Book

Migration, Refugee Policy and State Building in Postcommunist Europe.

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Abstract

Why do similar postcommunist states respond differently to refugees, with some being more receptive than others? Why do some states privilege certain refugee groups, while other states do not? This book presents a theory to account for this puzzle, and it centers on the role of the politics of nation-building and of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). A key finding of the book is that when the boundaries of a nation are contested (and thus there is no consensus on which group should receive preferential treatment in state policies), a political space for a receptive and nondiscriminatory refugee policy opens up. The book speaks to the broader questions of how nationalism matters after communism, and under what conditions and through what mechanisms international actors can influence domestic polices. The analysis is based on extensive primary research the author conducted in four languages in the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine.
... Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 27 September 2017 possibly conflicting national identities (Lebow, 2016, chapter 2). And some states have more contested national identities than others (Shevel, 2011). ...
... Smith (2005) focuses on the influence of ethnic lobbies on U.S. foreign policy, raising questions about the compatibility between the pluralism of ethnic preferences and U.S. national interests. But in Shevel's (2011) work on post-Communist refugee policies the direction of causality is reversed; here it is the domestic contestation over the appropriate boundaries of a nation that have a direct impact on the options relating to refugee and diaspora policies. According to Shevel, countries where national identity issues are settled will pursue favorable treatment of coethnic refugees, while those with unresolved identity debates are more likely to pursue neutral policies toward all groups. ...
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Nationalism continues to be an important ideology that informs the way state elites formulate and implement foreign policy. The relationship between nationalism and foreign policy is complex: there are many relevant levels of analysis and multiple causal pathways linking nationalism and foreign policy. Scholars have identified national masses, elite policymakers, and the nation-state itself as units of analysis. The causal mechanisms that relate nationalism and foreign policy have also been wide ranging: nationalism has been treated as an independent variable that drives foreign policy decision making but also as endogenous to international factors and a country’s foreign policy. Moreover, the causal relationship between nationalism and foreign policy has also been conceptualized as an interactive one. This eclecticism is noticeable in the study of nationalism and war. The war proneness of nationalism may be a function of the type of nationalist ideology being used. The nation-state as a product of the ideology of nationalism may be inseparable from war making. And the international system, ordered upon nationalist principles of self-determination and popular rule, may endogenously produce political violence. More recently, the role of nationalist protests in interstate crisis diplomacy has become more salient, especially in post-Soviet and China studies. Are nationalist protests manufactured by the government, or are governments forced to adopt certain foreign policies because of public pressure? The conundrum about nationalism being endogenous or exogenous again rears its head. Nationalism studies is an interdisciplinary field, but within political science interest in nationalism has largely been confined to comparative politics. International relations theory does incorporate nationalism as an important independent variable, but too often this is done in an ad hoc fashion. All in all, there has not been enough systematic theorizing about nationalism in foreign policy analysis.
... Statelessness is also caused by the hardening of national boundaries through identity checks and regularization drives. State-building, political restructuring, and identity regularization drives can effectively strip minorities of nationality rights-as the literature has documented in such places the former Soviet Union, Thailand, and Sri Lanka(Shevel 2011;Harris 2013;Wolozin 2014). Former Yugoslav states demonstrate how political restructuring creates liminal and stateless populations; some groups of former Yugoslav citizens became aliens forced to go through a process of naturalization (Shaw and Stiks 2013). ...
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Population movements have causes and consequences for both global security and the economic and security considerations of states. Migration itself is inexorably intertwined with global security outcomes, in the form of instability, state fragility, transnational terrorism and crime, and the radicalization (or perceived radicalization) of migrants and host societies. While modern states may have monopolized the authority over legitimate movement, they have never fully captured the management and enforcement of migration flows. Instead, market actors play key roles in determining migration outcomes—including the scale, direction, and violence associated with migration flows. Migration outcomes are, thus, critically constituted by two key forces—the security priorities of states and the complementary and competing forces of privatization and profit-making. While market forces undermine state control over migration, states have buffered and further consolidated their power over mobility by harnessing private actors and markets toward migration management and border control. We situate migration management and border control as a political economy of security issue, arguing that migration outcomes cannot be explained without examining the interaction between state security imperatives, private actors, and market forces.
... This study has demonstrated how humanitarian initiatives are implemented across borders via universalistic models of social change, here rooted in west European models of refugee integration (Smyth, Stewart, and Da Lomba 2010). Shevel (2006Shevel ( , 2011) has argued that the UNHCR and international institutions expand opportunity structures for an inclusive refugee policy, particularly in postsocialist countries where contention over ethnicity makes room for an inclusion of a range of ethnonational groups. 16 However, this study demonstrates that North–South power dynamics can emerge even through the very institutions established to promote ethnic diversity, unwittingly exacerbating refugee exclusion in transit countries in the Global South. ...
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Countries of immigration—old and new—have developed a range of methods to control the arrival of potential refugees on their territory. Migration scholars have paid increasing attention to the extraterritorial control of migration by Global North countries beyond their borders, while refugee scholars have investigated the ways in which United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) policies may reproduce the exclusion in camps within the Global South. However, studies of humanitarian affairs and integration rarely converge with studies of control. With an institutional ethnography of an European Union-led refugee integration initiatives in Ukraine, this case study seeks to bridge this gap, exploring the consequences of the securitization of migration in this nascent destination and gateway to Europe. The findings identify the ways in which local nongovernmental organizations and international humanitarian agencies may inadvertently reinforce social exclusion and extraterritorial control through refugee integration policies transposed from Global North to Global South. The article concludes with suggestions for studying the link between
... If, on the other hand, the parties are not so well organized, and there is a large number of groups participating in the negotiations, the mediator might be able to gain some dominance over the process and lead the parties toward a settlement. In a comprehensive study of nationalism and policy-making in post-Communist states, Shevel (2011) argues that in a state where national identity is contested and there is no consensus over which group should receive preferential treatment, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has an easier time influencing the state to adopt a receptive and nondiscriminatory refugee policy. ...
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We investigate the effect of ethnic pluralism on mediation in interstate and internationalized civil crises from 1945 to 2010. We find that mediation succeeds when two conditions are met. First, success is more likely when there are fewer disenfranchised ethnic groups in the disputant population, because these groups are usually excluded from peace talks and often use violence to challenge peace. Second, mediators are more likely to succeed when politically included disputants, usually present at peace talks, comprise various different ethnic groups. Because such groups, numerous as they are, pull and tug for dominance at peace negotiations, they are unable to form decisive coalitions. As a result, third parties have a chance to serve in a more authoritative role and influence a settlement.
... But their migration contexts were also different in many respects. This mixture of background similarities and differences enables us to treat as constant important background conditions such as understandings of nationhood (Brubaker 1992), levels of national identity contestation (Shevel 2011), and historical legacies (Akturk 2012), while still being able to test our argument against prominent alternatives. Our dependent variable is group-level variation in repatriation policy. ...
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Russian regional governments have shown remarkable variation in prohibiting immigrants from working in specific economic sectors. Why do regions enact immigration bans in some sectors but not in others? Few studies have explored the politics of immigration in authoritarian regimes, and recent sectoral bans in Russia have received scant attention. Based on an analysis of a novel data set on sectoral bans in 83 Russian regions and a case study of Novosibirsk Oblast, this article shows that regional governments tend to enact immigration bans in sectors that do not rely on a foreign workforce. I argue that autocrats impose immigration restrictions as mere grandstanding to appeal to public anti-immigrant sentiment. My findings challenge the existing literature’s emphasis on the roles of economic factors, such as economic growth and natural resources, in immigration restrictions, as well as the argument that Russia imposes excessive immigration restrictions.
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This paper presents the results of fieldwork conducted among the small Italian minority living in Kerch, a coastal town in Crimea, between 2012 and 2013. After introducing the socio-historical background and the current situation of the minority, it presents and discusses the attitudes of members of the community towards the different languages which constitute their linguistic repertoires. The research builds on Bourdieu's theoretical approach to symbolic (linguistic, social and cultural) capital and on analyses and conceptualisations of linguistic identification in Ukraine and Crimea. Analysed data generate a picture of language use and attitudes within a minority group in the Crimean pluralistic environment, where individuals may feel allegiances and commitments to different ethnic communities and to different languages simultaneously.
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The chapter locates itself in the tradition of British cultural studies and draws from governmentality studies, according to which power is wielded adopting different technologies. Inquiring after the ‘how’ of power, the research focus shifts toward power/knowledge arrangements in society and culture, for example, within the Olympic Games at Sochi. Adopting these two vantage points enables analysis of the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi as a mega event that shapes and reproduces Russian political identities. Hence, the paper pays particular attention to four areas of the Olympic candidature file: (1) modernisation, (2) democracy, and most prominently (3) the issue of diversity, which is tightly connected with (4) the security issue.
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Countries of immigration—old and new—have developed a range of methods to control the arrival of potential refugees on their territory. Migration scholars have paid increasing attention to the extraterritorial control of migration by Global North countries beyond their borders, while refugee scholars have investigated the ways in which United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) policies may reproduce the exclusion in camps within the Global South. However, studies of humanitarian affairs rarely converge with studies of migration control. Using an institutional ethnography of an European Union-led refugee integration initiatives in Ukraine, this case study seeks to bridge this gap, exploring the consequences of the securitization of migration in this recent destination and gateway to Europe. The findings identify the ways in which local nongovernmental organizations and international humanitarian agencies may inadvertently reinforce social exclusion and extraterritorial control through refugee i...
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This article analyzes engagement with Russias Compatriot policy, as an example of ethnizenship-type of quasi-citizenship, in Crimea, as the most likely case of Compatriot engagement. The article focuses on unpacking the lived experience of Compatriot identification and engagement and the rationale for this engagement. The article finds a narrow and niche engagement with the Compatriot policy in Crimea where only the most politicized and discriminated individuals, alongside beneficiaries of the Compatriot policy, identify as Compatriots. However, the article also finds dissatisfaction with the Compatriot policy because it fails to offer the kind of status, and rights and benefits, of full citizenship. Thus, while citizenship might be becoming fractured, via quasi-citizenship policies, citizenship remains the key point of entry to the kin-state. Focusing on the lived experience of quasi-citizenship, and examining quasi-citizenship as a category of practice, is crucial for developing understanding of the social and political impacts of quasi-citizenship policies.
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This chapter emphasizes the contradictory composition of the discourses of race in Central Asia―whereby it can be conceptualized both as breed (or lineage), which is supported by the discourses of nationalism and clan politics, and as type (or phenotype), which is supported by folk conceptions borrowed from the Soviet and post-Soviet experiences of racialization. The fluid character of racism in the region obstructs any non-contradictory formation of the racial order. The logic of racialization demands both internal and external “others”, which leads to contradictions within the available intellectual programs of nation-building under the conditions of striving to legitimize inequality and authoritarian rule. It is self-contradictory in its two functions of responding to the traumatic challenges of the neighboring countries and Russia and of naturalizing social differences at home. The weakness of civil society and of institutions endeavoring to apply transparency and meritocracy as their operating principles has resulted in a situation in which Central Asian states have not succeeded in questioning the institutionalized ascription of a variety of social markers, such as racialized ethnic belonging.
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These predominantly Christian societies have never had their own statehood within their present borders prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and since that time they for a long period were in the sphere of influence of Moscow. The chapter considers the connectedness of racist discourses with racist practices in the former metropolis, while stressing such historical distinctiveness as the long-standing anti-Semite and anti-Tsygan (anti-Gypsy) narratives and practices within these western edges of the former Russian Empire, tracing their logic and dynamics in present-day societies of Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. This chapter outlines a new path and logic of racialization processes in the context of mass migration, the search for national identity, and deterioration of relations with Russia.
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Why do ethnoculturally defined states pursue favourable policies to integrate some returnees from their historical diasporas while neglecting or excluding others? We study this question by looking at members of two historical diasporas that, in the 1990s, returned to their respective ethnic homelands, Greece and Serbia, but were not treated uniformly by their respective governments. Utilising a wide range of primary sources, we consider evidence for a number of plausible explanations for such policy variation, including the economic profile of an ethnic returnee group, its status in internal ethnic hierarchies, its lobbying power, and dynamics of party politics. We find, instead, that the observed variation is best explained by the role that each particular group played in the ruling elites’ ex ante foreign policy objectives. Elites discouraged the repatriation of co-ethnics from parts of the world they still had claims over, by pursuing unfavourable repatriation policies. Conversely, absent a revisionist claim, states adopted favourable repatriation policies to encourage their repatriation and facilitate their integration upon return. Methodologically, the article illustrates the importance of focused comparisons across dyads of states and particular sub-diaspora groups.
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Der Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit externe Faktoren der Europäisierung bzw. interne Maßnahmen des tschechischen Innenministeriums und innenpolitischer Akteure als Treiber der Politikfeldentstehung wirkten. Er prüft die verbreitete These, dass mit dem EU-Beitritt die Anreize für EU-angepasstes Verhalten wegfielen. Empirisch zeigt sich, dass die Übernahme des EU-Rechts vor dem EU-Beitritt Tschechiens 2004 die Politikgestaltung prägte, der EU-Rechtsrahmen jedoch zu allgemein war, um policy-Schablone zu werden. Dass die Politikformulierung nach dem Wegfall der EU-Beitrittskonditionalität durch innenpolitische Faktoren geprägt war, wurde ebenfalls nicht vollständig bestätigt. Zu einer programmatischen Ausrichtung der Migrationspolitik kam es erst ab 2011, vermutlich wegen der instabilen Regierungen und schnellen Regierungswechsel in der Zeit davor. Eine Politisierung setzte erst seit der europäischen Flüchtlingskrise 2015/16 ein und trieb die Herausbildung eines eigenständigen Politikfelds weiter voran.
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The text takes a deeper look at the consolidation of democracy in the Czech Republic and contrasts the picture of Czech Republic as a poster child for economic transition in the early 1990s with the decreasing quality of the Czech democracy in the past years. This paradox, it argues, makes the Czech Republic a compelling case for democratization research. The term swerving towards consolidation is advocated. There are no attempts to renegotiate the rules of the democratic game, even though the political system has become polarized, governance has become more difficult and new actors have emerged. At the same time civic engagement is growing. The findings show that democratic consolidation is not a linear process. Instead, the quality of democracy is dynamic – reacting to domestic and external factors. A more nuanced approach is needed to understand the dynamics of democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe.
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Der Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit externe Faktoren der Europäisierung bzw. interne Maßnahmen des tschechischen Innenministeriums und innenpolitischer Akteure als Treiber der Politikfeldentstehung wirkten. Er prüft die verbreitete These, dass mit dem EU-Beitritt die Anreize für EU-angepasstes Verhalten wegfielen. Empirisch zeigt sich, dass die Übernahme des EU-Rechts vor dem EU-Beitritt Tschechiens 2004 die Politikgestaltung prägte, der EU-Rechtsrahmen jedoch zu allgemein war, um policy-Schablone zu werden. Dass die Politikformulierung nach dem Wegfall der EU-Beitrittskonditionalität durch innenpolitische Faktoren geprägt war, wurde ebenfalls nicht vollständig bestätigt. Zu einer programmatischen Ausrichtung der Migrationspolitik kam es erst ab 2011, vermutlich wegen der instabilen Regierungen und schnellen Regierungswechsel in der Zeit davor. Eine Politisierung setzte erst seit der europäischen Flüchtlingskrise 2015/16 ein und trieb die Herausbildung eines eigenständigen Politikfelds weiter voran.
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This article argues that the sources of official and societal ambivalence towards civic nationhood in today’s Russia are found in the institutional instability and personalist dynamics of hybrid regime politics in the 1990s. Successful civic nation-building should institutionalize inclusive criteria for citizenship as a basis for policy-making, which in turn should create incentives for dominant ethnicities to embrace civic nationhood. While the shifting views of Boris El’tsin on nationalities policy and the constant turmoil in the government’s nationalities ministry have received little scholarly attention, they illuminate the endogenous sources of regime instability in relation to civic nation-building. Russia’s experience thus challenges the traditional view of ethnic nationalism as fostering authoritarianism and civic nationalism as fostering democracy: rather, competitive authoritarianism in the 1990s confounded the regime’s own efforts in civic nation-building and laid the groundwork for the ‘ethnic turn’ in Russian politics under Vladimir Putin.
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Many Western observers declare “a new Cold War” with Russia or point at the autocratic character of the Russian regime in order to explain Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in Syria. In contrast, this chapter investigates Russia’s foreign policy along three key types of power that modernity has produced—sovereignty, reason of state and biopolitics. It does not simply seek to explain the reasons underlying Russia’s foreign policy conduct, but aims to analyse its formal mechanisms, which resemble those of other modern great powers. The main argument of the chapter is that Russia’s military interventions in Crimea and Syria do not represent a break with the previously professed principles of Russian foreign policy. Rather, Russia has adopted the entire repertoire of devices, means or mechanisms available to modern states: all the tools of sovereignty, reason of state and biopolitics remain present in both domestic and foreign policy.
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This essay examines how the Ukrainian and Russian government-owned newspapers, Uriadovyi Kurier and Rossiiskaya Gazeta, represent people displaced by the war in Donbas, analysing the political goals revealed by these publications’ attitudes towards the displaced. While the Ukrainian publication delimits the nation by distinguishing ‘real’ internally displaced people (IDPs) deserving help and ‘fake’ IDPs guilty of siphoning Ukrainian taxpayers’ money to rebel-held areas, the Russian paper foregrounds the Russian state's competence in managing displacement while silencing the displaced themselves.
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The analysis of Russia’s imaginaire, which is based on spiritual and moral values anchored in a multiply defined civilization and an expanded historical tradition, makes it possible to identify the specific logics of the Russian Orthodox Church’s engagement in the global world. Russia’s plastic imaginaire has evolved in line with both Russia’s foreign policy and the Church’s own agenda. The Russian Orthodox Church, which has increasingly competed with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, has responded in a very specific way to the challenges of globalization. On the one hand, it conveys a religion that is largely culturalized and identity-oriented; the Russian Church positions itself in an Orthodox and Christian oriental space that is becoming more and more extensive. On the other hand, through the moralization of its message, it has increasingly global claims and contributes today to the diffusion of a global message that spreads beyond traditions. It becomes global not by adjusting its message to local cultures, but by engaging in dialogue and allying itself with other so-called “civilisations”. Finally, it is extending the perimeter of its traditional space through its attitude towards compatriots and through processes of autochthonization.
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This chapter explores the extent to which external factors, policy measures of the Czech ministry of interior and domestic political actors influenced the emergence of migration policy as a new policy field. It inspects whether or not EU incentives for adaptation and compliance disappeared after the EU accession. It finds that the adoption of the EU legal framework impacted on national policy-making but was too general to serve as a policy template. Similarly, the impact of domestic political factors was limited due to government instability. A stronger programmatic focus has only developed since 2011. Czech migration policy was politicised during the European refugee crisis 2015/16 which expedited its emergence as an autonomous policy field.
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Since the European refugee crisis 2015, the rather bureaucratic asylum and migration policy has become a highly politicised issue in ECE countries. The politicisation process started while political parties were involved with the policy. However, many studies have ignored the practice of executives’ and administrations’ action in this domain and knowledge of whether this public anti-EU rhetoric really resulted in non-compliance, therefore, remains limited. This chapter interlinks politicisation and non-compliance research in a comparative case study of Hungary and the Czech Republic. While combining findings of expert interviews, data on party manifestos and infringement procedures, it concludes that the partial politicisation did not lead to broader non-compliance in the Czech case, whereas the governmental-led politicisation in Hungary resulted in non-compliance. This difference is explained by the fact that in Hungary, the asylum-related administration, like other bureaucratic fields, has become increasingly re-politicised during the last decade.
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While the fall of the Berlin Wall is positively commemorated in the West, the intervening years have shown that the former Soviet Bloc has a more complicated view of its legacy. In post-communist Eastern Europe, the way people remember state socialism is closely intertwined with the manner in which they envision historical justice. Twenty Years After Communism is concerned with the explosion of a politics of memory triggered by the fall of state socialism in Eastern Europe, and it takes a comparative look at the ways that communism and its demise have been commemorated (or not commemorated) by major political actors across the region. The book is built on three premises. The first is that political actors always strive to come to terms with the history of their communities in order to generate a sense of order in their personal and collective lives. Second, new leaders sometimes find it advantageous to mete out justice on the politicians of abolished regimes, and whether and how they do so depends heavily on their interpretation and assessment of the collective past. Finally, remembering the past, particularly collectively, is always a political process, thus the politics of memory and commemoration needs to be studied as an integral part of the establishment of new collective identities and new principles of political legitimacy. Each chapter takes a detailed look at the commemorative ceremony of a different country of the former Soviet Bloc. Collectively the book looks at patterns of extrication from state socialism, patterns of ethnic and class conflict, the strategies of communist successor parties, and the cultural traditions of a given country that influence the way official collective memory is constructed. Twenty Years After Communism develops a new analytical and explanatory framework that helps readers to understand the utility of historical memory as an important and understudied part of democratization.
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Ukraine's 2004 presidential election and Orange Revolution was facilitated by the role of civic nationalism. The inability to mobilize civic nationalism in sufficient quantity in 1991-92 permitted the election of sovereign Communist Leonid Kravchuk and later centrist Leonid Kuchma. The growth of a civic nationalist Ukrainian identity from 1992-2004 transformed the political landscape, permitting Viktor Yushchenko to be elected president.1 Civic and ethnic nationalists in Ukraine can be differentiated fairly effectively based on their views on two issues, corresponding to the idea proposed by Lowell Barrington in this volume's introductory chapter that nationalism involves both membership boundaries and territorial boundaries. First, they have different definitions of the state, as either inclusive (civic) or exclusive (ethnic). Second, they either support Ukraine's inherited borders (civic nationalists) or harbor a desire to change them (ethnic Ukrainian, Russian nationalists, and Sovietophiles). This chapter is divided into two sections, which deal separately with ethnic and civic nationalism before and after independence. Prior to independence, ethnic nationalists grouped within the Interparliamentary Assembly (IPA) demanded independence from the moment of its arrival on Ukraine's political scene in 1989. After Ukraine became an independent state, the IPA transformed itself into the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA). As an ethnic nationalist movement, it was joined by several new parties.2 Civic nationalism only appeared as a phenomenon in 1990-91, although the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring (Rukh) was created in 1988. Rukh was composed of two wings (national democratic political parties created by former political prisoners and the cultural intelligentsia) and adopted a platform of independence only in October 1990. Rukh was joined in 1989-90 by the Democratic Platform of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), which created the centrist Party of Democratic Revival and New Ukraine bloc. In 1990-91, the "Sovereign Communists" also peeled off from the CPU. These two wings of the CPU backed the transformation of the USSR into a confederation of sovereign states until August 1991, after which they supported Rukh's program of independence. During 1988-91 civic nationalism in Ukraine therefore expanded from a narrower to a wider base by incorporating all CPU supporters except " Imperial Communists."3 In the post-Soviet period, ethnic nationalists on the far right of the political spectrum could not convert the energy of the drive for independence into an effective use of the state for implementing ethnic nationalist policies. Instead, the far right nationalists were marginalized following independence, while civic nationalist parties in the center and center right borrowed from them when convenient on issues of language, culture, and history. Ethnic nationalists on the left were likewise unsuccessful in their pursuit of reunion with Russia and the development of an Eastern Slav identity based on Russian language and culture. Instead, a civic nationbuilding approach became paradigmatic, with broad consensus about the need to balance Ukrainian cultural revival with protection of minority cultural rights. This does not mean that civic nationalists agreed on the details of the nation-building program. As in other former Communist states, the civic nationalist movement divided into its ideological wings once independence was achieved. But the central ideas of civic nationalism spread across the political spectrum. Rukh narrowed into a center-right political party and was joined by other national democratic offshoots (the Republican, Democratic, Reforms and Order, Christian Democratic, and other political parties). In the March 2002 elections both wings of the now-divided Rukh were members of a wider, patriotic (civic nationalist), reformist Our Ukraine bloc led by former National Bank governor and prime minister Viktor Yushchenko, which came first in the proportional half of the elections with 23.57 percent. During the first half of the 1990s, the national idea extended to the center ground of Ukrainian politics within which the Sovereign Communists congregated. Hence, Ukraine's "parties of power" (i.e., parties close to the authorities) are to be found among centrist (or "oligarchic") parties. During the second half of the 1990s, the civic national idea continued moving to the left and incorporated center-left and left-wing political parties committed to state independence, many of which were offshoots from the CPU during its period of illegality (the Socialist and Peasant parties). After more than a decade of independence only the radical left is in favor of Ukraine joining the Russian-Belarusian union. The center left now holds similar views to the center right on state independence for Ukraine and Russia. This could be clearly seen in the 1999 presidential election, when a majority (52.2 percent) of those who supported CPU leader Petro Symonenko also backed a union with Russia. Among supporters of Oleksandr Moroz's Socialists and President Leonid Kuchma, this figure was only 30.2 and 26.7 percent respectively.4 This brief overview of the various components of nationalism in Ukraine highlights its evolutionary nature, in both the late-Soviet and post- Soviet periods. It also points out the necessity of thinking carefully about one's categorization of political parties as nationalist, both in general and in terms of their civic and ethnic leanings. Scholars of Ukraine-and scholars generally-face potential pitfalls when attempting to employ the label nationalist either to a broad political movement or to a particular political party. Parties on the left can be nationalists, and parties on the right need not be ethnic nationalists. In this chapter, I outline a wider understanding of nationalism in Ukraine than is commonly discussed (see fig. 1 in the appendix to this chapter). I explore these various themes and conclude with lessons from the case of Ukraine about understanding nationalism after independence. © 2006 Published by University of Michigan Press. All rights reserved.
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The European Union may well be presiding over the most successful democracy-promotion program ever implemented by an international actor. All of the states that have become credible future EU members over the last decade are making progress toward liberal democracy and more transparent market economies. The puzzle is one of causation: Does the EU only accept liberal democracies? Or does the condition of being a credible future EU member create incentives for political actors to make their political agendas compatible with liberal democracy and the state’s bid for EU membership? The convergence that we see toward liberal democracy today is all the more puzzling given the divergence in regimes in the region some fifteen years ago. In some postcommunist states, democratically elected governments began laying the foundations of liberal democracy and implementing comprehensive economic reforms immediately after the collapse of the communist regime. By liberal democracy, I mean a political system where state institutions and democratically elected rulers respect juridical limits on their powers and political liberties. They uphold the rule of law, a separation of powers, and boundaries between the state and the economy. They also uphold basic liberties, such as speech, assembly, religion, and property. Important for our cases, they do not violate the limits on their powers or the political liberties of citizens in order to suppress rival political parties or groups.
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This article contains the results of research concerning parliamentary debate about voting rights for foreign residents in the Netherlands (1970-1996) using a discourse analytical framework. Due to the characteristics of the Dutch political field, a large majority of the political actors has to be willing and able to combine political interests and ideological narratives into one story line propagating franchise for foreign residents in order to grant voting rights to nonnationals. It is claimed that the success and failure of policy changes regarding the political participation of nonnationals is foremost determined by the extent of the discursive affinity of argumentative clusters used by parties of the "center-right" with the (leftist) discourse which propagates enfranchisement.
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This article analyses the Europeanization of domestic citizenship policy by focusing on the attempt to introduce the principle of multiple nationality in the Dutch Nationality Act. Considering that citizenship is often seen as a last bastion of national sovereignty, it is not surprising that neither the European Union nor the Council of Europe could play a decisive role. Nevertheless, the evidence from the Netherlands shows that, resulting from negative integration, the importance of Brussels could increase after a landmark ruling by the Court of Justice, and also that Strasbourg-based European norms should not be underestimated as they can substantially ‘frame’ domestic discourses.
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In the 1990s scholars working within the subfield of immigration studies in Western Europe have advanced four major arguments. (1) In a liberal era of global economic markets the capacity of states to govern their territorial borders has significantly eroded. (2) The widespread diffusion of liberal norms has severely inhibited the ability of governments to execute a rational immigrant policy. (3) The experience of mass immigration has transformed the boundaries of national citizenship. And 4) postwar immigration has fostered the surge of radical right-wing populist movements. This article evaluates these arguments in light of the evidence presented in both the collected scholarship under review and other select works. It concludes by arguing the case for new scholarly initiatives to synthesize and unify the separate literatures represented by the volumes under review.
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Does diversity endanger democracy? Ethnic composition is often thought to affect democracy by means of its influence on the probability of violent civil conflict. According to such thinking, more diverse societies are more prone to conflict, which in turn makes them less hospitable to democracy. How sound is this idea? This article tests it, performing quantitative analysis on data from the post-communist region. The study finds that conflict is negatively associated with democracy, but finds no empirical evidence that social fractionalization influences civil conflict or democratization. In fact, a concluding case study on Bulgaria suggests that diversity may actually ‘impose’ certain opportunities for – not just obstacles to – the emergence of practices and institutions that promote open politics.
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The November-December 2004 Orange Revolution led to the election of Viktor Yushchenko as Ukraine's third president. Yushchenko's presidency has been associated with a number of important democratic gains, such as the holding of free and fair elections, a free media, an active civil society, the dissociation of oligarchs from a corrupt relationship with the authorities, and a more robust commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration. The Orange Revolution went into crisis in September 2005, when the Tymoshenko government was removed, culminating in the victory of the Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovych, in the March 2006 elections. Following five months of coalition negotiations, a revived Orange coalition was replaced by first an Anti-Crisis and then a National Unity coalition, with a government led by Prime Minister Yanukovych. The signing of a "Universal" agreement by President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yanukovych, and three other parliamentary parties, aims to maintain Ukraine's democratic gains through the continued pursuit of Yushchenko's domestic and foreign policies. The Orange Revolution has reached a crossroads, with either the consolidation of further reforms begun by the Orange Revolution, or a return to the policies pursued in the Kuchma era.
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This article examines EU enlargement in the area of refugee policies as a process of policy transfer guided by the intergovernmental activities of EU member states with limited involvement of EU institutions. Giving an overview of asylum legislation in the ten Central and Eastern European candidate countries since the early 1990s, this article assesses the relationship between internal and external influences in the shaping of asylum policies and reflects on the scope of convergence in the candidate countries. Starting from the observation of the incomplete and still very much fragmented nature of the EU asylum acquis, it is shown that all candidate countries have adopted its main restrictive elements, regardless of practical difficulties in their implementation and important differences with regard to past and present experiences with refugee flows.
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The new Law on Refugees, adopted in July 1997 after a long and heated debate, represents an important step in the development of Russian legislation on asylum and on treatment of persons in need of protection from refoulement. The new Law has been drawn up to determine the status of asylum seekers, rather than to support returning Russian-speakers as was the case with the previous law. It will thus be an instrument for the legalization of individuals who need protection under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. However, the protection system established by the new Law is very restrictive and will therefore not provide protection to all those who are in need. Taking note of recent developments in the field of asylum in Western Europe, the legislator has set up a number of formal obstacles which are deemed to prevent access to a refugee status determination procedure to a considerable number of cases, such as the principle of safe third country, extremely restricted access for asylum seekers entering the country illegally, or the absence of a suspensive effect of an appeal submitted at the border. However, if in Western Europe such principles are being applied with minimal safeguards, these are often missing in Russian jurisprudence and practice. Taking into consideration the restrictive approach towards refugee status reflected in the law and in practice, the subsidiary protection envisaged under article 12 of the refugee law, which provides for temporary asylum to individuals who cannot return to their country because of humanitarian considerations, is generally viewed as a medicine to address the situation of the vast majority of asylum seekers currently staying in the Russian Federation. Whether this will be the case will largely depend on the implementing decree which should determine the parameters and the procedure for granting such status.
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Journal of Democracy 10.1 (1999) 96-111 Recent developments in the Czech Republic have led some Czechs to fear that their young democracy is in danger. This contrasts sharply with the atmosphere during the first half of the 1990s, when Czechs were proud to live in the country that was considered the region's model for transformation to democracy and a market economy. During the "velvet revolution" of 1989, Václav Havel successfully negotiated the peaceful transfer of power to a coalition government that included members of the Czech opposition group Civic Forum, the Slovak opposition group Public Against Violence, the Communists, and members of the parties formerly allied with the Communists (the Socialist Party and People's Party). When Havel became president, he wielded tremendous moral authority as a man who had been sent to prison and forced to work at various menial jobs because of his unrelenting opposition to the communist regime. In addition to having the leader with the highest moral authority, Czechoslovakia had several other advantages over its neighbors during the initial phase of transformation. It was the only country in the region to have enjoyed democratic rule for the entire period between the two World Wars. Its economy was also in better shape than its neighbors. With the exception of the former East Germany, it was the most industrially advanced country in the region and had the highest portion of capital-goods exports to the industrialized capitalist countries. Moreover, the Czechoslovak economy did not suffer from high inflation and a foreign debt crisis (as in Hungary or Poland). Unlike in Poland, the first Czechoslovak elections in 1990 led to a stable government that lasted its full term until 1992. By the 1992 elections, both Civic Forum and Public Against Violence had split into several competing parties. Former federal finance minister Václav Klaus and Slovak prime minister Vladimír Meciar were the winners of the 1992 elections. These two leaders, who had sharply contrasting views on policy issues, were not able to agree on a constitutional reform that would clarify the powers of the Czech and Slovak republics within the federation. Instead, they agreed on the peaceful separation of the country (known as the "velvet divorce"). Afterwards, Klaus, as prime minister of the Czech Republic, presided over a center-right coalition government that served out its entire four-year term. He introduced a voucher-privatization scheme that led to the fastest denationalization of state property in the region, and managed to keep unemployment down to about 3 percent in a region where double-digit unemployment abounded. The budget was in balance and inflation was the lowest in the region. Klaus' center-right coalition returned to power in the 1996 elections, although it fell one seat short of an absolute majority. It was the first postcommunist government in Central Europe to win reelection. Until 1997, political party development in the Czech Republic also seemed to be the most stable and "Western-like" in the region. Jacek Bielasiak asserts that party systems in the former communist countries have gone through three stages of development. First, a polarized party system forms, in which the main political cleavage is between the old regime and society. Second, after the communists are defeated, the anticommunist ruling coalitions split up into competing groups with differing ideas on how to carry out the transformation. At this stage, no clear economic interests have developed among the electorate, as voters are not yet sure how their situation will change after economic reforms are carried out, or even what the reforms will be. During this period, voters have not yet developed loyalties to existing parties, so there is fragmentation and no party system can crystallize. Finally, as voters become more aware of their interests and as the electoral system filters out weak parties, a pluralist party system emerges. On the whole, the development of Czech political parties followed this model. In the initial phase, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence became the dominant anticommunist groups. But shortly after the first free elections in 1990, the political scene became more fragmented. Federal Finance Minister Václav Klaus, the newly elected chairman...
Article
Journal of Democracy 13.4 (2002) 127-141 In the 1990s, Moldova, a small country sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine and bereft of a strong civil society, an established rule of law, and any previous democratic experience, nevertheless boasted remarkably competitive and democratic politics. In order to understand the persistence and intensity of pluralism in Moldova, as well as in other post-Soviet countries such as Russia and Ukraine through the mid-1990s, we need to move beyond the usual focus on democratic institution-building. Moldova should be seen less as a struggling democracy, where leaders strive to build more pluralistic institutions, and much more as a case of failed authoritarianism or what I call pluralism by default, a form of political competition specific to weak states. Pluralism by default describes countries in which institutionalized political competition survives not because leaders are especially democratic or because societal actors are particularly strong, but because the government is too fragmented and the state too weak to impose authoritarian rule in a democratic international context. In such cases, leaders lack the authority and coordination to prevent today's allies from becoming tomorrow's challengers, control the legislature, impose censorship, manipulate elections successfully, or use force against political opponents. Such countries are caught in a paradox: The same state weakness and governmental fragmentation that promotes pluralism also undermines effective governance and may ultimately threaten long-term democratic consolidation. Moldova lacks most of the qualities that social scientists consider critical for democratic development. First, the country is extremely poor, with a per capita gross national income that in 1999 was 65 percent of that found in Albania, 32 percent of that found in Belarus, and 7 percent of that found in the United States. Moldova is also highly rural with an urban population of just 46 percent—in the former Soviet Union, only the Central Asia republics have lower shares of urban residents. Moldova has also suffered one of the worst economic downturns in the post-Soviet region. In the decade following 1989, GDP plummeted by almost 70 percent. (During this time, only war-torn Georgia endured worse.) Further, Moldova also has no tradition of democracy or even independent statehood that reaches back before the 1990s: Most of the country's current territory formed the eastern Romanian province of Bessarabia until Stalin, given a free hand by Hitler in the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, demanded and got the province's cession by Bucharest in 1940. Prospects for pluralism in Moldova would also seem to be threatened by divisions over national identity. As a result of Stalin's annexation of eastern Romania, the newly formed Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic became perilously divided between a Romanian-speaking western zone and the highly industrialized, Slavic-speaking Transdniestr region in the east. This split created the basis for significant tensions that surfaced during the era of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika. In the late 1980s, the Popular Front of Moldova, founded by Moldovan academics and writers, focused on strengthening the linguistic and ethnic rights of Romanian-speakers whom nationalists felt had suffered disproportionately under communism. In 1990, the Popular Front won roughly a third of the seats in the Supreme Soviet and chose the premier. Bolstered by its early victories, the Front began to press for immediate unification with Romania, restrictions on Russian in-migration, and increased employment opportunities for Romanian-speaking citizens. Such policies helped to generate a highly polarized atmosphere. Opposition quickly appeared among local Russians and Ukrainians (who together accounted for about a quarter of the population in the late 1980s) in the Transdniestr, and also sprang up among the Gagauz (a group of Turkic-speaking Slavs in the south who account for about 4 percent of Moldova's people). In the summer of 1990, deputies from the Transdniestr and Gagauzia started boycotting the national legislature and declared their respective regions autonomous. Gun battles soon broke out between Moldovan government troops and separatist armed forces in and around Transdniestria. Mircea Snegur, Moldova's first president, declared a nationwide state of emergency in the spring of 1992 in an attempt to disarm separatist militias. The late General Alexander Lebed's Russian Fourteenth Army...
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When the global refugee protection regime was constructed between the two world wars and was consolidated into the existing regime with the signing of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signatories committed to the protection on asylum seekers by refraining to return them to areas where their safety could be in jeopardy. They also recognized the importance of burden-sharing in refugee protection and assistance. Assisting recipient states both through financial and service provision through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as through resettlement and repatriation programs were formulated as ways to mediate the tensions between the sovereign prerogatives of recipient states on the one hand, and their humanitarian obligations on the other. This paper examines the context and content of these shared global norms with respect to asylum seekers and refugee protection in the EU. It illustrates the development of new practices, absent in the global regime, in the European context and highlights their diffusion to other contexts such as Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and North Africa. It highlights patterns of shirking as well as shifting of responsibilities, made possible by the emergent shared norms and argues that these new shared (and partly exported) norms present an uneasy fit with the global regime and stand to weaken it.International Politics (2006) 43, 219–240. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800141
Article
More than a decade after acquiring statehood, Ukraine is still struggling to define the qualitative content of its national identity. To what extent is the Ukrainian nation to be conceived in political and territorial terms? To what extent is the Ukrainian nation to be grounded in ethnicity and culture? These are central topics of debate in contemporary Ukraine. A related issue is obscured by the civic/ethnic dichotomy, which directs attention toward the contest between civic and ethnic identities, and away from the conflict over which type of civic or ethnic identity the nation should pursue. Indeed, in the Ukrainian case the question of which, or rather, whose, ethnicity and culture should be at the core of the Ukrainian nation is more salient than the one over the relative priority of civic and ethnic identity. This article proposes that two versions of ethnic national identity are prominent today and compete for supremacy: an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity and an Eastern Slavic national identity. The goal of this article is to discover the degree of support among the masses in Ukraine for a civic national identity and for these two variants of ethnic national identity. It argues that the two ethnic national identities are embedded in a broader set of beliefs and policy preferences, forming what are labeled here 'national identity complexes'. Using survey data, the article shows that civic national identity is stronger than ethnic national identity, and that on most measures the Eastern Slavic national identity complex is stronger than the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex.
Article
This article takes a subjective approach to studying norm compliance in order to determine how EU conditionality and Russia's activism have affected elite attitudes toward minority policies, majority–minority relations, and language use in Estonian society in the post-accession period. The results of a Q method study and semi-structured interviews with integration elites in spring 2008 reveal four distinct viewpoints. The study casts doubt upon the success of EU conditionality in Estonia by demonstrating that European minority rights norms remain contested and have not been internalized by a substantial portion of elites. In addition, the study points to an important role for Russia's activism in the development of a more inclusive society. Russia's activism actually works against minority integration by reinforcing pre-existing domestic norms that are not compatible with European minority rights standards and by aggravating tensions over history and language, which frustrate integration efforts. This article ultimately contributes to studies on the effects of international pressure on minority integration by pointing to the need for greater attention to the ways in which multiple actors at both the international and domestic levels structure the influence of EU conditionality.
Article
The disciplines of economics and political science have a good deal to offer each other in the study of migration policy, but economists have until recently mostly ignored the ways in which politics constrain migration markets, and political scientists—although giving considerable credence to economic aspects of migration—have not always pursued these matters systematically. We consider economic ideas drawn from theories of labour markets, international trade and public finance and link them to political analyses stressing the role of states, institutions and interest groups. A review of literature incorporating these perspectives suggests the promise of a political economy of migration, but also indicates the considerable work that remains.