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Egalitarianism and Machiavellian Intelligence in Human Evolution

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Abstract

24 hunter-gatherer ethnographies across four continents establish meat sharing as universal among hunter-gatherers. Sharing was accompanied by vigilance against unfairness and cheating. Those who tried to establish dominance brought consistent 'counter-dominant' reactions, escalating step-by-step from ridicule to execution. A model of human evolution is proposed in which humans became too clever to dominate effectively, leaving sharing as the only viable strategy.
... There is an increasing body of evidence suggesting that deliberation has taken place in disparate societies in world history, including societies akin to the hunter-gatherer societies typical of human life until some twelve thousand years ago (Erdal & Whiten, 1996;Garfield, von Rueden, & Hagen, 2019;Gintis, Van Schaik, & Boehm, 2015;Sass, 2018;Van Vugt et al., 2008;Von Rueden & Van Vugt, 2015). Notwithstanding variation in its specific articulation across cultures, the observed cross-cultural consistency of this complex behavior of respectfully reasoning about politics makes it unlikely that it is solely the result of cultural diffusion . ...
... The two arguably come together in the political decision-making of hunter-gatherer societies, with discussions prior to decisions marked by persuasion. Further, reviews of the ethnographic record generally note that these tend to be long, acephalous discussions aimed at finding a consensus, indicative of interlocutors treating each other as equals (Erdal & Whiten, 1996;Garfield, von Rueden, et al., 2019;Gintis et al., 2015;Van Vugt et al., 2008;Von Rueden & Van Vugt, 2015). ...
... to illustrative examples of differences between intra-and inter-group decision-making, 44 none 42 In the work of Erdal and Whiten (1996), for example, evidence of the use of "argumentation" deals only with food sharing and at least for some cases is about the presence of conflict rather than reasoning. Similarly, their overview of informal leadership and counter-dominance hints at cross-cultural evidence of mutual respect in discussions but it remains ambiguous when and to what degree the evidence relates specifically to discussions about upcoming political decisions. ...
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[Full text: http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/277762 Data, and R scripts: https://osf.io/2xuha/] Many political theorists and pundits deplore the way we talk politics. Conversations among elites and ordinary citizens alike arguably often show a lack of argumentation and mutual respect. This has spurred widespread interest in finding new ways to stimulate deliberation, that is, respectful political talk marked by a give-and-take of reasons. A fundamental critique is that deliberation goes against human nature. This view of deliberation and human nature has so far received little scrutiny but has had major implications for how we think about what deliberation requires. Some maintain that interventions to promote deliberation are futile and others that deliberation requires substantial institutional tinkering and corrective pedagogy. In this dissertation, I critically engage with this commonly held pessimistic view on human nature and deliberation from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Theoretically, I ground our understanding of deliberation and human nature in the existing literature on human evolution, in particular work in the field of evolutionary psychology. Doing so allows me to advance an alternative view on deliberation: human nature dictates that deliberation under certain conditions will feel intuitive to most people. I put forward what I call the ‘group hypothesis’ of deliberation, which holds that deliberation formed an adaptive response to the problem of intra-group political disagreements, a problem recurrently encountered by our distant ancestors who used to live as (semi-)nomadic hunter-gatherers. Based on broader insights from evolutionary psychology, I expect that when people today disagree about politics with others from their ingroup (i.e. the group to which they (feel they) belong), they will still be inclined to deliberate. Conversely, disagreements with others from an outgroup should reduce people’s propensity to deliberate. Empirically, the dissertation relies on diverse sources of data to test these expectations: ethnographic evidence on political decision-making in historic hunter-gatherer societies; longitudinal-cross-sectional data on the propensity of political representatives to deliberate in mass societies; and experimental data on the drivers of deliberation in informal talk among citizens. While I find little support for the expectations derived from the group hypothesis, the findings provide relevant insights for future work to start building a research program on human nature and deliberation. The dissertation makes three key contributions to the literature on deliberation: 1. It grounds discussions about human nature and deliberation in the literature on evolutionary psychology, moving past mere philosophical speculation; 2. It shows how an evolutionary perspective can help to integrate research in the field of deliberation and incorporate insights from diverse disciplines such as anthropology and biology; and 3. It engages in theory-building based on existing evolutionary insights and novel empirics in an attempt to kickstart a research program on deliberation and human nature.
... First, the theoretical assumption that self-interested psychological motives are not easily suppressed by the egalitarian drive to share is well documented by ethnographic reports. Intense arguments and jealousies over food distributions, as well as occasional attempts at stealing and cheating, attest against any simple predisposition to share (Erdal & Whiten 1996). Second, that these recurring self-interested behaviors are successfully suppressed by coordinated action of group-members directed at the leveling of power and resource asymmetries within the group is a widely held view among anthropologists (Boehm 1999(Boehm , 2012Clastres 1989;Endicott 1988;Fried 1967;Lee 1988;Wiessner 1996;Woodburn 1982). ...
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Among social anthropologists, there is virtual consensus that the food-sharing practices of small-scale non-agricultural groups cannot be understood in isolation from the broader repertoire of leveling strategies that prevent would-be dominants from exercising power and influence over likely subordinates. In spite of that widespread view, quantitatively rigorous empirical studies of food sharing and cooperation in small-scale human groups have typically ignored the internal connection between leveling of income and political power, drawing inspiration instead from evolutionary models that are neutral about social role asymmetries. In this paper, I introduce a spatially explicit agent-based model of hunter-gatherer food sharing in which individuals are driven by the goal of maximizing their own income while minimizing income asymmetries among others.Model simulation results show that seven basic patterns of inter-household food transfers described in detail for the Hadza hunters of Tanzania can be simultaneously reproduced with striking accuracy under the assumption that agents selectively support and carry on sharing interactions in ways that maximize their income leveling potential.
Article
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Chapter
Inequitable distribution of land has been a perennial problem for human societies. Corrections have often been difficult and involved bloodshed, and they have rarely provided lasting relief. Thomas Paine struck upon a permanent, fair solution in the 1790s, drawing on the natural law tradition associated with Grotius and Locke. He proposed that landholders compensate the landless by paying into a trust fund. In Paine’s vision, the trust fund would issue universal dividends in the form of seed capital for young adults and pensions for the elderly and disabled. Paine’s 1797 pamphlet Agrarian Justice had little contemporary impact, but others worked out variants of the idea, most notably the American reformer Henry George. George left a lasting legacy in scholarship and policy. Although George is on record as approving a limited issuance of dividends, he is primarily known for proposing that land tax revenue be used to fund government. A useful distinction can be made between a “Paineite” approach of taxing land to fund dividends and a “Georgeist” approach of taxing land to fund government.KeywordsThomas Paine Agrarian Justice Land reformHugo GrotiusJohn LockeHenry George
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