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Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities
Abstract
For more than two decades sociological debates over religion and secularization have been characterized by a confrontation between (often American) critics and (mostly European) defenders of secularization theories. At the same time, there was a remarkable rise in public debates about the role of secularism in political regimes and in national as well as civilizational frameworks. Against this backdrop this paper presents the conceptual framework of “multiple secularities” with a view to refocusing sociological research on religion and secularity. We will demonstrate that it can stimulate new ways of theorizing the relationship of religion and secularity in a variety of modern environments. Arguing for a reformulation of this relationship within the framework of cultural sociology, we conceptualize “secularity” in terms of the cultural meanings underlying the differentiation between religion and non-religious spheres. Building on Max Weber we distinguish four basic ideal-types of secularity that are related to specific reference problems and associated with specific guiding ideas. Finally, we illustrate the use of the concept with regard to selected case-studies.
... This social transformation, accompanied by the increased politicization of organized non-religious groups in the post-war period, is now fueling the rise of nonreligion studies. Researchers in this emerging field collected the heritage left by Vernon (1968) and Campbell (1971) criticizing the adequacy of general non-religious labels (Lee, 2014(Lee, , 2015 and exploring the multiplicity of heterogeneous secular positions (Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012). The scientific community moved towards new puzzles. ...
... Secularization theory was accused of being too obsessed with religion and indicted for being the main culprit behind the series of the now sub-optimal data choices made by the scientific community in the past. As a reaction, the search for a new theoretical framework capable of replacing secularization theory started (Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012). ...
... Second, from this point onwards the term will refer to the public discourse of organized groups rather than to strictly personal and individual narratives. In researching the heterogeneity of positively framed non-religious positions and adopting the general framework of "multiple secularities" (Campbell, 1971;Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012), therefore, this research aims to analyze historical varieties of and longitudinal changes in the public discourses of militant non-religious organizations. In this sense, changes in non-religion are here conceived as an aspect of secularization that coexists next to the changes in religion. ...
Despite the growth of Non-Religion Studies in recent years, historical changes within secularity remain underexplored and there is a shortage of extensive longitudinal studies dealing with the phenomenon. This shortcoming arguably stems, on one side, from the lack of sufficient granularity in the commonly used longitudinal survey data and, on the other, from a chronic indifference of secularization theory toward the changes occurring within secularity itself. It was argued that secularization is a process of broader (non-)religious change, and that secularization theory can and should be extended to the analysis of non-religion. This thesis employs a series of computational methods, ranging from Topic Modeling to Sentiment Analysis and Dynamic Word Embedding, to explore a large collection of magazines published by two American and two British non-religious organizations between 1881 and 2019. The analysis reveals that the historical fluctuations in the relevance attributed to religion by militant non-religious organizations closely follows fluctuations in the public visibility of religion. Furthermore, in line with the theoretical expectations, the relevance of these topics is consistently higher among groups with a more radical orientation (i.e., among atheists rather than humanists) and in contexts characterized by a lower degree of secularization (i.e., in the US rather than the UK). On the contrary, the demand for positive non-religious identities remained prevalently stable over time showing signs of a descending trend only throughout the latest decades. Sentiment Analysis, in combination with linear regression, confirmed that the proportion of negative sentiment in religion-related topics is positively associated with the perceived relevance of religion. Finally, Dynamic Word Embedding revealed two prevalent shifts. On one side, the critique of religion progressively moved away from an ideological confrontation of religious others and towards a more moderate focus on pragmatic concerns. Second, the conceptualizations of atheism and humanism increasingly converged, emphasizing a positive non-religious identity, political activism, and the organizational aspects of the secular movement.
... Esta investigação pretende, então, examinar as consequências das limitações à prática de atos religiosos públicos ocorridas por conta da pandemia da COVID-19, nomeadamente aquando do primeiro confinamento em Portugal. Para esse efeito, partirei dos quadros teóricos da era secular (Taylor, 2007) e culturas de secularidade (Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012). Estes serão epistemologicamente úteis, porquanto permitirão analisar como a crise pandémica enfatizou os desafios legais, políticos e socioculturais e deu origem a uma tensão entre direitos concorrentes, exacerbando a tensão entre políticas públicas religiosa mente neutras e reivindicações de acomodação religiosa. ...
... Isto é, contribuem para a alteração das sociabilidades baseadas nas relações de vizinhança e numa única comunidade física e aumentam a complexidade das relações socioespaciais, especialmente, no espaço urbano. Como discutido noutros locais (Wilson, 1969(Wilson, [1966Hervieu-Léger, 1999;Moniz, 2020), o declínio das formas de comunidade e a consequente atomização dos indivíduos tendem a afastar as pessoas dos laços comunitários religiosos tradicionais. Com o desenvolvimento de esferas privadas e móveis de interação social, fomenta-se a diminuição da plausibilidade global dos sistemas moral e religioso (tradicionais). ...
... Isto é, contribuem para a alteração das sociabilidades baseadas nas relações de vizinhança e numa única comunidade física e aumentam a complexidade das relações socioespaciais, especialmente, no espaço urbano. Como discutido noutros locais (Wilson, 1969(Wilson, [1966Hervieu-Léger, 1999;Moniz, 2020), o declínio das formas de comunidade e a consequente atomização dos indivíduos tendem a afastar as pessoas dos laços comunitários religiosos tradicionais. Com o desenvolvimento de esferas privadas e móveis de interação social, fomenta-se a diminuição da plausibilidade global dos sistemas moral e religioso (tradicionais). ...
The state of health crisis, associated with the pandemic of COVID-19 and enacted in most European countries, led to a swift and abrupt contraction into the domestic space of the spheres of public life by which individuals had become accustomed to living. The confinement created an unprecedented situation, especially in terms of its consequences for public freedoms and fundamental rights. In particular, religious freedom, understood in its collective dimension, was restricted during this period to limit the spread of the virus.
... demais países europeus (The Conversation, 2020); e v) com o facto de não existirem ainda investigações que problematizem este fenómeno no país, em particular nas áreas da sociologia e ciência política. À luz dos marcos teóricos da era secular (Taylor 2007) e das culturas de secularidade (Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012, 2017, analisar-se-á como a crise pandémica enfatizou os desafios legais, políticos e socioculturais e deu origem a uma tensão entre direitos concorrentes, exacerbando a tensão entre políticas públicas religiosamente neutras e reivindicações de acomodação religiosa. Por conta da restrição de atividades no espaço público, nomeadamente celebrações religiosas, e da gradual marginalização da religião na vida pública, Portugal afigura-se como um laboratório útil epistemologicamente para se perceber como a liberdade religiosa e, por extensão, os valores religiosos são geridos pelos Estados na era secular. ...
This paper analyses the impact of restrictions on religious freedom, caused by the state of health emergency, related to the COVID-19 pandemic, during the first period of lockdown in Portugal. Against the backdrop of the secular age and secularism, this research allows for the interpretation of the place of religion in societies marked by cultures of secularity through a qualitative, hypothetical-deductive, analysis. It concludes that the normalisation of the subordination of religious values and practices to those of the political sphere, highlighted by the hierarchisation of essential and non-essential activities, and its promotion through self-secularity empties the presence of religion in the public sphere and helps the development of a culture of secularity.
... The South Korean government, the Park Chung-hee regime in particular, even conducted Mishin t'ap'a undong (未信打破運動, antisuperstition campaign) as part of the New Community Movement against folk beliefs or Shamanic tradition until the late 1970s. Emergent religious movements such as the Unification Church founded in 1954 by MOON Sun Myung (文鮮明, 1920-2012 and the Olive Tree Church founded in 1955 by PARK Tae Son (朴泰善, 1917-1990), both of which appeared in the wake of the Korean War, were often called 'heresy' or 'evil religion' rather than 'religion'. In the case of the Unification Church, in the end, it had to seek survival and new avenues abroad, including in Japan and the USA. ...
Beyond the once dominant secularization thesis that anticipated the decline of religion in the modern era, the academic study of religion has in recent decades revisited secular as one of the factors that shape religion and religions in the globalized world. Against this theoretical backdrop, in this article, I use the case of South Korea to explore how secular and religion interacted in contemporary global society. It focuses on describing the postcolonial reformulation of secularity and the corresponding discursive and organizational transformation of religious diversity in Cold War South Korea. The Japanese colonial secularism rigidly banning the public and political engagement of religion was replaced by the flexible secular-religious divide after liberation of 1945. The porous mode of secularity extensively admitted religious entities to affect processes of postcolonial nation-building. Religious values, interests, and resources have been applied in motivating, pushing, and justifying South Koreans to devote themselves to developing the national community as a whole. Such a form of secularity became a critical condition that caused South Korea’s religious landscape to be reorganized in a vertical and unequal way. On one hand, Buddhist and Christian populations grew remarkably in the liberated field of religion, while freedom of religion was recognized as a key ideological principle of the anticommunist country. On the other hand, folk beliefs and minority religious groups were often considered “superstitions”, “pseudo religions”, “heretics”, or even “evil religions”. With the pliable secularity at work, religious diversity was reorganized hierarchically in the postcolonial society.
... Moving beyond the idea of a universal linear secularisation process, the secular is produced in a historical and contextual space that is neither neutral nor ideological-free (Asad, 2003;Fadil, 2017;Griera et al., 2021;Mahmood, 2008;. While secularism is often biased by a Western interpretation (Asad, 2003), multiple secularities exist worldwide (Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012. The anthropology of secularism and nonreligion nourish each other as nonreligious individuals navigate their religioussecular environments. ...
This dissertation seeks to unravel how young nonbelievers in Morocco and the Moroccan diaspora engage in subtle forms of everyday activism to normalise being nonreligious. At its core, this involves analysing where and how this normalisation occurs, identifying ‘ordinary’ nonbelievers as contributors to this process, and understanding how such activism develops over time. To grasp the complexity of this phenomenon, this research employs a qualitative, intersectional, and comparative approach. The data draws from intermittent hybrid fieldwork conducted between 2019 and 2023 in Morocco and Western Europe, incorporating approximately fifty qualitative life story interviews, participatory observations, and social media analysis. Additionally, this research draws back on previously conducted data between 2016 and 2019, which enables a long-term perspective. The research group primarily consists of educated nonbelievers from urban middle-class Muslim backgrounds in Morocco and within the Moroccan diaspora. Though most may not explicitly identify as activists, their actions subvert religious norms and are therefore often perceived as dissent.
... In 2010, religious identification in Spain was at 74%, decreasing to 70% in 2019, and, for the first time, falling below 60% in early 2022 (CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas), 2022a, 2022b). These exhaustive empirical records of Spanish society confirm a progressively secularized, less religious, and less practicing society, aligning with the theoretical concept of 'believing without belonging' (Davie, 1990), as suggested by Molteni and Biolcati (2018), and resembling the pattern observed in other secularized European societies (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, 2012). ...
This paper explores patterns of religious identification in Spanish society, focusing particularly on the predominant religion, Catholicism, which constitutes 97% of the religious population. Over time, a declining trend in religious beliefs has been observed: in 2000, 80% of Spaniards identified as religious, a figure that decreased to 75% a decade ago, and further dropped to 59.5% in 2022. Simultaneously, the process of secularization has increased, impacting approximately 40% of the Spanish population. Non-believers are not a homogeneous group; rather, they constitute heterogeneous subgroups. Males tend to exhibit lower levels of religiosity than females, and the youth are less religious than the elderly. Additionally, individuals with higher education show lower levels of religiosity than those with lower education and left-leaning individuals tend to be less religious than their right-leaning counterparts. This article investigates and analyzes the profiles of religious identification in Spanish society, utilizing a comprehensive database that amalgamates 144 datasets from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), spanning from January 2013 to December 2023. The dataset comprises responses from 467,187 Spanish adults aged 18 and above. This extensive dataset enables a multidimensional descriptive analysis of secularization/religiosity based on respondents' demographic characteristics and ideological positions, functioning as a meta-analysis with secondary data. To further complement the study, a binomial logistic regression is also employed.
... Es lo que algunos investigadores califican como una banalización de la religiosidad, personas identificadas como creyentes pero que no son practicantes, que no se involucran en los cultos ni en la práctica religiosa activa (Clements and Bullivant, 2022;Conway and Spruyt, 2018;Molteni and Biolcati, 2018). Aparecen así múltiples interpretaciones de las secularizaciones (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, 2012), llenas de singularidades, por los permeables vínculos culturales que aparecen en la España de nuestros días, también en los países europeos próximos, donde la inmigración añade población no nativa a la población nacional, más de cinco millones de personas (11,3%) en el caso de España en 2021 (47 millones de habitantes según datos del INE en 2022). ...
Regional studies on religiosity are non-existent in Spain and infrequent or non-existent in the Europe regional sphere, but not between countries. is article shows the regional variability in Spain of people who identify themselves as believers. It is argued that religious identification (believers) in Spain is regionally heterogeneous and that the regional effects associated with religiosity are altered by other
ascriptive variables, gender, age, and educational attainment. 124 barometers have been merged, files from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) of Spain from January 2013 to May 2022, monthly, except Augusts, obtaining a sample size of 402,868 interviewees (394,906 identify themselves as religious or nonreligious).
... The first explores the structural conditions of religious freedom (Finke 2013;Richardson 2015;Sarkissian 2015;Fokas 2015;Fox, Finke, and Mataic 2018;Fox 2020) elucidating the normative principles of state regulations of religion, the societal impact of court rulings, and the authority of the dominant religion. The second perspective addresses the processes of social norm-making in everyday life and perceptions of religious freedom, questioning the role of group values and identities together with individual experiences in promoting cultural and religious pluralism (Giordan 2004;Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012;Beaman 2017;Breskaya and Giordan 2019;Fox, Finke, and Eisenstein 2019;Blasi, Breskaya, and Giordan 2020a;Van der Ven 2020). Moreover, at the intersection of these two perspectives, top-down and bottom-up normmaking processes are considered (Fokas and Richardson 2017), specifying the role of social institutions like courts in the production of norms and values for religious minorities, majority religions, and society at large. ...
ABSTRACT
Do social perceptions of religious freedom (SPRF) represent individual a priori experiences, or are they the results of a process of socialisation into a normative political and religious culture? The
contribution responds to this inquiry with data from comparative
research on the multidimensional construct of SPRF among youth in Italy and Russia (N = 1,810). The study conducted between 2018 and 2019 investigates the patterns of constructed meanings of religious freedom and their correlates in the contexts of Christian-majority cultures, a significant ratio of non-affiliated youth, and contrasting records on societal religious discrimination. The findings suggest, first, that Italian participants endorse the socio-legal and human rights aspects of religious freedom more strongly than their Russian peers, who favoured the issues of individual autonomy linked to this freedom more. Second, attitudes towards normative concepts of religious pluralism, passive secularism, and democracy are robust predictors of the SPRF dimensions in both samples. Third, we found that the main difference in perceptions of religious freedom between the samples is in regard to the predisposition of young people towards a model of the dominant church endorsed by the state. Its predictive power varies across four models of analysis of the SPRF and has the opposite effect in Italian and Russian samples.
... Es lo que algunos investigadores califican como una banalización de la religiosidad, personas identificadas como creyentes pero que no son practicantes, que no se involucran en los cultos ni en la práctica religiosa activa (Clements and Bullivant, 2022;Conway and Spruyt, 2018;Molteni and Biolcati, 2018). Aparecen así múltiples interpretaciones de las secularizaciones (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, 2012), llenas de singularidades, por los permeables vínculos culturales que aparecen en la España de nuestros días, también en los países europeos próximos, donde la inmigración añade población no nativa a la población nacional, más de cinco millones de personas (11,3%) en el caso de España en 2021 (47 millones de habitantes según datos del INE en 2022). ...
... Literature on religious resurgence tends to track three lines of thought. What I refer to as the "historical approach," retains the universal validity of macro differentiation within the modern polity but replaces it with the idea of "multiple secularities" characterized by historical contingency and geographical variation (Casanova, 1994;Gorski, 2000;Martin, 1978;Mayrl, 2016;Mcleod, 2000;Smith, 2003;Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012). "Historicizing" the secularization process (Gorski, 2000) reveals the broad range of entanglements between religion and politics in modern societies (Başkan, 2011;Casanova, 2005), as well as hybrid outcomes such as diminishing religious influence in fields like law or medicine but increasing significance in welfare or education. ...
What accounts for the resurgence of religion in Muslim countries that pursue strict secularization policies? Theories of religious resurgence have emphasized secular differentiation, religious growth, and pietist agency as animating sources behind politically engaged religions. Extending this work, I advance a typology of strategies oppositional actors employ to produce and sustain religious politics. I ground my approach in the study of Islamic resurgence in Turkey during the twentieth century. Drawing on published primary sources, secondary historiography, and multi-sited fieldwork, the analysis shows that Turkish Islamists spearheaded successful resurgence not only by capitalizing on exogenous “opportunities” that punctuated the “repressive” pathway but, more importantly, by pursuing endogenous institutional change. Even though secularizing agents restricted the religious field’s autonomy, dissidents avoided open confrontation with the state. Instead, they positioned themselves within official institutions (embedding, layering), changed their logic (conversion), and supplemented these institutions with alternative ones (substitution). As a result, religious actors turned Islam into an ideological counterattack on the regime’s secular institutions. These insights can be extended to religious mobilizations throughout the Muslim world as well as to non-religious social struggles beyond it.
... Recognizing that the acceptance of secularism as a framework for societal life is not the end, but merely a starting point for negotiating the coexistence of different religious institutions and beliefs in modern democracies (Habermas 2008), is a challenge for intellectuals around the world, including writers. Moreover, it is increasingly acknowledged that different modernization processes have resulted in multiple conceptions of "secularity," linked to the diversity of the religious landscapes and the different understandings of religion that prevailed in each region (Wohlrab-Sahr, Burchardt 2012). In his 2013 book Postsecular Imagination. ...
The article demonstrates how Olga Tokarczuk inscribes diverse religious traditions in her novels and creates new theological ideas to offer readers literary tools for exercising their imagination. In this way, Tokarczuk’s prose exposes the arbitrariness of religiously legitimized worldviews and destabilizes the existing cultural imaginary. An analysis of Tokarczuk’s methods for constructing beliefs, rituals and metaphysical frameworks of the world that consolidate the communities she describes allows us to perceive her writing as postsecular. Each of her published works of fiction is briefly presented in chronological order, providing an insight into both the continuities and transformations of her approach to contemporary fiction. Juxtaposing these analyses with Tokarczuk’s views on the social role of literature presented in her essays and self-commentaries and the concept of the “tender narrator” from her Nobel lecture, allow us to identify the political and ethical motivations for such a creative strategy.
... With the resurgence of the demonstrations and discussions about racism and Europe's BLM (Black Lives Matter) movements, it has become clear, once again, that Europe is particularly coagulated in a lic discourses and everyday practices, embodiments and affects. Much of the literature on the secular discusses this topic in terms of the governance of religion from the levels of international diplomacy, particular nation states to that of municipalities (Wilson 2012;Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012;. In contrast, in this issue we focus on the secular in terms of everyday practices and shared cultural norms, as well as on the implicit and explicit histories and binary oppositions that inform those practices (cf. ...
La laicidad en México se caracteriza por su origen anticlerical, ideología liberal-radical y tendencia a vigilar y controlar legalmente las expresiones religiosas. Algunos autores reportan que tal tipo de laicidad es crecientemente aceptada entre los mexicanos. Empero, las altas tasas de afiliación religiosa en el país y la ambigüedad de los indicadores estadísticos empleados hasta ahora sugieren que la situación podría ser distinta. En este trabajo problematizo si los mexicanos coinciden con el modelo de laicidad instituido en el país, mirando a sus políticas específicas. Usando técnicas de análisis multivariado y datos de la ENCREER-RIFREM 2016, clasifico las actitudes de los mexicanos hacia la laicidad en cuatro grupos de autoidentificación religiosa: católicos, protestantes-evangélicos, bíblicos y personas sin religión. Propongo que entre los sujetos de estudio hay cuatro actitudes típicas: 1) adherencia parcial o estratégica; 2) oposición sistemática; 3) "libre mercado", y 4) mayor apoyo. El grupo que más rechaza la laicidad mexicana aglutinó casi la mitad de la muestra 48%, mientras que solo el 7% perteneció al subgrupo de mayor apoyo. Más allá de la aceptación de la laicidad, argumento que estos resultados sugieren su polisemia, así como diferentes modos de imaginar a la religión en la esfera pública.
La secularización ha conformado uno de los ejes articuladores en la construcción de las Ciencias Sociales, particularmente relevante para aquellos análisis que han explorado las trayectorias religiosas en los contextos que calificamos como “modernos”. De hecho, la centralidad que la categoría “modernidad” —y sus implicaciones— posee para disciplinas como la sociología (Stolz y Voas, 2023) es equiparable al peso del debate de la secularización en los estudios sobre religiones.
This paper attempts to contribute to the debate on theory of secularization by presenting critical arguments against it and – where possible – these arguments’ refutation. Some of the arguments, however touch the core paradigm of secularization, and, it seems, can be answered only by developing a modified, but not necessarily contrary paradigm. The main objective of the paper is to be established against this backdrop, and it is to introduce and critically discuss the concept of desecularization. It shall be argued the concept of desecularization has potential to overcome the entanglement of paradigms of secularization in progressiveness, narrow-range scope, linearity and predicted directness of the role of religion. To illustrate the difference of paradigms, some particular cases of religious resurgence (Georgia, Hungary, Poland, USA) are briefly analyzed from the perspective of secularization and of desecularization
The “multiple secularities” framework may be regarded as a recent ambitious contribution to the comparative analysis of secularisms across Western and non-Western societies. While I argue in this article for the “historicization” of secularities as proposed by the framework, I also point out the latter’s lack of empirical attention to the subjective dimension of historical secularities. More specifically, the article attempts to show the theoretical relevance of analyzing historical secularities in post-colonial societies from the perspective of the subjects and their complex selves. Through a genealogical analysis of the subjectivities of three influential positivist intellectuals in 19th-century Mexico, I argue that the analytical axes of the multiple secularities framework may be refined and broadened. I discuss how the framework’s search for local forms of “conceptual distinctions” should be complemented by the search for conceptual erasures and how the analysis of “semantic hybridity” should be broadened and include the analysis of experiential and emotional forms of hybridizations. I also argue that the analyses of historical secularities should account for “sacred-secular” hybrids, as well as more specific hybridizations, such as ecclesiological–secular and theological–secular transpositions.
In order to trace pathways of secularisation and secularity in Africa this paper highlights a particular movement that carried great ideological weight at the time of most countries’ independence in the 1950s and 60s, namely African socialism. The development toward state secularism was structurally very similar throughout the continent independently of whether political leaders opted for the ‘West’ or the ‘East’ in the cold war. However, in opposition to Soviet ideology, African Socialism was famously antiatheist. With the wish to fend off Marxist atheism as a supposedly necessary aspect of socialism, ideologues in African socialism were among the few politicians in Africa even to address the place of religion in a secular state at all. The roots of African socialism can be traced to US-American Pan-Africanism as well as the interconnected colonial opposition movement grounded in Marxist anti-imperialism. Another argument focusses on the education of some prominent state leaders, such as Nyerere, Nkrumah, Touré and Senghor, to explain the importance of Christian mission schools and Islamic madrasahs as points of access to social, intellectual, and institutional participation in global anti-colonial movements. In the framework of one-party politics, state leaders called on (Pan-)African traditions, but ‘de-mystified’ them (Touré) in order to enhance African Socialism ‘as belief’ (Nyerere). In conclusion it is argued that state secularism in Africa at the time of independence, as demonstrated most visibly in African Socialism, is more about suppressing and/or balancing the traditional powers of religious leaders than about a fundamental critique of a religious way of life. In turn, the implicit association of socialism and Marxism with atheism needs further scrutiny in a global perspective.
Raising timely and urgent questions about the forms, scope and boundaries of religious authority and practice, this article offers novel ways for the study of secularities and secularisms in contemporary African societies. In recent scholarly debates on secularity, Africa has been marginal. Part of the reason, it was suggested was that African ways of being in, and knowing, the world lay outside the religious-secular divide. We contest such positions. Secularism was clearly part of modernists colonial ideologies that called for the eradication of African beliefs described as backward and irrational. We find that the colonial encounter had a powerful historical impact, essentializing and othering African societies as marked by holistic indigenous cultures rather than differentiated religions. We suggest that the complex interplay of different African and European cultures has simultaneously shaped the social construction and historical development of multiple secularities. We propose that the concept of multiple secularities provides creative avenues to rethink religion, political authority and belonging. We consider secularities as contested arrangements of religious and other spheres whose dynamics include processes of de-differentiation and de-secularization.
The article reconstructs aspects of the secularizing project of the British colonial administration in Uganda by exploring how state regulatory practices in the field of Western school education set the conditions for two forms of religious difference: first, relations between Muslims as members of a religious minority and the Christian majority, and second, dynamics among Muslims that transpired not only in leadership competition but also in controversies over education and proper religious practice. Focusing on the intersections between a state regulatory regime and the activities of Muslims who claimed religious and political leadership on behalf of other Muslims in the areas of Buganda and Bugisu, the article argues that these Muslim intellectuals mediated and contributed to the colonial administration’s production of Muslims as a religious minority. As articulators of Islam, they (re)formulated and debated the forms and purpose of Muslim education and partly novel understandings of proper religious practice, and what it means to be a modern, pious Muslim in the new colonial order. Their political aspirations were hampered, not only as a direct consequence of the colonial administration’s production of systematic inequalities between Christians and Muslims, but also as a result of the dynamics of intra-Muslim plurality.
The case of nineteenth-century Buganda opens up a number of assumptions within scholarship about religion, secularity, and politics in African history. Although much scholarship focuses on European colonizers introduced alien categories such as religion and imposed distinctions between religion and politics, this paper foregrounds a different set of historical transformations in what is now Uganda – transformations that ultimately increased rather than diminished connections between the exercise of political power and markedly religious convictions. Along the way, it locates some of the most important pieces of this story in ‘the precolonial’. This allows the paper to trace the emergence of the category of religion, as well as analyze the sense in which it is meaningful to think of precolonial Buganda as secular at a particular moment. In so doing, the paper puts an African story in dialogue with wider conversations on the secular.
Angolan independence, proclaimed in 1975, instituted a one-party, socialist-oriented revolutionary regime that vowed to create a nation of workers under a secular state with freedom of worship. However, such a framework existed only on paper. A generation gap opposed Protestant, mission-educated leaders to younger agnostic and atheist militants trained in socialist countries. The government acted to circumscribe the public space of churches and enforce compliance with the heavily contested new order, but also promoted certain denominations as a tool to build hegemony. Further complications arise from African religious practices not being deemed religion but tradition, pointing both to superstition and obscurantism on the one hand, and to the cultural corpus of nation-building on the other. This paper posits that the study of secularity in Angola does not fit into the usual theoretical dichotomy but must take into account the intersections and interplay of tradition with both religion and the state.
The normative framework is one of the constitutive edges of state regulation of religion. It contributes to the configuration of different forms of relations between state and religions. This can be observed in at least three areas. First, in the way the state defines religion. Second, in the way it recognises and legislates its relationship with different religions. Finally, in the rules it establishes for confessional institutions and actors at different levels of social life (education, health, prisons, etc.). In this article, we propose to comparatively analyse the national legal systems that regulate religion in Italy and Argentina, with special emphasis on the equal or differentiated treatment of different religions. The policies of recognition and integration of religious minorities find in the normative framework an empowering or limiting factor, depending on the national context. Although both countries share a dominant Catholic matrix, their historical developments and legal formats present contrasts that project different scenarios of religious governance, which we will try to elucidate.
The aim of this essay is to examine the connection between contemporary debates on political secularism and institutional arrangements between State and religions on one hand, and, on the other, on secularization theory and its latest 'rebirth': postsecularism. Analysing the link between the theories and concept of postsecular society and the debate on political secularism and its institutional forms and practices allows to understand the multidimensionality of the latter in its very latest theorisations and realizations.
and Keywords In the second half of the 20th century, theories on secularization and secularism have been dominated by three approaches: secularization theory, individualization theory, and market theory. In the new millennium, approaches that both built on and revised these neoclassical approaches emerged: deprivation and insecurity theory, the theory of secular transition and intergenerational decline, theories of religious-secular competition, and theories focusing on the tipping point of the 1960s. These four new approaches have deepened our understanding of secularization, secularity, and secularism; however, they each have their own theoretical and empirical problems that need to be addressed by fu ture research. It has become customary in sociology and the political sciences to distinguish three large types of macro-theory on secularization, secularity, and secularism, namely secularization theory, individualization theory, and market theory. Each of these types includes a large number of approaches, ideas, and research endeavors. These neoclassical theories were formulated in the last millennium and have been described, discussed, and criticized many times since. A brief overview of the three neoclassical theories is provided, but then four theoretical approaches are focused on that have been developed in the new millenni um: deprivation and insecurity theory, the theory of secular transition and intergenera tional decline, theories of religious-secular competition, and theories focusing on the tip ping point of the 1960s. These approaches are in the process of being discussed and test ed thoroughly.
My article offers commentary about Jacques Berlinerblau's new book Secularism: The Basics .
Previous research on religiosity in urban areas of Spain has typically relied on qualitative methods and focuses on densely populated provincial capitals. This study explores the significant variability in religious identification across Spain's municipalities, with individuals in larger municipalities reporting lower levels of religiosity than those in smaller ones. The study also examines how this variability is influenced by demographic factor such as gender, age, and education. The results reveal substantial differences in religiosity across municipalities, particularly among the eight Spanish municipalities with a population of over 400,000 residents aged 18 and older. Specifically, Barcelona and Palma de Mallorca show the lowest levels of religious identification, while Madrid falls in the middle and Murcia, Sevilla, Malaga, and Zaragoza show the highest levels. The data used in this study comes from a fusion of 125 monthly surveys conducted by CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) in Spain between January 2013 and June 2022 (excluding August), and includes 406,511 interviewees, 398,516 of whom identify as religious or non-religious. In summary, this study sheds light on the relationship between religiosity and population size in Spain, highlighting the need to consider this variable when conducting research in this field.
The main goal of this article is to present the relationship between secularization and the Catholic Church’s post-conciliar call for evangelization, including the new phase of evangelization, as well as to present the relationship between Pope Francis’ idea of an ecclesiastical university and the new phase of evangelization. To realize this aim, meanings of secularization, the new phase of evangelization and the idea of an ecclesiastical university are defined and presented, which in itself fills – to some extent – a research gap on the new phase of evangelization (shown here concerning evangelization and the new evangelization) and Francis’ idea of an ecclesiastical university. The paper argues that the call for evangelization is due to recognizing the secularization trend by the Catholic Church and that every ecclesiastical university receives the clear task of evangelization in the new phase of evangelization.
The objectives of the research include the investigation and analysis of the term secular, secularity, secularization and secularism. This is done in the backdrop of ever changing and challenging socio political global existential structure which encompasses and governs both public and private lives of individuals and societies. Although Western in origin these concepts are not unfamiliar in nonwestern worlds and have diverse and conflicting meanings. Secular pertains to this worldliness devoid of religion. Secularity is a condition of being secular which exists in thoughts, ideologies and practices that belong not to religion. Secularization is a historical, anthropological, and social condition which has remained engaged in removing religious influences from lifestyles of people. Secularism is assumed to be a belief system which gives no room to religion in human existential set up. The study explanatory, explorative and. This research finds that the secular and its cognate terms are now an undeniable reality and condition beyond Western borders. It recommends that the secular in any of its forms needs to be seen as an ideology opposite to religion.
By putting in the Moroccan context the concept of ‘multiple secularities’, this paper digs the process of conceptualization of ‘secularization’ at the initiative of the Islamist leader, Saadeddine al-Othmani. The latter supported the acceptability of a secular principle adequate to religion, its symbols and their presence in the political and public space. Through the analysis of his writings as well as of other leaders’ discourses, this article follows the compromises between religious and secular revendications during the process of conceptualization inside the PJD-MUR. Using the theories of ‘secularization’ and ‘de-théologisation’, this study highlights the strategy of ‘rejection’ and ‘adaptation’ developed by the PJD. Rejecting the hypothesis of a linear secularization of Islamist ideology, it also examines the ongoing or incomplete structural mutations resulted from the ‘distinction’ ( tamiyyîz) between the party and the movement, as well as between the socio-political spheres.
France, with its approach to managing religion known as laïcité, has been almost unique among Western nations in its approach to religious freedom for minority religious groups and movements. In recent decades it has passed widely criticized laws in efforts to implement a program of social control over such groups, including both new religious movements (NRMs) as well as older religious groups that have functioned in France for many decades. Examining why and how this has happened helps reveal how religious freedom can be curtailed in a modern Western society using the legislative process and the law. We apply theories from the sociology of law offered by Donald Black and by William Chambliss, as well as other relevant ideas, to understand how the situation developed in France. Black’s concepts of status and intimacy are particularly useful, as is Chambliss’ dialectic approach to law, which emphasizes human volition in lawmaking. Chambliss focuses on how societies develop resolutions to resolve dilemmas as they attempt to resolve conflicts that arise from contradictions in how society functions. The role of courts in such situations will also be addressed. We conclude that the liberalistic and humanitarian national motto (“liberté, égalité, fraternité”) of the French Republic does not necessarily lead to the non-discrimination and non-persecution of new religious movements and other nontraditional religious groups. We also conclude that the resolution obtained with the About–Picard law was, as predicted by Chambliss, not a final one, and that dilemmas continue to exist about how to address concerns about religious groups in French society.
Much theorizing about secularization tells a “differentiation story” that puts a historical process of structural differentiation at the center of its understanding of secularization. The heart of the story is the claim that the increasing differentiation of social spheres over time freed the “secular” spheres of life (politics, economics, etc.) from religious control or domination. This conceptual framing has been widely shared by scholars in the field, not only by adherents of the classical secularization paradigm, but also their leading critics in the supply-side and historicist–revisionist schools. While the story sometimes serves a purely descriptive function, at other times it is used to explain secularization (i.e., differentiation causes secularization). A close examination of the differentiation story, however, raises questions about the historical accuracy and theoretical plausibility of some of its core assumptions. Aspects of the differentiation story that require critical reconsideration include the empirical accuracy of its historical generalizations, its underspecified notion of “spheres,” and its explanatory assumption that some spheres are innately or properly nonreligious.
Dette temanummer handler om spiritualitet og helbred, med særligt fokus på eksistentiel og åndelig omsorg i konteksten af det danske sundhedsvæsen. Artiklerne i temanummeret fokuserer hver især, og fra forskellige perspektiver, på, hvorledes eksistentielle og åndelige livsaspekter påvirker menneskers helbred (og vice-versa), og derfor forholder de sig også kritisk til, hvordan man bør tænke dette ind i måden, hvorpå vi som samfund forholder os til sygdom og sundhed.
The Chinese, both in China and in an international migration setting, are commonly regarded as the world’s most secular population. However, the relationship between Chinese people and Chinese Popular Religion is nuanced and survey data, more often than not, do not account for the plethora of religious activities Chinese people engage in despite simultaneously self-identifying as secular. This paper examines the supposed secularity of Chinese immigrant families living in Edinburgh. It asserts that although self-identifying as secular, these families engage in undeniable religious activity and possess religious beliefs. Crucially, there is a marked difference between the beliefs pertaining to secularity of the parents and their children, with the former being adamant in their secularity and the latter being more willing to acknowledge the complicated relationship between religion and the secular.
Though an offshoot of the (Islamist) National Outlook movement, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has formally advocated since its initial years a pluralist secularism equidistant to all religious groups. Nevertheless, the AKP government has been more reluctant than its precedents in ending the republic’s bias toward Sunni Islam. In the last two decades of this government, a much more conservative understanding of Islam has been officially promoted as the basis of Turkish national identity. This chapter analyzes how and to what extent the AKP government’s policies in the last two decades reflected a more visible Islamist agenda at both national and international levels.KeywordsSecularismIslamDiyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs)Conservative nationalismIslamismOttomanism
Europe is a relatively secular part of the world in global terms. Why is this so? And why is the situation in Europe so different from that in the United States? The first chapter of this book - the theme - articulates this contrast. The remaining chapters - the variations - look in turn at the historical, philosophical, institutional and sociological dimensions of these differences. Key ideas are examined in detail, among them: constitutional issues; the Enlightenment; systems of law, education and welfare; questions of class, ethnicity, gender and generation. In each chapter both the similarities and differences between the European and the American cases are carefully scrutinized. The final chapter explores the ways in which these features translate into policy on both sides of the Atlantic. This book is highly topical and relates very directly to current misunderstandings between Europe and America.
Gevestigde liberaaldemocratische instituties en beleid staan door nieuwe religieuze minderheden, met name moslims, onder toenemende druk. Het lijkt alsof praktische politiek en politieke theorie moeten kiezen tussen een volledig geseculariseerde staat - een strikte scheiding tussen staat/politiek en volledig geprivatiseerde godsdiensten, gebaseerd op een geidealiseerd model van de VS of van Frans-republikeinse laicite - enerzijds, of verzuilde systemen van selectieve samenwerking tussen staat en kerken anderzijds. Secularism or Democracy presenteert een nieuwe conceptuele, theoretische en praktische benadering van oude en recente problemen in de omgang met religieuze diversiteit. Het verbindt ethische en politiek-filosofische perspectieven met constitutioneel recht, geschiedenis, godsdienst-sociologie en -antropologie, en vergelijkend institutionalisme. Voorstellen uit de traditie van associatieve democratie - een vrijzinnige, flexibele versie van een democratisch, institutioneel pluralisme - bieden een 'derde weg' die belooft de tekortkomingen van de dominante modellen in theorie en praktijk te vermijden.
With reference to the religious and ideological changes in the GDR we opt for a specific approach to the analysis of secularization processes that goes beyond the conceptualization of the East German secularization process as mere repression. Based on research among East German families, our argument is that an important element of this process was the successful introduction of an interpretational frame that constructs a non-reconcilable conflict between politics and religion, as well as between science and religion. Our hypothesis is that the success of the secularization process in the GDR is closely interrelated with this conflictive framework. Our data indicate three levels of this conflict: about membership, world interpretation and ethics. These conflicts did not remain on the level of repression alone, but acquired subjective plausibility for much of the population. Consequently our approach is based on a general theory of conflict; it is historically grounded; and it takes its starting point from the perspectives of laypersons in the religious-ideological field.
Modernization theorists from Karl Marx to Daniel Bell have argued that economic development brings pervasive cultural changes. But others, from Max Weber to Samuel Huntington, have claimed that cultural values are an enduring and autonomous influence on society. We test the thesis that economic development is linked with systematic changes in basic values. Using data from the three waves of the World Values Surveys, which include 65 societies and 75 percent of the world's population, we find evidence of both massive cultural change and the persistence of distinctive cultural traditions. Economic development is associated with shifts away from absolute norms and values toward values that are increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, and participatory. Cultural change, however, is path dependent. The broad cultural heritage of a society-Protestant, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Confucian, or Communist-leaves an imprint on values that endures despite modernization. Moreover, the differences between the values held by members of different religions within given societies are much smaller than are cross-national differences. Once established, such cross-cultural differences become part of a national culture transmitted by educational institutions and mass media. We conclude with some proposed revisions of modernization theory.
Responding to several new histories of church and state in America, this article warns against the emerging view that separation of church and state is a distinctly American and relatively modern invention that has been used principally to harm religion and religious freedom. The article traces the historical roots and routes of the principle of separation of church and state in biblical, patristic, Catholic, Protestant, and Enlightenment sources. It then shows how the eighteenth-century American founders used this principle to press five religious liberty concerns: protection of the state from the church; protection of the church from the state; protection of liberty of conscience from both church and state; protection of the new states from the federal government in their treatment of religion; and protection of citizens from unwelcome support and participation in religion. Finally, the article analyses the uses and misuses of this principle in the later history of American law.
The study of secularization appears to be entering a new phase. Supplyside theories that focus exclusively on religious participation and membership seem too one-dimensional. But classical theories of secularization contain generalized and teleological premises that are at odds with the complexities of empirical reality and the historical record. This review seeks to map a new way forward and identify key obstacles and goals. It begins by retracing the development of secularization theory within sociology and the genealogy of the secularization concept within presociological discourse. It then reviews what is and is not known about secularization in the West, noting the limitations of the data and biases in research. The article further argues for comparative and historical approaches that incorporate non-Christian religions and non-Western regions. The social scientific literature that critically reassesses the relationship between diverse religious movements, secularisms, and liberal democracies presents new questions for future research. We stress the importance of theoretical approaches that move beyond the deeply entrenched secularist and religious assumptions and propose general guidelines for future research on the varieties of secularity.
European governments must struggle with assimilating Muslim newcomers into their countries, with so many more now living in Western Europe. Britain, France, and Germany have dealt with the related problems differently. This book explains why their policies differ and proposes ways of ensuring the successful incorporation of practicing Muslims into liberal democracies. Resolving their issues has become all the more urgent in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Considers complicated questions of policy towards Muslims in Europe after 9/11. Emphasis on specifically religious aspects of Muslim mmigrants in Europe. Unique focus on church-state relations
In mid-nineteenth century England, George Holyoake coined the term “secularism” to name an orientation to life designed to attract both theists and atheists under its banner. Impatient with positions defined in opposition to traditional Christian belief, such as atheist, infidel, or dissenter, Holyoake dreamed of a new formation, rallying around the “work of human improvement,” that would not be splintered by these older divisions.1 He needed a positive philosophy, one that was not parasitic on what was being rejected. His 1854 Principles of Secularism aspired to give voice to such an alternate vision. Its signature features were its appeal to reason, nature, and experience and its passionate commitment to the amelioration of human life. Although it clearly differed from forms of traditional Christianity that invoked clerical or scriptural authorities or focused on supernatural means and otherworldly ends, secularism, as Holyoake fashioned it, was not the antithesis of religion or one side of a religion-secularism binary. It was a canopy large enough to house some forms of religion as it excluded others. Its capaciousness was one of its defining virtues.
Till a decade ago, there was a virtual consensus in India, a view shared by both its opponents and defenders, that secularism was alien to Indian culture and civilization. This view was to be found in the writings of T. N. Madan who claimed that secularism was a gift of Christianity, a product of the dialectic between Protestantism and the Enlightenment.1 Another example is K. M. Panikkar, who claimed that a modern, democratic, egalitarian, and secular Indian state was built on modern European traditions, not the foundations of ancient Indian thought.2 For Madan this alienness was the principal cause of the troubles of secularism in India. In his view, the distance between secularism and an Indian cultural ethos was so great that it had little hope of taking root and bringing peace between warring religious communities. Contrary to this view, Panikkar drew the opposite conclusion that the alienness of secularism from ancient traditions and Hindu thought meant not the redundancy of secularism but rather the estrangement of ancient traditions and Hindu thought from contemporary social reality. With the birth of new socioeconomic relations and their rupture with older orders, concepts developed in a different earlier context had to give way to new concepts. Thus, there was nothing surprising about the alleged alien character of secularism to ancient Indian culture or thought.
In February 1873, approximately five hundred people attended a national convention held by the National Reform Association (NRA) in New York City to call for a constitutional amendment that would “recognize God as the source of all power, Jesus Christ as the chief ruler, and the Bible as the supreme ruler of all national conduct.”1 The NRA, created a decade earlier by a coalition of Protestant leaders, pointed out that America had already been identified as a Christian nation in various state and federal court decisions and by prominent national figures such as Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, who had famously written that it was “the especial duty of government to foster and encourage [Christianity] among all the citizens and subjects.”2 NRA organizers believed that an amendment clarifying the nation’s Christian foundation would provide necessary constitutional protection for prayers and Bible reading in the public schools, Sunday closing laws, antiblasphemy laws, prison and military chaplains hired by the government, and other laws and traditions that they believed essential to the nation’s moral foundations. They denied that the proposed amendment would create an unconstitutional establishment of religion on the grounds that no particular denomination would receive special privileges and insisted that such a change would actually preserve rather than violate America’s liberties. In the words of an earlier NRA statement, “The proposed religious amendment to our national Constitution, so far from infringing any individual’s rights of conscience, or tending in the least degree to a union of Church and State, will afford the fullest security against a corrupt and corrupting Church establishment, and form the strongest safeguard of both the civil and religious liberties of all citizens.”3
This chapter lays out a theoretical framework for a “secular revolution” approach to macrosocial secularization and examines a set of specific institutions to see how this analytical approach might work in particular cases. It begins by examining problems in the old secularization theory. Most recent critiques of secularization theory argue primarily at the micro level of individual belief and practice. Few of them address the organizational and macrosocial levels of secularization. Following this, the chapter presents a critical analysis of the secular movement, and furthermore, elaborates a broad analytical framework for an alternative secular introduction movement approach. Finally, it proposes the rethinking of macrosocial secularization from the analytical perspective of the field of study most attentive to the factors missing from traditional secularization theory, which are the sociology of revolutions and social movements.
“Serious social scientists who care about making sense of the world can no longer ignore the fact that religious beliefs and practices are an important part of this world. Nor can scholars claim to understand religion by adding a couple of variables to their models, anymore than they could understand race, gender, or social class this way. This Handbook is a valuable resource for specialists and amateurs alike. The editors have done an exceptionally fine job of incorporating topics that illuminate the range and diversity of religion and its continuing significance throughout the world.”—Robert Wuthnow, Princeton UniversityAt a time when religions are increasingly affecting, and affected by, life beyond the narrowly sacred sphere, religion everywhere seems to be caught up in change and conflict. In the midst of this contention and confusion, the sociology of religion provides a rich source of understanding and explanation. This Handbook presents an unprecedentedly comprehensive assessment of the field, both where it has been and where it is headed. Like its many distinguished contributors, its topics and their coverage are truly global in their reach. The Praise for this text: In their introduction to this Handbook, the editors affirm: 'Many sociologists have come to realise that it makes no sense now to omit religion from the repertoire of social scientific explanations of social life'. I wholeheartedly agree. I also suggest that this wide-ranging set of essays should become a starting-point for such enquiries. Each chapter is clear, comprehensive and well-structured - making the Handbook a real asset for all those engaged in the field.—Grace Davie, Professor of Sociology, University of Exeter, UK In the last two decades the sociology of religion has experienced an intellectual renaissance. The old paradigm of secularization has been replaced with new theories and methods recognising the importance of religion in modern society. The new topics include women and spirituality, violence and power, globalization and glocalization, fundamentalism, identity and life course, spiritual markets and rational choice theory. The Handbook for the Sociology of Religion not only reflects but develops and extends this renaissance. Not so much a handbook but an intellectual feast.—Bryan Turner, National University of Singapore
Why do secular states pursue different policies toward religion? This book provides a generalizable argument about the impact of ideological struggles on the public policy making process, as well as a state-religion regimes index of 197 countries. More specifically, it analyzes why American state policies are largely tolerant of religion, whereas French and Turkish policies generally prohibit its public visibility, as seen in their bans on Muslim headscarves. In the United States, the dominant ideology is “passive secularism,” which requires the state to play a passive role, by allowing public visibility of religion. Dominant ideology in France and Turkey is “assertive secularism,” which demands that the state play an assertive role in excluding religion from the public sphere. Passive and assertive secularism became dominant in these cases through certain historical processes, particularly the presence or absence of an ancien régime based on the marriage between monarchy and hegemonic religion during state-building periods.
The multiple-modernities approach is developed in confrontation with alternative theories and by answering open questions. First, the basic problems of defining different types of modernity will be explained (1). In contrast to the idea of multiple patterns of modernity, neo-modernization theory claims there is a growing similarity between modernizing societies. This is based on the model of the fixed interdependencies of modern institutions (2). Furthermore, it is supposed that culture follows structure. That is why the effects of culture on patterns of modernity must be scrutinized in detail (3). World-systems approaches deny the existence of multiple modernities (4). Comparative research on forms of capitalism identifies a so-called Rhine-type of capitalism which cuts across civilizational units. The question arises as to whether variation develops as independent of or as dependent on cultural sources (5). These theoretical insights are used to clarify tacit assumptions within the debate on the entry of Turkey into the EU (6). Finally, open questions requiring further research are enumerated (7).
In recent years, the sociology of religion has been consumed by a debate over secularization that pits advocates of a new, rational-choice paradigm (the so-called religious economies model) against defenders of classical secularization theory. According to the old paradigm, the Western world has become increasingly secular since the Middle Ages; according to the new paradigm, it has become increasingly religious. I put these two images of religious development to the test through a detailed examination of religious life in Western Europe before and after the Reformation. I conclude that the changes in social structure and religious experience that occurred during this period were considerably more complex than either the old or new paradigms suggest and, indeed, that the two paradigms are neither so opposed nor so irreconcilable as many of their defenders contend. It is possible, indeed probable, that Western society has become more secular without becoming less religious. I discuss the limitations of the two competing paradigms and sketch the outlines of a more adequate theory of religious change.
The 1960s were a time of explosive religious change. In the Christian churches, it was a time of innovation from the 'new theology' and 'new morality' of Bishop Robinson, to the evangelicalism of the Charismatic Movement, and of charismatic leaders, such as Pope John XXIII and Martin Luther King. But it was also a time of rapid social and cultural change when Christianity faced challenges from Eastern religions, from Marxism and feminism, and above all from new 'affluent' lifestyles. Using oral history, this book tells in detail how these movements and conflicts were experienced in England, but because the 1960s were an international phenomenon, it also looks at other countries, especially the USA and France. The book explains what happened to religion in the 1960s, why it happened, and how the events of that decade shaped the rest of the 20th century.
In this paper, we propose to analyze ideas, practices, institutionalizations, and public controversies related to the religious-secular divide in the Netherlands in terms of contested formations of secularity. We introduce the concept of 'multiple secularities' and use it as an interpretive device for an analysis of the historical emergence and transformation of Dutch secularity. After that we show how historically shaped notions of secularity operated within the parliamentary debates on blasphemy, freedom of speech, and religion that unfolded between 2004 and 2009. We argue that long-standing notions of secularity as a means for balancing religious and ideological diversity are challenged by and give way to a new preponderance of secular progressivism. By secular progressivism we mean the idea that within an 'immanent frame' in which the secular ontologically embodies the 'real' and constitutes the ground for normative universalism, religion turns into a historical vestige whose protection must be subordinated to universalistic notions of civic liberties. However, this development is still contested in the Netherlands.
Finally, social scientists have begun to attempt to understand religious behavior rather than to discredit it as irrational, ignorant, or foolish--and Rodney Stark and Roger Finke have played a major role in this new approach. Acknowledging that science cannot assess the supernatural side of religion (and therefore should not claim to do so), Stark and Finke analyze the observable, human side of faith. In clear and engaging prose, the authors combine explicit theorizing with animated discussions as they move from considering the religiousness of individuals to the dynamics of religious groups and then to the religious workings of entire societies as religious groups contend for support. The result is a comprehensive new paradigm for the social-scientific study of religion.
Culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented, but by shaping a repertoire or "tool kit" of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct "strategies of action." Two models of cultural influence are developed, for settled and unsettled cultural periods. In settled periods, culture independently influences action, but only by providing resources from which people can construct diverse lines of action. In unsettled cultural periods, explicit ideologies directly govern action, but structural opportunities for action determine which among competing ideologies survive in the long run. This alternative view of culture offers new opportunities for systematic, differentiated arguments about culture's causal role in shaping action.
1. John Madeley (2007) has developed a tripartite measure of church-state relation, which he calls the TAO of European management and regulation of religion-state relations by the use of Treasure (T: for financial and property connections), Authority (A: for the exercise of states’ powers of command), and Organization (O: for the effective intervention of state bodies in the religious sphere). According to his measurement, all European states score positively on at least one of these scales, most states score positively on two of them, and over one-third (16 out of 45 states) score positively on all three.
This is the text, with a few verbal modifications, of a lecture delivered by T. N. Madan at the President's Panel in Honor of the Fulbright Fortieth Anniversary Program, on the occasion of the 1987 meeting of the Association of Asian Studies in Boston. T. N. Madan has invigorated the social sciences in India for many years by his research, writing, and teaching. As an author he has written on such themes as Hindu culture, culture and development, ethnic pluralism, family and kinship, and the professions. As editor of Contributions to Indian Sociology , he has attracted to its pages distinguished research and writing from an international pool of contributors. This achievement is related to his capacity to combine discriminating intellectual taste with a friendly capacity to insinuate the journal into the publishing program of outstanding social scientists. It is also related to the fact that his anthropological understanding is combined with a wide-ranging methodological sympathy for other social sciences as well as the humanities.
This article reviews recent literature on U.S. religious institutions and argues that a new paradigm is emerging in that field, the crux of which is that organized religion thrives in the United States in an open market system, an observation anomalous to the older paradigm's monopoly concept. The article has six sections: first, a brief survey of the paradigm crisis; second, a development of the concept of an open market in the historiography and sociology of U. S. religion; third, fourth, and fifth, arguments that U. S. religious institutions are constitutively pluralistic, structurally adaptable, and empowering; sixth, a consideration of recent religious individualism in the light of the new paradigm. A conclusion sketches some research implications.
The teaching of qualitative analysis in the social sciences is rarely undertaken in a structured way. This handbook is designed to remedy that and to present students and researchers with a systematic method for interpreting qualitative data', whether derived from interviews, field notes, or documentary materials. The special emphasis of the book is on how to develop theory through qualitative analysis. The reader is provided with the tools for doing qualitative analysis, such as codes, memos, memo sequences, theoretical sampling and comparative analysis, and diagrams, all of which are abundantly illustrated by actual examples drawn from the author's own varied qualitative research and research consultations, as well as from his research seminars. Many of the procedural discussions are concluded with rules of thumb that can usefully guide the researchers' analytic operations. The difficulties that beginners encounter when doing qualitative analysis and the kinds of persistent questions they raise are also discussed, as is the problem of how to integrate analyses. In addition, there is a chapter on the teaching of qualitative analysis and the giving of useful advice during research consultations, and there is a discussion of the preparation of material for publication. The book has been written not only for sociologists but for all researchers in the social sciences and in such fields as education, public health, nursing, and administration who employ qualitative methods in their work.
Secularism, one of the main political ideologies of the post-colonial state in India, has been at the centre of scholarly and political debates in recent times. This article seeks to illuminate some aspects of the career of secularism in India through an analysis of two landmark parliamentary debates on minority rights: the Constituent Assembly debates (1946-1949) and the Shah Bano debate (1986). My analysis attempts, first, to challenge a contrast commonly made by both advocates and critics of secularism in India, between a Western model of secularism, identified with separation of state and religion, and an Indian model, based on equal respect for all religions. Secondly, I critically examine the dominant view that the Shah Bano case constituted a watershed with regard to the career of secularism in India. I attempt to delineate the changes in the constellation of concepts associated with secularism that contribute to this impression while arguing that the ideological shift in the Shah Bano case is less radical than is commonly supposed.
In recent years, the importance of religion in the study and conduct of international affairs has come precipitously into view. This book seeks both to interrogate the problematic neglect of religion in extant scholarship and to take the first steps towards its rectification. Drawing on the work of leading scholars across many disciplines as well as policy makers and analysts, this books aims to form an authoritative guide to the interconnections of religion and global politics. The chapters aim to convey a sense for the big puzzles, issues, and questions in six major areas. Chapters critically revisit the “secularization thesis,” which proclaimed the steady erosion of religion's public presence as an effect of modernization; explore the relationship between religion, democracy, and the juridico-political discourse of human rights; assess the role of religion in fomenting, ameliorating, and redressing violent conflict; and consider the value of religious beliefs, actors, and institutions to the delivery of humanitarian aid and the fostering of socio-economic development. Later chapters address the representation of religion in the burgeoning global media landscape and the unique place of religion in American foreign policy and the dilemmas that it presents.
This new book provides a comprehensive, multidisciplinary overview of the history, theory, law, and comparative analysis of American religious liberty from the earliest colonial period through the most recent Supreme Court cases. It also highlights the shifting jurisprudence and weakening of First Amendment religion clauses that is leading to new federal and state legislation and eroding protection of religious liberty in the United States. “We are troubled by this emerging shift from the judiciary to the legislature, and from the federal to the state governments in the protection of religious liberty in America. Such a shift leaves what should be common national rights of religious liberty vulnerable to fleeting political fashions and contingent on a claimant’s geographical location,” the authors write in the new introduction. The new volume gives ample attention to the seven U.S. Supreme Court cases regarding religious liberty, including McCreary County v. ACLU and Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, that have arisen since the second edition went to press in 2004. Also included is a chapter on religious organizations and the law, a topic that has become increasingly important as attention shifts toward this subject with regard to religious institutions’ division over same-sex marriage. The book maintains the structure and themes introduced in the first two editions but contains substantial revisions. Widely used among scholars of law, theology, history, ethics, political science, human rights and American studies, the book is an introduction for students, a provocation for specialists, and an invitation for the public to view afresh the American experiment in religious rights and liberties.
Political secularism takes many forms but a fundamental distinction is between radical and moderate kinds. The latter is a genuine secularism and not just a failure to take secularism to its logical conclusion. The failure to appreciate this obscures the secularism that exists in western Europe. Namely, an accommodation of organised religion which sees it as a potential public good or national resource (not just a private benefit), which the state can in some circumstances assist to realise—even through an ‘established’ church. I adumbrate five types of reasons the state might be interested in religion: truth, danger, utility, identity and respect. The challenge facing such secularism today is whether it can be pluralised or multiculturalised, in particular whether it can accommodate Muslims. A ground for optimism is the respect that some people, especially some Muslims, have for religions other than their own.
Throughout the world, culture has been doggedly pushing its way onto the center stage of debates not only in sociological theory and research but also throughout the human sciences. As with any profound intellectual shift, this has been a process characterized by leads and lags. In Britain, for example, culture has been making headway since the early 1970s. In the United States, the tide began to turn unmistakably only in the mid-1980s. In continental Europe, it is possible to argue that culture never really went away. Despite this ongoing revival of interest, however, there is anything but consensus among sociologists specializing in the area about just what the concept means and how it relates to the discipline as traditionally understood. These differences of opinion can be usefully explained only partly as empirical reflections of geographical, sociopolitical, or national traditions. More importantly, they are manifestations of deeper contradictions relating to axiomatic and foundational logics in the theory of culture. Pivotal to all these disputes is the issue of "cultural autonomy" (Alexander, 1990; Smith, 1998a). In this chapter, we employ the concept of cultural autonomy to explore and evaluate the competing understandings of culture currently available to social theory. We suggest that fundamental flaws characterize most of these models, and we argue for an alternative approach that can be broadly understood as a kind of structural hermeneutics. Levi-Strauss (1974) famously wrote that the study of culture should be like the study of geology. According to this dictum, analysis should account for surface variation in terms of deeper generative principles, just as geomorphology explains the distribution of plants, the shape of hills, and the drainage patterns followed by rivers in terms of underlying geology. In this chapter, we intend to apply this principle to the enterprise of contemporary cultural sociology in a way that is both reflexive and diagnostic. Our aim is not so much to review the field and document its diversity, although we will indeed conduct such a review, as to engage
This article analyses how nation states respond to religious diversity produced by migration. Drawing on research results
from a comparative macro-sociological study on the incorporation of Muslims in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, it
is argued that both the claims of recognition and the modes of symbolic and organizational incorporation are shaped by varying
institutional arrangements of political organization, collective identity, and religion. Yet recent convergences in the development
of multicultural forms of incorporation and the inclusion of religion as a legitimate category of identity in the public sphere
suggest that these institutional arrangements are equally transformed under the influence of transnational discourses of human
rights.
Cet article présente une analyse des diverses réactions des États nations à la diversité religieuse qui résulte de la migration.
En se référant aux recherches comparatives sur l’incorporation des musulmans en Grande-Bretagne, France et allemagne, nous
avançons l’hypothèse selon laquelle les revendications et les modes d’incorporation symbolique et organisationnelle sont influencés
par les arrangements institutionnels de l’organisation politique, l’identité collective et la religion. Cependant, des convergences
récentes concernant le développement des formes “multiculturelles” de l’incorporation et l’inclusion de “religion” en tant
que catégorie légitime d’identité dans la sphère publique montrent, que ces arrangements institutionnels sont tous transformés
sous l’influence des discours transnationaux des droits de l’homme.
In 2009 a French national commission was created to issue recommendations against “the burqa” and raise the possibility of
a ban on the practice in certain public settings. This paper explores the different normative stakes of politicizing the burqa
and the form of Islamic Revival with which it is associated. Recent scholarship has sought to overturn orientalist depictions
of Islamic movements but has insisted that bodily ethical practices, such as Muslim women’s veiling, constitute forms of politics.
Based on ethnographic research in a women’s mosque community in a poor suburb of Lyon, France, I argue that these women are
not engaged in a form of politics but rather, antipolitics, a movement originally conceptualized in the 1970s and 80s as a rejection of politics and a valorization of private life.
Three components define their antipolitics: a reconfiguration of the private sphere against an intrusive state, a retreat
into a moral community, and emphasis on spiritual conditions and achievement of serenity. In interrogating different meanings
of politics and antipolitics, this paper suggests a rethinking of the relationship between “political Islam” and piety movements.
KeywordsIslam–France–Gender–Politics
Secularization is most productively understood not as declining religion, but as the declining scope of religious authority.
A focus on religious authority (1) is more consistent with recent developments in social theory than is a preoccupation with
religion; (2) draws on and develops what is best in the secularization literature; and (3) reclaims a neglected Weberian insight
concerning the sociological analysis of religion. Several descriptive and theoretical “pay-offs” of this conceptual innervation
are discussed: new hypotheses concerning the relationship between religion and social movements; the enhanced capacity to
conceptually apprehend and empirically investigate secularization among societies, organizations, and individuals; and clearer
theoretical connections between secularization and other sociological literatures. Ironically, these connections may indeed
spell the end of secularization theory as a distinct body of theory, but in a different way than previously appreciated.