ArticlePDF Available


This article focuses on Eurasianism as an ideological trend with a political appeal beyond the post-Soviet space. It demonstrates that the roles envisioned for the ‘Trojan horses’ of Eurasianism among the far right in Central/Southeast Europe and for Eurasianism’s sympathizers in Western Europe bear a qualitative difference. In the former case, the emphasis is on systemic transformation whereas, in the latter case, on a gradualist strategy.
Volume 8, 2014
Vassilis Petsinis,
Herder Institute, Marburg University.
This article focuses on Eurasianism as an ideological trend with a political appeal beyond the
post-Soviet space. It demonstrates that the roles envisioned for the ‘Trojan horses’ of
Eurasianism among the far right in Central/Southeast Europe and for Eurasianism’s
sympathizers in Western Europe bear a qualitative difference. In the former case, the
emphasis is on systemic transformation whereas, in the latter case, on a gradualist strategy.
ISSN 17527503
DOI: 10.2478/caeer-2014-0005
© 2014 CEER
First publication
Download Date | 9/18/15 11:52 AM
Central and Eastern European Review
Eurasianism and the Far Right in Central and Southeast Europe
Vassilis Petsinis
Herder Institute, Marburg University
The latest developments in Ukraine are indicative of Russia’s intention to solidify its status
within Eurasian space. In Russian geopolitical discourse, Eurasia roughly coincides with the
post-Soviet territories to the east of the Baltic Republics that stretch all the way to the
Caucasus and Central Asia. As early as the 1990s, experts in Geopolitics, such as Sergey
Karaganov, had been advocating that Russian minorities should be utilized as instruments of
Russian foreign policy in the ‘near abroad’ (e.g. the ‘Karaganov doctrine’ of 1992). However,
Boris Yeltsin’s foreign policy of appeasement towards the West softened the impact of these
During Vladimir Putin’s tenure of office, Moscow has demonstrated a more powerful
resolution to safeguard its interests within a region that it regards as a ‘traditional’ sphere of
geopolitical influence. The aim of this article is to focus on Eurasianism not so much as a new
agenda in Russian foreign policy but, mainly, as an ideological trend with a political appeal
beyond post-Soviet space. Eurasianism’s newly-acquired ‘fellow-travellers’ comprise a
number of far right parties in the ‘old’ (e.g. Golden Dawn in Greece) as well as the ‘new’ (e.g.
Jobbik in Hungary, Ataka in Bulgaria) EU member-states in Central and Southeast Europe.
This research acquires greater importance if one considers the successful performance of
populist and far right parties in the May 2014 elections for the European parliament.
This article concentrates on the most prominent representative of Eurasianism,
Alexander Dugin. A Professor of Sociology at Moscow State University, Dugin commenced
his literary and political engagement as a dissident journalist in 1988. Instead of being a
classical theorist in International Relations, Alexander Dugin has been an avant-garde figure
involved in a series of literary and political initiatives. Throughout the 1990s, he participated
actively in quite a few controversial circles in the midst of the ideological vacuum that
accompanied the fall of the Soviet Union (e.g. the nationalist grouping Pamyat and Edvard
Limonov’s National Bolshevik Party). Alexander Dugin launched the Eurasian Movement in
2001. Despite his flamboyant writing and controversial statements, the author is one of the
State Duma’s advisers in foreign affairs. The main questions here are:
Download Date | 9/18/15 11:52 AM
Central and Eastern European Review
1) What are the ideological foundations and evolution of Eurasianism?
2) How is it possible to interpret the appeal of Eurasianism among political actors from
the far right in Central and Southeast Europe?
Eurasianism: early beginnings
Alexander Dugin introduced the foundations of Eurasianism in the Principles of Geopolitics
(1997). In this book, the author advocates a foreign policy doctrine which is shaped by
cultural essentialism and historical revisionism. Dugin’s essentialism consists of dividing the
world into geopolitical spheres of influence in accordance with ‘established’ historical and
cultural attributes. Within this global context, the primary goal of Russian foreign policy must
be to maximize its national interest within Eurasian space.
In accordance with the ‘Karaganov doctrine’, Dugin also contends that Russia must
intervene to endorse the collective rights of ethnic Russians living in the ‘near abroad’.
Nevertheless, there exists a basic difference between the ‘Karaganov doctrine’ and the
concept of Eurasianism during its early stages. In the former case, Sergey Karaganov
positions his thought within the context of Classical Realism and advocates ways for Russia
to maximize its national interests inside the post-Soviet geopolitical environment (e.g. the
case of the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia). On the other hand, although he assigns
Russia a role of pivotal importance within the Eurasian project, Dugin does not endorse a
strictly statist approach. By contrast, the thinker aspires to embed Eurasianism within a
political infrastructure that goes beyond the role of states as the main actors in international
politics (Shekhovtsov, 2008, p. 496).
A dichotomy of fundamental importance is the one which consists of the Continental
(mainly Russia) versus the Atlantic powers (i.e. the US and NATO). Russia’s main global
competitor is Atlanticism, the NATO/US imperium, and the liberal, as well as expansionist,
principles that underpin US foreign policy (Dugin, 1997 pp. 255, 259; Ingram, 2001).
Russia’s main objective must be to utilize its resources in order to sustain a balance of power
vis-à-vis its global rival and harness ‘Atlanticism’s incursions to the Eurasian heartland’
(ibid). An early sign of Dugin’s differentiation from the ‘Karaganov doctrine’ is his
occasional choice of appeasement for tactical purposes. In this light, the author judges that the
Download Date | 9/18/15 11:52 AM
Central and Eastern European Review
Baltic Republics, together with Central and Eastern Europe, may be ‘conceded’ to the Atlantic
sphere of influence.
Dugin’s outlook on global politics as a puzzle that consists of ‘Russian/Eurasian’,
‘Atlantic/Western’ and/or ‘Arab/Islamic’ spheres of influence, reads like a rehearsal of the
pattern introduced in Samuel Huntingdon’s Clash of Civilizations (1996). It also reads like a
‘reversal’ of the pattern introduced by Zbigniew Brzezinski in The Grand Chessboard (1998).
In an opposite outlook to Dugin’s, Brzezinski views Russia as the main competitor to the US
and recommends ways to counter Russian influence in international politics.
Concretizing Eurasianism: Towards a ‘Fourth Political Theory’
Dugin’s most recent work, Fourth Political Theory (2012), standardizes and enhances the
political infrastructure within which the Eurasian project is embedded. In this work, Dugin
wants to establish the foundations upon which a fourth ideology will emerge after
Communism, Fascism, and Liberalism. The author subscribes to a vague notion of
neotraditionalism and deplores the way that liberalism and postmodernity aspire to achieve
universal homogeneity and lead towards an ‘end of history’.
In the Fourth Political Theory and in quite a few of his recent statements, Dugin has
concretized Eurasianism as a cultural sphere which, in his own words, is as distinct as the
Islamic or the Buddhist world. According to the author, this has been the outcome of a
historical process that has consisted of intercultural contacts and bonds of mutual reliance
within a common geographic space. As a matter of fact, Dugin has been particularly careful
not to conflate Eurasian identity with a ‘Greater Russian’ identity of any sort. By contrast, the
author has opted to portray Eurasianism as a transnational and inclusionary mosaic within
which smaller national identities can coexist harmoniously with the Russian one.
For Dugin,
it is the cultural diversity, as well as idiosyncrasy, of Eurasia that renders its strict
categorization into either the European or the Asian cultural zones highly problematic.
For instance, Alexander Dugin has lately been quite active in his endeavour to
convince Lithuanian nationalists that the Russian and the Lithuanian national identities can
On this issue, see also: (accessed on 01 June
On this issue, see also: (accessed on 01 June
Download Date | 9/18/15 11:52 AM
Central and Eastern European Review
coexist on grounds of equality within the fringes of the Eurasian world.
The feeble reactions
over Crimea’s annexation by Russia on the part of the Lithuanian populist parties (e.g. Order
and Justice) serves as, if only, an early hint at Eurasianism’s success in softening the
‘traditional’ Russoscepticism among Lithuanian nationalists.
Another important aspect in the Fourth Political Theory is the inversion of leftist
principles and their fusion with neotraditionalism and cultural essentialism within the context
of a new geopolitical strategy for Russia (Shekhovtsov, 2009). During the recent
developments in Ukraine, Alexander Dugin has been calling, via his personal blog, for a
continuous anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and anti-fascist revolution from Vladivostok to
These calls often combine in the author’s speech with other calls for the necessity to
cement Slavic unity as a bulwark against Western-sponsoredacculturation.
At a first glance, this corresponds to a change of course in comparison to the
situational choice of appeasement which Dugin advocates in the Principle of Geopolitics. To
the eyes of a Constructivist, this is indicative of Eurasianism’s malleability and extreme
susceptibility to geopolitical developments. Nevertheless, how can Alexander Dugin and his
fellow-Eurasianists use the term anti-fascist’ when they maintain relations with political
parties accused of being either quasi-fascist or overtly fascist (e.g. Golden Dawn)? This topic
requires some further elaboration.
The Great Patriotic War against Fascism and its symbolism form a major component
of nationalist imagery in contemporary Russia. The portrayal of the Great Patriotic War
retains much of its Soviet-era paraphernalia. Nevertheless, instead of being national in shape
and Socialist in content, the image of the Great Patriotic War has been given a distinctly
national (Russian) content. In his recent statements, Dugin gives ‘Fascism’ the content that
this notion has acquired in Russian political and popular discourse nowadays.
In this light, Russia is being portrayed as an anti-fascist force not on ideological but,
mainly, on national grounds. Along these lines, Russia’s rivals in foreign affairs can be
viewed as potentially Fascist.
Indeed, this emphasis on anti-fascism in Dugin’s most recent
On this issue, see the interview that Alexander Dugin gave to the Lithuanian nationalist portal Nacionalistas
on: (accessed on 01 June
On this issue, see ‘Alexander Dugin: Horizons of our Revolution from Crimea to Lisbon’ on: (accessed on 01 June 2014).
For example, Alexander Dugin has been dubbing the Svoboda and Pravyi Sektor parties as ’Neo-Nazismainly
on the basis of their animosity towards Moscow and, only to a secondary extent, on the basis of their
appropriation of the Banderite heritage. On this issue, see Alexander Dugin’s interview (‘United by Hatred’) for
Download Date | 9/18/15 11:52 AM
Central and Eastern European Review
writings has reaped some benefits for Russian foreign policy. Although this article
concentrates on the links between Eurasianism and the far right in Central and Southeast
Europe, a number of leftist parties in Western Europe (e.g. Germany’s Die Linke) often tend
to interpret the developments in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as a justified response to the
EU-sponsored, Fascist government in Kyiv.
According to Dugin, Russia’s more active engagement within the Eurasian space
provides an early vehicle for the materialisation of the ‘continuous anti-capitalist, anti-
imperialist and anti-fascist revolution from Vladivostok to Lisbon’. Although the final chapter
in the Fourth Political Theory is entitled ‘Against the Postmodern World’, its author’s
rhetoric is ironically and clearly set within a postmodernist matrix.
At this point, a crucial detail should be set in context. As result of Dugin’s
idiosyncratic and obscure writing, it might be an exaggeration to contend that his Eurasianism
shapes Russia’s foreign policy in the same way that, say, Machiavelli’s thought inspired
domestic as well as foreign policies in Mussolini’s Italy. However, it remains equally valid
that Dugin’s unilateral networking with various representatives from the European far right
and, to a lesser extent, the far left has expanded the pool of supporters for Russian foreign
policy beyond the geographic boundaries of Eurasia.
Why the appeal to the far right in Central and Southeast Europe?
The cases of Jobbik (Hungary), Golden Dawn (Greece), and Ataka (Bulgaria)
As Alexander Dugin has often acknowledged, he maintains close connections with the leaders
of Jobbik (Gábor Vona), Ataka (Volen Siderov), and Golden Dawn (Nikolaos Michaloliakos).
The Russian thinker has held a series of cordial meetings with the Jobbik leader. He has also,
allegedly, addressed a letter of support to the, currently imprisoned, leader of Golden Dawn.
Alexander Dugin has openly admitted that he regards such parties as a potential vanguard or
‘fellow-travellers’ in the European revolution against the Atlantic imperium. However, why
the appeal of Eurasianism, in particular, to these parties? One might isolate the following
factors in regards with these parties’ appreciation for the Eurasian project.
the neotraditionalist/revisionist Counter-Currents blog on:
ochsenreiter-interviews-alexander-dugin-on-the-ukraine-crisis/ (accessed on 01 June 2014).
On this issue, see Sahra Wagenknecht’s (i.e. Die Linke’s deputy-leader) statements on: (accessed on 01 June 2014).
To this, one might also add the simultaneous endeavour by Russia Today and other Kremlin-sponsored
networks to capitalize on, especially, lumpen Euroscepticism within the EU. However, it is not my intention to
discuss this issue in this short piece of work.
Download Date | 9/18/15 11:52 AM
Central and Eastern European Review
The first factor is the interaction between identity-politics and foreign policy. All three
parties have been very sceptical of the ways that globalization may allegedly result in
‘worldwide acculturation’. Along these lines, Dugin’s neotraditionalism has struck a sensitive
chord among them. Eurasianism’s agenda clearly coincides with Jobbik’s calls to reconnect
Hungary with the Asian part of its cultural ancestry. Although it subscribes to Hungary’s
historical image as a hegemonic power inside the Carpathian Basin, the Jobbik leadership
equally acknowledges the Eurasian origins of the Hungarian ethno-genesis (i.e. the references
to the Ancient Magyars and Huns).
Gábor Vona and other high-ranking members of Jobbik have been quick on their feet
to dispel any Eurocentric or Orientalist outlooks and emphasize Hungary’s role as a bridge
between East and West. This aspect of Jobbik’s foreign policy doctrine has come to legitimize
Vona’s campaign in emerging regional powers such as Turkey, Kazakhstan or, in this case,
Russia. In particular, it is the shared belief in cultural exceptionalism and the conviction that
neither Russian nor the Hungarian culture can be confined within the narrow limits of
‘Europe’ or ‘Asia’ that provides common ground between Dugin’s and Vona’s
understandings of Eurasian identity.
The same can be said over the employment of Slavophile and Christian Orthodox
imageries vis-à-vis Bulgaria’s and Greece’s position inside the Eurasian project. With specific
regard to Greece, Dugin has also stated that if Greece and Cyprus passed into the Kremlin’s
sphere of influence, this would upgrade the maritime status of Russia, as a Continental power,
vis-à-vis the Atlantic contenders.
The second factor is hard Euroscepticism. All three parties reject the EU as a
bureaucratic construct that simply promotes the interests of powerful states to the detriment of
peripheral ones. Alexander Dugin has also regarded the EU as a feeble entity within which the
Franco-German axis and the post-industrial states of Northwestern Europe maximize their
national interests over the EU peripheries.
Most importantly, the Russian thinker views the
EU as a mere instrument through which Atlanticism promotes its geopolitical interests within
the European space.
On this issue, see ‘Gábor Vona: The future of Eurasia will be based on traditions’ on: (accessed on 01 June
On this issue, see the interview with Alexander Dugin on:
and-cyprus (accessed on 01 June 2014).
Download Date | 9/18/15 11:52 AM
Central and Eastern European Review
The third factor is anti-capitalism. All three parties sense discomfort with neoliberal
capitalism and the way that transnational capital scours the globe with few constraints in its
flow. In their political platforms, these parties often blend elements from the traditional
political culture of nationalism in their countries with an artificial ‘anti-capitalism’. Dugin’s
denunciation of global capitalism and its greed complements the discomfort of these and other
far right parties with the ‘Eurocrats’, Atlanticism, and the alleged loss of cultural identity and
national values during a global era.
Last but not least, anti-liberalism, in the political and cultural sense, provides an
essential bridge between Eurasianism and its fellow-travellers from the Far Right in Central
and Southeast Europe. Dugin has been denouncing Liberalism as an ideology that may
ultimately turn human societies into herd-like aggregates of individuals without any
awareness of collective belonging.
Indeed, the prospective erosion of the collective bonds
which, allegedly, constitute human societies (e.g. family, religion and cultural traditions)
features as one of the greatest fears among the European far right. Meanwhile, the same
political actors tend to regard Putin’s Russia as a ‘healthier’ political model in comparison to
the mainstream patterns of politics in the West (i.e. a leader-centred and strong government,
the promotion of national values, the safeguarding of the ‘naturally ascribed’ gender-roles,
Implications for the future
By contrast to the bipolarity of the 80s and the unipolarity of the 90s, we are currently
witnessing the emergence of a multipolar international system. The European financial crisis
revealed not only the feeble foundations of monetary unification but also conflict among
various models of governance and financial management inside the EU.
It is particularly interesting how the latter conflict has often acquired cultural
underpinnings in political and popular discourse (e.g. ‘Germany versus Southern Europe’). It
is equally intriguing how such cultural reductions have been enacted within an EU which is
(informally) structured according to a ‘three-gear’ balance of power. This consists of the
‘Franco-German axis’ and the post-industrial states of Northwestern Europe, Southern
Europe, and the new member-states from Central and Southeast Europe.
In Alexander Dugin’s own words, ‘the liberals have liberated the human being from national identity, religious
identity and so on’. See this statement on:
(accessed on 01 June 2014).
Download Date | 9/18/15 11:52 AM
Central and Eastern European Review
Recently, Russia has reasserted its ambition to evolve into a potent global actor.
Despite his obscure and controversial outlook, Alexander Dugin maintains access to the halls
of power in Moscow. The three parties that have been nominated in this article operate
peripheries of the EU which are marred by economic stagnation and, occasionally, political
instability. Meanwhile, Greece, Hungary and Bulgaria are three societies where Eurasianism’s
employment of cultural identity politics is likely to gain significantly more popular appeal
than in the Western ‘core’.
Depending on the evolution of the balance of power between Russia and the EU, one
should not exclude the possibility for such political actors to function as ‘Trojan horses’
inside the framework of Russian foreign policy. The prospects for Eurasianism to expand this
strategy to political actors within the EU core remains to be seen in the near future. In all of
this, it should be borne in mind that the role envisioned for the pro-Eurasian ‘Trojan horses’
from Central and Southeast Europe within the EU bears a qualitative difference from the role
reserved for the sympathetic parties in the ‘core’ of Western Europe.
In the former case, Eurasianism seems to be pondering on systemic transformation, or
a radical shift in the foreign policy agenda, that would bring the states in question within
Russia’s sphere of influence. In the case of Greece, the drastic realignment of the party-
system and the state of turbulence between 2010 and 2011 revealed the fragile foundations of
political institutions.
In the case of Hungary, the state of friction between Budapest and
Brussels over the management of the economic crisis has been a driving force behind the
readjustment of this state’s foreign policy towards Moscow. By contrast, the polities of
Western Europe are characterized by greater stability and their democratic institutions have
been established as result of a long historical process.
Therefore, the prospects for systemic transformations with groundbreaking
repercussions are rather weak. Within the West European context, then, Eurasianism has
opted for a more gradualist strategy. This consists of an attempt to employ sympathetic parties
from Western Europe as a bulwark with the aim of countering the impact of Atlanticism on
the foreign policy agenda(s) in these states. So far, a variety of political parties, as diverse as
the National Front in France and UKIP in the United Kingdom, seem to endorse Russian
With specific regard to Greece, Alexander Dugin has also stated that ‘In Greece, our partners could eventually
be Leftists from SYRIZA, which refuses Atlanticism, liberalism and the domination of the forces of global
finance’. On this issue, see Alexander Dugin on White Nationalism & Other Potential Allies in the Global
Revolution’ on: (accessed on
01 June 2014).
Download Date | 9/18/15 11:52 AM
Central and Eastern European Review
foreign policy inside the Eurasian/post-Soviet space. The growing popularity of these parties
signals the shape of things to come.
Dugin, A. (1997), Principles of Geopolitics, (Moscow: Arktos Publishing).
Dugin, A. (2012), The Fourth Political Theory, (Moscow: Arktos Publishing).
Ingram, A. (2001), ‘Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia’ in
Political Geography 20 (8) pp. 10291051.
Shekhovtsov, A. (2008), ‘The Palingenetic Thrust of Russian Neo-Eurasianism: Ideas of
Rebirth in Aleksandr Dugin’s Worldview’ in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions,
Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 491506.
Shekhovtsov, A. (2009), ‘Aleksandr Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism: The New Right a la Russe’ in
Religion Compass, 3/4 (2009) pp. 697716.
The author
Dr Vassilis Petsinis is a Visiting Researcher at the Herder Institute (Marburg, Germany). His
main areas of specialization are European Politics and Ethnopolitics with a regional focus on
Central and Southeast Europe.
Download Date | 9/18/15 11:52 AM
... This could potentially be spotted in the call for a new European right and the vision for a pan-European movement that defies the current multi-cultural diversity in favour of an 'organic cultural ethnic process' (Shekhovtsov 2009, 697) under Russia's leadership and also the Eurasian ideology (Laruelle 2006(Laruelle , 2015. In essence, the operationalization of the Eurasian doctrine concerns the actors that implement this vision and have a direct influence in domestic politics, such as the party of Golden Dawn in Greece or Jobbik in Hungary (Petsinis 2014). In other words, the recent political developments -and the collapse of the previous dominant party system -would be further complicated by an exacerbation of far-right sentiment. ...
Contemporary Russophilia is examined in this article as an outstanding feature of Greek political culture. Recent opinion polls (2016–2017) are used to validate a distinction between two different types of Russophilia: the soft, described as a positive predisposition towards Russia, and the hard-core, which suggests an embrace of Russia by breaking with Greece’s ties to the West. Hard-core Russophilia surfaces as a fitting element in Diamantouros’ underdog culture, as it uncovers sentiments of isolation, support for traditional values and fear towards Western values of modernity. The paper confirms the analytical capacity of the ‘cultural dualism’ framework, not as a dichotomy between modernizers and underdogs, but through the identification and measurement of different layers that outline the contemporary profile of hard-core Russophilia.
... Much of this increase is due to disappointment with the outcomes of accession to the EU; countries in Central and Eastern Europe do not feel the EU has accelerated the establishment of democracy in their countries, and they accuse the EU of inhibiting, rather than facilitating, economic growth. Only 33% of citizens in Poland trust the EU, and the same figure holds true for citizens of Hungary (Petsinis, 2014). Much of the Euroskepticism within these countries is based on a shared history of being subject to the former Soviet Union, which has led to general distrust of government centralization and foreign institutions. ...
Full-text available
While increasing numbers of Europeans are skeptical about the EU, the primary causes behind Euroskepticism vary widely from country to country. Our paper examines the differing sources of Euroskepticism within Hungary and the United Kingdom, using these examples as case studies for the broader EU. Hungarian Euroskeptics accuse the EU of suppressing Hungarian culture and violating the country’s national sovereignty, fostering a growing sense that EU membership has not brought the promised benefits. The primary driving forces behind British Euroskepticism, however, are opposition to intra-EU immigration and a sense that the island nation is inherently separate from the Continent. The case studies of Hungary and the UK demonstrate that the motives behind Euroskepticism vary widely across the continent. If confidence in the EU is to be restored, the wide array of concerns held by various Euroskeptic groups must be specifically addressed.
Full-text available
The main subject of this study is the political relations between Bulgaria and Russia, which are based on the extreme right party. In Europe, which has recently been the cradle of democracy, major political changes have begun to take place, and it has been observed that extreme right-wing parties have risen due to the economic crisis. At the same time, the rise of these far-right parties was evaluated as an opportunity by Russia to destabilize the European Union, and the fact that Russia was were already sanctioned by Europe for its bad relations with Ukraine. Since Bulgaria was a satellite of the Soviet Union, Russia has tried to establish a political relationship with that country through the far-right parties by activating its old relations. As a result, Russia has tended to stop the enlargement process of both NATO and the European Union in this way
Full-text available
This article focuses on the party of Jobbik (‘The Better’) and places its rhetoric and activism within the context of the Hungarian political system and its internal pathologies. A deeper and broader insight of nationalism's socio-psychological appeal in Hungarian politics and society will help the reader understand better why and how the economic crisis has been a watershed for Jobbik's popularity among certain segments of the Hungarian electorate. This piece of work has primarily relied on a qualitative and discourse analysis of Jobbik's speeches, official statements and the party's political programme. Sources such as opinion polls and public surveys have also been of complementary importance. The research embeds this information in scholarly and theoretical literature in the thematic areas of Political Psychology and Nationalism. What this article demonstrates is that Jobbik has been particularly efficient in coordinating its socio-psychological campaign and mobilizing a series of social grievances for its political benefit. Meanwhile, the party has been equally successful in legitimizing its campaign by embedding it within the traditional framework of the political culture of nationalism in Hungary.
Full-text available
Applying Roger Griffin’s methodological approach to generic fascism, the article analyses individual – socio‐political, cultural and esoteric – themes within Dugin’s doctrine, treating them as elements of a larger integral concept of rebirth that constitutes the core of Neo‐Eurasianism. The article highlights the highly syncretic nature of this ideological core, a direct result of the ‘mazeway resynthesis’ that has conditioned Dugin’s worldview. It argues that this process has been necessitated by his self‐appointed task of envisioning a new stage of history beyond Russia’s present decadent and ‘liminoid’ situation, one that he sees only coming about as the result of a ‘geopolitical revolution’. The variant of Eurasionism that results has the function of a political religion containing a powerful palingenetic thrust towards a new Russia and new West. In conclusion, it is suggested that the new order aspired to by Dugin could only be realised by establishing a totalitarian regime.
Full-text available
Russian political thinker and, by his own words, geopolitician, Aleksandr Dugin, represents a comparatively new trend in the radical Russian nationalist thought. In the course of the 1990s, he introduced his own doctrine that was called Neo-Eurasianism. Despite the supposed reference to the interwar political movement of Eurasianists, Dugin's Neo-Eurasian nationalism was rooted in the political and cultural philosophy of the European New Right. Neo-Eurasianism is based on a quasi-geopolitical theory that juxtaposes the ‘Atlanticist New World Order’ (principally the US and the UK) against the Russia-oriented ‘New Eurasian Order’. According to Dugin, the ‘Atlanticist Order’ is a homogenizing force that dilutes national and cultural diversity that is a core value for Eurasia. Taken for granted, Eurasia is perceived to suffer from a ‘severe ethnic, biological and spiritual’ crisis and is to undergo an ‘organic cultural-ethnic process’ under the leadership of Russia that will secure the preservation of Eurasian nations and their cultural traditions. Neo-Eurasianism, sacralized by Dugin and his followers in the form of a political religion, provides a clear break from narrow nationalism toward the New Right ethopluralist model. Many Neo-Eurasian themes find a broad response among Russian high-ranking politicians, philosophers, scores of university students, as well as numerous avant-garde artists and musicians. Already by the end of the 1990s, Neo-Eurasianism took on a respectable, academic guise and was drawn in to ‘scientifically’ support some anti-American and anti-British rhetoric of the Russian government.
In this paper I aim to contribute to critical geopolitics through a discussion of the work of the radical right wing Russian geopolitician Alexander Dugin, focusing on his textbook The Fundamentals of Geopolitics: the geopolitical future of Russia. Dugin’s career and work are contextualized in terms of developments in Russian politics and the general shift towards Eurasianism in Russian foreign policy thinking in the last decade, and three main lines of inquiry are pursued. First, Dugin’s concept of geopolitics and his geopolitical strategy, conveyed both in text and maps (or cartogrammes), are related to debates about geopolitics, power and knowledge. I argue that Dugin’s geopolitics reproduce the worst excesses of the geopolitical and imperialist gaze, and I compare and contrast his proposals with aspects of current Russian foreign policy. Secondly, the relations between his work and questions of neo-fascism are explored. Here I argue that, despite the historically conflictual relationships between geopolitics and fascism, Dugin can in certain ways be considered a neo-fascist as well as a geopolitician. Thirdly, the relationship between rationalism and mysticism (or geopolitics and sacral geography) in Dugin’s writings, which I argue is connected in part with a reliance on environmental determinism and occultism, is highlighted at several points.Countless people…will hate the new world order, be rendered unhappy by the frustration of their passions and ambitions through its advent and will die protesting against it. H. G. Wells (1940, p. 170).In complex post-modern times…geopolitical visions and visionaries seem to thrive. Gearoid Ó Tuathail (1998, p. 2).
The Fourth Political Theory
  • A Dugin
Dugin, A. (2012), The Fourth Political Theory, (Moscow: Arktos Publishing).