Conference PaperPDF Available

"Easy problems or radical change? Recovering a set of criteria about scientific explanation of consciousness" “¿Problemas fáciles o cambio radical? Recuperando una serie de criterios acerca de la explicación científica de la conciencia”

August 2015

Conference: XVII Congreso Nacional de Filosofía, organizado por la Asociación Filosófica Argentina, Santa Fe, Argentina, Agosto de 2015, COMUNICACIÓN ENVIADA.

Authors:

Adrian Ramírez

National University of Córdoba

Gonzalo Del C Navarro

Pontifical Xavierian University

In this paper, we seek to determine the validity of a set of arguments and criteria designed to assess the possible progress of a science of consciousness (contemporary to the "hard problem of consciousness" proposed by Chalmers). For the purposes of this analysis, two theories or models of great impact on current neuroscience and psychology of consciousness will be taken. Some features of these proposals will be rebuilt in the light of discussions concerning in philosophy of neuroscience.

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