Capitalist expansion and agri-food systems in Southern Africa: A study on the relationship between the Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU) and small-scale farmer associations

Full text

Capitalist expansion and agri-food systems in the Southern African region:
A study on the relationship between the Southern African Confederation of Agricultural
Unions (SACAU) and small-scale farmer associations
Final draft, January 2013
By Stephen Greenberg, for People’s Dialogue

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Table of contents
ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................................. ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................... iv
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 1
2. BACKGROUND: COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND NEW FRONTIERS OF
ACCUMULATION ..................................................................................................................................... 1
2.1 New frontiers of accumulation ............................................................................................... 1
2.2 Agriculture in the economies of the region ............................................................................ 2
2.3 Regional agricultural policy ..................................................................................................... 4
2.3 Key value chains and geographical focus areas ...................................................................... 7
2.4 Regional agricultural investment ............................................................................................ 9
3. SACAU’S BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE .................................................................................... 12
3.1 Background ........................................................................................................................... 12
3.2 Structure ............................................................................................................................... 13
3.3 Current members .................................................................................................................. 13
4. SACAU’S KEY FOCUS AREAS .......................................................................................................... 17
4.1 Building farmer organisation ................................................................................................ 17
4.2 Strengthening regional trade for commercial agriculture .................................................... 18
4.3 Financing ............................................................................................................................... 20
4.4 Policy interventions .............................................................................................................. 21
5. WHAT IS ATTRACTING SMALL-SCALE FARMER ASSOCIATIONS TO SACAU? ................................. 22
APPENDIX 1: Selected agricultural statistics for Southern African countries ....................................... 28
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 29

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ACRONYMS
ABC Agricultural Business Chamber (South Africa)
ACT Agricultural Council of Tanzania
ACTESA Alliance for Commodity Trade in Eastern and Southern Africa
ADM Archer Daniels Midland
ADP Agro-dealer Development Programme (AGRA)
AGM Annual general meeting
AGRA Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
AgriSA Agri-South Africa
ARC Agricultural Research Council (South Africa)
BAT British American Tobacco
BAU Botswana Agricultural Union
CAADP Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme
CCAFS Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CFU Commercial Farmers Union (Zimbabwe)
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPM Coalition Paysanne de Madagascar
CTA Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Co-operation
DFIs Development finance institutions
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EAFF Eastern African Farmers’ Federation
EC European Commission
ESAFF Eastern and Southern Africa Small Scale Farmers’ Forum
FAAP Framework for African Agricultural Productivity
FANRPAN Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FARA Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa
FDI Foreign direct investment
FEKRITAMA Confédération des Agriculteurs Malagasy
FOSCA Farmer Organisation Support Centre in Africa
FUM Farmers’ Union of Malawi
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIZ German Development Cooperation
GM Genetically modified/genetic modification
GMO Genetically-modified organism
GNI Gross National Income
IARCs International agricultural research centres
ICT Information and communications technologies
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFAP International Federation of Agricultural Producers
IFOAM International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements
ILC International Land Coalition
IP Intellectual property
KARI Kenya Agricultural Research Institute
LDCs Least Developed Countries
LENAFU Lesotho National Farmers’ Union
LVC La Via Campesina
MAPP Multi-country Agricultural Productivity Programme

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NARO National Agricultural Research Organisation (Uganda)
NARS National agricultural research systems
NASFAM National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi
NAU Namibia Agricultural Union
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGOs Non-government organisations
NNFU Namibia National Farmers Union
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPVs Open-pollinated varieties
PAFO Pan-African Farmers’ Organisation
PAFFO Pan-African Farmers Forum
PPPs Public-private partnerships
PROPAC Plateforme Sous-Régionale des Organisations Paysannes d’Afrique Centrale
R&D Research and development
RAP Regional Agricultural Policy
RISDP Regional Indicative Strategic Development Programme
ROPPA Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et des Producteurs Agricoles de l’Afrique de
l’Ouest
SACAU Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions
SACPA Southern African Cotton Producers’ Association
SADC Southern African Development Community
SATH Southern African Trade Hub
SBF SADC Business Forum
SCC Swedish Cooperative Centre
SEYFA Seychelles Farmers Association
SFOAP Support to Farmers’ Organisation in Africa Programme
SNAU Swaziland National Agricultural Union
SPS Sanitary and phyto-sanitary
UN United Nations
UNAC União Nacional de Camponeses (Mozambique)
UNFCCC UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UPOV International Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
WRS Warehouse receipt system
ZFU Zimbabwe Farmers Union
ZNFU Zambia National Farmers Union

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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1. INTRODUCTION
The focus of the study is on why peasant movements and small farmer unions join both the
Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions (SACAU) and La Via Campesina (LVC). What is
it that SACAU offers? Why is SACAU an attractive option for small farmers in this period? The study
starts off with a background on the dominant agenda in African agriculture and reasons for the rapid
growth in interest in the potential of African agriculture in the past few years after decades of
neglect. A brief overview of the regional agricultural economy, agricultural policies, key regional
value chains and agricultural investment follows. This work needs to be deepened in future to better
understand the variations, similarities and core trends at work in the region. Without this, it will be
very hard to engage strategically on agriculture at a regional level, and farmer organisations will
remain reactive, constantly behind the curve, reacting to and perhaps eventually documenting
history instead of making it.
Following this regional overview, the study considers the basic structure and membership of SACAU
and its key priorities. These priorities are building farmer organisation; regional markets, trade and
value chains; financing of farmer organisations and value chains; and policy influence. The study
concludes with some considerations on why small-scale farmers and their organisations might
choose to join SACAU, and some thoughts for reflection.
2. BACKGROUND: COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND NEW
FRONTIERS OF ACCUMULATION
2.1 New frontiers of accumulation
There is growing consensus that we have entered a period of structurally higher food prices. The
United Nations (UN) predicts that food prices as a whole will rise at least 40% in the next decade
(Vidal, 2011). The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development/Food and Agriculture Organisation (OECD-FAO) predict that global
wheat and grain prices will be 30-60% higher in the coming decade than they were during the period
2002-2007 (Headey, et al., 2009:17). This is not merely a result of increasing demand for food, but is
also related to the expansion of money supply in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis where
governments created money to increase liquidity. There is a simple economic relationship between
increasing money supply and increasing prices: when the former rises, so does the latter.
As a result, land and agricultural production have become more important as a site both for
speculative activity and for potential profitable investment in production. Africa is seen as the ‘new
frontier’ of accumulation (Goldman Sachs, 2012). The continent is said to contain 60% of the world’s
“uncultivated, arable land”, much of which lies in southern Africa (Thomas, 2012:6), putting aside
the question for now about whether that land really is lying idle, or whether people are using it but
in ways considered to be unproductive from the standpoint of capital accumulation. Speculation in
land is coupled with increased competition for natural resources (land and water), especially in the
context of the simultaneous global energy crisis which has its roots in the increasing cost of
extraction of fossil fuels and perceived limits to future availability especially of oil (Klare, 2004).
Rising investment in African agriculture and land is thus part speculation and part investment in
productive capacity. At least 15 private equity funds, with a current value of US$2 billion, have
recently set up or are in the process of setting up, with the objective of investing in agricultural
production and processing in Africa (Thomas, 2012). Other general funds are also opening up to

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agricultural investment, previously seen as too risky. According to Thomas (2012:6) “smallholder
integration is a fundamental component of these funds”.
We should note the advancing of this frontier is still in the early stages: in 2010 Africa still only
received 4.4% of global foreign direct investment (FDI), most of which was directed towards energy
resources (coal, oil and gas). In southern Africa, the main destinations for FDI were Angola (oil) and
South Africa, although the latter experienced sharp declines in FDI in 2010. Other countries receiving
higher amounts of FDI in the region are Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia and
Madagascar, with consistent growth in FDI to Mozambique (Selelo, 2011). Despite this growth, intra-
regional FDI remains limited apart from investments made by South African companies. This is dealt
with in more detail below on agri-food investments.
There are two aspects to new productive investments in agriculture. On the one hand is the
production and export of raw or semi-processed materials for consumption outside Africa, in a
continuation of Africa’s colonial role as an exporter of raw materials. On the other hand is an
emphasis on building local and regional markets in Africa – driven by FDI itself – where an inflow of
resources produces a consumer economy (Louw & Kapuya, 2012:33). This applies to agriculture and
food as well as more broadly.
McMichael (2012: 681-82) argues that investments in African land and agriculture are driven by
speculation that land and food prices will rise. Investment decisions are based on returns on capital
rather than any concern for the state of food security in Africa. However, these essentially
speculative investments are, according to McMichael, “illusory solutions to a fundamental
accumulation crisis of the neo-liberal project”. They will only result in a short-term boost to returns
on capital, but cannot solve the longer term contradictions of rising costs of production (energy) and
reproduction (wage goods, including food), and the role of financial capital in structuring prices.
2.2 Agriculture in the economies of the region
Long-term trends in agriculture and food production unfold in the context of economic and
demographic transitions in southern Africa, including urbanisation, migration, increasing incomes
especially in growing middle classes, a continuing role for agriculture as a major employer in the
region, climate change, and a high degree of competition linked to globalisation and regional
integration. Gross National Income (GNI) per capita across Africa more than doubled between 2002
and 2010
1
. In the southern African countries we are looking at in this study, average annual per
capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the period 1997-2011 shrunk in Zimbabwe and DRC,
grown relatively slowly (less than 2% per year on average) in Madagascar, South Africa, Tanzania,
Seychelles, Botswana and Lesotho, and relatively fast (over 4% per year growth on average) in
Malawi, Namibia and Angola. Mozambique had the fastest average growth in the region, at 7.7% a
year over the past 14 years
2
. Even though these figures disguise vast and even growing inequalities
between and within countries, they indicate expanding economies overall.
Agriculture as a percentage of GDP in the region has remained in a band between 15% and 17% over
the period 2002 and 2011, and services have fluctuated between 42% and 48% of GDP
3
. The
fundamental structure of African economies has thus not changed in this period, but services,
including information and communications technologies (ICT) for supply chain management,
business co-ordination, financial and resource flows, skills development etc are an important
1
African Development Bank 2012 “Country profile macro-economic indicators, Africa”,
http://dataportal.afdb.org/Reports.aspx?type=DataByTopic&key=REP_CPMI
2
World Bank, “World Databank”, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx
3
African Development Bank 2012 “Country profile, Africa”

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component of the economy in tandem with primary productive capacity. Remuneration in services is
higher than in primary production and stimulates domestic demand, including for food.
Appendix 1 shows various statistics for agriculture in countries where SACAU has membership,
drawn from the World Bank and FAO. The first two columns show agricultural value added as a
percentage of GDP in 1997 and then in 2011 for comparison. Agricultural value added is the net
output of the sector after subtracting intermediate inputs. In no country is there significant growth
in the share of agriculture in GDP. In a few countries there was a significant drop in the share of
agricultural value added in total GDP. These include Tanzania, Lesotho, DRC, Zimbabwe and
Swaziland. The data doesn’t tell us the reasons for this. It could be a result of collapse of the
agricultural economy, or a result of rapid expansion in other sectors. But we can get the overall
sense that agriculture’s role in the regional economy is declining somewhat, for whatever reasons.
These two columns also show us the relative size of agriculture in the national economy. Here the
region can be divided roughly into those where primary agriculture still constitutes between half and
a quarter of value addition (DRC, Mozambique, Malawi, Madagascar and Tanzania), those where
primary agriculture is between a quarter and a tenth of value addition (Zambia, Zimbabwe and
Angola) and those where agriculture is a minor sector (Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa,
Botswana and Seychelles).
The third column gives an indication of the value of agriculture, and here the World Bank’s data
indicates that agricultural value addition (outputs minus intermediate inputs) in Angola is the highest
in the region, followed by South Africa, Tanzania, DRC, Mozambique and Zambia. A ‘second tier’
consists of Madagascar, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Smaller agricultural economies are Namibia,
Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and last Seychelles with a very small agricultural economy. That
Angola has a greater agricultural value addition than South Africa seems very strange, but other FAO
data appears to confirm this. Further investigation is required to understand this unexpected data.
From this we can see that DRC, Tanzania and Mozambique have relatively large agricultural
economies that are also significant sectors in these countries. Even though Tanzania shows a
dramatic drop in agricultural value addition as a percentage of GDP, a closer look at the data shows
growth of more than 4% a year in nine of the 14 years from 1997 to 2011. Agricultural value addition
in Mozambique has grown at an annual rate of more than 7.5% over the past 6 years, including 3
years of growth above 10% a year. In contrast, DRC’s growth in agricultural value addition has been
far slower at less than 3%, following a number of years of contraction before 2002, coinciding with
the civil war in that country. Just on the basis of these three countries we can see that the region’s
agricultural economies display a wide range of different trajectories.
The fourth column shows the agricultural population as a percentage of the total population in the
country. This is not the same as employment in agriculture or the number of producers, but
combines these with households relying on agriculture for their livelihoods. Here we can again divide
the countries in the region into three rough categories. First are those where more than half the
population is in agriculture (Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania, Malawi and Madagascar all with
more than 7 in 10 people in agriculture in 2010, and Angola, Zambia, DRC and Zimbabwe with
between 50% and 70% of the population in agriculture). The second group is those where less than
half of the population is in agriculture, but still a significant minority. This group includes Botswana,
Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. South Africa is an outlier in a category of its own, with less than
10% of the population in agriculture in 2010. Now we begin to get a fuller picture of the continuing
importance of agriculture in the region. Even though agriculture is not necessarily the largest
economic sector in most countries, the majority of the population in the region is still reliant on
agriculture for their livelihoods.

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The next column shows the change in the proportion of the population in agriculture from 1997 to
2010. In every country in the region, the agricultural population has declined as a share of the
overall population. Above all, this signals increasing urbanisation. The greatest drop in the
proportion of the agricultural population occurred in Namibia, Swaziland and then Zimbabwe, and
the slowest change occurred in Botswana, Mozambique and Angola.
The next column shows average fertilizer consumption per hectare in the countries in the region
over the 8 years from 2002 to 2009. South Africa used by far the highest average amount of fertilizer
per hectare in the region. An ‘intermediate’ group consisting of Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the
Seychelles indicate agricultural economies that have partially embraced Green Revolution
technologies. A third category of countries (Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Madagascar, Namibia
and DRC) had very limited use of fertilizer. To some extent we can consider commercial fertilizer use
as a proxy for the adoption of industrial agricultural techniques.
There are a rising number of ‘food surplus’ countries in the region (Louw & Kapuya, 2012:vi). The
final two columns of the table in Appendix 1 show average annual net cereal imports (imports minus
exports) and average annual net imports as a percentage of domestic production over the period
1997-2009 for each country. All countries in the region are net cereal importers. Some have net
imports that are more than their domestic production (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia),
a number have cereal imports which are significant in relation to domestic production (Angola,
Mozambique, DRC and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe) and those where imports are relatively small in
comparison with domestic cereal production (Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia, Madagascar and
Malawi).
2.3 Regional agricultural policy
Efforts are under way to ‘harmonise’ agricultural and trade policy to make it easier for capital to
circulate in the region. Without trying to deal with all the details of the many policy processes here,
we can highlight a few key issues for consideration. The discussion is framed in the context of public-
private partnerships (PPPs) and the role being allocated to the state by the dominant global neo-
liberal project. This opens up fundamental questions about the state as an instrument for
transformation in the current conjuncture, since states are currently being used to advance the
interests of large-scale private capital accumulation. Concretely, a pivotal role is assigned to the
Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) as a market-friendly
framework with buy-in from African governments. Evidence of regional-level harmonisation efforts
can be seen in regional seed policy and trade liberalisation as two key agendas of relevance to small-
scale farmer organisations in the region.
The role of the state in creating an ‘enabling environment’ for capital investment manifests in the
emphasis on PPPs, where the state develops and manages the institutional framework for the
creation of markets, and investment in infrastructure and research, while the private sector is
responsible for “product development and deployment” (Louw & Kapuya, 2012:ix). Investments in
African agriculture almost uniformly involve partnerships between national states, development and
charitable institutions and private sector interests. Even equity funds work with development
finance institutions (DFIs) (Thomas, 2012), thus utilising public resources for the facilitation of
private profit and capital accumulation. A good example is the US$25 million African Agricultural
Capital Fund, with investments from three charitable foundations (Gatsby, Rockefeller and Gates)
and one private sector institution, JP Morgan. In the arrangement, JP Morgan’s investment takes the
form of debt whereas the foundations provide equity, i.e. the former carries less risk. Not only will JP
Morgan be paid back first (with associated profits), but 50% of its loan is guaranteed by the US state

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(GIIN, 2012:3-4). So for very limited risk, private speculative capital receives publicly-backed
concessions for investment.
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and CAADP, its related agricultural
programme, are explicit in their support of a strategy that attracts FDI on the basis of investor-
friendly policies and systems. The limits to Africa’s development essentially are identified as lack of
capital and expertise. CAADP is the political reference point for investors. It is market- and
investment-friendly, and strongly influenced by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR) on technical agricultural matters. CGIAR is the network of international agricultural
research centres (IARCs) initiated and financially supported by Rockefeller Foundation but now
deeply embedded in commercial public-private plant breeding and other activities oriented to
commercialisation of agricultural activity. Amongst others, it is a primary source of germplasm for
the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and other commercial breeding programmes.
Commerce is thus not a purely private sector matter: AGRA, SACAU and others work closely with
national agricultural research systems (NARS), e.g. the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI),
the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) in Uganda, the Agricultural Research Council
(ARC) in South Africa, and others in the region.
Efforts at developing regional agricultural policies confront the challenge of a wide diversity of
systems and practices in agriculture, as well as in national level policies. The Forum for Agricultural
Research in Africa (FARA) was set up to operationalise CAADP’s Pillar IV on agricultural productivity.
In 2006 FARA produced the Framework for African Agricultural Productivity (FAAP). The framework
aims for a 6% annual growth rate in agriculture with investments channelled to four streams: i)
extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control systems (where
sustainability is measured first and foremost in terms of financial returns); ii) market access
interventions based on improving rural infrastructure and building capacity for trade; iii) increasing
food supply and reducing hunger (using the market as the primary mechanism of distribution and
allocation); and iv) agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption (again with an
emphasis on commercially viable, i.e. profitable, technologies) (FARA, 2009:3). Key challenges
identified include “capacity weaknesses [without specifying what capacity], insufficient end user
involvement, ineffective farmer support systems, systematic fragmentation between elements of
the overall innovation system (research, extension, training, farmer organisations, private sector,
consumers etc.)” (FARA, 2006:13). FAAP has three principal elements: i) institutional reform; ii)
increasing total investment; and iii) harmonising funding (FARA, 2006:14).
This apparently ‘neutral’ technocratic language, the logic of which appears to be unarguable, can be
reinterpreted from the angle of capital accumulation. The first and third streams for investment
(extension of the area under production and increasing production) can be considered, respectively,
to be the multiplication of circuits of accumulation and the ‘thickening’ of these circuits. In the first,
new spaces are identified and brought into processes of accumulation (extensification of
production). In the second, the pace of accumulation is speeded up (intensification of production).
This is the essence of productivity. The second and fourth streams of investment (market access and
research and technology) can be considered to be methods for increasing productivity, and the same
goes for efforts to co-ordinate and align innovation systems. Here ‘modern’ agricultural technologies
are identified as an essential part of increasing productivity. FAAP emphasises the “adoption of
modern or improved technologies” (FARA, 2006:8), thereby implying that current and historical
African practices are inefficient or obsolete.
This integrated approach to investment in African agriculture generates a number of markets. There
are markets for input technologies such as fertilisers, seed, agrochemicals, credit, construction,
telecommunications and the numerous services involved in knowledge and operational

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management, organisational development, training, research and development and so on. In
addition, output markets are created in the form of storage and transportation infrastructure and
equipment, trading, brokering and marketing services and so on. Each of these constitutes a
potential avenue for the deployment of capital for profitable return. This capital can be traced back
to private banks that generate fiat money through debt
4
. This is not to say that all these processes of
increasing and expanding production do not benefit (some) producers or (some) consumers in
Africa. But at the broadest level of critique, the important thing to recognise is that farmers are
primarily conduits for the expanded circulation, growth and accumulation of capital by others. The
principal economic function of a farmer in this model of economic development is as a generator of
added value, the bulk of which is appropriated by external agents.
This logic and the renewed investment thrust in African agriculture must be situated in the broader
context of speculation, the role of finance in the production process and the accumulation crisis
identified by McMichael above. The emphasis on growth in agriculture to increase competitiveness
in domestic and international markets in FAAP (FARA, 2006:8) links the programme strongly to the
logic of capital accumulation. Whether there are alternatives to this or not is something that farmer
organisations should consider.
National governments are tasked with aligning their policies with the continental framework of
FAAP, with any activities having cross-border advantages being passed to a regional level (FARA,
2006). On this basis, each region develops its own Multi-country Agricultural Productivity
Programme (MAPP). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) MAPP is a 15 year
programme based on three 5 year plans, which also builds on earlier regional integration
agreements such as the 2003 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Programme (RISDP) and the
Dar es Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in SADC. Regional priorities identified
are initiating and strengthening farmer-managed groups and networks (with an emphasis on
marketing groups), improving availability and accessibility of inputs, and improving information flow
between farmers, policy makers, markets and advisors (SADC-FANR 2008:viii). Key priorities for the
first phase are strengthening regional research and development (R&D) institutions and improving
access for farmers (especially smallholders) to “improved and profitable” technologies and to
markets (SADC-FANR, 2008:ix). “Routine joint regional activities” are anticipated by the end of the
second phase. 38% of new investments will be allocated to research and technology generation
(SADC-FANR, 2008:ix). SADC’s Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP) (SADC, 2012) adds further detail.
Funds are expected to come from “international co-operation partners” and national governments.
In practice, however, most of the funding has come from OECD countries and multilateral funding
institutions (e.g. World Bank) and private institutions such as AGRA which are not accountable to
any public governance institutions. Although African governments have agreed to invest 10% of
national budgets into the agriculture sector, most are investing in the range of 3-6% (Mushita,
2011:5).
Seed policy is a key focus for the private sector in the region. Efforts are well under way to
harmonise seed policies regionally to enable free trade, including intellectual property (IP)
protection, and regulations in favour of genetically modified (GM) seed. Harmonised laws are based
on the 1991 version of the International Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties (UPOV) which
essentially limits the rights of farmers to save and share seed, and transfers significant power to
commercial plant breeders (ACB, 2012c). The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
4
That is, money is created out of nothing but a debt obligation, thereby increasing the amount of capital in
circulation on the basis of debt issuance. This is a central feature of the restructuring of the monetary system
following the collapse of the Bretton Woods regulatory system in the early 1970s and followed up by other
fundamental financial system restructuring processes.

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(COMESA) has a draft policy statement and guidelines for the commercial planting of GMOs, trade in
GMOs, and acceptance of emergency food aid with GMO content (Mushita, 2011:22).
The RAP (SADC, 2012:53-67) aims to increase intra- and extra-regional trade in agricultural products.
Key intervention areas are i) improving farmer access to regional input (seed, agrichemicals, finance)
markets through promoting regional linkages and reducing tariff barriers; ii) promoting regional
output market efficiency through harmonising trade systems and promoting regional partnerships;
iii) enhancing price risk management and stabilisation through mechanisms such as warehouse
receipt systems (WRS)
5
and contract farming; iv) rationalise and harmonise trading systems in a
variety of ways; and v) improve use of existing infrastructure and promote additional agricultural
infrastructure development. On investment, the policy aims to support cross-border private sector
partnerships and investment and PPPs, stimulate national-level advance of agribusiness strategies,
and establish regional governance systems to enable agricultural investment and financing in the
region (SADC, 2012:68-74). Farmers and their organisations will need to engage more closely with
the policy and its implications for them.
2.3 Key value chains and geographical focus areas
This section considers three key value chains being targeted in the region with significant
implications for smallholders, viz. maize and soybean (AECOM International Development, 2011) and
cotton (Louw & Kapuya, 2012). In these priority areas, the geographical focus of USAID value chain
development (working through the Southern African Trade Hub (SATH)
6
in which SACAU is a partner)
is Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, given their similarities and well-
established industrial linkages (AECOM, 2011:3). The Alliance for Commodity Trade in Eastern and
Southern Africa (ACTESA) has a strategic focus on maize (Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania) and
livestock (Botswana, Ethiopia, Sudan) (COMESA, 2012). ACTESA is the main regional government
institution organising agricultural trade and investment. It is a specialised agency of COMESA which
is a regional governmental body like SADC.
Soya and maize are important crops for industrial agriculture. They can be rotated with one another
for year-round production, they are row crops amenable to industrialisation and mechanisation, and
both are key GM crops. In South Africa, the only country in the region currently using GM technology
commercially, GM completely dominates the market in maize and soya. 78% of maize seed sales in
South Africa in 2011 were GM, as were 85% of soya seed sales, in a rapidly expanding sector (ACB,
2012a). Both crops also have biofuel potential.
Table 1: 5 largest maize producers in southern Africa, 2006-2010 average
Country
Tons produced,
2006-2010 annual
average
South Africa
10,525
Tanzania
3,441
Malawi
3,176
Zambia
1,784
Mozambique
1,769
Source: Grant et al., 2012:19
5
Warehouse receipt systems are where farmers store their grain and are able to get credit for it before sale,
which is then taken off after sale. It gives farmers more flexibility in when to sell their produce and smooths
cash flow.
6
http://www.satradehub.org/

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
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Maize constitutes 79% of all cereals produced in region (Louw & Kapuya, 2012:4). It is the second
largest regional agri-industry after poultry. The main maize producers are South Africa, with more
than 60% of regional production, followed by Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique (Grant, et
al., 2012:19) (Table 1).
South Africa is a major market with just less than half of regional consumption. 52% of South African
consumption is for human consumption, with 47% for animal feed (Grant, et al., 2012:13). There is
very minimal use for biofuel at present, either in South Africa or in the region more broadly. Outside
South Africa, human consumption (77%) is more significant than animal consumption (12%) (Grant
et al., 2012:16). While the beef feedlot industry in South Africa is a major consumer of maize for
animal feed, poultry is the main sector for animal feed in the region as a whole (Grant et al.,
2012:14).
Table 2: Cereal yields in southern African countries
Country
Cereal yields,
kg/ha 2010
Country
Cereal yields,
kg/ha 2010
Angola
643.8
Namibia
372.7
Botswana
543.6
Seychelles
-
DRC
771.5
South Africa
4,161.8
Lesotho
908.9
Swaziland
1,225.7
Madagascar
2,986.5
Tanzania
1,332.5
Malawi
2,205.7
Zambia
2,547.0
Mozambique
1,006.0
Zimbabwe
751.5
Source: World Bank databank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx
Cereal yields in South Africa are much higher than in the rest of the region. Table 2 shows South
Africa had an average yield of 4.16 tons/ha in 2010 compared with 1.09 tons/ha (for maize) in
southern Africa excluding South Africa, according to Grant, et al. (2012:20). This is the result of the
dominant use of Green Revolution technologies (hybrid and GM seed, synthetic fertilisers and
pesticides, irrigation, credit). On the flipside, South Africa also has the highest levels of structural
inequality. In South Africa large-scale commercial farmers dominate maize production, whereas in
the region, the structure of production is based on large numbers of small-scale and subsistence
farmers. Fully half of the regional crop (excluding South Africa) is produced by those who do not
trade at all and therefore production is substantial but non-commercial.
There is high adoption of modern maize varieties - mainly hybrids but also improved open-pollinated
varieties (OPVs) - in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Kenya, and very low in Angola,
Mozambique and Tanzania (Grant, et al., 2012:28). Only South Africa plants GM seed commercially.
Because of restrictions on sales of GM in the region, South African producers are forced to sell
outside the region (e.g. Mexico) and the country’s regional sales are not GM seed. As indicated
above, there is an agenda to open the region to GM seed and products derived from GM seed.
South Africa, Malawi and Zambia are net surplus maize producers, with Zimbabwe anticipated to
join them in coming years. Export bans are in place in Zambia and Malawi (Grant, et al., 2012:30).
Malawi has a major informal cross-border maize trade. Lesser but still important informal cross-
border trade is also found in DRC, Zimbabwe and Zambia (Grant, et al., 2012:33).
The main producers of soya are South Africa, followed a way back by Zambia and relatively small
amounts being produced in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania. There is rapid
expansion of soya production in Malawi. Smallholders are the main soya producers in Mozambique
and Malawi, and large-scale commercial farmers dominate in South Africa and Zambia. There are

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
9
some efforts to develop contract farming arrangements, but this still constitutes a minimal
proportion of overall production. Commercial farmers of soya in Zambia and Zimbabwe have better
yields than those in South Africa despite the use of GM in the latter. This is partly due to better
growing conditions, especially higher rainfall (Opperman & Varia, 2011:12). Irrigation is used for soya
production in Zambia but not much elsewhere in the region. Processing capacity is mainly in South
Africa, followed a way back in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi (Opperman & Varia, 2011:25). The
industry is expected to expand vastly: southern Africa is currently a significant net importer of soy
products and substitutes (e.g. palm oil). Soya is a major input into animal feed, and has biofuel
potential. There is high demand from the poultry industry, especially in South Africa (Opperman &
Varia, 2011:10).
There is widespread cotton growing and trading in the region, with Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia,
Mozambique and Malawi the most significant producers. High quality cotton comes from Zambia
and Zimbabwe, and cotton is of poorer quality from Mozambique and Tanzania. Cotton is mostly
grown by smallholders in rotation with food crops (Bennett, et al. 2011:4). Contract farming with
ginners providing inputs and markets is widespread everywhere except in Tanzania. Cotton is mostly
rain fed, and yields are low even compared to other rain-fed regions (e.g. West Africa). This may be
accounted for by poor input and extension services in southern Africa.
As with maize and soya, competition in cotton is driven by GM technology, with pressure on
producers to adopt or fall out of the market (Bennett, et al., 2011:10). South Africa permits the
commercial planting of GM cotton. Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have “the
necessary legislative and institutional apparatus” to approve GM use, but so far only Malawi has
permitted confined trials of GM cotton seed (Bennett, et al., 2011:11). GM adoption may encourage
mechanisation of production.
Exports are mainly of unprocessed raw cotton (Louw & Kapuya, 2012:vi). Liberalisation of cotton
marketing has occurred in most countries although government interventions remain in some
places, e.g. floor prices. However this is based on consultations with both producers and ginners
where the latter have more resources to convince government of their price proposals (Bennett, et
al., 2011:9). The region has excess ginning capacity as a hang-over from past public sector
investments. There is a high level of global competition in apparel manufacturing. The main regional
exporters of apparel are Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius and Swaziland, with growth driven by Asian
investors (Bennett, et al., 2011:17).
Livestock is important in the region, but seems to be less of a priority for capitalist development at
present. Around half of grain goes into animal feed in South Africa, thus creating a ‘grain-livestock
complex’ with the weight to alter production relations across the region as demand for raw
materials and need for the expansion of opportunities for capital accumulation increase. Cattle and
poultry are the major livestock sectors. Livestock data in SADC is of poor quality. Based on existing
data, countries with the largest herds across all livestock types are Tanzania then South Africa,
followed some way behind by DRC, Namibia, Malawi, Angola and Zimbabwe. Between them
Tanzania and South Africa account for 57% of the region’s total cattle population (Louw & Kapuya,
2012:5-6).
2.4 Regional agricultural investment
As indicated above there is an increasing use of PPPs for agricultural investment. South African
banks, including Standard Bank and Absa Agribusiness Frontline and Africa, amongst others, play a
key role. Standard Bank has received funding from AGRA to leverage additional capital for
agricultural loans in eastern and southern Africa. There are presently ten key investment funds

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
10
focusing on agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa
7
. Capital is sourced globally, with funds mainly
domiciled in South Africa and Mauritius if not outside Africa, with an institutional investor base
including pension funds and development finance institutions (Thomas, 2012). For some funds, the
anticipation of returns of up to 30% suggests speculative investments (Hall, 2012:839).
The focus of regional agricultural investment is the modernisation and commercialisation of
production through the adoption of the latest technologies; the extension of credit to kick-start the
circulation of capital; building physical and institutional infrastructure to add value to primary
agricultural products as a profit-making enterprise (i.e. building value chains); the integration of
farmers at whatever scale into formal value chains; building domestic and regional markets for
value-added agricultural products; and working towards policy and institutional frameworks to
enable and support these. Contract farming, outgrower arrangements and off-take agreements are
key methods of bringing small-scale farmers into formal markets (World Bank, 2007), as are public
and private sector aggregation programmes to gather volume before distribution (Opperman &
Varia, 2011:22).
As seen above, South Africa is a major regional producer in most commodities. There is an
increasingly co-ordinated movement of South African commercial farmers to the north (through the
AgriSA Africa committee), ranging from concessions to consortia and agri-businesses, and
increasingly reliant on external financing through transnational partnerships (Hall, 2012). The
objective is to realise “regional economies of scale” through joint projects (AgriSA, cited in Hall,
2012:827). In 2010 AgriSA was engaged in negotiations for land acquisitions with governments in 22
African countries (Hall, 2012:823). South African land acquisitions in the region are driven by biofuels
expansion, especially jatropha, sugarcane, maize, soya and palm oil (Hall, 2012:828). An example is
AgriSAMoz, an association of South African commercial farmers in Mozambique to support these
farmers to secure rights to land, with involvement of the SA government. Already 800 farmers are
established, with another 800 waiting to secure land rights (Hall, 2012:830-831). It must be noted
that these projects are not received passively.
The sugar sector provides an example of regional expansion from South Africa. Illovo and Tongaat-
Hulett purchase or lease state-owned estates, build outgrower schemes where core mills and
estates are established and supply agreements with neighbouring small-scale farmers, and engage in
contracting farmers to supply mills (Hall, 2012:832). These sugar companies are vehicles for global
capital (for example, Illovo is owned by UK multinational Associated British Foods). Their agenda is to
expand access to international markets, for example by taking advantage of beneficial trade terms to
Europe for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) which they don’t have in South Africa (Hall, 2012:835).
There is growing foreign and South African investment throughout the food chain across the region.
Mhlanga (2010:7) provides a list of the largest foreign companies in different nodes of agri-food
value chains in the Africa (Table 3).
7
Key funds for southern and sub-Saharan Africa include Actis Africa Agribusiness Fund, Advanced African
Solutions, African Agricultural Fund, African Agricultural Land Fund, Agri-Vie Agribusiness Fund, Carlyle Group
Sub-Saharan Africa Investment Group, Chayton Atlas Agricultural Company, Futuregrowth Agri Fund,
Silverlands Fund and Standard Bank Private Equity (Thomas, 2012:11)

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
11
Table 3: Largest foreign and African multinationals in African agri-food chains
Biggest foreign companies
Biggest African companies
Inputs
BASF, Dow Chemicals, Bayer,
Du Pont, Linde Group
Sasol, AECI, Omnia, Chemical
Services Industries, Chimiques
du Senegal
Food processing
Nestle, Unilever, Archer Daniels
Midland (ADM)
Tiger Brands, Tongaat-Hulett,
Afgri
Beverages
Coca-Cola, InBev, Anheuser-
Busch, SABMiller
Distell, Nigerian Breweries
Tobacco
Altria Group, British American
Tobacco (BAT), Japan Tobacco
Eastern Co., BAT-Kenya, Société
Ivoirienne des Tabacs
Food retailers and distributors
No foreign8
BidVest Group, Pick n Pay
Stores, Massmart, Shoprite,
Spar
Food services
Compass Group, McDonald’s,
Sodexo
Anglovaal Industries, Astral
Foods, Rainbow Chicken
Source: Mhlanga, 2010
There are many other South African companies operating throughout agri-food value chains,
including Pannar Seed (acquired by Pioneer Hi-Bred in 2012 following South African competition
authority approval), Illovo Sugar, Senwes (whose African operations were merged in 2012 with
Bunge, one of the world’s largest grain traders), Pioneer Foods, Clover and Oceana Group (Louw &
Kapuya, 2012:13). South Africa is thus not only exporting farmers but also its value chains (Hall,
2012). South African corporate retailers (supermarkets) are major players in the region, and are
introducing modernised (profitable) procurement systems. Key requirements of volume, packaging,
consistency of supply, quality, food safety, labelling, cold chains, cost and logistics make it difficult
for many small-scale producers to enter into supply relationships with supermarkets (Louw &
Kapuya, 2012:viii). The region is experiencing “rapid and uneven modernisation of domestic
markets” (Louw & Kapuya, 2012:viii), with higher value and export markets increasingly the preserve
of larger-scale producers. Walmart’s entry into the region is likely to lead to major shifts in supply
chain functioning (Greenberg & Paradza, forthcoming). Centralised procurement, regional sourcing
networks and specialised wholesalers capable of differentiating products are some of the likely
effects arising from restructuring of supply chain arrangements (Louw & Kapuya, 2012:17).
These investments have contradictory outcomes. They may generate lower consumer prices, and
opportunities for producers and processors, but they also pose a challenge for small retailers,
farmers and processors who cannot meet entry requirements (Louw & Kapuya, 2012:9). They
threaten to disrupt long-standing food production and distribution networks, although supermarkets
still constitute a small proportion of the food market regionally and in most individual countries, and
significant ‘informal’ food distribution systems are likely to remain in place for a long time.
There are obstacles to capitalist expansion, and investors are not guaranteed of success. Some
examples include poor transportation and communication infrastructure, lack of efficient
distribution systems, and lack of operational and well-co-ordinated logistics systems (Louw &
Kapuya, 2012:9). From a capitalist point of view, investment is thus required in institutional and
physical infrastructure to ensure “broad-based, low-cost access to competitive well-functioning
markets” (Louw & Kapuya, 2012:viii). Resources are also required for first stage processing, rural and
wholesale marketing facilities, power sources and equipment, cold and dry storage, and
8
Walmart, the world’s largest company has subsequently acquired South Africa’s Massmart, which has a
presence in 13 sub-Saharan African countries with 235 stores (Fastmoving, 2011)

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
12
mechanisation. The expectation is that this will be mainly private sector funding, with a role for the
public sector to “create and maintain conditions that favour investment in agribusiness and agro-
industries by the private sector” (Louw & Kapuya, 2012:10).
Investors are also confronted by fragmented and weak policy and governance systems. The
corporate agenda is to harmonise regional policies in favour of greater private sector activity,
including secure land tenure in the form of private property. Bilateral investment treaties to secure
investors’ assets and the right to repatriate profits are seen as essential for expanded investment
(Cotula and Vermeulen, cited in Hall, 2012:831). The South African government supports this agenda
across the region, including government policy to support the export of white commercial farmers
into the region and the provision of resources for this. South African Agriculture Minister Tina
Joemat-Pettersson is quoted as saying “if we can’t find opportunities for white South African farmers
in this country, we must do it elsewhere in the continent” (cited in Hall, 2012:831). SACAU must be
understood as a regional organisation to advance this thrust. It emanates from South Africa but is
part of a global agenda of agricultural modernisation in Africa.
3. SACAU’S BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE
3.1 Background
SACAU describes itself as “a regional farmers’ organisation that was established in 1992. Its
membership is open to national farmers’ unions and regional commodity associations in Southern
Africa. It is involved in agricultural development in the region by strengthening the capacities of
farmers’ organisations, by providing a collective voice for farmers on regional and international
matters, and by providing agriculture related information to its members and others stakeholders.”
9
A condition of membership in SACAU is that organisations more or less represent the (commercial)
farming population in the country.
Very little information is available about SACAU’s early history, but it is clear that it emerged as an
effort to expand into the region by South Africa’s white commercial farmers and agribusinesses. The
federation has raised its public profile since the mid-2000s when it began orienting towards smaller
farmer associations in the region in an effort to expand its geographical scope. It is based in South
Africa.
SACAU receives funding from a range of private and government sources including the Swedish
Cooperative Centre (SCC) which provides core funding to the Secretariat, Agricord
10
, the French
Embassy, USAID, ABSA Bank, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, FAO, the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD), ACTESA, COMESA, the European Commission (EC), German
Development Cooperation (GIZ), the International Land Coalition (ILC), the ACP-EU Technical Centre
for Agricultural and Rural Co-operation (CTA), and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)/Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS). It therefore receives a
combination of private and public/development sector funding, linked to a broad ‘modernisation’
and commercialisation agenda, including from other farmer associations globally in the old
International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) camp (more below).
9
http://www.sacau.org/
10
Comprised of the national farmers' organisations of Belgium, Canada (Quebec), Finland, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, including SCC

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
13
3.2 Structure
SACAU is based on national producer associations, which must represent their constituencies on a
voluntary basis, be autonomous, farmer-governed and independent of political organisations
(SACAU, 2006:5). Members are general farmer organisations (not national commodity associations),
but membership is also open to regional commodity structures representing national commodity
associations at regional level. No such regional commodity structures exist in southern Africa at
present.
SACAU’s governing body is a Council consisting of representatives from three member organisations
elected at the organisation’s annual general meeting (AGM). SACAU is governed by a Board of
Directors consisting of a Chair, two Vice-Chairs and two other members, all elected by the Council
(therefore no direct election of individual leadership). The Chair/President is elected for a one year
term, with a limit of five terms. A Secretariat based on Pretoria oversees the day-to-day functioning
of the organisation. The Secretariat consists of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (currently Ishmael
Sunga) with 11 staff. Sunga has a history of research on land and agriculture in Zimbabwe, and has
regularly collaborated on research and writing with Sam Moyo.
The current Council consists of:
President - Felix Jumbe of the Farmers’ Union of Malawi (FUM)
Vice-President - Theo de Jager (AgriSA)
Additional members: Hajasoanirina Rakotomandimby from Coalition Paysanne de Madagascar
(CPM), Salum Shamte of the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT), and Ishmael Sunga (CEO)
Associate membership of SACAU is extended to agri-businesses, co-ops or other organisations
participating in agricultural value chains at a regional level. Honorary membership is offered to
individuals or organisations for a maximum of 5 years.
3.3 Current members
SACAU was formed in 1992 by the commercial farmers’ unions of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia
and Zambia. It currently has 16 members in twelve countries (Table 4). Three additional applications
are under consideration in Angola and DRC, and SACAU aims to have representative organisations in
every southern African country. Membership fees are currently US$1,500/year, with a proposal to
double them tabled at the 2012 AGM.
The size and strength of the different member organisations is uneven, with some large, established
commercial farmers’ unions and some smaller, more recently established associations. Thirteen of
the 16 are smallholder farmer organisations (Table 4). These can be divided roughly into mass-based
organisations with direct membership (e.g. UNAC in Mozambique and NASFAM in Malawi) and
representative bodies where local farmer associations or commodity organisations affiliate to an
umbrella body. The table indicates a number of small, recently formed organisations (e.g. SEYFA in
Seychelles, LENAFU in Lesotho and SNAU in Swaziland) with some of these established on the basis
of assistance from SACAU. Member organisations have substantial differences in resources, and
most are resource constrained apart from the bigger commercial unions (e.g. in South Africa and
Zimbabwe) (Jere, 2005:19). There is a strong sense that AgriSA is the power behind the network,
with support from Zimbabwe’s CFU, although the latter has been decimated as result of land reform.
AgriSA and the CFU work closely together and consider themselves to be sister organisations.
SACAU was associated with the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP), which had
its roots in northern European farmers groups which “may have had some ambivalence about

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
14
market liberalism, but often backed centre-right political parties” (Borras, et al., 2008:179). IFAP was
essentially the private sector counterpart to FAO on its formation after the 2nd World War. Borras et
al. (2008:171) label IFAP as ‘conservative’ and indicate medium and large farmers were dominant in
the federation, although it also had poor peasants and small farmers amongst its ranks.
IFAP was liquidated in 2010 in what appears to be a financial and political crisis and efforts were
made to replace it with another similar body, the World Farmers Organisation (WFO) in 2011. The
WFO’s first General Assembly was hosted by AgriSA in South Africa (farminguk.com, 2011). Its
President is from the US, with representation on the Board from Zambia, Japan, Canada and
Norway. The WFO’s key task is described as enabling agricultural producers “to improve their
positioning within the food supply chain… to get better returns from the market” (WFO, 2011).

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
15
Table 4: Current SACAU members
Country
Member organisations
Notes
Botswana
Botswana Agricultural Union (BAU)
No readily available information, although BAU appears to have been established through the
Ministry of Agriculture. Appears to have been formed in the 1960s.
Lesotho
Lesotho National Farmers’ Union (LENAFU)
Registered in 2008 with SACAU assistance. It consists of 55 organisations, 54 of which are very small
(all but one below 100 members) and one large organisation – the National Wool and Mohair
Growers’ Association with 43,590 members11.
Madagascar
Confédération des Agriculteurs Malagasy
(FEKRITAMA)
Coalition Paysanne de Madagascar (CPM)
Established in 1987. 47,000 members in 200912 in 2,015 farmer associations. 95% of members own
less than 3ha of land each, and there are no formal rights to land. In 2010 it had representation in 19
of Madagascar’s 22 regions (Snelder, et al. 2010:13-19). Has food sovereignty as one of its objectives,
and appears to be a member of the International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements
(IFOAM)13.
Formed in 2001. Platform of 300 farmer organisations. Member of the ILC, Eastern and Southern
Africa Small Scale Farmers’ Forum (ESAFF), Via Campesina and IFAP14. Food sovereignty as one of its
objectives.
Malawi
Farmers Union of Malawi (FUM)
National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of
Malawi (NASFAM)
Established in 2003, as an umbrella of mainly commodity association affiliates15. 78 affiliated farmer
organisations with over 260,000 farmer members (Malawi News Agency, 2012).
Movement formed in 1997 and currently with over 100,000 smallholder farmer members, mostly
farming less than 1ha each. Built around clubs of 10-15 individual farmers that combine to form action
groups as the focal point for extension, support and crop aggregation. Action groups combine to form
associations that then represent members at a national assembly. Has a commercial unit with a
national network of farm supply shops (currently 47 and expanding at around 10 per year)16.
Mozambique
União Nacional de Camponeses (UNAC)
Movement with 83,000 members in 2,100 local branches17. Member of Via Campesina, with food
sovereignty as an objective.
Namibia
Namibia Agricultural Union (NAU)
Namibia National Farmers Union (NNFU)
In existence for 63 years. White large-scale commercial farmer’s union, with 70 affiliated farmers’
associations18. Outreach to ‘emerging farmers’. Close relations with AgriSA.
Established in 1992 to represent Namibia’s ‘emerging’ (black) and communal farmers. In 2008, had
11
http://www.lenafu.org.ls/list-of-participants/
12
http://www.agro-info.net/?menu=organisations&view=organisation&organisation_id=15317
13
http://www.ifoam.org/about_ifoam/around_world/aosc_pages/Org-Africa-Countries/Madagascar.html
14
http://www.landcoalition.org/organizations/cpm
15
http://www.farmersunion.mw/home/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=56
16
http://www.nasfam.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=69&Itemid=79
17
http://www.actor-atlas.info/national-actor:mz-unac
18
http://www.agrinamibia.com.na/index.php?module=Pages&func=display&pageid=5

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
16
130 affiliated farmer associations organised in 12 regions, with a cumulative membership of 35,000
(NNFU, 2008:7).
Seychelles
Seychelles Farmers Association (SEYFA)
Established in 2002, currently with 79 individual members19.
South Africa
Agri-South Africa (AgriSA)
White large-scale commercial farmers’ association, based on commodity associations and regional
membership. Former South African Agricultural Union, a powerhouse behind the National Party under
apartheid. Increasing concentration in commercial farming in South Africa, with around 45,000 large-
scale farmers at present, though not all represented in AgriSA.
Swaziland
Swaziland National Agricultural Union (SNAU)
Established in 2008 with support from SACAU. 78 farmer associations, commodity groups and co-ops
representing 1,468 members. Individual membership being phased out and farmers must join
associations and commodity groups to be part of SNAU20.
Tanzania
Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT)
Established in 1999 as Tanzania Chamber of Agriculture and Livestock, and changed its name to ACT in
2005. Currently 97 registered member organisations (including a few individual honorary members).
Members range from co-ops and farmer associations to corporations. Member of East Africa Farmers’
Federation (EAFF)21.
Zambia
Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU)
Originated amongst large-scale settler farmers 107 years ago. After independence, more small-scale
farmers joined and the name was changed in 1992 from Commercial Farmers’ Bureau to ZNFU.
Consists of 59 district small-scale farmer associations and 10 large-scale farmer associations. Also has
10 corporate members, commodity associations and formed an agribusiness chamber in 2004. Was a
member of IFAP22.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU)
Commercial Farmers Union (CFU)
Established in 1991 after merger of Zimbabwe National Farmers Union and National Farmers
Association of Zimbabwe, both which represented black farmers since the 1930s23. Represents new
farmers who benefited from the fast-track land reforms, with claimed 300,000 members24.
Rooted in settler agricultural organisation more than a century ago. Mostly represents large-scale
commercial farmers. Provincial structure with parallel commodity associations25.
19
http://www.seychelles-farmers.sc/directory/seyfa-members
20
http://www.trademarksa.org/news/farmers-union-membership-comprises-60-women
21
http://www.actanzania.or.tz/index.php
22
http://www.znfu.org.zm/
23
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200208/16/eng20020816_101565.shtml
24
http://www.zbc.co.zw/news-categories/agriculture/21247-zfu-empowers-farmers.html
25
http://www.cfuzim.org/index.php

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
17
4. SACAU’S KEY FOCUS AREAS
SACAU has four key focus areas:
i. Building representative farmer organisation in the region, with an emphasis on capacity, finance
and information;
ii. Strengthening regional trade, including regional value chain development and information on
commercial opportunities;
iii. Financing for organisations and for practical activities to build commercial agricultural value
chains; and
iv. Facilitating organised farmer input into regional policy to advance these objectives.
No strategic plan beyond 2010 is publicly available and the 2006-2010 framework remains the latest
on the website. It is apparent, however, that SACAU is closely aligned with regional and continental
government agendas for African agriculture.
4.1 Building farmer organisation
Problem statement: farmer organisation in the region is fragmented and farmers do not have an
effective platform to push for their common interests. Farmer associations in the region are weak
and unable to provide services to members.
SACAU’s objective is to build farmer organisation and regional co-operation amongst farmers and
their organisations, including facilitation of capacity development for farmer organisations in the
region, and providing a platform for collective voice and for appropriate information (SACAU,
2006:6). It is looking for nationally-representative organisations and to build a united voice for
farmers regionally. This agenda is shared by the World Bank (2007), AGRA and others who
emphasise farmer organisation as a key building block to realise capitalist modernisation of
agriculture. It is also shared by organisations such as LVC who have a different agenda based on food
sovereignty. There is therefore an overlap in strategic direction on this score, although the types of
organisation and the ways of building them are likely to differ.
SACAU recognises the unevenness in organisation between different associations in the region. It
aims to provide support to different types of organisation: farmer unions or associations, commodity
associations and co-operatives (Jere, 2005:8). Farmer unions or associations generally bring together
sub-national or district associations or commodity associations under one umbrella. In some
countries, e.g. South Africa and Zimbabwe, there are national farmer associations for commercial
farmers and separate associations for small-scale (often understood as interchangeable with black or
‘emerging’) farmers. Some farmer organisations, in particular commodity organisations, also have
corporate members (Jere, 2005:14).
In a report commissioned by SACAU and the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis
Network (FANRPAN), Jere (2005:6) highlights the usual challenges in building organisation: lack of
financial resources and dependence on donors, and lack of capacity and organisational
infrastructure. Farmer organisations have identified their key objectives to include providing
technical skills to members, representing members’ interests, and facilitating and improving market
access (Jere, 2005:11).

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
18
SACAU is part of the Support to Farmers’ Organisation in Africa Programme (SFOAP)
26
initiated in
2009, funded by the EC with IFAD as the executing and supervising agency, and with additional
support from FAO and the CTA. The programme works with four regional farmers’ organisations in
Africa: Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et des Producteurs Agricoles de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
(ROPPA) in West Africa, the Eastern African Farmers’ Federation (EAFF), the Plateforme Sous-
Régionale des Organisations Paysannes d’Afrique Centrale (PROPAC) in central Africa and SACAU in
southern Africa. Together these formed the Pan-African Farmers Forum (PAFFO) in 2010, now the
Pan-African Farmers’ Organisation (PAFO). SFOAP aims to build strong farmers’ organisation through
building institutional capacity, including training and strategy, networking, policy and lobbying and
advocacy, communications and a significant input into staff, equipment and resources.
SFOAP has regular interactions with AGRA, which has established the Farmer Organisation Support
Centre in Africa (FOSCA), and also seeks to build farmer associations and networks in Africa. FOSCA
has ongoing collaboration with SACAU (FOSCA, 2012). They attend the same forums, and are part of
the same agenda. In 2010, SACAU received US$3.2m from the Gates Foundation (core donor of
AGRA along with the Rockefeller Foundation) for a 3 year programme to strengthen farmers’
organisations and increase SACAU’s smallholder farmer membership
27
.
Although SACAU works with organisations that have small-scale farmers amongst their members or
are even majority small-scale producers, it still operates in the mould of bigger is better. According
to SACAU CEO Ishmael Sunga (2009), there is a “tendency to romanticise smallness – every
enterprise wants to grow and prosper”. Agricultural production and farming is framed in the
language of enterprise and business. These are at the core of SACAU’s orientation towards
agriculture and farmer organisation, primarily as a business with a focus on commercial agriculture.
Nevertheless, there is undoubtedly an overlapping of agendas in building farmer organisation.
4.2 Strengthening regional trade for commercial agriculture
Problem statement: farmers are not aware of commercial opportunities domestically or in the
region; regulatory frameworks impede the connection between supply and demand of agricultural
products in the region; terms of trade are unfavourable to farmers; and farmers are not actively
involved in trade negotiations.
To respond to these problems, SACAU aligns with the agenda to ‘modernise’ African food production
and distribution using the latest technologies. It aims to promote the ‘viability’ of agriculture in the
region with a focus on building agricultural markets and an emphasis on cross-border trade. It seeks
to increase farmers’ participation in agricultural policy and trade negotiations, and to share
information amongst farmers, especially on regional trade and trade opportunities.
SACAU is a member of the SADC Business Forum (SBF), formed in 2005 to promote the interests of
the private sector in the region, including policy harmonisation to make investment and trade easier.
It is also a member of the SATH, a USAID-sponsored initiative aiming to increase agricultural and
agri-business competitiveness and trade in the region, with the backing of big business from South
Africa.
SACAU works throughout the value chain. In seed, it promotes agro-dealer development
programmes (Sunga, 2012:12). Again this is the same agenda as AGRA, whose Agro-dealer
Development Programme (ADP) is a core intervention (ACB, 2012b), mainly in East and West Africa
26
www.sfoap.net
27
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Grants-2010/Pages/The-Southern-African-Confederation-of-Agricultural-
Unions-OPPGD1147.aspx

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
19
and a bit in southern Africa. These networks are based on private sector distribution of ‘modern’
inputs focusing on improved seed (both open-pollinated and hybrid), synthetic fertiliser and
extension advice oriented towards commercial production. Sophie Murphy has developed a
typology of approaches to small-scale farmers in development thinking (Table 5).
Table 5: Narratives on small-scale farming
Yesterday’s
Economy
Agriculture to
Reduce Poverty
Room in the
Shade
Small-Scale =
Good Business
Food
Sovereignty
and the Right
to Food
Economic
assumptions
- Market-based
growth
- One global
market
- Reliance on
exports (and
insistence on
imports)
- Focus on
efficiency
as primary value
- Global value
chains (GVC)
- Market-based
growth
- Many markets,
but exports the
most important
- Focus on
efficiency,
but also local
capital
formation and
employment
- Look at rural
economies, not
just farmers
- GVC
- Market-based
growth
- Niche markets
are profitable
and plentiful
- Focus on
specialisation
and meeting
standards
- GVC
- Market-based
growth
- Small-scale
farmers are the
majority (and
plentiful) and so
important as
consumers and
farmers
- Niche markets
are profitable
and plentiful
- Focus on
specialisation
and meeting
standards
- GVC and
production webs
- Local markets
come first
- National and
Regional
markets ahead
of global
- Focus on
employment &
local capital
formation
- Comfortable
With govt
regulation
- Production
webs
Small-scale
producers
and
agriculture
- Agriculture is
mostly irrelevant
to a modern
economy
- Aim for less
than 2%
employment in
agriculture
- Food should
come from
industrial
producers
- Food should
come from mix
of small-scale
and industrial
farms in short
to medium-
term
- Governments
should aim at a
slow transition
to less than 2%
employment
in agriculture
- See roughly
25% of the
current small-
scale farmer
population as
viable
- Small-scale
producers as a
vital and
necessary part
of agricultural
production,
but also a
minority
- Focus on
entrepreneurs
- Exploit/work
with small-scale
producer
attributes
- Small-scale
producers are
the majority and
likely to remain
so for some time
- Small-scale
producers as
basis of the rural
economy
- Agriculture &
rural economies
are the heart of
development -
Small- scale
producers
should grow
our food
- Diversity and
small-scale over
monocrops and
industrial-scale
production
Source: Murphy, 2012:20
The typologies span a range from neo-liberal narratives (“yesterday’s economy”) to food
sovereignty. If we consider these typologies, SACAU is somewhere in the middle (“room in the
shade”) in its economic assumptions, but leans closer to the neo-liberal model in its approach to
small-scale farming (“agriculture to reduce poverty” and “room in the shade” with some elements of
“yesterday’s economy”). That is, SACAU adopts a market-based growth approach, and sees a role for

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
20
small-scale producers but mainly in niche markets where the focus must be on meeting quality
standards.
This is in line with global shifts in recent years either towards greater recognition of the role small-
scale farmers play in global food production (IAASTD, 2009; De Schutter, 2010) or towards seeing
commercial potential in small-scale agriculture in some places and conditions, targeting niche
markets within the paradigm of corporate value chains (World Bank, 2007). There is no inherent
inconsistency, for example, in the promotion both of small-scale agriculture in niches and the
simultaneous promotion of ‘supermarketisation’ of food distribution. These niches are in sectors
that are commercially competitive for small-scale, labour-intensive production e.g. horticulture,
cotton and tobacco, but also in less labour-intensive production such as poultry and cattle.
Building regional markets is seen as key to the expansion of commercial agriculture: according to the
World Bank (2009:xiii), in Africa “regional markets appear to offer the most promising opportunities
for expansion over the short to medium term”. SACAU follows this logic, placing emphasis on
building regional markets and of integrating small-scale farmers into these formal markets and
facilitating free trade across national boundaries. This requires the reduction of trade barriers
between countries. SACAU accordingly targets tariff and non-tariff barriers, including sanitary and
phyto-sanitary (SPS) regulations, and “trade distorting and protective subsidies” provided by
‘developed’ country governments to their producers (SACAU, 2006:17).
SACAU is a member of the Southern African Trade Hub (SATH). The Hub operates across economic
sectors, and aims to increase farmers’ competitiveness and to increase regional trade. At its 2012
conference, on the theme of connecting farmers to agricultural value chains, SACAU invited ABSA
Bank, the South African Agricultural Business Chamber (ABC), Afgri, Massmart/Walmart, Senwes and
SABMiller to address the conference. All of these emanate from South Africa, giving a clear sense
that SACAU is driving the agenda of corporate South Africa in its quest to expand into the region.
4.3 Financing
Problem statement: farmer associations in the region are under-resourced and credit for production
and expansion is not readily available.
Box 1: Cotton as an example of SACAU’s market-building work
In 2008 SACAU received funding from the SCC to carry out the Fair Deal in Cotton Contract
Farming project. The geographical focus was in Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe, where SACAU
worked with ZNFU, FUM and ZFU respectively. The project aimed to develop a more equitable
partnership between contract cotton farmers and agri-businesses. Main activities were the
development of cotton commodity associations, contract negotiations (including farmer training,
research and organisational development), and lobbying and advocacy (http://www.agro-
info.net/?menu=projects&view=project&project_id=24088&tab=definition).
The project eventually led to a declaration of cotton associations to establish a regional cotton
association, the Southern African Cotton Producers’ Association (SACPA), with representatives
from commodity associations in Malawi, South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Madagascar,
Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. It aimed to be set up by end August 2012 but does not yet
appear to exist as an independent entity. This signifies both the thrust of SACAU’s work but also
the limits it faces in realising its own plans.

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
21
SACAU seeks to mobilise donor funding to support its objectives, which including strengthening
member organisations. It has been able too raise some resources to support these activities. For
example, through SFOAP, national associations in Lesotho, Madagascar, Seychelles and Swaziland
were provided with financial resources to recruit and pay salaries for professional staff for the first
time
28
.
However, the primary thrust with regard to financing is to facilitate the linking of farmers to finance
institutions, and by lobbying for improved and simplified financing mechanisms in the region to
enable farmers to gain access to financing. In 2012 SACAU teamed up with AGRA to host a Farmers’
Organisation Forum on the topic of linking farmers to markets and financial services (SACAU News,
Nov 2012:1). The meeting involved farmers from the region and financial institutions.
The current focus is on value chain financing. This signifies a shift from security-based finance
(where farmers put up physical collateral, e.g. land, against which money is borrowed) to value chain
financing (where secure contracts are taken as credible collateral). Legally binding contracts are thus
a key element of financing (Louw & Kapuya, 2012:23) and this justifies interventions at policy level to
ensure the rule of law.
Financing is heavily dependent on whether lending institutions see profit potential in farmers’
activities. If there is a market that permits the realisation of exchange value (i.e. can the product be
sold for a profit that covers both the producer and the financier?), the financing will come. Thus
production finance cannot be pursued outside the context of concrete surplus value realisation
projects. There must be a return on capital, without which there will be no commercial financing. If
there are too few banks or poorly tailored financial products (Mhlanga, cited in Louw & Kapuya,
2012:24), the analysis either is that banks and investment houses have overlooked this new market,
or that the cost of producing the hard and soft infrastructure to liberate the profit is too high. The
reality is probably a combination of these. Financial institutions appear to have recognised a
potential market and are currently testing to see what the costs of (capitalist) development are.
Financing for small-scale farmers thus presently mainly takes the form of seed funding to investigate
its feasibility at larger scales. It is experimental and speculative, but based on hard evidence.
The danger in financing is that, in order to repay loans, farmers will be forced to pursue yields, thus
requiring ‘modern’ inputs that can trap producers into debt. UNAC members in Mozambique
interviewed for this report were unanimous in their agreement that production finance is very
important. However, they did not agree it would automatically lead down the ‘Green Revolution’
path: “We realise we would need to change our production strategy, but we would not need to use
GM (genetically modified seed). That destroys the soil, and there are health issues associated with it.
We can increase our production without relying on Green Revolution technologies. We believe that
with local seed and our existing soils we can increase production. But we need financing to do so”
(UNAC focus group discussion, Maputo, 27/11/12).
4.4 Policy interventions
Problem statement: lack of effective farmer participation in policy formulation in the region.
SACAU offers a forum to discuss matters of common interest and to develop and advocate for policy
positions based on these discussions. It seeks policy influence through conducting research to make
informed inputs into policy at national and regional levels, and aims to facilitate policy dialogue with
governments and private agencies.
28
“SFOAP achievements to date” http://www.sfoap.net/about_sfoap/

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
22
SACAU has gone a long way on this agenda. It is officially recognised by COMESA and acknowledged
as a regional farmer organisation by SADC, NEPAD, FAO and FARA (SACAU, 2006:16). It is a member
of FARA, which is linked to CAADP strategic objectives, NARS and IARCs, and has a memorandum of
understanding with FANRPAN, a regional government body. SACAU is on the SADC working group
responsible for designing the RAP. Key policy interventions include harmonisation of seed laws to
enable commercial use of GM technology, and PPPs for agricultural commercialisation.
SACAU embraces GM technology as an option for increasing productivity, though it recognises there
are obstacles to its adoption (this mirrors AGRA’s approach to biotech). None of the stated obstacles
have to do with problems with the technology itself, but with regulatory and capacity constraints
and (inaccurate, according to SACAU) perceptions of farmers that the technology may be harmful
(Sunga, 2012). SACAU’s aim is to adopt harmonised biosafety and GMO policy frameworks for the
region to enable the advance of the technology (SACAU, 2012), which includes protection of
intellectual property (IP) and replacement of non-commercial seed distribution systems by market-
based approaches (Sunga, 2012:10). This position is reflected in the RAP which sees opposition to
GM technologies by most countries in the region as an obstacle to be overcome rather than a
mandate to be followed. As such, the RAP seeks to “promote the adoption of biotechnology in crop
and livestock development by: a. facilitating agreement on a harmonised approach to the safe use of
modern biotechnology and clarifying how to deal with GMOs; and b. promoting regional
collaboration in biotechnology and biosafety research…” (SADC, 2012:43). It appears that SACAU’s
position on GMOs is the position of regional governments, indicating some level of policy influence.
On PPPs, SACAU seeks to direct public investment to realising its agenda. It does not have a difficult
time of this, since the investment agenda established through CAADP is market-friendly with a large
role for the private sector and agribusiness. SACAU’s priorities for public investment are: i) human
resources, ii) science and technology in agriculture, and iii) infrastructure and irrigation. Of critical
importance to capital is the need for an ‘enabling environment’ for profitable capitalist investment
(Louw & Kapuya, 2012:27). This “human resource complex”, as David Harvey (2006:398-400) terms
it, takes time to build, and regional and local partners must be found to root it. Although national
states are generally on board, it is not so easy for them to translate their desires into practice. First
they must negotiate local social systems, encountering resistance, conflict and diversions along the
way. Therefore the dominant agendas can best be understood as political projects, not inevitable
outcomes following rational processes of policy formulation.
5. WHAT IS ATTRACTING SMALL-SCALE FARMER ASSOCIATIONS TO SACAU?
It is apparent from SACAU’s focus areas that there is a lot of commonality with agendas of LVC and
related food sovereignty movements, at least at a superficial level. Building farmer organisation,
increasing trade and sales of produce domestically and regionally, gaining access to resources for
farming and amplifying the voice of farmers on issues affecting them will find little opposition
amongst farmers and support organisations of any ideological stripe in the region. Therefore it is not
surprising that farmer associations might choose to join SACAU. We see the situation that many
farmer organisations – especially the bigger, stronger ones – tend to participate in many different
networks. This makes sense, because each of the networks might offer something slightly different,
and may bring different resources to farmers and their organisations. Diversity, after all, is a
principle of sustainability. It also must be understood that SACAU is not acting on its own, but is
working within policy frameworks developed over the past decade by the region’s governments. This
gives them a blanket of legitimacy and allows them to pool their resources with those of national
governments and other international actors and donors to advance their agenda.

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
23
Overlapping representation by farmer associations in ‘rival’ networks is common, e.g. IFAP and LVC
(Borras, et al., 2008:172). Borras et al. argue that this reflects contradictory orientations within
farmer associations. But it is probably a mistake to assume producers join organisations for
ideological reasons. A lot depends on the opportunities that arise to secure and advance systems of
production and distribution that benefit producers directly, and therefore we might better
understand overlapping membership in practical rather than ideological terms.
According to UNAC members interviewed, membership of different networks has proven beneficial
for them. Membership of LVC has deepened UNAC’s understanding of agroecology and has also
provided them with practical support on agroecological practices. LVC has also strengthened UNAC
to engage with national government and strengthened their knowledge and ability to defend their
lands and to produce. LVC has been with UNAC for many years providing support and so it is not
really possible to compare LVC and SACAU, especially since SACAU has not reached farmers in many
provinces where they farm (UNAC focus group discussion, Maputo, 28/11/12).
However, some members have benefited from UNAC membership in SACAU. For example in 2009
SACAU financed an agroecological project and has financed organisation building around Maputo
(UNAC focus group discussion, Maputo, 27/11/12), one of UNAC’s general assemblies was sponsored
by SACAU, and farmers in Sofala received training on gender and leadership (UNAC focus group
discussion, Maputo, 28/11/12). At a broader organisational level, UNAC has benefited from SACAU
membership by gaining access to NEPAD and regional policy and governance institutions and
processes. This is an important level of engagement since many donors and investors are working
through these structures and institutions to unfold their own plans and direct their investments.
UNAC has therefore adopted a position of participating in both networks. With regard to SACAU,
UNAC started out as an observer at meetings, to get a better understanding of the aims of the
confederation. Others argue that “if we have an enemy, we need to get to know them in order to
know what strategies to adopt” (UNAC focus group discussion, Maputo, 28/11/12). Although there
are benefits, there are also contradictions. For example, UNAC has seen that SACAU at times makes
decisions based on the interests of large-scale commercial farmers (e.g. in Zimbabwe and Malawi)
rather than in the interests of small-scale farmers (interview, Renaldo Chingore, former President of
UNAC, 28/11/12). The decision to join SACAU has also caused internal tensions, mainly based on
long-standing ideological disagreements. According to a former leader of UNAC “it is a difficult
struggle because rural farmers are desperate, and any proposal that appears attractive has a
tendency to convince them” (Nnampossa, 2012:4).
These internal tensions should be understood in the context of the historical division between
‘mainstream’ farmer organisations and activist farmer movements globally. Although they have a
similar set of concerns, they have different ways of realising them. Mainstream organisations (e.g.
SACAU and the former IFAP to which it was affiliated) seek to integrate marginalised producers into
circuits of accumulation, working within existing structures and building on the latest technologies
and the credit system as the foundations of capitalist productivity. They therefore orient towards
commercial production and economic growth as fundamental requirements. These mainstream
organisations are connected to a large pool of resources, especially as African agriculture rises up
the global policy agenda. Capital investment must be understood as the materialisation of an
ideological vision, even if it does not always happen as smoothly as proponents might like.
Activist organisations seek to create alternatives to the commodification of agricultural production
based on fundamentally different economic and political organisation, built on concepts of food
sovereignty, solidarity and self-sufficiency. This means members sharing limited resources with their

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
24
neighbours in reciprocity and building on this solidarity in agricultural production for food, fibre,
medicine and fuel. This is a deep understanding of the role of agriculture, its multiple uses and its
integration into society. Agriculture is the material basis for humanity’s continuing existence, and as
such it must be protected and nurtured. This means not growing beyond the ecological means.
These are politically defined and ever-shifting terms, and their practical meaning is partly dependent
on the balance of class forces globally and the available technologies. The activist thrust is towards
widening the ecological definition to become much more fundamental to how we produce and
consume.
UNAC members clearly state that local production is their first priority. According to one member
“the main issue is not business. First it is food for the family, then local markets and later urban
areas in need. Healthy food is our priority, and for that we must not damage the land” (interview,
Renaldo Chingore, 28/11/12). UNAC members interviewed in Marracuene outside Maputo indicated
they were “family farmers” first and foremost, but when asked whether they would be interested to
selling to the national fresh produce market near to Maputo they unanimously said they would like
to do so. This captures the tension precisely: farmers have been food producers for their households
and their communities and they recognise the critical importance of maintaining this. But they also
recognise the potential for agricultural production to generate an income; however, this may mean
engaging more directly with the formal system.
In a rapidly changing economic and social context, food producers are likely to combine elements of
different production models to see what works best for them and the people around them. All
support organisations recognise the key importance of strong farmer organisation to facilitate these
choices. However, the content of organisation building may be quite different between different
support organisations. Increasing knowledge about business and markets is important, since that is
the current economic climate. But increasing knowledge about ecologically sound production
techniques is also important, as is broader thinking about the limits of economic growth and possible
alternatives for all humanity. Farmers are at the forefront of areas of human endeavour requiring
fundamental change. Do we close our eyes and pursue short-term profitability, or do we continue to
struggle for survival, trying to make ends meet with limited resources? Is there some way of sifting
through available knowledge from all sides and adopting what works best in the short and long
term? We need to know what knowledge is available and the extent to which adoption of
technologies close off possibilities for the adoption of other technologies. Which decisions are
irreversible and which can coexist with other choices? This means casting our nets widely, but also
thinking critically about what returns to us. The way farmers respond to the dilemmas facing them
will shape the path all of us will travel. These choices transcend individual well-being, but must
incorporate it at the same time.
Different farmers have different interests, and this is sometimes difficult to manage in large, mass-
based movements or organisations. There is a tendency to talk about undifferentiated farmer
interests (Bernstein, 2009) when there are differences based on class and other social divisions (e.g.
race, gender, location). SACAU talks about managing to combine the voices of small-scale and large-
scale farmers in the region. However, the issue is not necessarily one of small- vs large-scale farmers,
because small-scale farmers can also engage in ecologically and socially damaging competitive and
profit-seeking behaviour in corporate value chains. The issue is more about growing differentiation
between farmers able, by their life circumstances, to integrate into formal value chains and markets,
and the majority who are not able to do so. The dominant thrust in African agriculture, the
agribusiness-, government- and donor-driven agenda, will accelerate this differentiation. It has
occurred in Green Revolutions in Asia and Latin America already. This poses important questions
about the class base of existing farmer associations and movements, and the associated questions of
how to identify a core constituency and what strategies to adopt to ensure this constituency drives

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
25
and leads the movements or associations while still being open to forming alliances with other
classes. The key is the balance of power within farmer organisations.
SACAU has clearly defined its core constituency amongst commercial farmers, i.e. those who
produce regularly or primarily for sale. This is certainly a fairly small proportion of the total number
of food producers in the region. What role is there for activist networks and farmer movements
amongst these producers, and amongst those who cannot connect into formal value chains for any
number of reasons? What are the obstacles to social, economic and ecological improvements in
agricultural production and food distribution? What knowledge exists amongst producers that can
be shared with one another? Is there explicit agreement on larger political agendas amongst
members?
Almost by definition, nascent capitalist farmers will have more resources at their disposal. This is
true within organisations as much as it is across organisations (for example, AgriSA in comparison
with SNAU). This means that within organisations, better resourced, better educated and better
connected producers will tend to occupy decision-making positions. And these leaders are likely, not
out of ill will but out of the economic logic within which they operate, to orient the organisation
towards goals that serve their purposes. This is not to create enemies amongst farmers, but to raise
the necessity of considering how to balance these distributions of power in favour of those with
limited access to land, women, youth and others disempowered by the current distribution of
resources (whether material or immaterial, like knowledge).
To use some old-fashioned language, small-scale farmers have become a central ‘terrain of struggle’,
to define who and what these farmers are, and to determine the most appropriate paths of action to
orient their production and activities in particular directions. SACAU has a clear agenda in this
regard: to increase productivity and integrate farmers into formal systems of production and
distribution lubricated by financial capital. Some farmers may agree with this agenda, others may
not. Most farmers are merely trying to make ends meet. Some may share the vision of commercial
production and the fullest possible integration into capitalist production, but for most this is too far
from their practical reality. Likewise, some (many) support organisations may seek to advance this
agenda. Most donors, philanthropic institutions, banks, governments, non-government
organisations (NGOs), research institutes and parastatals are oriented to this agenda. For some it
promises a path of accumulation and profit, for others, that’s where the money is. Very few are
looking for alternatives to this way of producing. Those that are fight an uphill battle, because they
must rely on their own efforts, their own resources, to survive and to gain knowledge. But from the
point of view of the future, a future where the collapse of an unsustainable system of agri-food
production and distribution will be painfully obvious in its inevitability, the fruits of this uphill
struggle will provide the basis for the continuation of human civilisation. The struggle is to build
alternatives in the present that can keep people alive now while also reorienting production and
distribution in preparation for a future without large external support systems in place.
There is some evidence that farmers in the region are not blindly accepting the argument that the
alternatives are starvation or adoption of the full package of technologies and finance on offer by
the corporations. SACAU and other Green Revolution boosters are constantly coming up against
perceptions and beliefs amongst farmers and their organisations that run counter to the dominant
ideological orientation. SACAU can’t ignore these tensions within its membership if it is to build and
sustain its credibility with farmer organisations. It will be forced, at least to some extent, to balance
between the interests of member organisations even if its overall agenda is established by the large
commercial producers. Two examples are attitudes to biotech and GM, and trade liberalisation.

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
26
On biotech and GM, although SACAU’s ideological drivers see biotech as a key technology to be
adopted, they have been forced to tone down and recognise room for choice whether farmers and
consumers want to adopt (SACAU, 2011). This emerged from discussions with their members. UNAC
focus groups and interviews revealed the same, with SACAU’s support of GM technologies identified
as a key point of disagreement (UNAC focus group, Maputo, 27/11/12; interview, Renaldo Chingore,
Maputo, 28/11/12). SACAU may continue to influence regional bodies to adopt GM, but this will
increase tensions with at least some of its member organisations who have different positions on
this question.
On trade liberalisation there is a constant tension between large-commercial farmer associations
that view trade restrictions in domestic and export markets as a major constraint to their expansion,
and small farmer associations that see trade and market liberalisation as a key threat (see Jere,
2005:13). As indicated above, SACAU’s position on trade is to open markets to regional trade
through reducing tariffs. This is one of the key pillars of the dominant modernisation agenda, shared
by national governments and agribusinesses alike. Large-scale farmers globally (including in southern
Africa, especially South Africa) need markets in the region to dispose of their surpluses. But small-
scale farmers are looking primarily for local markets. The agendas clash when cheap imports flood
markets and destroy opportunities for small-scale producers. UNAC farmers tell a story of a project
they had which aggregated peanuts from Nampula and then took them to Maputo to sell. But South
African imports undercut the market and they lost the trade (UNAC focus group, Maputo, 27/11/12).
Another focus group simply said that trade liberalisation “is not a good idea because we will find it
difficult to sell” (UNAC focus group, Maputo, 28/11/12). Others offered some reasons for the
inability to compete that went beyond economies of scale: “buyers don’t give value to local
products. They will always buy international if they have a choice. One reason is packaging, the
imported products are always better packaged that ours. Another reason is cultural; people think
that what comes from outside is better” (UNAC focus group, Marracuene, 29/11/12).
Although mainstream organisations have a far greater pool of resources to draw on, even enabling
them to establish funded institutes to pursue their agendas, both mainstream and alternative
organisations continually confront obstacles to their practical realisation: weak organisation, poor or
unimplemented policies, limited resources for investment, entrenched systems of formal and
informal power, social isolation, and weakly developed technologies are impediments for
mainstream and alternative orientations alike. As a result, the practical work is often very similar on
the surface. Both are concerned with building and strengthening farmer organisation and
representation, strengthening farmer choice (although by different means and leaning towards
different goals), introducing a wider range of appropriate technologies (even if what these are
understood to be might differ), and generating more resources both for reproduction and for the
expansion of desired systems of production. The core of the differences in the two approaches
relates to the distribution of value in production, the extent of control over technology and
technological processes, and systems for the distribution of use values that do not rely on
exploitation in production. The mainstream approach accepts the private extraction of surplus value
(labour exploitation) as the necessary foundation for accumulation and technological innovation, the
separation of conception from execution, and the necessity of the realisation of exchange values to
liberate surpluses for further accumulation. For SACAU ‘farming as a business’ is the normative
framework. Anything other than efficient business enterprise is viewed as ideological, but the
discourse of business is viewed as non-ideological. Challenging this requires the development of
convincing and practical alternatives to the dominant business model. As part of developing their
strategic approaches, farmer organisations should consider their approach to these and other issues
they identify as pertinent.

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
27
SACAU is clearly part of the mainstream project to advance capitalist expansion in African
agriculture. Although it has its roots in large-scale commercial farmers in South Africa, it is part of a
much wider agenda that incorporates African governments as well as donors, agribusinesses and
governments and their institutions globally. African agriculture offers the potential for profit, new
markets both for inputs and outputs. This agenda is contradictory. It expands possibilities for some
producers, introduces some technologies that might be useful, and promises improvements in the
conditions of life for (some) producers and consumers. But it also displaces existing systems of
provision, and excludes or marginalises the majority of producers.
The challenge for small-scale farmers and their organisations is what strategies to adopt that can
both enable them to improve their lives through agricultural production while also placing
agriculture on a fundamentally different path from one that increases dependence on external
inputs and simultaneously undermines alternatives. For farmers to make choices about production
techniques and technologies, and about systems of distribution, requires access to information, not
only about one kind of production but about many different ways of doing. Farmers know traditional
methods, and the mainstream is offering new knowledge about new technologies and systems. But
the mainstream is doing this without any critique of those systems and technologies. It offers them
as if they are the final solution to hunger and poverty. However, experience in other parts of the
world show that adoption of these technologies can eliminate other possibilities and the
technologies and systems of the Green Revolution have internal weaknesses (soil infertility, farmer
passivity as a result of their separation from technological development, indebtedness etc). The key
question facing small-scale farmers is whether different technologies and systems of production and
distribution can be blended, or at least operate in parallel, or whether a choice must be made: food
sovereignty or Green Revolution. Are these alternatives all-encompassing, or is it possible to
produce hybrid systems, using the best of what is available? The response to this will determine
which networks are most appropriate for small-scale farmers and their associations. In order to
assist farmers with this, proponents of food sovereignty and agro-ecological practices will have to
work hard to make knowledge about these alternatives available to farmers, so that farmers will
have options.

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
28
APPENDIX 1: Selected agricultural statistics for Southern African countries
Country
Agric value
added (% of
GDP), 1997
Agric value
added (%
of GDP),
2011
Agric value
added, US$m
2011
Agric pop. as
% of total
pop., 2010
Change in agric
pop. as % of total
pop., 1997-2010
Fertilizer
consumption, kg/ha
on arable land, avg
2002-2009
Cereal imports
minus exports,
(‘000 tons annual
avg 1997-2009)
Net cereal imports
as % of domestic
production (avg
1997-2009)
Angola
9.0
10.1
10,158
69.2
-3.3
3.31
594.9
86.3
Botswana
3.7
2.5
416
42.1
-2.3
-
160.8
514.1
DRC
48.1
42.9*
4,636*
57.2
-6.5
0.39
530.5
34.4
Lesotho
18
7.8
168
38.9
-3.7
-
209.3
152.5
Madagascar
31.6
29.1*
2,295*
70.1
-5.9
3.12
255.5
7.6
Malawi
32.6
30.5*
1,625
72.9
-6.5
33.99
147.4
6.3
Mozambique
34.9
32
3,546
76.0
-3.2
4.43
671.6
42.0
Namibia
10.9
7.3
933
40.9
-10.7
2.20
158.8
142.9
Seychelles
3.5
1.8*
15
74.0
-4.9
24.50
16.7
-
South Africa
4
2.5
8,133**
9.8
-6.3
51.34
1,048.5
8.6
Swaziland
13
7.9
234
28.8
-8.6
-
126.3
151.5
Tanzania
46.8
27.1
5,780
73.3
-6.3
5.46
530.1
10.7
Zambia
18.7
20.7
3,538
64.0
-6.7
29.27
97.1
7.7
Zimbabwe
18.9
12.8
1,106
56.3
-8.5
29.16
361.0
21.9
Source: World Bank, “World Databank”, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx
*2009, **2010

SACAU and smallholder farmer associations in Southern Africa January 2013
29
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