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Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them
Abstract
Legislative careers can provide extremely useful information on political institutions, but only if used wisely. For example, we cannot assume that the amount of membership turnover in a legislature is an indication of the degree to which it is institutionalized. The real variable of interest is the (unfortunately much more difficult to quantify) consequences of that turnover. And even if we can determine that the consequences of legislative turnover are minimal, we cannot conclude that the legislature is institutionalized since what appears to be legislative institutionalization may actually be the institutionalization of political parties. More accurate indications of institutionalization would be the tendency of members to want to stay in the body (regardless of whether or not they do), and the length of service in the body required before leadership positions become a real possibility.
... 146). Para Hibbing (1999), el estudio de las carreras legislativas o trayectorias de los legisladores puede ofrecer información útil para las instituciones políticas, especialmente para los congresos, en el sentido de que, a mayor preparación de la o el legislador, sumada a buenos insumos institucionales, se pueden mejorar sus capacidades de respuesta al sistema. ...
... En palabras de Polsby, "Si queremos entender por qué los legisladores permanecen, ascienden, o abandonan, necesitamos explorar los incentivos profesionales que tienen las estructuras legislativas" 5 (citado por Squire, 1988, p. 65). Los insumos pueden ser la duración y el número de sesiones, la remuneración percibida, recursos legislativos, estructura de comisiones, el número de miembros, staff de apoyo (Hibbing, 1999), los beneficios que se pueden obtener como seguro médico y pensión, el tiempo que la legislatura le demanda al legislador y las facilidades que le ofrece para cumplir con sus actividades legislativas de manera efectiva (Squire, 1988). ...
... En este contexto, "La importancia de la medición de la profesionalización […] radica en que permite mejorar las capacidades de respuesta de un órgano legislativo a las demandas ciudadanas y una toma de decisiones más eficientes en términos de política pública, y, en general, para desempeñar un papel más proactivo en el proceso político" (Patrón Sánchez y Camacho García, 2016, p. 102). De este modo, podríamos considerar que una legislatura profesionalizada es aquella que provee los recursos financieros, materiales y humanos, así como una serie de incentivos a las y los legisladores para mejorar la calidad y dedicación a su trabajo, además de ayudarles a posicionarse como actores relevantes en la toma de decisiones, de manera que puedan mejorar sus capacidades de respuesta, tal como concluye Squire: "En los últimos 20 años, la mayoría de las legislaturas estatales se han profesionalizado más en el sentido de 4 Véase (Bárcena Juárez, 2019;Hibbing, 1999;Patrón Sánchez y Camacho García, 2016;Squire, 1988). 5 Traducción propia. ...
En este trabajo se propone un modelo de análisis para el estudio de la profesionalización legislativa, tomando como referencia la LXIII y LXIV legislatura del Congreso del Estado de Guanajuato. A partir del análisis de las dimensiones de la profesionalización legislativa desde un enfoque individual, se construye un índice compuesto que señala el grado de profesionalización por legislador y la dispersión por partido político. Los datos muestran que la principal fuente de profesionalización de las y los legisladores no reside en la experiencia legislativa, sino más bien por su trayectoria en otros cargos, como pueden ser regidor, síndico y presidente municipal, así como cargos dentro de sus respectivos partidos políticos. Adicionalmente, el índice compuesto de profesionalización legislativa señala que, en ambas legislaturas de estudio, la mayoría de las y los legisladores se encuentran como legisladores semiprofesionales y, en menor medida, como amateurs.
... Se debe reconocer que las ambiciones políticas abarcan una variedad de caminos, más allá del tradicional ascenso a cargos nacionales. Desde esta perspectiva, la ambición política y el tipo de carrera política a seguir se adapta estratégicamente a las oportunidades disponibles en el entorno político, y las posibilidades de un actor político para postularse a un cargo se ven influenciadas por la situación política circundante (Hibbing, 1999;Rohde, 1979;Black, 1972). El Gráfico 1 resume la investigación previa sobre las carreras políticas de legisladores en la región. ...
... Se debe resaltar que la presente investigación divide el análisis de las carreras legislativas o variable dependiente en cuatro tipos: ascendente, regresiva, estática y discreta (Schlesinger, 1966;Samuels, 2003). Es importante considerar un periodo de tiempo amplio, porque se estima que la carrera no se define por el cargo que ocupa el legislador inmediatamente después de dejar la legislatura; sino que, por el contrario, esta se va precisando con el paso de los años en razón a sus aspiraciones y a las oportunidades o restricciones del entorno (Hibbing, 1999). Es por esto que en la presente investigación se rastrea la carrera posterior del legislador por el periodo de tiempo considerado en la Tabla 1, donde se puede observar la codificación que se siguió para cada tipo de carrera política 4 . ...
... Por lo tanto, personas en el ejercicio político pueden tener aspiraciones de mantenerse en sus cargos o buscar uno de mayor relevancia, pero las condiciones institucionales, como la posibilidad de reelección, pueden limitar sus objetivos (Rendón-Arias, 2021). En este contexto, la ambición política es una respuesta estratégica a la estructura de oportunidades, es decir, las posibilidades de que un actor político se postule para un cargo aumentan cuando se encuentra inmerso en entornos políticos favorables(Hibbing, 1999;Botero, 2011). No obstante, son las y los políticos quienes, mediante sus habilidades, redes de apoyo construidas y comportamiento político, potencian las condiciones del entorno para lograr una posición de liderazgo y desarrollar su ambición.Nuestro enfoque teórico se centra en analizar tanto los factores institucionales como los individuales que pueden explicar las diversas trayectorias de carrera entre los miembros de un congreso. ...
A medida que se aproxima el término de su mandato en el congreso, una legisladora o un legislador se encuentra ante cuatro alternativas en relación con su carrera política: retirarse de la escena pública, buscar la reelección, aspirar a cargos de mayor jerarquía o retornar a la esfera política local. El presente estudio se propone analizar los factores que contribuyen en la elección del tipo de carrera que estas personas eligen emprender, poniendo énfasis en la carrera regresiva. Para ello, utilizamos un conjunto de datos de congresistas de la Cámara de Representantes en el periodo de 1991-2014. Se utiliza un análisis cuantitativo para estimar el impacto que tienen factores institucionales e individuales sobre el tipo de carrera que siguen las y los legisladores. Nuestro análisis sugiere que la magnitud del distrito electoral y la experiencia previa son factores críticos al momento de dar forma a las carreras políticas. Estos hallazgos brindan información importante para comprender las complejidades de la representación política, junto a los desafíos y oportunidades que enfrentan las y los políticos en la región.
... Interestingly enough, research on a Western, European parliamentary legislature shed light on the impact of institutional design (and by extent the party system) on legislative development complementing, somehow, previous findings on American state legislatures. Thus, focusing on Britain's House, Hibbing (1999) maintained that legislative institutionalization assumes an organizational movement in a specific direction, whose strength varies according to the type of legislature, e.g. the U.S. Congress versus a legislature in a parliamentary regime, which gave way to an upper limit on the institutionalization of every type of legislature. In that way, Hibbing (1999) claimed that: "Just as some legislatures cannot institutionalize as much as others, legislatures […] cannot institutionalize as much as more common hierarchical forms" (p. ...
... Thus, focusing on Britain's House, Hibbing (1999) maintained that legislative institutionalization assumes an organizational movement in a specific direction, whose strength varies according to the type of legislature, e.g. the U.S. Congress versus a legislature in a parliamentary regime, which gave way to an upper limit on the institutionalization of every type of legislature. In that way, Hibbing (1999) claimed that: "Just as some legislatures cannot institutionalize as much as others, legislatures […] cannot institutionalize as much as more common hierarchical forms" (p. 161). ...
... It takes the whole legislature, or legislative institutions, as a unit of analysis while conceiving it as an organization that moves toward growing stability, permanence, and distinctiveness by increasing boundedness, complexity, and automicity, especially at the national level. Needless to say, it assumes unidirectional change over time, but it also makes room for environmental influences both external and internal, as shown above (Polsby, 1981;Hibbing, 1999). ...
Este artículo revisa la teoría de la institucionalización legislativa que surgió en la Ciencia Política para analizar tendencias históricas en el Congreso de los Estados Unidos de América. Este artículo hace referencia al artículo The Institutionalization of the U.S. House de Nelson Polsby como punto de partida de la teoría, y sostiene que dicha teoría busca comprender el desarrollo histórico de los congresos, además de tratar problemas de gobernanza, construcción de autoridad y diferenciación del ambiente. Luego de revisar las observaciones y críticas hechas a la teoría, este artículo provee un marco analítico para estudiar la institucionalización de las asambleas legislativas nacionales democráticas, basado en un concepto procedimental tradicional de institucionalización legislativa. Este marco se basa en contribuciones teóricas hechas por sociólogos institucionales e investigadores presidenciales y legislativos, que son consideradas para comprender el proceso mediante el cual un congreso se institucionaliza. Finalmente, este artículo sugiere la existencia de un vínculo entre las dimensiones del proceso de institucionalización, el diseño institucional de un congreso y los intercambios entre este y su ambiente.
... Carreiras legislativas se tornaram objeto de investigação da Ciência Política há pelo menos 60 anos (Hibbing, 1999). Dentre as diversas temáticas que fazem parte dessa esfera, os estudos sobre a profissionalização de membros e a institucionalização dos parlamentos nacionais acumularam importantes resultados (Polsby, 1968;Eliassen and Pedersen, 1978;Squire, 1992;Rosenthal, 1996;Best and Cotta, 2000b). ...
... Dentre as diversas temáticas que fazem parte dessa esfera, os estudos sobre a profissionalização de membros e a institucionalização dos parlamentos nacionais acumularam importantes resultados (Polsby, 1968;Eliassen and Pedersen, 1978;Squire, 1992;Rosenthal, 1996;Best and Cotta, 2000b). Entretanto, as dificuldades de mensuração desses conceitos é algo que permanece em debate e carece de aperfeiçoamentos constantes (Hibbing, 1999;Allen et al., 2020). ...
... A literatura clássica dessa área define a institucionalização como um processo de estabilização e definição de limites em relação às regras de uma determinada organização. A rotatividade (entrada e saída) de seus membros, por exemplo, se torna mais difícil, assim como a ascensão de lideranças, que tendem a manter-se nos cargos (Polsby, 1968;Hibbing, 1999). ...
Introdução: Esta pesquisa buscou compreender como as premiações políticas são distribuídas entre os parlamentares da Câmara Baixa brasileira. Replicamos um modelo de mensuração de políticos de carreira aplicado ao Parlamento britânico para mensurar a profissionalização desses parlamentares premiados. Materiais e métodos: Para isso, analisamos apenas os deputados federais classificados pelo DIAP como “Cabeças” do Congresso entre 2011 e 2018. Ao todo, o corpus de análise comporta 136 parlamentares que assumiram seus mandatos ao longo das 54ª e 55ª legislaturas. Por meio do cálculo da mediana e da exposição em boxplot exploramos os dados e realizamos o teste estatístico t de student. Resultados: O índice obtido por esta pesquisa aponta que a profissionalização política desses atores varia em uma escala de valores entre -1,89 e 3,19, em uma ordem crescente que vai desde os deputados federais menos profissionalizados até os mais profissionais. Em forma escalar, notamos uma profissionalização de média para alta desses parlamentares premiados. Discussão: Os resultados rejeitam nossa hipótese alternativa (h1), a qual assumia que as médias do índice dos grupos de premiados diferem entre si. Percebe-se que parlamentares muito e pouco premiados, não apresentam diferenças significativas quanto ao nível de profissionalização política.
... Studying political careers can improve our understanding of institutional stability and change (Borchert, 2011). Therefore, features of the legislative careers of politicians in an institution become important indicators of the nature and the developmental stage of the legislature itself, although this is likely to vary by legislative body (Hibbing, 1999). ...
... After considering those with progressive and discrete ambitions, the third category in Schlesinger's categorisation is those with a static ambition. Some have looked at why politicians decide to pursue a career inside the institution they are elected in (Fenno, 1996;Loomis, 1988; among others cited in Hibbing, 1999). Squire (1988) finds that advancement prospects in the legislature, as well as pay, are important motivations for politicians to continue pursuing a career in the same institution. ...
... Although many scholars in the US have studied why some politicians decide to run for a higher office or why politicians seek the career track they do within the legislative body to which they belong (cited in Hibbing, 1999), European researchers have tended to disregard careerism (Borchert and Stolz, 2011b) (Scarrow, 1997). ...
Being a politician has become a profession for many. With the development of the European Parliament (EP) into an influential institution at the European level, building a career in the EP has become an interesting option for politicians. This thesis studies the different career paths of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and explores how these career paths and MEPs’ ambitions have an impact on their participation in the legislative process and thereby the way they represent citizens. This thesis is based on three empirical research papers. The first paper identifies two career paths that MEPs might follow, in addition to the three others which are generally used, and links these to the activities of MEPs in parliament. I find that an MEP’s career path and ambitions are relevant in explaining certain legislative behaviour across member states and party groups. The second paper looks at the career ambitions of MEPs and finds that MEPs’ career paths are also the result of expressed ambitions by politicians themselves, despite their dependence on party leadership and the second-order nature of EP elections. MEPs looking to pursue a career in the EP are more actively involved in the parliament’s activities. This higher level of participation and acquired policy influence is rewarded when MEPs stand for re-election. The third paper looks at the group of MEPs who become lobbyists after their time in parliament. Building on what is known from Washington, this paper finds that being on a powerful committee, from a smaller political group and having a longer tenure make it more likely that an MEP becomes a lobbyist. The findings across the three papers support the idea that the career paths and ambitions of politicians provide an important explanation when trying to understand an MEP’s willingness to invest resources in the EP’s legislative process.
... Los individuos ingresan a la política desde una posición inferior y van sor- teando niveles hasta alcanzar el máximo nivel posible. En ese ascenso, la asamblea legislativa suele ser un escalón inevitable de la trayectoria indi- vidual (Schlesinger, 1966;Black, 1972;Rhode, 1979;Hibbing, 1999). Los estudios de reclutamiento político se interesan por las formas y con- diciones que asume la selección de candidatos y para ello analizan quié- nes pueden ser elegidos, qué tipos de restricciones impone cada sistema electoral, quiénes son los electores, dónde se eligen los candidatos, qué procedimientos se utilizan y cuán estables son esas reglas en el tiempo (Gallagher y Marsh, 1988;Norris, 1997;Hazan y Rahat, 2001;Siavelis y Morgenstern, 2008). ...
... Este trabajo abreva de las tres vertientes teóricas. Su combinación conceptual impone problemas lógicos que deben ser tomados en cuenta al momento de desarrollar el análisis (Hibbing, 1999). El objeto de estu- dio inicial son las carreras legislativas pero las características que asume el patrón de comportamiento impide divorciar las trayectorias individuales de los mecanismos de selección de candidatos y de la isonomía de la asamblea legislativa. ...
Este libro presenta un amplio estudio sobre las carreras legislativas en Uruguay y sobre el funcionamiento de los partidos en el seno del Parlamento. En la primera parte, se analizan los incentivos que tienen los individuos para hacer carrera, mostrando que las trayectorias se desarrollan normalmente dentro de los partidos y fracciones. Como las carreras son reguladas por las colectividades partidarias, la capacidad para tomar decisiones individuales es muy limitada pues lo primero será el interés del partido. En la segunda parte, se examina el desempeño de los partidos en las cámaras, mostrando las formas organizativas que los mismos adquieren, el papel que cumplen los líderes y la limitada importancia que tienen las posiciones de autoridad dentro de la cámara. El estudio muestra cómo partidos fuertemente organizados resuelven dilemas de acción colectiva favoreciendo así la aprobación de buena parte de la agenda legislativa de los gobiernos de turno. Las explicaciones consideran particularmente las reglas institucionales que ordenan el juego político, los incentivos que generan y las preferencias de los actores individuales y colectivos a la hora de tomar decisiones.
... 1. length of the legislative term: the more frequent the elections, the lower the turnover rate; 2. level of professionalization: MPs are less likely to abandon the legislature when benefits are greater and the institutional context is professionalized (Squire 1988;Hibbing 1999;Kerby and Blidook 2011;); 3. degree of institutionalization: the stronger and more influential the legislature, the less likely it is that MPs will leave voluntarily (Sisson 1973;Hall and Van Houweling 1995;Hibbing 1999;Matland and Studlar 2004;Salvati 2016a); 4. legislature size: lower numbers of seats have a negative effect on turnover. ...
... 1. length of the legislative term: the more frequent the elections, the lower the turnover rate; 2. level of professionalization: MPs are less likely to abandon the legislature when benefits are greater and the institutional context is professionalized (Squire 1988;Hibbing 1999;Kerby and Blidook 2011;); 3. degree of institutionalization: the stronger and more influential the legislature, the less likely it is that MPs will leave voluntarily (Sisson 1973;Hall and Van Houweling 1995;Hibbing 1999;Matland and Studlar 2004;Salvati 2016a); 4. legislature size: lower numbers of seats have a negative effect on turnover. ...
Parliamentary turnover is an important question in political science due to its connection to salient topics like elite circulation and parliamentary roles, legislature institutionalization, executive-legislative relations, and the quality of the policy-making process. In this article we contribute to the debate by focusing on the Italian case from a longitudinal perspective. The 2018 general election was conducive to a relatively high level of turnover. This level is roughly equivalent to two previous electoral rounds. However, the empirical evidence shows that the conditions usually thought to account for another two exceptional elections seem not to apply to 2018. After introducing the literature on legislative turnover and arguing that this topic is worth tackling, we stress the usefulness of the Italian case for comparative research and we provide a picture of our case study, presenting the theoretical puzzle and research questions. Subsequently we tackle this issue, claiming that the usual explanations fit only partially with our case. In particular, we argue that neglected intra-party factors can be a viable explanatory alternative. The article ends with a brief discussion of the findings.
... Seria mais difícil captar as cofounders que podem interferir na tomada de decisão quando um partido ou um parlamentar de suas fileiras decide por um caminho em detrimento de outro. Essa decisão pode estar relacionada com a possibilidade de reeleição do próprio parlamentar, com a necessidade do partido se manter ativo captando recursos estatais, de acordos ocultos entre partidos e/ou grupos parlamentares ou ainda de constrangimentos institucionais que regem o comportamento das legendas quando no Legislativo ou o Executivo (Hibbing, 1999;Carey et al., 2000;Carroll, 2013). ...
Introduction
Political scientists have usually assessed ideological positions along the left-right spectrum only for parties that win elections and, as a result, control governments and implement their agendas. However, party profiles, strategies, and programmatic behaviors are far more diverse and extend beyond this framework. This article aims to offer tools for measuring the ideology of any political party, regardless of its presence in electoral or representative arenas.
Materials and methods
I outline the various techniques and approaches used in Political Science to position political parties ideologically, such as content analysis of party manifestos, the stances of elected officials, parliamentary behavior, and public opinion. I then analyze an original dataset from two waves of an expert survey conducted with Brazilian political scientists and Brazilianists, which classified Brazilian political parties in 2018 and 2022.
Results
The research findings reveal that: (i) the ideological center of the party system has faded; (ii) (ii) the average distance between political parties has decreased, even as polarization within the system increased during this period; and (iii) changes in electoral rules have impacted the ideological classification of Brazilian political parties.
Discussion
Lastly, I suggest that this research agenda could benefit from greater comparability and depth by using research techniques better suited to the subject. Only by examining the entire Brazilian party system can we fully understand the behavior of major parties and how they position themselves relative to one another. The continued use of expert surveys proves to be a powerful tool for tracking ideological shifts within the party system and demonstrating how institutional changes can reflect changes in a party's ideology
Keywords
political parties; Brazilian political parties; party ideology; left-right spectrum; expert survey
... Si se pone el foco en el campo de la élite política, donde más se ha usado el perfil político, social y económico de una persona como varia-ble independiente ha sido en los estudios sobre carreras políticas. Hibbing (1999) indica que a través del estudio de las carreras políticas sería posible determinar si hay generalidades a partir de las cuales se podrían perfilar los políticos de calidad y cómo estos elementos sirven para ser electos o reelectos. Este modelo sirvió a Llanos y Sánchez (2006), por ejemplo, para estudiar las carreras de los senadores del Cono Sur y determinar distintos patrones y trayectorias en función de los países. ...
... Si se pone el foco en el campo de la élite política, donde más se ha usado el perfil político, social y económico de una persona como varia-ble independiente ha sido en los estudios sobre carreras políticas. Hibbing (1999) indica que a través del estudio de las carreras políticas sería posible determinar si hay generalidades a partir de las cuales se podrían perfilar los políticos de calidad y cómo estos elementos sirven para ser electos o reelectos. Este modelo sirvió a Llanos y Sánchez (2006), por ejemplo, para estudiar las carreras de los senadores del Cono Sur y determinar distintos patrones y trayectorias en función de los países. ...
A mediados de la segunda década, se inicia una fase de parálisis y desintegración regional. Posteriormente, la pandemia de la COVID-19 expuso las debilidades del regionalismo latinoamericano, reforzando también sus limitaciones estructurales. A comienzos de la tercera década, el regionalismo latinoamericano atraviesa una vez más una fase de transformación, empujada tanto por cambios en el sistema internacional como por una reorientación política de varios gobiernos. En el capítulo, se describen y analizan los procesos de auge y declive de las instituciones regionales en América Latina.
... En general, cuando discutimos el rol, la importancia o la calidad de una legislatura tendemos a enfocarnos en la habilidad o efectividad de llevar adelante funciones que consideramos esenciales en dicha institución, como la representación de los intereses de los votantes, la fiscalización del ejecutivo y la elaboración de leyes. Algunos autores han puesto el énfasis en la institucionalización de los congresos, prestándole particular atención a características como la profesionalización de sus miembros, la complejidad de su estructura interna y su legitimización en la sociedad (Hibbing 1999;Palanza et al. 2016). Otros autores resaltan la manera en la cual el congreso se inserta en el proceso legislativo (Cox y Morgenstern 2001). ...
What factors impact on the productivity of legislators? In this paper, we argue that legislative productivity depends not only on party affiliation, seniority, gender, and other contextual considerations (e.g., alignment with the executive), as previous studies have shown, but also on the connections between legislators. Our main argument is that legislators' effectiveness in getting their proposals approved by the chamber depends on their centrality in the cosponsorship network. Unlike previous studies of Latin American legislatures, which usually consider bills as the unit of analysis, we focus on legislators and their individual records. We consider individual productivity as the number of authored bills approved by the chamber in a two-year congress. To test our hypothesis, we use data from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies from 1983 to 2019.
... El resultado de esta operación, gestada en el pasado, pero con plena vigencia en el presente, ha sido el empuje decidido de la carrera política por sobre la carrera parlamentaria. Por lo mismo, desde una perspectiva estrictamente racional, la mejor inversión para cualquier político que ha logrado acceder a una curul no es invertir en su especialización en ciertos temas e identificación de los grupos vinculados con ellos (Hibbing, 2002). Tampoco resulta una buena idea gastar su tiempo en profesionalizar su labor a fin de asegurarse un porvenir en la política. ...
El trabajo pone énfasis en las medidas de bioseguridad que fueron implementadas para el día de la jornada electoral del proceso electoral mexicano 2020-2021 por parte de la autoridad electoral nacional, y que fueron de observancia y obligatoriedad para todo el país. Se describe una experiencia de observación electoral mediante la que se vigilaron dichas medidas y se analiza la asociación de sus resultados con la tercera ola de contagios. Se explica que los altos niveles participativos en la elección y el relajamiento social ante la pandemia son asociados con el rebrote de nuevos casos de coronavirus del país y se propone la alternativa del voto a distancia (electrónico y postal) en latitudes donde resulta imposible aplazar comicios (la cual es poco avizorada para México debido a la debilidad de la institución electoral nacional).
... Esses dados, no entanto, parecem divergir da percepção dos eleitores quando observamos o surgimento de novos grupos que clamam por renovação (Tatagiba 2014), o que aponta para uma desconexão entre a classe política eleita e os anseios de renovação daqueles que os elegeram. Hibbing (1999) já levantava essa preocupação, sugerindo que, a depender dos processos de recrutamento e socialização, a eleição de novos membros pode representar pouca ou nenhuma mudança interna na instituição (Hibbing 1999:157). ...
Em que medida os legisladores novatos se diferenciam dos políticos veteranos? Mesmo as altas taxas de renovação observadas em cada eleição não foram capazes de mitigar a insatisfação do eleitor com a composição do parlamento no Brasil. Com o intuito de compreender a renovação da Câmara dos Deputados no período democrático recente, realizamos uma comparação de grupos entre novatos e veteranos com relação à composição social, às vias de recrutamento político, às características partidárias e à experiência política prévia dos indivíduos eleitos nos pleitos de 1998, 2002, 2006 e 2010. Para as análises empíricas foram apresentadas estatísticas descritivas e realizados testes de associação não paramétricos. Dentre os principais achados, observamos, de acordo com os mencionados testes, que as eleições de 2002 foram as mais favoráveis à renovação parlamentar e que os novatos eleitos nos últimos pleitos se diferenciam, em grande medida, por serem eleitos por pequenos partidos. No entanto, de forma geral, observamos que a renovação da Câmara baixa foi tímida com relação aos critérios analisados.
... Um olhar atento às atitudes dos atores políticos pode revelar os mecanismos pelos quais as diferentes instituições políticas e níveis de governo relacionam-se. Mas como estudar ambição política e de que forma analisar eficientemente os dados sobre carreiras?Em busca dessas respostas, John Hibbing trouxe importantes apontamentos sobre mudança institucional e as possibilidades dos estudos sobre carreiras políticas em seu artigo "Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them"(HIBBING, 1999). Inicialmente, o autor destaca as duas principais premissas teóricas que envolvem esses estudos: de um lado, os que entendem que instituições políticas são modificadas por forças internaspelos atorese, de outro, os que apostam em explicações exógenas.O primeiro grupo, em geral, parte do modelo da escolha racional, e assume que as instituições políticas são moldadas a partir do interesse individual dos atores. ...
O arranjo institucional brasileiro bem como a dinâmica de interação entre Executivo e Legislativo no sistema político do país afetam a estrutura das oportunidades políticas e, consequentemente, as escolhas de carreira dos indivíduos que se lançam à vida pública. Parte da literatura aponta a ambição dos políticos brasileiros em ocupar postos eletivos no Executivo, o que implicaria em pouco interesse pelo carreirismo legislativo. Por outro lado, trabalhos mais recentes apontam para a falta de direção específica dos movimentos de carreiras no país e descontinuidade das trajetórias. Buscando contribuir para o debate, a presente dissertação busca mapear e identificar as principais características da circulação política no Brasil por meio do registro longitudinal de movimentos de carreiras dos deputados federais eleitos nos pleitos de 1998, 2002, 2006 e 2010. Ademais, propõe-se um modelo de regressão logística para buscar compreender os determinantes da decisão de candidatar-se à reeleição na Câmara dos Deputados, o que auxilia a compreensão no curto prazo da intenção de construir carreira política no Legislativo. Observa-se que, apesar de descontinuadas, as carreiras políticas no país constroem-se, em grande medida, em torno do Legislativo e não se observam distinções claras entre aqueles que constroem carreiras legislativas e aqueles que apresentam trajetórias integradas entre Legislativo e Executivo.
... This scholarship has principally underscored a direct link between the socioeconomic background and past political experiences of elected parliamentarians, and the way the latter behave in assembly, successfully perform their legislative functions, and then consider their chances of being re-elected -and therefore shape a "legislative career" for themselves by becoming "professionals" of parliamentary affairs. As John Hibbing (1999) later argued, this is a good indication of the evolution of a legislative institution towards professionalisation. ...
In an attempt to better grasp the realities of Myanmar's national legislature, which was formed after the 2010 elections, this paper examines the personal profiles and social backgrounds of its elected and appointed members. I have sought to record data on the social composition of Myanmar's first “post-junta” parliament and provide a dataset for further comparative research on the resurgence of legislative affairs in the country. The study draws on official publications containing the biographies of 658 national parliamentarians. Focusing on six socio-demographic variables, the findings suggest that the typical Burmese legislator still closely mirrors the conventional image of Myanmar's characteristic postcolonial leader: a man, in his mid-fifties, ethnically Bamar, Buddhist, holding a Myanmar university degree, engaged in business activities or in the education sector (in the case of the 492 elected legislators) or in the security sector (for the 166 military appointees). However, I argue that the profile of Myanmar's first post-junta legislature offers a quite unexpected level of diversity that may augur well for the emergence of a new civilian policymaking elite in Myanmar.
... Generally, legislators are strategic about their political careers (Schlesinger 1966) and pursue their career goals through strategic and rational behavior in attempts to maximize their preferences (Hibbing 1999). From this working assumption, it is important to recognize the role of ambition in the strategic preferences of legislators. ...
... Institutionalization, primarily used in the context of Congress, is useful for understanding state legislatures as well. Institutionalization fundamentally altered the function of legislatures and legislative careers (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002;Hibbing 1999). Institutionalization increases the complexity of an organization, developing more rules and routinized procedures (Squire 2012;Squire and Hamm 2005;Polsby 1975). ...
This working paper on ambition in term-limited state legislatures has been presented at multiple conferences and is being staged for review. Key words: Term Limits; Political Career Ambition; State Legislatures
... The existence of multilevel systems is reflected not only in the mayors' career background but also in their future ambition at other tiers of government after a mayoral mandate. In this respect, the study of mayors' careers provides interesting information about the status of institutions and the broader socio-political system (Dahl 1961;Matthews 1984;Hibbing 1999). Mayors' different career paths question the interconnectedness between the tiers of government as well as the emergence of local political actors across these levels. ...
In this chapter, the authors identify and explain variation in the mayors’ political career by identifying different career patterns. First, they focus on pre-mayoral experience examining seniority in municipal council and other political positions prior to the mayoral mandate. Second, they examine the professionalisation of mayors in office. Third, they analyze mayors’ ambition to remain in local politics or move on towards upper tiers of government. Mayors’ different career paths question the interconnectedness between the tiers of government as well as the emergence of local political actors across these levels. This empirical analysis shows that European mayoral careers are primarily locally oriented in terms of recruitment, occupation and future ambition. Differences within and across countries, however, can be explained by the specific national institutional and municipal socio-demographics configurations.
... The institutional arrangements of state legislatures affect both the incentive of incumbents to vigorously pursue reelection as well as their capacity to do so (e.g., Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000;Hibbing 1999;Squire 1997). Legislatures that offer more attractive seats should stimulate an incumbent's interest in pursuing reelection relative to those legislatures with less attractive seats. ...
Legislators might rely on their partisan base for electoral support—what scholars call their normal vote—or they may cultivate support among nonpartisans through casework or constituency service—what scholars call a personal vote. Previous research frequently argues that legislators face a tradeoff between pursuing the normal vote and a personal vote as traditionally defined, often focusing on resources used by incumbents to build their personal vote. In contrast, we argue that securing the support of partisans and nonpartisans alike should be evaluated based on how a legislator performs in office, and that the so-called normal and personal vote need not be viewed as in conflict. We evaluate our claims using data from state legislative elections following redistricting, focusing on legislative professionalism to measure the resources available to incumbents that they might use to cultivate a personal note.
... This is partly responsible for the weakness of the Nigeria's National Assembly in relation to other branches of government. This is because, as argued by institutionalists a legislature with high leadership turnover is weak and unlikely to institutionalize (Polsby, 1968, Hibbing, 1999, Squire, 1992. This is in addition to the fact that the zoning arrangement itself is fragile. ...
Given the diverse nature of the Nigerian society and the tension associated with political contestations, particularly elective positions at various levels of government, some power sharing frameworks evolved in both formal and informal contexts. The ‘Federal Character Principle’ for instance, which is a constitutional provision that requires the sharing of major political and bureaucratic positions among the diverse people of Nigeria is meant to ensure fair representation, equitable distribution of political incentives and sense of belonging. This principle is also internalized by the major political parties in Nigeria in their candidates′ selection procedures and indeed by the legislature in determination of candidates for legislative leadership positions. Thus using the National Assembly of Nigeria from 1999-2011, the paper examined the extent to which formal and informal power sharing arrangements affects democratic governance in the country. The paper relied on secondary sources of data, which include official documents such as the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, constitutions of various political parties, newspaper and bulletins and some extant literature. Theoretically, Lijphart’s (1968; 1977; and 1990) consociational model of Proportional Representation (PR) provided the guide to understanding the power sharing arrangement in Nigeria’s democracy and particularly the informal arrangement within the National Assembly. This theoretical stance, though contradicts the broader theory of legislative institutionalization, is seen as an effective strategy for dousing tensions, curtailing upheavals and ensuring mutual trust among the diverse groups of Nigeria for democratic stability. The paper, however, argues that the informal power sharing arrangement in the Nigeria’s National Assembly undermines its autonomy, complexity and the principle of universal procedure of conducting legislative business. Essentially, the power sharing arrangement affects the stability of legislative leadership which is central to legislative autonomy and its institutionalization as well. The paper concluded that while the National Assembly in Nigeria is unlikely to institutionalize conventionally, the fragile nature of the informal arrangements of power sharing may also be a source of tension and conflict once it is obstructed.
... El primer modelo reúne propiedades de la experiencia previa de los diputados. Según John Hibbing (1999), dentro de los estudios dedicados al análisis de la carrera política destaca un grupo que vincula el tipo de representación -en términos de representatividad-con la trayectoria parlamentaria de los congresistas. Considerando que México tiene un sistema federal, las variables aquí agrupadas se dividieron de acuerdo con el nivel de acción política -gubernamental, de tal forma que quedaron, por un lado, los cargos partidistas, administrativos y de elección popular a nivel local, mientras que por otro se reservaron los del ámbito estrictamente federal o nacional-tanto partidista como administrativo. ...
In federal systems, it is often said that the work of legislators is linked to the interests of the state authorities, particularly governors and to a lesser extent, local party leaders. Using the bills and budget amendments promoted in the Chamber of Deputies during the LX Legislature (2006-2009) as units of analysis, this paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of political representation in Mexico. It seeks to understand the latter and contrast a number of assumptions commonly associated with the operation of federal systems.
... To date, few efforts have been made to investigate the complete preparliamentary political career path from adulthood up to the entry into parliament (for studies which have party-integrated pre-parliamentary career steps see Allen 2013;Borchert and Stolz 2003;MacKenzie 2011). While the literature on US legislatures has explained much of MPs' motivation and behaviour as a function of seeking re-election (Mayhew 1974) and reaching higher office within the legislature in the context of its institutional and party organisational environment, it rarely accounts for the pre-parliamentary aspects of a career (Hibbing 1999;MacKenzie 2011), even though earlier studies investigated recruitment to US legislatures quite thoroughly (for an early overview see Moncrief 1999;Schlesinger 1966). This ignores two important aspects of legislative careers: firstly, prospective MPs gather both political experience and expertise in subnational legislative or executive offices and, secondly, they build a personal network in the course of holding various party positions. ...
Research on parliamentary careers has paid little attention to variations in pre-parliamentary career patterns and their value in explaining legislators’ parliamentary success. Using sequence and cluster analysis, this article identifies typical career tracks taken by Party Animals, Local Heroes, Late Bloomers, Land Legislators, High-Flyers and Career Changers based on a comprehensive dataset of German parliamentarians’ biographies (1998–2014). The analysis confirms the role of the party as the primary career facilitator before and within parliament. Nonetheless both Career Changers and High-Flyers climb the greasy pole all the way to the national parliament without much service to the party. The former type, however, suffers from a lack of networks and experience, which is reflected in the limited career success within parliament. This article demonstrates that the use of sequence analysis on career paths offers a promising approach in distinguishing and explaining the opportunities, choices and obstacles MPs face in parliament.
... In representative democracies, two of the core research questions are: who are (s)elected and how are they (s)elected (Norris 1997)? The early interest for 'who' governs can be explained by the impact that the profiles of candidates have on a legislature, and even, on the broader sociopolitical system (Dahl 1961;Hibbing 1999;Pitkin 1967). MPs have the power to pass legislation and hold the government accountable. ...
Political parties need to act as unitary actors in parliaments in order to implement their policy goals. The literature has acknowledged that candidate selection process is one of the most powerful tools to achieve and maintain internal cohesion within the parliamentary group. Political parties that do not win elections cannot develop their policy goals though. Candidate selection processes present thus two – potentially conflicting – objectives: recruiting ‘popular candidates’ (vote-seeking strategy) and enlisting ‘party soldiers’ (policy-seeking strategy). The personalization of politics, where electoral campaigns are increasingly personalized while eroding the role of issues and ideology in voting behaviour, enhances the tensions between parties’ vote-seeking and policy-seeking strategies. However, in line with more recent developments in the literature, we argue that the personalization thesis is not necessarily a zero-sum game: in list systems, political parties can balance their lists of candidates using both strategies. In other words, a party’s vote-seeking strategy does not eradicate a policy-seeking strategy; on the opposite, we argue that they interact with one another. Using an innovative and consistent measurement of candidate-party congruence, we test this interactive effect on the recruitment of candidates at the 2014 Belgian elections. Overall, our results prove that party selectorates use both strategies as a trade-off to balance their lists, even though vote-seeking strategy ultimately prevails for a substantial number of candidates. That is to say, political parties are ready to sacrifice their own internal unity to favour popular candidates over party soldiers. The results call for a more positive normative account of the personalization thesis. The later has the potential to keep voters, candidates and parties connected in the representation process. This has some critical consequences for the functioning of political parties in legislatures and the broader democratic political systems.
... Large portions of an assembly might remain stable despite the overall chamber having a high turnover rate. Moreover, it is the effects of turnover that matter most for institutionalization (Hibbing 1999). Another component of institutionalization is internal complexity. ...
This study explores the consequences of legislative turnover for the hiring of lobbyists and influence of interest groups. We argue that lobbyists develop durable relationships with lawmakers in assemblies with low turnover. Such relationships allow lobbyists to attract clients. We use a new, state-level measure of multi-client lobbying to show that legislative turnover and multi-client lobbying are inversely related: decreases in turnover are correlated with more multi-client lobbying. In a second set of analyses, we find that legislative term limits are associated with less multi-client lobbying. Since multi-client lobbying poses risks to the representation of individual interests and magnifies the effects of resource differences between interests, our results suggest that turnover may help more diverse interests to achieve political influence.
En los últimos treinta años, como puede observarse, las élites mexicanas han sufrido cambios a partir de los elementos estructurales desde la apertura del sistema polí tico con las reformas de 1977. Estos están asociados sobre todo a la independencia presupuestal de las entidades, así como a la apertura y desarrollo económico global que favorecieron el surgimiento de nuevas élites económicas locales y del crecimiento económico de la sociedad. Estos eventos fortalecieron o incluso formaron nuevas élites políticas locales, a partir de como de la movilidad social que implicó un estado de la sociedad más involucrado con lo público. Sin embargo, ¿qué tan válido sigue siendo analizar los componentes de las élites y su influencia en la política mexicana?
Para dar respuesta dividimos este libro en tres partes: élites como marco analítico, élites y control institucional y élites y control social. Lo que se busca responder es cómo las minorías siguen ejerciendo cierta influencia ya sea en la teoría política, así como en las instituciones públicas y en las sociedades
La enfermedad coronavírica de 2019 ha representado un problema serio de salud pública con consecuencias muy amplias en el mundo. Se ha escrito mucho sobre los escenarios e impactos que produjo la pandemia como producto de las múltiples crisis que se concatenaron a partir de 2020: económica, social, educativa, por señalar solo algunas. Sin embargo, en el ámbito de la política se ha abordado con menor detalle los efectos que se han producido en los procesos de toma de decisión pública, particularmente en las democracias. Este tomo presenta un conjunto de trabajos que, concentrados en México, pero sin perder la perspectiva comparada, pretenden entender las repercusiones de ese fenómeno global sobre el régimen democrático mexicano, tanto en sus dimensiones institucionales como en las procesuales, incluidos los actores principales de la política. Además, los textos se interesan en detectar los retos y oportunidades para la acción de gobierno, las inercias en las formas de gobernar, así como las tendencias que se configuran a partir de ahora y que podrían definir el futuro del país.
By looking at research on the demographic makeup and political experience of candidates and elected representatives running for European Parliament (EP) elections in Slovenia during the last twenty years, a few general patterns start to crop up: the clear prevalence of middle-aged, university-educated men among the candidates and elected MEPs, as well as the fact that most parliamentary (i.e. established) political parties do not nominate their current high-profile politicians for EP elections. Some changes can probably be expected in these areas due to shifting demographics and changes in the political environment.
Why do autocratic ruling parties adopt certain candidate selection processes, and what effects do they have on political outcomes? This article argues that many contemporary autocracies democratize candidate selection to address the demands of multiparty elections, but that this creates unforeseen hazards. Autocrats centralize candidate selection to reassert control over the composition of legislatures, but not necessarily to recruit more effective representatives. These ideas are explored in Cameroon, a longstanding authoritarian regime that has altered its candidate selection twice. Using an original biographical dataset and elite survey that measures legislative role orientations, the article shows how changes to candidate selection allowed the Cameroonian regime to retain more partisan legislators and to recruit new candidates who were more oriented to the party than the constituency. The article expands the comparative study of candidate selection to new settings and provides insights into how candidate selection helps shape and sustain authoritarian regimes.
This chapter examines legislative careerism in term-limited states by testing long-standing theories about political ambition. Political career motivations are not linear but are multifaceted and the result of a number of contributing factors. Using career movement and legislative service as a way to assess displayed ambition, this analysis advances our understanding of legislative careers. Through this examination, Butcher finds that term limits are more dynamic than previously thought and that the career pathways a member chooses to follow are based on both the legislature that they serve in and the term limit they face.
Guatemala is one of the Latin American countries with the highest occurrence of party switching since its democratic era in 1985. In 2016, the Congress approved a regulation to sanction this practice, affecting the possibility of re-election and holding internal positions in Congress. The objective of this study is to analyze how, even with the legal containment of party switching, legislators find limits to this regulation to run for re-election and continue their parliamentary career. Based not the ambition theory and institutionalist literature, this study analyzes legislative careers, finding that informal rules in electoral institutions are decisive in admitting legislators with party switching, while belonging to legal or illegal networks seems to drive to successful political careers and positions in the legislative power structure under the cover of strong leadership.
From the analysis of our data, we found a number of issues relating to the lawmaking effectiveness of the Nigerian National Assembly. These issues range from legislators’ innate effectiveness ability to institutional framework that guides legislative behavior and performances. As a result of the adopted legislative organization theory and institutional approach, we observed that institutional and procedural frameworks of the National Assembly have high influence on legislative behavior and performances.
This article analyzes the historical development of Chilean congressional leadership offices (1834-1924), while testing a proposition of the theory of legislati ve institutionalization that says that legislatures gradually move to-ward greater boundedness over time. The indicator of boundedness is the length of the apprenticeship of congressional leaders. Lateral entry, short office tenure, and returning leaders became distinctive features in the case at hand. Institutional design and exchanges between the legislat ure and the environment determine legislative institutionaliz ation, so a legislature insti-tutionalizes by acquiring stability, permanence, distinctiveness, and sustain-ability in a polity.
Studies of ambition often frame decisions to run for reelection, seek higher office, or retire in terms of the nature of those opportunities and the risks associated with them. However, career decisions can also be framed in terms of the value of one's present position, which depends on what we refer to as institutional attachments. In contrast to institutional positions (leadership, committee chairs), institutional attachments relate to social position in the legislature and how it has changed over time. In this article, we explore how factors related to institutional attachments influence career decisions. Specifically, we ask whether a legislator's cohort, including its size, compatibility, and experience in possessing majority status affect the propensity to exhibit static ambition. Looking at a sample of more than 5500 state legislative open‐seat opportunities in 47 states between 2003 and 2016, we find some but not all these traits are predictive of career decisions.
A career in parliament is inherently a transitory vocation, and parliamentary turnover is critical for a healthy democracy. Yet many MPs fail to prepare for the time when they must leave parliament. This lack of preparedness exacerbates the challenges of post-parliamentary life. Drawing on research conducted with former members of the Parliament of Victoria, Australia, this article reports on the experiences of MPs leaving parliament. Former MPs, particularly those who leave the parliament involuntarily, experience serious challenges including a loss of identity, a fracturing of social relationships, and employment and financial stress. These outcomes may have democratic implications by discouraging highly capable candidates from diverse backgrounds from pursuing a career in parliament. Acknowledging that the role of modern parliaments is expanding well beyond their traditional purview, we offer practical recommendations to mitigate these issues.
p>El artículo tiene por objetivo analizar el ejercicio de reelección legislativa en las elecciones de 2021 a partir de la eliminación de la prohibición consecutiva bajo dos criterios: a) la reelección como derecho y b) como componente de la profesionalización parlamentaria. Para ello, se propone revisar el desarrollo del paso de la reincidencia a la reelección como cambio institucional, así como identificar el efecto que dicho cambio tiene en las carreras legislativas de los representantes populares desde un punto de vista cíclico y de continuidad en los intereses de los diputados federales que se reeligen por primera vez en las elecciones de 2021, por lo cual se elaboró una base de datos que acumula información de las trayectorias de los legisladores mexicanos en función de su experiencia en distintos puestos de representación y de la administración pública local y federal.</p
How does personnel turnover affect the legitimacy of the EU? This chapter establishes the foundations upon which this question can be addressed. It argues that questions about turnover’s consequences can be examined through a framework focused on three facets of legitimacy (input, output, and throughput). It discusses three sets of propositions—those arising from a populist critique of EU politics, a feminist critique of EU politics, and academic studies of turnover—that link turnover to EU legitimacy. The chapter defines personnel turnover and presents data on turnover across time in the seven treaty-established EU institutions. It concludes by presenting the structure of Personnel Turnover and the Legitimacy of the EU.
To what extent has personnel turnover affected the Brexit negotiations between the EU and the UK? And how might Brexit-related turnover affect output legitimacy? This chapter considers these questions by examining personnel dynamics between 2017 and 2019. During this period, the EU had a steady negotiation team and a strong negotiation management process; it experienced little turnover. The UK, on the other hand, experienced high turnover and poor inter-institutional communications. The chapter argues that structural features of “differentiated disintegration” (Schimmelfennig 2018) were not the only reason for the EU’s negotiating advantage; personnel dynamics mattered, as well. The Brexit case suggests that minimizing turnover among negotiating teams can help to boost output legitimacy. Widespread personnel replacements imperil negotiating success and undermine output legitimacy.
Nos proponemos exponer la interacción de los factores institucionales, sociales y de género y ver cómo estos han dificultado o favorecido la consolidación de carreras políticas. Los resultados de la investigación sugieren que existe una brecha de género en el desarrollo de una carrera política entre hombres y mujeres, aun cuando es baja para ambos, las mujeres desertan en mayor porcentaje luego de una primera experiencia. Ello se explicaría por las diferencias en las formas de ingreso a la política institucional, mayormente no partidaria; aquellas enmarcadas en el sistema de género, con relación al uso del tiempo, la maternidad, la división sexual del trabajo/cuidados; la menor socialización política; el acoso político y menores recursos para afrontar los costos de una campaña electoral y el desarrollo de una carrera política. Se analizará las trayectorias y las reducidas experiencias de continuidad de las mujeres en los cargos de elección popular. De las 82 regidoras provinciales cusqueñas (legislativo local) de los últimos tres procesos electorales solo 6 han ejercido un cargo de elección popular en más de una oportunidad.
Committees are important vehicles for parliamentary careers both as means to a (ministerial) end and as an end in themselves. This article explores the relationship between select committee membership and parliamentary career by analysing committee membership and frontbench appointments for the 2130 Members of Parliament (MPs) first elected since 1979. We focus on two of Donald Searing’s four informal backbench roles—Policy Advocates and Parliament Men and Women—and three of the four formal leadership roles—Whips, Junior Ministers and Ministers. The membership patterns of select committees suggest that MPs approach this aspect of their parliamentary work in different ways concomitant with the roles of Generalist and Specialist Policy Advocates and Good House of Commons Men and Women. The membership patterns also suggest that different groups of MPs—by party, gender and ethnicity—often (choose or are forced to) approach committee work in different ways. We also find membership of some committees is more strongly associated with leadership roles than others.
Ambition theory suggests that scholars can understand a good deal about politics by exploring politicians' career goals. In the USA, an enormous literature explains congressional politics by assuming that politicians primarily desire to win re-election. In contrast, although Brazil's institutions appear to encourage incumbency, politicians do not seek to build a career within the legislature. Instead, political ambition focuses on the subnational level. Even while serving in the legislature, Brazilian legislators act strategically to further their future extra-legislative careers by serving as 'ambassadors' of subnational governments. Brazil's federal institutions also affect politicians' electoral prospects and career goals, heightening the importance of subnational interests in the lower chamber of the national legislature. Together, ambition and federalism help explain important dynamics of executive-legislative relations in Brazil. This book's rational-choice institutionalist perspective contributes to the literature on the importance of federalism and subnational politics to understanding national-level politics around the world.
Why run for reelection when the logic and incentives of the political system leave no doubt that running for other offices is a better option? This paper focuses on the factors that influence both the choice of career and the electoral success of those who run for reelection and those who attempt to obtain other offices, using Brazil as a case study, a typically fragmented, multiparty environment with a strong executive. We argue that legislators run for reelection because it is the safest bet for them. The probability of winning is higher for those who attempt reelection than for those running for any other office. Because static ambition is conditioned by election results and not by the intrinsic desire to develop a career in the legislative branch, career paths do not necessarily lead to improvements in legislative professionalization and institutionalization. This finding contradicts theories that relate career paths to legislative institutionalization.
The thesis is an assessment of the extent to which leadership has become institutionalised in the Zambian legislature. The thesis shows that leadership has become complex, but it's boundaries have become weak since 2011. There has also been many leadership turnovers.
In multilevel systems, patterns of regional and national political careers reflect processes of regionalisation and federalisation. Yet the effects of regionalism on the orientation of legislative careers remain disputed. Such disputes result from the choice of the unit of analysis, the scarcity of comparative research across countries and over time, and bias in case selection. This article offers a systematic intranational comparative analysis of ‘sister regions’ in four countries that are examples of weak and strong regionalism. It tests the regionalism hypothesis based on an original comparative dataset of 4662 regional and national political careers in Belgium, Canada, Spain, and the UK. The results demonstrate that regionalism matters: regional legislative elites emerge more clearly in polities in which regionalism is stronger. The regionalism hypothesis is particularly supported in Spain and Canada, which have a longer history of regional institutions, but that trend is also confirmed in the UK and Belgium.
The diffusion of multi-level political arrangements in formerly unitary states has recently led to numerous studies being conducted of sub-national political elites, in addition to those devoted to traditional federal states. Most of these studies have focused on the formation of regional political classes distinct from national ones, and on the emergence of alternative career paths to the traditional, unidirectional bottom-up pattern. More recently, the influence of different career paths on the attitudes and behavior of legislators has also been hypothesized. However, while political science has made significant progress in analyzing and describing multi-level career patterns, much remains to be done in regard to the explanations for such patterns and their consequences.
Are career politician members of parliament (MPs) more or less likely to vote against the party line than their peers? Despite growing interest in the behavior of career politicians across parliamentary systems, answers to this question are marked by considerable theoretical and empirical uncertainty. I derive the two most common (but opposing) behavioral predictions before testing them over all legislative votes of two UK House of Commons terms (2005–15) using multilevel modeling of new and disaggregated data on MPs' occupational backgrounds. The finding that career politicians are more likely to rebel challenges conventional wisdom and provides an important empirical foundation for the ongoing debate.
The paper explores the causes of legislative turnover within individual parties (N=879) after 152 general elections in eight west European lower and unicameral chambers in the period 1945-2015. The focus is on political and institutional features of individual parties and the party system. The data is analysed using a simple OLS regression with country dummies. Two key findings emerge from the study. First, parties in different ideological streams show different levels of party MP turnover. Green and right-wing parties have higher, while conservative parties have lower turnover rates. Second, party change and party system change influence turnover. Beyond fluctuations in individual party electoral strength, individual party reform and replacement, in particular party name changes and mergers, as well as the position of parties in or out of government influence the rate of party MP renewal. The format of the party system, in particular the number of effective parties and fluctuations in the allocation of party strength among parties, in particular electoral volatility, have crucial consequences for legislative elite circulation within parties.
Is the transition from the political sphere to highly paid and attractive private and public sector positions a common phenomenon for legislators? If so, which variables determine these career moves? To answer these questions, the following variables are utilised: (1) the expertise gathered in certain committees, (2) strong professional networks resulting from a high position in party and legislature, (3) a business-friendly ideology, (4) the deteriorating party support and networking base indicated by a failed re-nomination, and lastly (5) the political success in winning elections. To comprehensively assess these factors, this study makes use of a new dataset that comprises information on the political positions as well as the professional status of 646 former German MPs who left the Bundestag between 1998 and 2009. Using probit regression analyses, it is shown that a higher hierarchical position in parliament and party and acquired expertise influence the probability of subsequently holding a more attractive private or public sector position. Moreover, the way in which legislators leave parliament – be it due to failed nomination, a scandal or failed re-election –serves as a reliable predictor for the status of subsequent employment.
The Mexican political system has undergone transformations that have deeply affected the legislative process. Not only has the executive branch stopped playing a key role in this process but political decentralization has forced legislators to cultivate a personal reputation in regard to the various actors able to lend continuity to their political careers. This raises the question of who legislates in Mexico. In order to explore this issue, this article analyzes the changes observed in the ways of making laws and the career followed by the authors of the initiatives passed in the Chamber of Deputies during the three periods of office that followed the party alternation of the year 2000.
In Latin America, quota laws and parity are the most relevant public policies in promoting women’s political representation. This chapter analyzes the ongoing process of gender-equal political representation and identifies five “broken promises” in the journey to quotas and parity, namely, (i) the adoption of quotas without clear placement mandates, (ii) the fallacy that gender quotas per se would guarantee women’s equal access to decision-making, (iii) the limitation of quotas in achieving women’s equal (proportional) representation in legislative bodies, (iv) the fallen assumption that women legislators would represent women’s interests, and finally, (v) violence against women who reached political office as an unintended consequence of quota systems. Some shortcuts to these policies do not always arise from broken promises, but result from the contrast between high social expectations of change and centuries of patriarchal domination.
Theory: This paper provides a comparative study of legislative institutions in the United States and Japan. It explains the rise of committee-based legislative organizations as an institutional choice made by rational legislators deciding how best to regularize their career advancement subject to electoral and constitutional constraints. Hypotheses: We argue that the rise of careerism within a legislature leads to a regularized system of career advancement, or a seniority system. Furthermore, the details of this system depend on the heterogeneity of intra-party preferences and each country's electoral and constitutional system. To the extent that parties can offer members electoral security and influence over policy, they will retain control over the policy-making process. Otherwise, control will devolve to smaller organizational units, such as committees. Methods: We develop a new measure of seniority within committees. We present statistical evidence linking a rise in average tenure within both legislatures to a regularization of careers, and detailing the nature of committee-based seniority in each country. Results: In the United States, single-member electoral districts, alternating party control, and a separation of powers system gave legislators an incentive to create committee-based policy jurisdictions. In Japan, multi-member districts, single-party control, and a parliamentary system led to a unique two-tiered seniority system in which members rise first through committees and then through cabinet posts.
This note expands research on representation of women in national legislatures. Existing
models are tested on newer data in advanced industrialized democracies, and these models
are then applied to a sample of democracies in developing countries. There are striking
differences across the two samples. While a proportional representation electoral system,
women's participation in the labor force, the cultural standing of women, and the country's
level of development all have positive effects on female representation in OECD democracies, none of these variables have a statistically significant and positive effect in less developed countries. These findings strongly suggest the existence of a threshold. Only after that threshold is passed do proportional representation, labor force participation, and cultural standing exert positive influences on the representation of women.
This research note presents a theory of congressional retirement and tests it with data from the 102d Congress. The results bridge the gap between the 1970s macro retirement studies and the more recent micro-centered approaches by high-lighting the importance of career ceilings. Defined as the interaction between formal position and years of service, the career ceilings variable can be interpreted as the degree to which the member's career in the House has stagnated. This variable dominates the traditional causes of retirement in the quantitative analysis. In light of the convergence of the unique 1992 retirement-causing factors, its power is especially surprising. Not only was 1992 the first election after redistricting and the House bank scandal, but it was also the last chance for members to convert excess campaign cash to personal income. Nevertheless, career ceilings predict retirement much better than any of the 1992-specific variables.
Political scientists have viewed modern state legislatures from three perspectives: legislative reform in the 1960s and 1970s, legislative professionalization in the 1980s, and most recently legislative institutionalization. Institutionalization is best indicated by the boundedness of the legislature from the environment, as specified by personnel differentiation, normative structure, and managerial autonomy. When various indicators are taken into account, legislatures appear to be moving in the direction of deinstitutionalization.
Office-holders periodically face the problem of choosing among a set of career alternatives, and these alternatives customarily include the choice of dropping out of political life, or seeking reelection, or of choosing to seek higher office. This paper assumes that officeholders behave according to a rational calculus in making such choices, and that the main elements involved in the choice process include the probabilities and values attached by the candidate to his alternatives, and the investments required to obtain these alternatives. Political ambition, or the desire to seek higher office, is shown to develop as a product of the investments that politicians make in their political careers, and the investments are shown to be associated with the structural characteristics of community size and electoral competitiveness. The subjects of the research are 435 city councilmen from 89 cities of the San Francisco Bay Region, and the data include information derived from interviews with the councilmen and aggregate election data collected on each city.
A serious failing of comparative legislative studies is that, while much is known about various aspects of many individual legislatures, there is no acceptable, general model of legislative change. The notion of institutionalization, as developed by Eisenstadt, Huntington, and others, and as applied to the U.S. House of Representatives by Polsby, probably offers the most promise to those who hope this situation will change. Here we find the seeds of what could become a model of legislative evolution. To date, however, no concerted attempt has been made to determine how well the concept of institutionalization fares in legislatures other than the U.S. House of Representatives. Moreover, significant differences of opinion persist regarding the interpretation and merit of the term. Consequently, in this paper I present data from a legislature other than the U.S. House of Representatives--the British House of Commons--and discuss the value of the notion of institutionalization as it has been applied to legislatures. This research constitutes a preliminary attempt to ascertain the ability of institutionalization to explain the nature of legislative change and not just change in the U.S. House of Representatives.
This study analyzes the decisions of members of the House on whether to seek higher office (governor or senator) during the period 1954-1974. It differs from previous ambition analyses in that it offers a more concrete theoretical base for the study of progressive ambition and it attempts to predict which members will seek higher office rather than just analyze the careers of members who did run. Hypotheses are offered which deal with the probability of winning a higher office, the value of the higher office, the value of the present office, and the impact of whether or not members are "risk-takers." These hypotheses are then tested. Finally, a number of other hypotheses which follow from the theory are discussed.
While recent studies of political recruitment emphasize sociological and psychological variables, this study stresses the relation between structural variables (legally prescribed nominating procedures) and the role of political parties in recruiting a state's legislators. To test their hypotheses, the authors analyze and compare the role of political parties in four states (Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Washington) in recruiting and sponsoring legislative candidates. Statistically significant differences among nominating systems are found.
Most observers of Congress know that the number of representatives voluntarily retiring from the House increased in the 1970s, and there has been much speculation about the causes of this increase. For the most part, however, explanations of the increase are attempted without a solid understanding of the more general motivations for voluntary retirements. In order to understand these motivations, I ascertain the type of individual who in recent years has been the most likely to retire. In addition, I show that the reasons for voluntary retirement changed radically in the early 1970s. A different type of representative retired in the 1970s than retired in the 1960s. In the final section of this study I explore the relevance of this change to the increase in the number of retirees.
The assertion that systematic sociological analysis cannot explain specific occurrences and directions of change is critically examined. On the basis of analysis of the social and political structure of traditional centralized Empires and of the development of religions within them, it is argued that the institutionalization of any social system creates possibilities for specific and defined types of change, which develop not randomly but in specific directions to a large extent set by the very process of institutionalization.
This article assesses the status of diachronic research on the United States Congress. A literature review reveals a lack of truly diachronic studies, but a wealth of insightful and useful historical and contemporary studies. Drawing on organization theory, a research approach designed to facilitate and improve diachronic analysis is put forward. A major focus of the approach is on the ways in which environmental factors--both fixed and variable--shape the operations and performance of Congress. In addition, problems and strategies in analyzing the impacts of Congress on the wider political system are examined. The concluding section presents a research agenda for political scientists interested in applying diachronic analysis to the study of Congress.
British elections are traditionally understood to be dominated by parties and leaders. Local candidates are taken to be mere ciphers, whose impact on the outcome is negligible. Recently, however, several works have documented a change in MP behavior. Today's members do more constituency service than did their predecessors, in the belief that this will create a personal vote. If the MPs are succeeding, incumbency advantage should now be evident, as it is in American elections. In fact, incumbency advantage does not seem to have changed over the postwar period: for the major parties, it remains small and sporadic.
Israel's proportional representation system favors group-oriented legislative recruitment. This study proposes a model for the analysis of group-oriented recruitment. Israeli data confirm a number of statements about the variables used in this model: party control over group eligibility and candidate selection, and the structural characteristics of the subsystems of parties and groups. The study then inquiries into the impact of system-variables on the behavior of parties and groups in the recruitment process. Two of these variables, the salience of politics and competitiveness in a multiparty system, are defined in terms which lend themselves to quantification.
Since World War II, divided government has become increasingly common in the American states. A significant component of the increase is the deterioration of Republican fortunes in state legislatures: after the 1990 and 1992 elections, for example, only five state legislatures were controlled by the Republicans. I shall examine the hypothesis that the professionalization of state legislatures makes legislative service more attractive to Democratic candidates and less attractive to Republican candidates, because full-time legislative service is incompatible with another career, and Democrats, on average, have less lucrative career opportunities than Republicans. Statistical analysis of post-World War II legislative elections outside the South is consistent with the argument: other things being equal, every ten-thousand-dollar increase in real biennial legislative compensation is associated with approximately a 1% increase in Democratic legislators.
Among the laws that rule human societies,” de Tocqueville said, “there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased.” ¹ In much of the world today, equality of political participation is growing much more rapidly than is the “art of associating together.” The rates of mobilization and participation are high; the rates of organization and institutionalization are low. De Tocqueville's precondition for civilized society is in danger, if it is not already undermined. In these societies, the conflict between mobilization and institutionalization is the crux of politics. Yet in the fast-growing literature on the politics of the developing areas, political institutionalization usually receives scant treatment. Writers on political development emphasize the processes of modernization and the closely related phenomena of social mobilization and increasing political participation. A balanced view of the politics of contemporary Asia, Africa, and Latin America requires more attention to the “art of associating together” and the growth of political institutions. For this purpose, it is useful to distinguish political development from modernization and to identify political development with the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. Rapid increases in mobilization and participation, the principal political aspects of modernization, undermine political institutions. Rapid modernization, in brief, produces not political development, but political decay.
Voluntary departure from Congress through retirement is the second most common method of opening positions for new members. The susceptibility to retirement is quite predictable. The decision to retire involves assessing one's ability to do the job, the desirability of the job, and one's vulnerability to involuntary departure. Statistical evidence and interview data indicate that a lessened job desirability leads to most retirement from Congress. As a source of change in the system, retirement removes some of the most conservative and least active members while umquely opening the door to the most liberal new members. Retirement is neither random in its antecedents nor its consequences.
Nearly thirty years of research on social choice has produced a large body of theoretical results. The underlying structure of the models that have generated these results is highly atomistic and institutionally sparse. While attention has been devoted to the mechanisms by which individual revealed preferences are aggregated into a social choice, rarely are other aspects of institutional arrangements treated endogenously. In this paper institutional properties are given more prominence. In particular, I focus on three aspects of organization: (1) a division-of-labor arrangement called a committee system: (2) a specialization-of-labor system called a jurisdictional arrangement; and (3) a monitoring mechanism by which a parent organization constrains the autonomy of its subunits called an amendment control rule. The conceptual language has a legislative flavor but, in fact, the concepts are broadly applicable to diverse organizational forms. The principal thrust of this paper is a demonstration of the ways institutional arrangements may conspire with the preferences of individuals to produce structure-induced equilibrium.
This paper combines an organization theory perspective with rational choice techniques to study legislative design. The specific focus is on how a legislature assigns members and transfers resources to standing committees with the aim of motivating committees to specialize and to share the benefits of specialization. The stimulus for the study comes from organization theory and a long tradition of empirical congressional studies. The main analytical tool, however, is a game of incomplete information. Several testable propositions about legislative organization are derived.
A rational-choice model is used to account for the decisions of United States Senators to run for president. The model predicts that senators will be more likely to run for president if their relative costs of running are low, if they have no political liabilities that might reduce their chances of winning, and if they have a propensity to take risks, which we measure by their past willingness to take risks in running for the Senate. The model works well in accounting for the decisions of Democrats to seek the presidency in 1972,1976, and 1984, and can explain why few Republican senators ran in 1980. The model is used to predict which senators in the 99th Congress are relatively likely to run for president in 1988. The model works better in accounting for the past behavior of Democrats than Republicans, and also generates more plausible predictions about future Democratic presidential candidates. This partisan difference results largely from the different opportunity structures of the two parties. Finally, we discuss the changing dynamics of the nomination process and the implications of this change both for our model and for American electoral politics.
The effectiveness of elections as instruments of popular control is at a minimum predicated upon the desire of elected officeholders to retain at least their current position. Additionally, a substantial body of research has pointed to the role differential ambition plays in shaping the careers and behavior of officeholders. The following analysis evaluates decisions by members of the U.S. House of Representatives either to seek reelection or to pursue higher office. Probit analysis is employed to disentangle the relative influence of factors contributing to decisions to seek higher office. This method also allows for the estimation of the influence of each of these factors in terms of how they contribute to the probability a member would seek higher office. Among the influences evaluated, factors conditioning the nature of the opportunity for higher office emerge as the more salient determinants of decisions to pursue that office. It is believed that this technique holds promise for future inquiries into the role ambition plays in the roll call and electoral activities of House members.
Previous research on the motivations for voluntary departures from Congress has often focused on individual events, such as the check-writing scandal, on individual election years, such as 1974 or 1992, or has degenerated into a debate over whether or not members quit because the job is “no longer any fun.” In this paper we use a dataset on House careers in the last half of the twentieth century and a synthetic theory to demonstrate that Congress is not universally “no fun,” but rather that there are certain situations that lead some members to be less satisfied than others with congressional service. This notion fits well with the data and makes more sense than attempting to conclude whether Congress either is or is not fun. In the process, we show that members who are not achieving their goals are more likely than others to depart voluntarily from the U.S. House.
Most previous research on congressional career decisions has focused on one of two binary
choices-between retiring and running for reelection, or between running for reelection
and seeking higher office. But most of the time, representatives face all three choices
simultaneously. Employing a "mother logit" model, we estimate the effects of relevant variables both
on pairwise comparisons (conditional probabilities) and on the unconditional probabilities of choosing
each one of these three alternatives. Probably most intriguing is our finding that a member's age has
little or no effect upon the unconditional probability of running for reelection. The interrelatedness of
career options is seen particularly clearly in the case of incumbents who had been redistricted out of
their seats. When they had an opportunity to run for higher office, they were likely to take it. Only
when they lacked such an opportunity were they more likely than other members to opt for retirement.
The revelation that hundreds of House members had regularly overdrawn their checking accounts with the House bank without penalty injected a new and unanticipated issue into the 1992 elections. The consequences were profound. The scandal was a major reason for the unusually high turnover of House seats in 1992. Bank overdrafts contributed significantly to exit by all routes: retirement, defeat in the primary election, and defeat in the general election. Overdrafts did not automatically spell disaster for incumbents, however; a record of bad checks was far more damaging when exploited by an experienced, well-financed challenger.
How do legislative bodies change over time? Polsby's (1968) examination of institutionalization in the U.S. House provides an organizational framework to assess how a legislature develops. I argue that the process of legislative institutionalization is driven by the membership's career goals. Because members of the California Assembly have different career ambitions than U.S. Representatives, application of institutionalization to the Assembly produces important contrasts with the House. Examination of data collected on the Assembly from 1951 to 1985, particularly with an interrupted time-series model, reveals that the Assembly has increased internal complexity, and, on many but not all measures, it has established well-defined boundaries. But, while the Assembly meets some minor standards of universalistic criteria and automatic methods, it fails to employ seniority as the main rule for the distribution of positions of power. Seniority does not matter because, I argue, more discretionary and particularistic methods better serve the career needs of the Assembly membership. This analysis suggests important implications for the utility of the concept of institutionalization.
Legislatures employ a variety of organizational schemes to determine how positions of power are distributed within them. I propose and test a theory relating the internal organization of a legislature to the political career goals of its members. Examining the lower legislative house in California, Connecticut, and New York, I demonstrate that each body offers its members a different political career path, and that the particular ambition is promoted by the internal organization of the legislature. New York assemblymen have career ambitions and seniority matters in gaining positions of power in that body. California assemblymen have progressive goals and operate in a system which allows any member to gain power quickly. In Connecticut, where legislators have discrete ambitions, seniority is not important and power is centralized.