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Requirements and Facilitators for Suicide Terrorism: An Explanatory Framework for Prediction and Prevention

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Abstract

When it comes to explaining, predicting, and preventing suicide terrorism, there is a lot more important work to be done. This paper draws on the most recent evidence about where suicide terrorism occurs and why to propose a basic explanatory framework. Taking a bottom-up approach, it first identifies the minimum requirements for a suicide terrorism attack, and then outlines additional facilitators for the deadliest attacks and most prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns. Next, it applies these variables to clarify popular misunderstandings about foreign occupation as the primary cause of suicide terrorism. Finally, it shows how security officials can use this framework to develop a series of short term and long term countermeasures and begin to reduce the prevalence of suicide terrorism worldwide.

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... It is vital to note that terrorism, in general, and suicide operations, in particular, are not recent phenomena but can be traced as far back as three millenniums during the pre-Christian era (Kaarbo & Ray, 2011). The first ever recorded suicide assault took place around 1078 BCE in the Middle East, during the reign of Samson when he prayed to God after he had been captured by the Philistines to give him strength to destroy the Philistines and himself by collapsing the Philistine temple (Rudd, 2016 (Lankford, 2011;Moghadam, 2005;. More so, in Nigeria and Somalia, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab have recently linked with al-Qaeda and intensified and expanded their operations in North Africa (Barton, 2016). ...
... This is because children do not need ideological propaganda to convince them to become suicide terrorists. They can easily be intimidated into carrying lethal weapons without their knowledge which raises the question whether this is suicide terrorism or outright murder of the innocent and operations which does not include the mutual acceptance of the bomber are not categorised as suicide terrorism or suicide (Lankford, 2011). ...
... There also exists the belief that destroying all financial support (terror financing) from a suicide terrorist organisation will culminate in its destruction (Quintana, 2015;Troy, 2006;Lankford, 2011). Conversely, practical evidence has proven that some terrorist organisations had lost their financial resources and capacity but continued to wage suicide operations. ...
Article
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Suicide terrorism has evaded understanding and the war on terror is failing in its attempt to counter and even control it. This article argues that suicide terrorism is largely caused by indoctrination and, therefore, the key to understand and defeat it is through weakening and even conquering indoctrination carried out by terror organizations. It further asserts that although other factors such as finance, weapons, religion, political environment, structured organization, infrastructure and sponsors contribute to suicide operations, they are not central. To this end, efforts to counter suicide terrorism should focus on ending radicalisation and/or indoctrination of individuals and communities.
... This is because children do not need ideological propaganda to convince them to become suicide terrorists. They can easily be intimidated into carrying lethal weapons without their knowledge which raises the question whether this is suicide terrorism or outright murder of the innocent and operations which does not include the mutual acceptance of the bomber are not categorised as suicide terrorism or suicide (Lankford, 2011). ...
... There also exists the belief that destroying all financial support (terror financing) from a suicide terrorist organisation will culminate in its destruction (Quintana, 2015;Troy, 2006;Lankford, 2011). Conversely, practical evidence has proven that some terrorist organisations had lost their financial resources and capacity but continued to wage suicide operations. ...
... This is also demonstrated in Islamic communities where conventional suicide is highly forbidden and is considered a short-cut to hell whilst suicide terrorism is socially condoned and at times celebrated. This explains why conventional suicide rates are below average whilst suicide terrorist acts are high due to social attitudes towards approval and disapproval of the acts (Lankford, 2011). ...
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The article sheds light on the political conflict triggered in Romania by the refugee crisis. In spite of Romania not being amongst the preferred destinations of the refugees, its voice within the European debate was by no means marginal. Nor was the topic peripheral in the discourse of Romanian mainstream political parties, which - surprisingly enough – sometimes had staggering opposite views on the issue. Our study taps into the communication patterns of both the media and the politicians representing mainstream political parties, as we aim to understand the political conflict on the issue. Our analysis suggests that political actors did not always respect their ideological views and that their attitudes on the quota system proposed by the European Commission were strategically linked to an agenda not directly related to the refugee crisis.
... Greater emphasis should also be put on the surveillance of the outside of government buildings to look for potential attackers and suicide bombers. Hardened barricades should be put around an estimated perimeter to form a safe zone and checkpoints should also be employed as well (Lankford, 2011). ...
... If these factors are present, a suicide attack could occur; if they are not, a suicide attack is essentially impossible. I also identify four additional facilitators for the most deadly attacks and prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns: (4) homicidal intent, (5) a sponsoring terrorist organization, (6) social stigmas against conventional suicide, and (7) social approval of suicide terrorism (see also Lankford 2011c). Although some attackers are primarily suicidal and largely indifferent to the casualties they cause, others with both suicidal and homicidal intent want to take as many victims with them as possible. ...
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The psychology of suicide terrorism involves more than simply the psychology of suicide. Individual differences in social dominance orientation (SDO) interact with the socio-structural, political context to produce support for group-based dominance among members of both dominant and subordinate groups. This may help explain why, in one specific context, some people commit and endorse terrorism, whereas others do not.
... If these factors are present, a suicide attack could occur; if they are not, a suicide attack is essentially impossible. I also identify four additional facilitators for the most deadly attacks and prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns: (4) homicidal intent, (5) a sponsoring terrorist organization, (6) social stigmas against conventional suicide, and (7) social approval of suicide terrorism (see also Lankford 2011c). Although some attackers are primarily suicidal and largely indifferent to the casualties they cause, others with both suicidal and homicidal intent want to take as many victims with them as possible. ...
Article
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Lankford's essential empirical argument, which is based on evidence such as psychological autopsies, is that suicide attacks are caused by suicidality. By operationalizing this causal claim in a hypothetical experiment, I show the claim to be provable, and I contend that its truth is supported by Lankford's data. However, I question his ensuing arguments about beauty and goodness, and thereby the practical value of his work in counterterrorist propaganda.
... If these factors are present, a suicide attack could occur; if they are not, a suicide attack is essentially impossible. I also identify four additional facilitators for the most deadly attacks and prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns: (4) homicidal intent, (5) a sponsoring terrorist organization, (6) social stigmas against conventional suicide, and (7) social approval of suicide terrorism (see also Lankford 2011c). Although some attackers are primarily suicidal and largely indifferent to the casualties they cause, others with both suicidal and homicidal intent want to take as many victims with them as possible. ...
Article
For years, scholars have claimed that suicide terrorists are not suicidal, but rather psychologically normal individuals inspired to sacrifice their lives for an ideological cause, due to a range of social and situational factors. I agree that suicide terrorists are shaped by their contexts, as we all are. However, I argue that these scholars went too far. In The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and Other Self-Destructive Killers, I take the opposing view, based on my in-depth analyses of suicide attackers from Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and North America; attackers who were male, female, young, old, Islamic, and Christian; attackers who carried out the most deadly and the least deadly strikes. I present evidence that in terms of their behavior and psychology, suicide terrorists are much like others who commit conventional suicides, murder-suicides, or unconventional suicides where mental health problems, personal crises, coercion, fear of an approaching enemy, or hidden self-destructive urges play a major role. I also identify critical differences between suicide terrorists and those who have genuinely sacrificed their lives for a greater good. By better understanding suicide terrorists, experts in the brain and behavioral sciences may be able to pioneer exciting new breakthroughs in security countermeasures and suicide prevention. And even more ambitiously, by examining these profound extremes of the human condition, perhaps we can more accurately grasp the power of the human survival instinct among those who are actually psychologically healthy.
... If these factors are present, a suicide attack could occur; if they are not, a suicide attack is essentially impossible. I also identify four additional facilitators for the most deadly attacks and prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns: (4) homicidal intent, (5) a sponsoring terrorist organization, (6) social stigmas against conventional suicide, and (7) social approval of suicide terrorism (see also Lankford 2011c). Although some attackers are primarily suicidal and largely indifferent to the casualties they cause, others with both suicidal and homicidal intent want to take as many victims with them as possible. ...
Article
Despite growing evidence to the contrary, it is still widely assumed that suicide terrorists are not actually suicidal. However, this review supports recent studies which suggest the opposite, and presents initial evidence that much like other suicidal individuals, many suicide terrorists appear to be driven by clinically suicidal risk factors, including: (1) the desire to escape the world they live in, (2) the desire to escape moral responsibility for their actions, (3) the inability to cope with a perceived crisis, and (4) a sense of low self-worth. By establishing the links between suicide terrorism and suicidality, scholars may be able to better understand the nature of these violent attacks and develop more effective ways to stop them.
... If these factors are present, a suicide attack could occur; if they are not, a suicide attack is essentially impossible. I also identify four additional facilitators for the most deadly attacks and prolonged suicide terrorism campaigns: (4) homicidal intent, (5) a sponsoring terrorist organization, (6) social stigmas against conventional suicide, and (7) social approval of suicide terrorism (see also Lankford 2011c). Although some attackers are primarily suicidal and largely indifferent to the casualties they cause, others with both suicidal and homicidal intent want to take as many victims with them as possible. ...
Article
For years, it has been widely agreed on that suicide terrorists are not suicidal individuals, and that behaviorally, they are more similar to noble soldiers who are willing to sacrifice themselves for a cause. However, upon closer examination, it appears that the foundation of this conventional wisdom is extraordinarily shaky. There are many reasons to think that both event-based and psychological risk factors for suicide may drive the behavior of suicide terrorists. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that more than 75 individual suicide terrorists have exhibited these classic suicidal traits. Given the power that the stigma of suicide may have to deter future suicide terrorists, it is critical that governments, scholars, and practitioners examine this issue once again.
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The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and Other Self-Destructive Killers proposes that suicide terrorists are psychologically and behaviorally similar to other people who commit suicide, due to a range of individual, social, and situational factors. Some commentators agree, while others are skeptical, given the lack of information about many attackers' lives. However, the book's position is not simply based on individual case studies; it is also supported by other independent assessments, the confirmation of empirical predictions, the paucity of contradictory evidence, and new applications of evolutionary theory. It is undisputed that human beings behave as the author suggests; it is unknown if they behave as the conventional wisdom suggests. Those who argue that suicide terrorists are psychologically normal and altruistically sacrificing their lives for an ideological cause should bear the burden of proof for those claims.
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Terror organizations tend to rely on a limited number of practices to reinforce commitment to suicide on the part of recruits. Therefore, given the many difficulties associated with identifying individuals willing to become suicide terrorists, understanding the organizational contexts in which most suicide terrorism takes place is likely to be more useful than psychological profiling for predicting future attacks.
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Research on the characteristics of suicide bombers is reviewed. Contrary to previous commentary, it is suggested that suicide bombers may share personality traits (such as the "authoritarian personality") that psychological profiles of suicide bombers might be feasible, and that the suicide bombers may be characterized by the risk factors that increase the probability of suicide.‐
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Beginning in June of 2000 Chechen terrorists have carried out twenty-eight acts of suicide terrorism acts including two mass hostage taking operations combined with suicide terrorism (Beslan and Nord Ost). This paper reports the findings from psychological autopsies (interviews with close family members and friends) of thirty-four (out of 112 total) of these human bombers as well as augmenting them with material from hostage interviews from Beslan and Nord-Ost. The authors analyze the phenomena on the levels of the organization, individual, society and in terms of ideology and compare findings from other arenas also involving suicide terrorism. The main findings are that a lethal mix occurs when individuals in Chechnya are vulnerable to self recruitment into suicide terrorism due to traumatic experiences and feeling a duty to revenge and this vulnerability is combined with exposure to groups that recruit and equip suicide terrorists with both an ideology and the means to explode themselves. The ideology supporting Chechen suicide terrorism is very similar to the global jihadist ideology but remains more nationalist in its goals. It functions for the bombers much like short lived psychological first aid—answering their posttraumatic concerns in a way that shortly leads to their deaths. Unlike the Palestinian case, there is little social support for suicide terrorism in Chechnya.
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Suicide bombers are often compared to smart bombs. From the point of view of their dispatchers, they are highly effective, inexpensive forms of weaponry, and there is no need to invest in their technological development. Suicide bombers are in fact smarter than smart bombs because they can choose their own target—and they can react to circumstances on the ground, changing their target, or their timing, in an instant, to ensure the maximum damage, destruction, and death. Of course, unlike smart bombs, suicide bombers think and feel, they have histories, stories, beliefs, desires—in short, they have an inner world. Exploring the inner world of suicide bombers has been the focus of Anat Berko's research for years. She has worked to understand the thought processes of a people who can choose to place explosives on their bodies and kill themselves, taking as many other people with them as they can. Do male bombers really believe that death will transport them to a paradise where they will be greeted by virgins? Are they victims of unbearable pressure to commit this act of terror? What are female bombers promised in the hereafter? Is there something that links all suicide bombers? Berko also explores the world of those who drop the smart bomb—the dispatchers: who are these people who persuade others to go calmly to their horrific deaths?
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Raphael Israeli's overview of Islamic martyrology focuses upon the situation that has developed worldwide since the World Trade Centre was destroyed. His thesis is that a sea-change has occurred in international terrorism that supersedes all other perspectives.
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This book attempts to shed light on suicide missions and provide answers to the questions we all ask. Are these the actions of aggressive religious zealots and unbridled, irrational radicals or is there a logic driving those behind them? Are their motivations religious or has Islam provided a language to express essentially political causes? How can the perpetrators remain so lucidly effective in the face of certain death? And do these disparate attacks have something like a common cause? It focuses on four main instances: the Kamikaze, missions carried out by the Tamil Tigers in the civil war in Sri Lanka, the Lebanese and Palestinian groups in the Middle East, and the al-Qaeda 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. For more than two years, the authors have pursued an unprejudiced inquiry, investigating organizers and perpetrators alike of this extraordinary social phenomenon. Close comparisons between a whole range of cases raise challenging further questions: If suicide missions are so effective, why are they not more common? If killing is what matters, why not stick to 'ordinary' violent means? Or, if dying is what matters, why kill in the process?
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Previous research comparing rampage shooters in the U.S. and volunteer suicide bombers in the Middle East appears to be virtually non-existent. When these two types of suicidal killers have been mentioned in the same context, it has primarily been to dismiss any possible connections. Rampage shooters are generally assumed to be mentally unbalanced, while suicide bombers are seen as extreme, but rational, political actors. However, this review explores the possibility that the primary differences between the two types of killers are cultural, not individual, and that in terms of their underlying psychology and motivation, they are actually quite similar. In both cases, substantial evidence indicates that these perpetrators of murder–suicide share many of the following characteristics: (1) they had troubled childhoods, (2) they lived in oppressive social environments, (3) they suffered from low self-esteem, (4) they were triggered by a personal crisis, (5) they were seeking revenge, and (6) they were seeking fame and glory.
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On November 5, 2009, a lone attacker strode into the deployment center at Fort Hood, Texas. Moments later, 13 Department of Defense (DoD) employees were dead and another 32 were wounded in the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil since September 11, 2001. The U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs launched an investigation of the events preceding the attack with two purposes: (1) to assess the information that the U.S. Government possessed prior to the attack and the actions that it took or failure to take in response to that information; and (2) to identify steps necessary to protect the United States against future acts of terrorism by homegrown violent Islamist extremists. This investigation flows from the Committee's four-year, bipartisan review of the threat of violent Islamist extremism to our homeland which has included numerous briefings, hearings, consultations, and the publication of a staff report in 2008 concerning the internet and terrorism. In our investigation of the Fort Hood attack, we have been cognizant of the record of success by DoD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the ten years since 9/11. We recognize that detection and interdiction of lone wolf terrorists is one of the most difficult challenges facing our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Every day, these agencies are presented with myriad leads that require the exercise of sound judgment to determine which to pursue and which to close out. Leaders must allocate their time, attention, and inherently limited resources on the highest priority cases. In addition, the individual accused of the Fort Hood attack, Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, is a U.S. citizen. Even where there is evidence that a U.S. citizen may be radicalizing, the Constitution appropriately limits the actions that government can take.
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For years, it has been widely agreed on that suicide terrorists are not suicidal individuals, and that behaviorally, they are more similar to noble soldiers who are willing to sacrifice themselves for a cause. However, upon closer examination, it appears that the foundation of this conventional wisdom is extraordinarily shaky. There are many reasons to think that both event-based and psychological risk factors for suicide may drive the behavior of suicide terrorists. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that more than 75 individual suicide terrorists have exhibited these classic suicidal traits. Given the power that the stigma of suicide may have to deter future suicide terrorists, it is critical that governments, scholars, and practitioners examine this issue once again.
Article
A motivational analysis of suicidal terrorism is outlined, anchored in the notion of significance quest. It is suggested that heterogeneous factors identified as personal causes of suicidal terrorism (e.g. trauma, humiliation, social exclusion), the various ideological reasons assumed to justify it (e.g. liberation from foreign occupation, defense of one’s nation or religion), and the social pressures brought upon candidates for suicidal terrorism may be profitably subsumed within an integrative framework that explains diverse instances of suicidal terrorism as attempts at significance restoration, significance gain, and prevention of significance loss. Research and policy implications of the present analysis are considered.
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The Globalization of Martyrdom
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Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008);
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Iraq Accuses Al-Qaeda Of Using Mentally Ill Man To Kill 33 Civilians In Samarra
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Colombian 'Donkey Bombs' Kill Drug Crop Eradicators
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Donkey Bombs New Iraqi Weapon
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The Case for Calling Them Nitwits
  • Daniel Byman
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Breivik er overrasket over at han lyktes
  • Jarle Brenna
  • Gordon Andersen
  • Morten Hopperstad
Jarle Brenna, Gordon Andersen, and Morten Hopperstad, "Breivik er overrasket over at han lyktes," VG Nett, July 26, 2011, accessed