choice over the years 1948 through 1978. The results indicate that presidents respond mostly to the rhythms of international events and not domestic politics when making foreign policy. In particular, little evidence is found to support the findings or earlier research that public approval influences presidential decision making on foreign policy.
... The reason is that there are significant differences in policy between administrations (particularly defense policy such as Reagan's buildup or Nixon's cutbacks). There is also reason to expect administrations to share common trends and cycles in approval and foreign policy behavior over the years (see Quandt 1988). In other words, there are compelling factors for pooling both within and across administrations. ...
Article
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Scholars have investigated the relationship between defense spending and domestic political constraints. Because of a two-year time lag, however, it is difficult to make a theoretical link between the aggregate defense budget and domestic politics. We focus on defense contract awards because of their rapid turn-around. We advance the referendum model to account for variations in the timing of defense contracts within administrations. The referendum model posits that government policies are reflective of approval ratings and that the President uses defense contracts to counter sagging approval and/or a weak economy This is a subtle but important alternative to political business cycle (PBC) models which constrain political manipulation of the defense budget to the electoral cycle. An empirical model is tested using pooled time-series analysis which allows us to assess variation within administrations. The analysis reveals that presidential approval, war, presidential reelection, and unemployment are determinants of defense contracting.
... Leblang and Chan (2003) suggest that despite the fact that the timing of an election does not influence a country's decision to initiate a conflict, democracies are, in fact, less likely to continue a conflict during an election year. Along these lines, Quandt (1986) argues that electoral cycles in the United States actually constrain leaders and prevent them from conducting consistent foreign policy. ...
... Thus even when the environ ment subsequendy exerted pressures for innovation, individuals and subgroups would exert pressure in the opposite direction in order to keep institutions as they were. Foreign policy analysts frequendy lament that foreign policy is "inefficient" according to the demands of the international context (See, for example, Quandt 1988). Yet from a realist evolutionary perspective such lamentations are misplaced because foreign policy behavior results from a dual context and can oiJy be imderstood and evaluated within it. ...
Chapter
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This chapter examines realist and liberal IR theory from an evolutionary theoretical perspective. It argues that evolutionary themes, concepts, and concerns inform each theory's assumptive frameworks and the research agendas pursued by its practitioners. In fact, it is possible to recast them as alternative theories of world political institutional evolution that remain fundamentally and irreconcilably at odds over why and how political institutional adaptation occurs in the first place. In the sections that follow I compare realism and liberalism to the development of evolutionary theory in its biological context and to one another in light of their evolutionary tendencies. Not only do obvious parallels exist between theories of evolutionary biology and theories of IR in the utilization of common concepts, themes, and connecting logics, but the philosophical disagreements that informed the development of evolutionary biology are replicated as well. The final section of the chapter applies their alternative logics to the European Union (EU) in order to illustrate how both realism and liberalism have theoretically viable accounts of that institution, yet remain at fundamental odds over what it represents. Such an example also underscores why viewing realism and liberalism through a prism informed by evolutionary concepts and concerns may promote new insights and perspectives in the study of global institutional phenomenon.
... Issued before the elections, they are also a form of advertisement to the public, containing policy pledges to be executed when in government. Given their purpose and timing, manifestos constitute an important opportunity-and instrument-to study the impact of political parties on the executive agenda, and numerous authors have previously confirmed this impact in a variety of policy areas (Budge and Laver 1993;Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994;Caul and Gray 2002;Keman 2007) Many scholars consider foreign policy to be different from domestic politics (Quandt 1986;Collier 1991;Sjursen 2011). According to Wood and Peake, "foreign policy is fundamentally different from domestic policy and requires a different rationale for explaining the rise and fall of issue attention" (1998,181). ...
Article
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Based on the growing scholarly recognition of domestic influences on foreign policy, political parties are considered to be among the main drivers behind foreign policy in most parliamentary democracies. In order to understand party influences on the governmental foreign policy agenda, we examine what determines the congruence between party manifestos and the ensuing government agreements in Belgium from 1978 to 2008. We find that a combination of variables related to political parties’ negotiation position during government formation and regarding their ideological left-right position co-determine their impact on the content of the coalition agreement in terms of foreign policy priorities. This study shows that political parties differ in their foreign policy priorities and that they compete to see these priorities included in the future government’s policy program.
... Analyses of second term US presidential foreign policy tend to emphasize the 'lame-duck' effect of a president's declining power as he heads towards the exit. (Quandt 1986;Rosati and Scott 2013, 71). But as Stern notes, "A 'lame duck' President may 10 perceive himself to have been liberated from domestic political constraints." ...
Article
Full-text available
How do disagreements within multiparty coalitions affect foreign policy, and how can junior parties exert their influence? These questions are of growing importance as new media increases domestic pressure on politicians to interject in international events, and as foreign affairs become more salient in domestic political contestation. Whereas prior research on foreign policy in multiparty coalitions focuses on the influence of junior parties over cabinet decisions, this article proposes a new theoretical concept of ‘rogue decisions’ to describe a distinct outcome of partisan disagreements. Rogue decisions are autonomous decisions by junior parties impacting foreign affairs, taken without cabinet coordination, that undermine their senior partners’ foreign policies. This resembles the ‘anarchy model’ of foreign policy previously attributed to less institutionalized systems. Having identified the necessary conditions that make rogue decisions possible, and the factors that increase their likelihood, the analysis is applied to cases in Britain and Israel. These represent polar opposite parliamentary systems, with Israel among the most proportional, where rogue decisions may be most expected, and Britain the most majoritarian, where they would be least expected. The identification of rogue decisions in contrasting parliamentary democracies challenges the assumption that cabinet is where foreign policy disagreements are managed, according to established decision-making rules. The article therefore prompts new thinking about the potential for junior parties to disrupt the foreign policy agendas of their senior partners, and challenges in new ways the assumption that states act as coherent units.
... Whether the level of public support influences presidential foreign policy choice, however, is unclear. Several studies employ an array of anecdotes to argue that self-interest motivates presidents (e.g., Nincic 1990;Quandt 1986). But only two studies employ statistical analysis to examine whether presidential decision making varies with public approval. ...
... This implication points to the need for more nuance and a wider temporal lens in the study of elections and war, drawing on earlier work which examined the relationship between the electoral cycle and foreign policy more broadly (Armacost, 2015;Nincic, 1992;Quandt, 1986). If we restrict our analysis to an election year, or even the three months preceding an election, as much existing research does, we are liable to mistake absence of evidence for evidence of absence thanks to a too-narrow timeframe. ...
Article
Full-text available
This article argues that electoral politics acts as an important constraint on presidential decision-making in war. Going beyond the existing literature’s focus on cases of conflict initiation, it outlines how electoral pressures push and pull presidents away from courses of action which may otherwise be deemed strategically optimal. Importantly, however, these electoral constraints will not just apply on the immediate eve of an election but will vary in strength across the electoral calendar. Together, this conceptual framework helps explain why presidential fulfilment of rhetorical pledges made on the previous campaign trail may be belated and often inconsistent. To probe the plausibility of these arguments, case studies of the closing stages of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq are outlined, drawing on archival and elite interview material. These episodes demonstrate that electoral accountability can be a powerful factor affecting wartime decision-making, but its effect is non-linear, and not easily observed through a narrow focus on particular timeframes.
... Por otro lado, el incentivo de una reelección puede hacer que ciertas alternativas sean convincentes o correctas (Quandt, 1986), mientras que una variación en la opinión pública pone limitaciones considerables en el curso de una política exterior (Brulé, 2005). Es importante considerar que según Hermann y Kegley (1995:514) una explicación convincente -de política exterior-no puede realizarse tratando al tomador de decisión de manera exógena. ...
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Esta investigación analiza la toma de decisión en dos eventos de la Política Exterior de Estados Unidos en Afganistán, el inicio de la guerra en 2001 y la escalada en 2009. Se utilizará la Teoría Poliheurística considerando que abarca elementos teóricos de los dos enfoques prominentes del análisis de la toma de decisiones en Política Exterior, racional y cognitivo. El énfasis de la teoría en el método no compensatorio de decisión permite profundizar en las opciones que fueron presentadas para los presidentes Bush y Obama, que son los principales tomadores de decisión. Se presenta el círculo de asesores y su relación con el presidente, esto aporta un elemento de influencia previo a la decisión. Se utiliza una matriz donde se comparan las dimensiones y opciones, que serán política, militar y diplomática como dimensiones junto a las 3 opciones generadas por los asesores. Esta metodología permite claridad en el análisis de los resultados, que tendrán sus respectivas características ya que el contexto de las decisiones es diferente. La comprensión de los estilos de liderazgo brinda elementos complementarios a la decisión, junto a su visión del mundo y valores como determinantes psicológicos, esto complementa el análisis y balance de las opciones desde una óptica racional que busca la máxima utilidad. Se pretende evaluar si dentro de la información que tenían disponible, tomaron la mejor decisión posible. El análisis provee herramientas teóricas para futuros análisis de Política Exterior, al considerar tanto el proceso, los actores como el resultado haciéndolo más completo.
... Foreign policy topics might be particularly suitable to generate popular support. Electoral cycles co-determine the conduct of foreign policy in democracies, often favouring short-term considerations over long-term strategy (Quandt, 1986). The literature on the 'rally-around-the-flag effect' tells us that foreign policy issues and potential threats from abroad can be easily used for domestic political mobilisation (Tir, 2010). ...
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Populists in power often resort to the politicisation of foreign policy to generate domestic support. This article explores this process. First, it conceptualises populist politicisation of foreign policy. Second, it develops expectations on how such politicisation will take place: the distinctive features of populism (the intensity of populist discourse, the relative weight of anti-elitism and people-centrism, and a transnational understanding of the ‘people’ or the ‘elite’) will have an impact on how foreign policy is politicised. The empirical analysis focuses on selected public speeches and tweets by two populist leaders from the Global South: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Narendra Modi. The analysis reveals huge differences: the more populist Erdoğan emphasises anti-elitism and extensively resorts to the politicisation of Turkish foreign policy by constructing foreign threats. Modi is less populist and his discourse emphasises people-centrism; as expected, he only marginally politicises foreign policy, highlighting the greatness of the Indian nation.
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The paper considers a repeated election game between an infinitely-lived representative voter and finitely-lived, heterogeneous politicians. The voter's prior belief about the incumbent's competency is updated during the incumbent's first term in office. The voter's problem is to find a rule that simultaneously selects and controls politicians. We show that the simple performance rule, standard in the literature, is justified as a time-consistent rule for a forward-looking voter. The outcome of a large class of perfect equilibria is "strategic caution": incumbent politicians slow down the voter's Bayesian learning by taking only weakly informative actions. Copyright 1992 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
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Prior scholarly analysis of Israeli military spending has focused on national security questions. We present a mathematical model incorporating security threats as well as electoral cycles and corporate profits. The parameters are estimated empirically. The results support the idea that in Israel the military budget at the margins is also employed as a political-economic instrument to help manage the economy and to provide a favorable election climate for incumbents. It is suggested that the political-economic dynamic widely attributed to Western industrialized societies may be of increasing importance in other societies throughout the world.
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Why does the president attend to some security issues but not others? This study examines presidential attention to foreign conflicts from October 1986 to November 1996 by devising a measure of attention based on the president's public speeches. Hypotheses on the determinants of the security agenda are drawn from the literature on agenda setting and foreign policy behavior. Results show the president's attention is limited and inertia brought by previous attention to an issue makes it less likely the president will address other issues. New issues are also less likely to receive attention when the president is running for re-election and, perhaps, when he has extensive foreign policy experience. The major forces for change are significant events abroad and extensive news coverage of a conflict. Of lesser significance is the extent of trade with parties to the conflict. No support is found for hypotheses relating attention to domestic economic circumstances.
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This article demonstrates that the probability of an international crisis involving the United States declines as a presidential administration gains time in office. This finding invalidates three widely held theories about the relationship between the American democratic cycle and foreign policy that (1) there might be a honeymoon period immediately following election in which new presidents are unlikely to become involved in foreign crises, (2) presidents might systematically use the ``rally round the flag'' effect to bolster their electoral prospects, or that more generally, (3) foreign policy might be primarily tied to the democratic constraints of the electoral cycle. This finding also stands in partial contrast to recent work suggesting that, globally, leadership experience does not influence the likelihood of a militarized interstate dispute, while leader age does. The differing conclusions are the result of both the unique American case and the differing formulations of conflict.
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The authors examine the role of Iraq as a campaign issue in the 2006 midterm elections, analyzing more than 400 television advertisements produced by ninety-four candidates in forty-seven competitive races for the U.S. House of Representatives. Generally, the authors find that the issue of the war was not as central an element of candidate appeals as the conventional wisdom and media storyline leading up to Election Day implied. On the issue of Iraq, as well as other issues central to 2006, the authors find evidence that challengers pursued different issue strategies than either incumbents or open-seat candidates of the same party.
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Internal determinations of foreign policy in the U.S. : a diachronic perspective The analysis of foreign policy in the U.S. must take into account the structural particularities of the American political and institutional system, characterised by an exacerbated pluralism. After having eliminated the commonplace which states that the pressure of a profoundly isolationist public opinion plays a decisive role, we try to resituate de recent modifications in the equilibrium between President and Congress in their historical context. We then retrace certain evolutions to the internal organisation of those two powers - legislative and executive. These evolutions show a dysfunctional aspect for the running of the foreign policy.
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How do approaching elections affect the security policy states conduct? We build on classic political economy arguments and theorize that one problem likely faced by democratic policy makers near elections is that of time inconsistency. The time-inconsistency problem arises when the costs and benefits of policy are not realized at the same time. We develop an application of the argument to the case of allied troop contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan. In that case, we argue that the expectation should be one of fewer troops committed close to elections. The exogenous timing of elections allows us to identify the effects of approaching elections on troop levels. Our finding of significantly lower troop contributions near elections is arguably the first identified effect of electoral proximity on security policy.
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It is widely lamented that lame-duck presidents are do-nothing presidents. But systematic studies of these periods focus almost exclusively on domestic policy, ignoring the implications for foreign affairs. In this article, I argue that presidents are no less ambitious at the end of their time in office and the desire to cement their historical legacies can even make them more so. However, this ambition is checked by a substantial increase in the constraints imposed by other political actors—most notably Congress. This mismatch between incentives and opportunity pushes presidents toward foreign policy, where meaningful achievements are still possible due to greater presidential autonomy. The result is an increase in diplomacy, and international agreements, and use of force.
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How and to what extent do domestic political considerations influence U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East? This article addresses that question by drawing on declassified records that enable scholars to reevaluate the Carter administration's search for an Arab-Israeli settlement. Politics at home greatly affected U.S. policy. Moreover, the way such factors affected Carter's Middle East diplomacy was largely a function of the type of domestic political strategy the president chose to rely on. Had Carter and his advisers been more skilled as political operatives, the outcome of the peace negotiations might have been fundamentally different, especially on the issue of Israeli settlements policy. Thus, this article highlights the crucial importance of playing the “two-level game” for effective statecraft, a concept that has not been given adequate attention in the scholarly literature on the subject. © 2017 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Barack Obama promised to transform foreign policy in a globalist direction. After raising hopes in the Prague and Cairo speeches of 2009, however, his administration turned down the rhetoric and adjusted expectations. Obama’s retrenchment strategy and cautious demeanor, exemplified in his Pivot to Asia, opened a vacuum that Donald J. Trump exploited in late 2015 and early 2016. As public fears of terrorism and refugee inflows crested just as the political campaign began, Obama and his former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, stayed focused on Asia and appeared detached from public fears of ISIS terrorists and criminals. Meanwhile, Trump’s tough talk on “radical Islamic terrorism” helped fill the foreign policy vacuum. Foreign policy had become a defining issue in the election of 2016, and the candidate who repudiated Obama emerged victorious. In a fearful political climate, tough talk trumped caution and retrenchment. History will judge whether Obama’s successors’ policies matched the moment or not. Either way, the legacies of Obama, Trump, and Biden will be inseparable from the complexities of foreign policy.
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