The Struggle for Recognition of Normative Powers: Normative Power Europe and Normative Power China in Context

Abstract

Who or what is a normative power? In response to this query the article suggests that normative powers are those actors that are recognized as such by others. This qualifies Ian Manners’s oft-quoted proposition that normative powers are only those actors that have the ability to ‘shape what can be “normal” in international life’. The proposition is that the definitions of the ‘normal’ are not merely undertaken by normative power, but they emerge in the context of its interaction with others. Recognition, in this setting, is indicated by the specific reactions of target states. In this respect, the issue is not merely about being and becoming a normative power, but also about being recognized as one by others. The article details this proposition through a parallel assessment of normative power Europe and normative power China. The intention of such comparison is to elicit the key elements of normative power in global life.

Full text

Cooperation and Conflict
48(2) 247 –267
© The Author(s) 2013
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0010836713485386
cac.sagepub.com
The struggle for recognition of
normative powers: Normative
power Europe and normative
power China in context
Emilian Kavalski
Abstract
Who or what is a normative power? In response to this query the article suggests that normative
powers are those actors that are recognized as such by others. This qualifies Ian Manners’s
oft-quoted proposition that normative powers are only those actors that have the ability to
‘shape what can be “normal” in international life’. The proposition is that the definitions of the
‘normal’ are not merely undertaken by normative power, but they emerge in the context of its
interaction with others. Recognition, in this setting, is indicated by the specific reactions of target
states. In this respect, the issue is not merely about being and becoming a normative power,
but also about being recognized as one by others. The article details this proposition through a
parallel assessment of normative power Europe and normative power China. The intention of
such comparison is to elicit the key elements of normative power in global life.
Keywords
normative power China, normative power Europe, struggle for recognition
A rise of normative powers?
Despite its centrality to European international relations theory, the notion of normative
power has had surprisingly little traction in the analysis of the nascent agency of other
international actors—especially, the growing prominence of Asian actors such as China
and India. Instead, the concept of soft power remains the dominant framework for those
seeking explanation of their increasing influence. There are several reasons for this devel-
opment. On the one hand, owing to the perceived complexity of the European Union (EU),
Asian scholars have been disinterested in engaging with the propositions and concepts of
European international relations. On the other hand, European international relations
Corresponding author:
Emilian Kavalski, School of Humanities and Communication Arts, University of Western Sydney, Locked Bag
1797, Penrith, NSW 2751, Australia.
Email: e.kavalski@uws.edu.au
485386CAC48210.1177/0010836713485386Cooperation and ConflictKavalski
2013
Article

248 Cooperation and Conflict 48(2)
scholars have expended little effort to translate the applicability of their terminology to
non-EU actors and contexts (both because of the all-pervasive nature of the EU and also
because of the positioning of Asian studies outside the international relations curriculum).
At the same time, both European and Asian international relations scholars have tended to
frame their analyses in reaction to the dominant American international relations view,
which—instead of aiding—appears to have further hampered engagement with each other.
This article aims to redress this trend. In fact, its point of departure is the suggestion
that a ‘rise of normative powers’ in global life is being witnessed. Such an assertion
might sound like a misnomer to some. To begin with, it can be argued that the behavior
of all international actors—whether they be states, international organizations or non-
state actors—is embedded in certain rules, standards and principles of behavior. As Hans
Morgenthau (1967: 10) has discerned ‘all nations are tempted—and few have been able
to resist the temptation for long—to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in
the moral purposes of the universe’. While not everyone need agree with the significance
of this normativity to the agency of particular actors, it nevertheless indicates certain
value-based judgments underpinning their international interactions. However, the sug-
gestion here is much more straightforward—just because any international behavior can
be labeled as normative should not lead one to assume that, in fact, all actors are norma-
tive powers (even if some of their actions have normative side effects).
On the contrary, following Ian Manners’ oft-quoted definition, normative powers are
only those actors that can ‘shape what can be “normal” in international life’. As he insists
(and few would disagree) ‘the ability to define what passes for “normal” in world politics
is, ultimately, the greatest power of all’ (Manners, 2002: 253). In a similar fashion, Jay
Jackson (nearly three decades earlier, but in a different context) defined ‘normative
power’ as ‘the potential for influencing activity … [through] the power of norms’, which
outlines the ‘domain and range’ of legitimate behavior (Jackson, 1975: 237–239; empha-
sis in original). In this respect, both Jackson and Manners intuit that the reference to
normative power suggests an ability to frame what is acceptable and what is unaccepta-
ble behavior. However, while Manners tends to prioritize the ability of an actor to define
the ‘normal’, Jackson stresses the legitimacy of the definitions of the ‘normal’—in other
words, this legitimacy needs to be earned.
It is in the contest over legitimacy that the significance of the rise of normative powers
emerges. In other words, the proposition of a rise of normative powers suggests that
actors such as the EU and China proffer themselves as exemplars of distinct patterns of
international interactions. The models they project are framed by their idiosyncratic stra-
tegic cultures which inform not only the cognitive frameworks of their international
interactions, but also the way(s) in which they practice policy-making. Thus, the expres-
sion of what is ‘normal’ invokes certain agendas and entails power relations. However,
what distinguishes normative power from other types of power is how these relations of
asymmetry are managed. On an instrumental level, normative power is ‘neither military,
nor purely economic, but one that works through ideas and opinions’ (Diez, 2005: 615).
Substantively, however, normative powers are ‘other empowering’ (Tocci, 2008: 9–13).
This brings us back to Jackson’s definition and his insistence that tolerance is a key
aspect of normative power. As tolerant international actors, normative powers are char-
acterized by ‘a willingness to suspend evaluation of others’ activity’, which then triggers

Kavalski 249
a specific set of ‘expectations by others for [a normative] actor’s conduct’ (Jackson,
1975: 240–244). Such a claim reveals a different take on the ‘naming’ of normative pow-
ers from the one offered by Edward Keene in this issue. As will be demonstrated, while
recognition might not be needed by great powers, it is essential to the agency of norma-
tive powers. In this respect, even though they are ‘self-made international actors’, the
suggestion here is that normative powers require distinct degrees of (voluntary) acquies-
cence by their partners in order to ‘reveal’ themselves as such. Thus, unlike the relation-
ships of great powers, those of normative powers—by their very nature—are much more
dialogical. In this setting, Jackson’s emphasis on the significance of tolerance reframes
EH Carr’s intuition that
power goes far to create the morality convenient to itself, and coercion is a fruitful source of
consent. But when all these reserves have been made, it remains true that a new international
order and a new international harmony can be built up only on the basis of an ascendancy which
is generally accepted as tolerant and unoppressive. (Carr, 1964: 236)
The reference to a rise of normative powers inscribes itself within Nora Fisher Onar’s
and Kalypso Nicolaïdis’ project of decentering the study of normative power by taking it
‘outside of [its] Eurocentric box’ (2013). The claim is that non-western normative orders
are just as legitimate as western ones (Pu, 2012: 365). This article therefore acknowl-
edges the emergence of alternative (and oftentimes) contending conceptualizations of
political goods in global life and the appropriate way(s) for their attainment. Such con-
textualization acknowledges that normative powers are in the business not of enforcing
orders over other actors, but of engaging other actors in shared practices. Thus, the con-
tention of a rise of normative powers can be interpreted as a contemporary twist on the
age-old inquiry into what a multi-polar theory of international relations might look like
(Holsti, 1991: 19). If one is to pursue such a study, the parallel investigation of normative
powers promises to open the doors to a contextual exploration of the intellectual founda-
tions not only of multi-polarity, but also of the proliferation of a cacophony of normative
languages in global life.
The claim is that the EU and China offer some of the most conspicuous indications of
the different types of normative power in global life.1 What transpires in this rise of nor-
mative powers is a ‘balance of practices’ distinct from the conventional ‘balance for
power’ (Adler, 2008: 203). Thus, the unevenness underpinning the distinct repertoires of
normative power practices promoted by Brussels and Beijing in different global locales
emerges from the distinct logics of action informing their international agency. As will
be explained, the EU’s normative power tends to prioritize compliance with rules through
its ‘logic of appropriateness’, while China asserts the practice of interaction through its
‘logic of relationships’. Such parallel examination contributes to Owen Parker’s and Ben
Rosamond’s investigation (in this issue) into the cosmopolitan accoutrements of norma-
tive power by drawing attention to its culturally specific variants. Parker and Rosamond
suggest the norms and values of the EU have rendered it a neoliberal ‘normative/cosmo-
politan’ power. It can be argued that China has strived to present itself as the very antith-
esis to this type of cosmopolitanism through stressing its ‘singularly historical practice
of universal principles that is open to emulation not as a universal pattern, but for its

250 Cooperation and Conflict 48(2)
procedures in articulating the universal to concrete historical circumstances’ (Dirlik,
2012: 291). The claim here is that normative power China acts as ‘a metaphor for “dif-
ference”’ to the seeming hegemony of neoliberal cosmopolitanism—thence, ‘what the
China model is is less important than what it is not’ (Breslin, 2011: 1324; emphasis in
original).
In this respect, one of the central claims of this article is that normative power
emerges as a power in context—it is not entirely an intrinsic property of an actor, but
depends on the kind of interactions it has in specific contexts. The emphasis on the
significance of context comes to suggest that what are at stake are not the perceptions
or misperceptions of other actors regarding who is or is not a normative power, but
those actors’ ‘subjective expectations and understandings, both of which are strongly
affected by cultural settings’ (Wolf, 2011: 113; emphasis in original). Thus, it is the
contingent (temporal and spatial) context of each interaction—rather than an actor’s
perception or misperception—that encourages an actor to interpret its partner’s behav-
ior as that of a normative power or not. In other words, contexts can act as a ‘cause’, a
‘barrier’, and a ‘changing meaning’ (Goertz, 1994) for the normative power of interna-
tional actors. Normative power, therefore, is not necessarily only about affecting the
perceptions of other actors (which offers a rather limited scope of action), but mostly
about framing the responses of those other actors. As Erik Ringmar (2012: 19) cogently
observes, the ‘reaction [of other actors] is far more important than the action itself and
their reaction is what the exercise of power ultimately seeks to influence’. Such reac-
tions are influenced in context.
The claim, thereby, is that normative power emerges in relation to the inter-subjective
environment to which its agency is applied. Thus, the reference to a ‘rise of normative
powers’ emerges as shorthand for their ‘struggle for recognition’. As it will be explained,
an actor’s capacity to define the ‘normal’ depends on the recognition of this agency by
target states. The emphasis on recognition-in-context draws attention to the performative
qualities of normative power—or what Parker and Owen call in their contribution to this
issue ‘the performative enactment of foreign policy’ (emphasis in original)—which inti-
mates that to be a normative power is oftentimes less important than to appear to be a
normative power.2 The suggested rise of normative powers in global life—such as the
ones of the EU and China—indicates their nascent contestation for such recognition.
In other words, recognition becomes the permissive context for an actor’s normative
power. Before detailing this dynamic, the following sections briefly outline the EU’s and
then China’s normative power. Since most of the contributions to this issue dwell on the
EU’s normative agency, the following discussion offers a more detailed account of nor-
mative power China. Both ‘normative power Europe’ and ‘normative power China’ are
treated here as ideal types. While concurring that such conceptualizations are rarely
countenanced in their purest and isolated form, it is useful to surmise the ideal types that
emerge from the literatures on European international relations and Chinese international
relations in order to elicit the nascent struggle for recognition of normative powers. The
following sections therefore do not intend an account of the bilateral interactions between
two normative powers. Instead, by outlining the ideal types of normative power Europe
and normative power China, this inquiry hopes to encourage fresh perspectives on the
EU–China relations.3 Such research focus will also be helpful for uncovering the key

Kavalski 251
elements of normative power, perse—not just normative power Europe or normative
power China—in global life.
Normative power Europe: still a contradiction in terms?
When discussing the external affairs of the EU, most commentators note its inter-depend-
ent politico-economic framework flaunting the benefits of liberal democracy. Such a con-
text informs the EU’s intent to promote the establishment of transparent forms of
governance, viable market mechanisms, and strong civil societies in countries around the
world. These objectives are the very reason why the Brussels-based bloc has been referred
to as a normative power. Thus, and owing to the dominant focus on enlargement, the EU’s
normative power has been treated largely as coterminous with the transformative potential
underwriting the dynamics of accession-driven conditionality. Thereby, it was only recently
that the relevance of the EU’s ability to alter the practices of states (outside of the purview
and the prospect of membership) has been given serious consideration. It seems, however,
that the bulk of popular and policy attention has been captured by the development of the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Consequently, the kind of normalization of inter-
national affairs embedded in the EU’s normative power reflect its assumed privileged posi-
tion—in other words ‘it is the non-EU Europe that needs to learn to adapt’, not the EU
(Webber, 2007: 161).
It is in this setting that not only the EU has become ‘the most important external con-
text for the foreign policy-making of [post-communist] states’ (Wivel, 2004), but also the
post-communist states themselves have become the enabling environment for the EU’s
external agency. In terms of Brussels’ global outreach, however, the overwhelming atten-
tion to the Europeanization of candidate states appears to have undercut the operational
effectiveness of EU’s normative power in ‘out-of-Europe’ areas. As Michael Smith
(2009: 603) has eloquently argued, ‘the strengths that give the EU a major role in the
European order do not export easily; they are less immediately appropriate to a fluid and
often chaotic world’. It is in this context that the contention of normative power Europe
still appears as a contradiction in terms of ‘out-of-Europe’ areas. Brussels does not seem
capable of formulating relations with countries beyond the realms of membership and
privileged partnership that would sustain the socializing influence of its normative
power. In this respect, the cultural instincts underpinning the Europeanizing mechanisms
developed for prospective candidate states and neighborhood countries appear ill-suited
to the dynamic environment of most ‘out-of-Europe’ areas. The complexity of global life
confronts the EU with the reality where other countries do not perceive it as a magnet.
This is a qualitatively new condition for Brussels and its normative power—a situation
which appears to baffle the EU and one which it still has not addressed convincingly
(Kavalski, 2008).
In its external affairs, therefore, the EU continues to insist on the internalization of its
norms by various countries around the world, without, however, the support of its explicit
instruments for socialization, which are part and parcel of its enlargement policy. This
confirms the suggestion that the ability of the EU’s normative power to affect others is
dependent upon its own awareness of a particular kind of self (Diez, 2005: 614). Thus,
the socializing actorness of the EU depends not so much on its capabilities, but on the

252 Cooperation and Conflict 48(2)
way it constructs relationships through which its normative power is applied in different
global locales. In this respect, the EU’s search for a ‘new’ external strategy (beyond
enlargement and enlargement-like initiatives such as the eastern Partnership of the ENP)
demands a serious reflection upon the framework of its own normativity. Without such
questioning (or what Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis (2013) call ‘let[ting] go of its civiliza-
tional conceits’), the EU is unlikely to emerge as a viable normative power beyond the
geographical confines of Europe and its immediate neighborhood.
Framing normative power China
China’s expanding outreach and diversifying roles have provided a novel context for the
ongoing reconsiderations of world politics. In the wake of the Cold War, commentators
were pondering how far western ideas can or would spread in a geopolitical environment
characterized by ‘the end of history’. Today, the debate seems to be how far Chinese
ideas will reach. In this setting, the focus on Beijing’s fledgling normative power sug-
gests that international affairs need to be understood not only as fractures into territori-
ally defined spaces, but also by social relations and their socio-cultural and eco-historical
nexus of reference (Alagappa, 1998). It has to be acknowledged from the outset that
while the study of normative power China is of recent provenance (Kavalski, 2007b,
2012b; Pu, 2012; Wang, 2009; Womack, 2008; Zhang, 2010), the inquiry into the trans-
formations and the transformative potential of China’s foreign policy has become a vir-
tual cottage industry in the last two decades.4 In particular, there is a heated debate
regarding whether China provides an ‘Eastphalian’ ‘example’, ‘model’, ‘mode’, or a
‘new paradigm’ for the study and practice of world affairs (Breslin, 2011; Dirlik, 2012;
Fidler, 2010). Such assessments of the security, economic, and foreign policy implica-
tions of China’s rise provide the background for the outline of normative power China
offered in this section.
This distinct point of departure brings into focus the norms and values of China’s
foreign policy. Such consideration reflects a growing preoccupation with the guoqing
(national peculiarities) of China’s strategic culture (Barmé, 1999: 18). In fact, normative
power China might actually represent the most conspicuous indication of the ‘return to
tradition (huixiang chuantong)’ dominating the country’s foreign policy thinking (Davis,
2012: 30). Thus, most commentators assert that Beijing’s external outlook is steeped in
China’s philosophical oeuvre (especially, Confucianism, but also Daoism and the works
of numerous pre-Qin thinkers).5 Even the Chinese Communist Party has been actively
seeking to infuse Confucian principles into its Marxist underpinnings in order to increase
its domestic legitimacy (Ai, 2011).6 It is not coincidental, therefore, that the mushroom-
ing of Confucius Institutes around the world has become one of the most conspicuous
indications of China’s global outreach. There have been two aspects to Beijing’s ‘patri-
otic worrying (youhuan)’ about China’s capacity to attain the ‘ultimate perfection (da
tong)’ necessary for its influence to radiate outward (Davis, 2007: 229).
On the one hand, China has been keen to learn from the experience of previous great
powers. This reflects a key aspect of current Chinese international relations thinking,
according to which the dynamics of world politics represent a ‘succession of hegemonies’
(Zhang, 2012: 99). Using the example of the popular TV-documentary series on The Rise

Kavalski 253
of Great Powers, which was commissioned by the Chinese Communist Party and focused
on the nine ‘world powers since the fifteenth century’ (Portugal, Spain, Holland, Great
Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Russia/the USSR, and the USA), Nicola Spakowski
draws attention to the plurality of views in China on both ‘the criteria for historical “great-
ness”’ and ‘the major ingredients of a rise to a great power status’ (Spakowski, 2009:
485–489). What is important for the purposes of this study is that this look back at the
experience of previous great powers is intended to stress that China’s ascendance does not
indicate the emergence of a new hegemon. Instead, its nascent normative power can trans-
form the dominant pattern of international affairs into one of inclusive and benevolent
leadership (Paltiel, 2011: 391).
On the other hand, the reflexivity animating China’s international agency has been
much more introspective and has tended to focus on China’s own historical recollec-
tion. In this respect, the lessons that are gleaned are not only from the experience of
other international actors, but also from the legacy of China’s own past glory (Zhang,
2009: 31). Suggesting the centrality of such critical reckoning, Yan Xuetong notes that
‘A nation that cannot face historical events correctly is one that cannot win over the
hearts of other states’ (Yan, 2012: 218). The patterns of China’s nascent normative
power present an intriguing intersection of the discursive memory of the past with the
contexts of the present and the anticipated tasks of the future. In this setting, China’s
introspective look recollects a normative power premised on the practices of interac-
tion rather than explicit norms of appropriateness. That is why the influential public
intellectual and commentator Hu Angang has argued for the substitution of the often
brandished label of the ‘Beijing Consensus’ with the ‘Beijing Proposal’. According to
him, the latter term offers a better illustration of the relational character of China’s
external outlook—that is, ‘other countries can choose whether or not they would like
to accept [the Beijing Proposal]. In addition, they may accept it wholesale or accept it
only in part’ (Hu, 2011: 7).
The emphasis on dialogue has had significant implications for the evolution of China’s
normative power. For instance, it has promoted an understanding that China’s unique
experience should not be inflicted upon others by force, but by making Beijing attractive
to them. In other words, a position of leadership needs to be earned (in the process of
interaction) and not imposed (through domination). Brantly Womack argues that this
attitude is crucial to understanding China’s socializing propensities. He singles out
‘respect for the other’ as the ‘cardinal virtue’ of Beijing’s normative power. Thus, by
lavishing attention to countries ‘that normally do not get much respect’, China sets itself
as a different kind of actor (if not necessarily as an alternative model). Beijing’s insist-
ence on ‘respect for the other’ becomes an important boon for its normative power:
In a world of equals, each is in a similar situation, and each can respond in kind to the actions
of others … In a world of asymmetric relationships, respect—appreciation for the situation and
autonomy of the other—requires special attention. Respect for the weaker side is not simply
noblesse oblige or an act of generosity of the stronger. The weaker can only afford to be
deferential to the strong when they feel that their identity and boundaries will be respected.
(Womack, 2008: 294–297)

254 Cooperation and Conflict 48(2)
The emphasis on respect for the other draws attention to China’s social roles in global
life. Borrowing the Confucian notion of ‘harmony with difference (he er butong)’, Feng
Zhang explains the occurrence of such respect in contemporary Chinese foreign policy
thinking through the practice of ‘harmonious inclusion’. As he states, Confucian logic
demands ‘harmoniz[ation] with others [and] not necessarily agree[ing] with them’
(Zhang, 2011: 8). Such framing echoes the neo-Gramscian reading of normative power
offered by Thomas Diez in this issue. In fact, the parallel assessment of ‘consensual
hegemony’ with the Chinese notion of ‘humane authority’ is likely to open promising
pathways for the further exploration of normative power China. Chinese normative
power is thereby underpinned by the principle, ‘let others reach their goals as you reach
yours’ (Zhao, 2006: 35). In other words, traditional Chinese ethics suggest that it is in
interactions premised on respect for (not agreement with) those different from us that
meaningful engagements can occur, not in the imposition of rules and norms.
Normative power in this respect is necessarily contextual—Chinese (especially Confucian)
traditions assert that definitions of the ‘normal’ are contingent and depend on ‘who we are
interacting with, and when’ (Rosemont, 2006: 14). Beverley Loke intuits this relationship by
accentuating the interaction between ‘national interest’ and ‘national responsibility’, under-
pinning Beijing’s external affairs. As she insists, the construction of international agency
around respect for the other prompts the realization that ‘both to interpret others’ behavior and
to design one’s own behavior so that others will draw the desired conclusions from it, the
actor must try to see the world the way the other sees it’. Loke, thereby, infers that the sense
and practice of responsibility is not only ‘tied to one’s position of power’ (i.e., the actor’s
‘rank within international society’), but also constituted by it (Loke, 2009: 203).
This inference brings us back to Brantly Womack, who proposes that unlike the nor-
mative power of the EU, which is framed by ‘logic of appropriateness’, China’s norma-
tive power is framed by ‘logic of relationships’. Such logic assumes that a ‘normal
relationship does not require symmetry of partners or equality of exchanges, but it does
require reciprocity [i.e. respect for the other]’ (Womack, 2008: 295–297). What is crucial
about the understanding of normative power through such logic of relationships is that
the norms for the normal are no longer defined by the leading state in terms of ‘rights and
obligations’, but emerge as ‘behavioral standards’ accepted by the majority of participat-
ing states in the process of interaction (Yan, 2011: 238). The emphasis here is that
Beijing’s normative power engages other states in the practice of doing together—that is
to say, they do as China does. This pattern is distinct from the security governance prac-
ticed by western actors (especially the EU), which is premised on the conditionality of
‘do as I say, not as I do’ (Kavalski, 2009: 1–18). Shaun Breslin (2011: 1338) has elabo-
rated this observation further by insisting that
the China model isn’t important for others because of the specifics of what has happened to
China; rather it is important for establishing what can be done if other countries do what is best
for themselves based on their own concrete circumstances and not simply what they are told to
do by others. (Breslin, 2011: 1338; emphasis added)
Asserting that normative action is ‘effective in the example it provides to another’,
Jack Barbalet (2011) makes a prescient observation on China’s normative power through

Kavalski 255
the prism of the concept wuwei (effortless or non-coercive action). As Barbalet points
out, wuwei is neither willful nor random behavior, but reflects an understanding of nor-
mative power framed by three key elements:
First, the thing or event acted upon is never regarded as inert or without its own agentic capacity;
second, no actor is independent of other actors and non-actors, but is interconnected with them
in various ways; third, things are subordinate to the processes through which they have
manifestation and these processes are dynamic and things in them are even becoming different.
These background ideas inform the notion of wuwei as non interfering action which
accommodates to social processes as non-willful action directed to realizing the potential
events and others, and as action that animates others to act on their own behalf. (Barbalet, 2011:
342–347)
Some commentators have noted that wuwei’s logic of relationships has emerged out
of a contingent ‘policy of “pre-emptive participation”’ intended to maintain China’s sta-
tus while Beijing develops reassurance strategies to allay the fears of others (Paltiel,
2009: 49). In this setting, showing respect for the other intends to demonstrate Beijing’s
‘self-discipline and self-restraint’ in the process of developing ‘positive relationships
among actors for the common good, including cooperation and coordination to create an
extensive social network of win–win results’ (Qin, 2011: 138). Such understanding of
normative power demands of those who practice it that they be ‘more aware of the rela-
tionships that constitute the objects of their concern than they are of their own interests’
(Barbalet, 2011: 346).
China’s respect for its interlocutors has contributed to (what Philip Nel labels as) the
struggle of awkward states—regardless of whether they are in Asia, Africa, or Latin
America—‘against their own invisibility in terms of the reigning [western] discourses of
development, modernization, and global economic and cultural integration’. Thus, the
individuation implicit in the logic of relationships suggests the profound ontological
implications of interactions: ‘the appreciation of what is important to you in terms of
your own self-conception, in contrast to the general expectations that [the international]
society may impose on you [provides] an increasing scope for self-realization’ (Nel,
2010: 970–971).
It is these patterns that reflect the socializing capacities of normative power China. Its
global ‘charm offensive’ thus confirms China’s attempt to construct itself as a responsi-
ble, as well as a reliable, international player that offers a viable alternative to the models
proffered by western actors and organizations. At the same time, Beijing has generally
resisted engaging in direct subversion of established institutions and regimes, and has
more often than not complied with their standards and/or sought inclusion through mem-
bership of their organizational clubs (Lanteigne, 2005).
Although some observers would argue that China has always been (or has always
had) a normative power, this article posits that China’s normative power can be elicited
from the interaction between the key practices of its external relations: (i) ‘peaceful rise’
to international status, (ii) non-interference in the domestic affairs of states, and (iii)
preservation of Chinese national values. The inference then is that, from the point of
view of Beijing, world politics is not about ‘the application of abstract norms to cases’,

256 Cooperation and Conflict 48(2)
but about ‘a set of particular international relationships, with concrete obligations defined
within the context of each relationship’ (Womack, 2008: 265).
‘Peaceful rise’ to international status
China’s ability to manage its own economic and social transformation as well as its
increasing impact on regional and global inter-state affairs tends to be historicized
within the context of its peaceful ascendance to global prominence (Zheng, 2005).
As Wenran Jiang has noted, the Beijing-promoted discourse of a peaceful rise is
underwritten by the articulation of ‘the historically unprecedented scenario that
China’s rise to world power status would be fundamentally different from the rise of
great powers in history: the world can avoid large-scale wars that rising powers fight
with status quo powers’ (Jiang, 2006: 340). The emphasis on peaceful development
offers rhetorical confirmation of President Hu Jintao’s claim that ‘China embarks on
the road of peaceful development because of its historical and traditional culture’ (in
Ai, 2011: 89).
According to Feng Zhang, such contextualization intends to contrast China’s foreign
policy stance with the colonizing tendencies of western international practices. The aim
is to establish Beijing as a ‘moral authority’, which is ‘leading by example’ rather than
the missionary (if not always militaristic) zeal to export and impose (Zhang, 2011: 12–
16). Thus, the ‘harmonious world (hexie shijie)’ professed by China’s peaceful rise
develops an understanding of normative power through the Confucian practice of ‘model
behavior’, according to which ‘exemplary action forms a force field that commands
authority’ (Paltiel, 2011: 394). The narrative of China’s peaceful rise endorses a vision of
world order and an understanding of peace distinct from western notions of security
community (as practiced by the EU, for instance). Such comparison, however, is not
intended as a value judgment, but aims only to acknowledge the different context(s) of
China’s normative power.
Non-interference in the domestic affairs of states
In December 2005, while on a visit in Myanmar, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao
declared that China ‘vowed not to meddle in Myanmar’s affairs in return for invest-
ment deals, a template for Chinese behavior elsewhere such as in Africa, the Middle
East, and Central Asia’ (Chen, 2007: 46). Such proclamations tend to add to the qualms
of western actors about China’s increased international agency through the promise
and practice of enhanced trade relations. The socializing strategy that evidences
China’s growing confidence in its ability to fashion inter-state relations has been
described in the slogan ‘participate actively, demonstrate restraint, offer reassurance,
open markets, foster interdependence, create common interests, and reduce conflict’
(Shambaugh, 2005: 54).
The insistence on non-interference in the domestic affairs of states underwrites the
emphasis on ‘strategic sovereignty’ (Zhou, 2004). Historically, this stance reflects a pol-
icy pattern that has seen decision-makers in Beijing ‘willing to behave in ways that
jeopardized China’s security in order to preserve China’s autonomy and independence’

Kavalski 257
(Johnston, 1998: 66). Yongjin Zhang explains such insistence through the contextual
restraints that it is supposed to impose on the aggressive traits of human nature (Zhang,
2001: 48–50). In terms of policy practice, therefore, such a rhetorical stance intends to
reinforce China’s position as an international actor that can be both trusted and emulated.
During the Cold War, Beijing criticized both the USSR and the USA for their disregard
for and encroachment upon the principle and practice of state sovereignty (Kavalski,
2010).
The emphasis on the inviolability of sovereignty, therefore, reflects China’s objection
to the practices of international intervention (regardless of whether it is military or
through demands for democratization). A dominant Chinese foreign policy belief is that
the erosion of sovereignty frustrates the development of the perceived ‘victim’, under-
mines the stability of neighboring countries, and ultimately counteracts the objectives of
the ‘perpetrator’ (Shih, 1990: 41). Hence, the insistence on non-interference aims to
draw attention to the tolerance and benevolence of its normative power. In this respect,
the legitimacy of China’s normative agency is embedded in the relationships it has rather
than any implicit or explicit conditionality that might frame such interactions.
Overcoming the specters of the past
The projections of normative power constitute (and are constitutive of) specific identity
politics. The conjecture is that the arena of world affairs is populated not by agents per
se, but by (embryonic) international identities (with their attitudes, attributes, and val-
ues) that are actualized by actors in the process of international interactions. Thus, the
attempt to overcome the specters of history instills a critical reflexivity in the discursive
formulations of external affairs (Diez, 2005: 634). Such understanding infers that foreign
policy is an identity issue which takes coherence in the context of (negotiating) national
insecurities.
China is no exception to this trend. The patterns of external relations simultaneously
reflect, reiterate, and reconstitute its self-image. The assertiveness of China’s prescrip-
tive stance on the significance of sovereignty in the context of its peaceful rise to global
prominence implicates the identity politics of its normative power. In particular, it hints
at China’s ‘washing away the past shame’ (Shih, 1990: 61), when Beijing was denied its
legitimate status. Thus, while the function of foreign policy is to maintain the integrity of
the national self, China’s inferiority complex for the better part of the 20th century dented
its socializing propensities.
In this respect, China’s normative power has been preconditioned on the reflexive
construction of the past of national humiliation as other. In his discerning process-
tracing of the articulations, performances and meanings of ‘National Humiliation Day’,
Callahan outlines the cognitive mapping of the legacy of ‘losing face’ in post Boxer
Rebellion China (Callahan, 2006: 190). Chinese foreign policy can be read as an attempt
to rectify this legacy by projecting an international identity dispelling the specters of the
past; yet, the socializing rhetoric proclaims that others need not experience humiliation
either. From this perspective, Beijing’s nascent normative power in regional and global
affairs offers one of the most conspicuous indications of China’s ‘completion of the pain-
ful search for a coherent national identity’ (Shambaugh, 2005: 59).

258 Cooperation and Conflict 48(2)
Normative power and the struggle for recognition
The parallel assessment of the normative powers of the EU and China draws attention to
one of the crucial aspects of world affairs—the feature that the basic ontological condi-
tion of international actors is relational (i.e., the content of their existence as actors is
constituted inter-subjectively during the process of interaction) (Murray, 2008: 252). At
the same time, such relationality performs the epistemic function of validating particular
truth claims through the inter-subjective legitimization of particular points of view in the
process of interaction (Haacke, 2005: 191). The contention here is that contemporary
world affairs are not merely about who gets what, when, and how, but also about how
nascent normative powers engage other actors. Normative powers need to be perceived
as legitimate—in other words, their agency depends on the validation by target actors
(usually through different types of compliance or conformity). Both the EU and China
are motivated by a desire to be recognized as actors that not only are capable, but also
have the right to set the ramifications of the ‘normal’ in global life. Thus, Brussels and
Beijing are learning that, for their normative power to be considered legitimate, they
themselves are expected to behave in certain ways to earn such recognition. In other
words, the viability of either the ‘EU model’ or the ‘China model’ is not entirely depend-
ent on Brussels’s or Beijing’s decisions, but contingent on the interpretation of their
agency by other actors.
In this setting, recognition emerges as ‘the core constitutive moment’ of interna-
tional interactions and refers to ‘the communicative process in the international society
of states through which states mutually acknowledge the status and social esteem of
other states’ (Nel, 2010: 963). The acknowledgment of this nascent struggle for recog-
nition suggests that the contestation between normative powers moves beyond their
relative capability—that is, it cannot be captured through the narratives of ‘struggle for
power’. In other words, the answer to the question ‘Who or what exists politically as a
normative power?’ is ‘Those actors that are recognized as normative powers.’
Recognition, in this setting, is indicated by the specific attitudes, dispositions, and
behaviors of target states. This then raises the question: ‘Under what conditions are
target states willing to grant such recognition?’ The answer provided in this article is
that normative powers are granted recognition when they deliver credible commit-
ments to the intended target. Thus, the most credible incentive appears to be ‘the inclu-
sion of the interests and/or ideas dominant in another country’ into the strategy of the
normative power (Schrim, 2010: 199).
In this respect, the pattern (and perception) of international anarchy is animated by
the ‘status insecurity’ of actors (Webber, 2007: 4–5). Such status insecurity stems
from the uncertainty associated with the inter-subjective constitution of identity in
global life. Ultimately, all actors in international life have the fundamental autonomy
to follow or not to follow someone’s lead. Thus, the diverse tools used to signal rec-
ognition or disrespect provide means for validating or casting doubt on other actor’s
narratives about themselves (Honneth, 2011: 34). Michelle Murray cogently argues
that, owing to the inherent insecurity of the struggle for recognition, international
actors attempt to take control over the process of meaning-creation by anchoring their
identity to explicit material practices (Murray, 2008: 249). For instance, the EU’s

Kavalski 259
desire for recognition is grounded in the practices of the common market and China’s
is grounded in the government-led model of development.
The struggle for recognition among normative powers is not merely ‘a part of,’ but
becomes constitutive of, the complex systemic logic of global life (Kavalski, 2007a). As
Hedley Bull has asserted, great powers need to be ‘recognized by others to have certain
special rights and duties’ (Bull, 1977: 196; emphasis added). Likewise, Hans Morgenthau
has suggested the significance of recognition in his avowal that the ‘prestige of a nation
is its reputation for power. That reputation, the reflection of the reality of power in the
mind of the observers can be as important as the reality of power itself. What others think
about us is as important as what we actually are’ (Morgenthau, 1965; emphasis added).
The legitimacy of normative power derives from and is embedded in the practices
through which it projects its social purpose in global life.
Thus, the recognition by others rests on recognition of others. In this context, the ref-
erence to normative power indicates an actor’s ability to show consideration for the
effects of its actions on others (Womack, 2008: 266). In particular, ‘the power of norma-
tive example radiates outwards and influences even those who are beyond the range of
its sanctioning authority’ (Paltiel, 2011: 392). As suggested, respect for the other encour-
ages expectations of reciprocity. It goes beyond the mere acknowledgment of an actor’s
‘equal membership rights’ and involves ‘an appreciation about what is distinct and valu-
able’ about this actor (Nel, 2010: 965). As Axel Honneth suggests, successful patterns of
socialization ‘no longer appear to be [guided by] the elimination of inequality, but the
avoidance of degradation and disrespect; its core categories are no longer “equal distri-
bution” or “economic equality”, but “dignity” and “respect”’ (Honneth, 2001: 43).
However, such recognition is both tentative and revocable (Appleby, 1954: 96). This
attests to the ‘constitutive vulnerability’ of international actors—especially normative
powers—‘to the unpredictable reactions and responses of others’ (Markell, 2003: 36). This
suggestion does not deny that the relationship is asymmetrical; yet the status of the EU and
China as normative powers is premised on having others’ acknowledgment. Jay Jackson
seems to have had the same in mind when he stressed the significance of tolerance toward
others in his definition of normative power, stating that such relations should not only show
respect for the esteem of others and what is valuable about them, but also ensure that they
perceive normative power as legitimate. The recognition as a normative power, thereby, is
impacted by (as well as dependent upon) an actor’s sense of obligation—the policy choice
of expanding the practice of ‘self-interest’ to include ‘an interest in the welfare of others’
(i.e., ‘responsibility to one’s own welfare is defined as responsibility to others’) (Crawford,
1991: 455).
The ability to treat others with respect allows normative powers to gain the recogni-
tion that creates the permissive environment allowing them to define and redefine the
standards of the ‘normal’ in international life. Thus, the international identity of an actor
is not just about capabilities, but mostly about recognition—which is both an outcome
and a reassertion of an actor’s normative power. Status is therefore contingent upon the
inter-subjective construction of identity, which ‘is not (only) threatened by others, but
also possible because of them [as] they are always already involved in [an actor’s] iden-
tity’ (Wæver, 1996: 127). Consequently, anarchy is not just ‘what states make of it’, but
what reaction actors engender in their struggle for recognition.

260 Cooperation and Conflict 48(2)
In lieu of a conclusion: normative power in global affairs
By outlining the normative power of the EU and China, this analysis has indicated the
nascent rise of normative powers—international actors demanding recognition for their
ability to define the ramifications of the ‘normal’ in global life. As explained, the EU has
elaborated a rule-based model of normative power, while China develops a relationship-
based model. Since social life keeps on going, there appears to be ‘no visible end to the
struggle for recognition’ (Haacke, 2005: 188) between actors that present themselves as
normative powers. This dynamic seems to be intuited by some of the other contributors
to this issue. For instance, Richard Whitman stresses that values (even if universally
acceptable) cannot be ‘pushed forward on third parties’ unless they are acceptable to
them, while Thomas Diez suggests that normative powers require the ‘consent’ of others.
As hinted in this article, such ‘acceptance’ and ‘consent’ are reactions indicative of spe-
cific practices of recognition-in-context. Paraphrasing from Parker’s and Rosamond’s
contribution to this issue, the contention is that the ‘particular circumstances’ of each
‘concrete enactment’ of normative power demand further exploration. In fact, Womack
(2010: 16) has gone as far as to argue that ‘the deepest contribution of East Asia to global
thinking about international relations [is] bring[ing] the particularity of relationships
back into focus.’
Thus, in this concluding section, the analysis turns to the elements of normative
power, per se, rather than ‘normative power Europe’ or ‘normative power China.’
As Ian Manners has noted, in its ‘purest form,’ the concept of normative power is
ideational—that is, it relies on ‘normative justification rather than the use of mate-
rial incentives or physical force’. Such framing involves a three-part understanding
of normative power linking together its principles, actions, and impact. First, the
principles underpinning normative power should be seen as legitimate. Second, the
actions undertaken by normative powers should be perceived as persuasive. Third,
if normative power is to be attractive, its impact must emerge from socialization.
Thus, Manners’s claim is that the ‘consequences’ of the concept of normative power
regard envisioning the possibility of ‘more holistic, justifiable, and sustainable
world politics’ (Manners, 2009).
The contention here is that, albeit relevant, Manners’ ‘purest form’ of normative
power is profoundly embedded in the cognitive framework of EU-centric explanation
and understanding (this does not mean that it is not translatable to other geopolitical and
cultural contexts as demonstrated by Fisher Onar’s and Nicolaïdis’ contribution to this
issue). In this respect, the question here is to what extent ‘normative power Europe’ can
be used as the template for a general model (if not for a theory) of normative power in
world politics. Chinese commentators have insisted that the dynamics of inclusion and
exclusion underpinning the EU model lack an ‘ideal for the world’, because of its self-
aggrandizing rule-based governance pattern which ‘enhances the integration of a region
[i.e. Europe], but deepens its separation from the world’ (Zhao, 2006: 38).7 This con-
cluding section therefore challenges some of the universalizing claims implicit in the
normative power Europe model (not so much in the way it has been framed by Ian
Manners, but in the way it has been applied by most European international relations
scholars), by outlining the key features of normative power emerging from the

Kavalski 261
discussion of normative power China. The three steps that emerge link together interac-
tion, deliberate relations, and communities of practice.
Interaction
The claim here is that the ability of a normative power to exert influence is contingent on
its capacity to generate locally appropriate interactions. This study (borrowing from
Robert Jervis) indicates several reasons why this is significant. First, results cannot be
predicted from looking only at separate actions—in particular, the tendency to engage
only with the agency of normative powers. Instead, outcomes emerge in the context of
interactions—especially interactions that are dialogical rather than objectifying. Second,
‘strategies depend on the strategies of others’. Thus, dialogical relationships indicate that
‘the success and failures of policy are determined interactively’ (Jervis, 1997: 23–25).
Significantly, the process of interaction empowers local participants and enhances the
perception that they (and their inputs) are respected. Third, ‘behavior changes the envi-
ronment’—that is, the exercise of normative power has its own evolutionary effects
(Jervis, 1997: 23–25).
Thus, it is through dialogical relationships that normative powers can have an impact
on the behavior of target states. To put it bluntly, it is by engaging in interactions that
definitions of the ‘normal’ gain their causal effects. Thus, normative power is not merely
about the initiation of ‘rule-based governance’ (as the case of the EU seems to indicate),
but mainly about ‘relational governance’ (Qin, 2011). It is the interactive environment
that allows for the ongoing reassessment of preferences and expectations between par-
ticipating actors as well as the modification and tweaking of strategies. In other words,
it is not only the practices (and, occasionally, the identity) of target actors that (is
expected to) change, but also the content and meaning of the promoted norm. The focus
on interactions suggests that definitions of the ‘normal’ are negotiated in the relations
among participating actors. In other words, interactions suggest that normative powers
should have the capacity to live with, and in, ambiguity.
Deliberate relations
It needs to be stressed here that normative power rests not just on any kind of interaction,
but the deliberate practice of interaction—the purposeful and repeated effort to improve
interactions (Ericsson et al., 1993: 368). Translated into the language of world affairs, the
notion of deliberate practice suggests that normative powers deliberately seek to con-
struct learning situations through which they can socialize target states (Ericsson et al.,
1993: 368). The socializing effects of normative power emerge in the ongoing repetition
of the practice of interaction. As already suggested, rather than socializing states into
compatibility with ‘accepted’ models, normative powers demand recognition of pro-
moted standards. It is deliberate practices that provide the facilitating environment for
such recognition to occur—in other words, it is a product of sustained and purposeful
(not episodic) interactions. It is in the context of such deliberate relations that beliefs and
perceptions about others’ intentions both emerge and are transformed.

262 Cooperation and Conflict 48(2)
Socialization, thereby, reveals the interpretative aspect of normative power, which is
embedded in the deliberate practice of establishing and maintaining relationships of
respect. As Robert Maxfield suggests, it is in the process of such relationships that a
normative power can ‘learn best about its world and the changes to it’. Thus, the deliber-
ate practices allow normative powers to foster ‘generative relationships’ through which
they can both (i) ‘recognize and influence emergent opportunities’ and (ii) impact on ‘the
way participants see their world and act in it’ (Maxfield, 1997: 95). In particular, the
deliberate practice of interactions based on respect can maximize the generative potential
of relationships. In such a dialogical context, the possibility for constructing ‘new histo-
ries’ emerges by altering the suspicion and bias from past interactions and opening up
opportunities for new avenues for interaction (Qin, 2011).
Community of practice
The inference here is that normative agency emerges in a community, not in a vacuum.
As suggested, it is the relational (rather than the rule-based) nature of normative power
that makes its recognition a group process. Thus, the focus on communities of practice
suggests that the definitions of the ‘normal’ are an acquired characteristic of an imagined
community of interactions, constituted by repeated deliberate practice. In other words,
the ‘normal’ is an outcome of dialogical ‘norm-building’ in a community of practice. The
proposition then is that the impact of normative powers—such as the EU and China—
depends on their willingness to initiate, and their ability to maintain for an extended
period of time, a deliberate practice of interaction. Deliberate practices demand both
strong motivation and determination from normative powers. It is this capacity to make
credible commitments to shared practices that belies the recognition of normative pow-
ers in global life.
Such contextualization acknowledges that normative powers are in the business not of
enforcing orders over other actors, but of engaging them in shared practices. Thus, by
instigating nascent communities of practice, normative powers socialize target states. It
is in the active process of repeated deliberate interaction that a normative power can
effectively communicate its message to intended targets (Kroenig et al., 2010). The point
here is that rather than ‘we-feeling’, communities of practice foster ‘generative relation-
ships’ through ‘we-doing’ (Adler, 2010: 68). The lack of conditionality of ‘we-doing’
characterizing communities of practice enables normative powers to engage ‘relations
and elements of irreducible multiplicity, incongruence, and contingency’ (Zhan, 2012:
111). In particular, the opportunity for diverse and multiple local inputs enhances the
validity and relevance of interactions. Thus, regardless of however loose or amorphous
they are, communities of practice fashion negotiated outcomes in the process of doing
things together.
By emphasizing interactions, deliberate relations, and communities of practices, the
Chinese model suggests that to have normative power is to use normative power. This
proposition follows Confucius’s well-known dictum that ‘p is p if p does as p is con-
ceptually meant to do’ (Zhao, 2006: 31)—a normative power is a normative power
only if it does as a normative power is meant to do (i.e., it approximates the ideal type
or purest form in its relations with others). Thus, the definition of what passes for ‘nor-
mal’ in global life entails a deliberate practice of interaction, informed by an actor’s

Kavalski 263
willingness to suspend evaluations of others as long as they engage in shared
practices.
Funding
This research benefited from a 2012 Taiwan Fellowship grant at the Institute of Political Science,
Academia Sinica.
Notes
1. The required qualification here is that, despite the complexity of their historical, socio-political,
and economic experiences, both the EU and China are treated here as identifiable unitary actors—
hence, the frequent use of Brussels and Beijing as a stylistic variation. On the one hand, while
contentious, the debate on what and who is Europe seems to have abated since the ‘big bang’
2004–2007 enlargement of the EU. On the other hand, the discussion of who or what is China is
still ongoing, spanning a much longer time-frame than the current iteration of Chinese statehood,
and seems to be intensifying. Thus, China (in both its People’s Republic of China and its Republic
of China variants) is variously framed as a ‘civilization pretending to be a state’, a ‘civilization
state’, a ‘region state’, a ‘regional system’, etc. (Hsiung, 2012; Womack, 2010; Yan, 2012; Zhang,
2001). Since the focus of this article is on the distinct practices of normative power, the debates
on who and what either the EU or China is remain outside the purview of this investigation.
2. This statement is a paraphrase of Ringmar (2012: 19). In this respect, it is worthwhile to point
Breslin’s (2011: 1338) prescient (even if cheeky) observation of the unintended performativity
of normative power China: ‘So what makes China attractive is not so much a Chinese “model”
as the lack of a projection of any model. [Thus], not being identified as the promoter of any
specific normative position is in itself a normative position.’
3. Furthermore, the discussion of the EU–China relations as an interaction between two normative
powers is a misnomer. There seem to be two reasons for this: first, as many have indicated, the
EU’s normative power seems to be constrained to ‘Europe’ and its neighborhood, while China’s
normative power does not seem to extend beyond the developing world and the non-West
(although, in the current debt crisis, Beijing’s financial appeal seems to be seeping into the EU
itself; yet it still remains to be seen whether the current context will engender a reaction that will
recognize China as a normative power by some EU Member States). Second (and an aspect that
requires further research), it might be that normative powers do not interact with one another in
normative power ways—even if (as the EU–China relationship demonstrates) their relations are
peaceful, productive, and mutually beneficial. This second point gestures toward Fisher Onar’s
and Nicolaïdis’s call, in their contribution to this issue, for further research into ‘the ways in
which … normative powerhood can be shared with other actors in the international system’.
4. For a detailed overview see Kavalski (2012a).
5. See Ford (2010), Hsiung (2012), Kueh (2012), Paltiel (2009), Pines (2012), Shih (1990), Qing
(2013), Yan (2012), Zhang (2009).
6. Such development should not be surprising since from its very inception the Party has pursued
a deliberate path of ‘sinisizing’ first communism and then capitalism by introducing distinct
‘Chinese characteristics’ into their practices (Dirlik, 2012).
7. In his contribution to this issue, Ian Manners offers a detailed overview of Chinese (and other
non-European) takes on normative power Europe.
References
Adler E (2008) The spread of security communities: communities of practice, self-restraint, and
NATO’s post-cold war transformation. European Journal of International Relations 14(2):
195–230.

264 Cooperation and Conflict 48(2)
Adler E (2010) Europe as a civilizational community of practice. In: Katzenstein PJ (ed.) Civi-
lizations and World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives. New York: Routledge, pp.
67–90.
Ai J (2011) The political use of tradition in contemporary China. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Uni-
versity of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia.
Alagappa M (ed.) (1998) Asian Security Practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Appleby PH (1954) Managing complexity. Ethics 64(2): 79–99.
Barbalet J (2011) Market relations as Wuwei: Daoist concepts in analysis of China’s post-1978
market economy. Asian Studies Review 35(3): 335–354.
Barmé GR (1999) In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press.
Breslin S (2011) The ‘China model’ and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a Chinese mode
of governance? International Affairs 87(6): 1323–1343.
Bull H (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Callahan W (2006) History, identity, security. Critical Asian Studies 38(2): 179–208.
Carr EH (1964) The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of Interna-
tional Relations. New York: Harper & Row.
Chen M (2007) Chinese national oil companies and human rights. Orbis 51(1): 41–54.
Crawford B (1991) Toward a theory of progress in international relations. In: Adler E and Craw-
ford B (eds) Progress in Postwar International Relations. New York: Columbia University
Press, pp. 438–468.
Davis G (2007) Worrying about China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Davis G (2012) Hommo dissensum significants. Social Text 29(4): 29–56.
Diez T (2005) Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering ‘normative power Europe’.
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33(3): 613–636.
Diez (2013) Normative power as hegemony. Cooperation and Conflict 48(2): 194–210.
Dirlik A (2012) The idea of a ‘Chinese model’. China Information 26(3): 277–302.
Ericsson KA, Krampe RT and Tesch-Römer C (1993) The role of deliberate practice in the acqui-
sition of expert performance. Psychological Review 100(3): 363–406.
Fidler DP (2010) Eastphalia emerging? Asia, international law, and global governance. Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies 17(1): 1–12.
Fisher Onar N and Nicolaidis K (2013) The Decentring Agenda: Europe as a post-colonial power.
Cooperation and Conflict 48(2): 283–303.
Ford C (2010) The Mind of Empire: China’s History and Modern Foreign Relations. Lexington,
KY: University Press of Kentucky.
Goertz G (1994) Contexts of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haacke J (2005) The Frankfurt school and international relations: on the centrality of recognition.
Review of International Studies 31(1): 181–194.
Holsti KJ (1991) Change in the International System: Essays on the Theory and Practice of Inter-
national Relations. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
Honneth A (2001) Recognition or redistribution? Changing perspectives on the moral order of
society. Theory, Culture & Society 18(2/3): 43–54.
Honneth A (2011) Recognition between states. In: Lindermann T and Ringmar E (eds) The Inter-
national Politics of Recognition. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, pp. 25–38.
Hsiung JC (2012) China into its Second Rise: Myths, Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Challenges to The-
ory. Singapore: World Scientific.
Hu A (2011) China in 2020: A New Type of Superpower. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Jackson J (1975) Normative power and conflict potential. Sociological Methods & Research 4(2):
237–239.

Kavalski 265
Jervis R (1997) Complex systems: the role of interactions. In: Alberts DS and Czerwinski TJ
(eds) Complexity, Global Politics and National Security. Washington, DC: National Defense
University, pp. 45–72.
Jiang W (2006) China makes ‘great leaps outward’ in regional diplomacy. International Journal
61(2): 329–340.
Johnston AI (1998) Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kavalski E (2007a) The fifth debate and the emergence of complex international relations theory.
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20(3): 435–454.
Kavalski E (2007b) Partnership or rivalry between the EU, China and India in Central Asia. Euro-
pean Law Journal 13(6): 839–856.
Kavalski E (2008) Extending the European Security Community. London: I.B. Tauris.
Kavalski E (ed.) (2009) China and the Global Politics of Regionalization. Farnham: Ashgate.
Kavalski E (2010) Shanghaied into cooperation: framing China’s socialization of Central Asia.
Journal of Asian and African Studies 45(2): 131–145.
Kavalski E (2012a) The Ashgate Research Companion to Chinese Foreign Policy. Aldershot: Ash-
gate.
Kavalski E (2012b) Central Asia and the Rise of Normative Powers: Contextualizing the Security
Governance of the EU, China, and India. New York: Continuum.
Keene E (2013) The naming of powers. Cooperation and Conflict 48(2): 268–282.
Kroenig M, McAdam M and Webber S (2010) Taking soft power seriously. Comparative Strategy
29(5): 412–431.
Kueh YY (2012) Pax Sinica: Geopolitics and Economics of China’s Ascendance. Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press.
Lanteigne M (2005) China and International Institutions. London: Routledge.
Loke B (2009) Between interest and responsibility: assessing China’s foreign policy and burgeon-
ing global role. Asian Security 5(3): 195–215.
Manners I (2002) Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market
Studies 40(2): 235–258.
Manners I (2009) The Concept of Normative Power in World Politics. Copenhagen: Danish Insti-
tute for International Studies Brief.
Markell P (2003) Bound by Recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Maxfield RR (1997) Complexity and organizational management. In: Alberts DS and Czerwin-
ski TJ (eds) Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security. Washington, DC: National
Defense University, pp. 171–218.
Morgenthau HJ (1965) Vietnam: shadow and substance. New York Review of Books, 16 September.
Morgenthau HJ (1967) Politic Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York:
Alfred Knopf.
Murray MK (2008) The struggle for recognition in international politics. Unpublished PhD Dis-
sertation, University of Chicago.
Nel P (2010) Redistribution and recognition: what emerging regional powers want. Review of
International Studies 36(4): 951–974.
Paltiel J (2009) China regionalization policies: illiberal internationalism or neo-Mancian benevo-
lence? In: Kavalski E (ed.) China and the Global Politics of Regionalization. Farnham: Ash-
gate, pp. 47–62.
Paltiel J (2011) Constructing global order with Chinese characteristics. Chinese Journal of Inter-
national Politics 4(4): 375–403.
Parker O and Rosamond B (2013) ‘Normative Power Europe’ meets economic liberalism: com-
plicating cosmopolitanism inside/outside the EU. Cooperation and Conflict 48(2): 229–246.

266 Cooperation and Conflict 48(2)
Pines Y (2012) The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and its Imperial
Legacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pu X (2012) Socialization as a two-way process: emerging powers and the diffusion of interna-
tional norms. Chinese Journal of International Politics 5(4): 341–367.
Qin Y (2011) Rule, rules, and relations. Chinese Journal of International Politics 4(2):
117–145.
Qing J (2013) A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape its Politi-
cal Future. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ringmar E (2012) Performing international systems: two East-Asian alternatives to the Westpha-
lian order. International Organization 66(1): 1–25.
Rosemont H (2006) Two loci of authority: autonomous individuals and related persons. In: Her-
shock PH and Ames RT (eds) Confucian Cultures of Authority. Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
pp. 1–20.
Schrim SA (2010) Leaders in need of followers: emerging powers in global governance. European
Journal of International Relations 16(2): 197–221.
Shambaugh D (ed.) (2005) Power shift: China and Asia’s new dynamics. Berkeley, CA: Univer-
sity of California Press.
Shih C (1990) The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Smith M (2009) Between ‘soft power’ and a hard place: European Union foreign and secu-
rity policy between the Islamic world and the United States. International Politics 46(5):
596–615.
Spakowski N (2009) National aspirations on a global stage. Journal of Global History 4(4):
479–489.
Tocci N (2008) Proliferating normative foreign policy: the European Union and its global partners.
In: Tocci N (ed.) Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its
Global Partners. Brussels: CEPS, pp. 1–23.
Wæver O (1996) European security identities. Journal of Common Market Studies 34(1):
103–132.
Wang Y (2009) The identity dilemmas of EU normative power: observations from Chinese tradi-
tional culture. In: Gerrits A (ed.) Normative Power Europe in a Changing World. The Hague:
Netherlands Institute of International Relations, pp. 67–76.
Webber M (2007) Inclusion, Exclusion, and the Governance of European Security. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Wivel A (2004) Small EU Member States after enlargement. Paper presented at the ‘Workshop on
Small States’, University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland, 17–18 September.
Wolf R (2011) Respect and disrespect in international politics. International Theory 3(1):
105–142.
Womack B (2008) China as a normative foreign policy actor. In: Tocci N (ed.) Who is a Norma-
tive Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global Partners. Brussels: CEPS, pp.
265–300.
Womack B (2010) China among Unequals: Asymmetric Relations in Asia. Singapore: World Sci-
entific.
Yan X (2011) International leadership and norm evolution. Chinese Journal of International Poli-
tics 4(2): 233–264.
Yan X (2012) Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Zhan M (2012) Worlding oneness. Social Text 29(4): 107–128.

Kavalski 267
Zhang F (2009) Regionalization in the Tianxia? Continuity and change in China’s foreign policy.
In: Kavalski E (ed.) China and the Global Politics of Regionalization. Farnham: Ashgate, pp.
19–32.
Zhang F (2011) The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in international relations. European Journal of
International Relations 17: 1–24.
Zhang F (2012) The Tsinghua approach and the inception of Chinese theories of international rela-
tions. Chinese Journal of International Politics 5(1): 73–102.
Zhang X (2010) A rising China and the normative changes in international society. East Asia
28(3): 235–246.
Zhang Y (2001) System, empire, and state in Chinese international relations. Review of Interna-
tional Studies 27(1): 43–63.
Zhao T (2006) Rethinking empire from the Chinese concept ‘all-under-heaven’. Social Identities
12(1): 29–41.
Zheng B (2005) China’s ‘peaceful rise’ to great power status. Foreign Affairs 84(5): 18–24.
Zhou Y (2004) China’s Diplomacy. Beijing, China: China Intercontinental Press.
Author biography
Emilian Kavalski is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of
Western Sydney and the Editor for Ashgate’s Rethinking Asia and International Relations book
series. His research explores the security governance of complexity and the interactions among
China, India, and the EU in Asia. Among his recent publications is Central Asia and the Rise of
Normative Powers: Contextualizing the Security Governance of the EU, China, and India
(Continuum, 2012).