“Enemy Territory:” Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands

Abstract

For the last two decades, the guiding strategy of immigration enforcement along the US-Mexico border has been “prevention through deterrence,” or stopping unauthorized immigrants from entering the country rather than apprehending those who have already crossed the border. “Prevention through deterrence” has entailed a massive concentration of enforcement personnel and resources along the border and at ports of entry. It has also led to the detention and removal of increasing numbers of unauthorized immigrants and far greater use of “expedited removal.” As gauged by the doubling in size of the unauthorized immigrant population over the same period, “prevention through deterrence” has not been a successful enforcement strategy. Moreover, it has funneled more migrants to their death in the deserts and mountains of the southwest as they (and smugglers) resort to increasingly dangerous routes to evade border enforcement. In addition, there has been public concern over ethnic profiling and the use of extraordinary authority by Border Patrol agents to conduct arbitrary searches within 100 miles of the border. Despite these problems, the federal government continues to spend billions of dollars each year on the “prevention through deterrence” strategy.A first step in overcoming the deficiencies of this border enforcement strategy is to strengthen accountability within the Border Patrol, so that allegations of excessive force and abuse are investigated and adjudicated promptly and appropriately. The culture of the Border Patrol must be transformed to foster respect for rights. More broadly, the mission of the Border Patrol should be to capture dangerous individuals and to disrupt the operations of the transnational criminal organizations that traffic people, drugs, guns, and money. In addition, providing more pathways to legal entry through immigration reform would enhance border security by attenuating the flow of unauthorized immigrants within which dangerous criminals or terrorists can hide. Finally, the US government should pursue economic policies to promote development in Mexico and Central American countries in order to address the underlying causes of migration.

Full text

© 2014 by the Center for Migration Studies of New York. All rights reserved.
JMHS Volume 2 Number 3 (2014): 198-222
“Enemy Territory”: Immigration
Enforcement in the US-Mexico
Borderlands
Walter A. Ewing
American Immigration Council
Executive Summary
For the last two decades, the guiding strategy of immigration enforcement
along the US-Mexico border has been “prevention through deterrence,” or
stopping unauthorized immigrants from entering the country rather than
apprehending those who have already crossed the border. “Prevention
through deterrence” has entailed a massive concentration of enforcement
personnel and resources along the border and at ports of entry. It has also
led to the detention and removal of increasing numbers of unauthorized
immigrants and far greater use of “expedited removal.”
As gauged by the doubling in size of the unauthorized immigrant
population over the same period, “prevention through deterrence” has not
been a successful enforcement strategy. Moreover, it has funneled more
migrants to their death in the deserts and mountains of the southwest
as they (and smugglers) resort to increasingly dangerous routes to evade
border enforcement. In addition, there has been public concern over ethnic
proling and the use of extraordinary authority by Border Patrol agents to
conduct arbitrary searches within 100 miles of the border. Despite these
problems, the federal government continues to spend billions of dollars
each year on the “prevention through deterrence” strategy.
A rst step in overcoming the deciencies of this border enforcement
strategy is to strengthen accountability within the Border Patrol, so that
allegations of excessive force and abuse are investigated and adjudicated
promptly and appropriately. The culture of the Border Patrol must be
transformed to foster respect for rights. More broadly, the mission of the
Border Patrol should be to capture dangerous individuals and to disrupt
the operations of the transnational criminal organizations that trafc
people, drugs, guns, and money. In addition, providing more pathways to
legal entry through immigration reform would enhance border security by
attenuating the ow of unauthorized immigrants within which dangerous
criminals or terrorists can hide. Finally, the US government should pursue
economic policies to promote development in Mexico and Central American
countries in order to address the underlying causes of migration.

Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands
199
Tenuous Rights
In 2008, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) described the US border as a
“Constitution-Free Zone,” referring to a 100-mile wide strip of territory around the “external
boundary” of the nation within which Fourth Amendment protections against random
and arbitrary stops and searches by law-enforcement ofcials do not apply. According to
the ACLU, the 197.4 million people residing in this zone—roughly two-thirds of the US
population—are subject to “administrative” stops by the Border Patrol or other federal
authorities for the purpose of guarding the nation’s borders from security threats (ACLU
2008b). The inland checkpoints where the Border Patrol conducts “administrative” stops
and searches are mostly clustered near the southwest borderlands of California, Arizona,
and Texas, but are also found along the northern border in Washington state and could, in
principle, appear anywhere else along US land or coastal borders (ACLU 2008a).
While the ACLU’s depiction of a border zone devoid of constitutional guarantees may be
over-stated, it does powerfully convey the manner in which federal authorities often treat
the borderlands, and especially the US-Mexico borderlands, as “enemy territory” (Nevins
2010, 171-73). The extraordinary authority of Border Patrol agents to conduct inland
border searches under the rationale of border protection has too often resulted in human
rights violations inicted upon both immigrants and native-born Americans. Some border
communities—like Douglas, Arizona—are so permeated by Border Patrol personnel and
equipment that the lives of all residents are disrupted to varying degrees (Nevins 2010,
155-58).
Over the course of decades, federal lawmakers have not only poured more and more
resources into controlling immigration and securing the border, but have fundamentally
changed the nation’s border and immigration enforcement strategies to prevent unauthorized
immigrants from entering the country. Yet legal immigration channels remain woefully
inadequate to accommodate the demand for either temporary or permanent visas. With a
lack of legal immigration options, migrants, many of whom have close family in the United
States, risk death by seeking to cross the US-Mexico border without authorization. Once
in the United States, they live in a precarious state dened by their “unlawful presence.”
The Evolution of US Border Enforcement
Since the creation of the Border Patrol in 1924, many border communities have been living
with heavy-handed border enforcement. But the nature and scale of that enforcement has
varied considerably over time, with different communities experiencing different degrees
of Border Patrol intrusion at different periods. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s,
the immigration enforcement strategy of the Border Patrol was focused on the arrest of
unauthorized immigrants who had already made it across the border and entered the
United States (Dunn 2009, 125-63; Rosenblum 2013, 3). As a result, the Border Patrol
was highly active in Mexican-American communities in border cities like El Paso, Texas,
which meant that US citizens of Mexican heritage were often stopped, searched for drugs
and weapons, and questioned about their immigration status. Moreover, unauthorized
immigrants and native-born citizens alike fell victim to beatings and other forms of abuse
at the hands of Border Patrol agents (Dunn 2009, 125-63).

Journal on Migration and Human Security
200
Life along the border began to change substantially in the early 1990s with the
implementation of a “prevention through deterrence” strategy of immigration enforcement
devoted to deterring unauthorized entry into the country. This was to be accomplished
by amassing enforcement personnel and resources directly along the border (Dunn 2009,
125-63; Rosenblum 2013, 3). As this strategy was gradually implemented along more of
the border, traditional crossing points in urban areas became more difficult to traverse
and unauthorized ows shifted to outlying areas. As a result, the growing ranks of Border
Patrol agents began to deploy to more rural communities comprised mainly of
immigrants. Enforcement efforts therefore became more tightly focused on noncitizens,
and the abuses which occurred were now less visible to the general public (Dunn 2009,
125-63, 196). But the abuses were no less real, and US citizens in urban areas were not
immune to the periodic enforcement excesses of roving patrols (Rosas 2012). However,
the efforts of advocacy groups such as the Border Network for Human Rights have
succeeded in curbing abuses in some locales (Peter 2014).
The Quest for “Prevention through Deterrence”
The strategy of “prevention through deterrence” was rst implemented in El Paso in 1993
as Operation Blockade, then in San Diego in 1994 as Operation Gatekeeper, and later in
other portions of the Texas, California, and Arizona borderlands (Dunn 2009, 1; Rosenblum
2013, 3-4; Massey, et al. 2002, 93-95). These various operations were characterized by the
massing of Border Patrol agents at the border together with an assortment of technologies
which came to include ground radar, cameras, motion detectors, thermal imaging sensors,
stadium lighting, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (Rosenblum 2013, 17-18).
But the symbolic centerpiece of “prevention through deterrence” has always been the
border fence. Starting with just a single 14-mile stretch in San Diego that was completed
in 1993, by February 10, 2012, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—the parent
agency of the Border Patrol within the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—had
nished building 651 miles of pedestrian and vehicle fencing along the US-Mexico border
(Nuñez-Neto and Kim 2008, 1; CBP 2014a). The fence is symbolic not only because of
its imposing presence, but also because it does not work as a deterrent. According to the
US Government Accountability Ofce (GAO), during Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 there were
“4,037 documented and repaired breaches” of border fencing (GAO 2011, 9). And no one
knows how many times smugglers have simply driven over the fence by using a system of
truck-mounted hydraulic ramps (Goddard 2012, 5).
Effective or not, a massive amount of money and manpower has been poured into border
enforcement since the initiation of “prevention through deterrence.” The annual budget
of the Border Patrol has increased ten-fold, from $363 million in FY 1993 to $3.5 billion
in FY 2013 (US Border Patrol 2014a). During this same period, the number of Border
Patrol agents stationed along the southwest border increased from 3,444 to 18,611 (US
Border Patrol 2014b). These increases eventually had a major impact on every Border
Patrol sector (US Border Patrol 2014b).

Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands
201
$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
$3,000
$3,500
$4,000
Millions
Fiscal Year
Source: US Border Patrol 2014(a).
Figure 1: US Border Patrol Budget, FY 1993-2013

Journal on Migration and Human Security
202
Figure 2: Number of US Border Patrol Agents Stationed Along Southwest Border,
FY 1993-2013
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000
Fiscal Year
Source: US Border Patrol 2014(b).

Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands
203
Variations on a Theme
The “prevention through deterrence” strategy has gone through a few iterations since it
was introduced in the 1994 National Strategic Plan of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). However, the fundamental goal of deterring unauthorized immigration
through concentrated border enforcement has remained the same (Rosenblum 2013, 3).
The rst reshaping of the strategy came in the wake of 9/11 with the dissolution of the
INS and the creation of DHS. The new National Border Patrol Strategy of 2004 placed
a high rhetorical value on the interdiction of terrorists attempting to cross the border and
emphasized the use of “Smart Border” technology (camera systems, sensor platforms,
gamma x-rays) to get the job done. Yet the primary day-to-day work of the agency would
continue to be the deterrence of “illegal entries through improved enforcement” (CBP 2004,
2-3). The next iteration of this approach came with the 2005–2010 Strategic Plan of CBP.
The plan’s title, “Protect America,” encapsulated the continued rhetorical focus on ghting
terrorism. In addition, the plan called for “establishing and maintaining operational control
of the borders” through a combination of personnel, technology, and a more centralized
command structure within the Border Patrol (CBP 2005, 2, 23).
DHS Secure Border Initiative
The central role of technology in securing the border was apparent in DHS’s Secure Border
Initiative (SBI) of 2005. The rather ambitious aim of SBI was “to achieve operational
control of both the northern and southern border within ve years”—which did not occur.
Nevertheless, this goal was to have been achieved through a variety of means, including a
general ramping up of immigration enforcement both along the borders and in the interior
of the country; ending the so-called “catch and release” of unauthorized immigrants from
countries other than Mexico; and expanding immigration-detention capacity and use of the
“expedited removal” process. However, the centerpiece of SBI was increased investment
in “tactical infrastructure” along the border (fences and vehicle barriers), together with
the development of “SBInet,” a system of “smart” technologies such as thermal imaging,
ground radar, and drones that would allow Border Patrol agents to detect the unauthorized
entry of immigrants into the United States (DHS 2005; Rosenblum 2013, 5-6).
SBInet
SBInet did not go smoothly. In September 2006, CBP awarded a contract to Boeing to
develop and deploy SBInet technologies. One of Boeing’s rst tasks was Project 28, a
$20.6 million effort to secure 28 miles of border in Sasabe, Arizona (Ewing 2010; Miller
2014). Boeing was not up to the task. According to a 2010 GAO report, “the number of new
SBInet defects has increased faster than the number of defects that have been xed, which
is not a trend that is indicative of a maturing system” (GAO 2010, 25). On March 16, 2010,
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano froze funding for the program and issued
a statement noting that “the system of sensors and cameras along the southwest border
known as SBInet has been plagued with cost overruns and missed deadlines.” A decision
was made to “redeploy” funds to off-the-shelf, “tested, commercially available security

Journal on Migration and Human Security
204
technology” (DHS 2010). After SBInet was ofcially cancelled in January 2011, CBP
developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan—a combination of cameras,
radars, and sensors designed to secure the Arizona-Mexico border (GAO 2014, 2).
endIng “CatCh and ReleaSe”
SBI also involved changes in the way unauthorized immigrants were handled and processed
by the Border Patrol. Until recently, if the immigrant was from Mexico and did not have
any outstanding warrants, was not a convicted felon, and had not been formally “removed”
or deported from the United States, he or she could be “voluntarily returned” home.
But if an immigrant with a clean record was what the Border Patrol terms Other Than
Mexican (OTM), he or she was placed in removal proceedings. The Border Patrol would
then contact the Ofce of Enforcement and Removal Operations at US Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE)—the interior-enforcement counterpart to CBP within DHS—
to determine if detention space was available for the immigrant to be held during the
removal process. If there was no available space, as was often the case, then the immigrant
would be issued a “Notice to Appear” before an immigration judge on a specied date and
released on his or her own recognizance. Most immigrants who were issued a Notice to
Appear did not do so. As a result, critics dubbed the practice “catch and release” and it
was largely ended in August 2006 (Nuñez-Neto et al. 2006, 2-10).1
expanSIon of “expedIted Removal” authoRIty
Putting an end to the policy of “catch and release” involved not only an increase in the
detention capacity of ICE, but also an expansion of the “expedited removal” process by
which arriving immigrants are removed from the United States without the opportunity for a
hearing before an immigration judge. Immigrants who enter without proper documentation
can be summarily removed from the United States by an immigration ofcer unless they
request asylum or express a fear of persecution or torture if returned home, in which case
they are supposed to be referred to an asylum ofcer who determines if that fear is “credible.”
In addition to being accorded scant legal rights, immigrants placed into expedited removal,
as well as those awaiting a credible fear determination, are subject to mandatory detention.
Expedited removal was originally applied only to immigrants arriving at ports of entry. But
it was expanded in 2005 to include immigrants apprehended by the Border Patrol between
ports of entry along the southwest border, and, in 2006, to immigrants apprehended along
the northern border. The federal government currently applies expedited removal authority
to unauthorized immigrants arrested up to 100 miles from a land border, and who arrived
in the United States within the previous 14 days (Siskin and Wasem 2008, 4-8).
CBp ConSequenCe delIveRy SyStem
At the same time SBI was being implemented, CBP was rolling out its “Consequence
1 Unauthorized immigrants who request asylum and are found to have a “credible fear” of persecution if
returned to their home countries can be paroled into the United States—a practice which is also referred to
by critics as “catch and release” (Nuñez-Neto et al. 2006, 4).

Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands
205
Delivery System” (Rosenblum 2013, 6-8). As described by Border Patrol Chief Michael
J. Fisher, Consequence Delivery “uses a combination of criminal and administrative
consequences developed by the Border Patrol, and implemented with the assistance of
ICE, targeting specic classications of offenders, effectively breaking the smuggling
cycle along the border of the United States” (Fisher 2011a). In practice, this means that
fewer apprehended Mexicans are given the option of “voluntary return” to Mexico. Rather,
the Border Patrol now opts for three types of “high consequence” outcomes: formal
removal (deportation); immigration-related criminal charges; and lateral repatriation (that
is, sending immigrants to remote locations far from the smugglers who took them across
the border) (Rosenblum 2013, 6-8). Lateral repatriation can result in the separation of
family members who migrated together, and it sometimes returns migrants to
dangerous border cities without their belongings (De León 2013; Slack et al. 2013).
opeRatIon StReamlIne
One prominent component of Consequence Delivery is Operation Streamline, which Chief
Fisher describes as “a consequence-based prosecution program” (Fisher 2011b). Under
Streamline, unauthorized border-crossers are prosecuted in group trials and convicted of
illegal entry into the country, which is a misdemeanor. If they cross again, they may be
convicted of a felony and face up to two years in prison (Lydgate 2010, 481-544). Although
these offenses have been on the books since 1929, they are being applied under Operation
Streamline more widely than ever before (Keller 2010, 65-139). The structure of Operation
Streamline—in which 80 or more immigrants are tried at one time, and each defendant
has only a few minutes of access to an attorney—compromises due process. Moreover,
Streamline has severely strained the capacities of courtrooms along the border and
clogged the courts with petty immigration offenses (Lydgate 2010, 481-544). According to
Department of Justice data analyzed by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
(TRAC), immigration prosecutions “reached an all-time high” in FY 2013 of 97,384 (of
which 53,789 were for “illegal entry” and 37,346 for “illegal re-entry”). This marks an
increase of 367 percent over the number of prosecutions 10 years earlier (TRAC 2013a).
Collateral Damage
In addition to deporting non-violent immigrants en masse, the Border Patrol’s tactics and
priorities also manage to drive unauthorized immigrants to their death. This was the case
even before implementation of the “prevention through deterrence” strategy (Bailey, et al.
1996, 16-20; Massey, et al. 2002, 113-14). However, since the dawn of the “prevention
through deterrence” era in 1994, the number of deaths has surged as smugglers lead their
clients through increasingly isolated and dangerous terrain in order to evade heightened
US border enforcement. The Border Patrol recorded 5,570 migrant deaths from FY 1998
to FY 2012 (Border Patrol 2013). As border enforcement resources were concentrated in
California and Texas beginning in the early 1990s, more and more migrants began crossing
into the United States through Arizona—and dying there. According to the Pima County
Ofce of the Medical Examiner, 2,238 migrants died in just the Tucson Sector of the US-
Mexico border from FY 1990 to FY 2012 (Martínez, et al. 2013).2
2 The data in gures 3 and 4 do not include estimates of fatalities on the Mexico side of the US-Mexico
border.

Journal on Migration and Human Security
206
Figure 3: Migrant Deaths Along US-Mexico Border, FY 1998-2012
263249
380
340 320 338 328
492
454
398 385
420
365 375
463
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Fiscal Year
Source: US Border Patrol 2013.

Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands
207
87511 11 813 21 17 19
71 74
143 146
170
200
171
209
167
190
225
181
171
0
50
100
150
200
250
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Fiscal Year
Source: Martínez et al. 2013.
Figure 4: Migrant Deaths in Tucson Sector, FY 1990-2012

Journal on Migration and Human Security
208
But Border Patrol involvement in immigrant deaths is not always indirect. A 2013
investigation by the Arizona Republic found that, “since 2005, on-duty Border Patrol
agents and Customs and Border Protection ofcers have killed at least 42 people, including
at least 13 Americans” (Ortega and O’Dell 2013). According to journalists Bob Ortega and
Rob O’Dell, the shootings “vary from strongly justiable to highly questionable,” and in
none of the cases “is any agent or ofcer publicly known to have faced consequences—not
from the Border Patrol, not from Customs and Border Protection or Homeland Security, not
from the Department of Justice, and not, ultimately, from criminal or civil courts” (Ortega
and O’Dell 2013). In addition, a 2013 report by the Police Executive Research Forum
(PERF) raised serious concerns about the use of deadly force by CBP ofcers and agents,
in particular with regard to “shots red at vehicles and shots red at subjects throwing
rocks and other objects” (PERF 2013). The report advised, among other things, that CBP
personnel “should be prohibited from shooting at vehicles unless vehicle occupants are
attempting to use deadly force—other than the vehicle,” and that ofcers and agents “should
be prohibited from using deadly force against subjects throwing objects not capable of
causing serious physical injury or death” (PERF 2013, 2). In 2014, CBP released a new
“use of force” handbook that incorporated some of PERF’s recommendations, but fell short
of comprehensively revising its use-of-force policies (CBP 2014b).
In a related vein, research has documented physical abuse of deportees during their
apprehension or detention by CBP and ICE. A survey conducted between 2009 and 2012 by
the Migrant Border Crossing Study3 found that 11 percent of recent deportees interviewed
in Mexico reported being hit, pushed, grabbed, or physically attacked while in US custody
(Martínez, Slack, and Heyman 2013, 1-4). Likewise, a 2011 report by No More Deaths
found that 10 percent of deportees reported physical abuse at the hands of US authorities
(No More Deaths 2011). And a study of Salvadoran deportees from 1999 to 2000 found an
abuse rate of 16 percent (Phillips, Rodríguez, and Hagan 2002, 285-306). Taken together,
these studies indicate the abuse of far more people than the relative handful who report
mistreatment to the DHS Ofce for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, which received 58
cases of civil rights violations by CBP ofcers and 174 by ICE agents in FY 2012 (DHS
2013, 33).
Pending Policy Proposals for Border Enforcement
Fatalities and human rights violations notwithstanding, it seems likely that “prevention
through deterrence” could remain a cornerstone of US border enforcement. Escalating
levels of concentrated border enforcement are central to both the comprehensive
immigration reform bill passed by the Senate in June 2013 and the border enforcement
bill that passed the House Committee on Homeland Security in May 2013 (Ewing 2013).
At rst glance, these bills might seem very different. The Border Security, Economic
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744 seeks to revamp practically every
component of the US immigration system, while the Border Security Results Act, H.R.
3 The Migrant Border Crossing Study (MBCS) is a Ford Foundation-funded research project that is currently
housed in the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Arizona in Tucson and the Department
of Sociology at George Washington University in Washington, DC.

Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands
209
1417 is an enforcement-only bill which does not even acknowledge the existence of any
other component of immigration reform (Immigration Policy Center 2013; AILA 2013).
Yet the border enforcement provisions of the bills are very similar. Both share the arbitrary
and possibly unveriable goals of “operational control” over the entire southwest border
(dened as a 90 percent deterrence rate), as well as 100 percent “situational awareness”
(persistent surveillance). The Senate bill also extended border security provisions through
the Corker-Hoeven, or “border surge,” amendment, which seeks to aggressively expand
border security operations and would appropriate tens of billions of dollars in additional
funding, and hire 19,200 additional Border Patrol agents, before DHS has even determined
what resource and stafng levels are needed.
Likewise, the “Standards for Immigration Reform” released by the House Republican
leadership in January 2014 also would seem to suggest a continuation of the existing
enforcement-rst style of border control. The one-page statement asserts that:
It is the fundamental duty of any government to secure its borders, and the United
States is failing in this mission. We must secure our borders now and verify that they
are secure. In addition, we must ensure now that when immigration reform is enacted,
there will be a zero tolerance policy for those who cross the border illegally or overstay
their visas in the future. (Boehner 2014)
In perpetuating and expanding this model of border control, lawmakers are failing to address
the need for greater accountability of the law enforcement agencies that are responsible for
border security, a problem which culminates in human rights abuses.
Beyond the Border
The policies and practices of the Border Patrol do not exist in isolation. Rather, border
security operations have expanded in tandem with interior enforcement measures as part of
a broader national initiative. Since the creation of DHS in 2003, the annual budget of CBP
(which includes the Border Patrol) doubled from $5.9 billion to $11.9 billion in FY 2013.
Spending on ICE grew 73 percent, from $3.3 billion since its inception to $5.9 billion in
FY 2013 (DHS 2014). In addition to the growing ranks of Border Patrol agents, the number
of CBP ofcers stafng ports of entry grew from 17,279 in FY 2003 to 21,423 in FY 2012
(CBP 2012). The number of ICE agents devoted to Enforcement and Removal Operations
more than doubled from 2,710 in FY 2003 to 6,338 in FY 2012 (ICE 2013). All told, the
number of border and interior enforcement personnel now stands at more than 49,000
(Border Patrol 2012; CBP 2012; ICE 2013).
Secure Communities
The growth of ICE over the past decade is most apparent in the dramatic expansion of one
interior immigration enforcement program, Secure Communities. This DHS program, now
activated in all 3,181 jurisdictions across the United States, uses biometric data to screen for
deportable immigrants as people are being booked into jails, regardless of whether or not
they are actually charged with or convicted of crimes (ICE 2013; Rosenblum and Kandel
2012, 15-16). Under Secure Communities, the ngerprints of anyone who is arrested for

Journal on Migration and Human Security
210
Figure 5: CBP & ICE Annual Budgets, FY 2003-2013
$5.9 $6.0 $6.3 $7.1 $7.7
$9.3
$11.3 $11.5 $11.2 $11.8 $11.9
$3.3 $3.7 $3.1
$3.9
$4.7
$5.1
$6.0 $5.7 $5.8
$6.0 $5.9
$0
$2
$4
$6
$8
$10
$12
$14
$16
$18
$20
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Billions
Fiscal Year
Source: US DHS 2014.
ICE
CBP

Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands
211
Figure 6: CBP Officers, Border Patrol Agents,and ICE Agents, FY 2003-2012
17 18 18 18 18 20 21 20 20 21
11 11 11 12
15
17
20 21 21 21
3334
5
5
6666
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Thousands
Fiscal Year
Sources: US Border Patrol 2012; US CBP 2012; US ICE 2013.
* Includes only ERO Officers.
ICE*
Border Patrol
CBP

Journal on Migration and Human Security
212
any reason are run against both criminal databases and immigration databases. If there is
an immigration “hit,” ICE can issue a “detainer” requesting that the jail hold the person
in question until ICE can pick them up. Secure Communities has grown to encompass
every part of the country, throwing more and more people into immigration detention
prior to deportation (Waslin 2011). Most of the immigrants being scooped up by Secure
Communities are non-violent and not a threat to anyone. ICE data analyzed by TRAC
indicate that
…no more than 14 percent of the ‘detainers’ issued by the government in FY 2012 and
the rst four months of FY 2013 met the agency’s stated goal of targeting individuals
who pose a serious threat to public safety or national security. In fact, roughly half of
the 347,691 individuals subject to an ICE detainer (47.7 percent) had no record of a
criminal conviction, not even a minor trafc violation. (TRAC 2013b)
Given that Secure Communities is mostly targeting people who do not threaten public
safety, more than one hundred cities and counties around the country are refusing to
honor ICE detainers unless the individual in question has been arrested for a serious crime
(Linthicum 2014).
The Failure to Deter Unauthorized Immigration through
Enforcement Policies
Ironically, at the same time immigration enforcement has gone into overdrive, apprehensions
along the US-Mexico border have fallen to their lowest levels in decades (Simanski and Sapp
2013, 3). The Border Patrol is at times quick to take credit for this dramatic decline, acting
as if it were caused principally by the deterrent effect of their border enforcement programs
(Fisher 2011b). But it is not a coincidence that the greatest drop in apprehensions started
with the economic downturn which began in late 2007 and which reduced labor demand
throughout the US economy (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013, 9). The fact is that
the federal government has been trying without success to curb unauthorized immigration
through enforcement-only policies for a long time. Since the last major overhaul of the US
immigration system in 1986, the federal government has spent an estimated $186.8 billion
dollars on immigration enforcement (Meissner, et al. 2013, 3). But this expenditure did
not keep unauthorized immigrants out of the United States, nor persuade them to leave,
because the 1986 reforms failed to create legal channels of immigration that could keep up
with US labor demand, or the need for family reunication.
Perhaps a more realistic measure of how effective enforcement programs have been in
meeting their goal, both at the border and in the interior of the country, is the number of
unauthorized immigrants living in the United States. This number has tripled from 3.5
million in 1990 (just prior to the initiation of “prevention through deterrence”) to 11.7
million in 2012 (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013, 9). In part, this increase reects
the fact that as many as half of unauthorized immigrants may enter the country on valid
visas and then stay after their visas expire. For these immigrants, border enforcement is
not a deterrent to entering the United States. But the persistent presence and growth of the
unauthorized population also reects the degree to which it has become part of US society.
According to DHS estimates, roughly three-fths of all unauthorized immigrants have been

Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands
213
Figure 7: Number of Unauthorized Immigrants in the U.S.,1990-2012
3.5
5.7
6.3
6.8
7.3
7.9
8.6
9.4 9.7 10.1
10.7 11.1
11.6
12.2
11.7 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Millions
Source: Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013, 9.
* Data unavailable.

Journal on Migration and Human Security
214
in the United States for more than a decade (Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker 2011, 3). Moreover,
according to the Pew Research Center, close to one million unauthorized immigrants are
children, while 4.5 million native-born, US citizen children have at least one parent who
is unauthorized (Passel and Cohn 2011). These are people who have roots in this country
and are likely to stay when faced with escalating immigration enforcement (Filindra 2012).
One of the grim side effects of the current border enforcement system is how it fuels
the human smuggling business. Migrants now depend upon the services of smugglers to
guide them between (or through) ports of entry into the United States. But as demand for
smugglers has increased, so have the prices they charge. As a result, the protability of
human smuggling has become so great as to attract the interest of drug cartels that are
taking control of prized smuggling routes. Migrants not only fear the Border Patrol, but
are also subject to abuses at the hands of the smugglers they pay to help them evade the
Border Patrol (Goddard 2012; Heyman 2011; Heyman 2014, 120-24). Women and girls
in particular are at high risk of being raped or abandoned in the desert by smugglers
(O’Leary 2012, 143-44).
Prescriptions for Change
A rst step toward improving the negative consequences of concentrated yet poorly-
focused border enforcement is to increase accountability within the Border Patrol and the
CBP more broadly. At present, it is difcult to ascertain if and when Border Patrol agents
and CBP ofcers are disciplined or even investigated when allegations of misconduct are
lodged against them. This shroud of secrecy must be lifted and investigations conducted
within full view of the public. More importantly, allegations of misconduct must be subject
to third-party monitoring and review to ensure some degree of neutrality. In addition,
substantial revisions are needed in the CBP Use of Force Policy Handbook, and in the
training of CBP ofcers, to prevent the use of excessive force in the rst place (ACLU
2014). The culture of CBP must emphasize respect for the human rights of all people, be
they US citizens or unauthorized border-crossers. This means that excessive force should
never be tolerated, and deadly force never be used to protect property. In the end, CBP
should have a mission comparable to that of any police department: protecting the public
(PERF 2013, 10). And it should be the norm rather than the exception that a Border Patrol
agent who abuses someone stands trial and faces prison time.
However, no amount of reform within CBP can compensate for the fact that US immigration
law and policy is out of balance. The growing criminalization of both legally present and
unauthorized immigrants is a systemic problem that requires a systemic x. From the
standpoint of public safety, the primary aim of law enforcement in general, both at the
border and in the interior of the country, should be the capture of dangerous criminals,
and not the pursuit of unauthorized border crossers or lawful permanent residents with
misdemeanors on their records. In other words, the legal denitions of who qualies as a
“criminal alien” and who does not must be rewritten (Stumpf 2006, 367-419; American
Immigration Council 2013). Of paramount importance from a law enforcement perspective
is dismantling the transnational criminal organizations that smuggle people, drugs, guns,
and money across the US-Mexico border. Targeting those criminal organizations would
serve to enhance public safety and national security far more than the mass detention of

Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands
215
unauthorized immigrants, the vast majority of whom do not pose a threat of any kind
(Goddard 2012; Heyman 2011).
Border security would also be greatly enhanced through immigration reform that effectively
drains the sea of unauthorized immigrants within which dangerous criminals hide (Ewing
2007, 429). This would be accomplished by creating a readily accessible pathway to
legal status for the current unauthorized population. In addition, establishing sufciently
exible avenues for employment-based and family-based immigration would ensure that
the country does not face the same problems yet again in future decades (Giovagnoli
2013, 4-8; Immigration Policy Center 2010). Until the United States has a functional
immigration system, no immigration enforcement policy will work, no matter how much
money is poured into it. And as long as unauthorized immigration exists on a large scale,
transnational criminal organizations stand to make billions of dollars each year by coming
up with new ways to circumvent US border defenses.
It also is important to keep in mind that border communities bear the brunt of poorly-
conceived federal enforcement policies which should be protecting the people who
live along the border rather than targeting them. Many of the conicts between border
residents and federal ofcials could be avoided if border communities were involved in
the formulation and implementation of border enforcement policies, as well as
longer-term strategies to develop border regions. For instance, nongovernmental
organizations based along the border have for years been calling for citizen review boards
to provide local oversight of federal border enforcement personnel. They have also
advocated for focusing federal resources on modernizing ports of entry rather than simply
fortifying the vast stretches of land between ports of entry. In short, residents of border
regions view their communities as a vibrant resource rather than just an enforcement zone
to be policed by federal agents (Border Network for Human Rights and Border Action
Network 2008; Heyman 2013).
Finally, lawmakers in the United States must begin to consider the ways in which US
trade, investment, and international development policies impact migration from sending
countries. For instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was crafted
and implemented in such a way as to drive many small farmers out of business in Mexico.
Without a means of subsistence, and with insufcient numbers of jobs available in urban
areas, these former farmers have few options but to head north to the United States. If the
federal government seeks to control unauthorized migratory ows in the long run, it must
pursue economic policies that promote the creation of jobs in sending countries rather than
exacerbating unemployment (Bacon 2013).
Conclusion
US policies governing immigration, trade, and international development are very much
intertwined, and they must all incorporate the concept of human security. If people are
driven from their home countries by economic necessity (created, in part, by US policies),
drawn to the United States by labor demand, and confronted by unrealistic limits on legal
immigration, then dangerous forms of unauthorized immigration are the inevitable result.
Unauthorized migrants who make it through the gauntlet of US border enforcement face

Journal on Migration and Human Security
216
a precarious existence of “unlawful presence” within the United States. They can be
apprehended and deported by immigration agents at any time, and their upward economic
mobility and social integration are severely limited. It would be far more humane and
practical for the US government to enact policies which encourage job creation in the
home countries of unauthorized immigrants, to create an accessible pathway to legal status
for those unauthorized immigrants already living in the United States, and allow limits on
legal immigration to rise and fall in accordance with economic conditions. Moreover, US
border enforcement policies must become more tightly focused on the apprehension of
terrorists and dangerous criminals, and the disruption of transnational smuggling networks,
rather than on seizing as many unauthorized immigrants as possible.
REFERENCES
ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union). 2008a. “Fact Sheet on U.S. ‘Constitution Free
Zone’.” October 22. https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/fact-sheet-us-
constitution-free-zone.
———. 2008b. “Know Your Rights: Constitution Free Zone - Map.” https://www.aclu.org/
know-your-rights-constitution-free-zone-map.
———. 2014. “ACLU Recommendations Regarding Use of Force by U.S. Customs and
Border Protection Ofcers.” Last updated February 24, 2014. https://www.aclu.
org/sites/default/files/assets/14_02_24_aclu_use_of_force_recommendations_
nal.pdf.
American Immigration Council. 2013. Two Systems of Justice: How the Immigration
System Falls Short of American Ideals of Justice. Washington, DC: American
Immigration Council. http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/les/docs/
aic_twosystemsofjustice.pdf.
AILA (American Immigration Lawyers Association). 2013. “H.R. 1417 – Border Security
Results Act of 2013.” Washington, DC. http://www.aila.org/content/default.
aspx?docid=45056.
Bacon, David. 2013. The Right to Stay Home: How US Policy Drives Mexican Migration.
Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Bailey, Stanley, Karl Eschbach, Jacqueline Hagan, and Nestor Rodriguez. 1996. “The
Human Costs of Border Enforcement: Migrant Deaths at the Texas-Mexico Border.”
Migration World Magazine. 24(4): 16-20.
Boehner, John, Ofce of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 2014. “Draft
Standards for Immigration Reform,” January 28. http://assets.speaker.gov/
documents/Immigration-Standards.pdf.
Border Network for Human Rights and Border Action Network. 2008. U.S.-Mexico
Border Policy Report: “Effective Border Policy: Security, Responsibility And
Human Rights at the U.S.-Mexico Border.” https://www.utexas.edu/law/centers/

Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands
217
humanrights/borderwall/communities/municipalities-US-Mexico-Border-Policy-
Report.pdf.
CBP (US Customs and Border Protection). 2004. National Border Patrol Strategy. Ofce
of Border Patrol. September. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dhs/national_
bp_strategy.pdf.
———. 2005. 2005–2010 Strategic Plan. Ofce of Policy and Planning. http://www.hsdl.
org/?view&did=470246.
———. 2012. Communications Management Ofce, personal communication to the
author, November.
———. 2014a. “Southwest Border Fence Construction Progress.” Last modied February
1. http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/photo-gallery/gallery/2013/11/southwest-
border-fence-construction-progress.
———. 2014b. Use of Force Policy: Guidelines and Procedures Handbook, HB 4500-01C.
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/UseofForcePolicyHandbook.
pdf.
De León, Jason. 2013. “The Efcacy and Impact of the Alien Transfer Exit Programme:
Migrant Perspectives from Nogales, Sonora, Mexico.” International Migration
51(2): 10-23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/imig.12062
DHS (US Department of Homeland Security). 2014. Budget-in-Brief, FY 2005-2014.
Accessed July 9, 2014. http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget.
———. 2013. Fiscal Year 2012 Annual Report to Congress. Ofce for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties. http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/les/publications/crcl-annual-
report-fy-2012_4.pdf.
———. 2005. “Press Release: DHS Announces Long-Term Border and Immigration Strategy,”
November 2. http://americanpatrol.com/DHS/PRESS-RELEASES/051102-DHS-
PR/051102-New-Strategy.html.
———. 2010. “Press Release: Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano,”
March 16. http://www.dhs.gov/news/2010/03/16/statement-secretary-napolitano-
southwest-border-security-technology.
Dunn, Timothy J. 2009. Blockading the Border and Human Rights: The El Paso Operation
That Remade Immigration Enforcement. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Ewing, Walter A. 2007. “Beyond Border Enforcement: Enhancing National Security
through Immigration Reform.” Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 5(2):
427-46.
———. 2010. Looking for a Quick Fix: The Rise and Fall of the Secure Border Initiative’s
High-Tech Solution to Unauthorized Immigration. Washington, DC: American
Immigration Council. http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/les/docs/
SBInet_-_Looking_for_a_Quick_Fix_041510.pdf.

Journal on Migration and Human Security
218
———. 2013. An Unlikely Couple: The Similar Approaches to Border Enforcement in
H.R. 1417 and S. 744. Washington, DC: American Immigration Council. http://
www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/unlikely-couple-similar-approaches-border-
enforcement-hr-1417-and-s-744.
Filindra, Alexandra. 2012. The Myth of “Self-Deportation”: How Behavioral Economics
Reveals the Fallacies Behind “Attrition through Enforcement. Washington, DC:
American Immigration Council. http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/
les/docs/lindra_-_self-deportation_042912.pdf.
Fisher, Michael J. 2011a. “Testimony of Michael J. Fisher, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, before the House Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security: ‘Does Administrative
Amnesty Harm our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operational Control of the
Border?’” October 4. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/10/04/written-testimony-
cbp-house-homeland-security-subcommittee-border-and-maritime.
———. 2011b. “Testimony of Michael J. Fisher, Chief, United States Border Patrol, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Before the
House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
Security, February 15, 2011.” http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.
gov/les/Testimony%20Fisher_0.pdf.
GAO (US Government Accountability Ofce). 2010. Secure Border Initiative: DHS
Needs to Address Testing and Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology
Program at Risk, GAO-10-158. Washtington, DC: Government Accountability
Ofce. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10158.pdf.
———. 2011. Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S.
Southwest and Northern Borders, GAO-11-508T. Washtington, DC: Government
Accountability Ofce. http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125867.pdf.
———. 2014. Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed
to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-14-368. Washtington,
DC: Government Accountability Ofce. http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661297.
pdf.
Giovagnoli, Mary. 2013. Overhauling Immigration Law: A Brief History and Basic
Principles of Reform. Washington, DC: American Immigration Council. http://www.
immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/les/docs/perspectivescirprimerwe111213.pdf.
Goddard, Terry. 2012. How to Fix a Broken Border, Part II: Disrupting Smuggling at its
Source. Washington, DC: American Immigration Council. http://immigrationpolicy.
org/sites/default/files/docs/Goddard%20Part%20II%20-%20Smuggling%20
020112.pdf.
Heyman, Josiah McC. 2011. Guns, Drugs, and Money: Tackling the Real Threats to
Border Security. Washington, DC: American Immigration Council. http://www.
immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Heyman_-_Drugs_Guns_and_
Money_091211.pdf.

Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands
219
———. “A Voice of the US Southwestern Border: The 2012 ‘We the Border: Envisioning a
Narrative for Our Future’ Conference.” Journal on Migration and Human Security
1(2): 60-75. http://dx.doi.org/10.14240/jmhs.v1i2.9
———. 2014. “‘Illegality’ and the U.S.-Mexico Border: How It Is Produced and Resisted.”
In Constructing Illegality in America: Immigrant Experiences, Critiques, and
Resistance, edited by Cecilia Menjívar and Daniel Kanstroom, 111-35. New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press.
Hoefer, Michael, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker. 2011. “Estimates of the Unauthorized
Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2010.” Washington,
DC: US Department of Homeland Security, Ofce of Immigration Statistics. http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf.
ICE (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement). 2013a. Enforcement and Removal
Operations, personal communication to author, May 28.
———. 2013b. “Activated Jurisdictions.” Secure Communities. http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf.
Immigration Policy Center. 2010. Focusing on the Solutions: Key Principles of
Comprehensive Immigration Reform. Washington, DC: American Immigration
Council. http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/les/docs/Solutions_
Paper_032310.pdf.
———. 2013. A Guide to S.744: Understanding the 2013 Senate Immigration Bill.
Washington, DC: American Immigration Council. http://www.immigrationpolicy.
org/sites/default/les/docs/guide_to_s744_corker_hoeven_nal_0.pdf.
Keller, Doug. 2012. “Re-thinking Illegal Entry and Re-entry.” Loyola University Chicago
Law Journal 44(1): 65-139.
Linthicum, Kate. 2014. “Local, federal authorities at odds over holding some immigrant
inmates,” Los Angeles Times. June 1. http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-
immigration-holds-20140602-story.html.
Lydgate, Joanna Jacobbi. 2010. “Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation
Streamline.” California Law Review 98(2): 481-544.
Martínez, Daniel E., Robin Reineke, Raquel Rubio-Goldsmith, Bruce E. Anderson,
Gregory L. Hess, and Bruce O. Parks. 2013. A Continued Humanitarian Crisis at
the Border: Undocumented Border Crosser Deaths Recorded by the Pima County
Ofce of the Medical Examiner, 1990-2012. Tucson, AZ: Binational Migration
Institute, University of Arizona. http://bmi.arizona.edu/sites/default/les/border_
deaths_nal_web.pdf.
Martínez, Daniel E., Jeremy Slack, and Josiah Heyman. 2013. Bordering on Criminal: The
Routine Abuse of Migrants in the Removal System—Part I: Migrant Mistreatment
While in U.S. Custody. Washington, DC: American Immigration Council.
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/ipc/Border%20-%20
Abuses%20FINAL.pdf.

Journal on Migration and Human Security
220
Massey, Douglas S., Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone. 2002. Beyond Smoke and Mirrors:
Mexican Immigration in an Age of Economic Integration. New York, NY: Russell
Sage Foundation.
Meissner, Doris, Donald M. Kerwin, Muzaffar Chishti, and Claire Bergeron. 2013.
Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery.
Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/
enforcementpillars.pdf.
Miller, Todd. 2014. Border Patrol Nation: Dispatches from the Front Lines of Homeland
Security. San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books.
Nevins, Joseph. 2010. Operation Gatekeeper and Beyond: The War On “Illegals” and the
Remaking of the U.S.–Mexico Boundary. New York, NY: Routledge.
No More Deaths. 2011. A Culture of Cruelty: Abuse and Impunity in Short-Term U.S. Border
Patrol Custody. Tucson, AZ: No More Deaths. http://www.nomoredeathsvolunteers.
org/Print%20Resources/Abuse%20Doc%20Reports/Culture%20of%20Cruelty/
CultureofCrueltyFinal.pdf .
Núñez, Guillermina Gina and Josiah McC. Heyman. 2007. “Entrapment Processes and
Immigrant Communities in a Time of Heightened Border Vigilance.” Human
Organization 66(4): 354-65.
Nuñez-Neto, Blas and Yule Kim. 2006. Border Security, Apprehensions of “Other Than
Mexican” Aliens. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://trac.syr.
edu/immigration/library/P1.pdf.
———. 2008. Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border.
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
RL33659_20080513.pdf
O’Leary, Anna Ochoa. 2012. “Of Coyotes, Crossings, and Cooperation: Social Capital
and Women’s Migration at the Margins of the State.” In Political Economy,
Neoliberalism, and the Prehistoric Economies of Latin America, edited by Ty
Matejowsky and Donald C. Wood, 133-60. Volume 32 of Research in Economic
Anthropology. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Ortega, Bob and Rob O’Dell. 2013. “Deadly border agent incidents cloaked in silence.”
Arizona Republic, December 16. http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/
articles/20131212arizona-border-patrol-deadly-force-investigation.html?nclick_
check=1
Passel, Jeffrey S. and D’Vera Cohn. 2011. Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National
and State Trends, 2010. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center. http://pewhispanic.
org/les/reports/133.pdf.
Passel, Jeffrey, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera. 2013. Population Decline
of Unauthorized Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed. Washington, DC: Pew
Research Center. http://www.pewhispanic.org/les/2013/09/Unauthorized-Sept-

Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands
221
2013-FINAL.pdf
(PERF) Police Executive Research Forum. 2013. U.S. Customs and Border Protection—
Use of Force Review: Cases and Policies. Washington, DC: Police Executive
Research Forum. http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/les/documents/PERFReport.
pdf.
Peter, Tom A. 2014. “Fernando Garcia bridges the gap between residents and law enforcers
in El Paso, Texas.” Christian Science Monitor, March 21. http://www.csmonitor.
com/World/Making-a-difference/2014/0321/Fernando-Garcia-bridges-the-gap-
between-residents-and-law-enforcers-in-El-Paso-Texas.
Pew Hispanic Center. 2006. Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population.
Washington, DC. http://www.pewhispanic.org/les/2011/10/19.pdf.
Phillips, Scott, Nestor Rodríguez, and Jacqueline Hagan. 2002. “Brutality at the Border:
Use of Force in the Arrest of Immigrants in the United States.” International
Journal of the Sociology of Law 30(4): 285-306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0194-
6595(03)00003-0
Rosas, Gilberto. 2012. Barrio Libre: Criminalizing States and Delinquent Refusals
of the New Frontier. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1215/9780822391838
Rosenblum, Mark, R. 2013. Border Security: Immigration Enforcement between Ports of
Entry. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/
Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=146454.
Simanski John F. and Lesley M. Sapp. 2013. Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2012.
Washington, DC: Ofce of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security. http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/les/publications/ois_enforcement_
ar_2012_0.pdf.
Siskin, Alison and Ruth Ellen Wasem. 2008. Immigration Policy on Expedited Removal
of Aliens. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://assets.opencrs.
com/rpts/RL33109_20080130.pdf.
Slack, Jeremy, Daniel E. Martínez, Scott Whiteford, and Emily Peiffer. 2013. In the Shadow
of the Wall: Family Separation, Immigration Enforcement and Security. Tucson,
AZ: Center for Latin American Studies, University of Arizona. http://las.arizona.
edu/sites/las.arizona.edu/les/shadow_of_the_wall_nal_web.pdf.
Stumpf, Juliet. 2006. “The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power.” American University Law Review 56(2): 367-419.
TRAC (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse). 2013a. “At Nearly 100,000,
Immigration Prosecutions Reach All-time High in FY 2013.” Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University. http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/336/.
———. 2013b. “Few ICE Detainers Target Serious Criminals.” Syracuse, NY: Syracuse
University. http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/330/.

Journal on Migration and Human Security
222
US Border Patrol. 2013. “Southwest Border Deaths By Fiscal Year.” http://www.hsdl.
org/?view&did=734433.
———. 2014a. “U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year Budget Statistics.” http://www.cbp.gov/
sites/default/les/documents/BP%20Budget%20History%201990-2013.pdf.
———. 2014b. “U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year Stafng Statistics.” http://www.cbp.gov/
sites/default/les/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%20Year%20
Stafng%20Statistics%201992-2013.pdf.
Waslin, Michele. 2011. The Secure Communities Program: Unanswered Questions and
Continuing Concerns. Washington, DC: American Immigration Council. http://www.
immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Secure_Communities_112911_
updated.pdf.