Content uploaded by Steven Vogel
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Steven Vogel on Apr 26, 2018
Content may be subject to copyright.
The Nature of Artifacts
Abstract
Philosophers such as Eric Katz and Robert Elliot have argued against ecological restoration on the grounds that restored landscapes are no longer natural. Katz calls them "artifacts," but the sharp distinction between nature and artifact doesn't hold up. Why should the products of one particular natural species be seen as somehow escaping nature? Katz's account identifies an artifact too tightly with the intentions of its creator: artifacts always have more to them than what their creators intended, and furthermore the intention behind some artifacts might explicitly be to allow things to happen unpredictably. Indeed, to build any artifact is to employ forces that go beyond the builder: in this sense all artifacts are natural. Recognizing the naturalness of artifacts can help encourage the key environmental virtues of self-knowledge and humility.
... Aún con las restricciones a la movilidad impuestas por muchos gobiernos, hemos podido acceder a medicamentos y víveres a través de las aplicaciones instaladas en nuestro teléfono celular. También hemos creado dentro de nuestras ciudades artefactos naturales 5 (Vogel, 2003) como jardines, parques y senderos que aumentan nuestra sensación de bienestar y confort urbano. "Todo esto nos lleva a creer que hemos hecho nuestro propio entorno y ya no dependemos del que nos brinda la naturaleza. ...
... There were, of course, significant exceptions, such as Andrew Light, who challenged strong rejections concerning ecological restoration as unhelpful(Light 2009) or Steven Vogel's attempts to bring attention to the unfair status of artifacts in environmental ethics(Vogel 2015(Vogel , 2003. ...
The transgressive ontological character of hybrids—entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects—calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of “moral considerability” and related to it the idea of “intrinsic value” understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of moral considerability by reexamining the legitimacy of identifying intrinsic value with a non-instrumental one. We offer the concept of “functional value,” which we define as a simultaneous contribution to the common good of the ecosystem and the possibility to disclose the full variety of aspects of a being’s identity. We argue that such a value of hybrids allows us to include them into the scope of moral considerability.
The urgent need for solutions to critical environmental challenges is well attested, but often environmental problems are understood as fundamentally collective action problems. However, to solve these problems, there is also a need to change individual behavior. Hence, there is a pressing need to inculcate in individuals the environmental virtues-virtues of character that relate to our environmental place in the world. We propose a way of meeting this need, by the judicious, safe, and controlled administration of "classic" psychedelic drugs as a way to catalyze the development of environmental virtues-a form of moral bio-enhancement. Recent evidence shows that psychedelics can be given safely in controlled environments, and can induce vivid experiences of unity and connectedness. These experiences, in turn, can durably increase feelings of nature-relatedness and pro-environmental behaviors. Therefore, we argue that responsible psychedelic use can reliably catalyze the development of a key environmental virtue known as living in place. This is a "master environmental virtue" that subsumes the qualities of respect for nature, proper humility, and aesthetic wonder and awe. Our account advances the environmental virtues debate by introducing a relevant practical proposal, and advances the psychedelic moral enhancement debate by providing a much-needed conceptual framework.
The aim of this article is twofold. On the one hand, it provides an analysis and a taxonomy of hybrids, and of hybrid nature, in the Anthropocene, relying on Bruno Latour’s view on Nous n’avons jamais été modernes. Essai d’anthropologie symétrique (1991). On the other hand, it explores some ways to claim that hybrid nature has intrinsic value. Sections “The Anthropocene, the End of Nature and Hybridism” and “Getting Rid of “Nature”?” put hybridism in the wider context of discussions about the end of nature and the point of environmental ethics in the Anthropocene and defends the legitimacy of using the notion of “Nature.” Section “Kinds of Hybrids and Hybridity” lists types of hybrids, while Section “The Value of Hybrid Nature” defends the claim that hybrid nature has intrinsic value because it contains the trace of uncontaminated nature, or because it has the same value-making features of pristine nature.
This paper seeks to establish positive environmental ethics of artifacts as unique individuals embedded in the network of functionality, deserving of care and respect. Such a perspective is integrated with postnatural environmentalism and ecofeminist frameworks. By offering a new conceptualization of artifacts, it aims to transform the patterns of how humans deal with artifacts, and thereby limit consumerism, which should contribute to achieving pro-environmental goals.
s it time to embrace the so-called “Anthropocene”—the age of human dominion—and to abandon tried-and-true conservation tools such as parks and wilderness areas? Is the future of Earth to be fully domesticated, an engineered global garden managed by technocrats to serve humanity? The schism between advocates of rewilding and those who accept and even celebrate a “post-wild” world is arguably the hottest intellectual battle in contemporary conservation.
In Keeping the Wild, a group of prominent scientists, writers, and conservation activists responds to the Anthropocene-boosters who claim that wild nature is no more (or in any case not much worth caring about), that human-caused extinction is acceptable, and that “novel ecosystems” are an adequate replacement for natural landscapes. With rhetorical fists swinging, the book’s contributors argue that these “new environmentalists” embody the hubris of the managerial mindset and offer a conservation strategy that will fail to protect life in all its buzzing, blossoming diversity.
With essays from Eileen Crist, David Ehrenfeld, Dave Foreman, Lisi Krall, Harvey Locke, Curt Meine, Kathleen Dean Moore, Michael Soulé, Terry Tempest Williams and other leading thinkers, Keeping the Wild provides an introduction to this important debate, a critique of the Anthropocene boosters’ attack on traditional conservation, and unapologetic advocacy for wild nature.
The transgressive ontological character of hybrids-entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects-calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of "moral considerability" and related to it the idea of "intrinsic value" understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of moral considerability by reexamining the legitimacy of identifying intrinsic value with a non-instrumental one. We offer the concept of "functional value", which we define as a simultaneous contribution to the common good of the ecosystem and the possibility to disclose the full variety of aspects of a being's identity. We argue that such a value of hybrids allows us to include them into the scope of moral considerability. 2
This paper enhances postnatural environmentalism (represented by Steven Vogel) by highlighting and incorporating selected concepts from Martin Heidegger’s ontology. In particular, I examine Heidegger’s detailed analysis of the affinity between phusis and techne, the critique of ‘replaceability’, the problem of ‘proper use’, and his earlier concept of a tool structure. This analysis is aimed at grounding the metaphysical and ethical significance of technical artefacts. It shows that Heidegger can support postnatural environmentalism’s claim that artefacts should not be jettisoned by environmental thinking because that leads to reckless treatment of them. Exploration of these issues also contributes to environmental interpretations of Heidegger’s philosophical legacy, which were limited to natural beings.
It has been argued that human restoration of nature is morally problematic because artificially restored natural entities are artifacts, which are ontologically different from natural entities and hence essentially devoid of the moral standing that natural entities have. I discuss the alleged assimilation of restored natural entities to artifacts, and argue that it does not follow from the ontological differences, if any, between the artifactual and the natural that the former is morally inferior to the latter. This defense against the devaluation of restored natural entities is aimed at narrowing the ethical gap between the wild and the tamed, which is often endorsed by ecocentric environmental ethics.
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics199921316
Environmentalists express concern at the destruction/exploitation of areas of the natural environment because they believe that those areas are of intrinsic value. An emerging response is to argue that natural areas may have their value restored by means of the techniques of environmental engineering. It is then claimed that the concern of environmentalists is irrational, merely emotional or even straightforwardly selfish. This essay argues that there is a dimension of value attaching to the natural environment which cannot be restored no matter how technologically proficient environmental engineers become. The argument involves highlighting and discussing analogies between faking art and faking nature. The pivot of the argument is the claim that genesis is a significant determinant of an area's value.