Self-esteem would appear to be a laudable quality. Indeed, from a superficial view, what could be wrong with esteeming the self? Esteeming oneself would seem akin to the other prescriptions of modern so-cial-cognitive psychology: Be optimistic; hold positive illusions; expect success; feel efficacious; be happy. But like many of these "positive" prescriptions, the ad-monition to esteem oneself is more complex and prob-lematic than it seems. We believe that Kernis (this issue), in working to disentangle the issues of level of self-esteem from its stability, has brought some of the problematic dynam-ics of "self-esteeming" into the forefront. Our com-ments, derived from both self-determination theory (SDT; Ryan & Deci, 2000) and Buddhist perspectives, suggest some reasons why. Extending the issues raised by Kernis, previous SDT formulations of contingent and noncontingent self-esteem (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1995), and our recent findings concerning mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003), we suggest that when self-esteeming processes are salient there is something awry with self-regula-tion, and with well-being. Based on SDT, we argue that, although self-evaluation is a "natural" human ten-dency with both evolutionary (Sedikedes & Skowronski, 2000) and developmental (Ryan & Kuzckowski, 1994) foundations, ongoing concern with the worth of the self is a byproduct of need depri-vation or conflict. Specifically, the salience of pro-cesses in which the self is esteemed or disparaged is etiologically linked with the experience of contingent regard by significant others. We hypothesize that con-tingent regard increases one's proneness to introjection, a form of behavioral regulation in which one's actions are motivated by desires to gain (or not lose) self or other approval. Introjection, in turn, leaves one vulnerable to exogenous social pressures, the pur-suit of unfulfilling goals, and the inauthentic living that can follow from them. Based on Buddhist perspec-tives, we further suggest that regulation based on mindfulness, rather than on contingent self-regard, is associated with healthier and more vital living, and provides a basis for acting more authentically. Self-as-Object; Self-as-Process The dominant view of self in Western psychology is that of the "self-as-object" (McAdams, 1990). Derived primarily from the work of Mead (1934) and Cooley (1902), this tradition describes the self as a concept that is largely internalized from the reactions and opinions of others. One's self-concept can be positive or nega-tive, simple or complex. Yet, whatever its structure or valence, self-concepts are defined as involving, in part, appraisals and evaluations of one's being and attrib-utes, and it is these evaluative schema that constitute self-esteem. These appraisals regarding worth can be relatively generalized (e.g., Rosenberg, 1965) or do-main specific (Harter, 1993). In either case, the com-mon view is: the more positive, the better. In contrast to the self-as-object perspective is an-other take on self derived from developmental and or-ganismic theorizing—the self-as-process (e.g., Blasi, 1988; Deci & Ryan, 1991; Loevinger, 1976). Re-searchers in the self-as-process tradition view the self not merely as a concept, or as an object of self-evalua-tion, but as the very process of assimilation and inte-gration. The self represents the integrative core of the person and entails ongoing activities of extending, as-similating, and bringing meaning and coherence to life experiences. Thus, in this view, the self is both an in-herent tendency and a dynamic, synthetic process. SDT has specifically focused on the conditions that support the integrative tendencies that characterize the self, versus those under which these tendencies or functions are compromised (Ryan, 1995). Taking the self-as-process perspective, the question becomes not merely how high or low is self-esteem, but what is one doing when evaluating the self as an object? In this view, the very process of placing one's self in the role of object, and then evaluating "its" worth, is a motivated act. Indeed, apart from being handed a self-esteem survey by a psychologist, many people would not spontaneously ask themselves, "How worthy am I?" When they do, the question is, why do they? There are also people who are preoccu-pied with their worth. They regularly appraise them-selves, compare themselves with others, and struggle to ward off threats to a positive view of self. Whether such individuals come away with positive or negative conclusions, the very fact that one's esteem is in ques-tion suggests a psychological vulnerability. This is consistent with Kernis's thesis, as it suggests that when self-esteem is a salient concern it is problematic, and likely to be contingent, unstable, and vulnerable. In contrast, optimal health is more likely when self-es-teem is not a concern because the worth of the self is not at issue.