Content uploaded by Sean Hughes
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Sean Hughes on Mar 26, 2015
Content may be subject to copyright.
A preview of the PDF is not available
Highly Prevalent but Not Always Persistent
Abstract and Figures
Although past research has documented the prevalence of misconceptions in introductory psychology classes, few studies have assessed how readily upper-level undergraduate and graduate students endorse erroneous beliefs about the discipline. In Study 1, we administered a 30-item misconception test to an international sample of 670 undergraduate, master's, and doctoral students. Analyses indicated that participants identified and rejected the majority of misconceptions, with doctoral students performing better than their master's or undergraduate peers. In Study 2, we administered a revised version of our questionnaire to a novel sample of 557 students while controlling for number of years spent at university, psychology courses completed, and need for cognition. Once again, we found that graduate students rejected more, affirmed less, and reported lower levels of uncertainty than their undergraduate counterparts. Educational implications and future research directions are discussed.
Figures - uploaded by Sean Hughes
Author content
All figure content in this area was uploaded by Sean Hughes
Content may be subject to copyright.
... Myths in psychology have been studied for more than a century (see the early review by Nixon, 1925), yielding an interesting but modest body of scientific literature by the late 20th century (i.e., Brown, 1983;Furnham, 1992;Gutman, 1979;Vaughan, 1977). Since then, there has been a substantial increase in research interest, especially since Lilienfeld et al. (2010) published their book on the most prevalent psychological myths in contemporary Western society (Bensley et al., 2019;Furnham & Hughes, 2014;Hughes et al., 2014;Sibicky et al., 2021;Sleegers et al., 2019;Taylor & Kowalski, 2012). More recently, several researchers have turned their attention to the psychological mechanisms and contextual factors that prompt people believe in myths and their resistance or not to change (Cadaret et al., 2019;Cavazos et al., 2021;Cho, 2021;Curtis & Kelley, 2021;Fazio et al., 2015;Fenn et al., 2019;Hughes, Lyddy, and Kaplan, 2013;Kowalski & Taylor, 2009;Nyhan & Reifler, 2015;Wilson, 2018). ...
... In this line, several studies have focused on the prevalence of myths in individuals with different levels of training in the field, providing relevant baseline information to be used for teaching purposes. Typically, a measure of the level of training (or expertise) used in different studies is the academic year in which psychology students are enrolled (i.e., Bensley et al., 2019;Brown, 1983;Furnham, 1992;Hughes et al., 2014;Rodríguez, 2016;Taylor & Kowalski, 2004), and in some studies, these samples are compared to a lay population (Furnham & Hughes, 2014). In Anglo-Saxon countries, where most research has been conducted, the results usually show a prevalence of around 60% in the general population (Furnham & Hughes, 2014;Lilienfeld et al., 2010;Segal, 2001). ...
... Research with students at different levels of psychology training yields mixed results, particularly when comparing psychology students and the general population. Some studies find no appreciable differences between these groups (Brown, 1983;Furnham, 1992;Hughes et al., 2014;Segal, 2001;Sleegers et al., 2019;Taylor & Kowalski, 2004), while others report a lower prevalence of myths (20-30%) among psychology students than in the general population, and significant relationships between level of training in psychology and myth debunking (Cho, 2021;Gardner & Dalsing, 1986;Hughes et al., 2014). These studies, however, did not include experts such as university psychology teachers, who presumably would be less likely than students to endorse myths. ...
Background
The study of myths in psychology has conceptual and educational relevance: How to adapt the teaching of psychology to confront myths with grounded knowledge? A first step is to know which myths prevail and its relation to training in psychology.
Objective
To explore myth's prevalence among Spanish first-year university students of Social (SS) and Engineering Sciences (ES) (Study 1), and among different levels of expertise in psychology (Study 2).
Method
Questionnaire including 21 myths. Study 1: 175 first-year SS and ES undergraduates. Study 2: 102 lay, semi-experts and experts in psychology.
Results
Lower prevalence of myths among Spanish students than in other countries (approx. 37% vs. 60%), with SS students performing better than ES students. Experts performed significantly better (14% myths endorsed) than lay students (33%), but not than semi-experts (19%).
Conclusions
The lower prevalence of myths compared to other countries may be due to methodological and sociocultural aspects. University training in psychology helps to better identify myths but does not eradicate them.
Teaching Implications
Need to reflect on the little progress beyond a medium level of expertise. Teachers and students must identify their own myths and work on them in classroom, promoting critical thinking.
... Contrary to certain expectations, these misconceptions are not only believed by people outside of Psychology, but also prevail among professionals within this discipline (Fasce & Adrián-Ventura, 2020;Furnham & Hughes, 2014;Galassi & Gersh, 1993;Hooper, 2006;Houben et al., 2019;Lilienfeld et al., 2013;Torres, Boccacini & Miller, 2006). Although some studies show that university studies reduce the belief in myths (Bensley, Lilienfeld & Powell, 2014;Hughes et al., 2015;Sibicky, Klein & Embrescia, 2020), it has also been shown that having university studies does not eliminate the belief in myths nor are these beliefs fully replaced with explanations from scientific psychology (Hughes et al., 2015;Lyddy & Hughes, 2012;Root & Stanley, 2017). On many occasions, students who begin their studies in Psychology have imprecise and contradictory information about human behavior (Hughes, Lyddy & Lambe, 2013). ...
... Contrary to certain expectations, these misconceptions are not only believed by people outside of Psychology, but also prevail among professionals within this discipline (Fasce & Adrián-Ventura, 2020;Furnham & Hughes, 2014;Galassi & Gersh, 1993;Hooper, 2006;Houben et al., 2019;Lilienfeld et al., 2013;Torres, Boccacini & Miller, 2006). Although some studies show that university studies reduce the belief in myths (Bensley, Lilienfeld & Powell, 2014;Hughes et al., 2015;Sibicky, Klein & Embrescia, 2020), it has also been shown that having university studies does not eliminate the belief in myths nor are these beliefs fully replaced with explanations from scientific psychology (Hughes et al., 2015;Lyddy & Hughes, 2012;Root & Stanley, 2017). On many occasions, students who begin their studies in Psychology have imprecise and contradictory information about human behavior (Hughes, Lyddy & Lambe, 2013). ...
... Some studies suggest that psychology students are better at recognizing the myths in this discipline than the general population or students from other university degrees (Bensley, Lilienfeld & Powell, 2014;Furnham & Hughes, 2014;Gardner & Dalsing, 1986;Hughes et al., 2015;Sibicky, Klein & Embrescia, 2020). Reaching a higher academic year could indicate a greater interest in the discipline, and with it, a greater desire to further delve into psychology (Furnham & Hughes, 2014). ...
Myths in Psychology are beliefs that are widely spread and inconsistent with the empirical evidence available within this field of knowledge. They are characterized by being relatively stable, resistant to change, and prevalent both among the non-academic population and among students and professionals within this discipline. The aim of this study was to analyse the prevalence of these myths among Spanish psychology students and the influence of three variables: the type of university, face-to-face (UAM) and online (UNED), the academic year in which participants were enrolled and familiarity with scientific dissemination. Results show that participants from the face-to-face university, enrolled in higher academic years and that reports familiarity with scientific dissemination believe less in myths than those from the online university, enrolled in lower years and that report no familiarity with scientific dissemination.
Need for cognition is conceptualized as an individual’s intrinsic motivation to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activities. Over the past three decades, there has been increasing interest in how need for cognition impacts and correlates with learning performance. This meta-analysis summarized 136 independent effect sizes (N = 53,258) for the association between need for cognition and academic achievement and investigated the moderating effects of variables related to research context, methodology, and instrumentation. The overall effect size weighted by inverse variance and using a random effects model was found to be small, r = .20, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from .18 to .22. The association between need for cognition and learning performance was moderated by grade level, geographic region, exposure to intervention, and outcome measurement tool. The implications of these findings for practice and future research are discussed.
Bilingualism is associated with a number of false beliefs, myths and misconceptions, which carry implications for bilingual education and policymaking. While the language used, often in the media, to express such misconceptions may have become more subtle, a negative bias remains and is arguably more difficult to detect and defend against. The current study examined the endorsement of common misconceptions by bilingual and monolingual participants as a function of the phrasing used to construct the misconception statements. Participants (N = 103; 47% bilingual) completed an online survey comprising common misconceptions about bilingualism as well as filler items, rating their agreement with the statements using a 7-point Likert-type scale. The phrasing of the misconceptions was varied such that participants read either a strongly worded or weakly worded version of the statements. The results showed that participants gave higher ratings of the statements in the weakly worded condition. While overall the average endorsement of the misconceptions was low, 82% of participants agreed with at least one misconception and 29% agreed with half the statements or more. There was no significant difference between monolinguals’ and bilinguals’ ratings. The findings suggest that misconceptions about bilingualism remain prevalent and are readily detectable when worded ambiguously.
This experimental field study (pre-post-follow-up design) with 184 student teachers examined the effectiveness of an intervention to reduce misconceptions about psychology within an introductory psychology course. For this purpose, over the course’s one-semester duration, all students attended six lectures and, in addition, worked individually on six assignments in between. In both, the intervention and control group, assignments covered the same learning content but assignments for the intervention group particularly addressed six topic-related misconceptions, and were designed to bring about conceptual change. These assignments included refutational texts and other tasks that triggered conceptual inconsistency and emphasized students’ use of scientific concepts. Students in the control group completed assignments designed for rehearsal of and elaboration on the topics at hand but were not exposed to the respective misconceptions. The findings demonstrate the efficacy of this slight modification of tasks in reducing students’ misconceptions around psychology. While the groups did not differ in exam performance, the positive associations found between exam performance and high-confidence rejection of psychological myths, and their correlation with evaluativist epistemic beliefs and critical thinking, underline the importance of early interventions in teacher education with the aim of dispelling misconceptions about psychology.
Background
Psychological misconceptions permeate our culture, with many people endorsing these erroneous beliefs.
Objective
The purpose of this study was to replicate and extend previous findings that reported psychology knowledge and cognitive thinking style predict undergraduates’ beliefs in psychological misconceptions.
Method
Two hundred and ninety-six undergraduates participated in an online survey in which they completed a psychological misconceptions questionnaire and the Critical Reflection Test (CRT). Participants’ academic information (i.e., number of psychology and non-psychology courses taken and overall psychology GPA) was retrieved via institutional data.
Results
Number of psychology courses, psychology GPA, and CRT score were all positive correlates of rejecting psychological misconceptions.
Conclusion
Students who took more and attained higher grades in psychology courses and engaged in more reflective and analytical thinking are less likely to affirm psychological misconceptions.
Teaching Implications
Psychology courses, particularly those that include activities and assessments to bolster reflective and analytical thinking skills, could be effective means to reduce students’ beliefs in psychological misconceptions.
Fostering metacognitive awareness of misconceptions should enhance deep processing of scientifically correct explanations and thereby decrease misconceptions. To explore these potentially beneficial effects, we conducted a field study implemented in a regular educational psychology course in an Australian teacher education program. In a two-by-two within-subject experimental design, student teachers ( n = 119) answered misconception questionnaires, made metacognitive judgments, and participated in awareness activities at the start (T1) and the end (T2) of the semester (within-subject factor: time). Half of the misconception items focused on educational psychology course content, while the other half focused on related topics that were not covered in the course (non-course content). Awareness activities (AA) consisted of providing feedback regarding all misconception items. During the lectures, we provided additional scientifically correct refutational explanations (RE) regarding course content. Thus, we compared the combined AA+RE treatment for course content with the AA treatment for non-course content (within-subject factor: treatment). Our findings confirm that student teachers harbor numerous high-confidence educational psychological misconceptions. Furthermore, awareness activities plus refutational explanations resulted in significant increases in metacognitive awareness and in performance. Additionally, initial metacognitive overconfidence was related to persistent misconceptions, indicating that overconfidence may hinder correction of course content misconceptions.
Previous research has found a high prevalence of some (educational) psychological misconceptions (i.e., incorrect but often popular assumptions that contradict results from psychological research) among (pre-service) teachers. However, the number of topics that have been investigated is limited. Additionally, knowing the sources of misconceptions might be helpful for rebutting them. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence has been found to be important for informing (pre-service) teachers' practice, but personal experiences also are among the main sources of misconceptions. Therefore, we hypothesized that pre-service teachers would predominantly view sources of anecdotal evidence as the origin of their educational psychological beliefs in general and the main source of their misconceptions in particular. In an online survey (with correlational and quasi-experimental elements) of N = 836 pre-service teachers, we found that educational psychological misconceptions were less prevalent than expected but that pre-service teachers indeed mainly based their beliefs on sources of anecdotal evidence (personal experiences and narratives from other people) and that these nonscientific sources turned out to be the main sources of their misconceptions (comparison with scientific sources: d = 0.19 and d = 0.23). Furthermore, referring more to sources of anecdotal than scientific evidence (research and lectures) was associated with undesirable aspects, that is, more misconceptions ( d = 0.21) and less reduction of misconception endorsement through empirical refutation-style information ( d = 0.30) but not with a lower judgment of the view that it is possible to examine educational psychological topics scientifically. In sum, our results indicate that basing one's beliefs more on sources of anecdotal than scientific evidence is associated with outcomes that stand in contrast to evidence-based education. Future research should investigate why pre-service teachers concentrate on sources of anecdotal evidence, how to make sources of scientific evidence more tempting, and whether counteracting misconceptions by showing the downside of nonscientific sources is effective.
Personal trainers are a popular source of exercise guidance for the public but have been shown to have fundamental errors in their knowledge, and hold misconceptions about some exercise and nutritional concepts. Critical thinking skills have been found to relate inversely to misconceptions in other populations but this has not been examined in personal trainers. This study assessed the impact of an online, domain-specific, critical thinking course on the misconceptions and critical thinking ability (CTA) of personal trainers. One hundred and twenty-five participants were recruited into a randomised control trial. Participants completed measures of knowledge, misconceptions, CTA, and their use and perceived trustworthiness of sources of information about exercise and nutrition, then were allocated to either an intervention or control group. The intervention group completed the course over six weeks, while the control group waited six weeks before being surveyed again. Participants showed reduced endorsement of misconceptions and increased trust in reliable sources after completing the intervention. CTA improved in both the intervention and control groups. These results provide evidence that targeting critical thinking skills tailored to relevant content may contribute positively to the professional development of personal trainers.
Studies of how students experience their Ph.D. education have been promoted as an indicator to improve doctoral programmes (assessment-oriented studies) and/or to enhance understanding of career development among this collective (research-oriented studies). Interest in the latter group has increased in recent years as researcher development has become a field of study in the context of higher education. In this respect, a database of studies measuring the Ph.D. experience could be of use to researchers. We therefore conducted a review of 53 empirical studies, focusing only on large-scale research based on data obtained from questionnaires and scales, published between 1991 and 2018. In terms of results, we provide an overview of studies conducted in the last 27 years, reveal the core elements that are traditionally considered in measuring the Ph.D. experience, and identify some gaps and contributions in clarifying this generic term. Directions for future research are offered.
The present study examined the possibility that the language and response format used in self-report questionnaires influences how readily people endorse misconceptions. Four versions of a 40-item misconception test were administered to European (n = 281) and North American (n = 123) psychology and nonpsychology undergraduates. Response format and ambiguity of phrasing were manipulated. Results indicate that misconception endorsement was strongly influenced by both question phrasing and response format, with students showing more agreement and less disagreement when misconceptions were ambiguously phrased or a 7-point rating scale used. These procedure-related effects were observed for European and North American psychology and nonpsychology students alike irrespective of the amount of time they had spent studying the subject. Implications for designing pedagogical procedures to assess student's disciplinary knowledge and beliefs are discussed.
This study examined the prevalence of psychological myths and misconceptions among psychology students and within the general population. In total, 829 participants completed a 249-item questionnaire designed to measure a broad range of psychological myths. Results revealed that psychological myths and misconceptions are numerous and widely held. A number of widely held, potentially harmful, and socially divisive myths were identified. Psychology students recognized more myths than did the general population. However, effect sizes were small, indicating that education has only a very limited success in alleviating psychological myths and misconceptions.
Misconceptions about psycho-legal issues are widespread and threaten the fabric of our legal system. The present study examines how misconception endorsement is related to tough-on-crime beliefs and sentencing decisions. Two hundred and fifty-six students completed a 50-item questionnaire assessing misconceptions related to forensic psychology and determined sentences in four mock-jury scenarios at the beginning and end of an introductory forensic psychology course. Misconception endorsement decreased significantly from 32% to 21%, with every subscale (police and interrogations, service provision, mental illness, memory and cognition, tough on crime) experiencing a significant decrease from pre-test to post-test. This drop in endorsement is meaningful, as misconceptions and beliefs are typically very difficult to change. Additionally, misconception endorsement was positively correlated with tough-on-crime beliefs and punitive (mock) sentencing. This study provides a valuable resource for endorsement rates of psycho-legal misconceptions and the propensity of individual misconceptions to change. It also makes a strong argument for the usefulness of psychology and law courses in reducing potentially harmful misconceptions and tough-on-crime beliefs.
The widespread prevalence and persistence of misinformation in contemporary societies, such as the false belief that there is a link between childhood vaccinations and autism, is a matter of public concern. For example, the myths surrounding vaccinations, which prompted some parents to withhold immunization from their children, have led to a marked increase in vaccine-preventable disease, as well as unnecessary public expenditure on research and public-information campaigns aimed at rectifying the situation.
We first examine the mechanisms by which such misinformation is disseminated in society, both inadvertently and purposely. Misinformation can originate from rumors but also from works of fiction, governments and politicians, and vested interests. Moreover, changes in the media landscape, including the arrival of the Internet, have fundamentally influenced the ways in which information is communicated and misinformation is spread.
We next move to misinformation at the level of the individual, and review the cognitive factors that often render misinformation resistant to correction. We consider how people assess the truth of statements and what makes people believe certain things but not others. We look at people’s memory for misinformation and answer the questions of why retractions of misinformation are so ineffective in memory updating and why efforts to retract misinformation can even backfire and, ironically, increase misbelief. Though ideology and personal worldviews can be major obstacles for debiasing, there nonetheless are a number of effective techniques for reducing the impact of misinformation, and we pay special attention to these factors that aid in debiasing.
We conclude by providing specific recommendations for the debunking of misinformation. These recommendations pertain to the ways in which corrections should be designed, structured, and applied in order to maximize their impact. Grounded in cognitive psychological theory, these recommendations may help practitioners—including journalists, health professionals, educators, and science communicators—design effective misinformation retractions, educational tools, and public-information campaigns.
The authors attempted to generalize Standing and Huber's (2003) findings concerning psychological myth-beliefs among Canadian students to a sample of Midwestern Americans, including university students (n = 171), junior college students (n = 79), and a local community sample (n = 45). Midwesterners' scores on the Huber Test were significantly lower than those of Canadians. In contrast to Standing and Huber's findings, myth acceptance was no higher for junior college than university students. Psychology courses taken and GPA were significant predictors of Huber test scores. Additionally, students were less susceptible to myth acceptance after having taken 10 or more psychology courses compared to those having taken 0 to 1 and 2 to 9 courses.
Attempts to reduce students' misconceptions about psychological principles by presenting contrary evidence have not successfully reduced the number of such misconceptions. The source-monitoring literature shows that carefully considering the source of memories reduces many memory-related errors. In this study, students judged the truth of common misconceptions about psychology. In a source condition, students had to report where they heard these misconceptions before making their judgment. This source manipulation did not reduce the number of misconceptions. Students in both conditions were more confident with their incorrect answers than with their correct ones.
Contributors. Preface. Introduction M. Limon, L. Mason. Part I: Theoretical Perspectives. The Processes and Challenges of Conceptual Change M.T.H. Chi, R.D. Roscoe. Why 'Conceptual Ecology' is a Good Idea A.A. diSessa. On the Nature of Naive Physics S. Vosniadou. Map Reading Versus Mind Reading: Revisiting Children's Understanding of the Shape of the Earth J. Ivarsson, et al. Understanding Conceptual Change: A Commentary R.E. Mayer. Part II: Motivational, Social and Contextual Aspects. The Role of Motivational Beliefs in Conceptual Change E.A. Linnenbrink, P.R. Pintrich. Situating the Question of Conceptual Change O. Hallden, et al. Participative Learning and Conceptual Change M. Gorodetsky, S. Keiny. Cognitive Variability in the Development of the Concept of Family: A Contextualist or a Gradualist View? M.J. Rodrigo, et al. Motivational, Social, and Contextual Aspects of Conceptual Change: A Commentary G.M. Sinatra. Part III: Domain Specificity and Learning. The Role of Students' Epistemological Knowledge in the Process of Conceptual Change in Science J. Leach, J. Lewis. Intuitive Rules: The Case of 'More A - More B' R. Stavy, et al. Conceptual Change in Mathematics: Understanding the Real Numbers K. Merenluoto, E. Lehtinen. Conceptual Change in History M. Limon. Content and Conceptual Change: A Commentary R. White. Part IV: Instructional Practices to Promote Conceptual Change in Classroom. Developing Epistemological Thinking to Foster Conceptual Change in Different Domains L. Mason. Science Learning Through Text: The Effect of Text Design and Text Comprehension Skills on Conceptual Change M. Mikkila-Erdmann. Computer-BasedInteractions for Conceptual Change in Science M. Wiser, T.G. Amin. Knowledge Assessment and Conceptual Understanding J. Alonso-Tapia. Change as a Process and a Disposition: A Commentary P. Boscolo.
It was during a presentation on ways to enhance critical thinking in college classes that a jaded faculty member shot back at me, “What kind of thinking do you think I teach – noncritical thinking?” I assured this faculty member that no offense had been intended, although certainly it had been taken. In fact, often there is noncritical, or more appropriately labeled, rote memorization or lower level thinking that is taught and tested in many classrooms at all levels of education at the expense of higher order or critical thinking. Consider, for example, typical questions that might be found on tests given in developmental psychology classes. There is the ubiquitous question that asks students to list each stage of Piaget's theory of cognitive development, along with the age range for each stage, and an example of a cognitive task that can be accomplished at each stage. This is a basic recall question, even though there is an opportunity to provide an example, which allows for the application of the knowledge of what cognitive abilities become possible at each stage of development. The example given is almost always the same as an example that was presented in class or in the text. If this is the extent of students' knowledge, they are unlikely to be able to use Piaget's conceptualization of cognitive development in any applied setting (such as designing an age-appropriate toy or activity for a preschool) or in a novel or useful way.