Article

Evaluations of Self and Others: Self-Enhancement Biases in Social Judgments

If you want to read the PDF, try requesting it from the authors.

Abstract

Three investigations are reported that examined the relation between self-appraisals and appraisals of others. In Experiment 1, subjects rated a series of valenced trait adjectives according to how well the traits described the self and others. Individuals displayed a pronounced “self-other bias,” such that positive attributes were rated as more descriptive of self than of others, whereas negative attributes were rated as less descriptive of self than of others. Furthermore, in contrast to C. R. Rogers's (1951) assertion that high self-esteem is associated with a comparable regard for others, the tendency for individuals to evaluate the self in more favorable terms than they evaluated people in general was particularly pronounced among those with high self-esteem. These findings were replicated and extended in Experiment 2, where it also was found that self-evaluations were more favorable than were evaluations of a friend and that individuals with high self-esteem were most likely to appraise their friend...

No full-text available

Request Full-text Paper PDF

To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.

... People struggle to accurately assess the extent to which they or their discussion partners adhere to the ideals of deliberation because people typically suffer from self-perception biases (Brown, 1986;Wilson & Brekke, 1994). For example, those with low levels of knowledge or competence in a particular domain tend to dramatically overestimate their knowledge/competence (the Dunning-Kruger effect; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). ...
... Many scholars explain the third-person perception as a form of self-serving bias-the self-image is elevated by perceiving oneself to be impervious to persuasive messages that others are Deliberating Alone 8 susceptible to (Gunther, 1995;Gunther & Thorson, 1992). Because self-evaluations rely on a comparison of the self to others (Brown, 1986;Duck & Mullins, 1995), third-person perceptions reinforce the belief that the self is more intelligent and autonomous than others. ...
... Deliberative bias is likely the consequence of both ego and phenomenological experience. People have an inherent desire to view themselves positively (Brown, 1986;Pronin et al., 2002). This positive self-image can be attained, in part, by perceiving the self as superior to relevant social comparisons. ...
Article
Full-text available
In our research examining how people think and talk about immigration, we consistently find that people want to have a reasonable conversation about politics, but they often decide that productive conversations are not possible because other people are uninformed, irrational, close-minded, and uncivil. We argue that self-serving biases and phenomenological experiences lead to the biased perception that the self is far more capable of adhering to the ideals of rational deliberation than others, a process that we refer to as deliberative bias. In Study 1, we use data from in-depth interviews to develop the concept of deliberative bias. In Study 2, we use a survey to demonstrate that perceptions that other people are uninformed, irrational, close-minded, and uncivil are related to a decreased likelihood of talking politics with loose ties or those with opposing perspectives. These results suggest that deliberative bias may be a significant impediment to productive political conversations.
... Relatively little research, however, has been conducted to investigate the universality of positive self-views. That is, most research that explored positive self-perception in desirable traits (e.g., kind, attractive) and emotions was conducted in Western cultural contexts [2][3][4]. Importantly, cultural research has found members of individualistic cultures to show more positive views of the self compared to those from collectivistic cultures, whereas other studies found no cultural differences in positive self-views [2,5]. While the debate on cultural differences in selfenhancement bias is still ongoing, most prior studies used self-report measures to examine one's positive perception tendencies. ...
... While the debate on cultural differences in selfenhancement bias is still ongoing, most prior studies used self-report measures to examine one's positive perception tendencies. Specifically, studies tended to operationalize selfenhancement as the tendency to make overly positive evaluations of their attributes and traits relative to how they see the average person [3]. ...
... Self-enhancement bias is a particularly important psychological process that influences people's thoughts and behaviors. Indeed, people tend to perceive themselves as better than others on a variety of desirable traits and skills and quickly accept favorable information about themselves but not unfavorable information [3,8]. For example, most respondents rated themselves above average on positive attributes and personality traits (e.g., intelligence, driving ability, charisma) [1,[9][10][11] and performance levels [12]. ...
Article
Full-text available
Previous studies on self-enhancement bias used self-report measures to investigate individual and cultural differences in well-being. In the current research, we took a behavioral approach to analyze positive and negative perception tendencies between European Canadians, Asian Canadians and Koreans. In Study 1 and 2, participants were asked to bet on their expectation of success on a given task and then perform the task. The betting behaviors and actual performance were used to quantify positive and negative perception tendencies. In Study 1, we did not find cultural differences in positive and negative illusions. Positive self-perceptions were also not associated with higher self-reported well-being. In Study 2, we employed the same research design as Study 1, and we included a measure of perceived desirability to examine whether perceived desirability of the performance tasks are related to the two illusions indices. The results from Study 2 replicated the findings from Study 1, and perceived desirability did not influence the results. Our findings suggest that North Americans do not always exhibit more positive self-perceptions than Asians, suggesting that North Americans do not always view the self through rose-colored lenses.
... According to Boninger and colleagues (1995), selfrelevance is a basic characteristic that defines an individual's attitudes and their subjective importance (see also Howe & Krosnick, 2017;Visser et al., 2016). It is therefore unsurprising that many of our attitudes are influenced by a bias favoring ourselves and self-associated elements over other-associated or neutral persons, institutions or objects (Brewer, 1979;Brown, 1986;Cunningham & Turk, 2017;Greenwald & Farnham, 2000;Tajfel, 1970;Tajfel et al., 1971). Self-association affects the evaluation of elements in regard to their valence (Gawronski et al., 2007): The self is usually evaluated positively (Krueger, 1998) and -by proxy -selfassociated elements tend to be evaluated more positively than neutral elements (Shu & Peck, 2011). ...
... The finding replicates and extends prior research which demonstrated a selfprioritization bias in affective measures. A large body of research demonstrates that selfrelevance is a strong guide for attitudes and valence judgements (e.g., Brewer, 1979;Brown, 1986;Cunningham & Turk, 2017;Gawronski et al., 2007;Tajfel, 1970;Tajfel et al., 1971). ...
Article
Full-text available
Self-relevant stimuli such as one’s name and face have been demonstrated to influence information processing in both the cognitive and affective domain. It has been observed that recently self-associated stimuli can also influence cognition, but their impact on affect has not been tested yet. In the current study (N = 107), we test whether recently self-associated stimuli yield an affective bias and compare the size of the effect to that of familiar self-associated stimuli. A Recoding-Free Implicit Association Test (IAT-RF) presenting self-associated, neutral object-associated, positive, and negative stimuli was used with two groups: one which categorized familiar words as self- and neutral object-associated stimuli, and a second which categorized recently self- and neutral object-associated geometric shapes. In both cases, response times were faster for congruent trials, which mapped response keys as “positive/self” and “negative/neutral object”, than for incongruent trials which mapped response keys as “positive/neutral object” and “negative/self”. The size of the effect yielded by familiar and new self-associated stimuli did not differ. This indicates that experimentally induced self-association can immediately yield an affective bias in favor of the self-associated stimulus.
... Overall, people overwhelmingly believed that they would be better than the average American at detecting and resisting the influence of inaccurate information; out of 116 respondents, only five reported that they would be below the 50th percentile (over 95% believing they are above average for Americans). This finding could be a demonstration of the "better-thanaverage" (BTA) effect, wherein most people believe that they are better and that they do better than the average person (Brown, 1986;Krueger & Mueller, 2002). It is important to note, however, that our sample could in fact be "better than average" on this task; MTurkers do differ in noteworthy ways from the general American population (e.g., are on average younger; Ross, Irani, Silberman, Zaldivar, & Tomlinson, 2010). ...
... Across all three experiments, participants who were not tasked with reflection were less accurate at estimating the extent to which they would be influenced by reading false information. Additionally, participants generally reported they would be better than the average American at detecting and discounting inaccuracies while reading, adding to the already large number of contexts in which people perceive themselves to be better than average at various skills and aptitudes (Brown, 1986;Krueger & Mueller, 2002). Whether or not the sampled participants here were actually above average at this task, these responses align with the growing number of documented cases wherein people view themselves as less susceptible to biases as compared with others (for review, see Pronin, 2007). ...
Article
Full-text available
The current study investigated the role of metacognition with respect to the consequences of exposures to inaccurate information. Previous work has consistently demonstrated that exposures to inaccuracies can confuse people and even encourage reliance on the falsehoods. We specifically examined whether people are aware of their likelihood of being influenced by inaccurate information, and whether engaging in metacognitive reflection is effective at reducing this influence. In three experiments, participants read a story containing false assertions about the world. In Experiment 1, we compared participants' estimated resistance to inaccurate information against the degree to which their subsequent judgments actually reflected an influence of previously read inaccuracies. Participants were generally unaware of their susceptibility to inaccurate information, demonstrated by a lack of calibration between estimated and actual resistance. Their judgments consistently revealed an influence of previously read inaccuracies. In Experiment 2, we applied a metacognitive reflection task intended to encourage evaluation while reading. Participants who completed this task made fewer judgment errors after having read inaccurate statements than did participants who did not engage in reflection. Experiment 3 replicated these effects with a larger sample, and showed benefits of reflection for calibrations between people's estimated resistance and their actual performance. The accumulated findings highlight the importance of metacognitive considerations for understanding and addressing oft-reported, problematic effects of exposures to inaccuracies. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
... Bei Wissenseinschätzungen, aber auch in vielen anderen Bereichen haben Personen die Tendenz, sich selbst möglichst positiv wahrzunehmen. Dies zeigt sich beispielsweise in dem allgemeinen Wahrnehmungsschema, sich selbst bei der Einschätzung von Fähigkeiten und Leistungen im Vergleich zu anderen als über dem Durchschnitt einzuordnen ("better than average"-Effekt, Brown, 1986). Zu dieser Thematik gibt es zahlreiche Studien (für einen Überblick, siehe z. ...
... B. Brown, 1998). Als Ursache für diese Heuristik bei der Selbstwahrnehmung galt zunächst ein Aufwertungsbedürfnis (Brown, 1986). Personen haben demnach das Bedürfnis, sich selbst "besser" wahrzunehmen als andere, weil es ihnen ein gutes Gefühl gibt und zu mehr Selbstzufriedenheit beiträgt (Kruger & Gilovich, 2004). ...
Book
Durch das Internet hat sich der Zugang zu Nachrichten maßgeblich verändert. Informationen stehen nicht nur unbegrenzt zur Verfügung, sondern sie sind auch zu einem omnipräsenten Bestandteil in digitalen Informationsumgebungen geworden. Dadurch werden Internetnutzer*innen, auch ohne bewusst danach zu suchen, wiederholt mit tagesaktuellen Schlagzeilen konfrontiert, z.B. wenn sie ihren Browser öffnen, oder sich auf sozialen Netzwerkseiten bewegen. Diese kurzen Nachrichtenkontakte haben aufgrund der geringen Informationsmenge wenig Potential für Lerneffekte, können jedoch das Gefühl vermitteln, sich mit einem Thema auszukennen. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern Nachrichten in digitalen Informationsumgebungen die Entstehung einer Wissensillusion begünstigen, wie sich dieser Prozess erklären lässt und mit welchen Folgen dies verbunden ist. Im theoretischen Teil der Arbeit werden dazu Erkenntnisse zum Gedächtnis, dem Metagedächtnis und der Rolle von Medien für Wissen und Wissenswahrnehmung aufgearbeitet. In Studie 1 wird mit einer experimentellen Studie untersucht, wie sich Nachrichten auf sozialen Netzwerkseiten im Vergleich zu vollständigen Nachrichtenartikeln auf objektives und subjektives Wissen auswirken. Außerdem werden Effekte einer Wissensillusion für Einstellungen und Verhalten untersucht. Studie 2 untersucht mit qualitativen Leitfadeninterviews, welche Rolle Medien für Wissen und Lernen aus Sicht der Nutzer*innen spielen. Diese Erkenntnisse liefern Erklärungen dafür, weshalb und aufgrund welcher Merkmale unterschiedliche Nachrichtenkontakte eine Wissensillusion begünstigen können.
... 4. If the fertilizer you bought is good, you will attribute the success to yourself, on the contrary, you will attribute failure to others. Heine & Lebman, 1997Brown, 1986Miller et al., 1975Cialdini et al., 1980Lund, 1925Langer et al., 1975 Symbolic Meaning 1. Focus on the visual symbol, such as shape, color, mark, typeface, during purchasing fertilizer. 2. When you buy fertilizer, you tend to purchase the brand that you loving. ...
... Temporal self-appraisal theory is concerned with how people, as they are in the present moment, see themselves over time (Wilson and Ross, 2001). Among euthymic individuals, this "self-enhancement bias" promotes a continuous positive trajectory and drives a desire to build a positive self-concept (Brown, 1986). ...
Article
Background: Previous studies found that psychopathology is associated with distinct self-perceptions over time. Euthymic individuals report experiencing a self-enhancement bias, with self-appraisal increasing over time. In contrast, depressed individuals report viewing a personal decline from past to present and anticipated self-improvement from present to future. This study examined the association between the singular presence of anxiety and temporal self-appraisal. Methods: Using the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale, this study examined a depressed (n = 142), anxious (n = 95), comorbid depressed and anxious (n = 335), and euthymic group (non-depressed and non-anxious, n = 535), on a validated task of temporal self-appraisal. Results: Anxiety has a unique association with temporal self-appraisal that differs from the other disorders examined in this study. Specifically, individuals with anxiety had a similar positive trend of self-view to the euthymic group; however, their overall trend was lower at each temporal point. Individuals with depression had a stable past-to-present self-view and an improving present-to-future self-view. Limitations: The use of an online self-report sample without longitudinal assessment of variables, while sufficient for the intent of the present study, limits the potential extrapolation from this sample, as well as prevents the determination of the direction of causality. Conclusions: While individuals with anxiety demonstrate a positive sense of improvement over time, their psychopathology is associated with a negative bias in their perception of their past, present, and future selves. These findings have important implications for clinicians regarding potential interventions and treatment for anxiety and depression.
... We ran an extension examining the difference in positive versus negative trait attributions between self and other attributions, hypothesizing that participants would ascribe a greater ratio of positive traits when making assessments about themselves compared to their friends out of a motive to self-enhance and see themselves in a positive light. This was based on prior studies which found that people tend to attribute more positive traits during self-appraisal as opposed to other-appraisal out of a motivation to enhance self-worth (e.g., Brown, 1986;Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993). Surprisingly, the results of the current investigation suggest that the opposite may be true. ...
Article
Full-text available
We attempted a pre-registered replication and extension of Studies 1, 2, and 3 from Pronin and Ross ‎‎(2006) regarding the effects of social and temporal distance on trait attributions with an online American ‎Amazon MTurk sample (N = 911). We concluded mixed findings. We found support for the original findings: ‎participants attributed more dispositional traits to others compared to themselves, although with weaker ‎effects (original: f = 0.35, 95% CI [0.09, 0.61]; replication: f = 0.10, 95% CI [0.03, 0.16]). Also, similar to the ‎original, we found that participants tended to attribute a favorable ratio of positive traits when making ‎self-assessments (original: f = 0.77, 95% CI [0.29, 1.25]; replication: f = 0.87, 95% CI [0.50, 1.24]). ‎However, unlike the original, we failed to find support for the core hypothesis that participants would ‎ascribe more dispositional traits to their temporally distant selves compared to their present self (original: f ‎‎= 0.54, 95% CI [0.27, 0.77]; replication: f = 0.01, 95% CI [0.00, 0.05]). Furthermore, in contrast to the ‎original, we found that the positive traits ratio increases with temporal distance (original: f = 0.15, 95% CI ‎‎[0.00, 0.31]; replication: f = 0.32, 95% CI [0.22, 0.41] in opposite direction). Contrary to our hypothesis, in ‎an extension we found that people were more likely to ascribe a greater ratio of positive traits to their ‎friends than to themselves (ξ=0.3, 95% CI [0.21, 0.38]). All materials, data, and code are provided on: ‎https://osf.io/gs2rx/.
... The better-than-average effect has been demonstrated in a variety of domains and is generally considered a manifestation of self-evaluation bias. Drivers believe that they are better drivers (Svenson, 1981; inspired by Preston & Harris, 1965), college instructors believe they are better teachers (Cross, 1977), social psychologists believe they are better researchers (Van Lange et al., 1997), couples believe they have better marriages (Rusbult et al., 2000), and undergraduates believe they have better leadership skills, athletic prowess, and ability to get along with others (Brown, 1986). People even believe that they are less biased than others, an effect known as the bias blind spot (Pronin et al., 2002). ...
Preprint
Full-text available
The better-than-average effect refers to the tendency to rate oneself as better than the average person on desirable traits and skills. In a classic study, Svenson (1981) asked participants to rate their driving safety and skill compared to other participants in the experiment. Results showed that the majority of participants rated themselves as far above the median, despite the statistical impossibility of more than 50% of participants being above the median. We report a preregistered, well-powered (total N = 1,203), very close replication and extension of the Svenson (1981) study. Our results indicate that the majority of participants rated their driving skill and safety as above average. We added different response scales as an extension and findings were stable across all three measures. Thus, our findings are consistent with the original findings by Svenson (1981). Materials, data, and code are available at https://osf.io/fxpwb/.
... The better-than-average effect has been demonstrated in a variety of domains and is generally considered a manifestation of self-evaluation bias. Drivers believe that they are better drivers (Svenson, 1981; inspired by Preston & Harris, 1965), college instructors believe they are better teachers (Cross, 1977), social psychologists believe they are better researchers (Van Lange et al., 1997), couples believe they have better marriages (Rusbult et al., 2000), and undergraduates believe they have better leadership skills, athletic prowess, and ability to get along with others (Brown, 1986). People even believe that they are less biased than others, an effect known as the bias blind spot (Pronin et al., 2002). ...
Preprint
Full-text available
The better-than-average effect refers to the tendency to rate oneself as better than the average person on desirable traits and skills. In a classic study, Svenson (1981) asked participants to rate their driving safety and skill compared to other participants in the experiment. Results showed that the majority of participants rated themselves as far above the median, despite the statistical impossibility of more than 50% of participants being above the median. We report a preregistered, well-powered (total N = 1,203), very close replication and extension of the Svenson (1981) study. Our results indicate that the majority of participants rated their driving skill and safety as above average. We added different response scales as an extension and findings were stable across all three measures. Thus, our findings are consistent with the original findings by Svenson (1981). Materials, data, and code are available at https://osf.io/fxpwb/.
... To him, all kindness reflected veiled self-interest (Hobbes, 1651, Ch. 15). In the intervening centuries, psychologists have held the same position 1986a;Cialdini, 1981;Freud, 1930;Skinner, 1978), and self-interested explanations for seemingly altruistic behavior have continued to emerge within psychology and behavioral economics as well (Andreoni & Rao, 2011;Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007;Bodner and Prelec, 2003;Dana et al., 2007;Maner et al., 2002; see also Carlson, Adkins, et al., 2020). ...
Article
Full-text available
Are humans ever truly altruistic? Or are all actions, however noble, ultimately motivated by self-interest? Psychologists and philosophers have long grappled with this question, but few have considered laypeople’s beliefs about the nature of prosocial motives. Here we examine these beliefs and their social correlates across two experiments (N = 445). We find that people tend to believe humans can be, and frequently are, altruistically motivated—echoing prior work. Moreover, people who more strongly believe in altruistic motives act more prosocially themselves—for instance, sacrificing greater amounts of money and time to help others—a relationship that holds even when controlling for trait empathy. People who believe in altruistic motives also judge other prosocial agents to be more genuinely kind, especially when agents’ motives are ambiguous. Lastly, people independently show a self-serving bias—believing their own motives for prosociality are more often altruistic than others’. Overall, this work suggests that believing in altruistic motives predicts the extent to which people both see altruism and act prosocially, possibly reflecting the self-fulfilling nature of such lay theories.
... The most common explanation rendered to account for the 3PP is that it is part of a self-serving strategy to bolster one's ego (see Brown, 1986) by trying to downplay effects on oneself relative to perceived effects on others (Duck, Hogg, & Terry, 1999;Gunther & Mundy, 1993;Gunther & Thorson, 1992;Perloff, 2002). Feeling that one is less affected than others is presumed to enhance one's self-esteem. ...
Article
Full-text available
This review explicates the past, present and future of theory and research concerning audience perceptions of the media as well as the effects that perceptions of media have on audiences. Before the sections that examine media perceptions and media effects perceptions, we first identify various psychological concepts and processes involved in generating media-related perceptions. In the first section, we analyze two types of media perceptions: media trust/credibility perceptions and bias perceptions, focusing on research on the Hostile Media Perception. In both cases, we address the potential consequences of these perceptions. In the second section, we assess theory and research on perceptions of media effects (often referred to as Presumed Influence) and their consequences (referred to as the Influence of Presumed Influence). As examples of Presumed Influence, we evaluate the literature on the Persuasive Press Inference and the Third-Person Perception. The bodies of research on media perceptions and media effects perceptions have been featured prominently in the top journals of the field of mass communication over the past 20 years. Here we bring them together in one synthetic theoretical review.
... Originally, the above-average effect has been described as motivated by selfenhancement needs (i.e., to induce positive affect towards oneself) or a byproduct of motivated reasoning (Alicke, 1985;Brown, 1986;Kunda, 1990;Taylor & Brown, 1988). Self-enhancement enables the maintenance of a global self-concept allowing for both positive attributes under personal control and negative attributes resulting from factors beyond personal control (Alicke, 1985) 1 . ...
Preprint
Full-text available
Above-and-below-average effects are well-known phenomena that arise when comparing ‎oneself to others. Kruger (1999) found that people rate themselves as above average for easy ‎abilities and below average for difficult abilities. We conducted a successful pre-registered ‎replication of Kruger’s (1999) Study 1, the first demonstration of the core phenomenon (N = ‎‎756, US MTurk workers). Extending the replication to also include a between-subject design, ‎we added two conditions manipulating easy and difficult interpretations of the original ability ‎domains, and with an additional dependent variable measuring perceived difficulty. We ‎observed an above-average-effect in the easy extension and below-average-effect in the ‎difficult extension, compared to the neutral replication condition. Both extension conditions ‎were perceived as less ambiguous than the original neutral condition. Overall, we conclude ‎strong empirical support for Kruger’s above-and-below-average effects, with boundary ‎conditions laid out in the extensions expanding both generalizability and robustness of the ‎phenomenon. All materials, data, and code are available on: https://osf.io/7yfkc/
... Thus, human reasoning should favor socially advantageous beliefs over socially costly ones (sometimes, regardless of their accuracy) (e.g., Kunda, 1990). Socially motivated reasoning has been demonstrated many times Haidt, 2001Haidt, , 2012, for example: (1) people seek favor by more generously evaluating in-group over outgroup members (e.g., Christenson & Kriner, 2017;Claassen & Ensley, 2016;Cohen, 2003;Hawkins & Nosek, 2012;Kahan et al., 2012), (2) people exaggerate their own social value and downplay their weaknesses (e.g., Alicke & Govorun, 2005;Brown, 1986;Hoorens, 1993;Sedikides et al., 2003), (3) people avoid information that challenges in-group views and seek out confirmatory information (e.g., DeMarree et al., 2017;Frimer et al., 2017;Stroud 2008Stroud , 2010, and (4) people are credulous toward information that reinforces in-group beliefs and skeptical of information that challenges them (e.g., Campbell & Kay, 2014;Ditto et al., 2019aDitto et al., , 2019bGampa et al., 2019;Kahan et al., 2017;Lord et al., 1979;Taber & Lodge, 2006). All this suggests that sometimes reasoning is motivated more by social goals (e.g., rising through the ranks of one's coalition) than by accuracy. ...
Article
Full-text available
Behavioral scientists enjoy vast methodological freedom in how they operationalize theoretical constructs. This freedom may promote creativity in designing laboratory paradigms that shed light on real-world phenomena, but it also enables questionable research practices that undercut our collective credibility. Open Science norms impose some discipline but cannot constrain cherry-picking operational definitions that insulate preferred theories from rejection. All too often scholars conduct performative research to score points instead of engaging each other’s strongest arguments—a pattern that allows contradictory claims to fester unresolved for decades. Adversarial collaborations, which call on disputants to co-develop tests of competing hypotheses, are an efficient method of improving our science’s capacity for self-correction and of promoting intellectual competition that exposes false claims. Although individual researchers are often initially reluctant to participate, the research community would be better served by institutionalizing adversarial collaboration into its peer review process.
... Fourth, perceived conflict frequency was assessed annually using self-reports, while conflict styles were assessed annually with the use of perceived reports about the partner. Although we used partner reports to yield a more objective perspective on the individuals' actual behavior [65,66], we cannot know if perceived conflict frequency and conflict styles were objective measures. Nevertheless, we controlled for prior levels of all constructs during investigating their longitudinal associations, which resembles a control of at least some confounding measures. ...
Article
Full-text available
Self-esteem has been shown to be both predictive of and predicted by characteristics of romantic relationships. While there is an increasing number of studies yielding support for reciprocal influences between self-esteem and perceived conflict in romantic relationships, longitudinal transactions between these constructs from both partners' perspectives have not been studied systematically to date. Our aim was to close this gap. To that end, we examined the transactional and longitudinal interplay between self-esteem and perceived relationship conflict in continuing romantic couples from a dyadic perspective. Our sample consisted of N = 1,093 young adult female-male relationships from the German Family Panel. Individuals' self-esteem, perceived conflict frequency, and their perceptions of their partners' dysfunctional conflict styles (i.e., unconstructive behavior, withdrawal) were examined annually throughout a time span of five years. Based on dyadic bivariate latent change models, we tested our assumption that self-esteem and aspects of perceived relationship conflict are negatively interrelated within individuals and between partners both within and across time. We found one actor effect of self-esteem on changes in unconstructive behavior above and beyond initial unconstructive behavior levels, supporting self-broadcasting perspectives. Moreover, we found strong support for sociometer perspectives. Actor effects highlighted the importance of perceived conflict frequency for subsequent self-esteem changes. In addition, perceived conflict styles affected both partners' self-esteem. The results imply that perceiving conflict is a between-person process, and might be more important for the development of self-esteem than vice versa.
... Next, the RISP model's adoption of informational subjective norms (Aizen, 1988) "Government officials care about the personal welfare of people like me" and "Eventually, we will find a way to prevent or cure the virus." The remaining two statements are, "White House officials are doing a competent job of protecting people from the coronavirus" and "I trust our government agencies to protect me from the risks of the coronavirus." ...
Research Proposal
Seven national online experiments, each with 750 participants, began after the first U.S. COVID-19 death on February 29th and continuing through August 2020. The Risk Information Seeking and Processing Model or RISP (Dunwoody & Griffin, 2015) measure if media use, risk perceptions, and trust in government change as news about the virus changes. Preliminary findings from the first two are summarized here but the proposed paper will include comprehensive analyses from all seven.
... If cover changed people's preference for UV information because the activity and amenity information encouraged them to make different inferences about the beaches or the UV photo, then we would expect the same effects for the self and other. The fact that we find a self-other difference supports our motivated account (see also Brown 1986;Brown 2012;Kunda 1990;Wilson and Ross 2001;Zuckerman 1979). In other words, these results support our theory that cover creates ambiguity so that the personal desire to avoid information can drive decisions. ...
Article
Full-text available
More information is available today than ever before, yet at times consumers choose to avoid it. Even with useful information (I should find out), people may prefer ignorance (But I don’t want to). Seven studies (N = 4,271) and five supplemental studies (N = 3,013) apply the concept of “cover” to information avoidance for consumer choices with real financial consequences. More consumers avoid information with cover—that is, when they can attribute their decision to another feature of a product or decision context rather than to information they want to avoid. Cover increases avoidance when consumers face intrapersonal conflict—when consumers want to avoid information that they believe they should receive (e.g., calorie information). As such, the effect of cover is reduced by decreasing want–should conflict, whether by reducing the should preference to receive information or the want preference to avoid it. Furthermore, cover increases avoidance by helping consumers justify a decision to themselves: avoidance increases only when people can attribute their decision to a relevant (vs. irrelevant) product feature and operates in public and private settings. Together, this research offers theoretical insights into consumers’ information avoidance and how cover itself operates, with practical implications for marketers.
... Some studies of self-enhancement attempt to circumvent the criterion problem by inferring bias from apparent intrapsychic inconsistencies in people's judgments. For example, several studies have shown that people's self-ratings are, on average, more positive than their ratings of a hypothetical "average other" (e.g., Brown, 1986). This finding has been widely interpreted as evidence of self-enhancement bias because, according to the researchers, it is logically impossible for the majority of people to be better than average. ...
... This positive illusion is widely found in trait ratings (Alicke, 1985;Brown, 2012;Dunning et al., 1989), skill perceptions (e.g., Svenson, 1981), and perceptions of risk of misfortune (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986). Furthermore, the effect is not only found in comparison with an average, abstract person but also in comparison with friends (Brown, 1986;Perloff & Fetzer, 1986) and vivid, real, and specific persons (Alicke et al., 1995). There are various explanations for the positive misperception between the self and others. ...
Article
Full-text available
When individuals are given a choice between an outcome that is comparatively superior but absolutely inferior (your salary is $5,000; others’ salaries are $4,000), and an outcome that is absolutely superior but comparatively inferior (your salary is $6,000; others’ salaries are $7,000), what would they choose for themselves or for others? The present study aims to explore the impact of decision targets (self vs. other) on a decision involving a tradeoff between a better absolute outcome and an outcome with a more favourable interpersonal comparison. Across six studies (n = 927, including two preregistered studies), we consistently found that the absolutely superior option with low relative standing was more preferable when deciding for oneself than for others. Furthermore, evaluation of the target was identified as the underlying mechanism. Compared with making decisions for others, individuals who made decisions for themselves had a higher preference for the absolutely superior option because they have a higher evaluation for the self than for others.
... Por estas dos razones, más importante que el asesoramiento externo recibido, es que el emprendedor desarrolle la capacidad crítica necesaria para saber juzgar su propio proyecto con objetividad (Brown, 1986). ...
... Research suggests that the BTAE operates under the mechanisms of self-enhancement (Alicke, 1985;Brown, 1986;Sedikides & Strube, 1997). With the assumption that concern for the self is the most fundamental human motivation (Broad, 1949), it has been suggested that people are motivated to perceive and evaluate themselves favorably to maintain a positive self-perception (Alicke & Govorun, 2005). ...
Article
Full-text available
During the first outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), many people expressed hatred toward others whom they believed were responsible for the situation. Such increase in negative affect could be resultant of the better-than-average effect (BTAE), which refers to the phenomenon of believing that one is superior to average others. This study investigated the relationship between the BTAE and emotional valence toward others and tested whether the relationship was moderated by allocentric goals (i.e., concerned with the interests of others rather than themselves) and culture. Participants from the U.S. (N = 210) and South Korea (N = 214) were asked about their perceptions on whether they were better than others at preventing the COVID-19 infection, how they felt about others regarding COVID-19, and for whom they were preventing COVID-19. The results indicated that people showing more BTAE in relation to preventing the COVID-19 infection reported more negative emotional valence toward others, but the relationship was moderated by allocentric goals. In particular, the U.S. participants with higher allocentric goals reported less negatively valenced emotions, while the same was not found in Korean participants. The findings suggest the power of allocentric goals in diminishing the BTAE in some cultures, which may possibly explain the negative emotions some people experience when following social distancing rules.
... Comparing oneself with others assist individuals in evaluating their performance (Taylor & Lobel, 1989) and upholds their self-esteem (Brown, 1986). Comparisons may result in feelings of inferiority and poor self-evaluation (Collins, 1996), increasing the likelihood of triggering envious feelings and diminishing one's self-presentation. ...
Article
This study examines tourists’ envy and social return from engaging in domestic travel among Millennials and Baby Boomers. A conceptual framework is developed, grounded by social comparison theory. Using a quantitative research design, an online survey instrument was used to collect data. Results reveal that the relationship between social comparison and travel envy, selfpresentation and travel envy, and tourism xenophilia and domestic travel behaviour is stronger for Millennials. However, the relationship between domestic travel behaviour and social return relationship is stronger for Baby Boomers. The findings contribute to the under-researched area of domestic tourism during an unprecedented global pandemic.
... These changes in self-evaluation have also been found to boost implicit self-esteem, which affects how individuals evaluate objects that are relevant to their identity [86]. For example, people have been found to inflate the monetary value of their property [87], view individuals who are similar to them as more attractive [86], and view individuals within their social group more positively [34,88,89]. ...
Article
Full-text available
Self-enhancement (SE) is often overlooked as a fundamental cognitive ability mediated via the Prefrontal Cortex (PFC). Here, we present research that establishes the relationship between the PFC, SE, and the potential evolved beneficial mechanisms. Specifically, we believe there is now enough evidence to speculate that SE exists to provide significant benefits and should be considered a normal aspect of the self. Whatever the metabolic or social cost, the upside of SE is great enough that it is a core and fundamental psychological construct. Furthermore, though entirely theoretical, we suggest that a critical reason the PFC has evolved so significantly in Homo sapiens is to, in part, sustain SE. We, therefore, elaborate on its proximate and ultimate mechanisms.
... These changes in self-evaluation have also been found to boost implicit selfesteem, which affects how individuals evaluate objects that are relevant to their identity 86 . For example, people have been found to inflate the monetary value of their property 87 , view individuals who were similar to them as more attractive 86 , and view individuals within their social group more positively 34,88,89 . ...
Preprint
Self-enhancement (SE) is often overlooked as a fundamental cognitive ability mediated via the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC). Here we present research that establishes the relationship between the PFC, SE, and the potential evolved beneficial mechanisms. Specifically, we believe there is now enough evidence to speculate that SE exists to provide significant benefits and should be considered a normal aspect of the self. Whatever the metabolic or social cost, the upside of SE is great enough that it is a core and fundamental psychological construct. Furthermore, though entirely theoretical, we suggest that a critical reason the PFC has evolved so significantly in Homo sapien is to, in part, sustain SE. We therefore elaborate as to its proximate and ultimate mechanisms.
... Instead, research has focused on components of functional status and fatigue. Brown [23] found that fatigue was greater in pregnant women who were employed than in their unemployed counterparts. In addition, Reeves et al. [24] reported that fatigue had a substantial impact on women's performance of household and social activities during the first half of pregnancy. ...
... Second, we know from research on self-positivity bias (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004;Sharot & Garrett, 2016;Taylor & Brown, 1988) that people tend to view their self, their actions, and their traits in a favorable light (Brown, 1986;Epley & Whitchurch, 2008). That is, people are motivated to justify their own behaviorseven undesirable onesin a way that allows them to maintain a positive view of the self (Kunda, 1990;Sharot, Korn, & Dolan, 2011). ...
Article
Full-text available
Phone use is everywhere. Previous work has shown that phone use during social experiences, or “phubbing”, has detrimental effects on cognitive processing, well-being, and relationships. In this work, we first replicate this by showing the negative effects of phone use on relationships during both controlled and naturalistic social experiences. In Study 1, participants that were randomly assigned to complete a task with a confederate who used their phone part of the time reported lower feelings of social connection and engagement than participants paired with a partner who did not use their phone at all. In Study 2, dyads in a park completed a survey about their experience of the day. Participants reported that increased phone use resulted in lower feelings of social connection, enjoyment, and engagement in the experience. If the negative effects of phone use are so obvious, why do people continue to phub their friends? Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that people accurately intuit the effects of others' phone use on experiences, but fail to recognize the effects of their own phone use. Study 4 explains this phubbing blindspot by demonstrating an actor-observer bias – people attribute their own phone use to positive motives and overestimate their ability to multitask compared to others. Together these findings suggest that while people are aware of the harmful effects of another person's phone use in social situations, they may fail to recognize the negative consequences of their own use because they mispredict the positive contributions of their phone use to the experience.
... Despite this enhanced self-salience, we observed no evidence for improved memory for prediction-inconsistent outcomes, even those subjectively rated as unexpected or surprising. Given past work in the memory domain suggesting that increasing salience to the self has a strong effect on episodic memory (i.e., self-reference effects; [63][64][65][66][67][68][69][70][71][72][73][74][75]), and additional neurobiological evidence that errors produced in tasks with higher salience to the self can induce stronger prediction errors which can lead to additional processing of discrepant information [43,44], we hypothesized that memory for prediction-inconsistent outcomes would be enhanced when those outcomes were endorsed as unexpected relative to expected, but that is not what we found. One possible reason we saw no hint of improved memory for prediction-inconsistent outcomes may be that the outcomes (e.g. ...
Article
Full-text available
Background Decades of research has investigated the relationship between memory and future thinking. Although some of this work has shown that memory forms the basis of making predictions about the future, less work has investigated how the outcome of those predictions (whether consistent or inconsistent with what one predicts) is later remembered. Limited past works suggests that memory for outcomes that are consistent with what one predicts are better remembered that predictions that are inconsistent. To advance understanding of the relationship between episodic memory and future thinking, the current investigation examines how the outcome of predictions affects memory after the predicted events takes place. Methods In this experiment, participants first learned trait information about social targets. Then, participants imagined scenarios involving targets and the self (i.e., the participant) and made predictions about which behaviors targets would perform based on the trait information associated with targets participants learned earlier. Participants were then told the behaviors the targets actually performed (i.e., prediction outcome), which was either consistent or inconsistent with predictions, before then taking a memory test for prediction outcomes (what the social target actually did). Results Results showed memory for prediction-consistent outcomes was better than for prediction-inconsistent outcomes, suggesting people exhibit enhanced memory for events that are in line with predictions based on existing contents of memory (e.g., what one knows; schemas), which is in line with the limited past work in this domain. Conclusion Overall, finding better memory for prediction-consistent outcomes may reflect an adaptive function in memory, where people show enhanced memory for episodes when they play out as predicted, and aligned with the current contents of memory.
... While all the study targets have been completed, the thesis has many drawbacks. The conclusion obtained from self-evaluation may not be right because of self-bias (Brown, 1986). Naturally, people tend to rank themselves even more than anyone else. ...
Article
Full-text available
Workplace incivility has gotten a lot of attention in recent decades. Researchers have looked at many forms of aggressive conduct in the workplace and their negative impacts on individuals and businesses. The goal of this study was to see how incivility among supervisors leads to work withdrawal and when this link might be mitigated. We argued that supervisor incivility indirectly influences work withdrawal behavior through job insecurity, and that emotional intelligence moderates this connection. This study attempted to evaluate the influence of supervisor incivility on the job withdrawal behavior of personnel working in several banks Lahore by drawing on affective events theory and conservation of resource theory. Data were gathered from 350 workers of banks in Lahore, Gujranwala, and Sheikhupura to test our assumptions, and SPSS 24 was used to generate and analyze data with Hayes Process. The findings revealed a strong link between supervisor incivility and job insecurity but no link between supervisor incivility and work withdrawal behavior. The idea of moderation was validated, since emotional intelligence moderates the relationship between job insecurity and job withdrawal behavior. There are also suggestions for more empirical studies and theoretical and practical ramifications.
... Par ailleurs,Kouabenan (2006c) note que le biais de supériorité est rapporté également en ce qui concerne le respect des règles de circulation. Par exemple, les recherches montrent que les conducteurs se perçoivent comme étant meilleurs que le conducteur moyen en ce qui concerne le respect des règles de sécurité(Delhomme, 1991 ;Walton & Bathurst, 1998).Ce biais de supériorité peut être motivé par des besoins d'estime de soi(Brown, 1986).En effet, les individus ont des avis plus positifs sur eux-mêmes que sur les autres, car la croyance d'être au-dessus de la moyenne génère des émotions positives(Măirean & ...
Thesis
La présente thèse cherche à comprendre les facteurs qui peuvent agir sur le comportement des usagers de la route au Maroc. Elle vise à examiner le lien entre les croyances, la perception du risque, l’explications causale des accidents et le comportement de sécurité. Cette thèse repose sur une méthodologie mixte, combinant une approche qualitative et une approche quantitative. Elle comprend une pré-étude et une étude principale. La pré-étude vise à mettre en lumière les formes de croyances par rapport à la sécurité routière dans le contexte marocain, les risques routiers et les causes des accidents de la route, ainsi que la perception des actions de prévention. Elle est menée auprès de 90 usagers de la route par le biais d'entretiens semi-directifs. Les données recueillies ont fait l’objet d’une analyse thématique manuelle. Il en ressort que les risques auxquels les usagers de la route sont exposés et les causes des accidents de la route sont davantage liés au comportement des usagers de la route et au mauvais état des routes. Par ailleurs, les participants perçoivent les actions de prévention menées au Maroc comme étant inefficaces. Enfin, les croyances religieuses, les croyances fatalistes et les croyances de contrôle apparaissent comme les formes les plus fréquentes de croyances liées à la sécurité routière au Maroc. Les résultats de cette pré-étude ont permis de construire un questionnaire pour tester les liens entre les variables prises en compte dans cette thèse. L’étude principale est justement menée par questionnaire. Les données ont été recueillies sur le terrain au Maroc en face à face auprès de 1017 conducteurs. Cette étude examine la relation entre les croyances de contrôle, les croyances fatalistes, la perception du risque, les explications causales des accidents et les comportements de sécurité. L’hypothèse générale stipule que les croyances, la perception du risque et l’explication causale naïve des accidents sont des facteurs qui peuvent permettre de cerner les comportements des usagers de la route marocains. Des analyses de régression multiple et une analyse en équations structurelles ont été réalisées. Il en ressort que les conducteurs ayant un sentiment de contrôle élevé face au risque routier tendent à avoir une faible perception de ce risque et à adopter un comportement moins sécuritaire. En outre, les conducteurs fatalistes tendent à expliquer les accidents de la route par des causes externes aux conducteurs et à adopter un comportement moins sécuritaire. Par ailleurs, on observe que les conducteurs tendent à adopter un comportement plus sécuritaire lorsqu'ils perçoivent le risque routier comme étant plus élevé. De même, les conducteurs tendent à adopter un comportement plus sécuritaire lorsqu'ils expliquent les accidents par des causes internes aux conducteurs. Par ailleurs, les analyses d'interaction montrent que le comportement tend à être moins sécuritaire pour les conducteurs moins âgés, moins expérimentés et n'ayant pas eu d'accident lorsqu'ils ont un niveau élevé de contrôle perçu sur le risque, contrairement aux conducteurs plus âgés, plus expérimentés et ayant eu plusieurs accidents, pour lesquels le comportement de sécurité dépend très peu du niveau de contrôle perçu. Enfin, les résultats indiquent que l’effet des croyances de contrôle sur les comportements de sécurité est médié par la perception du risque. Les résultats obtenus dans cette thèse sont globalement en accord avec les travaux antérieurs dans le domaine. Ces résultats sont discutés et interprétés à l'appui des considérations théoriques et des travaux antérieurs. Les issues pratiques de ce travail suggèrent, entre autres, que les actions de prévention devraient viser à réduire la vision fataliste des conducteurs marocains concernant la causalité des accidents de la route, et les amener à prendre conscience que, même s'ils ont des capacités personnelles pour faire face aux risques sur la route, ils ne sont pas à l'abri du risque.
... There is a wealth of evidence that mentally healthy individuals have positively enhanced, rather than realistic, self-perceptions across multiple cognitive domains. For example, identifying positive traits are far more characteristic of the self than negative attributes (Alicke, 1985;Brown, 1986). This is exemplified in the "Better-than-Average-Effect" where mentally healthy individuals tend to endorse positive traits as more self-descriptive relative to others (e.g., Alicke et al., 1995), and from data showing that self-evaluations are systematically more positive than those of objective observers (e.g., Lewinsohn et al., 1980). ...
Article
Full-text available
Hierarchies pervade human society, characterising its members along diverse dimensions ranging from their abilities or skills in a particular domain to their economic status or physical stature. One intriguing aspect of the centrality of hierarchies, relative to egalitarian constructs, is that hierarchically-organised social information appears to be remembered more easily than non-hierarchically-organised information. However, it is not yet clear how one's social rank within a hierarchy influences processing. In a pre-registered study with 66 healthy participants, we examined memory recall for hierarchical information when participants themselves were positioned higher in the hierarchy versus lower in the hierarchy, both relative to an egalitarian control condition. The results replicate previous work showing that hierarchical information is memorised faster relative to the egalitarian control. Importantly, this effect was modulated by the participant's position within the hierarchy, with higher positioned participants memorising information faster than lower-positioned participants. This study provides new evidence showing biases in memory will favour hierarchical information if modulated by perceptions of one's own social rank.
... Originally, the above-average effect has been described as motivated by self-enhancement needs (i.e., to induce positive affect towards oneself) or a byproduct of motivated reasoning (Alicke, 1985;Brown, 1986;Kunda, 1990;Taylor & Brown, 1988). Self-enhancement enables the maintenance of a global self-concept allowing for both positive attributes under personal control and negative attributes resulting from factors beyond personal control (Alicke, 1985). ...
Article
Full-text available
Above-and-below-average effects are well-known phenomena that arise when comparing oneself to others. Kruger (1999) found that people rate themselves as above average for easy abilities and below average for difficult abilities. We conducted a successful pre-registered replication of Kruger’s (1999) Study 1, the first demonstration of the core phenomenon (N = 756, US MTurk workers). Extending the replication to also include a between-subject design, we added two conditions manipulating easy and difficult interpretations of the original ability domains, and with an additional dependent variable measuring perceived difficulty. We observed an above-average-effect in the easy extension and below-average-effect in the difficult extension, compared to the neutral replication condition. Both extension conditions were perceived as less ambiguous than the original neutral condition. Overall, we conclude strong empirical support for Kruger’s above-and-below-average effects, with boundary conditions laid out in the extensions expanding both generalizability and robustness of the phenomenon. All materials, data, and code are available on: https://osf.io/7yfkc/ .
Article
The importance of having high self-esteem is frequently debated in academic and public domains, and believing that high self-esteem causes good outcomes has recently been introduced as an impactful individual difference variable. For example, naïve theories about self-esteem's causal influence (e.g., believing that high self-esteem protects one's health) is related to an increased pursuit of self-enhancement. However, several critical qualities of the self-esteem importance scale (Vaughan-Johnson & Jacobson, 2020) remain unexamined, and we explore these questions across four main and two supplementary studies (total N = 1997). Self-esteem importance beliefs were stable across time and distinct from other self and motivational constructs. Consistent with expectations derived from prior research and theory, we found cultural (European-Canadian vs. Asian-Canadian) and gender differences on self-esteem importance. Finally, we demonstrate that high scorers on the self-esteem importance scale anticipate heightened responses to rejection vs. acceptance scenarios. Thus, self-esteem importance beliefs are chronologically stable, are relatively independent from past self-related variables, reflect known group differences from past research, and are linked with an amplified sensitivity to social threat versus reward. These findings support key theoretical claims made about the self-esteem importance construct, and suggest likely unintended consequences of promoting self-esteem's consequentiality.
Article
This study focuses on how American audiences perceived news coverage during the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic in the United States. Through a survey-experiment of news consumers (N = 767) over a three-day period in mid-March 2020, this study shows that citizens had positive attitudes toward their own Covid-19 news sources, but were critical about the news sources others were using to get information about the virus. Data reveal evidence of presumed media influence, where audiences believed others’ health behaviors were being influenced by pandemic news.
Article
Full-text available
Article
To investigate emergency clinicians’ comfort level in assessing neurological emergencies and to identify opportunities to foster enhanced training of clinical neurology in the emergency room. Internet‐based survey. University teaching hospitals and private referral centers. One hundred and ninety‐two emergency and critical care specialists and resident trainees (ECC) and 104 neurology specialists and resident trainees (NEUR) in clinical practice. An internet‐based survey was distributed via veterinary professional organizations’ listserves and message boards and responses were collected between March and April 2020. ECC completed a survey evaluating stress levels associated with neurological emergencies, confidence with neurological examinations, and neuroanatomical localization. NEUR completed a similar survey to report their perception of their ECC colleagues’ confidence in the assessment of neurological cases. Chi‐square and Mann–Whitney U‐tests were used to compare categorical responses and confidence scores between groups. P < 0.002 was considered significant. Fifty‐two percent of ECC found neurological emergencies slightly challenging, whereas 85% of NEUR found them moderately to extremely challenging for ECC (P < 0.0001). ECC's median self‐reported confidence score in performing a neurologic examination on a scale of 0–100 was 75 (interquartile range [IQR], 27), while NEUR reported a median ECC confidence of 44 (IQR, 25; P < 0.0001). Median self‐reported ECC confidence in localizing intracranial, spinal, and neuromuscular disease was 67 (IQR, 40), 88 (IQR, 21), and 60 (IQR, 37), respectively, which was significantly higher than median NEUR‐reported ECC confidence of 35 (IQR, 38), 51 (IQR, 31), and 18 (IQR, 20), respectively (all P < 0.0001). Following case transfer, 34% of ECC received NEUR feedback in >75% of cases. Noticeable discrepancies between ECC and NEUR perceptions of ECC clinical confidence were seen, while no firm evidence of neurophobia could be inferred. Improvements in interdepartmental communication and teaching of clinical neurology may be warranted.
Article
Full-text available
Global self-esteem is a component of individual personality that impacts decision-making. Many studies have discussed the different preferences for decision-making in response to threats to a person’s self-confidence, depending on global self-esteem. However, studies about global self-esteem and non-social decision-making have indicated that decisions differ due to reward sensitivity. Here, reward sensitivity refers to the extent to which rewards change decisions. We hypothesized that individuals with lower global self-esteem have lower reward sensitivity and investigated the relationship between self-esteem and reward sensitivity using a computational model. We first examined the effect of expected value and maximum value in learning under uncertainties because some studies have shown the possibility of saliency (e.g. maximum value) and relative value (e.g. expected value) affecting decisions, respectively. In our learning task, expected value affected decisions, but there was no significant effect of maximum value. Therefore, we modelled participants’ choices under the condition of different expected value without considering maximum value. We used the Q-learning model, which is one of the traditional computational models in explaining experiential learning decisions. Global self-esteem correlated positively with reward sensitivity. Our results suggest that individual reward sensitivity affects decision-making depending on one’s global self-esteem.
Article
Past research suggests that personality differs by age—older adults tend to be more conscientious, agreeable, and less neurotic than younger adults. However, most of these studies have used self-report measures of personality which may be influenced by people's motivations to appear socially desirable that also change over time. If these changing motivations affect the validity of personality measures, our understanding of age differences in personality may need to be revised. In the current study (N = 12,702), we examined age differences in implicit (i.e., IAT-based) and explicit (i.e., traditional self-report) measures of personality. Although we found some heterogeneity in the exact non-linear age patterns of personality across different measures, the age patterns were largely consistent across implicit and explicit measures of personality.
Article
The focus of diagnostic radiology training is on creating competent professionals, whereas confidence and its calibration receive less attention. Appropriate confidence is critical for patient care both during and after training. Overconfidence can adversely affect patient care and underconfidence can create excessive costs. We reviewed the psychology and medical literature pertaining to confidence and competence to collect insights and best practices from the psychology and medical literature on confidence and apply them to radiology training. People are rarely accurate in assessments of their own competence. Among physicians, the correlation between perceived abilities and external assessments of those abilities is weak. Overconfidence is more prevalent than underconfidence, particularly at lower levels of competence. On the individual level, confidence can be calibrated to a more appropriate level through efforts to increase competence, including sub-specialization, and by gaining a better understanding of metacognitive processes. With feedback, high-fidelity simulation has the potential to improve both competence and metacognition. On the system level, systems that facilitate access to follow-up imaging, pathology, and clinical outcomes can help close the gap between perceived and actual performance. Appropriate matching of trainee confidence and competence should be a goal of radiology residency and fellowship training to help mitigate the adverse effects of both overconfidence and underconfidence during training and independent practice.
Article
Our study aims to deepen the understanding of personalized digital nudges by evaluating their effects on energy‐saving behavior. We conducted a field experiment with a leading smart metering company in South Korea to investigate whether customers save more energy when a personalized goal and feedback are provided, and how the impacts of nudges vary according to the types of misperception. Specifically, we focused on the behavior of customers who underestimate or overestimate their past electricity usage compared to their actual consumption. We merged daily energy consumption with a pre‐experiment survey for the customers. We found that goal‐setting and feedback mechanisms have a markedly different impact on each type of misperception. Underestimating customers reduced energy consumption only under the “goal setting with feedback treatment”. Conversely, overestimating customers reduced energy consumption even under the “goal setting without feedback” condition. The underlying mechanism is suggested as updating biased beliefs towards goal achievement. Overall, the results demonstrate that personalized nudges lead to heterogeneous behavioral responses and that service providers and policymakers can use these signals to enrich their planning of behavioral nudges.
Article
Despite the tremendous growth of Airbnb, various media have reported ethical misconduct occurring within the Airbnb context by both hosts and users. The current research seeks to examine the interactive effects of power (high vs. low) and psychological distance (close vs. distant) to explain individual tolerance of unethical behavior across two experimental studies for the case of Airbnb. Specifically, we propose that when an individual (i.e., an Airbnb host or user) feels powerless (vs. powerful), that individual will show a low level of tolerance to unethical behavior and tend to judge the ethical behavior more harshly. However, the effect of power will only emerge in the psychologically close condition (e.g., a host judging a host's unethical behavior), but not in the psychologically distant condition (e.g., a host judging a user's unethical behavior). Further, we establish that this interactive effect is mediated by feelings of empathy.
Article
Research on hostile media perception (HMP) has suggested that both news slants and partisan source cues influence individuals’ perception of news bias. Yet, relatively little attention has been paid to the possibility that the two message features may interact. Extending the literature on HMP, the present experiment investigates the content-source interaction in the context of President Trump’s policy on immigration, with two audience characteristics as potential moderators: political ideology strength (PIS) and need for cognition (NFC). Results show that (1) the effect of news slants on HMP is greater when the news is from an in-group source and (2) such interaction is more pronounced for those with higher levels of PIS and lower levels of NFC. Implications for our understanding of HMP and for public opinion in an increasingly fragmented and partisan media environment will be discussed.
Article
We investigated comparisons to the average other in shaping how individuals view their lives as unfolding over time, affective reactions, and motivation. Participants described their current life (Study 1; N = 382; M age = 30.01 years; 43% female) or their life as unfolding over time (Study 2; N = 451; M age = 30.89; 54% female) as either better (BTA) or worse (WTA) than the average person their age and gender (both studies included a ‘no comparison’ control group). In both studies the BTA (vs. WTA) condition resulted in greater perceived improvement in life satisfaction, more positive affective reactions, and greater motivation to achieve one’s goals for the future. Thus, we conclude that viewing one’s current life or one’s progress in life over time as better (vs. worse) than average leads to more favourable temporal life evaluations, more positive affective responses, and greater motivation.
Article
Full-text available
We estimate that foreign language learners in tertiary institutions have individual objectives for studying a particular language. These objectives become a major motivation for these learners to take a foreign language course. It is therefore our major preoccupation in this research to study in detail students' individual motives for taking a French language course especially at the University level. We believe that having knowledge about students' individual motivation is beneficial in meeting learning and teaching objectives.
Article
Background Accurate self-assessment of knowledge and technical skills is key to self-directed education required in surgical training. We aimed to investigate the presence and magnitude of cognitive bias in self-assessment among a cohort of surgical interns. Methods First-year general surgery residents self-assessed performance on a battery of technical skill tasks (knot tying, suturing, vascular anastomosis, Fundamentals of Laparoscopic Skills peg transfer and intracorporeal suturing) at the beginning of residency. Each self-assessment was compared to actual performance. Bias and deviation were defined as arithmetic and absolute difference between actual and estimated scores. Spearman correlation assessed covariation between actual and estimated scores. Improvement in participant performance was analyzed after an end-of-year assessment. Results Participants (N = 34) completed assessments from 2017 to 2019. Actual and self-assessment scores were positively correlated (0.55, P < .001). Residents generally underestimated performance (bias -4.7 + 8.1). Participants who performed above cohort average tended to assess themselves more negatively (bias -7.3 vs -2.3) and had a larger discrepancy between self and actual scores than below average performers (deviation index 9.7 + 8.2 vs 3.8 + 3.1, P < .05). End-of-year total scores improved in 31 (91.2%) participants by an average of 11 points (90 possible). Least accurate residents in initial self-assessments (deviation indices >75th percentile) improved less than more accurate residents (median 5 vs 16 points, P < .05). All residents with a deviation index >75 percentile underestimated their performance. Conclusion Cognitive bias in technical surgical skills is apparent in first-year surgical residents, particularly in those who are higher performers. Inaccuracy in self-assessment may influence improvement and should be addressed in surgical training.
Chapter
In 2003, the President's Council on Bioethics released a report that analyzed possible drugs to dampen traumatic memories. Such drugs hold promise for victims of terrorism, military conflict, assault, car accidents, and natural disasters who might otherwise suffer from intense, painful memories. While the Council acknowledged potential benefits of memory dampening, many members were quite troubled by it. In this chapter, I describe some ethical issues that could arise from memory dampening and argue that many of the Council’s concerns were founded on controversial premises that unjustifiably privileged our natural cognitive abilities. While memory dampening may eventually require thoughtful regulation, broad-brushed restrictions are unjustified: We have a deeply personal interest in controlling our own minds that entitles us to a certain freedom of memory.
Article
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: (1) to provide a philosophical justification for the counterintuitive attitude that Judaism seems to have towards proselytism; and (2) to extend the case so as to create a general argument, applicable to all religions, against many forms of proselytism.
Article
Full-text available
The study aims at identifying a one-to-one correspondence among self-consciousness and social interaction anxiety between students. Furthermore, the differences between coeducational and non-coeducational schools were also studied. Correlation research design and purposive sampling strategy was used to collect the data. A total sample of N= 200 participants were selected out of which 100 students were enrolled in coeducational, boys and girls, each (n= 50) and 100 participants who were enrolled in non-coeducational schools, boys and girls, each (n= 50) with ages ranging between 14-19 years old. The scales used in the research were The Self-Consciousness Revised Scale (Scheier & Carver, 1985) and Social Interaction Anxiousness Scale (Leary, 1983). Results suggested strong correlation among self-consciousness both in public and private, as well as in social anxiety and social interaction anxiety. Moreover, no differences were found in relation to the self-consciousness and social interaction anxiety between the students enrolled both within coeducational and non-coeducational schools.
Article
High numbers of young military personnel die due to road traffic collisions (RTCs). Yet, there is a paucity of research related to the contributing factors (i.e., optimism bias and willingness to take risks) associated with RTCs and the examination of road safety education program tailored at reducing young military fatalities. In order to address this gap in the literature, we examined one specific road safety educational intervention tailored for the UK military personnel and investigated their attitudes towards the program, optimism bias and willingness to take risks. Measures evaluating their optimism bias, willingness to take risks and attitudes towards the program were asked after the participants attended the road safety interventions. The results revealed that young military personnel, aged 18–25, had higher optimism bias and willingness to take risks compared to older military personnel, and that this effect diminishes with age. The results provide importance evidence related to military personnel’s attitudes to risk-taking.
Depression, non-depression, and cognitive illusions A replc