Frank Sander’s speech at the Pound Conference in the United States
in 1976 is considered as the beginning of the ADR. When it comes to
1990s, ADR started to be used in many areas of the law, and employment
dispute became one of the common areas of use. England has always been
a part of this trend during this period. In this context, a compulsory ADR
mechanism was adopted in 2002 to resolve employment disputes to resolve
them the outside of the court, but this mechanism did not give the
desired benefit. Since 2008, the UK has been adopting a voluntary mediation
system and it offers judicial and non-judicial LRM to the benefit
of the parties. In contrast, Turkish Mediation Law in Turkey in 2012
has taken a step into the world of individual employment disputes and
then, after receiving positive results, compulsory mediation has been introduced
to resolve employment disputes.
Due to the increase in the caseload in litigation, both countries have
adopted systems that direct the parties to the ADR mechanism and that include
compulsion elements. But the intensity of the compulsion elements
in one country may not mean the same as the concept of ‘compulsory’ in
another country. In other words, a system is neither completely voluntary
nor completely compulsory; some elements within the laws may make the
system more voluntary or more compulsory. In order to determine the intensity
of the mandatoriness within these legal systems in, a scale called
“Continuum of Mandatoriness” by Quek has been introduced. In this paper,
it will initially be introduced this scale, and then Turkey’s and the England’s
position on this scale will be determined.
Quek’s scale has stipulated 5 different types containing the different
degrees of compulsion. The first level refers to totally discretionary ADR
system meaning that parties are entirely free to commence and to bring an
ADR proceeding to an end; the second level refers to a system that parties
are pre-required to assess whether ADR is an appropriate alternative to resolve
the dispute but without sanctions; the third level stipulates a system
pre-requesting disputants to consider the appropriateness of ADR system
but with a sanction; the fourth level refers to a mandatory ADR system with
provisions involving an opt-out system or exemptions; the fifth level means mandatory ADR system with no exemptions and cost sanctions for refusing
to participate in ADR meetings. On this basis, the higher-level compulsion,
the higher the Art 6 hurdle.
England has adopted two different judicial methods for the settlement
of employment disputes; for claims less than £25,000, the parties can go
to the Employment Tribunal, while claims over £25,000 must apply to the
Civil Court. These two courts contain separate procedural rules and separate
ADR mechanisms. Looking at the system in employment tribunals, it
forces the parties to obtain a document called an ‘early conciliation certificate’
before filing a lawsuit, and applications made without this document
are rejected. In order to obtain this certificate, parties must contact an ADR
Institution called ACAS, but they do not have to participate in settlement
negotiations. In other words, it is possible to get this certificate by just stating
that the parties do not want to participate in the conciliation meeting.
In the civil court system, if the judge or the other party of the case proposes
to go to mediation and this person rejects this offer without any reason,
the court has the authority to punish the rejecting party with the costs of a
trial. Turkey regulated mediation as a pre-condition to action and the system
punishes a party, who does not attend mediation meetings without any
reason, in following court proceedings with the costs of litigation, even if
the party wins the case. The Turkish system has a few exemptions to mandatory
mediation, namely; the claim of compensation for pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damages arising from occupational accidents or diseases.
Since English system forces the parties to receive certification, but it
is not tasked with the suitability of the conflict to ADR methods, its place
in the scale should be between the first and the second level. The ADR in
the general courts, on the other hand, should be placed at the third level, as
it sanctions the persons who do not participate in the mediation meetings
without a legitimate reason. Our compulsory mediation system should be
between the fourth and fifth level, though our Employment Courts Law includes
some exceptions, the party that does not participate in mediation
meetings without reason is punished with the cost of litigation.
The right of access to courts guaranteed by Art 6(1) ECHR is not certain
and may be subject to some restrictions, but these restrictions should
not violate the essence of the right. However, what is important here is
whether ADR is a compulsory condition for access to court violates Art
6 of the ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights (AIHM) applies
a proportionality test to such regulations and examines whether this law is
necessary and an appropriate regulation.
The caseload in England (400,000) and Turkey (569 000) is taken
into consideration, at least it can be said that they are unnecessary regulations.
In this context, in one of ECtHR judgments, it has been found that
trend regulation between member states might be sufficient to be regarded
as necessary. The 2008 mediation directives of the EU left mandatory mediation
to the discretion of member states, and as a result, countries such as
Poland and Slovakia use the directive rules to resolve individual labour cases.
On the other hand, the European Court of Justice has decided that mediation
can be regulated as a pre-condition to action if it does not cause excessive
delay in the court process, does not cause loss of rights due to the
statute of limitations and is not extremely expensive.
In light of the information above, I think that mandatory mediation is
in line with the ECHR and the ECtHR case law. However, two issues; there
is a potential to punish the party who refuses to participate in the mediation
meeting for no reason to be punished in the subsequent court process
(this is also valid for the employment cases outgoing to the general courts
in England) and the quality of the ADR agreement signed at the end of the
ADR proceedings, there is a potential to violate Article 6.
Primarily, ‘unreasonably refusing’ is a subjective term. It is a mystery
whether it is a valid reason to believe that he will definitely win in court, or
that mediation will fail. This uncertainty is also a factor that can prevent a
party that does not attend a mediation hearing for any reason from suing
for fear of possible court costs. In addition, the understanding of “restorative
justice” aims to make the conflict as if it never happened and to eliminate
the damages suffered, but here the parties contain the possibility of
being punished in a case where they are justified. In terms of employment cases in England general courts, it was stated that this subjectivity could
force the parties to agree to a mediation agreement with the fear of sanction,
which could potentially be a violation of Article 6.
Another issue is that mediation agreement are binding contracts in Turkey
and England (res judicata) and it is not possible to continue employment
litigation for these mediation agreements even in situations such as mistakes,
cheat, and undue influence. Nevertheless, the right of access to court is the
right of everyone involved in a dispute, not just those who cannot resolve
their dispute during the mediation or settlement process. This is the case for
the two countries and is open to criticism as it may violate article 6.
As a result, mandatory mediation will not cause a violation of the AIHS
6 (1) since the compulsory mediation system is unlikely to cause a significant
delay and since it is free of charge in case of failure and the court way is not
closed. As a matter of fact, the Turkish Constitutional Court has also decided
in this direction. However, since the uncertainties and subjectivity in the
procedural rules and since the mediation agreements signed at the end of the
ADR proceedings may be a factor that may prevent the parties of the employment
relationship from going to the employment litigation specific to these
persons. This situation may create a violation of Convention 6 (1).