... The aforementioned disciplines are reinterpreted here, to analyze the issue of the gender paradox, via the neo-institutionalist approach (remember that it is considered a heterodox approachdespite being mainline or fundamental, Boettke et al, [47]; Sánchez-Bayón, [27,28], since unlike the mainstream or orthodoxy, it is one of the few lines of thought, together with the Austrian School, that is capable of putting an end to the romanticism of Politics and state paternalism -by revealing the hidden interests of its component actors) . It includes the following currents and a20pproaches: a) Law & Economics -L&E or (Coase [48,49]; Posner [50,51]), which allows us to question the incentives, efficiency and institutional quality of regulation and public policies, as well as the costs on public goods and how to improve with reallocations of property rights; b) Public Choice -PCh or Public Choice (Buchanan J, Tullock G [19], Anderson M [21]), serving to review how collective decisions are made (according to the maximization of interests of the economic agents that operate behind the State: bureaucrats, politicians and pressure and interest groups, above all), with their beneficiaries and those harmed (given the costs of consensus), taking into account hypotheses such as the endless agenda, clientelist networks, omnibus laws, the system of spoliation or distribution of the loot, nepotism, etc.; c) Constitutional Economics -CE or Constitutional Economics (Brennan and Buchanan [52]; Buchanan, [53,54]), favors the reduction of excess regulation, advocating for shorter and clearer laws, that establish basic and acceptable rules, thus allowing more exchanges and fewer costs of consensus, information 199and opportunity (in addition to avoiding perverse second-round effects, such as increased informality, corruption, etc.). ...