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Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It like to Try a Rat?
... Ewald 1998, pp. 701-707, 705-706;Ewald 1995Ewald , p. 1896. It proposes methodologies for the study of the intellectual foundations of rules protecting rights in various legal systems. ...
... A study of how anti-discrimination law operates within various legal systems can lead to conclusions on which liberties are more worthy of protection in various legal systems (Suk 2007b;2007a;Tourkochoriti 2015;. A study of hate speech in Germany can enlighten the constitutional culture of that country as one that accepts limitations to free speech, in opposition to the US, where the self-understanding points towards protecting free speech (see Tushnet 1998Tushnet -1999Tushnet , p. 1278 This approach is a version of the one comparativists have characterized as the search for 'mentalités' (Samuel 1998;Legrand 1995, p. 273) and 'Styles of thought' (Ewald 1994(Ewald -1995(Ewald , p. 1948. It is also close to what some other scholars have characterized as 'expressivism', the inquiry as to how constitutions help constitute the nations, 'offering to each nation's people a way of understanding themselves as political beings'. 5 It is also broader than this as it aims at identifying wider patterns of thought and ex ante understandings, conscious and unconscious elements at play within the understandings of jurists on the legitimate limits of a liberty within a legal system. ...
... William Ewald advocates a similar approach inEwald 1995Ewald , p. 1944.Dit artikel uit Law and Method is gepubliceerd door Boom juridisch en is bestemd voor anonieme bezoeker ...
... A striking feature of the literature is the consensus that comparative law suffers a longstanding 'malaise' (Ewald, 1995(Ewald, : 1891. Indeed, the 'so-called "malaise of comparative law" has become a catchphrase' (Smith, 2010: 332 (footnote collecting sources omitted)). ...
... For some, the lack of disciplinary coherence displays itself in comparatists' weak 'sense of ultimately belonging to the same guild and of working towards similar goals', relative to groups such as international lawyers and legal historians (Reimann, 2002: 687). Tackling matters of method that return below, the field's leading scholars characterize comparative law as 'superficial and unsystematic, dull and prone to error' (Ewald, 1995(Ewald, : 1891. Riles (2001: 3 (footnote omitted)) remarks 'a certain ubiquitous angst' about comparative law's identity vis-à-vis disciplines such as comparative politics, jurisprudence and the anthropology or sociology of law. ...
... Such tacit rules may help to explain why what is superficially the same rule operates differently in different places (and within a place). In turn, Ewald (1995: 2111 (emphasis omitted)) encourages attention to 'law in minds', the aim being 'to understand the legal system from within and be able to think about it as a foreigner thinks' (Ewald, 1995(Ewald, : 1948. A variation looks to 'paradigms'lawyers' 'hard core of shared understandings, of basic theories and concepts, a common language, a common methodology' (Van Hoecke and Warrington, 1998: 513À514). ...
... Perhaps they did not know much about the historical importance of the term for a legal understanding of style or simply did not consider the issue. 6 On the academic context of Spiethoff's paper in German economics, see Redlich (1970); on modern uses of economic style in (comparative) economics, see Schefold (1994;1994-1995 as he is after 'those features that jointly determine the style of entire groups of legal systems' (Zweigert, 1961, p. 47). ...
... Rather than providing a basis, it merely puts a new label on Arminjon, Nolde and Wolff's pre-existing classification. As indicated above, Constantinesco arguably had the false expectation that the doctrine of style would 14 'We must, it seems, for this purpose conceive of law as a cognitive phenomenon, seeing in it not just a set of rules or a mechanism for the resolution of disputes, but a style of thought, a deliberate attempt, by people in their waking hours, to interpret and organize the social world: not an abstract structure, but a conscious, ratiocinative activity' (Ewald, 1995(Ewald, , p. 1940. See also Ewald (1998). ...
Through a close reading of Konrad Zweigert's 1961 essay and related writings, the paper discusses his use of the term ‘style’ in the classification of legal families, making three arguments. First, Zweigert's use of style is methodologically naive. He uses style as a cluster concept, grouping an eclectic mix of features characteristic for the history, language, techniques, doctrines and values of national laws. His explicit sources seem to have provided associative and superficial inspiration rather than a theoretical basis for this terminological move. Second, Zweigert's methodology could have been improved by using more rigorous style concepts – and he seems to have been aware of the necessary theoretical resources. Third, such a commitment to a humanistic and cultural approach to comparative law is not easily reconciled with the blunt functionalism of Zweigert's programmatic methodological statements. His style doctrine is only compatible with a weak version of functionalism as a ‘methodological metaphor’: the version he actually espoused.
... Why did the magis trates execute the animals at all, let alone in this particular fashion? The trial of animals by both ecclesiastical and criminal courts had a long history in Europe (Evans 1906;Hyde 1916;Berman 1994;Ewald 1995;Girgen 2003), and, in cases of bestiality, "the animal was regularly put to death with the man" (Ewald 1995(Ewald : 1905. Some colonists believed that human copulation with animals could result in monstrous hybrids, and they took steps to foreclose any possibility of inter species procreation. ...
... Why did the magis trates execute the animals at all, let alone in this particular fashion? The trial of animals by both ecclesiastical and criminal courts had a long history in Europe (Evans 1906;Hyde 1916;Berman 1994;Ewald 1995;Girgen 2003), and, in cases of bestiality, "the animal was regularly put to death with the man" (Ewald 1995(Ewald : 1905. Some colonists believed that human copulation with animals could result in monstrous hybrids, and they took steps to foreclose any possibility of inter species procreation. ...
The article explores the history and structure of American laws criminalizing sexual contact between humans and animals to demonstrate how the ecological conditions of late capitalism are remaking sexual taxonomies, practices, and identities. It notes that the majority of these statutes have been enacted within the past three decades and most contain language that explicitly exempts animal husbandry and veterinary medicine from prosecution. The article explores the legislative politics that produce these exemptions and exposes an underlying ambiguity: in the age of industrial reproduction, the “accepted practices” of animal husbandry can be distinguished from bestiality only through legal fiat. The structure of the laws exempts human sexual contact with animals when it reproduces biocapital and produces “perverse” bestialists and “normal” farmers as mirrored categories, distinguished not by their relations to animals but by their relations to capital. Finally, the article reads this insight against the biopolitical theorist Giorgio Agamben’s concept of anthropogenesis and notes that such exemptions reveal a limitation in his theory. In place of the timeless ritualism of Agamben’s “anthropological machine,” the article argues for an account of speciation that recognizes strategic gradations of pain and pleasure, the critical role of sexual violence and reproduction, and processes of trans-speciative procreation.
... Trên trường quốc tế, các luật mẫu như UNCITRAL (Uỷ ban Liên Hợp Quốc về Luật Thương mại Quốc tế), UNIDROIT (Viện Quốc tế về Nhất thế hoá pháp luật tư) khuyến khích quá trình cấy ghép pháp luật của các nước đang phát triển nhằm đáp ứng nhu cầu toàn cầu hoá cũng như yêu cầu của các điều ước quốc tế như TRIPS [69]. Tuy nhiên, việc chúng ta quá vội vã khi chưa xem xét tính tương thích giữa quốc gia và Việt Nam đã khiến cho việc cấy ghép pháp luật không đạt được thành công như mong đợi (ví dụ như việc xem xét nền tảng triết học và nguyên tắc cơ bản ẩn sau ngôn từ -thành quả của lịch sử tiến hóa của một chế định luật mà Việt Nam muốn cấy ghép [70]). Watson cũng đưa ra giải thích cho sự thất bại của việc cấy ghép pháp luật: i) thiếu các ý niệm, ý thức hệ, giá trị thuận lợi cho việc cấy ghép pháp luật, ii) các quan niệm pháp luật cấy ghép bị đánh tráo khái niệm, cùng tên gọi nhưng nội hàm khác, với mục đích khác, iii) thiếu các thiết chế thuận lợi giúp áp dụng, phổ biến ý tưởng của pháp luật, giúp số đông dân chúng được tham gia nhiều hơn, hưởng lợi nhiều hơn, được trao quyền nhiều hơn từ pháp luật cấy ghép [14]. ...
The interplay of legal systems has existed for thousands of years. In the contemporary context, globalization promotes interaction between legal systems. Legal comparatists have long developed the “legal transplant” theory to investigate foreign legal borrowing cases. However, scholars have not looked into this phenomenon in Vietnam thoroughly. The article introduces the theoretical framework of legal transplant. It then considers the practice of legal transplant in Vietnam in several legal fields to point out the decisive factors of the success or failure of the legal transplant.
... Zu den Motiven für die Personifizierung in "traditionellen" Gesellschaften,Ewald (1995). Für eine historische Typologie von personae,Dijk (2020). ...
Zusammenfassung
Modelle individueller Verantwortlichkeit für die Handlungen von Algorithmen versagen dann, wenn eine Mensch-Algorithmus-Assoziation selbst als Handlungseinheit in den Blick gerät. In manchen Situationen sind menschliche und algorithmische Handlungen derart eng miteinander verwoben, dass keine lineare Verbindung zwischen den emergenten Kollektiven und den komplexen Interaktionen der individuellen Handlungseinheiten mehr besteht. In solchen kollektiven Entscheidungssequenzen lässt sich auch keine individuelle Verantwortlichkeit mehr zurechnen. Deshalb bedarf es einer neuen Perspektive auf Mensch-Algorithmus-Assoziationen, die ihre emergenten Eigenschaften und ihren organisationalen Charakter erfasst, um angemessene Modelle kollektiver Verantwortlichkeit zu entwickeln. Der Artikel sucht Antworten auf die folgenden Fragen: Wie kann die Begegnung zwischen Mensch und Algorithmus innerhalb einer solchen sozio-technischen Konfiguration theoretisch angemessen erfasst werden? Lässt sich die Konfiguration als hybrides Kollektiv verstehen? Können der Konfiguration selbst als personifiziertem Kollektivakteur Handlungen zugerechnet werden? Welche Verantwortlichkeitsformen dürften für Mensch-Algorithmus-Assoziationen institutionalisiert werden – zentralisierte oder distribuierte Kollektivverantwortlichkeiten?
... Савиньи, начиная с первой работы, которая принесла ему признание, («Право владения» (1803)), последовательно разделял римский и германский элементы в действующем праве (Савиньи 2011b: 186; см. об этом: Кёниг 2010: 364;Ewald 1995Ewald : 2027. Более того, Савиньи отстаивал, вслед за Кресин А.В. ...
... The author's intention here is not to praise or condemn any norms or practices of their application, but provide an examination of how RF SC reasons in its decisions on religious freedoms, and how this reasoning can be representative of the collective mind-sets and attitudes. This analysis can help identify what William Ewald (1995a) called, "law in the minds" at RF SC in matters of religious freedoms; it can potentially serve the consequent political analyses for the comparative law examination of (dis)similarities in the regulation of religious freedoms in Russia and other countries and perhaps for normative judgments by policy-makers or by those who aspire to become such. ...
... They had been accused of eating and of intentionally destroying barley crops in the jurisdiction. When the rats failed to appear in court, their defence lawyer's tactic was to invoke the notion of fair process, and more specifically to challenge the original writ for failing to give the rats due notice (Ewald 1995). ...
... First, the class of criminally accountable agents has to be taken into account. From the ninth century to the nineteenth in Western Europe, legal systems tried animals for any kind of crime or damage (Ewald 1995). Prejudices and superstitions of the Middle Ages were finally eclipsed by the ideas of the Enlightenment, leaving humans as the only plausible actor in the legal domain. ...
This work is based on the premise that the practice of comparative law will only be able to reach sophisticated levels of investigation once the theory of legal comparison is minimally established in Brazilian academia. In this sense, comparative research in public law needs a more rigorous theoretical study. To contribute to this, this research questions whether there is, in fact, an autonomy of comparative public law within comparative legal studies. To achieve this objective, employing a descriptive and analytical methodological approach and a hypothetical-deductive approach aims to determine whether the field possesses its object, characteristics, and objectives. After this first step, the aim is to demonstrate how the definition of each of these elements contributes to a better production of legal knowledge. RESUMO O presente trabalho parte da premissa de que a prática do direito comparado só poderá alcançar níveis sofisticados de investigação quando a teoria da comparação jurídica es-tiver minimamente sedimentada na academia brasileira. Neste sentido, a pesquisa compara-da em direito público se ressente de um estudo teórico mais rigoroso. Com o intuito de contri-buir neste sentido, esta pesquisa questiona se há, de fato, uma autonomia do direito público comparado dentro dos estudos jurídicos com-parados. Para isso, e adotando um processo metodológico descritivo e analítico e um mé-todo hipotético-dedutivo, busca-se identificar se o campo possui objeto, característica e fina-lidades próprias. Após este primeiro momen-to, intenta-se demonstrar como a definição de cada um desses elementos contribui para uma melhor produção do conhecimento jurídico. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Direito Público Compa-rado. Teoria da Comparação Jurídica. Direito Público. SUMÁRIO-1. INTRODUÇÃO. 2. A PRIMAZIA DO DIREITO PRIVADO NO CAMPO DOS ESTUDOS COMPARADOS: RAZÕES E LIMITES. 3. DELIMITANDO O CAMPO DO DIREITO PÚBLICO COMPARADO: OBJETO, CARACTERÍSTICAS E FINALIDADES. 4. CONCLUSÃO.
One argument that is at times adduced against proposals for legal change, such as granting personhood to autonomous agents, is that the change in question will be inefficacious if it takes the law too far from the folk world of people. By contrast, in this article we argue that legal concepts and folk concepts are more malleable than we tend to assume. We turn to (legal) history to demonstrate that the relationship between legal concepts and folk concepts is not one-directional, which means that changes in the law can and have influenced folk psychology as well as vice versa. This has implications for debates around the regulation of new technologies: the ‘lack of efficacy’ argument is not a strong one and mere reference to current folk concepts cannot suffice in such debates. Moreover, the efficacy argument does not, and cannot, replace normative arguments in this respect, so the malleability of folk concepts needs to be considered by legal decision-makers. Current conceptual apparatuses (legal or folk) are not immutable, and reification of the current status quo should not be presupposed.
Comparative law is a common subject-matter of research and teaching in many universities around the world, and the twenty-first century has aptly been termed 'the era of comparative law'. This Cambridge Handbook of Comparative Law presents a truly global perspective of comparative law today. The contributors are drawn from all parts of the world to provide different perspectives on how we understand the 'law' and how it operates in practice. In substance, the Handbook contains 36 chapters covering a broad range of topics, divided under the following headings: 'Methods of Comparative Law' (Part I), 'Legal Families and Geographical Comparisons' (Part II), 'Central Themes in Comparative Law' (Part III); and 'Comparative Law beyond the State' (Part IV).
This paper analyses the Chilean class action system considering the comparative context. Our thesis is that our system transitioned from a compensatory emphasis to a predominantly regulatory one but without the inherent proper controls of a regulatory system. With that target, a general approach to the class action concept and history is first undertaken, followed by a description of the underlying principles through a comparative review. Having identified the compensatory and regulatory justifications, the second part addresses the above-mentioned thesis. This, by analyzing the collective procedure of Law No. 19.496 and examining its subsequent legal reforms, which entails delving into modifications concerning available remedies and the involvement of private parties in the system. Finally, the paper presents the risks derived from a shift in emphasis towards a regulatory approach without the necessary control mechanisms.
In recent years, several cases about the legal personhood of nonhuman animals garnered global attention, e.g. the recognition of ‘basic rights’ for the Argentinian great apes Sandra and Cecilia. Legal scholars have embraced the animal turn, blurring the once sovereign boundaries between persons and objects, recognising nonhuman beings as legal subjects. The zoonotic origins of the Covid-19 pandemic stress the urgency of establishing ‘global animal law’ and deconstructing anthropocentrism. To this end, it is vital to also consider the extensive premodern legal history that humans share with other animals. Over 200 so-called animal trials have been documented in premodern Europe. In these proceedings, certain nonhuman animals—particularly domestic pigs—were prosecuted, often resulting in their capital punishment or anathema. This paper takes a history of ideas approach to these historical instances where Western philosophy of law and philosophical anthropology intersect, problematising the notion that such trials constitute wholesome precedents of the kind of legal personhood presently debated in jurisprudence. My counter-hegemonic analysis of the legal prosecution and execution of several pigs in fifteenth-century France demonstrates that late mediaeval notions of criminality transcended the alleged human-nonhuman divide whilst reaffirming and reifying human distinctiveness. I propose that pig trials were local laboratories where Christian communities reflected upon the natural hierarchy of God’s creation. Ensuing the apparent breach of the prescribed boundaries of nature, these communities renegotiated and re-naturalised everyday interspecies sociability by utilising the offending animals to exemplify particular norms about what it means to be human, generally to the animals’ detriment.
The article showing that the highest goal of each autonomous general legal discourse is the construction and implementation of its vision and mission as a special picture of the world – a conceptualized and structured model of an aspect or fragment of reality accessible through its research program and methods. Depending on different types of scientific rationality, this picture of the world can be considered as a subject, object or goal of a scientific discipline, but it continues to be the main question of the latter, even if it is not formulated as such. The claim to the right to construct and present one’s own picture of the world as common to all legal discourses has actually been and is a key point of competition and dominance between legal philosophy, legal theory and comparative jurisprudence (comparative law) during the last two centuries. The author argues that only comparative jurisprudence’s awareness of its own fundamental experience and continuity, available opportunities and valuable advantages in creating a picture of the world can bring it from a semi-marginal state to a well-deserved central status among general legal disciplines in the scientific and educational agenda. In addition, a realistic and inductive picture of the world of comparative jurisprudence is better for considering and modeling the existing and potential serious challenges of legal development. Key words: scientifi c picture of the world, cognitive goal of science, comparative law, comparative jurisprudence.
Este trabajo ha sido seleccionado y ha obtenido el Accésit Premio Estudios Financieros 2007 en la Modalidad de DERECHO CIVIL Y MERCANTIL. El trabajo de investigación presenta la larga trayectoria por la que pasaron las Cajas de Ahorros europeas, y más precisamente, el cambio sufrido por la institución en su tradicional forma jurídica. Se trata de exponer las características más importantes de la institución, haciendo especial hincapié en la proyección social de las Cajas y su fuerte vinculación con la forma jurídica en la que efectúan sus servicios. Se pretende convencer al lector de lo trascendente y fructífero, tanto para el sistema financiero como para la sociedad misma, de mantener viva la institución que durante tanto tiempo fielmente coadyuvaba en el desarrollo del país en el que efectuaba sus servicios, intentando mostrar que los cambios sufridos por las Cajas de Ahorros en su forma jurídica se traducen indistintamente en la desnaturalización de la institución y en su consiguiente desaparición. Finalmente, se señala el Reino Unido como el primer país en implementar la forma jurídica de sociedad anónima, y la siguiente decisión de muchos de los países europeos de tomar la misma senda, en un intento por atender la demanda de aumentar los recursos propios de la institución y sus fuentes alternativas de financiación. El trabajo incluye también una análisis de los trasplantes legales desarrollada por Günther Teubner a base de la teoría Autopoiética del Derecho. De ahí que se presenten las Cajas de Ahorros como instituciones profundamente entretejidas de distintos discursos, siendo estos: el epistéme social, económico, político y jurídico, y dentro de este último, instituciones incluso abordadas entre distintas disciplinas jurídicas: civil, mercantil y administrativa; todo eso con el propósito de probar que las Cajas de Ahorros se clasifican dentro de la categoría de las instituciones de tipo «orgánico», en el sentido dado a aquellas por Günther Teubner. «More progress could be made through a more directly multi-disciplinary approach, where economics is set alongside jurisprudence, organizational studies, political science, sociology, and various elements of anthropology, psychology, and geography. All sciences develop through two opposed principles: that of specialization as separate disciplines become defined, and develop their theory and methodologies; they necessarily insist on the importance of recognition of their distinctive contribution, and as a result become at best indifferent and at worst hostile to the approaches of other disciplines studying the same phenomena. They therefore resist invitations to combination, even when attempts at explaining new phenomena challenge the walls that have thereby been imposed.» Colin Crouch, Modelling the firm in its market and organizational environment: methodologies for studying corporate social responsibility, Institute of Governance and Public Management, University of Warwick Business School (Paper for discussion at EABIS PhD workshop on methodologies for studying corporate social responsibility, 19-21 May 2006).
Alejandro Vergara ha desarrollado una concepción del derecho junto con una original formulación del contenido y función de la teoría del derecho. Se trata de un enfoque muy promisoria y que este artículo somete a examen. Se postula que la definición de la disciplina por Vergara presenta algunas inconsistencias con sus reflexiones generales sobre el fenómeno jurídico. Su teoría del derecho pareciera aproximarse a un análisis conceptual y desarraigado del contexto temporal y territorial. En su lugar, se propone que la lectura más coherente con la ontología jurídica que reivindica Vergara es un estudio local y situado, que indague en la cultura jurídica que predomina en una específica comunidad de intérpretes.
Although the emergence of sustainability development in civil law has triggered substantial discussion, scarce literature is available in English on the introduction of ecological norms to the newly promulgated Chinese Civil Code, which came into force at the beginning of 2021. This article intends to fill the gap by providing an overview of the structure and significance of the principles and rules designed to render the Civil Code more adaptable to the global urgency of sustainable development. The ecological principle added to the Civil Code is designed to promote public interests rather than individual liberty. Unlike other civil law principles, the ecological principle needs to be scientifically justified, which no longer depends only on judicial discretion. Regarded as a continuation of the movement for socialization, the ecological principle contributes to the global trend of questioning anthropocentrism in law and manifests itself in a new understanding of human activity. Ecologizing the Civil Code entails a methodological agenda that incorporates more pragmatic, coherent, and policy-oriented argumentation in judicial practice. Moreover, it entails an ontological agenda, still in formation, that urges us to recognize the inevitable connections between human and nonhuman worlds on the ontological side. Within the scope of this principle, the section of the Civil Code on property law imposes the duty to act in accordance with the necessity of resource conservation and environmental protection. It is also predictable that stricter limitations will be imposed on property rights, in the name of good neighborliness. State intervention by courts due to ecological considerations will become more frequent in contractual disputes. Finally, the Code introduces the notions of punitive liability and pure environmental harm, which diverge from the classical continental tradition of understanding civil liability. Despite the theoretical novelties, the question of to what extent civil adjudication can achieve a comprehensive ecological transformation still needs to be scrutinized.
In this book, we propose three liability regimes for addressing the considerable responsibility gaps caused by AI-systems: Vicarious liability for autonomous software agents (‘actants’), enterprise liability for inseparable human-AI interactions (‘hybrids’), and collective fund liability for interconnected AI systems (‘crowds’). The liability regimes serve as fine-tuned reactions to liability gaps of different quality. Instead of overgeneralising a one-size-fits-all liability or undergeneralising a sectorally fragmented liability along with the various contexts in which AI is used, we focus on three fundamental risks that AI systems pose: autonomous decision-making, association with humans, and systemic interconnectivity.
Methodologically, our book suggests new interdisciplinary ways of thinking of the interrelation between technology and liability law. In contrast to the regularly observed short-cut that translates technological properties directly into liability rules, we place the emphasis on the social sciences as an intermediary discipline between AI technology and law. The social sciences help identify the social-technical configurations in which AI systems appear and theorise their social risks that law needs to respond to within its own system of rules. We propose to introduce the concept of ‘socio-digital institutions’. Algorithms do not have as such the ontological qualities of an actor that allow them to engage in social relations and communicate with humans. Only once algorithms are part of socio-digital institutions, these institutions will, according to their normative premises, obtain communicative capacities and qualify as actors. Our approach also differs from the typical focus that lawyers place on economics and thus the costs and benefits of liability systems. Instead, we integrate insights from social theory, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of technology. These insights are particularly helpful for dealing with complex issues such as personification of algorithms, emergent properties of human-algorithm associations and distributed cognition of interconnected networks.
We recognise that liability rules remain, to a large extent, fragmented along national lines. Therefore, our legal analysis contains a comparative dimension. To provide a solid basis for algorithms’ status in law, we focus on the current discussion in the civil law world with a particular view to the specifics of German law, and in the common law world, particularly in the US and English law. Whenever relevant, we also integrate the European dimension of the topic. Our comparative analysis follows a method that Collins has coined ‘comparative sociological jurisprudence’. Sociological jurisprudence analyses socio-digital institutions and their inherent risks to framing the relevant legal categories; comparative sociological jurisprudence uses this analysis with a view to different legal systems and the specifics of national doctrines. Our analysis of the various risks attempts to identify the most suitable legal categories for handling this problem. In spelling out how these categories are applied, the study then accounts for liability laws in national legal orders, their concepts in legal doctrine, and their basic principles.
Two legal systems founded from similar Enlightenment philosophical and political values use state coercion differently to regulate a core liberty: the freedom of expression. This comparative study of France and the United States proposes a novel theory of how the limits of freedom of expression are informed by different revolutionary experiences and constitutional and political arrangements. Ioanna Tourkochoriti argues that the different ways freedom of expression is balanced against other values in France and the United States can be understood in reference to the role of the government and the understanding of republicanism and liberty. This understanding affects how jurists define the content and the limits of a liberty and strike a balance between liberties in conflict. Exploring both the legal traditions of the two countries, this study sheds new light on the broader historical, social and philosophical contexts in which jurists operate.
Partiendo del análisis de la Ley 1774 de 2016 sobre protección y bienestar de
los animales en Colombia, el artículo hace un recuento de las diversas posi�ciones jurídicas que contemplaron la protección de los animales, y aquellas
que permitieron su juzgamiento en procesos civiles y penales, en especial
desde la época Antigua y la Edad Media, y su influencia en la época moderna,
buscando identificar la permanencia de los principios jurídicos fundantes
de la relación hombre-animal y su incidencia en el derecho animal actual
Our thoughts are products of our own culture, tradition, and ideal of order, so their understanding and development can only be based upon them. However, cultures, traditions and ideals vary from time to time and from people to people, as each of them has been created and developed to respond to challenges under their own conditions given. Consequently, they are both independent of each other in their genesis and also incommensurable in their historical set; they are not even classifiable but only taxonomisable in a strict sense. Each of us lives and interprets his own world; when comparing, we attempt at putting all of them in a common hat, while none of us can transcend the symbolic paradox of “I interpret your culture through my culture”. A way out, if at all, can only result from their individual parallel characterisation, when we build up some kind of abstract philosophical universality from the ideals of order concerned. In the context of the Self, on the one hand, and of You, on the other, we are expected not only to explain the Other, but also to recognise it by its own right. Accordingly, legal comparison aims at getting knowledge not only of ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ but about what is meant by law when it works in the mind. All in all, comparison comprises, in addition to the mere act of taking cognisance, also the acceptance of this Other by its own right, in which no entity involved is simply reduced to anything purely factual (“what is the law?”), but the actuality of the entire normative process leading to a legal statement (“how do we think in law?”) is considered. Getting to know any foreign law begins with the grouping of laws and, expressed in terms of belonging to legal families, by combining those which are similar and contrasting those which are dissimilar. Their interaction and mixing are part of their life, but establishing their occurrence cannot substitute to the didactic necessity and explanatory power of analysing them in term of legal families as well. When describing them, mere contrast or parallelism is to be completed by showing up the specific field and way of ingenuity each of them may have in comparison to others, as their individual contribution to the cultural production of the humanity.
Globalisation has disrupted most of the intellectual and practical tools jurists had devised. Yesterday’s “high definition” law has given way to a new “low definition” law. The main features of the latter have debased such paradigmatic concepts as the authority of the State legislator, the dichotomy between internal and external legal norms, the distinction between public and private sources of law, the image of the Kelsenian pyramid of norms, and the centrality of legal obligation. Legal pluralism and constitutionalism have frequently been presented as the two main competing orientations to meet the challenges of the global age. Whereas the former insists on diversity, the latter insists on common values. The legal, empirical, and doctrinal information gleaned from nine national reporters about the respective situations of Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, and the United Kingdom tend to prove that no clear-cut distinction between pluralism and constitutionalism is evident. Nor are the strategies these two perspectives embody totally successful to meet the demands of the day. Section 2 of this general report sets the stage for the study of legal interactions in the global age. It sheds light on the degree of pluralism each of the studied legal systems admits, both in its relations with other legal systems that reach beyond the States, and in its relations with more or less autonomous inner forms of legal normativity. Section 3 tackles the forms of interactions that take place among legal actors in the context of an increasingly plural landscape, and how they contribute to changing legal mentalities. By focusing respectively on legal actors’ reasoning and on legal scholarship, understood as the interacting members of a unified epistemic community, Sects. 4 and 5 contribute to highlighting what “thinking like a lawyer” means today. Finally, Sect. 6 identifies how little neutral, and how value-laden, the current discussion about pluralism and constitutionalism is. The very concepts that are currently used to confront today’s major legal changes testify to the ideological dimension of legal analysis.
This paper examines the methodological claim made famous by P. F. Strawson: that we understand what features are required for responsible agency by exploring our attitudes and practices of holding responsible. What is the presumed metaphysical connection between holding responsible and being fit to be held responsible that makes this claim credible? I propose a non‐standard answer to this question, arguing for a view of responsible agency that is neither antirealist nor straightforwardly realist. It is instead “constructivist.” On the “Scaffolding View” I defend, reactive attitudes play an essential role in developing, supporting, and thereby maintaining the capacities that make for responsible agency. Although this view has relatively novel implications for a metaphysical understanding of capacities, its chief virtue, in contrast with more standard views, is in providing a plausible defense of why so‐called “responsible agents” genuinely deserve to be treated as such.
Our thoughts are products of our own culture, tradition, and ideal of order, so their understanding and development can only be based upon them. However, cultures, traditions and ideals vary from time to time and from people to people, as each of them has been created and developed to respond to challenges under their own conditions given. Consequently, they are both independent of each other in their genesis and also incommensurable in their historical set; they are not even classifiable but only taxonomisable in a strict sense. Each of us lives and interprets his own world; when comparing, we attempt at putting all of them in a common hat, while none of us can transcend the symbolic paradox of “I interpret your culture through my culture”. A way out, if at all, can only result from their individual parallel characterisation, when we build up some kind of abstract philosophical universality from the ideals of order concerned. In the context of the Self, on the one hand, and of You, on the other, we are expected not only to explain the Other, but also to recognise it by its own right. Accordingly, legal comparison aims at getting knowledge not only of ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ but about what is meant by law when it works in the mind. All in all, comparison comprises, in addition to the mere act of taking cognisance, also the acceptance of this Other by its own right, in which no entity involved is simply reduced to anything purely factual (“what is the law?”), but the actuality of the entire normative process leading to a legal statement (“how do we think in law?”) is considered. Getting to know any foreign law begins with the grouping of laws and, expressed in terms of belonging to legal families, by combining those which are similar and contrasting those which are dissimilar. Their interaction and mixing are part of their life, but establishing their occurrence cannot substitute to the didactic necessity and explanatory power of analysing them in term of legal families as well. When describing them, mere contrast or parallelism is to be completed by showing up the specific field and way of ingenuity each of them may have in comparison to others, as their individual contribution to the cultural production of the humanity.
This chapter is based on experience of teaching comparative law in the multicultural environment of classrooms in Singapore. Reflecting on this experience, the chapter explores the mission(s) of comparative law drawing on jurisprudential perspectives. From this, the chapter develops and argument about what comparative law should and should not be called upon to do in the classroom, and what a teacher of comparative law in multicultural legal classes should aim to deliver. In sum, the argument is that a jurisprudentially informed comparative legal studies approach should be pursued. If such an approach is adopted, then the teaching of comparative law in multicultural legal classes, while challenging, presents a significant opportunity for enhanced understanding.
Cambridge Core - Jurisprudence - Kinship, Law and Politics - by Joseph E. David
What kind of legal history might account for the unique and continued practice of forfeiture in the United States? Law enforcement, as many recent writers have argued, has grown increasingly dependent on this fail-safe way to gain revenue, since civil asset forfeiture has few procedural safeguards. Unlike criminal forfeiture (in personam), civil forfeiture generally proceeds against the offending property (in rem), not against the person. A piece of property does not have the rights of a person; so, instead of proving crime beyond “a reasonable doubt,” suspicion equal to “probable cause” is enough. Your property is guilty until you prove it innocent. With civil forfeiture, owners do not have to be charged with a crime, let alone be convicted, to lose homes, cars, cash—or dogs. This effort to sharpen our understanding of dispossession is preeminently a legal project. It takes its meaning and garners its effects from the division between value and disregard, things and persons, human and nonhuman. In analyzing how legal reasoning has historically contributed to literal expropriation, I examine the generally invisible nexus of animality, human marginalization, and juridical authority.
The comparison is a mental process wherein two or more different objects are examined to determine their possible relationships. As an element of the cognition process, comparison cannot be considered separately from other logical means of cognition, such as analysis, synthesis, induction and deduction. Scientific comparison involves three interconnected aspects: a logical method of cognition; a process or cognitive activity; and a cognitive result, i.e. knowledge of a certain kind. It also embraces judgment and evaluative selection, as it is usually concerned with one or some aspects of the objects compared, while abstracting provisionally and conditionally other aspects. Comparison is used in all fields of scientific inquiry, although in each field the comparative method employed has its own distinct features that fulfil the relevant cognitive functions. A distinction may be drawn between the function of comparison as an element of cognition in general, and the comparative method as a relatively autonomous, systematically organized means of research designed to achieve specific aims of cognition.
The term comparative law does not denote a specific branch of positive law, or a body of rules governing a particular field of social activity. When we speak, for instance, of the comparative law of marriage, we do not refer to a set of rules regulating relations between husband and wife; we merely refer to the fact that the marriage laws of two or more countries have been subjected to a process of comparison with a view to ascertaining their differences and similarities. The term ‘comparative law’ denotes, therefore, a form of study and research whose object is the comparison of legal systems with a view to obtaining knowledge that may be used for a variety of theoretical and practical purposes. In the words of Zweigert and Kötz, comparative law is “an intellectual activity with law as its object and comparison as its process.” Comparative law embraces: the comparing of legal systems with the purpose of detecting their differences and similarities; working with the differences and similarities that have been detected (for instance explaining their origins, evaluating the solutions utilized in different legal systems, grouping legal systems into families of law or searching for the common core of the systems under comparison); and the treatment of the methodological problems that arise in connection with these tasks, including methodological problems connected to the study of foreign law. As the above definitions suggest, the scope of comparative law is extremely broad and its subject-matter can never be treated in an exhaustive manner, for one can hardly imagine all the possible purposes and dimensions of legal comparison.
Протягом останніх десятиліть було поставлене питання щодо узагальнення й осмислення елементів спеціальнонаукової картини світу, притаманної порівняльно-правовим дослідженм і дисциплінам. Проблемою в цьому контексті стало уявне відокремлення філософських засад порівняльно-правових досліджень та сформованої на їхній основі класифікації правопорядків. Метою статті є реконструкція зв’язку між філософськими вченнями, розвитком філософії та теорії різних наук і становленням учення про особливе в праві в контексті становлення теоретичних засад порівняльно-правових досліджень, зокрема, генезою порівняльно-правової наукової картини світу. У статті доводиться, що поява ідеї соціального особливого в праві була закономірною, такою, що випливала із суперечності між апріорним проголошенням всесвітньої стадіальності правового розвитку і вивченням конкретних механізмів взаємодії правових систем. Багато в чому ця ідея була побічним продуктом, по-перше, усвідомлення неуніверсальності значення і реального поширення релігійних учень та римського права, по-друге, регіональності, культурної та іншої обумовленості ідей природного права, по-третє, намагання визначити межі етнокультурних традицій народів, що не збігаються із кордонами держав, по-четверте, виявлення нерівноцінних зв’язків між різними національними правопорядками. У другій половині XVIII – першій третині ХІХ ст. було розвинуто теорію сім’ї правових систем як середньої і максимальної об’єктивної одиниці між національним правопорядком та загальнолюдським правовим розвитком, що є внутрішньо пов’язаним феноменом, існування якого матеріалізується у вигляді особливих іманент них елементів у складі національного права. Це особливе в праві, згідно з поглядами тогочасних учених, можна визначити як суму суттєвих елементів і взаємодій, що склалися історично і є загальними для певної групи правопорядків. Це найвища одиниця правового розвитку і найширший об’єкт юридичної науки; узагальнення ж більш високого рівня є суб’єктивними і входять до предмета філософії. Проблематика правових сімей та їх класифікації у досліджуваний період низкою вчених уже була виокремлена як сфера наукових знань. Найбільш розробленим критерієм виокремлення особливого в праві був мовнокультурний. Окрім нього в основу визначення окремого в праві деякими вченими були покладені: фізико-географічний детермінізм, ареали поширення релігій, належність до римської правової традиції, поділ на західне і східне право. Доводиться, що ці теорії виявили свою непослідовність, а також субсидіарність щодо теорії правових сімей.
Today's world has been deeply affected by globalization. Different cultures have deepened their knowledge of each other and are forced to create common solutions to worldwide problems. This has led to an increasing interest in comparing different nations’ approaches to common problems.
Core Questions of Comparative Law. By Bernhard Grossfeld. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2004. xiii, 261 p.; 21 cm. - Volume 34 Issue 2 - Marylin J. Raisch
This article takes issue with the longstanding oppositional themes of harmonisation versus regulatory competition in European company law. Instead of embracing one approach over the other in exclusivity, the article draws attention to the persisting mixture of approaches to an emerging European-wide law regulating the business corporation. Against the background of an ongoing struggle over identifying the goals and taboos of the European legislator’s mandate in regulating the company, the argument put forward here is that this very struggle is reflective of the nature of the evolution of company law in an ‘integrating Europe and a globalising world’. European attempts of developing European company law as part of a larger initiative of improving the Union’s potential for innovation and competition are thus likely to meet with the challenges that contemporary Nation States are facing when adapting their modes of regulation and representation to the demands of an increasingly complex and decentralised fields of market activities. Situating the law of the business corporation within the larger theme of European integration on the one hand, and of issues of market regulation, domestic, transnational, and international, on the other, suggests the adoption of a systems theory-based approach to understanding the boundaries of law in this multilevel and multipolar process.
Despite the humanities' “animal turn,” the historiography of western European medieval animals is limited. Social historians have examined specific (usually economically important) species, and cultural historians have analyzed the symbolism of animals in the Middle Ages, but few are interested in the animals themselves. Drawing on the highly interdisciplinary field of Critical Animal Studies and other fields of history, I suggest ways that medieval historians could embrace the animal turn to study the experiences of real animals and animal–human entanglements of the Middle Ages.
This chapter begins with the mysterious image of a cat hanged in 1554 London and investigates whether this particular hanging was similar in nature to the extensive medieval and early modern animal prosecutions in continental Europe reported on by the historian E.P. Evans. It examines the adequacy of Evans’ claims about the periodicity, the geography and the meaning of animal prosecutions. The existence of deodands notwithstanding, no evidence is found of any animal trials in the British Isles. The chapter warns that the power of medieval criminal law to punish animals has been usurped by the bureaucratic regulations attached to the circumstances in which animal shelters and animal control officers put animals to death.
This book explores how the design, construction, and use of robotics technology may affect today’s legal systems and, more particularly, matters of responsibility and agency in criminal law, contractual obligations, and torts. By distinguishing between the behaviour of robots as tools of human interaction, and robots as proper agents in the legal arena, jurists will have to address a new generation of “hard cases.” General disagreement may concern immunity in criminal law (e.g., the employment of robot soldiers in battle), personal accountability for certain robots in contracts (e.g., robo-traders), much as clauses of strict liability and negligence-based responsibility in extra-contractual obligations (e.g., service robots in tort law). Since robots are here to stay, the aim of the law should be to wisely govern our mutual relationships.
Having entered the twenty first century, comparative law must now take stock of important issues arising from the above picture and then move on. The shifting and changing horizons of comparative law must be critically analyzed.
This chapter delves into the nature of the pactum as both substantial and functional bond, as well as mythical canon of any contractual-constituting initiative in the public and private spheres. The aim is to show that the movement toward the conceptualisation of good faith as an organising principle and implied term in the Common law tradition is due to the need to counterbalance our inhuman condition as made manifest by the humanitarian façade of the modern constitutional project. This claim is supported by an unconventional method of investigation that will promote the comparison between the role of political action at the public level and the increasing utilisation of the doctrine of good faith in Contract law theory and practice.
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