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Building Up New Bogeymen
... Many argue that civilizations, be they religiously defined or not, will not be the basis of post-Cold War conflict. Some argue that conflicts will more often be within civilization than between them and the major basis for conflict will continue to be ethnic and national groupings and sometimes sub-ethnic and subnational groupings Halliday, 1997;Rosecrance, 1998;Walt, 1997). Others make the opposite argument that for various reasons, the world is uniting and will rise above conflicts (Ahari, 1997;Ikenberry, 1997;Tipson, 1997). ...
... Fourth, many argue that Huntington has his facts wrong. Some, Anwar (1998), Hassner (1997a), Heilbrunn (1998), Kader (1998), Neckermann (1998), andWalt (1997), simply argue that the facts do not fit Huntington's theory. Pfaff (1998) accuses Huntington of ignoring facts. ...
... Gurr (1994) and Halliday (1997) note that Huntington's evidence is completely anecdotal, leaving room for many to cite counterexamples. Similarly, Senghass (1998), Rosecrance (1998), andWalt (1997) argue that Huntington provides no systematic analysis of the link between civilizational controversies and political behavior. That is, a quantitative, or at least a more systematic, analysis of Huntington's is necessary before it can be properly evaluated. ...
Legitimacy is an important aspect of international relations and few would deny that religion is an excellent source of legitimacy. Legitimacy can be described as “the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed” (Hurd, 1999: 381). In other words, to convince another that your cause is legitimate, is to convince him that you are morally correct and he should support your cause or at least not oppose it. Thus, legitimacy can be a powerful asset to foreign-policy makers that can be directed at several audiences. It can be used to convince policy makers from other states. It can be used to undermine policy makers from other states who oppose you by convincing the populations of their states that you are correct. It can also help to mobilize support for policies within your own state, both among the population and other policy makers. It is also an important element of the stability of the international system. Other important elements of international stability include a balance of power and acceptance of the norms and structure of the international system (Kissinger, 1957).
... Many argue that civilizations, be they religiously defined or not, will not be the basis of post-Cold War conflict. Some argue that conflicts will more often be within civilization than between them and the major basis for conflict will continue to be ethnic and national groupings and sometimes sub-ethnic and subnational groupings Halliday, 1997;Rosecrance, 1998;Walt, 1997). Others make the opposite argument that for various reasons, the world is uniting and will rise above conflicts (Ahari, 1997;Ikenberry, 1997;Tipson, 1997). ...
... Fourth, many argue that Huntington has his facts wrong. Some, Anwar (1998), Hassner (1997a), Heilbrunn (1998), Kader (1998), Neckermann (1998), andWalt (1997), simply argue that the facts do not fit Huntington's theory. Pfaff (1998) accuses Huntington of ignoring facts. ...
... Gurr (1994) and Halliday (1997) note that Huntington's evidence is completely anecdotal, leaving room for many to cite counterexamples. Similarly, Senghass (1998), Rosecrance (1998), andWalt (1997) argue that Huntington provides no systematic analysis of the link between civilizational controversies and political behavior. That is, a quantitative, or at least a more systematic, analysis of Huntington's is necessary before it can be properly evaluated. ...
To examine the claims of our book and to explain them, we chose to analyze a case where religion played or conceivably could have played a most important role—the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A salient event that demonstrates the importance of religion in recent times is the title or name given to the outburst of violence at the end of September 2000 — “the Al-Aqsa intifada.” Al-Aqsa is the name of the mosque situated on the Temple Mount in the middle of Jerusalem, holy both to Jews and Muslims. The official reason to this title was that on September 28, 2000, then Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, an event considered by the Palestinians as the provocation to the second Intifada. A prelude to the outbreak of violence occurred in September 1996 when the right-wing Netanyahu government (1996–1999) authorized the opening of a tunnel in Jerusalem that led to the Haram al-Sharif as the Temple Mount is called by the Muslims. To the Jews the place was holy since it was the location of the first and second Temples, and the Western Wall was the only remnant left from those holy shrines. Two Mosques are located on this domain, Omar and Al-Aqsa, the latter built at the spot where, Islam’s founder, the prophet Mohammed is believed to have risen to heaven. Religion and international relations are tied up in this conflict because of the worldwide religious lookouts toward the Holy Land.
... Some, like Kirkpatrick et al (1993), Halliday (1997), Heilbrunn (1998), Hunter (1998, Kader (1998), Kirth (1994), Rosecrance (1998), Tipson (1997) and Yamazaki (1996) argue that the civilisations Huntington describes are not united and that most conflicts, both international and domestic, will be between members of the same civilisations. Walt (1997) similarly argues that nationalism remains the most important factor in the post-Cold War era, making conflicts within civilisations as likely as conflicts between them. On the other hand, many argue that modern communications, economic interdependence, borrowing between cultures, and other factors will cause the world to become more united, thus causing a general decrease in conflict (Ahari 1997;Anwar 1998;Halliday 1997;Ikenberry 1997;Tipson 1997). ...
... Fifth, Hunter (1998) argues that the rise in Islamic fundamentalism is not unique to the Islamic civilisation and, furthermore, the enthusiasm for Islamic fundamentalism is waning. On the other hand, even some of Huntington's critics such as Halliday (2000), Hassner (1997a) and Heilbrunn (1998) believe that there may be some truth to Huntington's arguments with regards to clashes between the Western and Islamic civilisations. 4 Other criticisms of Huntington's theory include: that Huntington got his facts wrong (Anwar 1998;Hassner 1997a;Heilbrunn 1998;Kader 1998;Neckermann 1998;Walt 1997) or even ignored or bent the facts to fit his theory (Pfaff 1997;Hassner 1997b); that his theory is an oversimplification (Hassner 1997a;Pfaff 1997); that his list of civilisations is incorrect (Beedham 1999;Pfaff 1997;Smith 1997;Tipson 1997); that he often contradicts himself (Heilbrunn 1998); that his evidence is wholly anecdotal, leaving room for others to cite counterexamples (Gurr 1994;Halliday 1997); that he provides no systematic analysis of the link between civilisational controversies and political behaviour (Senghass 1998;Rosecrance 1998;Walt 1997); and that his predictions amount to self-fulfilling prophecies (Hassner 1997a;Pfaff 1997;Singhua 1997;Smith 1997;Tipson 1997;Walt 1997). ...
... Fifth, Hunter (1998) argues that the rise in Islamic fundamentalism is not unique to the Islamic civilisation and, furthermore, the enthusiasm for Islamic fundamentalism is waning. On the other hand, even some of Huntington's critics such as Halliday (2000), Hassner (1997a) and Heilbrunn (1998) believe that there may be some truth to Huntington's arguments with regards to clashes between the Western and Islamic civilisations. 4 Other criticisms of Huntington's theory include: that Huntington got his facts wrong (Anwar 1998;Hassner 1997a;Heilbrunn 1998;Kader 1998;Neckermann 1998;Walt 1997) or even ignored or bent the facts to fit his theory (Pfaff 1997;Hassner 1997b); that his theory is an oversimplification (Hassner 1997a;Pfaff 1997); that his list of civilisations is incorrect (Beedham 1999;Pfaff 1997;Smith 1997;Tipson 1997); that he often contradicts himself (Heilbrunn 1998); that his evidence is wholly anecdotal, leaving room for others to cite counterexamples (Gurr 1994;Halliday 1997); that he provides no systematic analysis of the link between civilisational controversies and political behaviour (Senghass 1998;Rosecrance 1998;Walt 1997); and that his predictions amount to self-fulfilling prophecies (Hassner 1997a;Pfaff 1997;Singhua 1997;Smith 1997;Tipson 1997;Walt 1997). ...
This study quantitatively examines Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' theory using data from the State Failure dataset which focuses on intense and violent internal conflicts between 1950 and 1996. The proportion of state failures which are civilisational has remained mostly constant since 1965. The absolute amount of civilisational conflict has dropped considerably since the end of the Cold War. There is no clear evidence that the overall intensity of civilisational state failures is increasing in proportion to non-civilisational state failures. Also, the predictions of Islam's 'bloody borders' and the Confucian/Sinic-Islamic alliance against the West have not yet occurred. In fact, Islamic groups 'clash' mostly with other Islamic groups. However, the majority of the West's civilisational conflicts, during the Cold War and to a lesser extent after it, are with the Islamic civilisation. Thus it is arguable that Huntington's prediction that the Islamic civilisation is a potential threat to the West is probably more due to the end of the relevance of the Cold War paradigm than any post-Cold War changes in the nature of conflict. This highlights the potential influence of paradigms on policy and should serve as a caution to academics and policy makers to be more aware of the assumptions they make based on any paradigm.
... Third, many argue that Huntington bases his theory on incorrect facts. This type of argument takes three forms: that Huntington was mistaken about many of his facts (Hassner, 1997a, b;Walt, 1997;Anwar, 1998;Heilbrunn, 1998;Kader, 1998;Neckermann, 1998); that Huntington ignored important facts (Pfaff, 1997); and that Huntington falsified or misrepresented the facts (Hassner, 1997b). ...
... (Naff, 1998) His list of civilizations as well as their composition are challenged (Ikenberry, 1997;Pfaff, 1997;Smith, 1997;Tipson, 1997;Beedham, 1999). Many argue that his methodology is based wholly on selective anecdotes which his critics can easily counter with their own selective anecdotes (Gurr, 1994;Halliday, 1997), and that he does not provide any systematic analysis of the link between civilizational controversies and political behavior (Walt, 1997;Rosecrance, 1998;Senghass, 1998). ...
... Fifth, many of the critiques are rhetorical in nature. He is accused of making unwarranted doomsday predictions (Gungwu, 1997;Anwar, 1998) and selffulfilling prophecies (Hassner, 1997a;Pfaff, 1997;Singhua, 1997;Smith, 1997;Tipson, 1997;Walt, 1997). Others, like Hassner (1997a, b), take a more ad homonym approach calling Huntington and his CoC theory 'delusional,' 'inflammatory,' 'excessive simplification,' 'deeply wrong,' 'indefensible, ' 'distorted,' 'appalling,' 'odd,' 'objectionable,' and 'dangerous.' ...
This study addresses a gap in the quantitative literature which tests Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilization theory (CoC). Nearly all of the quantitative studies which directly address the theory and most of those which indirectly test it find Huntington's theory lacking. However, few of these studies include data more recent than the mid-1990s. As the CoC theory posits that its predictions apply to the post-Cold War era (1990 onward) and will become increasingly apparent as time goes on, these predictions need to be examined for time periods more recent than the mid-1990s; however, some studies do not even have data as recent as 1990. Accordingly, this study examines domestic conflict using the Minorities at Risk data set (1945–2000) and the State Failure data set (1955–2001). The findings of this study are consistent with previous ones in that there is no sufficient evidence to support Huntington's paradigmatical claims. Civilizational conflicts were less common than non-civilizational ones for the entire time period tested. Also, civilizational conflicts did not become more violent relative to non-civilizational conflicts in the post-Cold War era. While the data used in this study are current only through the end of 2001, anecdotal evidence suggests that even after 9/11 his predictions, including those regarding an Islamic—Western clash, are unlikely to come true unless the prediction itself becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
... Gurr (1994) and Halliday (1997) note that Huntington's evidence is completely anecdotal, leaving room for many to cite counterexamples. Similarly, Senghass (1998), Rosecrance (1998), andWalt (1997) argue that Huntingtonprovides no systematic analysis of the link between civilizational controversies and political behavior. That is, a quantitative, or at least a more systematic, analysis ofHuntington's is necessarybefore it can be properly evaluated. ...
... Sixth, many argue that because of his popularity among policy makers, Huntington's theory is a self-fulfilling prophecy. (Hassner, 1997a;Pfaff, 1997;Singhua, 1997;Tony Smith, 1997;Tipson, 1997;and Walt, 1997). Similarly, Anwar (1998) and Gungwu (1 997a) accuse Huntington of making unwarranted doomsday predictions. ...
In Religion, Civilization, and Civil War author Jonathan Fox carves out a new space of research and interrogation in conflict studies. As a preeminent observer of religious trends on domestic conflicts, Fox utilizes new statistical analysis in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset - which tracks several hundred politically active ethnic groups across the globe, to examine the impact of religion and religious practice on rebellion, protest, discrimination, and international intervention. Fox also employs the State Failure (SF) dataset, which tracks internal wars and failed governances. Fox expertly uses this information to analyze ethnic wars, mass killings, and civil wars between 1948 and 2001. Covering over five decades, this study provides the most comprehensive and detailed empirical analysis of the impact of religion and civilization on domestic conflict to date and will become a critical resource for both international relations and political science scholars. Like his first book, Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late 20th Century: A General Theory, which was touted as closing gaps in the concept of ethnoreligious conflict, Religion, Civilization, and Civil War provides the data to substantiate, expand, and transform the way scholars understand global conflict since World War Two.
... Many argue that civilizations, be they religiously defined or not, will not be the basis of post–Cold War conflict. Some argue that conflicts will more often be within civilization than between them and the major basis for conflict will continue to be ethnic and national groupings and sometimes sub-ethnic and subnational groupings (Halliday, 1997;Rosecrance, 1998;Walt, 1997). Others make the opposite argument that for various reasons, the world is uniting and will rise above conflicts (Ahari, 1997;Anwar, 1998;Ikenberry, 1997;Tipson, 1997). ...
... He argues that political science in general, and Huntington specifically, have wrongly made the behavioral assumption that political behavior can be explained scientifically. Sixth, many argue that because of his popularity among policy makers, Huntington's theory is a self-fulfilling prophecy (Hassner, 1997a;Pfaff, 1998;Singhua, 1997;Smith, 1997;Tipson, 1997 andWalt, 1997). Similarly, Anwar (1998) and Gungwu (1997a) accuse Huntington of making unwarranted doomsday predictions. ...
This book has several main themes and arguments. International Relations has been westerncentric, which has contributed to its ignoring religion; while religion is not the main driving force behind IR, international politics cannot be understood without taking religion into account; the role of religion is related to the fact that IR has evolved to become more than just interstate relations and now included elements of domestic politics. The book proceeds in three stages. First, it looks at why religion was ignored by IR theory and theorists. Second, it examines the multiple ways religion influences IR, including through religious legitimacy and the many ways domestic religious issues can cross borders. In this discussion a number of topics including but not limited to international intervention, international organizations, religious fundamentalism, political Islam, Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' theory, and terrorism are addressed. Third, these factors are examined empirically using both quantitative and case study methodology.
... Many argue that civilizations, be they religiously defined or not, will not be the basis of post–Cold War conflict. Some argue that conflicts will more often be within civilization than between them and the major basis for conflict will continue to be ethnic and national groupings and sometimes sub-ethnic and subnational groupings (Halliday, 1997;Rosecrance, 1998;Walt, 1997). Others make the opposite argument that for various reasons, the world is uniting and will rise above conflicts (Ahari, 1997;Anwar, 1998;Ikenberry, 1997;Tipson, 1997). ...
... He argues that political science in general, and Huntington specifically, have wrongly made the behavioral assumption that political behavior can be explained scientifically. Sixth, many argue that because of his popularity among policy makers, Huntington's theory is a self-fulfilling prophecy (Hassner, 1997a;Pfaff, 1998;Singhua, 1997;Smith, 1997;Tipson, 1997 andWalt, 1997). Similarly, Anwar (1998) and Gungwu (1997a) accuse Huntington of making unwarranted doomsday predictions. ...
Several domestic phenomena and issues that juxtapose with religion are becoming progressively global in that they are no longer bound by state borders. We qualify them as transnational. Religious fundamentalism is becoming an increasingly important factor in both domestic and international politics in most parts of the world and across religions with political Islam being, perhaps, the most obvious but clearly not the only example of this. Religiously motivated terrorism has an increasingly global agenda. International missionary movements often upset local governments and cultures. Human rights, including religious human rights, has become a global issue. Also many transnational issues like women’s rights and family planning have religious aspects or overtones.
... Many argue that civilizations, be they religiously defined or not, will not be the basis of post–Cold War conflict. Some argue that conflicts will more often be within civilization than between them and the major basis for conflict will continue to be ethnic and national groupings and sometimes sub-ethnic and subnational groupings (Halliday, 1997;Rosecrance, 1998;Walt, 1997). Others make the opposite argument that for various reasons, the world is uniting and will rise above conflicts (Ahari, 1997;Anwar, 1998;Ikenberry, 1997;Tipson, 1997). ...
... He argues that political science in general, and Huntington specifically, have wrongly made the behavioral assumption that political behavior can be explained scientifically. Sixth, many argue that because of his popularity among policy makers, Huntington's theory is a self-fulfilling prophecy (Hassner, 1997a;Pfaff, 1998;Singhua, 1997;Smith, 1997;Tipson, 1997 andWalt, 1997). Similarly, Anwar (1998) and Gungwu (1997a) accuse Huntington of making unwarranted doomsday predictions. ...
Throughout this book we focus upon and evaluate the extent that religion influences international relations. Our general argument is that religion has been ignored by international relations scholars for a variety of reasons even though it plays an important role. One of the most important of these reasons is that international relations tend to be Western-centric. That is, the major scholars of international relations theory have been Westerners who focused mostly on the West. The discipline has its origins in the Western experience of the Enlightenment and the belief that religion is becoming an epiphenon. The major theories of international relations and many of the methodologies for testing them also have not included religion.
... Many argue that civilizations, be they religiously defined or not, will not be the basis of post–Cold War conflict. Some argue that conflicts will more often be within civilization than between them and the major basis for conflict will continue to be ethnic and national groupings and sometimes sub-ethnic and subnational groupings (Halliday, 1997;Rosecrance, 1998;Walt, 1997). Others make the opposite argument that for various reasons, the world is uniting and will rise above conflicts (Ahari, 1997;Anwar, 1998;Ikenberry, 1997;Tipson, 1997). ...
... He argues that political science in general, and Huntington specifically, have wrongly made the behavioral assumption that political behavior can be explained scientifically. Sixth, many argue that because of his popularity among policy makers, Huntington's theory is a self-fulfilling prophecy (Hassner, 1997a;Pfaff, 1998;Singhua, 1997;Smith, 1997;Tipson, 1997 andWalt, 1997). Similarly, Anwar (1998) and Gungwu (1997a) accuse Huntington of making unwarranted doomsday predictions. ...
One of the questions we must ask when examining the role of religion in international relations is why has there been so little written on the topic? Religion is rarely included in most major theories of international relations and when it is addressed, it is usually through viewing it as a subcategory of some topic that is considered more important such as institutions, terrorism, society, or civilizations (Kabalkova, 2000: 682–683). In the few cases where it is addressed directly, “religion tends to be characterized as fundamentalist, extreme, radical, or militant” (Fawcett, 2000: 2) rather than as a normal element of the political process. That is, in the rare cases where the international relations literature deals with religion, it is presented as a secondary aspect of the topic at hand or an exception that has little impact.
... Many argue that civilizations, be they religiously defined or not, will not be the basis of post–Cold War conflict. Some argue that conflicts will more often be within civilization than between them and the major basis for conflict will continue to be ethnic and national groupings and sometimes sub-ethnic and subnational groupings (Halliday, 1997;Rosecrance, 1998;Walt, 1997). Others make the opposite argument that for various reasons, the world is uniting and will rise above conflicts (Ahari, 1997;Anwar, 1998;Ikenberry, 1997;Tipson, 1997). ...
... He argues that political science in general, and Huntington specifically, have wrongly made the behavioral assumption that political behavior can be explained scientifically. Sixth, many argue that because of his popularity among policy makers, Huntington's theory is a self-fulfilling prophecy (Hassner, 1997a;Pfaff, 1998;Singhua, 1997;Smith, 1997;Tipson, 1997 andWalt, 1997). Similarly, Anwar (1998) and Gungwu (1997a) accuse Huntington of making unwarranted doomsday predictions. ...
Ever since Huntington (1993a, 1996a,b) proposed his clash of civilizations thesis there has been a vigorous debate over its validity. Since Huntington’s concept of civilizations considerably overlaps with religion, this means that, in essence, this debate has been over the role of religion in international relations. However, this discussion of religion is a very odd one in that most of those engaged in the debate, not in the least Huntington himself, went to great lengths to avoid the term religion. Rather, the focus was on culture, which just happened to be predominantly defined by religious identification.
... Many argue that civilizations, be they religiously defined or not, will not be the basis of post–Cold War conflict. Some argue that conflicts will more often be within civilization than between them and the major basis for conflict will continue to be ethnic and national groupings and sometimes sub-ethnic and subnational groupings (Halliday, 1997;Rosecrance, 1998;Walt, 1997). Others make the opposite argument that for various reasons, the world is uniting and will rise above conflicts (Ahari, 1997;Anwar, 1998;Ikenberry, 1997;Tipson, 1997). ...
... He argues that political science in general, and Huntington specifically, have wrongly made the behavioral assumption that political behavior can be explained scientifically. Sixth, many argue that because of his popularity among policy makers, Huntington's theory is a self-fulfilling prophecy (Hassner, 1997a;Pfaff, 1998;Singhua, 1997;Smith, 1997;Tipson, 1997 andWalt, 1997). Similarly, Anwar (1998) and Gungwu (1997a) accuse Huntington of making unwarranted doomsday predictions. ...
Domestic conflicts, including religious conflicts, are becoming increasingly international issues. Since the end of the Cold War, a greater proportion of world conflicts are domestic ones (David, 1997; Huntington, 2000). Many of these domestic conflicts, in turn, become internationalized (Sarkees et al., 2003: 49–70; Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 75–90). This can occur for several reasons. First, they often cross borders and can destabilize an entire region as did the various ethnic and national conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Second, the successes of groups on one side of the world can often inspire similar groups on the other to rebel. Third, the growing presence of the international media publicizes these conflicts throughout the world. Fourth, since the end of the Cold War superpower rivalry international intervention has become more feasible and, thereby, more common. Fifth, those involved in domestic conflicts often seek to use international forums and pressure in order to further their aims. Sixth, conflicts often result in international refugee flows. Seventh, the groups involved in the conflict often have national, religious, or ethnic ties with groups living in other states. Eighth, international organizations and forums are increasingly used by the parties in conflicts and their allies in order to further their goals.
... These include improved conflict management techniques, the importance of population and environmental issues (Viorst, 1997), the strength of secularism and the desire for economic prosperity (Ajami, 1993), information technology (Barber, 1998), the continuing importance of military and economic power (Rosecrance, 1998), and the desire ofthe non-West to emulate the West (Kirkpatrick et al. , 1993). Some contend that Huntington's theory does not fit the facts (Anwar, 1998;Hassner, 1997a;Heilbrunn, 1998;Kader, 1998;Neckermann, 1998;and Walt, 1997), and some even accuse him ofignoring or bending the facts (Pfaff, 1998;Hassner, 1997b). Most quantitative studies ofHuntington's theory contradict his claims. ...
... Gurr (1994) and Halliday (1997) note that Huntington's evidence is completely anecdotal, leaving room for many to cite counter examples. Similarly, Senghass (1998), Rosecrance (1998), and Walt (1997) argue that Huntington provides no systematic analysis ofthe link between civilizational controversies and political behavior. That is, a quantitative, or at least a more systematic, analysis ofHuntington's work is necessary before it can be properly evaluated. ...
... Nello specifico, per Walt l'autore non ha chiarito che il modello teorico delle civiltà, alla cui base vi è l'idea esplicita di non interferenza internazionale (Fossati 1999), non giustificherebbe del tutto dei rapporti bilaterali profondi fra gli Stati Uniti d'America, il core-State della civiltà occidentale, e lo Stato ebraico. Walt ha concluso, pertanto, che il collega della Harvard University abbia occultato deliberatamente determinate dinamiche per tutelare l'attrattività del proprio libro o per sostenere che Israele rappresenti un'anomalia del modello di civiltà (Walt 1997 (1997), dove si presume che Huntington abbia evitato di indagare il conflitto israelo-palestinese in quanto incerto sull'afferenza o meno della comunità ebraica alla civiltà occidentale (McNeill 1997;Perry 2002) 1 . 3 Secondo Dan Margalit, autore dell'introduzione all'edizione ebraica del Clash, ma anche per il giornalista Peter Berkovitz che ha recensito il volume, esistono altre due ragioni per cui Huntington ha evitato il confronto con il conflitto in corso in Palestina: il numero esiguo di coloro che appartengono alla civiltà ebraica e la volontà di dimostrare che uno Scontro tra Islam e Occidente sarebbe avvenuto inevitabilmente anche in assenza dello Stato ebraico (Bonney 2008, 38-39;Huntington Archive 2005;2005a). ...
The essay aims to analyze the political thought of Samuel P. Huntington regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unlike those theses that accuse the author of The Clash of Civilizations of an opportunistic lack of interest in the Palestine question, the paper suggests that the prudent choice of not arguing in depth on that issue is motivated more by methodological than political reasons. Huntington’s political ideas will be analyzed using edited and archival material.
... These extensions continue to rattle the walls of academia. Recent prominent reviews of CC (Ahrari 1997;Falk 1997;Foreign Affairs 1997;Gress 1997;Ignatieff 1996;Manning 1997;Mazarr 1996;Mortimer 1997;Power 1996;The Economist 1996a,b, 1997Tipson 1997;Walt 1997;Wolf 1996) reveal a general skepticism, even amazement toward Huntington's theories and predictions. ...
... Stephen Walt, for example, rightly complains that 'Huntington never explains why conflict is more likely to arise between civilisations than within them'. 24 The explanation, I would suggest, is that Huntington conceives of civilisation in terms of peace. States within a civilisation may not feel the same need to resort to war as to a 'continuation of politics' because they (are supposed to) act in a conforming manner and do not present each other with an 'other' which needs to be resisted and contested. ...
... Even most of those who dispute his theory acknowledge that identity is important. They rather argue that Huntington's religious identity based civilizations will not be the primary basis for identity (Halliday 1997;Walt 1997). Studies of conflict often focus on the difference between interreligious and intra-religious conflict (Roeder 2003;Pearce 2005). ...
Featuring contributions from renowned experts, Religion, Politics, Society, and the State provides a uniquely broad perspective on religion's influence on politics, covering multiple countries in major regions. It shows how religion interacts with politics on many different levels, and that these influences can be divided into the influence of the state and the influence of society on politics.
Representing multiple disciplines, methodologies, and levels of analysis--including individual, social group, institutional, and state--the selections cover several countries in major world regions, including the United States, Israel, Turkey, North Africa, and Western Europe. In addition, two chapters include information from the entire world.
... But this is to merely restate the conventional belief in the social sciences that identities are multifarious, fluid, situational, strategic as well as constructed (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2000); it does not account for the formation and salience, as has been widely examined in Europe, of transnational political identities rooted in religiosity and the perceived threat of 'foreign' cultures (Nelsen et al., 2001;McLaren, 2002). It may be, as Steven Walt (1997) argues, that 'the neglect of nationalism' is instead the 'Achilles heel of the civilizational paradigm' as it has often been for Europeanization (e.g., Carey, 2002), and, as Henderson and Tucker (2001: 333) contend, 'the nation, and not the civilization, appears to be the largest identity group to which people consistently swear fealty in the post-Cold War era' . But that, too, remains debatable for, in a number of developing countries, as well as the US, surveys show individuals saying their religious identity is comparable to, or precedes, their national identity (e.g., Pew, 2011;Sinnott (2006) examines this in Asia). ...
Samuel Huntington's influential clash of civilizations hypothesis (Huntington, 1993; Huntington, 1996) has been widely debated, but empirical tests of his ideas about core states remain limited at the micro-level. In this paper, we bring new evidence to bear, focusing on the ‘cauldron of civilizations’: Greater Asia and the Pacific. Using the AsiaBarometer, we examine the extent to which publics in the region identify with the core states of the supposedly most contentious civilizations in the region – the US, China, and Iran – and the factors that influence those perceptions. We give attention to the role of globalization and nationalism and whether both may be subsumed by religiosity as Huntington suggests. Our descriptive evidence affirms some of the tensions between the US, China, and Islamic-predominant Asia identified by Huntington as areas of potential conflict. At the same time, we find no evidence to suggest that attitudes toward core states are zero-sum; Asian publics often see rival powers as mutually good influences. Using multivariate analysis, we find that religiosity, as the clash paradigm surmises, boosts Iranian influence and undermines American influence in several predominantly Islamic states. We also find, contrary to Huntington, that overall exposure to foreign cultures leads to a more positive assessment of American influence among Chinese and Pakistanis, as well as American perceptions of China. When foreign exposure influences perceptions of Iran, the effect is modestly, but consistently, negative. Taken together, the findings raise questions about two key assumptions of the Huntington framework – civilizational identity formation and cultural resurgence – and suggest that alternative approaches in recent civilizations literature show greater empirical promise.
... Furthermore, as Walt points out, Huntington never really explains why people will shift their loyalty to civilisations, and even if they do, why this will lead to more conflict. 12 Nevertheless, his arguments have been taken seriously and do represent an attempt to answer the question of what will be the basis for identity and conflict in the future. They have also, if nothing else, spurred many others to begin thinking about this question. ...
The end of the Cold War has caused a reassessment of the future basis for conflict and identity. While Samuel Huntington predicts that super-national ‘civilisations’ are becoming the basis for identity and conflict, many dispute this arguing that either past ethnic and national bases for identity and conflict will remain the norm or that world integration and interdependence will cause the world to unite. This article examines an aspect of this debate using data on ethnic conflict from the Minorities at Risk data set, as well as data collected independently. Specifically, it assesses whether post-Cold War ethnic conflict, and by inference ethnic identity, is more influenced by civilisational or ethnic variables. The analysis shows that separatism, a nationalist variable, is considerably more strongly associated with ethnic rebellion than are civilisational differences. Furthermore, in the multi-variate analysis civilisational differences are, if anything, associated with less ethnic rebellion. Also, separatism and various political variables more strongly influence ethnic rebellion than do civilisational differences. Thus, this study strongly supports the contention that, at least as of the late 1990s, identity continues to be based on national end ethnic factors rather than civilisational ones.
... There are also many, including Ikenberry (1997) and Smith (1993), who argue that the world is becoming a global society and, thus, people will identify themselves primarily as world citizens. Others, like Walt (1997), argue that things will remain as they have been. 4 There are several arguments opposing Huntington's predictions with regard to the Islamic civilization. ...
Samuel Huntington's controversial `Clash of Civilizations' argument posits, among other things, that the extent of both international and domestic conflict between `civilizations' will increase with the end of the Cold War. This is expected to be especially true of clashes involving the Western and Islamic civilizations and even more so for clashes between these two civilizations. This article uses the Minorities at Risk dataset, along with independently collected variables, to test these propositions with regard to ethnic conflict, which Huntington includes in his theory under the title of `fault line' conflicts within states. The results are examined from three perspectives: globally, from the perspective of the Islamic civilization, and from the perspective of the Western civilization. Globally, there has been little change in the ratio of civilizational versus non-civilizational ethnic conflict since the end of the Cold War. There has also been little change in Islamic involvement in civilizational ethnic conflict since the end of the Cold War. However, from a Western perspective, the proportion of civilizational conflicts involving Western groups that are with Islamic groups increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War. Thus, the results show that if one focuses narrowly on the perspective of the Western civilization, there is some support for Huntington's claims regarding Islam, but not for a general increase in civilizational conflict. However, from the perspective of the Islamic civilization and from a broader global perspective, there is little support for Huntington's arguments.
... If that characterization is mistaken, it will misguide us. After a century vivid with the consequences of ethnic and racial hatred, and now deep into an era of weapons of mass destruction, 'Nothing would be more dangerous for the nations of the West and East than to prepare for a supposed confrontation between Christianity and Islam' (Herzog, 1999: 12; see also Holmes, 1997 andWalt, 1997). The worst outcome would be for 'clash' to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, intensifying conflicts or bringing about some that otherwise would not have occurred. ...
We assess the degree to which propositions from Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order can account for the incidence of militarized interstate disputes between countries during the period 1950-92. We find that such traditional realist influences as contiguity, alliances, and relative power, and liberal influences of joint democracy and interdependence, provide a much better account of interstate conflict. Pairs of states split across civilizational boundaries are no more likely to become engaged in disputes than are other states ceteris paribus. Even disputes between the West and the rest of the world, or with Islam, were no more common than those between or within most other groups. Among Huntington's eight civilizations, interstate conflict was significantly less likely only within the West; dyads in other civilizations were as likely to fight as were states split across civilizations, when realist and liberal influences are held constant. The dominance of a civilization by a core state, democratic or not, does little to inhibit violence within the civilization. Contrary to the thesis that the clash of civilizations will replace Cold War rivalries as the greatest source of conflict, militarized interstate disputes across civilizational boundaries became less common, not more so, as the Cold War waned. Nor do civilizations appear to have an important indirect influence on interstate conflict through the realist or liberal variables. They help to predict alliance patterns but make little contribution to explaining political institutions or commercial interactions. We can be grateful that Huntington challenged us to consider the role that civilizations might play in international relations, but there is little evidence that they define the fault lines along which international conflict is apt to occur.
... The rightness and the wrongness of Huntington's thesis have been discussed many times before. Prior to September 11, scholars took the ''clash of civilizations'' thesis with a grain of salt (see, for example, Ajami 1993; Rubenstein and Crocker 1994;Ikenberry et al. 1997;Puchala 1997;Walt 1997;Hunter 1998;Rosecrance 1998). The September 11 attacks, however, in a sense proved Huntington correct by creating an international order in which the divisive character of identities and cultures is being highlighted and reinforced almost daily. ...
... This aspect of his theory essentially argues that civilizations will be the primary basis for identity and conflict in the international arena, to the exclusion of all other bases for identity. Many disagree, arguing that states and sub-state groups will be the primary basis for identity and conflict [3,23,29,42,43,51,53,63,65]. Others argue that local identities are becoming less important and that the world is developing a united identity or that international issues like the environment will be of primary importance 2 [2,5,20,27,38,62]. ...
This study examines the influence of civilization, as defined by Samuel Huntington, on state religion policy between 1990 and 2002 based on the religion and state (RAS) dataset. While most previous studies of Huntington's civilizational arguments focus on his predictions regarding conflict, and tend to falsify these predictions, the findings show that there is a clear link between civilization and state religion policy. Overall, state involvement in religion increased between 1990 and 2002 but the pattern of change differed between civilizations with each civilization having its own unique pattern. This is true of both the absolute levels of government involvement in religion and the patterns of change.
... And that may, as some maintain, make Huntington's analysis self-fulfilling. They have suggested that the conflict between the United States and Muslim fanatics is more rooted in the nature of Islam than its defenders admit (Hassner, 1997;Pfaff, 1997;Walt, 1997). After the terrorist attacks in September, novelist Salman Rushdie (2001) blamed Islam for the atrocities asking, "If this isn't about Islam, why the worldwide Muslim demonstrations in support of bin Laden and Al Qaeda? ...
To contribute to an understanding of whether and how religion influences the way that Lebanese Muslims think about U.S. policy in the Middle East, and at the same time to shed light on politics and religion in the Middle East, this study utilizes comprehensive survey data from Lebanon (N = 262) to examine the degree to which, and the conditions under which, personal religiosity and support for political Islam account for variance in attitudes toward the U.S. policy in the region. The findings reveal a practical distinction between personal and social aspects of Islam on the one hand, and political Islam on the other, with regard to foreign policy. In particular, high investment in political Islam is inversely related to approval of U.S. policy.
... Even if Huntington's particular formulation of clashes between civilizations is questionable, refinement of research on the potential broader links between identity, culture, and international conflict deserve scholarly attention, particularly in a time of heightened political sensitivity to cultural tensions. Huntington (1996) did not attempt to evaluate his claims about the relationship between culture and conflict systematically, while initial replies offered more sophistry than substance (see, e.g., Heilbrunn 1998, Kaplan 1997, Said 2001, Walt 1997, Kirkpatrick et al. 1993. 5 More recently, there have been a number of studies examining culture and conflict (see, e.g., Henderson 1998, Henderson 1997, Henderson 2004, Henderson & Tucker 2001, Chiozza 2002, Bolks & Stoll 2003. ...
Conventional wisdom suggests that cultural differences make conflict more likely. Culture can unite and divide, but there exists little agreement among scholars over how identity forms among states, what distinctions are most salient, and when conflict is more likely. Researchers have tended to ‘confirm’ the role of identity in an ex post facto fashion, looking only at actual conflicts with cultural differences, without considering the opportunities for conflict among groups. We address a series of problems with existing conceptions of identity and ethnicity. We distinguish between shared and different culture by religion, language, and ethnicity. Rather than equating states with just the dominant groups, we also consider how relations involving secondary groups present in other states can give rise to conflict. We examine empirically the relationship between cultural similarities and differences and international dispute behavior in the post-World War II era. Our results suggest that culture and identity influence dispute patterns, but in ways that run counter to conventional beliefs. We find little evidence that conflict is more common between states where the dominant groups come from different cultural affiliations. If anything, our results suggest that violence is more likely among states with similar cultural ties, even when controlling for other determinants of conflict. Moreover, dyads where a group is politically privileged in one state but a minority in another tend to be particularly conflict prone. We conclude with suggestions for reorienting the study of identity and conflict in more constructive ways than the clash of civilization thesis.
... Our study is not designed to evaluate the full range of relevant counterarguments to Huntington's thesis, some of which focus explicitly on the CoC thesis e.g., Ajami, 1993;Bartley, 1993;Mahbubani, 1993;Rubenstein and Crocker, 1994;Mottahedeh, 1995;Walt, 1997;Midlarsky, 1998;Rosecrance, 1998;Senghaus, 1998!. Others address the larger relationship between cultural similarity and conflict~e.g., Gleditsch and Singer, 1975;Henderson, 1998!. ...
Huntington's (1993a, 1993b, 1996) clash of civilizations thesis suggests that states belonging to different civilizations are more likely to become involved in conflict with one another. To evaluate the empirical accuracy of Huntington's claims, we examined the relationship between civilization membership and interstate war between 1816 and 1992. We find that civilization membership was not significantly associated with the onset of interstate war during the Cold War era (1946–1988), which is consistent with one aspect of Huntington's thesis; however, we also find that for the pre–Cold War period (1816–1945) states of similar civilizations were more likely to fight each other than were those of different civilizations, which contradicts Huntington's thesis. Most importantly, our analysis reveals that during the post–Cold War era (1989–1992), the period in which Huntington contends that the clash of civilizations should be most apparent, civilization membership was not significantly associated with the probability of interstate war. All told, our findings challenge Huntington's claims and seriously undermine the policy recommendations that devolve from his clash of civilizations thesis.
... Also, Huntington (1996) argues, among other things, that the West, which is partly defined by its democratic tradition, will be challenged both internationally and domestically by the Sinic and Islamic civilizations, which are considerably less democratic. However, Ikenberry (1997), Tipson (1997) and Walt (1997), among many others, disagree with this argument. 3 ...
Although many assume that the relationship between the autocracy–democracy continuum and discrimination is linear, with autocracies discriminating the most and democracies discriminating the least, the assumption is not universal. This study uses the Minorities at Risk dataset to test this relationship with regard to government treatment of religiously differentiated ethnic minorities (ethnoreligious minorities) as well as ethnic minorities that are not religiously differentiated. The results show that the pattern of treatment of ethnoreligious minorities differs from that of other ethnic minorities. The extent to which a state is democratic has no clear influence on the level of discrimination against non-religiously differentiated ethnic minorities, but it has a clear influence on the level of discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities. Autocracies discriminate more than democracies against ethnoreligious minorities, but semi-democracies, those governments that are situated between democracies and autocracies, discriminate even less. This result is consistent on all 11 measures used here and is statistically significant for seven of them, and it remains strong when controlling for other factors, including separatism. This phenomenon increases in strength from the beginning to the end of the 1990s. Also, democracies discriminate against ethnoreligious minorities more than they do against other minorities. The nature of liberal democracy may provide an explanation for this phenomenon.
Istilah ‘konflik peradaban’ diperkenalkan Samuel Huntington dalam bukunya The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order (1996). Menurut Huntington, dengan berakhirnya Perang Dingin yang ditandai dengan runtuhnya ideologi komunisme, wilayah konflik meluas melewati fase Barat, dan yang mewarnainya adalah hubungan antara peradaban Barat dan non-Barat serta antarperadaban non-Barat itu sendiri. Huntington mengelompokkan negara-negara bukan atas dasar sistem politik ekonomi, tetapi lebih berdasarkan budaya dan peradaban. Ia mengidentifikasi sembilan peradaban kontemporer, yaitu, peradaban Barat, Cina, Jepang, Amerika Latin, Afrika, Hindu, Budha, Islam, dan Kristen Ortodoks. Benturan yang paling keras – menurut Huntington - akan terjadi antara kebudayaan Kristen Barat dengan kebudayaan Islam. Tesis tersebut secara tidak langsung memperkuat asumsi sebagian besar ilmuwan Barat yang melihat Islam sebagai aggression and hostility (agresi dan ancaman). Pendek kata, bagaimana Barat menciptakan stereotipe-stereotipe simplistis yang menunjukkan wajah the rage of Islam.
Recently, American academia celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of Samuel Huntington’s most controversial article, later book, on the post-Cold War era. “Clash of Civilizations?” was published for the first time in the summer issue of the semi-scholarly journal Foreign Affairs, and considered the manifesto of US foreign policy after the fall of the Soviet Union. With his publication, Huntington has become one of the foremost founders and promoters of the dominant and unchallenged narrative in world politics during the 1990s and 2000s, especially after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, which promoted that “Islam is the enemy,” and “Muslims are the new bogeyman,” to use Stephen Walt’s analogy.
This paper is not limited to the evaluation process of whether Huntington’s assumptions about representation of Islam (as a truly global threat) and Muslims (as the bogeymen of the twenty-first century) were correct or not? It also will trace Huntington's academic legacy to manifest that his works suffer from several ontological and epistemological fallacies. Accordingly, the study argues (based on genealogical and critical analysis of Huntington’s works) that there is a steady, recursive and biased pattern in his works against Non-Western (and Non-Anglo Saxon in particular) cultures, norms and societies.
This research was inspired by the problem of the mercy of Islam which is reduced in the contemporary era, on the one side, and awareness of the Islamic preaching Sufism of M. Fethullah Gülen, in thought and praxis, to the problem, on the other side. This inspiration manifests three issues that drive this study, namely: (1) How is the thought of Sufism of the contemporary Islamic preaching of Gülen? (2) How is the praxis of Sufism of the contemporary Islamic preaching of Gülen? (3) How is the Gülen’s construction of the Islamic preaching and the future of world civilization associated with the vision and mission of Islamic preaching? Its main focus is the urgency and the existence of Sufism of the contemporary Islamic preaching of Gülen. Conforming to the substance of three issues above, this study uses a combination of textual and field qualitative research, with the interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches of analysis (hermeneutical, phenomenological, historical and existentialist). Its major theoretical perspectives are the Islamic preaching approaches belonging to Moh. Ali Aziz and M. Abu> al-Fath} al-Baya>nu>ni>, and the combined theories of Sufism.There are three points findings in this study. First, the thought of the Gülen’s Islamic preaching Sufism comes down from his view of Sufism as the spiritual life and the journey of a lifetime for a human to achieve happiness in this world and hereafter. This thinking evolved and can be accepted by the global community in the contemporary era. This thinking is urgent because it is needed to solve a number of problems that occur due to the reduction of Islamic mercy and build a future world of peace and mutual respect. This thought exists in its role to disseminate the ideas of love, tolerance, and pluralism and to absorb a lot of attention from over 160 countries. Second, the praxis of the Gülen’s Islamic preaching Sufism manifested into Islamic preaching practice with a methodical system that emphasizes the hizmet movement with the philanthropist and contemporary media tactics. This praxis is urgent as the actualization of thought and alternative models of successful Islamic preaching praxis. This praxis exists in its role of producing the golden generation progressively, contributing to an increase in the positive image of Islam and Muslims and moral development of the world community. Thirdly, the thought and praxis can be formed into an ideal construction of the Sufism of the Gülen’s contemporary Islamic preaching based on Islamic preaching ideality (global mercy) from the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet with an emphasis on the hizmet praxis aimed at the creation of the Golden Age (Age of Happiness).
The objective of this study is to assess and compare the relative impact of issues and the economy on the vote in democratic elections. There is a rich and vast literature dealing with issue voting and an equally impressive literature concerning economic voting. For the most part, however, these amount to two separate streams of research. Relatively little attention has been paid to where these literatures overlap and less still to the simple but basic question: which matters most, the issues or the economy?
The main debate in the issue voting literature recently has been between the directional and proximity models. That debate, engaging both technical and conceptual issues, has focused entirely on how issues play in an election, whether voters prefer the party that is closest to their own position or the party that is the strongest defender of their side on an issue. The question of how much issues affect the vote, however, has been neglected. Indeed, both the proximity and directional schools implicitly agree that issues matter, and so challenge the Michigan school's strong scepticism on the import of issues. Given that the difference between the two models is often quite small, a more fruitful line of investigation might be to return to the equally fundamental ‘how much’ question.
Looking back over the last 30 years, culture as an explanatory factor has been in retreat. Today, however, with the determined reassertion of Islamic values, and an increasingly confident China developing its own international paradigms, the need to investigate cultural and historical specificities is hard to deny. In the Asian region, developments in the South China Sea during 2016 have been especially perplexing for many commentators: International Relations (IR) analysis has come up against a wall of stubborn Chinese and Southeast Asian perspectives. Even some elements in Samuel Huntington ‘civilizations’ approach, widely condemned in the 1990s, today deserve reconsideration – certainly with respect to what Wang Gungwu saw as Huntington's stress on a ‘new language and logic of behaviour’. The common IR analytic framework – highlighting sovereignty, state interests and power (and the balance of power) – needs to be supplemented. Current interest in non-Western IR is promising, especially if it engages in research collaboration with history (particularly the history of ideas, with its focus on close textual analysis). Culture – though certainly in a refined conceptualization – is back.
After a long and remarkable absence, the concept of culture has in recent years become a theme of discussion within the discipline of International Relations (IR).2 Beyond being the site for the formulation of theoretical concepts, IR itself must also be considered an important producer of images that have implications for the perception of Middle Eastern conflicts. IR scholars often serve as advisers for policymakers, are members of brain trusts, and sometimes their theories even gain influence on a mass media level, as Samuel Huntington’s (in)famous thesis of a coming clash of civilizations illustrates (1993, 1997). In order to reach a better understanding of Middle Eastern politics, it is therefore important to shed some light on the various discourses within IR. In particular on the current debate whether cultural diversity must be recognized as playing a significant role in international relations and, if so, how this should be conceptualized. The positions taken in this debate are closely connected to the way in which regional conflicts in the Middle East are explained.
Der 11. September 2001 hat die Welt verändert. Dieser Gemeinplatz, der rasch die Anfangszeile „Nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konfliktes...“ vieler Analysen ersetzen wird, hat indirekt auch das Thema Religion und internationale Beziehungen schlagartig auf die Agenda von Politik und Forschung katapultiert. Denn mit den terroristischen Angriffen auf das World Trade Centre und auf das Pentagon ist nicht ausschließlich der Terrorismus und seine Bekämpfung zum Großthema geworden, sondern auch die religiösen Bekenntnisse und Motive der Attentäter geben der ohnehin schon laufenden Debatte, insbesondere um den Islam und sein Verhältnis zum Westen, neuen Auftrieb. Nach den Attentaten verengte sich allerdings der Blickwinkel auf den Islam. Wesentlich stärker als zuvor stehen gegenwärtig Fragen der internationalen Sicherheit und des fundamentalistischen bzw. extremistischen Islam auf der Tagesordnung. Die politische Wahrnehmung religiöser Orientierungen, insbesondere des Islam, ist in Publizistik und Politik nach dem 11. September weitaus kritischer als zuvor. Religion wird oftmals gleichgesetzt mit Fundamentalismus, dieser wiederum mit Konflikt, Gewalt und Krieg. Besonders ausgeprägt ist diese Sicht auf Seiten der USA, die sich seit Anfang der neunziger Jahre von fundamentalistischen Strömungen bedroht fühlen. Auslöser dafür war auch der Bombenanschlag auf das World Trade Centre 1993 durch eine fundamentalistische muslimische Gruppe, dessen psycholgische Wirkungen auf die USA enorm waren. Es ist daher keine Überraschung, dass die Diskussion um Religion und internationale Politik vor allem in den USA geführt wird.1 Eine kaum noch zu überblickende Anzahl an Publikationen beschäftigt sich insbesondere mit dem Islam, oder genauer mit bestimmten aggressiven Formen des Islam. Einige Autoren sprachen bereits vor dem 11. September von einer regelrechten „Islamophobia“ in den USA (Halliday 1999). Das Negativimage des Islam wird aber auch in Deutschland durch — in der Gunst des breiten Publikums oben rangierende — Fernsehserien wie „Das Schwert des Islam“ des Journalisten Peter Scholl-Latour befördert. Die Diskussion über Religion und Politik verkommt daher schnell zu einer Diskussion über die Gefahrenpotentiale des radikalen Islam bzw. des Fundamentalismus.2 In einigen Veröffentlichungen deutet sich an, dass ein Feindbild Islam entstehen kann: „Das islamische Ressentiment [sc. gegen den ungläubigen Westen] scheint die spezifische Aggressivität des Islam gegenüber allem Nicht- oder Unislamischen hervorgerufen bzw. gefordert zu haben. Im Gegensatz zum Christentum und anderen Religionen bejaht der Islam durchaus Gewalt, wenn es um die Macht geht (...) Der Islam ist eine Religion des Kampfes. Bürgerkriege nach innen und außen prägten seine Entstehung und Ausbreitung“ (Glagow 2001: 40). Das Bild des aggressiven Islam — politisch bewusst (?) inkorrekt — sieht die aktuellen Probleme in historisch bedingten „Defiziten“ der Religion: „Eine im Mittelalter verharrende Religion, die noch keine Reformation, noch keine Aufklärung, noch keine Säkularisierung kennt (...) wird in die westliche Postmoderne katapultiert“ (ebd.: 39). Derartige Verallgemeinerungen bergen letztlich die Gefahr einer sich selbsterfüllenden Prophezeihung.
Since 11 September 2001, the ‘Muslim world’ has become a novel religio-culturally defined civilisational frame of reference around which American foreign policy has been partly reoriented and reorganised. In parallel, the ‘Muslim world’, is increasingly becoming, at this historical juncture, a civilisational social fact in international politics by being progressively embedded in, and enacted onto the world by, American foreign policy discourses, institutions, practices, and processes of self-other recognition. This article theoretically understands and explains the causes and consequences of these changes through an engagement with the emerging post-essentialist civilisational analysis turn in International Relations (IR). In particular, the article furthers a constructivist civilisational politics approach that is theoretically, empirically, and methodologically oriented towards recovering and explaining how actors are interpreting, constructing, and reproducing - in this case through particular American foreign policy changes - an international society where intra- and inter-civilisational relations ‘matter’.
In this essay we introduce this special volume on the role of religion in world conflict. We develop a common definition of religion which focuses on five ways religion can influence society and politics: (1) as a basis for identify; (2) as a belief system that influences behavior; (3) through formal religious doctrines; (4) as a source of legitimacy; and (5) through its religious institutions. We discuss why the issue of religion has in the past received little attention from social scientists. Finally, we develop a set of common questions which the other authors in this volume address. These questions are designed to create a better understanding of the role religion plays in world conflict as well as how international relations theory can help us understand this role.
This article maps and develops—theoretically and empirically—the field of civilizational analysis in international relations (IR). In particular, it teases out a more explicit “civilizational politics” line of research, which builds upon latent and underdeveloped themes in the civilizational turn in IR. “Civilizational politics” offers an avenue for theoretically inclined, empirically minded, scholars to explore how social and political actors have come to understand, change, and construct world politics as if plural civilizations existed and their relations mattered. The article anchors “civilizational politics” research to a modernist constructivist approach to IR and structures it around two key steps. The first step is to recover and interpret subjective and intersubjective meanings through participants' discourse. The article proposes an understanding of civilizations as “imagined communities” narrated by political and intellectual elites as: essentialized or non-essentialized entities; and as clashing/conflicting or dialoguing/engaging with each other. The second step outlines three causal pathways that explain how narrated civilizational imaginaries affect world politics and turn civilizations into social facts: by guiding and structuring social action; by shaping and becoming embedded in formal institutions and patterned practices; and by bestowing recognition and socially empowering actors claiming to speak for civilizations. The empirical import of a “civilizational politics” line of research is demonstrated through a re-reading of Turan Kayaoğlu's article “Constructing the Dialogue of Civilizations in World Politics: A Case of Global Islamic Activism.”
The war in Bosnia in the early 1990s made it clear that the transformation of eastern Europe would not be an easy process. It also marked Europe's failure to agree on a foreign policy and end the war. Remarkably, reporters emerged from the conflict with their reputations greatly enhanced by their bravery and commitment to multicultural Sarajevo in particular. This paper challenges this view, arguing that German reporters at least did little to salvage the notion of multiculturalism from the battlefields of Bosnia. Torn by their desire to back a new German foreign policy, shocked by parallels to the Nazi extermination camps or quite simply ignorant of Bosnian society, German reporters in fact contributed to the aims of the warring parties by making ‘heterogeneous communities unimaginable’ (Robert Hayden).
Im Bosnienkrieg der frühen neunziger Jahre zeigte sich erstmals, dass und wie sehr man die Probleme der Transformationsprozesse in Osteuropa unterschätzt hatte. Außerdem machte dieser Krieg deutlich, dass es der EU nicht gelungen war, eine gemeinsame Außenpolitik zu entwickeln und damit den Krieg zu beenden. Im Gegensatz zur Politik vermochten es die deutschen Auslandskorrespondenten allerdings vor allem durch ihr angebliches Engagement für die Sache des Multikulturalismus und der Toleranz in Sarajevo, sich das Ansehen und den Respekt der Öffentlichkeit zu verdienen. Dieser Beitrag stellt eine solche Sichtweise infrage. Er argumentiert, dass es gerade die deutschen Reporter waren, die auf vielfache Weise indirekt die Ziele der Kriegsparteien unterstützten. Ihre Befürwortung der neuen deutschen Außenpolitik, ihre Warnungen vor der Wiederkehr von Konzentrationslagern oder auch schlichtweg ihre pure Ignoranz trugen letztendlich dazu bei, die Möglichkeit von ‘heterogenen Gesellschaften unvorstellbar’ zu machen (Robert Hayden).
Samuel Huntington's ‘clash of civilizations’ argument that in the future most conflicts will be between civilizations has been the source of considerable debate within international relations. Among the criticisms of this argument is the fact that there is a considerable overlap between Huntington's concept of civilizations and religion. In fact, only one of Huntington's eight civilizations has no obvious religious component. This raises the question of whether the concept of civilizations is really a surrogate for religion. Accordingly, this study examines the influence of both religion and Huntington's concept of civilizations on ethnic conflict using data from the Minorities at Risk Phase 3 dataset as well as data on religion and civilizations collected independently. The results show that while there is considerable overlap between religion and civilization, the two are not the same. Also, while it is not clear whether religious or civilizational differences have a greater impact on ethnic conflict, it is clear that neither are they its primary cause. These results cast serious doubt on the validity of Huntington's hypothesis, at least as far as it concerns ethnic conflict.
Cultural identity has become prominent in studies of world politics in the post-Cold War era. First, a growing literature in world politics has emerged that focuses on the impact of social culture, broadly conceived as the shared religious, racial or ethnolinguistic characteristics of a society. The significance of this aspect of culture is epitomized in studies focusing on ‘ethnic conflicts’, ‘ethnic security dilemmas’, and most prominently in Huntington's ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, which suggests, among other things, that shared civilization membership is the fulcrum upon which post-Cold War era world politics rests. Secondly, the impact of political culture, broadly conceived as the shared norms and institutions guiding political behaviour in a society, has become increasingly salient, as evidenced by the bourgeoning literature on the democratic peace thesis, which posits that the extent to which a state (or pair of states) is democratic is a major determinant of its war-proneness. Adherents of this view argue either that although democracies are just as war-prone as non-democracies they rarely fight other democracies, or that democracies are more peaceful than
non-democracies, in general.
In addressing the subject of nationalism after communism, one might do one or both of the following two things: treat the subject from 1989/91 to the present, as the title of this lecture suggests; or, understand one's task differently and revisit the subject of nationalism before and during the communist era. What the communist and pre-communist periods can tell us about nationalism might help us to evaluate nationalism today, after communism.
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