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The "Soft Peace Boys": Presurrender Planning and Japanese Land Reform

The "Soft Peace Boys":
Presurrender Planning and Japanese Land Reform
Steven Schwartzberg
Yale University
The danger of communism comes from the misery of the masses, and
where governments show no disposition to alleviate the economic con-
dition, or even to hold forth hope of a higher standard of living. I ven-
ture that not one "communist" in ten knows what communism is. He
understands it is something extremely opposite to the system under
which he suffers and he joins the communists as a protest striking
blindly and stupidly. He is convinced that nothing could be worse than
his present state. Here again, as all through history, we encounter the
stupidity of the over-privileged in refusing to concede anything to the
man below.
Claude Bowers to Joseph Grew, 14 June 1945.
I want you to know that what you say fits in precisely with my own
thinking.
-Joseph Grew to Claude Bowers, 29 June 1945.
Before retiring in August 1945, Joseph Grew had risen through the
ranks in the State Department to become the acting secretary of state.
Yet he was and remains most readily identified by the ten years he
spent as the American ambassador to Tokyo. It was on the basis of his
tenure there, and with the help of friends and colleagues drawn pri-
marily from that embassy, that he exercised a considerable influence
on American planning for the Occupation of Japan. Keenly aware of
the failure of the last European peace settlement, these Japan hands
were often criticized as the advocates of a "soft" peace. As if to invite
such criticism, Grew publicly urged the abandonment of any vindic-
tiveness in planning for the peace. It was the same kind of blind preju-
dice which in the last war had been directed against the Germans, he
told a Chicago audience in December 1943, that prevented so many
Americans from admitting "that there can be anything good in Japan
or any good elements in the Japanese race." Without a postwar policy
that would seek to strengthen these good elements and win their co-
operation, he implied, the Japanese might simply follow the German
example and wait a generation before trying again. There would be
The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1993)
© by Imprint Publications, Inc. All rights reserved.
little lasting benefit to the United States, Grew warned President Harry
S Truman in June 1945, "if we were to achieve merely a military vic-
tory and fail to pursue the victory into the field of ideas."'
Ironically, the influence that Grew and his circle exercised is often
presented in the literature on the Occupation as though it were ma-
levolent and their primary purpose the retention of as much of pre-
war Japan as possible. If the Japan hands had had their way, one recent
author has insisted, the Occupation would not have instituted "the
far-reaching changes that remade Japan's economic structure into a
mass consumer economy: the land reform, labor unions, democrati-
zation of business, and so forth." A careful study of the origins of the
Occupation's land reform policy suggests that much of this criticism
of the Japan hands is unwarranted, the product of contemporary preju-
dices and faulty recollections. While macroeconomic and trade poli-
cies were never clearly developed during the period of presurrender
planning, and while there was a range of opinion as to the best means
to promote structural economic reform, a broad consensus on the need
for basic s oci al reform in Japan did emerge. The Japan hands shared
and played a central role in the formation of this consensus. Unlike
those who hoped to see radical change brought about by revolution,
they placed their hopes in reformist Japanese and a progressive Ameri-
can Occupation. Some of them were uncertain as to the feasibility of
such measures as thoroughgoing land reform, and wished to see what
the situation on the ground in Japan would look like before deciding,
but all of them appear to have recognized the desirability of economic
reform as a means of contributing to the emergence of a more liberal
and democratic Japanese society. They were convinced, as Grew wrote
to General Douglas MacArthur on 22 August 1945, "that a great many
fundamental changes must be wrought in the whole Japanese system
before that misguided country can take its proper place among the
peace-loving nations."2
The portrait of the Japan hands as opponents of needed reforms
was drawn forcefully by their contemporary critics. Grew's alleged
concern with the practical and ethical difficulties of fostering democ-
racy in postwar Japan, T. A. Bisson wrote in one issue of The Nation,
1. Joseph Grew, "War and Post-War Problems in the Far East," Department of State
Bulletin, 1 Jan. 1944, 11. Grew memorandum for the president, 13 June 1945, Confiden-
tial File, White House Central Files, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am
indebted to Akira Iriye, Gaddis Smith, Diane Bell, and Fredrik Logevall for their com-
ments on an earlier version of this essay.
2. Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal ed. Herbert
Passin (New York, 1987), 17. Grew to MacArthur, 22 Aug. 1945, MSAml687 v. 122(29),
Joseph C. Grew Papers (hereafter Grew Papers), Houghton Library, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass.
was thoroughly hypocritical. "What Grew, Dooman, and their follow-
ers are really concerned about is something quite different. They fear
a popular revolt which will topple the 'moderates'—Emperor, Zaibatsu,
landlords, and the rest-which, they hope, will retain power in post-
war Japan." It is surprising to note the extent to which this character-
ization has been maintained over the years. Grew, one is informed by
Howard Schonberger, "thought extensive changes in the Japanese po-
litical economy were not required to achieve a stable and peaceful
nation." Grew and his former counsellor of embassy, Eugene Dooman,
according to Theodore Cohen, "staunchly defended Japanese big busi-
ness as the element most likely to serve as a bulwark against military
resurgence." Grew was "brought up among the very wealthy," John
Roberts claims, and "gravitated toward his own kind in Japan and
was on cordial terms with leading members of the zaibatsu families."
Similarly, Marlene Mayo maintains that Grew had "only a superficial
understanding of Japan's past. His ten years there had been spent
largely with the rich and powerful." Susan Deborah Chira asserts that
Grew and Dooman's opposition "effectively stopped" a proposal for
land reform from being adopted in Washington. Even Edwin
Reischauer once held that the "essentially quite conservative" Grew
turned down a proposal to transfer land ownership from the hands of
nonfarming landowners to their tenants.' .3
Fortunately, Mayo, Cohen, and Schonberger contend, a com-
mitment to economic reform was "somehow"-and each of them use
that particular word-smuggled past hostile Japan hands into the cen-
tral Occupation policy documents: SWNCC 150 and JCS 1380. The
credit for this operation is given largely to an economist named Edwin
Martin. Martin, who was then working on far eastern economic af-
fairs out of the office of Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton,
certainly played an important role in the drafting of what became the
economics section of SWNCC 150. But instead of evidence of Japan
hand opposition to his efforts, or to economic reform in general, what
3. T. A. Bisson, "What Program for Japan?" Nation, 14 July 1945, 28. Howard B.
Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent,
Ohio, 1989), 29. Cohen, 167. John G. Roberts, "The 'Japan Crowd' and the Zaibatsu Res-
toration," Japan Interpreter 12 (Summer 1979): 387. Marlene J. Mayo, "American Wartime
Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans
as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952
(Carbondale, Ill., 1984), 29-30. Susan Deborah Chira, Cautious Revolutionaries: Occupa-
tion Planners and Japan's Post-War Land Reform, (Tokyo, 1982), 76. Edwin O. Reischauer,
My Life Between Japan and America (New York, 1986), 104. After reading an earlier version
of this essay, Reischauer commented that it was "entirely convincing" and that he had
inadvertently "perpetuated a common misapprehension of the time that Ambassador
Grew was essentially a conservative man." Reischauer to author, 8 Aug. 1990.
rary critics and maintained with relatively minor modifications by
some recent author .6
Within the presurrender planning structure, the Inter-Divisional
Area Committee on the Far East (IDACFE) was a stronghold of what
their critics called the "Japan Crowd." The chairman of the group,
George Blakeslee, had taught at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplo-
macy since its establishment and was, in Grew's opinion, "among our
soundest experts on Japanese affairs." Among those regularly in at-
tendance at IDACFE meetings after the spring of 1944 were two oth-
ers whom Grew would include in that category: Dooman, his former
counsellor of embassy, and Joseph Ballantine, who had once served
briefly as his first secretary. Other Japan hands regularly present in-
cluded Erle Dickover, another of Grew's first secretaries; Frank Will-
iams, his former commercial attache; and Robert Fearey, his former
private secretary. Hugh Borton, who had written his doctorate on peas-
ant uprisings in Japan and taught at Columbia for a number of years,
served as the group's secretary. There was a considerable range of
opinion among these figures, but they were united by their conviction
that a punitive peace would not be in America's interest and their
belief that fundamental reform in Japan was both necessary and would
require Japanese support to succeed. As Borton has written, many of
the IDACFE's recommendations "developed into the basic postwar
policies for Japan." As far as Grew was concerned, the influence of the
Japan hands in the IDACFE and at every level of the pl a nn i n g process
was such that SWNCC 150 could be referred to as "our plan,"-the
plan of "the so-called 'Japan Crowd' and 'soft peace boys."''
There is a vast gap between Grew's conception of the Japan hands'
role and the conception of that role formulated by Mayo, Cohen, and
6. Grew to: Wharton, 25 Oct. 1945, MSAml687 v. 123(33); Reifsnider, 19 Oct. 1945,
MSAml687 v. 122(52); Grew Papers. Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record
of Forty Years, 1904-1945, 2 vols. (Boston, Mass., 1952), 2:1440-41. Grew's biographer
also notes that Grew "approved of the breakup of the zaibatsu and agrarian reform."
Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the
United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston, Mass.,1966), 367.
7. Grew, Turbulent Era, 2:1422. Heinrichs, 369. Cohen, 18. Hugh Borton, American
Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan (New York, 1967), 11. Grew to Elsie and Cecil
Lyon, 30 Sept. 1945, MSAml687 v. 122(26), Grew Papers. Department of State, Biographic
Register (Washington, D.C., 1944). Dickover stands out to some extent in this group for
his conviction that the institution of the throne should be abolished. See Akira Iriye,
Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War,1941-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.,1981), 206-9.
Ballantine stands out, at least in the early period of planning, for the extent of his reli-
ance on reformist elements among the Japanese. See Marlene J. Mayo, "Psychological
Disarmament: American Wartime Planning for the Education and Re-Education of De-
feated Japan, 1943-1945," in Thomas W. Burkman, ed., The Occupation of Japan: Education
and Social Reform (Norfolk, Va., 1982), 23-25.
Schonberger. These authors acknowledge to varying degrees the Ja-
pan hands' contribution to the Occupation's political reforms, but this
acknowledgment is combined with a portrait of their attitude toward
economic reform that cannot be sustained. Mayo has done some of
the most sophisticated and detailed work on the period of presurrender
planning, and she is certainly correct to call attention to the role of
others besides the Japan hands in the planning process. She shows
persuasively that the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy,
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, and many others, all played
a vital role in the development of antitrust policy for Japan. But her
speculations as to why Dooman and Grew did not forcefully oppose
the increasingly explicit anti-zaibatsu proposals as they emerged are
specious. They completely overlook the fact that Grew, at least, clearly
supported breaking up the zaibatsu. For Dooman's position they rely
on his recollections in spite of the fact that they are, as she notes, mis-
taken as to how and when zaibatsu dissolution was agreed upon. For
the Japan hands, the basic objective of economic reform was a widely
shared prosperity which would make possible a favorable reorienta-
tion of Japanese attitudes. To the extent that a "punitive" perspective
informed some of the advocates of zaibatsu dissolution, as Mayo sug-
gests, it is not surprising that there should have been tension between
them. Such tension hardly constitutes evidence of Japan hand opposi-
tion to economic reform.8
Cohen and Schonberger go farther than Mayo in their attribution of
antireformist positions to the "Japan Crowd." American policy-mak-
ers ignored or rejected, Schonberger insists, a more radical perspec-
tive that "emphasized strengthening trade unions and other popular
forces." Nowhere, Cohen claims, did the Japan hands show "a great
interest in labor unions, peasant organizations, or the prewar antiwar
'proletarian parties.'" When questioned as to the wisdom of support-
ing labor unions during the period of military government, however,
Dooman replied that "giving rights to labor would tend to accelerate
the process of democratization."9
On 15 November 1944, Maxwell Hamilton, a China hand and s p e -
cial assistant to the secretary of state, sat in on a meeting of the IDACFE.
When Hamilton stated that he saw no reason why military govern-
ment should be interested in labor organizations, "Mr. Dooman ex-
8. Marlene J. Mayo, "American Economic Planning for Occupied Japan: The Issue of
Zaibatsu Dissolution," in Lawrence H. Redford, ed., The Occupation of Japan: Economic
Policy and Reform (Norfolk, Va., 1980), esp. 222-38.
9. Schonberger, 27. Cohen, 19. Minutes of the IDACFE, Meeting No.105,18 July 1944,
Ma ko to lokibe, ed., The Occupation of Japan: U.S. Planning Documents, 1942-1954, Micro-
fiche Collection (Bethesda, Md., 1987), 2-B-86.
plained that the Committee realized that the labor movement up to
1936 had been one of the strong physical points for the development
of a more liberal social point of view. The Committee believed there-
fore that the labor group was one of the best potential elements of
liberalism." Two days later, in a presentation before the Post-War Pro-
grams Committee (PWC), then the highest presurrender planning body
in the State Department, Blakeslee emphasized that because of the
liberal political potential of workers' organizations, the IDACFE rec-
ommended that their formation "be encouraged by military govern-
ment."10
In contrast with their attitude toward a Japanese labor movement
with which they were familiar, many of the Japan hands wished to
postpone a decision on questions such as land reform until sometime
during the Occupation. They were not alone in wanting to see what
the situation on the ground would look like. Leo Pasvolsky, a special
assistant to the secretary of state, told the PWC in November 1944
that it appeared as though "the President was anxious to avoid too
many details concerning the economic policy for Germany as we did
not know what conditions we will find" and that similar consider-
ations would be applicable to Japan. This uncertainty as to what would
be possible in Japan, as well as a desire to maintain operational con-
trol in Washington, is evident in the drafts of what became the eco-
nomics section of SWNCC 150. In the words of one of these drafts:
"except as they may be specifically directed, the occupation authori-
ties should not take the initiative with respect to long-range reform or
reorganization of the Japanese internal economy. Only where inter-
nally generated reform movements reach significant proportions,
should the occupying forces consider taking any positive action with
respect to them, and then only upon specific direction of the appropri-
ate authorities in Washington." Long before this document reached
the secretary of state's staff committee, however, this clause was
dropped and the authority to take the initiative with regard to such
matters as agrarian reform, implicitly conferred upon the Occupation." 11
On 6 June 1945 the IDACFE approved most of the draft economics
section and informed its author, Edwin Martin, that a final draft could
be submitted to the members for approval without another meeting.
By this point, the clause maintaining control from Washington already
appears to have been dropped. What remained was the injunction that
10. Minutes of the IDACFE, Meeting No. 165, 15 November 1944 and attached Notes
on PWC Meeting, 17 Nov. 1944, lokibe, 2-B-146.
11. Notes on PWC Meeting, 17 Nov. 1944; and CAC-222a/PWC-296b revised, "Ja-
pan: Economic Policies During Military Occupation," 16 Mar. / 19 May 1945, both in ibid,
2-B-146, 2-A-66. See also Mayo, "American Economic Planning," 258n31.
"military government should encourage the development of demo-
cratic organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, and should favor
a wider distribution of ownership, management and control of the
Japanese economic system." On important issues, established prac-
tice within the IDACFE was to "continue discussion until a general
consensus had been reached rather than abiding by a majority vote."
Yet there is nothing in the IDACFE minutes to suggest opposition to
Martin's language on this point. Nor is there evidence of opposition
at the higher levels of planning with which Dooman, in particular,
was involved. When the draft policy reached the secretary of state's
staff committee on 26 June, it was presented by Joseph Ballantine who
was then head of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Grew was presid-
ing over the meeting as the acting secretary of state. The economics
section was approved not only without criticism, but without discus-
sion. This was not because it had been successfully maneuvered past
hostile Japan hands, but because it articulated a general agreement
Early Efforts and the Opponents of a "Soft" Peace
Turning to an examination of the origins of American support for land
reform in Japan, one finds a member of the "Japan Crowd" develop-
ing the first relevant arguments in the presurrender planning docu-
ments. Although it is not clear that anything directly c a m e of the work,
Robert Fearey's E-155-"Japanese Post-War Economic Consider-
ations"-was a prescient paper and appears to have been well received
at the time. In a presentation based upon it, before the State
Department's Subcommittee on Territorial Problems on 30 July 1943,
Fearey argued his case that "certain essential reforms in agriculture
and industry would have to be carried out before Japan could attain a
stable economy after the war." After he had finished, Isaiah Bowman,
the president of Johns Hopkins University and the chairman of the
subcommittee, "complimented Mr. Fearey on the clarity of his report,
and remarked that rarely had a better statement been presented to the
subcommittee by a member of the research staff."'3
12. Minutes of the IDACFE, Meeting No. 204, 6 June 1945; CAC-222a/PWC-296b
revised, 16 Mar./ 19 May 1945; and, on the policy of reaching consensus, Minutes of the
IDACFE, Meeting No. 105, 18 July 1944, all in lokibe, 2-B-185, 2-A-66, 2-B-86. For
Dooman's position, see boxes 131 and 110, SWNCC Records, RG 353, National Archives
(hereafter NA), Washington, D.C. SC-138, "Summary of United States' Post-Defeat Policy
Relating to Japan." Minutes of the Secretary's Staff Committee, 26 June 1945. Records of
the Secretary of State's Staff Committee, microfilm, M-1054, reel 2 for SC-138, reel 3 for
the minutes, also in NA.
13. Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, T Minutes 53 (30 July 1943),11,12, lokibe,
l-C-3.
Fearey wrote that there were three main schools of thought on what
should constitute policy toward Japan after the war. His purpose, in
E-155, was to examine their economic implications. In retrospect, the
positions of the first two schools could probably have been seriously
advocated only in wartime. But they form an important part of the
background against which the Japan hands advocated a "soft" peace.
The first school held that security against future Japanese aggression
required cutting Japan off from foreign trade and eliminating its mod-
ern industrial plant. The second would allow foreign trade, after a
while, but would deprive Japan of its heavy industries and merchant
marine. The third school of thought, while insisting on a disarmament
that would perhaps include Japan's aircraft manufacturing and ship-
building industries, held that a tolerable Japanese living standard was
a prerequisite for turning Japan to a course of peaceful and orderly
development.'4
Given the large increase in population since the end of Japan's self-
imposed seclusion, and given the fact that the law of diminishing re-
turns had long since set in for agriculture-the total yield would be
appreciably higher if the population pressure on the farming districts
were reduced by a third-the conclusion was inescapable that under
the first school's plan, "Standards of living would fall below the sub-
sistence level and extinction of a fourth or more of the population
would be rendered almost inevitable." Even under the second school's
scheme, only the discovery of extensive new overseas markets for the
products of Japan's light industries could prevent a sharp reduction
in standards of living and very likely also in population. 15
This established at the outset, the bulk of Fearey's paper was de-
voted to the assumption that American policy would follow the third
school and the United States would undertake "to assist or actually to
direct the rehabilitation and reform of [the] Japanese economy." In the
future as in the past, Japan would be primarily dependent on foreign
trade for its economic welfare. Here the primary questions were the
willingness of other nations to accept Japanese exports in free or rea-
sonably free competition, the future course of demand for Japan's tra-
ditional exports, and its prospects for developing new ones. Japan
having become America's third largest export market in the 1920s, it
was by no means entirely a matter of altruism for the United States to
help Japan in attaining a minimum volume of trade. A further reduc-
tion in the silk trade appeared virtually certain, but there was good
14. Robert Fearey, E-155, "Japanese Post-War Economic Considerations," 21 July 1943,
1-2, ibid., l-B-18.
15. Ibid., 4.
On 24 August 1943, Grew wrote to Fearey that he had read with
"keen interest" his papers on Japanese postwar economic consider-
ations. The work, study and thought which had gone into these pa-
pers, Grew noted, was evident. Surely they had been and would be
appreciated. There were so many imponderable factors, however, that
it was difficult to get down to brass tacks. The course of the war and
the nature of its conclusion, the duration of the war and the losses
involved, the impact of the war on Japanese morale and the attitudes
of other nations, each of these might fundamentally influence the even-
tual settlement. "But by and large," he told Fearey, "I find myself in
the third of the three schools of thought mentioned in your Introduc-
tory Remarks in E-155."19
It is at this point in the narrative that Susan Deborah Chira, who
has otherwise written one of the best accounts of American
presurrender planning, goes seriously astray. Confusing Fearey's E-
155 with his work on land reform in 1945, she compounds the error by
mistakenly ascribing to Grew and Dooman the criticism which Fearey
later recalled was directed against his proposals. Since Chira's book
was originally a senior thesis at Harvard, and Edwin Reischauer her
adviser, his description of Grew's opposition to land reform may also
derive from this mistake. In the summer of 1943, the opposition that
Fearey encountered came not from Grew, who was rather sympathetic,
but from those generally opposed to a "soft" peace.2o
Before Grew replaced him on 1 May 1944, Stanley K. Hornbeck, an
old China hand, was the director of the State Department's Office of
Far Eastern Affairs. At about the same time that Fearey was beginning
to argue for having the Occupation direct the reform and rehabilita-
tion of the Japanese economy, Hornbeck was claiming that aside from
humanitarian considerations, there was no need to be greatly concerned
with the postwar stability of that economy. "Whereas Germany was
an integral part of Europe as a whole and while its economy could not
be wrecked without wrecking that of the whole continent, Japan's
position was very different. The Japanese played no significant role in
the world economy or even that of the Far East, and if economic chaos
were to be produced on its islands it could easily be restricted to Ja-
pan." In a letter critical of Fearey and his ideas, written toward the
end of 1943, Hornbeck stressed that he believed that options should
be kept open and that the focus should be on the real objective of
eliminating the military cancer from the Japanese body politic. To-
ward that end it might be wise to try to remake Japan in America's
19. Grew to Fearey, 24 Aug. 1943, MSAml687v. 115(43), Grew Papers.
20. Compare Chira, 76, and Robert Fearey, presentation at a symposium sponsored
by the MacArthur Memorial, 13-15 Apr. 1978, in Redford, ed., Occupation of Japan, 152.
image and it might be wise to let a demilitarized Japan work out its
own future in its own way; "procedure along that line might or might
not result in revolution and temporary chaos in Japan; revolution in
Japan, if it came, might or might not be a good thing
The belief that a Japanese revolution might be for the best-a belief
which would become part of the basis of opposition to the " J ap a n
Crowd" and a "soft" peace-had been voiced as early as October 1942
by Willis Church Lamott, the director of missionary education for the
Presbyterian Church in the United States. The "old liberals" in Japan,
Lamott warned, "either have been assassinated, have died off or are
passing the days of their senile decay behind the closely guarded gates
of their estates." It was foolish to expect leadership from them and
still more foolish to think that defeat would lead the Japanese to repu-
diate their beliefs in favor of such liberals. What the demobilization of
soldiers and the agrarian problem would probably combine to pro-
duce was not Western style democracy, but revolution. It would be
along the lines of the recent social experiments in the Soviet Union
and China, "rather than the more doctrinaire conceptions of freedom
and the rights of man obtaining in the democratic nations, that Japan
will naturally seek her salvation." For all of the conflict and suffering
that this would entail, in the end it would produce a nation rather
than an inchoate mass of men and women ruled by a divine emperor
This theme that a revolution was needed to sweep away Japan's
archaic mental and feudal structures continued to be articulated well
into 1945. Owen Lattimore, who suggested that the difference between
"liberals" and "militarists" in Japan had only been a matter of timing,
also stressed the need for a revolution.
It is a mistake to think that Japan could achieve "democratic monar-
chy" by reform. We Americans are likely to be misled by thinking of
England as the example of a democratic monarchy. But one of the im-
portant reasons why the British can be democratic is that, at a time
which has now receded so far into history that it can be talked about
without discomfort, the English people cut off the head of an English
king. Until the Japanese people have done something equally progres-
sive (whatever the suitable equivalent of cutting off heads may be),
everybody will be uncomfortable and no palliative reform will be ad-
equate
21. Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, T Minutes 52 (16 July 1943), 8, Iokibe,1-C-
2. Hornbeck to Bowman, 31 Dec. 1943, "RobertA. Fearey," box 165, Stanley K. Hornbeck
Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, Calif. This letter
does not appear to have been sent.
22. Willis Church Lamott, "What of Postwar Japan," Asia 42 (October 1942): 573-75.
23. Owen Lattimore, "The Sacred Cow of Japan," Atlantic 175 Qan. 1945): 50.
For some of those who desired a Japanese revolution, any form of
military occupation appeared to be counterproductive. John Embree,
who was connected with the Civil Affairs Training School at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, argued that an occupation would provoke a back-
lash and strengthen the hand of those favoring traditional
governmental forms. "Even if a revolutionary party or group were to
survive the initial mo nt hs of occupation, it is very likely that the occu-
pying forces will do as they did in the Rhineland after the last war and
tried to do in Russia-namely, suppress all thunder from the left. In
other words, the announced policy of the United States to occupy Ja-
pan will tend to retard rather than advance the democratic process in
that country."z4
Although hoping that a vast social revolutionary upheaval would
occur in the postwar period-"burning away in its fires much of the
dross of old Japan"-T. A. Bisson was unusual among the critics of
the "Japan Crowd" in sharing a great many of its central assumptions.
A vengeful postwar policy designed to maintain the political or eco-
nomic subjugation of Japan, Bisson argued, would generate a perpetual
threat to the peace of Asia. An effort to return Japan to an agrarian
subsistence economy would result in the death by starvation of a quar-
ter of the population and persons advocating such methods were evad-
ing the real task of establishing a Japan which could cooperate with
other nations. Defeat would help to discredit the old Japanese leader-
ship and their program and facilitate the emergence of a new leader-
ship which would undertake basic reforms. This new leadership should
be supported and Japan given full opportunity to raise the living stan-
dard of its people through the processes of normal international trade.
Reparations should be limited, perhaps to the transfer of Japanese as-
sets abroad. Like Fearey, Bisson was convinced that agrarian reform
was a prerequisite to the establishment of a healthy Japanese economy.25
Bisson differed from the "Japan Crowd" in that he explicitly blamed
the large landlords and the zaibatsu as well as the military for Japan's
aggression and stressed the need to abolish the emperor institution.
But even here, the differences involved should not be exaggerated or
misconstrued. The core of Grew's position was certainly not-as Bisson
would later charge-some special sympathy for Emperor Hirohito,
the landlords or thezaibatsu. After Japan's surrender, Grew could write
of Hirohito in a private letter that "he ought to be tried as a war crimi-
nal." What Grew believed was that the institution of the throne could
24. John F. Embree, "Democracy in Postwar Japan," Arnerican journal of Sociology 50
(November 1944): 207.
25. T. A. Bisson, "The Price of Peace for Japan," Pacific Affairs 42 (March 1944): 24, 8,
10, 11, 14, 9, 22.
be used to advance a liberal agenda-including ultimately land re-
form and zaibatsu dissolution-while maintaining political stability.
For Bisson, political stability was simply not a central value and the
emperor was a primary representative of what needed to be over-
thrown. Like William C. Johnstone, the dean of the School of Govern-
ment at George Washington University, Bisson believed that the pursuit
of stability could have reactionary implications. Johnstone put the
matter succinctly in a paper prepared for the Ninth Conference of the
Institute of Pacific Relations in January 1945:
The United Nations may become so anxious to avoid chaos, civil strife
or revolution in Japan as to be willing to compromise the ultimate goal
of a transformed Japan for the short-term advantage of a false stability.
Japan must not be permitted to follow the same course as Germany
did after World War I, and the continuance in power of any groups
among Japan's civilian bosses-big business monopolists, bureaucrats,
politicians or nobility-could fatally compromise the nation's trans-
formation into a law-abiding state and risk a renewal of Japanese ag-
gression at their first opportunity.26
The public criticism that was directed against Grew, and the Japan
hands generally, often focussed precisely on this question of where
the postwar Japanese leadership should come from. In general, the
assumption was that the "Japan Crowd" was devoted to what
Johnstone called "civilian bosses." Grew, the editors of Amerasia were
convinced, looked only to "prominent civilian members of the ruling
oligarchy." In fact, as Akira Iriye has shown, the Japan hands did feel
a strong affinity for the Japanese statesmen of the so-called Anglo-
American school and expect that many of them would be important
allies after the war. But their attitude toward the Japanese labor move-
ment indicates that they also looked well beyond this group. In a let-
ter to Hornbeck of 30 September 1943, Grew made it clear that he was
not simply thinking of some sort of restoration to power of moderate
elements from the prewar period. The impact of the war, he wrote,
"may have converted some or many of our old friends among the
moderates to rabid extremists whose reconversion may be difficult or
impossible." It was simply not possible at that stage of the war to
know who there would be to work with when the war was over. "I
will however say this: I have constantly held that when, through de-
feat in war and postwar measures, the Japanese military caste and
cult have been rendered powerless, elements will be found in Japan
26. Grew to Elsie and Cecil Lyon, 30 Sept. 1945, MSAml687 v. 122(26), Grew Papers.
William C. Johnstone, The Future of Japan American Council Paper (New York, 1945), no.
5:28.
who will welcome and who will cooperate in the building of a new
and nonmilitary structure, so long as they are not denied hope for the
future. "27
The element of contingency involved in presurrender planning de-
serves to be stressed. Final decisions on such structural economic re-
forms as zaibatsu dissolution and land reform did not begin to be taken
until it was clear-after Japan's surrender-that there would be a co-
operative Japanese government through which the Occupation could
rule and through which it could accomplish much more than it could
as a straightforward military government. It was precisely such a mili-
tary government, with its severe limitations in the way of trained per-
sonnel fluent in Japanese, which the presurrender planners had to
assume in their planning. Had Bisson been in Fearey's position in 1943
or early 1944, his ideas about agr arian reform would probably have
received a similar response both from Grew and from the overall plan-
ning bureaucracy: interesting thought, save it for later. Perhaps some-
one would have pointed out to him that if the problem were framed
as he had cast it-as one between 3,547 "big" landlords and 5.5 mil-
lion tenants and small holders-it was a problem without a solution.
Bisson's "big" landlords (those with holdings of over 122.5 acres) held
a small percentage of Japan's arable land. In any case, the dominant
issues of the economic policy dr afts of 1944, and even much of 1945,
remained such immediate occupation concerns as the control of infla-
tion, the destruction of war material, and the provision of relief. The
belief that a healthy Japanese economy was a prerequisite to a favor-
able reorientation of Japanese attitudes, and the corollary that reforms
should be designed to strengthen that economy, were not universally
shared. As early as April 1944, Secretary of State Cordell Hull had
reminded the Post-War Programs Committee that "the American
people are not now in a mood to be too considerate of Japan. The
emphasis should be placed on the conversion of Japan to a law abid-
ing, peacefully disposed nation; until the Japanese have shown evi-
dence of having reformed, they should be accorded only the necessary
minimum of consideration
27. "The Dangerous Myth of the 'Moderates,'" Amerasia 8 (June 1944), 184. Most of
the Japan hands would probably not have cared for Okano Susumu, the head of the
Japanese People's Liberation Alliance, who Amerasia touted for postwar leadership. See
"PotentialAnti-Fascist Forces in Japan,"Amerasia 8 (August 1944): 227. But see also note
45 below. Akira Iriye, "Continuities in U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1941-1949" in Yonosuke
Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York,1977), 378-407.
Grew to Hornbeck, 30 Sept. 1943, MSAml687 v. 116(17), Grew Papers.
28. See the various versions of CAC-222, "Japan: Economic Policies During Military
Occupation," and the Minutes of PWC Meeting No. 21,14Apr. 1944, lokibe, 2-A-61 to 2-
A-66, 2-D-1. See Bisson, "Price of Peace," 15.
From Washington to Tokyo
In December 1944, Edward Stettinius replaced Hul l as secretary of
state and Grew was appointed undersecretary. The Post-War Programs
Committee was superseded by the newly established State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and, in January, what became
known as SWNCC's Subcommittee on the Far East (SFE) was set up
with Dooman as its chairman. Yet in spite of the Japan hands' ascen-
dancy, the critics of a "soft" peace continued to exercise a strong influ-
ence. In April 1945, a statement of general economic policy toward
Japan was torpedoed by Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson on
the grounds that it was poorly written and represented the same kind
of "soft peace" that had gotten the State Department into trouble over
policy toward Germany. According to Acheson, "it seemed absurd to
recommend that we should see that Japan has a vigorous international
trade so that it can pay reparations." The Japan hands' position was
strengthened somewhat by the presence of "soft" peace advocates in
the American military. In early August, Colonel William Chanler, the
acting director of the Civil Affairs Division, sent Secretary of War Henry
L. Stimson a series of proposed amendments for SWNCC 150. These
included the recommendation that any "statements suggesting vin-
dictiveness beyond our specific requirements should be eliminated,
particularly since we must leave the way open for the revival of Japa-
nese political and economic life on a demilitarized basis and for de-
veloping in Japan friendly attitudes toward the United States." In a
letter of late July, Colonel Thomas D. Roberts had already complained
that SWNCC 150 "falls off on the economic side of the vital question
of what the U.S. really wishes Japan to become-for instance, do we
wish to run the risk of allowing depressed conditions in postwar Ja-
pan to force the Japanese middle and lower classes into Commu-
nism ?"29
The consensus position that finally emerged was the version of
SWNCC 150 approved before Dooman retired from the State Depart-
ment at the end of August 1945. This document required the Occupa-
tion to facilitate the restoration of the Japanese economy while at the
same time stressing that the primary responsibility would fall on the
Japanese themselves:
The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great eco-
nomic destruction and confronted them with the prospect of economic
29. For the text that Acheson was criticizing, see SC-101, 17 Apr. 1945; see also Min-
utes of the Secretary's Staff Committee, 23 and 30 Apr. 1945; all in lokibe, 5-C-4, 5-C-13,
5-C-15. Chanler to secretary of war, 6 Aug. 1945. Roberts to Lincoln, 25 July 1945. Both
letters are in ABC 014 Japan, 13 Apr. 1944, sec. 7, RG 165, NA.
difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its
own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repair-
ing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce
all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single pur-
pose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to
undertake physical reconstruction, deeply to reform the nature and
direction of their economic activities and institutions, and to find use-
ful employment for their people along lines adopted to and devoted to
peace. The Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would
prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due times
It was at the meeting of SWNCC at which this language was ap-
proved that Dooman proposed that the SFE be authorized to request
funding from the State Department to obtain "the best qualified opin-
ion" on a paper drafted by Undersecretary of the NavyArtemus Gates.
This paper, a "Positive Policy for the Reorientation of the Japanese,"
appears to be the only articulate call for using the Occupation to con-
duct a program of radical reform in Japan among the presurrender
planning documents. The aims that were implicit in many of the more
narrowly focused p l an n i ng papers, and in the overall consensus that
the democratization of Japan was to be encouraged, Gates made ex-
plicit in this paper. America's objective, he argued, should not be to
"recast the culture of the Japanese, but rather to use it, as far as pos-
sible, in establishing new attitudes of mind conforming to the basic
principles of democracy and fair dealing." All SWNCC papers should
be reviewed in the light of this objective and all Occupation activities
integrated with a program to achieve it. In seeking this reorientation
of Japanese culture, use was to be made of the high value the Japanese
placed on education. All Japanese, and not merely the young, were to
be presented with materials to encourage rethinking, especially mate-
rials about the outside world. Principles of self-government and indi-
vidual responsibility were to be emphasized as well as the dangers to
individual freedom and international peace inherent in tyrannical gov-
ernmental forms. Many of the older ethical standards of Japanese home
and family life could be supported, but it would also be important to
ensure equal educational opportunities for women. As the power of
the Japanese oligarchy and the ready acceptance of Japanese milita-
rism on the part of the population rested in part on depressed eco-
nomic conditions, and as a gradual improvement in the living
standards of ordinary Japanese was essential to the success of reedu-
cation, appropriate agrarian and economic reforms would be an inte-
30. SWNCC 150/3, 22 Aug. 1945, box 603, Records of the Combined Civil Affairs
Commi tt ee, RG 165, NA.
gral part of the program. Gates also suggested that there were other
"interested elements" who would take advantage of an American fail-
ure, and that the probable result of such a failure would be "the devel-
opment of a political hegemony inimical to the best interests of the
United States and the future peace of the worlds
Although a modified version of Gates's paper was not adopted until
early 1946, it is worth considering the response his draft received when
presented to the IDACFE. There was general agreement among the
committee members that the ideas expressed in the paper were valu-
able, but there was also what can legitimately be referred to as a "con-
servative" concern that the program outlined was too ambitious to be
practicable. The following paragraph, which the committee adopted,
makes it clear that this conservatism was not rooted in any hostility to
reform:
It is recognized that any basic change in the ideology and thinking of
the Japanese cannot be forced upon them from the outside, if such re-
forms are to have lasting value, but must be acceptable to the Japanese
themselves. Consequently, military government will be faced with the
extremely difficult task of not simply drawing up a reform program
and insisting on its acceptance but rather of convincing the Japanese
that certain basic reforms are desirable and necessary and should be
instituted by them .32
Much of the presurrender planning that did take place with regard
to long-range reform came about as a result of an early 1945 effort to
approach Occupation issues systematically. On 5 February 1945,
SWNCC's Subcommittee on the Far East appointed a subcommittee
of its own to formulate an agenda of topics to be worked on in order
of priority. The initial list, circulated for the consideration of SWNCC
two weeks later, included under paragraph VI(10), "Adjustments in
Systems of Land Tenure." Notice of the problem was undoubtedly
taken at the higher level for in approving the initial list of topics,
SWNCC was particularly concerned with paragraph VI(10), adding
to it: "Nature and Extent of Industrial Control," "Education," and
"Control of Public Information."33
31. Minutes of the 22nd Meeting of SWNCC, 31 Aug. 1945, box 238, Combined Chiefs
of Staff Decimal File, 1942-1945, RG 218, NA. SWNCC 162/D, 19 July 1945, "Positive
Policy for the Reorientation of the Japanese," 2-7, in ABC 014 Japan, 13 Apr. 1944, sec. 4,
RG 165, NA.
32. Minutes of the IDACFE, Meeting No. 214, 30 July 1945, lokibe, 2-B-195.
33. SWNCC-PFESC, Minutes, Meeting No. 1, 5 Feb. 1945, microfilm, T 1198, 1 roll.
SWNCC 16/2,AppendixA, 19 Feb. 1945, and SWNCC to SFE, 24 Feb. 1945, also in SWNCC
16 series, microfilm, LM-54, roll 2, NA.
On 7 April 1945, the SFE suggested that in accordance with the
approved list of topics, SWNCC should request from the Department
of State a paper which would include: "(1) a brief statement of the
pre-war situation in Japanese rural land tenure; and (2) policies which
should be followed, depending upon the conditions which may de-
velop during the period of military occupation." This proposal was
accepted by SWNCC on 23 April and became SWNCC 100. On 1 May,
Fearey finished the preliminary versions of PR-12 and PR-13, two pa-
pers apparently designed to meet the SWNCC requirement. The first
was a ten-page description of "The Japanese Agrarian Problem." The
second, "Japan: Occupation Period: Agrarian Reform," contained pos-
sible courses of action. 34
Fearey argued in PR-13 that besides the contribution agrarian re-
form would make to achieving reasonably satisfactory living standards,
it was in line with established plans recommending the "elimination
of ultra-nationalistic influences" and the "strengthening of liberal
thought and democratic processes" in Japan. The farming class could
least be ignored in a program for the conversion of the Japanese people
from militaristic to peaceful tendencies. They comprised close to 45
percent of the population and had, largely because of their poverty
and discontent, been a more sincere and constant source of support of
the military program than any other class. In comparison wit h E-155,
the analysis and recommendations that Fearey presented in these pa-
pers were much more clearly developed. It appears to have been in
the interim that he met theeminencegrise of the Japanese land reform-
Wolf Ladejinsky.35
Born in 1899 in Ekaterinopol, a predominantly Jewish community
in the Ukraine, Ladejinsky came of age as the Bolsheviks were coming
to power. He brought to a life-long career of land reform advocacy not
only a concern for the peasantry and a great expertise, but also a deep
awareness of the ease with which severe agrarian problems could be
exploited by political extremists. Lenin, he observed in an article on
the collectivization of Soviet agriculture, was aware of the fact that
the October Revolution would not have triumphed without peasant
34. SWNCC 100, microfilm, LM-54, roll 11; RobertA. Fearey, PR-12 preliminary, "The
Japanese Agrarian Problem" and PR-13 preliminary, "Japan: Occupation Period: Agrar-
ian Reform," Harley A. Notter File, box 119a, NA. Mayo, "American Wartime Planning,"
464n74.
35. Fearey, PR-13,1-2. The best account of Ladejinsky's role, especially in the crucial
months of 1946 when the Japanese government's initial proposal was dramatically
strengthened, is to be found in Chira, 91-106. See Louis J. Walinsky, ed., Agrarian Reform
as Llnfinished Business: The Selected Papers of Wolf I. Ladejinsky (New York, 1977). See also
Al McCoy, "Land Reform as Counter-Revolution," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 3
(Winter-Spring 1971): 14-49.
support and that it was the Bolsheviks' land to the tiller decree which
had won that support. The articles like this one which won Ladejinsky
his reputation in the 1930s were mostly technical studies of land ten-
ure and agricultural issues in such countries as Russia, Japan, and
India. Yet they all included a reference to the political dimension of
agrarian problems. In 1944, while working for the Department of Ag-
riculture, Ladejinsky was asked to author a Civil Affairs Handbook
for the American military on Japanese agriculture. In it, he called at-
tention to the revolutionary implications of the agrarian problem in
Japan. Japanese tenants and part-tenants had been a "hotbed for ex-
tremist political movements on the part of the Army." Agrarian unrest
had provided no small part of the stimulus to Japan's foreign policy. It
would be well, therefore, to consider the possibilities presented by a
defeated army largely composed of farmers and farmers' sons. "The
drastic agrarian changes in the countries of central and eastern Eu-
rope, following the military defeats in the First World War," he warned,
"furnish a precedent that cannot be ignored
Studying agrarian reform generally and land reform in Japan in
particular, Fearey soon came upon Ladejinsky's name: "After reading
some of his pieces, I got to know him. I had many pleasant evenings in
his apartment (he was a bachelor and a music lover; we used to listen
to music and talk about the Japanese agrarian situation). Then I started
to write. I showed him successive drafts of an analysis of the Japanese
farm problem and proposed reform measures."37
This was the origin of PR-13. The basic choice Fearey presented in
this paper was between efforts to improve the conditions of tenancy
and a program for the expropriation of all rented farmland-with com-
pensation based on the land's productive value-and the transfer of
that land to the tenants free and without lien of any kind. The first
alternative, an effort to improve tenancy conditions, would be self-
defeating. Under present conditions the exceptionally high prices at
which land was sold in Japan meant that most landlords earned only
a moderate return on investment. Faced with reforms which would
greatly reduce or eliminate this return, many landlords would till the
land themselves or else sell it. In either case, the decision would result
36. W. Ladejinsky, "Collectivization of Agriculture in the Soviet Union," Political Sci-
ence Quarterly 49 ( Mar ch 1934), 2, 7. Army Service Forces Manual M354-7, Civil Affairs
Handbook, Japan, sec. 7: Agriculture (1 Apr. 1944), Iokibe, 37, 189. Among Ladejinsky's
articles in the 1930s are: "Farm Tenancy and Japanese Agriculture," Foreign Agriculture
(September 1937); "Soviet State Farms," Political Science Quarterly (March and June 1938);
"Agrarian Unrest in Japan," Foreign Affairs (January 1939); "Agricultural Problems of
India," Foreign Agriculture (August 1939).
37. Fearey, presentation at a symposium, in Redford, ed., Occupation, 151-52.
in mass evictions among the tenants the reform was attempting to
help. Moreover, even a rent reduction of 50 percent would still leave
many peasants without an adequate income. "Finally, since there would
have been no fundamental change in landlord-tenant relationships (i.e.
for the tenants who were not evicted) the landlords, because of the
continuing scarcity of land and multiplicity of farmers seeking land to
till, would still possess every advantage in dealing with their tenants,
and would probably succeed in gradually restoring the former condi-
tions of tenancy."38
Unfortunately, unlike most of the other papers in the PR series, there
is no discussion of PR-13 in the IDACFE minutes. It was in corridors
and informal conversations, Fearey has recalled, that his critics among
the Japan hands "poured cold water" over his position. In a letter of 1
June 1945 to Edwin Martin, Fearey explained that since sending mem-
bers of the economic divisions copies of PR-13, he had revised his
views in the light of "Messrs. Dickover's, Williams', Johansen's and
others' criticisms." He was personally still of the opinion that the Oc-
cupation should "assume greater initiative in the matter," but pro-
posed that the principles "which have been supported by those with
whom I have discussed the matter in recent weeks, be accepted as the
basis of approach to the problem." These principles constitute the bulk
of Fearey's letter and can be summarized as follows:
(1) "There should be no attempt at comprehensive agrarian reform
in the immediate post-hostilities period, i.e. probably for six months or
more."
(2) At the end of the emergency period the occupation authorities
should take note of any spontaneous movements for agrarian reform.
A substantial reform movement not strongly opposed by other classes-
with the exception of the landlords-should, with the approval of Wash-
ington, be offered encouragement and support.
(3) In order for the military government to be able to properly ap-
praise, and, if appropriate, to guide the preparation of any reform pro-
gram to be initiated under its authority, a tentative reform program
should be drawn up by State, Agriculture and possibly other depart-
ments and agencies.
(4) "Japanese leaders desirous of instituting a program of agrarian
reform would be told during the above mentioned emergency period
that a program which appeared to be widely supported by the Japa-
nese people would receive the blessing and support of the military
government. 1139
38. Fearey, PR-13, 10-16.
39. Interview with Robert Fearey (12 June 1990, Washington, D.C.). Erie Dickover,
Frank Williams, and Beppo Johansen were in charge of the Division of Japanese Affairs,
commonly attended IDACFE meetings, and were all old Japan hands. Fearey to Martin,
The most important thing for the present, Fearey told Martin, "is
that the problem be thoroughly studied by the appropriate agencies
of the Government and that we be prepared for whatever course may
be decided upon later." Martin, for his part, was in no more of a hurry
on the question of land reform than Fearey's critics among the Japan
hands. He became chief of the State Department's Division of Japa-
nese and Korean Economic Affairs on 20 October 1945 and a month
later produced an outline of his division's policy program. Under the
heading of "Basic Reforms" for Japan, he listed as his last point: "Ag-
ricultural Reform-SWNCC 100 Paper in suspension-not urgent and
no one available competent to handle." In other words, while there
appears to have been a general agreement among the presurrender
planners, Japan hands and non-Japan hands alike, that a postwar land
reform in Japan would be desirable, there was uncertainty as to its
feasibility and little sense of need for prompt action,.40
In spite of the fact that PR-13 was not adopted, and the fact that the
land reform section of Ladejinsky's Civil Affairs Guide was deleted,
planning for a possible agrarian reform continued. In an article writ-
ten in 1951, Mark Williamson, who became deputy chief of the Agri-
culture Division of the Natural Resources Section of the Occupation,
recalled the situation: "Considerable research and background mate-
rial had been prepared in Washington by various government agen-
cies; and during the presurrender spring and summer of 1945 at the
Civil Affairs staging area for the Occupation of Japan at the Presidio
of Monterey, California, a unit of trained agriculturalists had been at
work full time studying Japanese agriculture and preparing, discuss-
ing, and revising tentative plans for agricultural programs that might
need to be instituted by the Occupation Force upon its entry into the
country. "41
Williamson was one of those working at the Presidio of Monterey.
Like Fearey, he was in contact with Ladejinsky, but the proposals and
arguments that he and his colleagues put together were not as fully
n.d. but clear from context, misfiled by four years as 894.52/6-149, microfilm, LM 105,
roll 28, NA. Fearey has recalled that Hugh Borton and George Blakeslee were "very
interested" in his ideas about land reform, while Eugene Dooman and Joseph Ballantine
were "skeptical." Fearey, presentation to the symposium, in Redford, ed., Occupation,
152.
40. Martin to Rubin, 27 Nov. 1945, in Correspondence of the United States Political Ad-
viser for Japan, Vol. 2, microfilm, Japan, POLAD, roll 653FA, Washington National Record
Center (hereafter WNRC), Suitland, MD; also quoted in Mayo, "American Economic
Planning," 262n42.
41. In his letter to Martin of 1 June 1945, Fearey refers to the deletion of the land
reform section of Ladejinsky's Civil Affairs Guide at a meeting on 28 May. Mark B.
Williamson, "Land Reform in Japan," Journal of Farm Economics 33 (May 1951): 170.
developed as those of PR-13. A paper of late summer spoke in general
terms of such things as increasing the number of independent own-
ers, limiting rental rates, establishing a minimum tenure of ten years,
and insisting that all tenure agreements be made in writing. The ratio-
nale presented, while bearing affinities with Fearey's arguments, was
not as forceful or lucid:
The existing social economic structure of Japanese Agriculture and the
Governmental pattern which maintains it are essentially antisocial in
nature, conducive to social unrest, and potentially detrimental to world
peace aims. The improvement of conditions among Japanese farmers
through a gradual relaxation of existing controls, the institution of ba-
sic agrarian reforms, the promotion of democratic organizations among
farmers and the encouragement of a wider distribution in the owner-
ship of farm lands must ultimately become the very basis of any agri-
cultural program in Japan."
When the issue of land reform was raised with the Natural Re-
sources Section of the Occupation in November 1945, Williamson's
boss, Major Warren H. Leonard, replied that basic agrarian reforms in
Japan were long overdue but that food problems were more pressing
at the moment and that it was "planned to have Dr. Wolf Ladejinsky
make a detail[ed] study of the subject. He is expected to join the staff
of the Agriculture Division of this section as a civilian consultant some-
time during November."43
The document that caused the issue of land reform to be raised
with the Natural Resources Section, and which changed the tempo
and perhaps the course of Occupation policy with respect to land re-
form, was a combined and revised version of PR-12 and PR-13. Fearey
had been assigned to work with George Atcheson, the political advi-
sor to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), and
shortly after arriving in Japan had asked him for a few days in which
to improve his paper:
Atcheson asked me to let him look at it; I did, and he afforded me the
time to polish it up. He read it, and said that we would send it to Gen-
eral MacArthur. So I drafted a brief covering memorandum for him to
use for that purpose. I remember that several days later I was in my
office when a couple of colonels from SCAP came bursting through the
door. One of them said, "Are you Fearey?" (I wondered what I had
42. See Chira, 77-80. "Plan for Administration and Control ofAgriculturalAffairs by
Military Government in Japan," 14 Aug. 1945, folder: "Publications," box 8819, Natural
Resources Section, RG 331, WNRC.
43. Warren H. Le onard , m emo rand um for the record, 4 November 1945, File 313, Box
8968, Natural Resources Section, RG 331, WNRC. Ladejinsky did not actually arrive
until December.
done wrong.) I said "Yes." He said, "General MacArthur took your
farm reform program home last night and was very taken by it. He has
asked us to work with you on a directive ordering the Japanese gov-
ernment to carry out a land reform program on the lines recommended
in your study""
Issued on 9 December 1945, SCAP 411 directed the Japanese gov-
ernment to come up with a land reform program by 15 March 1946
and offered guidance as to what that program should include. Both in
its description of the problem and in its delineation of the general
requirements for a successful reform, it borrowed heavily from what
has come to be known as the Atcheson-Fearey memorandum. Fearey's
recollections on the influence of that memorandum are congruent with
the history of the land reform put out by the Natural Resources Sec-
tion during the Occupation: "In the latter part of October 1945, Gen-
eral MacArthur was furnished a comprehensive statement of the farm
tenancy situation, outlining the need for a v i g o r o u s reorganization of
tenure arrangements and suggesting specific means for effecting it....
Thus within a few weeks General MacArthur received on the one hand
full authority for correcting undemocratic economic arrangements in
Japan, and on the other hand, a documented indictment of the un-
democratic land tenure system
A reevaluation of General Douglas MacArthur's role as supreme
commander for the allied powers, and an increased awareness of the
importance of presurrender planning to Occupation policy, has been a
valuable contribution of the recent literature. Yet while it is true that
MacArthur and his staff played a smaller role in planning the initial
goals of the Occupation than was once thought, and while it is also
true that the widespread consensus that change was necessary and
the pressures of the Japanese advocates and opponents of reform were
of great importance, the role of MacArthur's convictions should not
be entirely overlooked. Particularly as regards the decision to support
land reform, alternative courses of action were available. SWNCC 150
44. See Chief, CIE to Chief, Natural Resources Section, 1 Nov. 1945; Chief, Natural
Resources Section to Chief, CIE, 6 Nov. 1945; file 313, box 8968, Natural Resources
Section, RG 331, WNRC. Fearey, presentation at a symposium, Redford, ed., Occupation,
153.
45. Laurence 1. Hewes, Jr., Japanese Land Reform Program (Tokyo, 1950), 15. For the text
of the Atcheson-Fearey memorandum of 26 Oct. 1945, and the text of SCAP 411, see
Walinsky, 569-80. What Chira calls SCAP's "official silence" on land reform before 26
October is indicative of the memorandum's importance. See Chira, 130n26. It should be
noted that one of the ideas in PR-13 that was dropped from theAtcheson-Fearey memo-
randum was the idea that "Japanese communists now living and working with the Chi-
nese communists on the continent may be of assistance." See Fearey PR-13, 6.
did not explicitly mandate land reform and the course of action which
MacArthur adopted was not without critics. In July 1946, Ladejinsky
described a conversation he had held with Major General Archer L.
Lerch, the military governor in Korea. "The clear-cut impression gained
by this observer is that to General Lerch the very word 'reform' is
suspect; that reform partakes of communism, and that those who ad-
vocate land reform are not altogether free of communism." "If the
intensification of small-scale farming is achieved," warned the Nippon
Hyaron from elsewhere on the political spectrum, "then at best Japan
will become a silk-producing colony of the United States. Such a pro-
gram would wed agricultural areas to feudalism and reaction." As
against such views, MacArthur argued that the land reform would
give rise to "a new class of small capitalistic landowners which itself
will stand firm against efforts to destroy the system of capitalist
economy of which it will then form an integral part."46
In retrospect, as John W. Dower and others have suggested, the
success of the land reform was dependent on a variety of factors largely
beyond the control of the Americans: "That the vast majority of the
rural population welcomed such a drastic transformation of relations
was of course essential, but the reform was also facilitated by two
additional circumstances. First, there existed a cadre of Japanese aca-
demics and former wartime bureaucrats who were themselves com-
mitted to land reform, and possessed the technical and administrative
expertise to carry it out. And second, it quickly became apparent that
wartime developments, especially after 1940, had severely eroded the
traditional power of the landlords.""
By August 1950, some 4,748,000 tenants had purchased close to 5
million acres of rice land and upland. This land had earlier been ac-
quired from roughly 2,341,000 landlords. The government, which
served as middleman, offered long term bonds as compensation to
the former owners. But postwar inflation, which greatly helped the
tenants to purchase and improve their land by wiping out their debts,
meant that these bonds were of little value
46. Wolf Ladejinsky, "Agrarian Reform in Korea," 4 July 1946, box 8968, Natural Re-
sources Section, RG 331, WNRC. Nippon Hybron quoted in Harold Strauss, "MacArthur
in the Paddy Fields," Nation, 9 Nov. 1946. MacArthur to Gipson, 24 Jan. 1948, RG 5:
SCAP, Official Correspondence, January-December 1947, MacArthur Memorial Archives,
Norfolk, Va.; also quoted in Chira, 59.
47. John W. Dower, "The Useful War," Daedalus 119 (Summer 1990), 61. To this list,
Ladejinsky would certainly have added the land commissions that actually handled the
30 to 40 million pieces of land involved. Wolf I. Ladejinsky, "Land Reform in Japan: A
Comment," in Kenneth H. Parsons et al., eds., Land Tenure (Madison, Wisc., 1956), 227.
48. R. P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan (London, 1959), 174.
as the period of presurrender planning drew to a close a considerable
convergence of opinion was apparent. The common assumption was
that the United States would find, as Grew put it, "plenty of co-opera-
tion in starting that misguided country towards a New Deal."5°
Epilogue
The interpretation presented here has stressed the sense of contingency
that dominated presurrender planning and the broad areas of agree-
ment which nonetheless emerged. It has suggested that the role that
the Japan hands played in the planning process has been needlessly
obscured by the erroneous assumption-which can be traced to their
contemporary critics-that they were opposed to the economic and
social reform of Japanese society. An additional part of the difficulty
in seeing their wartime views clearly has been a tendency to read the
later views of some of the Japan hands themselves back into the pe-
riod of presurrender planning. In this way, and particularly for Eu-
gene Dooman, an unwarranted antireformist continuity of opinion has
been created.
Beginning in late 1948, Dooman helped to launch a public cam-
paign to suggest that measures subversive of the Japanese economy
had been smuggled into SWNCC 150 by his successor as chairman of
the SFE, a China hand named John Carter Vincent. Just after he had
left the State Department, Dooman maintained, Vincent must have
added the passages in that document designed to bring about the dis-
solution of large industrial and banking combinations and a purge of
the Japanese economic leadership. In the words of Harry F. Kern, a
Newsweek editor and Dooman's collaborator in this effort, these co-
vert passages in SWNCC 150 became the basis for measures which,
whether their s p o ns o r s knew it or not, "at least paralleled a world-
wide attack against the existing business structure by the extreme left."
In fact, the revisions in question were approved at the same meeting
of SWNCC at which Dooman suggested that Artemus Gates's paper
should receive careful attention. The redrafting had been completed
more than a week before under the direction of Assistant Secretary of
War John J. McCloy. But Dooman's faulty recollection, as Gary May
points out, did not prevent him from telling this same story to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Senator Patrick McCarran's Subcom-
mittee on Internal Security, and a State Department Loyalty-Security
Board.s'
50. Grew to Harriman, 9 Sept. 1945, MSAml687 v. 122(3), Grew Papers.
51. Harry F. Kern, "Significance of a Switch: End of an Extremist Plan for Japan,"
In his memoirs, Joseph Ballantine also maintained that "new provi-
sions," inconsistent with the spirit of earlier SWNCC 150 drafts, were
adopted after Dooman retired. Without mentioning Vincent, he de-
scribed the ascendancy of a group that favored "extreme treatment of
Japan: deposition of the Emperor, a thorough 'purge' of existing lead-
ers; a comprehensive recasting of its economic organization, and
sweeping 'reforms' in its political and social institutions." But while
Ballantine exaggerated the practical differences between the Japan
hands and their successors, the element of conspiracy is absent in his
account. Unlike Dooman, he had little difficulty in seeing lasting ben-
efits in many of the reforms ultimately carried out under the Occupa-
tion. In terms of agrarian reform, he was p a r t i c u la r l y impressed with
the establishment of agricultural extension services, systematic crop
reporting and "facilities for crop storage and for credits, which will
render the farmers more independent of usurious money lenders." "If
we'd given compensation," he concluded in an oral history, "it would
have been all rights
As far as Dooman was concerned, agrarian reform was first and
foremost a means of "effectively pauperizing an element which could
be counted on to resist the communists." It was of a piece with other
measures which had, he asserted, "eliminated from the Japanese
Newsweek, 20 Dec. 1948, 30. An edited draft of Kern's article is in Dooman's papers un-
der the title "American Policy Toward Japan: Summary," n.d., folder: "US Foreign Rela-
rions-Japan," box 2, Eugene H. Dooman Papers (hereafter Dooman Papers), Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, Calif. The text of SWNCC 150/3 of
22 Aug. 1945 is in box 603, Records of the Combined Civil Affairs C om mi ttee, RG 165;
the minutes for the SWNCC meeting of 31 Aug. 1945 are in box 238, Combined Chiefs of
Staff Decimal File, 1942-1945, RG 218, both in NA. Gary May, China Scapegoat: The Dip-
lomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent (Washington, D.C., 1979), 249. According to May,
Kern's collaboration with Dooman began a year before in the campaign against direc-
tive FEC 230's program for economic deconcentration. See Newsweek,1 1 Dec. 1947,36-38.
But whatever the virtues or flaws of FEC 230, it was after its fate was decided that
Dooman's public attack on Vincent began. On the postwar controversy over the China
hands generally, see Ernest R. May, "The China Hands in Perspective: Ethics, Diplo-
macy, and Statecraft," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed ., The China Hands' Legacy (Boulder,
Colo., 1987), 97-123.
52. Joseph W. Ballantine, Memoirs, 1888-1970 (unpublished), 267-68, 292, box 1, Jo-
seph W. Ballantine Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. Joseph W.
Ballantine, "Oral History," 81, Special Collections, Columbia University, New York. Even
advocates of "revolution" who w en t on to serve in the Occupation, such as T. A. Bisson,
soon realized that the Occupation's reforms did not constitute a "revolutionary" pro-
gram. Their own programatic ideas lacked the depth and strength of those that had been
through the process of mobilizing a consensus during the period of presurrender plan-
ning and in a sense never got off the ground. As late as the summer of 1945, Bisson was
still thinking in terms of such half-baked notions as the "nationalization of all large
peace-time industrial plants." Bisson, "What Program for Japan?" 28. For Bisson's disil-
lusionment with the Occupation, see Schonberger, 90-110.
economy its brains, experience and leadership, and impoverished
hundreds of thousands of business executives and others of what might
be called the capitalist class." Since Dooman's later views appear to
have helped obscure the perspective he actually held while in govern-
ment, some examination of their origin and their relationship to his
earlier views is in order. When Grew retired after Japan's surrender, it
was at the end of a full career. Dooman, in contrast, retired only after
he heard that Dean Acheson had been appointed undersecretary of
state. It was at this point, Dooman told William R. Castle, that "he
realized that there was nothing more for him to do in the Depart-
ment." In addition to this active dislike of Acheson, there is no doubt
that Dooman viewed his own replacement as the advocate of a puni-
tive peace. This was not entirely without cause. On 6 October 1945,
Vincent participated in a radio address in which he naively suggested
that one could "reduce Japan's foreign trade far below the pre-war
level and still have a standard of living comparable to what they had
before the war." Even after much Japanese heavy industry had been
cut back or wiped out-including the production of iron and steel,
chemicals, machine tools, electrical and automotive equipment-he
maintained that Japan could still solve its economic problems by plac-
ing emphasis on "farming and fishing and the production of consumer
goods." Dooman was both frustrated and horrified. The implication
of Vincent's position, if seriously pursued, was mass starvation. Quot-
ing Vincent's speech a month later to the Worcester Foreign Policy
Association he protested that "Economic security is essential to the
development of democracy. I believe that that has been the basic prin-
ciple of the New Deal."53
Dooman's address on this occasion, before he had become com-
pletely embittered, is perhaps the closest approximation we have to a
detailed presentation of his thinking before he left office. The purpose
of the Occupation, he told his audience, was not simply demilitariza-
53. Eugene Dooman, "Land Redistribution and the Ladejinsky Affair," folder: "Ja-
pan Reports, Trip Reports," n.d., ca. late 1954, box 2, Dooman Papers. Diary entry of 18
Aug. 1945, MSAm2021, v. 50, 249, William R. Castle Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass. At 252, an entry of 24 Aug. suggests that even in office
Dooman was opposed to certain kinds of land reform: "Gene says that they are making
blue prints of how best to confiscate the large land holdings in order to distribute land
among the peasants," I have not been able to find the "they" in question or their "blue-
prints," but I am grateful to Waldo Heinrichs for the reference to the Castle Papers. "Our
Occupation Policy for Japan," transcript of radio broadcast in Department of State Bul-
letin, 7 Oct. 1945, 542-43. As Dooman's extensive notes for this speech, actually his half
of a debate, which took place on 5 Nov. 1945, lack a title, they will be referred to as his
"speech notes." The reference to the basic principle of the New Deal can be found in
"speech notes," 21, along with a press clipping from the event, in folder 1-12, box 1,
Dooman Papers.
tion and reeducation, but rather the establishment o f conditions in
Japan which would make for the will to peace. The debate was over
how to do this and the common mistake was the assumption that the
problem was a simple one because all peoples were by nature inher-
ently democratic. Democracy as we have known it, Dooman insisted,
had only emerged as the product of prolonged and arduous revolu-
tionary and evolutionary processes:
I am all for economic reforms which will provide security of livelihood
to the individual, for without it there can be no effective democracy. I
am all for political reforms toward reposing power in the hands of the
people so long as the people is composed of individuals capable of
enlightened moral judgement. But I for one am concerned by the easy
assumption that in the case of Japan we have only to eliminate the
emperor institution, the capitalists and the bureaucrats for the sup-
pressed forces of democracy to appear. It is essential for any intelligent
dealing with the problem of Japan to recognize that it is a communal-
ism today as it has been for two thousand years. By communalism I
mean that order of society in which the primary importance of the com-
munity is recognized and is its constructive principle and in which the
interests and welfare-in the broadest sense—of the individual are not
an effective element. By way of contrast, I would define an individual-
istic order of society as that in which the advantages of communal unity
are retained, but in which the first preoccupation of government is to
safeguard opportunity for the spiritual and material advancement of
the individual and to assure liberty of thought, act and initiative-lib-
erty which communalism excludes as dangerous and immoral. 54
In other words, the problem was much more serious than simply
the removal o f archaic political and economic structures. Combines
and trusts were as inevitable in a communalistic society, with its pre-
occupation with the perpetuation of privilege, as the Sherman anti-
trust law was necessary to safeguard free competition in an
individualistic society. The problem was how to transform a
communalistic society-one with a profound belief in its exceptional
origins, and with members who saw themselves as sacred by virtue of
their membership in the national unity-into a free society whose
members saw themselves as sacred not because they were Japanese,
but because they were individual human beings. Describing the prin-
ciples that should guide such an effort, Dooman stressed the need for
patience, economic security, support for the aspirations o f the colonial
peoples of Asia for independence, the avoidance of coercive dictation,
and reliance on a Japanese leadership capable of distinguishing right
from wrong. It would not be possible, he warned, to pull d o w n s t ru c-
54. Dooman, "speech notes," 3, 5-6.
tures in the mind in the way armies were dissolved and munitions
factories destroyed. A thorough demilitarization was obviously nec-
essary including a purge of militaristic elements from positions of
authority in government and business. So was a reorientation of the
system of education. But ultimately the changes desired would re-
quire Japanese support and cooperation. The Japanese had not invented
jujitsu for nothing. They could simply pull while the Occupation
pushed. Then, once American troops had been withdrawn, they might
simply sweep away whatever reforms and government the Occupa-
tion had established. Central among the reforms that would require
Japanese support would be the transfer of the repository of sover-
eignty from the emperor to the people. While this could be easily done
on paper, Dooman cautioned, "I can imagine nothing better calculated
to inspire among the Japanese contempt for the new doctrine of popu-
lar sovereignty than an attempt to force it down their throats
Unfortunately, and for a variety of reasons, the kind of growing
economy that Dooman was convinced was essential to the develop-
ment of democracy in Japan was not to be seen during 1946 and 1947.
Instead, output was only about half of what it had been in the late
1930s. Watching from the United States, the coercive dictation of re-
forms appeared to Dooman to be the order of the day. The fact that the
lower house of the Japanese parliament had, after perfunctory debate,
adopted the new Constitution by a vote of 456 to 5 was, he thought,
impressive only to those "capable of nourishing an invincible confi-
dence in democracy by obedience."56
It is in his unpublished papers of late 1946 that Dooman began to
write about "left-wing elements," well represented in high places in
the Department of State, who were imposing on Japan the same kind
of "reforms" being imposed on Eastern Europe. Describing the situa-
tion in China in one of these papers, he suggested that the assistance
which had been provided to the Nationalist government had given
the world plausible grounds for believing that the United States was
supporting the nationalists against the communists. This was the "last
charge which anybody familiar with the personal philosophies of
Undersecretary of State D e a n Acheson and John C. Vincent, Director
of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, formulators of American Far East-
55. Ibid., 11-20.
56. Eleanor M. Hadley, Antitrust in Japan (Princeton, N.J.,1970),134. Eugene Dooman,
"Bridges of Friendship," 17, n.d., ca. late 1946, folder 1-18, box 1, Dooman Papers. Con-
trary to Dooman's impressions, MacArthur-even over issues that he cared about
deeply-was determined to rely on persuasion and to use coercion sparingly. See NR
601 (26 June 1946) "Conference with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on
Land Reform," box 8968, NRS, SCAP, RG 331, WNRC.
ern policies, would bring against them." There is considerable irony
here. If he had stayed in office, Dooman himself might well have been
one of those accused of being responsible for "losing" China. Instead,
out of office, he helped to launch a McCarthyist campaign against his
successor. 57
In January 1954, Grew and a few of his well-known former col-
leagues launched a blast of their own against McCarthyism in a letter
to the New York Times. The series of attacks from "outside sources"
which had recently been directed at the foreign service, they main-
tained, were generally "so flimsy as to have no standing in a court of
law or in the mind of any individual capable of differentiating repeated
accusation from even a reasonable presumption of guilt." Neverthe-
less these attacks were having sinister results on foreign service mo-
rale and on the prospects for objective reporting. It is relevant to
inquire, they wrote, "whether we are not laying the foundations of a
Foreign Service competent to serve a totalitarian government rather
than the Government of the United States as we have heretofore known
it." In a private letter to Grew a few days later, Dooman criticized his
stance and claimed that he was misleading a public which mistakenly
assumed that he spoke "with knowledge of all the facts."58
Where Dooman had once stressed the limitations on America's di-
rect influence over Japan, he increasingly came to emphasize the power
of American policy over Japan's economy in his criticisms of postwar
policy. Where he had previously recognized the impor tance of con-
sensus in the development of policy, he now attributed political deci-
sions to the machinations of a few individuals. Where he had once
been concerned with the future, he was increasingly-and this after
the practical battle over economic deconcentration in Japan had al-
ready been won-concerned with a poorly remembered past. It was a
past from which he sought not understanding, but something of the
vindictiveness he had earlier tried to keep from falling on the Japa-
nese. If power tends to corrupt, as John P. Roche has observed of Lord
Acton's famous aphorism, "the absence of power corrupts absolutely."59
57. Eugene Dooman, "Asia's Problems and Ours," n.d., 18, folder 1-18, box 1, Dooman
Papers. As far as Dooman was concerned, neither the Kuomintang nor the Chinese Com-
munist Party had anything in common with Western democracy or with the individual-
ism of the common people of China. The only proper course of policy was to cease
meddling, "ending the flow of help to China and bringing our troops home." Dooman,
"Asia's Problems and Ours," 15, 19.
58. Norman Armour, Robert Woods Bliss, Joseph C. Grew, William Phillips, and G.
Howland Shaw, "Backing Our Diplomats," New York Times, 17 Jan. 1954. Dooman to
Grew, 27 Jan. 1954, letter and attached memorandum, box 2, Dooman Papers.
59. John P. Roche, "The Demise of Liberal Internationalism," National Review, 3 May
1985, 40. See note 51 above.
Article
The purpose of this academic colloquium was to identify principles and supporting policies of state-building that will enhance America's ability "to win the peace" while stabilizing chaotic regions. Basic to the concept of the colloquium was the idea that just as there are acknowledged principles of war that enhance the possibility of victory on the battlefield, there should be principles that, if applied during the state-building process, will enhance the chances of "winning the peace." The idea that principles should constitute the foundation of state-building and that supporting policies and procedures then flow from those principles was fundamental to the colloquium's process. The participants included scholars from a wide range of academic disciplines, active duty military personnel, nongovernmental organization staff, and governmental administrators. The colloquium's sponsors endeavored to blend the expertise of civilian academics and military professionals. Each speaker was asked to nominate several principles of peace that represent parallel ideas to the principles of war. As expected, some duplication in naming the principles occurred. The speakers addressed their respective lists of principles during their presentations. After all scheduled presentations, six independent breakout groups distilled the consolidated list of principles to a common core for each group. Next, a plenary session considered the resulting six lists of principles for further consolidation into a core list of six principles. Those principles are as follows: (1) rule of law, (2) security (military, economic, and civil), (3) legitimacy, (4) development (the encouragement thereof), (5) self-empowerment/self-sufficiency, and (6) communications (intergovernmental and international). In the process of refining these principles, the group also identified 15 specific policies and procedures which will serve to assist in implementing the principles.
Article
The pre-war government of Japan was unique in Asia in being a real, if limited, democracy. After the war the present militaristic cabinet may be overthrown by a popular uprising. But, on the other hand, occupation by a conquering army may create sentiments against democracy and unintentionally foster reaction.
American Wartime Planning
  • Mayo
Mayo, "American Wartime Planning," 39-40. Cohen, 34-35. Schonberger, 38-39.
Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years Grew's biographer also notes that Grew "approved of the breakup of the zaibatsu and agrarian reform
  • Grew Papers
  • C Joseph
  • H Grew
  • Heinrichs
  • Jr
Grew Papers. Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945, 2 vols. (Boston, Mass., 1952), 2:1440-41. Grew's biographer also notes that Grew "approved of the breakup of the zaibatsu and agrarian reform." Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston, Mass.,1966), 367.
American Economic Pla