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Abstract

Investigators have begun to document links between emotional clarity and forms of negative emotionality, including neuroticism and major depressive disorder (MDD). Researchers to date have relied almost exclusively on global self-reports of emotional clarity; moreover, no studies have examined emotional clarity as a function of valence, although this may prove to be crucial in understanding the relation of emotional clarity to maladjustment. In 2 studies, we used experience-sampling methodology and multilevel modeling to examine the associations between emotional clarity and 2 constructs that have been linked theoretically with emotional clarity: neuroticism and depression. In Study 1 we assessed 95 college students who completed a self-report measure of neuroticism. In Study 2 we examined 53 adults diagnosed with MDD and 53 healthy adults. Reaction times to negative and positive emotion ratings during the experience-sampling protocols were used as an indirect measure of emotional clarity. Neuroticism was related to lower clarity of negative, but not of positive, emotion. Similarly, compared with the healthy controls, individuals with MDD had lower clarity of negative, but not of positive, emotion. It is important to note, findings from both studies held after controlling for baseline RTs and current levels of negative and positive emotion. These findings highlight the importance of assessing valence when examining emotional clarity and increase our understanding of the nature of the emotional disturbances that characterize neuroticism and MDD. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).
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Thompson, R. J., Kuppens, P., Mata, J., Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Jonides, J., & Gotlib, I. H. (in press).
Emotional clarity as a function of neuroticism and Major Depressive Disorder. Emotion.
Emotional Clarity as a Function of Neuroticism and Major Depressive Disorder
Renee J. Thompson, Peter Kuppens, Jutta Mata, Susanne M. Jaeggi, Martin Buschkuehl, John Jonides,
and Ian H. Gotlib
Renee J. Thompson, Departments of Psychology, Stanford University & Washington University in St.
Louis; Peter Kuppens, Department of Psychology, KU Leven, Belgium; Jutta Mata, Departments of Psychology,
Stanford University and University of Basel, Switzerland; Susanne M. Jaeggi, School of Education, University of
California at Irvine; Martin Buschkuehl, MIND Research Institute, Irvine, CA; John Jonides, Department of
Psychology, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor; and Ian H. Gotlib, Department of Psychology, Stanford
University.
The research reported in Study 1 was supported by the Research Fund of KU Leuven (Grants GOA/15/003;
OT/11/031), by the Interuniversity Attraction Poles program financed by the Belgian government (IAP/P7/06), and
by a research grant from the Fund for Scientific Research-Flanders (FWO). The research reported in Study 2 was
supported in part by grants from the National Institute of Mental Health Grants F32 MH091831 to Renee J.
Thompson, MH60655 to John Jonides, and MH59259 to Ian H. Gotlib; and Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
fellowship Wi3496/4-1 to Jutta Mata. The authors thank Courtney Behnke, Sarah Victor, Brooke Gilbert, and Jordan
Davis for their assistance in project management (Study 2).
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Renee J. Thompson, Washington University
in St. Louis, 1 Brooking Drive; Campus Box 1125; St. Louis, MO 63130. Email: reneejthompson@gmail.com
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
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Abstract
Investigators have begun to document links between emotional clarity and forms of negative
emotionality, including neuroticism and Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). Research to date has relied
almost exclusively on global self-reports of emotional clarity; moreover, no studies have examined
emotional clarity as a function of valence, although this may prove to be crucial in understanding the
relation of emotional clarity to maladjustment. In two studies, we used experience sampling methodology
and multi-level modeling to examine the associations between emotional clarity and two constructs that
have been linked theoretically with emotional clarity: neuroticism and depression. In Study 1 we assessed
95 college students who completed a self-report measure of neuroticism. In Study 2 we examined 53
adults diagnosed with MDD and 53 healthy adults. Reaction times to negative and positive emotion
ratings during the experience sampling protocols were used as an indirect measure of emotional clarity.
Neuroticism was related to lower clarity of negative, but not of positive, emotion. Similarly, compared to
the healthy controls, individuals with MDD had lower clarity of negative, but not of positive, emotion.
Importantly, findings from both studies held after controlling for baseline reaction times and current
levels of negative and positive emotion. These findings highlight the importance of assessing valence
when examining emotional clarity and increase our understanding of the nature of the emotional
disturbances that characterize neuroticism and MDD.
Keywords: emotional clarity, neuroticism, negative emotionality, Major Depressive Disorder, depression
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Emotional Clarity as a Function of Neuroticism and Major Depressive Disorder
Emotions provide individuals with information: They help people navigate their lives and inform
them if their goals, needs, and concerns are being met (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Lazarus, 1991; Schwarz
& Clore, 2003). In this context, being unclear about how one feels is likely to be maladaptive. For
example, how do people decide what actions to take if they are basing decisions on inaccurate
information? How well can people successfully regulate emotions about which they are confused? Dizén,
Berenbaum, and Kerns (2005) found that people who are less clear about their emotions are also less
aware and less clear about their psychological needs.
Emotional clarity refers to the extent to which individuals can unambiguously identify, label, and
mentally represent the type (e.g., sadness, nervousness) and source or cause of emotions they feel
(Coffey, Berenbaum, & Kerns, 2003; Gohm & Clore, 2000). The extent to which people are clear about
their emotional experiences varies continuously and is an individual difference construct (Gohm & Clore,
2000). Lower levels of emotional clarity have been associated with poorer emotion regulation (e.g., Gratz
& Roemer, 2008; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995; Tull, Barrett, McMillan, & Roemer,
2007) and diminished psychological well-being (e.g., Saxena & Mehrotra, 2010; Augusto-Landa, Pulido-
Martos, & Lopez-Zafra, 2011; Landa, Martos, & Lopez-Zafra, 2010; Montes-Berges & Augusto-Landa,
2014; Saxena, Dubey, & Pandey, 2011). For example, individuals who are diagnosed with Major
Depressive Disorder (MDD) report lower levels of emotional clarity than do non-psychiatric controls
(Loas et al., 1998). Similarly, college students whose depressive episodes are in remission report lower
levels of emotional clarity than do their never depressed peers (Ehring, Fischer, Schnulle, Bosterling, &
Tuschen-Caffier, 2008).
The study of emotional clarity has been extended to the domain of personality. In particular,
researchers have examined relations between emotional clarity and global or trait measures of
neuroticism, or trait negative affect. Neuroticism has been consistently associated with lower levels of
emotional clarity in samples of college students (Coffey et al., 2003; Euse & Haney, 1975; Extremera &
Fernandez-Berrocal, 2005; Gohm & Clore, 2002; Salovey et al., 1995).
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
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There are two reasons to expect both neuroticism and MDD to be inversely related to emotional
clarity. First, if depressed individuals are indeed characterized by diminished levels of emotional clarity,
risk factors for the development of MDD, particularly those that have an emotional component, may also
be associated with low levels of emotional clarity. In this context, neuroticism, which has been linked to
negative affectivity (e.g., Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999), is posited to serve as a risk factor
for MDD (e.g., Barlow, Sauer-Zavala, Carl, Bullis, & Ellard, 2013). Second, it is possible that
neuroticism and MDD have in common underlying processes, such as a shared genetic diathesis (e.g.,
Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998; Watson & Clark, 1995).
Researchers examining emotional clarity have almost exclusively used global self-report
measures, which have notable limitations. Perhaps most important, the extent to which people can
accurately introspect and report on their emotional clarity is unclear. Lischetzke, Angelova, and Eid
(2011) used a novel method to assess emotional clarity as part of an experience sampling study.
Participants rated how they were feeling in the moment, and their reaction times (RT) to make these
ratings were used as a proxy for emotional clarity. Presumably, faster ratings on emotion items reflect
greater clarity about emotions. Lischetzke and colleagues (2011) found that although these RTs were not
related to global self-reports of emotional clarity, they were related to participants’ certainty about their
feelings in the moment. Further, faster RTs, but not global measures of emotional clarity, predicted
greater subsequent self-reported mood-regulation success during the experience sampling protocol.
Indirect assessments of emotional clarity also reduce possible influences of cognitive biases that
have been found to characterize clinical populations, including individuals with MDD (e.g., memory
biases; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Finally, retrospective self-report measures suffer more generally
from the weakness of being far removed from the actual situations and contexts in which people actually
experience their emotions. Assessing emotional clarity in the context of people’s daily lives provides
information with greater ecological validity. Thus, in order to assess level of emotional clarity more
reliably, it is important to use methods other than retrospective self-report.
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
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In addition to these methodological issues, investigators examining emotional clarity, including
researchers studying neuroticism and MDD, have yet to assess emotional clarity as a function of valence.
Although there is evidence that MDD and neuroticism are related to lower levels of emotional clarity, it is
unclear whether these results for emotional clarity hold for both positive and negative emotions, or
alternatively, whether diminished emotional clarity is unique to negative or positive emotions. There are
important clinical implications for understanding whether disturbances in emotional clarity are general or
are specific to one valence. For example, if difficulties in emotional clarity are specific to negative
emotions, then treatment components targeting emotions need to focus on helping clients learn how to
better identify only their negative, and not their positive, emotions.
We hypothesize that neuroticism and MDD will be characterized by decreased clarity of negative,
but not positive, emotions. Individuals vulnerable to and diagnosed with MDD exhibit a variety of
negative cognitive biases in memory, attention and the interpretation of ambiguous information (e.g.,
Alloy, Abramson, Walshaw, & Neeren, 2006; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). For example, people with
MDD exhibit difficulty removing negative material from working memory (e.g., Levens & Gotlib, 2010).
This strong focus on negative valence may obscure the clarity about the specific negative feelings they
may experience. Indeed, people with MDD struggle in their understanding of specific negative emotions.
For example, individuals with MDD have less differentiated negative emotions than do healthy controls
(Demiralp et al., 2012); importantly, the groups do not differ on differentiation of their positive emotions.
Similarly, neuroticism is associated with lower levels of differentiated negative emotions (Erbas,
Ceulemans, Pe, Koval, & Kuppers, 2014).
In addition, there are also two lines of research that provide at least indirect support for our
central hypothesis that neuroticism and MDD will be associated with reductions in the clarity of negative,
but not positive, emotions. First, both neuroticism (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008) and
MDD (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010) have been found to be associated with poor
regulation of negative emotions. We posit that these problems with emotion regulation are due in part to
these individuals being unclear about their negative emotions. In other words, we think that the
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
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diminished clarity of negative emotion is one factor that leads to subsequent difficulties in regulating
negative emotions. Consistent with this formulation, investigators have shown that participants with
lower clarity of emotion have greater difficulty repairing experimentally induced negative moods
(Salovey et al., 1995).
Although we conceptualize emotional clarity as being central to understanding why people
experience aberrations in negative emotions, emotional clarity may play less of a key role in
understanding the relations between positive emotions and neuroticism or MDD. First, neuroticism is
generally unrelated to positive emotions; even though MDD is associated with diminished positive
emotions, the particular issue is that people do not experience enough positive emotion (Watson, Clark, &
Carey, 1988). We think that the main issues involved in understanding aberrations in positive emotions
related to neuroticism and MDD will be linked to factors and processes that clarify the elicitation,
maintenance, and up-regulation of positive emotions, and emotional clarity may not be central to these
processes. Indeed, in a related line of research, Barrett, Gross, Christensen, and Benvenuto (2001) found
that emotion regulation was related to the extent to which people differentiated negative, but not positive,
emotions.
The second line of research that provides indirect support for our central hypothesis involves the
construct of emotional instability. Higher levels of emotional variability have been found to be associated
with less emotional clarity (Thompson, Berenbaum, & Bredemeier, 2011). In this context, compared with
healthy controls, individuals diagnosed with MDD experience greater variability of negative, but not of
positive, emotions (e.g., Houben, Van den Noortgate, & Kuppens, in press; Peeters, Berkhof, Delespaul,
Rottenberg, & Nicolson, 2006; Thompson et al., 2012). Thus, we predict that depressed individuals will
experience lower clarity of negative, but not of positive, emotions.
Before examining the specific mechanisms that may underlie possible lower levels of clarity of
negative emotions in individuals with high levels of neuroticism or MDD, it is important that we elucidate
the relations between emotional clarity and both neuroticism and MDD. Therefore, in the first study,
which involves the reanalysis of existing data (e.g., Kuppens, Allen, & Sheeber, 2010), we examined the
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
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strength of the relation between emotional clarity and trait neuroticism in a sample composed largely of
college students. In the second study, we examined the relation between emotional clarity and MDD in a
community sample of adults who were in a current depressive episode or who had no history of any
mental health disorders. Importantly, in both studies participants completed experience-sampling
protocols that included items assessing their current levels of positive and negative emotion. This allowed
us to measure negative and positive emotional clarity using participants’ RTs to endorse negative and
positive emotions, respectively. This is the first study to use RTs to examine clarity of positive and
negative emotions as a function of neuroticism and MDD.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Study 1: An initial sample of 80 participants took part in the study, of which 77 were university
students and 3 were university personnel.1 They were recruited by responding to ads that were placed
around the university campus. One participant withdrew after the first day of data collection, resulting in a
final sample of 79 participants (63% female). They ranged in age from 18 to 67 years (M = 24; SD =
7.82). All participants had Belgian nationality and are from European ethnicity. Participants came from a
variety of disciplines, including, the humanities (42%), science and technology (22%), and biomedical
sciences (22%). Participants provided informed consent and were compensated for their participation.
In the first session, each participant received a Tungsten E2 palmtop computer along with
instructions for how to use it to respond to the questions at each prompt. Each palmtop was programmed
to beep 10 times a day for 14 consecutive days during the participant’s waking hours using the
Experience Sampling Program 4.0 (D. J. Barrett & Feldman Barrett, 2000) on the basis of a stratified
random interval scheme (dividing each participant’s waking hours into ten equal periods and randomly
assigning one prompt in each interval). At each prompt, the palmtop presented a number of questions in
randomized order, including items about the experience of specific emotions and questions about the
circumstances that led to them. For the next two weeks, participants carried the palmtop during their
normal daily activities and responded to the questions when signaled. Compliance was good: overall,
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
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participants responded to 82% of the prompts. After two weeks, participants attended a second session in
which they were debriefed and paid for participation. All participants also completed a battery of self-
report measures either before or after the sampling procedure, as determined by random assignment.
These measures included questionnaires assessing self-esteem, emotion, emotion-regulation, self-esteem
(which are not relevant to the current research question) and a personality scale (see below).
Study 2: Adults from the surrounding communities of Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Stanford,
California, were recruited using postings at local businesses and online (e.g., Craigslist). To be eligible for
participation, people needed to be between 18 and 40 years old (M = 26.8, SD = 6.5) and be native
English speakers. The sample was largely women (69.8%) and ethnically/racially diverse: 67.9% white,
7.5% African American, 10.4% Asian American, 2.8% Latino/a, 9.4% multi-racial and 1.9% indicated
“other.” Participants were highly educated with approximately 51.9% having a bachelor’s degree or
higher. People were required to either have no history of any mental health disorder (CTL; n = 53) or be
in a current depressive episode (MDD; n = 53). Mental health status was assessed using the Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2001). Additional eligibility
requirements for the control group included a Beck Depression InventoryII (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, &
Brown, 1996) score of 9 or less. Additional eligibility for the depressed group included a BDI-II score of
14 or higher, and no alcohol/drug dependence in past six months, Bipolar I or II diagnoses, or psychotic
disorders. The final sample of 106 participants excluded 15 participants because of equipment failure (n =
12; 7 CTLs, 5 MDDs) or noncompliance (n = 3; all MDDs). The MDD and control groups did not differ
significantly in gender (2(1) = 0.18, p = .83), raceethnic composition (2(5) = 7.79, p = .17), or
educational attainment (2(3) = 6.67, p = .08). Individuals with MDD, however, were significantly older
than control participants (t(104) = 2.19, p < .05).2
At their first session, participants completed the lifetime SCID, which was administered by
graduate and post-baccalaureate students who had received extensive training. Diagnostic reliability was
assessed by randomly selecting and re-rating recorded interviews. Our team has achieved excellent inter-
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
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rater reliability for a major depressive episode (k = .93) and for classifying participants as non-psychiatric
controls (k = .92; Levens & Gotlib, 2010). Participants returned to the laboratory for a second session to
complete a series of self-report measures, including the one described below. At this session, they were
instructed on the experience sampling method (ESM) protocol, including completing a full practice trial.
Participants carried a hand-held electronic device (Palm Pilot Z22) that was programmed using
the Experience Sampling Program 4.0 (D. J. Barrett & Feldman Barrett, 2000). They were prompted (via
a tone signal) eight times per day between 10 a.m. and 10 p.m. The majority of participants carried the
device for 7 to 8 days to be prompted 56 times. Prompts occurred at random times within eight 90-min
windows per day; thus, prompts could occur between 2 and almost 180 min apart (M = 93 min, SD = 38
min). After a prompt, participants had 3 min to respond to the initial question. For each ESM item, an RT
was recorded. MDD and CTL groups did not differ in the percentage of completed prompts (MDD =
77.9%, CTL = 81.0%, t(104) = 1.24, p = .22). Participants provided informed consent and were
compensated for their participation, with an extra incentive for responding to more than 90% of the
prompts. The protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Boards of University of Michigan and
Stanford University.
Neuroticism. In Study 1, the Dutch translation of the NEO-Five Factor Inventory (FFI)
personality questionnaire (Hoekstra, Ormel, & de Fruyt, 1996) was used to measure neuroticism. The
questionnaire consists of 60 items, with 12 items measuring each of the Big Five personality dimensions.
Respondents are asked to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with each of the statements
using a five-point Likert-type scale (ranging from 0 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree; Cronbach
= .88).
Emotion ratings. Finally, to rule out the possibility that people take longer to respond to emotion
items that they endorse strongly, we controlled for within-person mean levels of current emotion. At each
prompt, participants reported their current levels of negative and positive emotions. Each study
administered a different list of emotion words. To maximize comparison of results from each study, we
limited the analyses to emotions that were administered in both studies. For negative emotion, we used
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
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ratings for angry, sad, and anxious. For positive emotion, we used ratings for happy and excited.3 In Study
1, participants indicated the extent to which they were currently feeling each emotion using a continuous
slider scale that ranged from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much). For Study 2, participants used a 4-point
scale (1 = not at all, 4 = a great deal) to report the extent to which they were currently feeling each
emotion at each prompt. We calculated the between and within-person reliability values for negative and
positive emotions using MIXED methods (see Shrout & Lane, 2011, for detailed information, including
syntax). For Study 1 for negative emotion, the between-person reliability was .995 and the within-person
reliability was .657, and for positive emotion the between-person reliability was .994 and the within-
person reliability was .715. For Study 2 for negative emotion, the between-person reliability was .994 and
the within-person reliability was .570, and for positive emotion the between-person reliability was .997
and the within-person reliability was .751. Across studies, the between-person reliabilities were excellent
and the within-person reliability values are in the moderate range (Shrout, 1998).
Emotional clarity. As described above, based on previous work (e.g., Lischetzke et al., 2011),
we operationalized emotional clarity as the speed with which participants responded to emotion items
during the experience-sampling period. Because of the non-normal distribution of the data in our analyses
and to avoid excessive influence of outliers (which occur given the nature of collecting experience
sampling data), RTs were log transformed before computing averages or conducting analyses. For clarity
of negative and positive emotions, mean scores for the log-transformed RTs to negative and positive
emotion items, respectively, were calculated at the prompt-level (i.e., for each participant for each
prompt). Study 2 also assessed global emotional clarity. Participants were administered the emotional
clarity subscale of the Trait Meta Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995).
Baseline reaction time. We included baseline RTs as a covariate in our analyses at the within-
person level. 4 It is important to control for baseline RTs when examining RTs to valenced stimuli.
However, it was particularly important to do so for Study 2 because some people with MDD exhibit
psychomotor retardation (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). To assess baseline RT, log-
transformed RTs across all non-emotion items were averaged for each prompt to provide a general RT
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
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variable. RTs to any item that included an emotion term were excluded. More specifically, for Study 1,
this included items asking participants to provide information about their ongoing situation and how they
appraised the situation. For Study 2, this included items assessing physical activity (Mata et al., 2012),
significant events (Thompson et al., 2012), as well as mind wandering and rumination.
Analytic overview
Because of the nested data structure (prompts nested within individuals), we tested our
hypotheses using multilevel modeling. Multilevel modeling simultaneously estimates within- and
between-person effects (Krull & MacKinnon, 2001) while handling varying time intervals between
prompts and missing data (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Importantly, multilevel modeling does not assume
independence of data points. We used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM 6.08; Raudenbush, Bryk, &
Congdon, 2008) and report parameter estimates with robust standard errors. Full models, all of which
were random effects models (i.e., intercepts and slopes were allowed to vary), are described in each
respective section.
For both studies, we conducted a series of multilevel models. First, we examined whether
negative emotional clarity varied as a function of the Level 2 variables, neuroticism (Study 1) and
depression status (Study 2), after controlling for the Level 1 variables: mean log-transformed RT on non-
emotion items at that prompt (i.e., baseline RT), and the level of negative emotion at that prompt (all
Level-1 predictors person-mean centered). Then, we conducted the same multilevel analyses for positive
emotional clarity. For Study 1, in the equations below, i represents beeps or prompts and j represents
participants. In all models that included neuroticism as a Level 2 (between-person) variable, neuroticism
was grand-mean centered.
Level 1 Model (prompt level)5:
RT to emotion itemsij = 0j + 1j* mean emotion + 2j* baseline RT + rij 1a
Level 2 Model (person level):
0j = 00 + 01*(neuroticism) + u0j 1b
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
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1j = 10 + 11*(neuroticism) + u1j 1c
2j = 20 + 21*(neuroticism)+ u2j 1d
For Study 2, all models were identical to those presented in Study 1, with the exception that
depression status instead of neuroticism was included as a Level 2 (between person) variable (dummy-
coded as 0 = CTL group; 1 = MDD group). The equations below represent the series of multilevel models
we conducted on the participants in Study 2.
Level 1 Model (prompt level)2:
RT to emotion itemsij = 0j + 1j* mean emotion + 2j* baseline RT + rij 2a
Level 2 Model (person level):
0j = 00 + 01*(depression status) + u0j 2b
1j = 10 + 11*(depression status) + u1j 2c
2j = 20 + 21*(depression status)+ u2j 2d
Results
Study 1
In Table 1, we present the average scores and within- and between-person standard deviations for
RT to negative and positive emotion items as well as levels of negative and positive emotion. Next, we
examined the correlations between RTs to negative versus positive emotion items at the within-person
level (Nezlek, 2012) and at the between person level, using aggregated values across the ESM period. At
the within-person level correlation, RT to negative emotion items was moderately correlated with RT to
positive emotion items, r = .47, p < .001. At the between-person level, they were correlated at r = .63, p <
.001; when controlling for baseline RT, RT to negative emotion items was moderately correlated with RT
to positive emotion items, r = .48, p < .001. These correlations suggest that clarity of negative and
positive emotions (i.e., RT to negative and positive emotion items) overlap but are not redundant.
Negative emotional clarity. The top half of Table 2 presents results from the negative emotional
clarity model (see Figure 1A for a graphical representation of the findings). People with higher levels of
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
13
neuroticism had longer RTs to endorse negative emotion items (see γ01). This suggests that higher levels
of neuroticism were related to lower levels of negative emotional clarity. Importantly, the model
controlled for the level of current negative emotion and participants’ current baseline RT. Findings also
show that RTs increased with the level of reported negative emotion (see γ10); further, this relation was
moderated by levels of neuroticism (see γ11). Although on average it took participants longer to report
negative emotions as their levels of negative emotions increase, this effect was weaker for participants
with high levels of neuroticism. Baseline RT was positively related to RT to negative emotion items (see
γ20), but this relation was not moderated by levels of neuroticism (see γ21).
Positive emotional clarity. The bottom half of Table 2 presents results from the positive
emotional clarity model (see Figure 1A). After controlling for average level of current positive emotion
and participants current baseline RT, neuroticism was not significantly related to participants’ RT to
positive emotion items (see γ01). Thus, positive emotional clarity was not related to levels of neuroticism.
In addition, RTs increased with higher levels of reported positive emotions (see γ10), but this relation did
not vary as a function of neuroticism (see γ11). Baseline RT was also positively related to RT to positive
emotion items (see γ20), but the relation between baseline RT and RT to positive emotion items did not
vary as a function of levels of neuroticism (see γ21).
Study 2
Next, we examined our hypotheses in an adult community sample, half of whom were in a major
depressive episode (MDD group) and half of whom had no current or past history of any mental health
disorders (CTL group). See Table 1 for the average values and within- and between-person standard
deviations for RT to negative and positive emotion items as well as of negative and positive emotion as a
function of MDD status. Next, we examined the validity of using RTs to in-the-moment ESM ratings of
negative and positive emotion ratings to assess emotional clarity. Study 2 included an assessment of
emotional clarity using a global self-report measure. Controlling for baseline RT, scores on the global
emotional clarity scale were not significantly associated with aggregated RTs to negative emotion items
(MDD: r = .15, p = .31; CTL: r = .05, p = .75) or with aggregated RTs to positive emotion items for the
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
14
MDD group (r = -0.12, p = .42). On the other hand, global emotional clarity was significantly associated
with RTs to positive emotion items for the CTL group, controlling for baseline RT (r = .29, p = .04). As
in Study 1, we examined the correlation coefficients between RT to negative and positive emotion items
at the within- and between-person level. At the within-person level, RTs to negative and positive emotion
items were weakly associated, r = .14. At the between-person level, however, they were strongly
correlated, r = .77, p < .001; when controlling for baseline RT, RTs to negative and positive emotion
items were moderately related, r = .55, p < .001. As in Study 1, these correlations suggest that RTs to
negative and positive emotion items are not redundant.
Negative emotional clarity. The top half of Table 3 presents results from the negative emotional
clarity model (see Figure 1B for a graphical representation of the findings). Compared to the healthy
control group, the MDD group had longer RTs to negative emotion items (see MDD (γ01) row for the
intercept (β0)). Thus, the MDD group had lower levels of negative emotional clarity than did the CTL
group. Importantly, the model controlled for average level of negative emotion and participants’ baseline
RTs to non-emotion items at each prompt. In addition, RTs increased (i.e., emotional clarity decreased) as
the level of reported negative emotions increased for the CTL group (see γ10). This relation, however, was
moderated by group status (see γ11): As the level of reported negative emotions increased, the MDD group
exhibited a smaller increase in RTs to negative emotion items than did the CTL group. Baseline RT was
positively related to RT to negative emotion items, and the relation between baseline RT and RT to
negative emotion items did not vary as a function of depression status (see γ20 and γ21, respectively).
Positive emotional clarity. The bottom half of Table 3 presents results from the positive
emotional clarity model (see Figure 1B for a graphical representation of the findings). After controlling
for the level of positive emotion and participants’ baseline RT to non-emotion items at each prompt, the
MDD group did not demonstrate significantly higher RTs to positive emotion items (see γ01) than did the
CTL group (γ00). In other words, there was no moderation based on MDD status. Higher levels of positive
emotion were related to higher RTs for the CTL group (γ10), this relation was not moderated by group
status (γ11). In other words, higher levels of positive emotion were related to longer RTs for all
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
15
participants independent of their depression status. Finally, baseline RT was also positively related to RT
to positive emotion items (γ20), but this relation was also not moderated by group status (γ21).
Discussion
We hypothesized that neuroticism and MDD are characterized by a similar emotional deficit
experiencing lower clarity of negative but not of positive emotions. We posited that individuals with
higher neuroticism and MDD have deficits in their knowledge of negative emotions. This theorizing is
consistent with research on a conceptually related but distinct construct (Boden, Thompson, Dizen,
Berenbaum, & Baker, 2012) of emotional differentiation. Less differentiation of negative emotions is
related to higher neuroticism (Erbas et al., 2014) and characterizes people with MDD compared to healthy
controls (Demiralp et al., 2012).
We were able to test our hypothesis in two studies examining emotional clarity in people’s day-
to-day lives in terms of how quickly they respond to items assessing their momentary experience. We
found that participants’ longer RTs to make ratings of their negative, but not positive, feelings in-the-
moment were related both to higher levels of neuroticism (Study 1) and to a diagnosis of MDD (Study 2).
Given that slower responses to emotion items reflect lower emotional clarity, our results suggest that
individuals high in neuroticism or with MDD are less clear about their negative emotions in daily life.
This lower clarity may have important intrapersonal and interpersonal consequences. Intra-personally, for
example, it may give individuals less accurate information about how a specific event impinges on their
concerns (Dizen et al., 2005), and how they can deal emotionally with the event (Butler & Randall, 2013).
Interpersonally, diminished emotional clarity may hinder adequate emotion regulation or social support
(Butler, 2011).
In contrast to negative emotional clarity, positive emotional clarity did not vary as a function of
participants’ levels of neuroticism (Study 1) or depression status (Study 2). These findings are important
because past research examining relations between emotional clarity and both neuroticism and MDD has
conceptualized emotional clarity as a general disturbance in emotion, rather than a disruption that may
vary by valence. The present studies are the first to examine emotional clarity as a function of valence,
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
16
and the findings from both studies highlight the importance of this distinction. Using a set of common
items assessing negative and positive emotion in the two studies, we documented that emotional clarity is
related only to levels of negative emotion. It is possible, of course, that different mechanisms underlie
emotional clarity for positive and negative emotions, and this issue should be examined more explicitly in
future research.
Given that neuroticism is a risk factor for MDD (Barlow et al., 2013), another direction for future
research is to examine whether reduced clarity of negative emotion predicts the onset of this disorder. We
cannot examine this question in Study 1 because we do not know which, if any, of the participants had
experienced a major depressive episode of in their past, were in a depressive episode at the time of the
study, or may experience an episode in the future. Future research should also examine longitudinally
whether clarity of negative emotion diminishes after the onset of a major depressive episode and/or
increases after individuals experience remission from depression. If predictive, RTs to negative emotion
items could be an easy way to assess future risk for mood disorder such as MDD. Such RTs can easily be
collected online and could be used as a diagnostic indicator for possible mood dysregulation. Further
research is needed to examine the diagnostic utility of such RTs however.
Only Lischetzke and colleagues (2011) used methods other than global self-reports to assess
emotional clarity. Our paper extends Lischetzke et al.’s findings in two important ways. First, these
investigators administered emotion items with bipolar scales (e.g., relaxed--nervous); in contrast, we
administered emotion items with unipolar scales. Our use of unipolar items is important because it lays
bare the valence-specificity of emotional clarity. Indeed, the findings from Study 1 illustrate that
emotional clarity is not always diminished across all emotions, but can be specific to an emotional
valence. Second, Lischetzke et al. found that people’s RTs to emotion items were related to how certain
they felt about their emotions in the moment, but not to global emotional clarity scores; RTs to emotion
items were also correlated with people’s self-reported success of subsequent emotion regulation.
Consistent with Lischetzke et al.’s findings, we found in Study 2 that RTs were generally not related to
self-reports of global emotional clarity.
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
17
Using an indirect assessment of emotional clarity is particularly important when assessing clinical
samples, such as individuals diagnosed with MDD. RTs should be less influenced by cognitive biases
than are more volitional self-reports of emotional clarity. Although we were able to minimize biases in
self-report, some individuals with MDD can exhibit psychomotor retardation. In our main analyses we
controlled for varying baseline RTs at the within-person level. However, our pattern of findings did not
differ when baseline RT was also included at the between-person level. Although the MDD participants
were slower than the CTL participants to respond to all experience sampling items, they were even slower
to respond to the emotion items.
In addition to including baseline RT in our multilevel models, we controlled for the levels at
which people endorsed emotions in our analyses. This is important because increased levels of negative
emotion are a defining feature of neuroticism. Moreover, increased negative emotion and decreased
positive emotion are diagnostic criteria for MDD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), with a large
body of evidence documenting this pattern of affective functioning in individuals diagnosed with MDD
(e.g., Peeters et al., 2006). People who are experiencing higher levels of negative or positive emotion may
take longer to evaluate the specific level at which they are feeling the emotions than do people who are
not experiencing any negative or positive emotion. Our results suggest that as levels of negative emotion
increase, adults with average levels of neuroticism (Study 1) and without mental health problems (Study
2) take longer to rate the specific levels at which they are experiencing negative emotion (i.e., have less
clarity about negative emotion). RTs also increase as levels of negative emotion increase for people with
higher levels of neuroticism and for those with MDD, but significantly less than is the case for healthier
individuals. This was an unexpected pattern of results, and future research is needed to better understand
how the relations between levels of emotion and clarity of emotion vary based on the levels of current
emotion. For positive emotion, our results suggest that all people (independent of their levels of
neuroticism or their MDD status), take longer to rate the levels at which they are experiencing positive
emotion as their actual levels of positive emotion increase (as happens for negative emotion). That is,
people’s clarity of positive emotions decreases with increasing positive emotion. Although the relation
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
18
between level of positive emotion and RT to positive emotion items is significant, the magnitude of this
association is lower than that of the relation between negative emotion and RTs to negative emotion
items, underscoring the importance in future research of taking into account the levels at which people are
endorsing emotion items when using RTs to assess emotional clarity.
Despite the methodological strengths and the importance of findings from these studies, there are
four limitations of this research. First, the sample in Study 1 comprised largely students and, in Study 2,
adults up to 40 years of age. Therefore, investigators should examine whether neuroticism and MDD are
associated with decreased clarity of negative emotions in older adults. Second, despite consistent findings
concerning the clarity of negative emotions across two studies with diverse samples, it is not clear
whether the lower clarity of negative emotions in participants with neuroticism or MDD reflects a
labeling issue or whether their actual emotional experience is amorphous, which should be examined in
future research. Third, the three negative emotions (angry, sad, anxious) varied across arousal and
approach/avoidance domains, whereas the two positive emotions (happy, excited) were both fairly high-
arousal and more approach-oriented emotions. Consequently, participants may have had to make more
distinctions for the negative than for the positive items, which may have made it more difficult to rate
negative than positive emotions. Future research should examine whether the present findings are
replicated if the arousal and approach/avoidance domains are better represented among positive emotions.
Finally, in Study 2, as noted above, RTs to emotion items were largely unrelated to the global emotional
clarity (with one exception: for the CTL group, RTs to positive emotion items were positively related to
global emotional clarity, which was in the opposite direction as expected.) On the one hand, these
findings question the validity of using RTs as a measure of emotional clarity. On the other hand,
Lischeske and colleagues (2011) conducted a rigorous assessment validating this indirect method to
assess emotional clarity. Further, although it is reasonable to expect that different measures of emotion to
converge, correlations between measures of emotions are “moderate at best, small in typical studies and
inconsistent across studies” (Mauss & Robinson, 2009, p. 227). Regardless, it will be important for future
researchers to attend to issues of validity when examining emotional clarity.
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
19
In sum, across two independent naturalistic studies, we found consistent evidence that negative
emotionality, conceptualized as both a disposition (neuroticism) and a state (MDD) is related to decreased
clarity of negative, but not of positive, emotions in daily life. These results highlight the importance of
examining emotional clarity separately by valence. In these studies, we used a validated assessment
method and utilized statistical techniques appropriate to the research questions and to analyses of
experience sampling data. Negative emotions often communicate whether people’s goals, needs and
concerns are not being met. In this context, the results of these studies contribute to a growing
understanding of the emotional disturbances that characterize neuroticism and MDD, and implicate
difficulties in clarity of negative emotions in both of these disruptive forms of distress.
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
20
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Footnotes
1 Excluding the non-student participants did not change the conclusions for either study.
2 Age was not significant when it was included as a covariate in any of the models examining negative or
positive emotional clarity. Further, the significance levels were not different from those in the analyses in
which we did not include age as a covariate.
3 Results of models that included all available negative and positive emotions (and not only the common
emotions) that were administered for Study 1 and 2 were similar to those presented in this paper; that is,
the significance levels did not change for the models for positive and negative emotional clarity for either
study.
4 When we include baseline RT as a between-person variable in our models (i.e., in equations 1b-1d and
2b-2e), the conclusions do not differ for either study.
5 The model can also be written as follows:
Emotional clarity = 00 + 01(depression status)+ 10baseline RT + 11depression status*baseline RT + 20
mean affect + 21depression status * emotion level+ u0 +u1*baseline RT + u2*mean affect + r
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
27
Table 1
Means and Within- and Between Person Standard Deviations of Major Variables
Study 1
Study 2
Mean
Within
SD
Between
SD
Mean
CTL
Mean
MDD
Within SD
CTL
Within SD
MDD
Between SD
CTL
Between SD
MDD
268.29
166.02
86.23
171.95
223.72
239.85
218.29
61.95
79.16
337.07
201.58
92.95
202.18
225.74
272.87
390.94
73.35
110.39
7.53
8.24
7.25
1.15
1.95
0.32
0.78
0.17
0.50
56.72
16.42
13.86
2.17
1.59
0.83
0.74
0.53
0.41
a These values are for hundredths of seconds and represent the raw RT means. For analyses, log-transformed values were used to minimize effects
of outliers. CTL = healthy control group; MDD = group with major depressive disorder.
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
28
Table 2
Multilevel Analyses Predicting Negative and Positive Emotional Clarity in Study 1
Fixed Effect
Unstandardized
Coefficient
Standard
Error
t-ratio
Degrees of
Freedom
p-value
Outcome: Negative Emotional Clarity
For Intercept, β0
Intercept, γ00
5.180
0.029
177.114
77
< 0.001
Neuroticism, γ01
0.120
0.040
2.932
77
0.004
For negative emotion average slope, β1
Intercept, γ10
0.017
0.001
15.863
77
< 0.001
Neuroticism, γ11
-0.004
0.001
-2.703
77
0.008
For baseline RT slope, β2
Intercept, γ20
0.540
0.013
40.573
77
< 0.001
Neuroticism, γ21
0.001
0.018
0.028
77
0.978
Outcome: Positive Emotional Clarity
For Intercept, β0
Intercept, γ00
5.585
0.024
236.137
77
< 0.001
Neuroticism, γ01
0.036
0.034
1.044
77
0.300
For positive emotion average slope, β1
Intercept, γ10
0.002
< 0.001
4.361
77
< 0.001
Neuroticism, γ11
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.311
77
0.757
For baseline RT slope, β2
Intercept, γ20
0.609
0.011
54.080
77
<0.001
Neuroticism, γ21
0.007
0.015
0.505
77
0.615
Note. Neuroticism represents the contrast between the average level of neuroticism and a one-unit
increase in neuroticism.
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
29
Table 3
Multilevel Analyses Predicting Negative and Positive Emotional Clarity in Study 2
Fixed Effect
Unstandardized
Coefficient
Standard
Error
t-ratio
Degrees of
Freedom
p-value
Outcome: Negative emotional clarity
For Intercept, β0
CTL, γ00
2.083
0.016
126.563
104
<0.001
MDD, γ01
0.136
0.024
5.573
104
<0.001
For negative emotion slope, β1
CTL, γ10
0.184
0.029
6.394
104
<0.001
MDD, γ11
-0.147
0.032
-4.645
104
<0.001
For baseline RT slope, β2
CTL, γ20
0.278
0.027
10.112
104
<0.001
MDD, γ21
0.013
0.045
0.289
104
0.773
Outcome: Positive emotional clarity
For Intercept, β0
CTL, γ00
2.180
0.018
123.618
104
<0.001
MDD, γ01
0.023
0.026
0.883
104
0.379
For positive emotion slope, β1
CTL, γ10
0.055
0.016
3.499
104
<0.001
MDD, γ11
0.007
0.021
0.333
104
0.739
For baseline RT slope, β2
CTL, γ20
0.264
0.028
9.294
104
<0.001
MDD, γ21
0.046
0.048
0.977
104
0.331
Note. MDD represents the contrast between the healthy control group (CTL) and group with Major
Depressive Disorder (MDD).
EMOTIONAL CLARITY, NEUROTICISM, AND MDD
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Figure 1. Aggregated within-person reaction times (prompt level, z-scored). Panel A presents results from
Study 1, separately for low (-1 SD below mean) versus high (+1 SD above the mean) levels of
neuroticism. Panel B presents results from Study 2 by depression group (CTL = healthy control group;
MDD = Major Depressive Disorder group), with error bars representing 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 1A
Negative Emotion
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Positive Emotion
low neuroticism high neuroticism
Emotional Clarity
Reaction Time (z-scored)
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Figure 1B
Negative Emotion
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Emotional Clarity
Reaction Time (z-scored)
... Therefore, individuals with low emotional clarity are less likely to use emotion regulation strategies (as they are failing to identify the need for them), which can negatively impact well-being. Lower emotional clarity has often been associated with reduced mental health [8][9][10], although there are exceptions. For instance, prior research has suggested that higher emotional clarity may be adaptive primarily for individuals who do not have very frequent and strong experiences of negative emotions but maladaptive for those who frequently have strong feelings of NA [11]. ...
... Evidence supporting this theory has been found, such as shorter RTs to affect items being associated with better momentary emotion regulation and mood [12]. However, emotional clarity may be confounded with emotional intensity [9], and evidence suggests the validity of RTs as a measure of affective clarity is enhanced by controlling for emotional intensity at the within-person (and not between-person) level [17]. ...
... The validity of the RT-based indicators of emotional clarity was tested by examining their associations with well-validated measures of relevance to emotional clarity. In forming our hypotheses (summarized in Table 1), we made a distinction between the clarity of PA and the clarity of NA because of prior research suggesting that the latter had associations with mental health while the former did not [9]. Therefore, we speculated that the awareness of NA is a more direct precursor to the application of coping strategies and successful coping than the awareness of PA. ...
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Background Emotional clarity has often been assessed with self-report measures, but efforts have also been made to measure it passively, which has advantages such as avoiding potential inaccuracy in responses stemming from social desirability bias or poor insight into emotional clarity. Response times (RTs) to emotion items administered in ecological momentary assessments (EMAs) may be an indirect indicator of emotional clarity. Another proposed indicator is the drift rate parameter, which assumes that, aside from how fast a person responds to emotion items, the measurement of emotional clarity also requires the consideration of how careful participants were in providing responses. Objective This paper aims to examine the reliability and validity of RTs and drift rate parameters from EMA emotion items as indicators of individual differences in emotional clarity. Methods Secondary data analysis was conducted on data from 196 adults with type 1 diabetes who completed a 2-week EMA study involving the completion of 5 to 6 surveys daily. If lower RTs and higher drift rates (from EMA emotion items) were indicators of emotional clarity, we hypothesized that greater levels (ie, higher clarity) should be associated with greater life satisfaction; lower levels of neuroticism, depression, anxiety, and diabetes distress; and fewer difficulties with emotion regulation. Because prior literature suggested emotional clarity could be valence specific, EMA items for negative affect (NA) and positive affect were examined separately. Results Reliability of the proposed indicators of emotional clarity was acceptable with a small number of EMA prompts (ie, 4 to 7 prompts in total or 1 to 2 days of EMA surveys). Consistent with expectations, the average drift rate of NA items across multiple EMAs had expected associations with other measures, such as correlations of r=–0.27 (P<.001) with depression symptoms, r=–0.27 (P=.001) with anxiety symptoms, r=–0.15 (P=.03) with emotion regulation difficulties, and r=0.63 (P<.001) with RTs to NA items. People with a higher NA drift rate responded faster to NA emotion items, had greater subjective well-being (eg, fewer depression symptoms), and had fewer difficulties with overall emotion regulation, which are all aligned with the expectation for an emotional clarity measure. Contrary to expectations, the validities of average RTs to NA items, the drift rate of positive affect items, and RTs to positive affect items were not strongly supported by our results. Conclusions Study findings provided initial support for the validity of NA drift rate as an indicator of emotional clarity but not for that of other RT-based clarity measures. Evidence was preliminary because the sample size was not sufficient to detect small but potentially meaningful correlations, as the sample size of the diabetes EMA study was chosen for other more primary research questions. Further research on passive emotional clarity measures is needed.
... Guil et al. (2022) found that emotional clarity interacts with emotional attention and emotional repair as emotional intelligence factors, with higher emotional clarity associated with higher emotional attention, promoting emotional repair and reducing depression likelihood. Thompson et al. (2015) showed that the effects of emotional clarity differ according to valence. People with major depressive disorder had particularly low clarity regarding negative emotions, indicating that an inability to recognize one's inner thoughts during negative emotions can lead to depression. ...
... Older adults who were better at interpreting and understanding their emotions tended to be more satisfied and had lower levels of depression. These findings support those of research showing that emotional clarity increases life satisfaction and reduces depression in various populations (Delhom et al., 2017;Guil et al., 2022;Günther et al., 2016;Honkalampi et al., 2000;Kennedy et al., 2010;Rey et al., 2011;Saarijärvi et al., 2001;Thompson et al., 2015;Wang et al., 2019) and reaffirm the relationship between emotional clarity and mental health, even in older age when people experience emotional changes. The findings are consistent with existing research suggesting that being aware of one's internal emotional dynamics helps individuals manage, accept, and resolve emotions (Greenberg, 2004;Kim and Chung, 2016;McFarland and Buehler, 1997). ...
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Objective Individuals who can recognize emotions well are better able to identify and accept their feelings and manage them. This study examined the mediation of problem-focused coping in the pathway through which emotional clarity predicts higher life satisfaction and lower depression in older adults. Methods In total, 150 older adults (75 male and 75 female, aged 60–69 years, with a mean of 64.53 [SD = 2.49]) participated in a face-to-face survey, answering questions on emotional clarity, problem-focused coping, life satisfaction, and depression. Results Emotional clarity was associated with higher life satisfaction and lower depression in older adults. People who were aware of their emotions well were in better emotional condition. Mediation analysis revealed that problem-focused coping mediated the positive relationship between emotional clarity and life satisfaction and the negative relationship between emotional clarity and depression. Older adults who understand their own emotions tend to deal with emotional events in a problem-focused manner, leading to high life satisfaction and low depression. Conclusion This study identifies cognitive conditions for increasing life satisfaction and preventing depression in later life and offers suggestions for personal and social efforts to maintain mental health.
... Research has linked emotional clarity to a variety of individual differences. Lower levels of emotional clarity are associated with personality traits such as neuroticism (Thompson et al., 2015), and initial research suggests that individuals increase in emotional clarity as they age (Mankus et al., 2016;Orgeta, 2009). In addition, emotional clarity has been linked to healthy repertoires of emotion regulation strategy use (Pugach et al., 2020). ...
... In addition, emotional clarity has been linked to healthy repertoires of emotion regulation strategy use (Pugach et al., 2020). Lastly, people with higher emotional clarity show fewer internalizing symptoms due to more successful emotion regulation (Park & Naragon-Gainey, 2019) and are less likely to have major depressive disorder (Thompson et al., 2015) or social anxiety disorder . ...
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People experience momentary fluctuations in how much they differentiate between emotions and how clear they are about what they are feeling. To better understand situational predictors of shifts in emotion differentiation and emotional clarity, we investigated whether individuals are more differentiated and clearer about their emotions in social situations (vs. alone) given that emotions fulfill important social functions. We tested if these within-person associations varied depending on socially relevant individual differences, including age, extraversion, and social connectedness. We also examined whether people are more differentiated and clearer in situations that have previously been processed (i.e., familiar situations) and if this effect was stronger for older (vs. younger) adults. Community adults (N = 290, aged 25–85 years) completed measures of extraversion and social connectedness and then were randomly prompted 6 times a day for 10 days to report on their current emotional experience and situation. Using multilevel structural equation modeling, social context was associated with less positive emotion differentiation and not associated with emotional clarity; these within-person associations did not differ by age, extraversion, or social connectedness. Individuals experienced more differentiated positive emotions and higher emotional clarity than usual when they were in more (vs. less) familiar situations. Familiarity was especially predictive of higher positive emotion differentiation among relatively older (vs. younger) adults. These findings suggest positive emotion differentiation, particularly in familiar situations could be a way in which the quality of one’s emotional experience changes with age.
... Az érzelemmegértés fejlődése egy egész életen át tartó folyamat, amely együtt jár a fizi kai, kognitív és társas fejlődéssel (Thompson et al., 2015). A fejlődés alapja az elsődleges gondozókkal való szoros kapcsolat (pl. ...
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Az utóbbi években az érzelemmegértés jelentősége egyre nyilvánvalóbbá vált. Számos tanulmány rámutatott a viselkedésproblémákkal, az együttműködéssel, a beilleszkedéssel és általában a társas kapcsolatokkal mutatott összefüggéseire (pl. Hughes et al., 1998; Dunn & Cutting, 1999; Schultz et al., 2011), ám maga a fogalom az elméleti megközelítés sokfélesége és az egymással részben átfedésben álló meghatározások miatt nem teljesen letisztázott, illetve épp a fogalmi sokszínűség miatt nem könnyű az érzelemmegértés fejlesztését célzó intervenciókat összehasonlítani. Cikkünkben hiánypótló céllal összegyűjtöttük és definiáltuk azokat a fogalmakat, amelyek az érzelemmegértés különböző tudományterületekről származó koncepcióinak alapját képezik, elemeztük közös jellemzőiket, majd elhelyeztük az érzelemmegértés újszerű fogalmát (emotion comprehension; Pons et al., 2002), illetve Pons és Harris meghatározó elméletét (2019) a szocio-emocionális tanulás integrált rendszerében. Emellett áttekintjük az érzelemmegértés fejlődésének csecsemőkortól kisiskoláskorig tartó mérföldköveit, valamint bemutatjuk az érzelemmegértés mindeddig hiányzó, átfogó mérőeszközét (TEC-teszt; Pons & Harris, 2000), mely a fejlesztést célzó intervenciók hatásvizsgálatának hatékony módszere lehet. A szakirodalmi háttér bemutatása után a tanulmány második részében a TEC-tesztet használó intervenciós módszerek összehasonlító elemzése következik.
... Emotional awareness and clarity challenges can make it harder for individuals to identify and regulate their emotions effectively [19]. Individuals with depression often report lower emotional awareness [20], less clarity of negative feelings [21], and higher levels of alexithymia compared to those without depression [22]. Additionally, limited emotional tolerance, characterized by being easily overwhelmed by emotions, may lead individuals to rely more on maladaptive emotion regulation strategies like avoidance or suppression to manage their emotions [23]. ...
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Background Patients with depression struggle with significant emotion regulation difficulties, which adversely affect their psychological well-being and hinder recovery. Traditional therapeutic approaches often fail to adequately address these challenges, leading to a persistent gap in effective mental health care. This research seeks to address this gap by investigating the impact of emotion regulation skills training on patients with depression. Aim To assess the difficulties in emotion regulation among patients with depression and evaluate the impact of an emotion regulation skills training intervention on those with higher levels of emotion regulation difficulties, specifically focusing on increasing the use of adaptive emotion regulation strategies and reducing the use of maladaptive emotion regulation strategies. Method A quasi-experimental research design was utilized, using three tools: a socio-demographic and Clinical Data structured interview schedule, Difficulties in Emotional Regulation Scale, and Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. Eighty patients with depression were recruited to assess those with higher levels of emotion regulation difficulties; out of those with greater difficulties, 30 patients were chosen to participate in the emotion regulation skills training intervention. Result The 80 studied subjects' emotion regulation difficulties scores ranged from 158 to 169 (164.5 ± 3.21), and they indicated less use of adaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies and more use of maladaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies (56.07 ± 2.67). Regarding the intervention group, the overall mean score of the 30 patients’ emotion regulation difficulties decreased from 167.35 ± 2.21 pre-intervention to 105.85 ± 3.33 post-intervention (p < 0.0001). Cognitive emotion regulation total scores improved markedly from 54.07 ± 1.66 to 35.2 ± 3.46 (p < 0.01). Implication Healthcare providers should routinely assess emotion regulation difficulties in patients with depression and integrate personalized treatment plans that target individual emotion regulation difficulties. Conclusion The findings suggest that the emotion regulation intervention has the potential to improve emotion regulation difficulties and cognitive emotion regulation strategies among patients with depression.
... PMM = positive mood maintenance, SF = sampling frequency. Low positive mood maintenance was M -1 SD, high positive mood maintenance was M + 1 SD 2022) and depression (Thompson et al., 2015). Moreover, lower emotional clarity was associated with higher depression scores (Berenbaum et al., 2012), higher posttraumatic stress symptoms (Tull et al., 2007), and various personality disorder symptoms (Leible & Snell, 2004) in subclinical or healthy populations. ...
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Ambulatory assessment (AA) studies are frequently used to study emotions, cognitions, and behavior in daily life. But does the measurement itself produce reactivity, that is, are the constructs that are measured influenced by participation? We investigated individual differences in intraindividual change in momentary emotional clarity and momentary pleasant-unpleasant mood over the course of an AA study. Specifically, we experimentally manipulated sampling frequency and hypothesized that the intraindividual change over time would be stronger when sampling frequency was high (vs. low). Moreover, we assumed that individual differences in dispositional mood regulation would moderate the direction of intraindividual change in momentary pleasant-unpleasant mood over time. Students (n = 313) were prompted either three or nine times a day for 1 week (data collection took place in 2019 and 2020). Multilevel growth curve models showed that momentary emotional clarity increased within participants over the course of the AA phase, but this increase did not differ between the two sampling frequency groups. Pleasant-unpleasant mood did not show a systematic trend over the course of the study, and mood regulation did not predict individual differences in mood change over time. Again, results were not moderated by the sampling frequency group. We discuss limitations of our study (e.g., WEIRD sample) and potential practical implications regarding sampling frequency in AA studies. Future studies should further systematically investigate the circumstances under which measurement reactivity is more likely to occur.
... Individuals with current and remitted MDD may need more support when seeking IER, possibly due to their greater emotional distress compared to controls (Liu & Alloy, 2011). It may also be that they were less clear about their emotions (Thompson et al., 2015) and psychological needs (Dizén et al., 2005), and thus reported more generalized IER goals, though future research is needed to test these hypotheses. As IER goals can shape subsequent aspects of IER, clarifying IER goals in MDD can help inform what contributes to other MDD-related differences in IER. ...
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Individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) have difficulties regulating emotion on their own. As people also use social resources to regulate emotion (i.e., interpersonal emotion regulation [IER]), we examined whether these difficulties extend to IER in current and remitted MDD compared to those with no psychiatric disorders (i.e., controls). Adults with current MDD (n = 48), remitted MDD (n = 80), and controls (n = 87) assessed via diagnostic interviewing completed 2-week experience sampling, reporting on how frequently (IER frequency), from whom (sharing partners), and why (IER goals) they sought IER; how the sharing partners responded (sharing partner’s extrinsic IER strategies and warmth); and how their feelings about the problem and the sharing partner changed following IER (IER outcomes). Using multilevel modeling, the current-MDD group did not differ from controls in IER frequency and sharing partners, but the current-MDD group demonstrated a more mixed (albeit generally adaptive) profile of received IER strategies and benefited similarly or more from certain IER strategies than the other two groups, suggesting that IER may be a promising avenue for effective emotion regulation in current MDD. The remitted-MDD group sought IER most frequently and demonstrated the most adaptive profile of received IER strategies, and they and the current-MDD group reported seeking more types of IER goals than controls. People with remitted MDD seem highly motivated to pursue IER support and their pursuit takes place in particularly supportive social contexts. Research is needed to examine mechanisms driving these group differences and how IER predicts the course of MDD.
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Affect-as-information theory posits that understanding of one’s emotions (i.e., emotional clarity) can be leveraged to make decisions and attain goals. Furthermore, recent work has emphasized the dynamic nature of emotional clarity and its fluctuations in daily life. Therefore, we sought to test how momentary emotional clarity, experienced in everyday life, would be associated with levels of indecisiveness and goal pursuit. Following affect-as-information, we hypothesized that emotional clarity would be associated with lower indecisiveness but greater goal pursuit. We also hypothesized that indecisiveness would be associated with less goal pursuit with momentary emotional clarity being a potential moderator of this association. Adults (N = 215, Mage = 44.3) experiencing a range of depression, a disorder characterized by indecisiveness, completed a self-report measure of indecisiveness and 2 weeks of experience sampling assessing momentary emotional clarity, goal pursuit, and negative affect. Momentary emotional clarity showed robust links to lower indecisiveness and greater goal pursuit that were not accounted for by negative affect. We did not observe a link between indecisiveness and goal pursuit. Emotional clarity appears to play a role in motivational and cognitive processes that unfold in daily life.
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