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Environmental Values 23 (2014): 00–00.
© 2014 The White Horse Press. doi: 10.3197/096327114X13947900181950
Submitted 7 November 2012; accepted 15 February 2013
The Blind Hens’ Challenge:
Does It Undermine the View That Only Welfare
Matters in Our Dealings with Animals?
PETER SANDØE,ab PAUL M. HOCKING,c BJORN FÖRKMAN,a KIRSTY
HALDANE,c HELLE H. KRISTENSEN,a and CLARE PALMERd
a Department of Large Animal Sciences, University of Copenhagen
Grønnegårdsvej 8, DK-1870 Frederiksberg C, Denmark
Email: pes@life.ku.dk
b Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
Rolighedsvej 25, DK-1958 Frederiksberg C, Denmark.
c Roslin Institute and R(D)SVS, University of Edinburgh
Easter Bush, Midlothian, EH25 9RG, Scotland
d Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University
4237 TAMU, College Station, Texas, TX 77843–4237, USA
ABSTRACT
Animal ethicists have recently debated the ethical questions raised by disen-
hancing animals to improve their welfare. Here, we focus on the particular
case of breeding hens for commercial egg-laying systems to become blind, in
order to benet their welfare. Many people nd breeding blind hens intuitively
repellent, yet ‘welfare-only’ positions appear to be committed to endorsing
this possibility if it produces welfare gains. We call this the ‘Blind Hens’
Challenge’. In this paper, we argue that there are both empirical and theoreti-
cal reasons why even those adopting ‘welfare-only’ views should be concerned
about breeding blind hens. But we also argue that alternative views, which (for
example) claim that it is important to respect the telos or rights of an animal,
do not offer a more convincing solution to questions raised by the possibility
of disenhancing animals for their own benet.
KEYWORDS
Animal welfare, animal ethics, disenhancement, egg production, blind hens,
utilitarianism, telos, perfectionism.
PETER SANDØE et al.
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Environmental Values 23.6
1. WHAT IS THE BLIND HENS’ CHALLENGE?
Serious animal welfare problems often occur in modern egg-production sys-
tems. Laying hens either live in cages where their scope for movement is
strictly limited, or are kept in large ocks in barn systems or systems with
outdoor runs, where they have more space and better facilities, but where they
may experience severe feather-pecking and cannibalism. Attempts to prevent
these problems through breeding, feeding, and changes in the housing systems
have somewhat reduced the problems, but have not eliminated them. Thus a
recent review of different housing systems concludes ‘that no single housing
system is ideal from a hen welfare perspective’ (Lay et al., 2011). One of the
stated reasons for this conclusion is that ‘environmental complexity can create
opportunities for the hens to express behaviors that may be detrimental to their
welfare’ (Lay et al., 2011).
There is, however, another solution that may allow farmers to keep lay-
ing hens in large ocks without harmful behavioural problems: to use blind
hens. A study by Ali and Cheng (1985), of hens from a line of birds which
are blind due to a natural mutation, showed that the blind birds displayed no
feather-pecking or cannibalism. They did not appear to have any other obvious
welfare problems, and they were more productive. Clearly, for these reasons,
Ali and Cheng were of the opinion that blind hens could play a role in future
egg-production. This seemed, so to speak, to be a win-win situation: Farmers
would make more money and hens would live better lives.
Ali and Cheng’s idea of using blind hens in commercial egg-production has
not yet been taken up by any commercial poultry-breeder. So far their main
inuence has been on discussions in animal ethics. Beginning in 1999 (Sandøe
et al.), a number of authors have used the example of blind hens as part of a dis-
cussion about which values matter in our dealings with animals (for instance
Thompson 2007, 2008; Palmer, 2011; Webster, 2011).
The debate has been framed mainly in terms of a challenge to utilitarianism
and other views which claim that welfare outcomes are all that matter in our
dealings with animals. These views, while accepting the importance of welfare
outcomes, may diverge in terms of what they take to be the right distribution
of welfare across individuals. Whereas dominant forms of utilitarianism claim
that, in principle, the right distribution of welfare is the greatest possible sum
of welfare across all affected individuals, other related views (including other
forms of utilitarianism) favour a different distribution. Some views, reected
in much current animal-welfare legislation, take the position that all animals in
our care must be brought to achieve a certain minimum level of welfare, while
others maintain that we should strike a balance between getting the largest
possible sum of welfare and giving special priority to the worst-off individuals
(Part, 1997). Nevertheless, these views share with utilitarianism the assump-
tion that only welfare matters in our dealing with animals; and different ideas
THE BLIND HENS’ CHALLENGE
3
Environmental Values 23.6
about welfare distribution between affected individuals will not make a differ-
ence to the central arguments in this paper. So we do not need to consider these
differences further here; we will just call such views ‘welfare-only’ views.
The views we consider here, however, may also differ in terms of what they
take welfare to mean. Both in the literature on animal welfare (Fraser, 1997;
Sandøe and Christiansen, 2008) and in the philosophical literature on wellbe-
ing (Sandøe, 1999), welfare is dened in different ways. Here, we will at the
outset assume some kind of hedonist account, according to which welfare is
dened in terms of the presence of positive feelings (pleasure) and the absence
of negative ones (discomfort or suffering) (Duncan, 1996). This interpretation
of welfare will allow the blind hen case to be stated in a clear and forceful way,
and we will refer to this subjective idea of welfare when we use the expression
‘‘welfare-only’ views’. Later in the discussion, however, we will bring in dif-
ferent accounts of welfare.
In response to the blind hen case, adherents of such ‘welfare-only’ views
seem to be obliged to say that the breeding and use of blind chickens should
not generate additional ethical concerns. According to Ali and Cheng (1985),
blindness does not itself seem to create suffering (or to prevent pleasure), and
it does seem to reduce harmful behaviour; so blind hens may, overall, be better
off than sighted ones. Breeding chickens to be blind might be morally superior
to breeding them as sighted; from a utilitarian position, it might even be mor-
ally required. Yet since most people intuitively nd the idea of breeding blind
hens ethically disturbing, there seems to be a problem for utilitarianism and
other ‘welfare-only’ views (Sandøe and Christiansen, 2008). This problem,
which we will call ‘The Blind Hens’ Challenge’, is the subject of this paper.
We want to be clear, at this point, that we are not discussing whether or
not to accept the use of animals for food production, including hens for inten-
sive egg-production. Rather the question is whether, in a situation where as
a matter of fact there is ongoing intensive egg-production, it should be seen
as a moral improvement – or the opposite – to introduce blind hens. Thus no
assumptions are being made regarding whether, more fundamentally, it is mor-
ally acceptable to use hens for intensive egg-production.
The ‘Blind Hens’ Challenge’ can be seen as a special case in the general
challenge of justifying disenhancing animals for welfare reasons (Thompson,
2008). Some argue, on the basis of this challenge, that ‘welfare-only’ views
should be given up. John Webster provides a recent example of this. Here he
defends an alternative view, according to which, in our dealings with animals,
we should:
recognize the ‘telos’, i.e. the fundamental biological and psychological essence
of any animal; in simple terms ‘the pigness of a pig’. A pregnancy stall for
sows that denies them the freedom to express normal behaviour is an insult
to telos, even if we cannot produce evidence of physical or emotional stress.
If you disagree with this concept (and many do), consider two more extreme
PETER SANDØE et al.
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Environmental Values 23.6
possible manipulations of farm animals in the interests of more efcient pro-
duction: breeding blind hens for battery cages, or genetically engineering pigs
to knock out genes concerned with perception and cognitive awareness (in es-
sence, to destroy sentience). A strictly utilitarian argument could be marshalled
to defend both practices since it could be argued that blind hens would be less
likely to damage one another, and less sentient pigs would be less likely to suf-
fer the emotional effects of discomfort and frustration. I offer these examples
in support of the argument that, even when considering non-human animals,
utilitarianism is not enough. (Webster, 2011)
In the rest of the paper, we will discuss Webster’s argument, with a specic
focus upon the case of blind hens. We focus upon this case, rather than having
a general discussion about disenhancing animals for welfare reasons, because
there are new and interesting ndings in the case of blind hens that may enrich
the discussion.
We rst discuss why it is supposed to be problematic for utilitarianism and
other ‘welfare-only’ views if blind hens in commercial egg-production enjoy a
higher level of welfare than sighted hens. Secondly, based on recent literature
and the ndings of some of the authors of this paper, we will discuss whether,
as a matter of fact, blind hens are likely to enjoy a higher level of welfare in
commercial egg-production systems than normal, sighted hens. Thirdly, we
will present our own thoughts on blind hens and other forms of animal disen-
hancement, and argue that – even though such interventions will in practice
rarely contribute to animal welfare – there is no reason to oppose them in
circumstances where the animals are still to be produced and kept on a large,
commercial scale, provided that disenhancement does improve welfare and is
better in this regard than other long-term alternatives. Finally, before conclud-
ing, we discuss the extent to which Webster’s suggested alternative (2011),
i.e. to recognise the telos of an animal, is a coherent and well-thought-through
alternative to a ‘welfare-only’ view; and we consider whether alternative views
regarding our duties towards animals may deal with the blind hens’ challenge
in a more plausible way than ‘welfare-only’ views do. The general thrust of
the paper will be to argue against Webster, to the effect that the ‘Blind Hens’
Challenge’ does not provide a sufcient reason to reject the view that welfare
(interpreted as ‘what it feels like’ for the animals and other affected parties) is
all that matters in our dealings with animals.
2. WHY IS IT SUPPOSED TO BE A PROBLEM FOR ‘WELFARE-ONLY’
VIEWS THAT BLIND HENS ENJOY A HIGHER LEVEL OF WELFARE?
When Ali and Cheng argued in favour of using blind hens in commercial egg-
production, they tacitly assumed that all that matters here, morally speaking,
is the subjective welfare of the affected parties. This, however, is precisely the
THE BLIND HENS’ CHALLENGE
5
Environmental Values 23.6
assumption contested by those who invoke the Blind Hens’ Challenge as an
argument against welfare-only views.
The relevant part of Webster’s argument can be roughly spelled out as
follows:
1. If utilitarianism (or any other ‘welfare-only’ view) is accepted, then any
manipulation of farm animals which means that they enjoy a higher level
of welfare should be accepted as a superior alternative to the way in which
farm animals are treated in current production systems;
2. the breeding and use of blind hens in egg production is a manipulation
which means that laying hens will enjoy a higher level of welfare;
3. yet the breeding and use of blind hens should not be accepted as a superior
alternative to the way hens are treated in current egg-production systems;
4. utilitarianism (or any other ‘welfare-only’ view) should therefore not be
accepted.
Premise One just spells out what utilitarianism and other ‘welfare-only’
views entail. It is important, however, to be clear about the meaning of saying
‘any manipulation of farm animals which means that they enjoy a higher level
of welfare should be accepted as a superior alternative’. What is meant here is
not that any such manipulation is necessarily the best or the right choice; all
that is being said is that this choice is superior to the current situation. It may
not, all things considered, be the right choice, since it is possible that there is
an even better choice which, for utilitarians, is the right one. This is important
for thinking through Premise Three.
Premise Two asserts the empirical assumption which will, for now, be ac-
cepted for the sake of argument.
Premise Three is the key moral premise of the argument. Yet how this
premise could be defended is unclear. Paul Thompson (2007) argues that most
people would think it wrong to breed and use blind hens in egg production.
But a moral premise cannot simply be justied by reference to a sociological
fact about how people think. Even if that problem is set aside, however, there
are still some subtle terminological nuances here. Premise Three does not say
anything about what is right and wrong, only about one alternative not being
superior to another. Claiming that it is wrong to breed blind hens is not neces-
sarily the same as denying that breeding blind hens should be accepted as a
superior alternative to the current situation in intensive egg-production.
An analogy may be appropriate here. Conventional battery-cages are now
being phased out in egg production in Europe. One of the alternative solutions
is so-called enriched cages. It may be argued that these cages, which allow
hens access to perches, a nest and a dust-bathing area, are superior not only
to traditional battery-cages but also to the most prevalent alternative cage-free
system. The basis of this argument would be that the enriched-cage system
PETER SANDØE et al.
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Environmental Values 23.6
gives the hens opportunities to exercise their important behavioural needs, and
at the same time has a low mortality rate compared to non-cage systems (see
reviews by Lay et al., 2011; Rodenburg et al., 2012). Alternative non-cage sys-
tems, while also providing hens with opportunities to exercise their important
behavioural needs, often have a higher mortality rate (Rodenburg et al., 2012);
and therefore the enriched case system may, so to speak, be seen as the least
bad alternative currently available.
To say that something is currently the least bad alternative is equivalent
to saying that it is superior to the existing alternatives. This, however, is not
the same as saying that it is the best possible choice, or the right one, because
what we choose has implications for future developments in methods of egg
production. In the case of enriched cages, it may be argued, as many people
do, that even though they are the least bad alternative for the time being, they
are not the right choice, because they will not in the long run be conducive to
the development of the best possible system, i.e. a free-range system where the
mortality rate is at least as low as it is in the cage systems.
So, even if we assume that the welfare of blind laying-hens is superior to
sighted birds, it is at least possible to question the foundation of Premise Three.
When people question the rightness of breeding and using blind chickens, they
are not necessarily denying that the breeding and use of blind laying-hens
is superior to the treatment of hens in the most common current systems for
producing eggs. Rather, their view may be that even though blind hens are
superior, they do not constitute the right solution. The right solution would be
superior both to the existing alternatives and to the breeding and use of blind
hens.
An adherent to a ‘welfare-only’ view, however, is not prevented from agree-
ing with this merely by virtue of adhering to the key ‘welfare-only’ premise.
From a ‘welfare-only’ position, it is perfectly possible to defend the view that
we should not endorse minor improvements in animal welfare because this
may stand in the way of better solutions in the longer term. An adherent to a
‘welfare-only’ view could therefore argue that the breeding and use of blind
hens, even though superior when viewed in isolation, is problematic because
it prevents investment in nding better long-term solutions to the problems of
modern egg-production. Of course, it must be likely both that better solutions
will be found if blind hens are not used, and that the use of blind hens will
stand in the way of nding these solutions. The mere logical possibility of a
better alternative in the long run will not do. Thus adherents of utilitarianism
and other ‘welfare-only’ views are not bound to endorse blind hens, even if the
hens would enjoy better welfare than sighted hens in current egg-production
systems, provided they can argue that this option as a matter of fact would
stand in the way of better solutions in the longer run.
In addition to this, however, the empirical premise of improved welfare can
be questioned.
THE BLIND HENS’ CHALLENGE
7
Environmental Values 23.6
3. DO BLIND HENS ENJOY A HIGHER LEVEL OF WELFARE THAN
THEIR SEEING COLLEAGUES?
The discussion about blind hens has so far relied on a single study by Ali and
Cheng (1985). Here they examined so-called rc chickens from twenty to 28
weeks of age. These chickens were blind from hatch. During the short period
of time studied, however, the blind birds laid more eggs and consumed less
feed than sighted control birds. Body- and egg-weights were similar in both
lines, but the blind birds had less feather- and comb-damage. No physiologi-
cal differences were found to indicate that the blind birds were more or less
stressed than sighted controls, though there were more social interactions in
the sighted birds. Furthermore, fertility in the blind birds was poor because
blind males had difculty making the appropriate contact with the hen, and the
latter was less likely to respond correctly to the approach of the male. Ali and
Cheng speculate that despite these potentially negative factors, blind hens may
be under less stress than sighted hens, all things considered. Thus their main
conclusion seems to be that, overall, blind hens would enjoy a higher level of
welfare in egg-production systems than sighted birds do.
Two recent studies, however, paint a less rosy picture of the welfare of blind
chickens. Collins et al. (2011) studied chicks from a line called ‘blind enlarged
globe’ (beg) which inherit an autosomal recessive mutation that causes blind-
ness from hatch (Pollock et al., 1982). The research examined the development
of social behaviour to determine whether it would be adversely affected in the
blind birds. Behavioural evidence was also gathered, to follow up on previous
observations that blind (beg) birds displayed abnormal behaviour and had dif-
culty feeding, particularly during the rst two weeks after hatching. Finally,
data regarding mortality and weight-gain were recorded. In a follow-up study
(Haldane et al., unpublished), the behaviour and physiological data of a line of
chickens (rdd) – which inherit a sex-linked mutation and are sighted at hatch,
but turn blind before adulthood – was compared with beg chickens and sighted
controls, from hatch to ten weeks of age and as adults.
The results of these studies showed that in terms of social behaviour, re-
duced rates of behavioural synchrony and group aggregation were observed in
beg chickens in both studies, and in beg and rdd adults in the second study. We
think that there is reason to believe that these results reect welfare problems
for the blind birds. Chickens are highly social animals: social behaviour and
social comfort are important aspects of their normal behavioural repertoire
(Marx et al., 2001), and they naturally carry out behaviours in synchrony. It
has been suggested that they can suffer frustration when denied this experi-
ence (Hughes, 1971). Behavioural synchrony is thought to be important in the
regulation of normal behaviours such as feeding and, when roosting, in con-
serving and sharing heat (Lill, 1968; Hughes, 1971; Waldvogel, 1990; Webster
and Hurnik, 1994). Chickens live in ocks and have a strong motivation to
PETER SANDØE et al.
8
Environmental Values 23.6
remain members of the group, preferring to aggregate with conspecics rather
than to disperse throughout free-range pasture (Keeling and Duncan, 1991).
Furthermore, they normally nd separation and isolation from social compan-
ions stressful (Jones and Williams, 1992; Marx et al., 2001).
Blindness will clearly reduce the number of sensory pathways available to
the chickens, thereby limiting information available to them about their social
and physical environment. As an adaptive result, the birds need to rely on non-
visual cues, and would potentially compensate by increasing their perception
of alternative stimuli (auditory, olfactory, tactile, and so on), as has been shown
in other species (e.g. Munoz and Blumstein, 2012). Yet the results from the two
above-mentioned studies suggest that blind birds are unable to engage in social
behaviours to the same extent as sighted birds. While it is logically possible
that being blind changes the social nature of chickens, this is very implausible.
It is more likely that the need for social engagement with other birds persists,
but that blindness acts as an ongoing obstacle to realising such engagement.
If that is so, the blind chickens lack the positive states that sighted chickens
would have, and may be undergoing negative states; if this is correct, being
blind has substantial welfare implications for laying hens.
Blind and sighted adult hens also differed in their time spent pecking the
environment, with sighted adults spending signicantly more time environ-
mental-pecking (21.2 per cent) than blind hens, whether they were blind from
hatch (8.2 per cent) or became blind later in life (13.6 per cent). The rela-
tively high proportion of time spent pecking the environment, even in blind
hens, suggests an underlying motivation for environmental pecking even when
visual stimuli are absent, whereas the signicant differences between the lines
suggest the importance of visual stimuli for pecking and exploratory behaviour
in hens (Rogers, 1995; Collins et al., 2011). It seems reasonable to say that
even though blind hens may not suffer because they peck less, they may forego
opportunities for pleasure linked to environmental pecking. Abnormal behav-
iours were also observed in blind birds (circular walking, ‘star gazing’ and
air-pecking), and blind birds were frequently observed to walk into furniture or
conspecics. The abnormal behaviours may be a response to the lack of visual
cues, suggesting poor welfare, and clearly unexpected collisions are likely to
be at least unpleasant (Collins et al., 2011; Haldane et al., unpublished).
The frequency of feeding behaviour was not statistically different between
blind and sighted adult birds, but body weight was signicantly lower from
fourteen days of age in both beg and rdd, reecting the apparent difculty that
blind chicks experience in identifying and ingesting feed. Mortality in the rst
two weeks was higher in the blind chicks, but not statistically so in Collins et
al. (2011); mortality, however, was nearly thirty per cent in beg compared to
four per cent in sighted controls in the subsequent experiment (Haldane et al.,
unpublished).
THE BLIND HENS’ CHALLENGE
9
Environmental Values 23.6
The results of these two later studies clearly contrast with the results of Ali
and Cheng (1985). One explanation for this could be that the sighted control
birds in the early experiment suffered a high rate of feather-pecking, pulling
and cannibalism as adults, which contributed to a very high stress-level among
these birds. Low levels of welfare in the control animals will make a compari-
son with the blind hens favour the interpretation that blind hens have better
welfare. The subsequent studies have not found the same low level of welfare
in the sighted controls.
Taken together, the results of the two later studies suggest that blind laying-
hens do, after all, have poor welfare compared with similar sighted birds. Blind
birds are likely to suffer from extended hunger, due to their difculty in learn-
ing to feed, and for the same reason they have lower body-weights and higher
mortality than sighted birds. The development of abnormal behaviours, and
changes in the frequency of other behaviours, suggest that blind birds undergo
negative experiences due to their lack of sight. And there is reason to believe
that they also miss out on important social behaviours that may affect their
welfare.
4. SECOND THOUGHTS REGARDING BLIND HENS?
In light of the results just presented, an adherent of a welfare-only view may
conclude that the Blind Hens’ Challenge has been overcome. While breeding
blind hens may prevent some of the welfare problems that sighted hens suffer
by virtue of feather-pecking and cannibalism, these will be counterbalanced by
some potentially severe problems in blind hens in terms of increased mortal-
ity, abnormal behaviour and deprivation of important social behaviour. It is
implausible that this balancing will turn out in favour of keeping blind hens,
so there is unlikely to be a welfare benet achieved by substituting seeing hens
with blind ones in modern egg-production. Thus it can be concluded that the
empirical part of the challenge, as formulated above, will turn out to be false,
and therefore the conclusion will not follow.
Some opponents of utilitarianism and other ‘welfare-only’ views, however,
may argue that this is an easy way out for the welfarist. They might retort: ‘So,
it turns out in this case that, in practice, blind hens suffer more and experience
less positive satisfaction than sighted hens. But there is a sense in which this is
serendipitous. It could have been otherwise; and there will no doubt be other
cases where it is otherwise – where creating animals ‘disenhanced’ in some
way improves their welfare. But it is wrong to disenhance animals, even if it
does improve their welfare. So utilitarian and related welfare-only theories are
untenable’. Thus, even though the empirical part of the Blind Hens’ Challenge
is overcome in this case, the theoretical challenge persists.
PETER SANDØE et al.
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Environmental Values 23.6
The welfarist can respond to this theoretical challenge in several ways. One
would be to give an account of moral thinking based on Hare’s (1981) two-
level approach. Hare distinguishes between the everyday moral decisions we
make, based on our intuitions and current moral norms, and decisions made at
a different, reective level, when we have the opportunity to step back from
our ordinary moral practice and to reassess it critically in the light of underly-
ing principles. On this view, the intuitive, everyday response is that breeding
disenhanced animals such as blind chickens is morally wrong. We know that
quick technical solutions to complex biological problems usually fail. And we
expect that being blind (for instance) is likely to make a chicken’s life more
difcult. So, at the everyday level, we have reason to react against practices
such as breeding blind chickens (and indeed, the recent empirical evidence on
blind chickens, reported here, backs up this intuitive view about their lives).
But when we move to the second, critical and reective level, we cannot rely
on everyday norms and intuitions. We have to push ourselves to work through
underlying principles. It is at this level that we must consider cases where
disenhancing animals may improve their welfare, and why, if it does improve
welfare, and better welfare alternatives are not available, there is something
wrong with doing it. At this reective level, assertions that a practice is simply
untenable are inadequate.
This leads to a second, related response. Suppose that a disenhancement
project actually did improve animal welfare. On many (though not all) the-
oretical approaches to ethics, this welfare benet provides a positive moral
reason for disenhancement, unless such disenhancement correspondingly re-
duces welfare elsewhere, or prevents the development of methods of animal
production that would be better for welfare in the long run. Animals are better-
off, and no-one is worse-off. The onus, then, appears to be on those who would
resist such disenhancement, that they should give a satisfactory reason why the
principle they are adopting takes priority over animal welfare.
One alternative view that rejects – or at least may appear to reject – the dis-
enhancements allowed by ‘welfare-only’ views is suggested by John Webster
in the quotation above. Webster argues that this view, based on the idea of rec-
ognizing the telos of an animal, leads to less counterintuitive conclusions than
utilitarianism, and is therefore superior. To this we will now turn.
5. IS THERE A SUPERIOR ALTERNATIVE VIEW BASED ON THE IDEA
OF RESPECTING THE TELOS OF ANIMALS?
In his argument against welfarism, Webster apparently assumes that there is a
coherent and plausible idea of respecting the teloi of animals that goes beyond
looking after their welfare. Here he seems to piggyback on the work of the
American philosopher Bernard Rollin who says: ‘Not only will welfare mean
THE BLIND HENS’ CHALLENGE
11
Environmental Values 23.6
control of pain and suffering, it will also entail nurturing and fullment of the
animals’ natures, which I call telos.’ (Rollin, 1993: 48) As it stands, however,
this is not necessarily in conict with utilitarianism or any other welfare-only
view. What Rollin says here is that welfare is more than the absence of pain
and suffering: there is also what one may label ‘positive welfare’, a conclusion
with which no adherent of ‘welfare-only’ views should disagree. In traditional
utilitarianism, for instance, the point is not merely to prevent negative welfare,
pain, but also to promote positive welfare, pleasure. In what Rollin says here
and elsewhere (1995), however, we need to consider whether he is claiming
that ‘nurturing and fullment of animals’ natures’ according to telos is good
for the animals because it is likely to lead to more pleasure, or whether it is
good for the animals irrespective of whether it gives rise to pleasure or not. If
Rollin accepts the latter view, he is an adherent of a form of what is sometimes
called perfectionism (Hurka, 1996). According to the perfectionist, being able
to realise signicant species-specic potentials is an essential part of a good
life. The key thing is not to feel well, but to do well. Underlying this approach,
in the context of animals, is the common but also controversial assumption
that animals have well-dened natures (the perfectionist uses these to dene
the criteria for living a successful life). For example, it is rather obvious that
it is in the nature of a domestic cat to engage in reproductive behaviour. So,
adopting a perfectionist view, one might argue that something crucial is lost in
the life of the cat when it is neutered; and that this is so despite the fact that the
neutered cat itself is not (in some suitable sense) ‘aware’ of missing anything.
In the case of the neutered cat, and even more so in the case of breeding
blind hens, it is not that the humans involved prevent the animals in question
from doing what it is in their nature to do. Rather, they have created these ani-
mals to have a different nature, in one case by means of surgery, in the other
by means of breeding. Still, we can in the case of the cat make sense of saying
that it has ‘lost’ something: a cat has literally been ‘altered’, from being intact
to becoming castrated. The blind chickens, however, have not been changed
from anything, they were bred blind: right from the start of their existence,
they were different from normal chickens. They have not been ‘altered’; blind-
ness is built into their genetic identity.
Looked at this way, breeding blind chickens is surely a way of changing the
telos of the animals. Blind chickens have a different telos to seeing chickens. If
one thinks of telos as a key part of animal welfare, how, then, should one think
about changing an animal’s telos? Bernard Rollin is very clear here:
Given an animal’s telos, and the interests that are constitutive thereof, one should
not violate those interests. If the animals could be made happier by changing
their natures, I see no moral problem in doing so (unless, of course, the changes
harm or endanger other animals, humans, or the environment). Telos is not sa-
cred; what is sacred are the interests that follow from it. (1995: 172)
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Environmental Values 23.6
Given this, Rollin does not seem to be a perfectionist. He accepts welfare
as dened in terms of a satisfaction of interests. His valid criticism of much
traditional thinking as regards animal welfare appears to be really concerned
with including positive welfare, rather than just looking at the absence of pain
and suffering and other aspects of negative welfare.
This understanding of telos, however, is a problem for Webster’s approach
to the Blind Hens’ Challenge. For on this understanding, the telos of the hens
has not been disrespected, because the telos of blind hens is different from that
of sighted hens. If this is the case, then respecting the telos of the animals, as
understood here, is not really incompatible with utilitarianism or any other
‘welfare-only’ view.
Of course, Webster may claim that since the idea of breeding and using
blind hens is repugnant, this by itself speaks in favour of invoking an idea of
respecting the telos of animals, one which is incompatible with utilitarianism or
any other ‘welfare-only’ view. Thus he may defend a version of perfectionism
which claims that it is a loss for an animal to be manipulated so that it cannot
express aspects of its species-specic nature, or the species specic behaviour
of its ancestor – in this case the jungle fowl – even if the individual animal does
not experience reduced welfare as a consequence of the manipulation.
Indeed, something like this seems to be in the mind of some authors who
invoke respect for telos, or the related idea of animal integrity, as part of the
discussion of the Blind Hens’ Challenge (Star et al., 2008; Alrøe et al., 2001).
Yet none of these authors really try to engage in a discussion regarding the
plausibility at the core of their view: i.e. that something we do to an animal, or
to produce an animal, such as breeding from blind hens to produce blind off-
spring, may matter morally even though it does not matter to the animal itself
(or to any other animals or involved humans).
Other views in animal ethics may do better here. It is, of course, not pos-
sible in this paper to engage in a full discussion of alternative views. It is,
however, worthwhile to consider briey how two alternative views can deal
with the issue of animal disenhancement. This may serve to illustrate a general
problem faced by attempts to formulate a principled alternative to the approach
of ‘welfare-only’ views, when it comes to animal disenhancements for the ben-
et of animals’ welfare. One view is based on animal rights; and the other takes
a preference-utilitarian, as opposed to a hedonistic-utilitarian, perspective.
6. WOULD ALTERNATIVE ETHICAL VIEWS OPPOSE
DISENHANCEMENT IN PRINCIPLE?
Arguments that sentient animals (Francione, 2000) or animals which are
‘subjects-of-a-life’ (Regan, 1984) possess rights, have formed an important
alternative to utilitarian and other ‘welfare-only’ views in debates about animal
THE BLIND HENS’ CHALLENGE
13
Environmental Values 23.6
ethics. In principle, on these views, breeding chickens in industrial systems
is normally morally impermissible, because it instrumentalises them and in-
fringes upon their rights (for instance, by conning them and eventually killing
them). In this sense, to ask a question about breeding blind chickens is irrel-
evant: chickens should not be commercially bred for human use at all.
Here, however, we have assumed that, as is almost inevitable, chickens
will continue to be bred in intensive systems. It would be of particular interest
here if a rights-view could offer a special objection to breeding blind chick-
ens that it did not offer to breeding sighted ones. Yet as Thompson (2008)
and Palmer (2011) have already argued, this does not appear to be the case.
Rights-arguments normally apply to beings already in existence. So, were the
proposal to blind normally-sighted chickens, there would be a rights-objection:
the chickens would have been deprived of an important capacity which they
already possessed.
In the case of the hens bred to be or become blind, however, this argument
does not apply. These birds did not exist prior to having exactly the capacities
they actually have; nothing has been taken away from them, since from con-
ception they were destined to be blind. Certainly, it would have been possible
to breed different, sighted individuals; but that does not mean that particular
individual chickens, either blind from hatch or genetically destined to become
blind, have been deprived of anything. At the point of human activity, there
was no ‘subject of-a-life’ or sentient being to wrong: prior to conception, no
being exists to be harmed (Palmer, 2011). So it does not seem plausible that
existing animal-rights arguments, at least, would especially object to the crea-
tion of blind chickens, even though they may object to the idea of breeding
chickens for human use in general.
Another alternative to the hedonistic views discussed above is views that,
even though they share the ‘welfare-only’ assumption, dene animal welfare
in terms of satisfaction of preferences or desires, so aiming (roughly) at sat-
isfying preferences (or desires), and not causing the frustration of preferences
(or desires). In making decisions about whether to disenhance, the question
would be whether, in any particular case, there would be, from the point of
view of the affected animals, more preference-satisfaction through producing
disenhanced or non-disenhanced animals. If producing disenhanced animals
reduced preference-satisfaction, then the disenhancement should, other things
being equal, not be pursued. As with a hedonistic-welfarist view, however, it is
at least possible for there to be cases where disenhancement increases overall
net preference-satisfaction, and these are the cases in which we are interested.
Preference-utilitarianism cannot in principle rule out disenhancement as a way
of increasing preference-satisfaction and/or reducing preference-frustration. As
a matter of fact, it is possible that preference-satisfaction views would have a
less restrictive, and thereby perhaps less plausible, stance towards disenhance-
ments than hedonistic views. Disenhancements might remove preferences that,
PETER SANDØE et al.
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Environmental Values 23.6
had they been there, would have generated pleasure by being satised. On a
hedonist view, this form of disenhancement can be seen as a moral problem
because of the loss in positive welfare; whereas on a preference account there
appears to be no loss, since no actual preference is being frustrated.
So neither a rights-view nor a preference-based form of welfarism will
obviously be able to come up with arguments in principle against disenhancing
animals for the benet of their own welfare. Of course, there is very good rea-
son – as the blind-chicken case makes clear – to be sure that a disenhancement
really will improve animal welfare, and it may well be that cases where dis-
enhancement will improve animal welfare are very rare. Nonetheless, where
they do occur, the burden of argument surely lies with those who object to
disenhancement, rather than those who advocate it, since – assuming the con-
tinuance of commercial animal production – their objections will lead to more
animal suffering, and less positive animal experience, in the world.
7. CONCLUSION
The Blind Hens’ Challenge raised both an empirical question (‘Do blind hens
have better welfare than sighted ones in modern production systems?’), and a
philosophical-cum-ethical question (‘If blind hens have better welfare, should
we breed them?’). New empirical evidence suggests that blind hens have wel-
fare problems because they are blind. It seems likely, then, that we should not
produce them. Yet this empirical conclusion does not mean that the philosoph-
ical-cum-ethical question is closed; there may be cases, even if these cases are
rare, where disenhancing animals does improve welfare in modern production
systems. Even so, however, on ‘welfare-only’ positions, disenhancements may
not be justied if adopting them stands in the way of developments that would,
ultimately, be even better for animal welfare. Disenhancement is rarely likely
to be what’s best. But the ‘welfare-only’ view does not oppose animal dis-
enhancement in principle, on the grounds (for instance) that disenhancement
disrespects animals’ teloi; in fact, arguments that disenhancement is ‘disre-
spectful of telos’ do not seem to stand up to critical scrutiny. On ‘welfare-only’
views, then, there is no principled objection to disenhancement, although there
is a recognition that welfare benets may be rare and other, better, options for
welfare are likely to be available in the long term. The burden of proof is there-
fore on those who oppose the breeding of disenhanced animals on principle,
where such disenhancements actually do improve animal welfare, to provide
new arguments to support these objections.
THE BLIND HENS’ CHALLENGE
15
Environmental Values 23.6
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