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Israel Studies, Volume 20, Number 1, Spring 2015, pp. 31-56 (Article)
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DOI: 10.1353/is.2015.0006
For additional information about this article
Access provided by University of Haifa (29 Jan 2015 17:00 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/is/summary/v020/20.1.azaryahu.html
Maoz Azaryahu and Yitzhak Reiter
e Geopolitics of Interment:
An Inquiry into the Burial of
Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem,
ABSTRACT
On Friday, January , the prominent Muslim Indian leader Muham-
mad Ali Jouhar, who died in London on January, was interred in the
perimeter of the Jerusalem Haram al-Sharif compound. e article offers
a detailed historical analysis of the geopolitics underlying and surrounding
the interment of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem. e underlying premise of
the investigation is that a large-scale political production, the interment
of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem, involved a variety of political actors with
particular interests and stakes. In addition to Amin al-Husayni, the Grand
Mufti and the Head of the Muslim Supreme Council in British mandate
Palestine who initiated and promoted the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jeru-
salem, other major actors included the British Government(s) in London
and in Jerusalem. Among the local political actors, the role of the Zionist
leadership, most prominently Colonel Fredrick Kisch, head of the political
department of the Jewish Agency, was especially awkward. Like the politi-
cal rivals of the Grand Mufti within Arab-Palestinian society, the Zionist
leadership was ostensibly consigned to the role of spectator in an unfolding
political play whose script was written by the Grand Mufti and approved
by the British Government.
INTRODUCTION
T
of national pantheons: cemeteries and burial sites reserved for people of
special distinction such as national leaders and heroes. Eligibility for burial
• ,
in a specifically designated pantheon is a measure of recognition of merits
and acknowledgement of achievements.¹ As this article shows, the forma-
tion of such a privileged burial place can also be motivated by geopo-
litical considerations and amount to a potentially resonant (geo) political
statement.
On Friday, January , the prominent Muslim Indian leader
Muhammad Ali Jouhar, who died in London on January, was interred
in the perimeter of the Jerusalem Haram al-Sharif compound. e burial
of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem was initiated and organized by Amin
al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Head of the Muslim
Supreme Council in British mandate Palestine. For the Mufti, the burial
of the Indian Muslim leader at the Haram was a geopolitical statement
designed to augment the position of Al-Quds and the Haram al-Sharif in
particular as a revered and relevant pan-Islamic center. It was also a means
to garner pan-Islamic solidarity and commitment to the cause of Palestine’s
Muslims as well as support for the leadership of the Grand Mufti within
Arab-Palestinian society. e burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem has
been mentioned on the margin of the academic literature dealing with
Arab-Muslim politics in British Mandate Palestine.² Making use of Arabic
and Hebrew newspapers and British and Zionist archival material, this
article offers a detailed historical analysis of the geopolitics underlying and
surrounding the interment of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem.
e underlying premise of the historical analysis is that the interment
of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem was a large-scale political production that
involved a variety of political actors with particular interests and stakes. In
addition to Amin al-Husayni, who initiated and promoted the burial of
Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem, other major actors included Shawkat Ali, the
brother of the deceased, whose support for Amin al-Husayni’s politics was
indispensable. ey also included the British Government(s) in London
and in Jerusalem and in particular Sir John Chancellor, the High Commis-
sioner. Among the local political actors, the role of the Zionist leadership,
most prominently Colonel Fredrick Kisch, head of the political department
of the Jewish Agency, was especially awkward. Like the political rivals of
the Grand Mufti within Arab-Palestinian society, the Zionist leadership was
ostensibly consigned to the role of spectator in an unfolding political play
whose script was written by the Grand Mufti and approved by the British
Government.
e Geopolitics of Interment •
THE GEOPOLITICAL BACKGROUND
e interment of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem was an act of political
propaganda that was firmly aligned with the Mufti’s political interests and
concerns in a period when, on top of his devotion to the struggle against the
Jewish National Home, his politics also included dealing with the growing
opposition to his leadership within Arab-Palestinian society, and developing
and promoting grand geostrategic visions and schemes.
A centerpiece of the Mufti’s struggle against an alleged Zionist threat
to Arab Palestine in the late s was the campaign he waged in “defense
of Al-Buraq”, namely, the effort to assert Muslim control over the Western
Wall and to deny the rights of Jews to pray there. Following the anti-Jewish
riots in the summer of the British government of Palestine sought a
compromise, while Amin al-Husayni, as Yehushua Porath observes, made a
systematic effort to make the defense of Al-Buraq a pan-Islamic cause and
thus a source of conflict between the British government and the Muslim
world.³ His strategy was to mobilize pan-Muslim solidarity in support of
the Arab-Palestinian uncompromising position in regard to the issue of the
Western Wall.
e Mufti found Indian Muslims to be particularly supportive of the
Arab-Muslim cause in Palestine. India’s Muslims constituted the largest
Muslim community in the British Empire. Before the era of large scale
oil revenues in the Middle East, many in the Arab world looked to India’s
rich princes and businessmen for financial aid for religious and charitable
projects. e engagement of Muslim-Indian leaders was extremely impor-
tant for al-Husayni because of the financial means they could contribute
to defend Arabs’ rights in Palestine and the pressure they could exert on
the British government in support of the Arab-Muslim cause in Palestine.⁴
Of particular importance for Amin al-Husayni were the ties with and
support of the two Indian Muslim brothers Muhammad and Shawkat Ali.
Mohammad Ali Jouhar (–) was a scholar, journalist, poet, and
above all a prominent Indian Muslim leader. He and his brother Shawkat
led the Indian Khilafat Movement. A pan-Islamic political-religious cam-
paign launched by Muslims in the Raj (British India), the Khalifat Com-
mittee formed by Muhammad Ali in opposed the abolishment of the
Ottoman Caliphate and sought to unite all Muslims under a re-instituted
caliphate. Muhammad Ali was also among the founders and a president of
the All-India Muslim League.
e political relationship between Muhammad Ali and Amin al-
Husayni began in the early s. In , al-Husayni asked him to send
• ,
someone to look after the Indian lodge (Al-Zawiyah al-Hindiyya) in Jeru-
salem.⁵ In a Palestinian-Muslim delegation to the Hijaz issued an
appeal to “India and other Muslim countries” to help foil what he described
as an attempt by the Jews to convert the Al-Aqsa Mosque into a place of
worship for Jews.⁶ It was under these circumstances that a three-man Arab-
Palestinian delegation headed by Jamal al-Husayni (–), Secretary of
the Palestine Muslim-Christian Association, visited India from November
to June to collect funds for the renovation of Al-Aqsa. e Mufti
met the Ali brothers in Mecca during the pilgrimages of and .⁷
In Muhammad Ali visited Palestine and spent hours in Jerusalem.
e Mufti appealed to Indian Muslims to support the Arab-Muslim hard-
line position in the Muslim struggle to deny Jews the right to pray at the
Western Wall. e involvement of Indian Muslims was made apparent in
the decision to hold in India a Palestine Day on May .⁸
e Mufti cultivated the Indian-Muslim connection and viewed the
Ali brothers’ close ties with the British government as advantageous. e
cooperation between the brothers and the British government reflected the
rift between them and their former ally Gandhi. As leaders of the Muslim
minority in the Raj, they did not share the vision of an independent India
with a Hindu majority.⁹ e Mufti traveled to Cairo to meet the Ali broth-
ers and members of the Indian-Muslim delegates en route from India to
London to participate in the London Round Table Conference for India,
which the British government convened in late to discuss constitu-
tional reforms and the future of India. In his meeting with them the Mufti
and Muhammad Ali devised a plan in support of Palestinian Arabs.¹⁰ e
Mufti dispatched his aide Jamal al-Husayni to London to keep close ties
with the Ali brothers, particularly Shawkat Ali.¹¹
In the Mufti’s geopolitical vision, Al-Quds was to become a religious
Islamic center of importance for the entire Muslim world and frequented
by Muslim pilgrims returning from the Umra or Hajj rituals of Hijaz. In
response to Zionist projects such as the opening of the Hebrew University
on Mount Scopus in , the Mufti promoted the opening of an Islamic
University in order to upgrade the city’s position as a center of Islamic learn-
ing. Shawkat Ali supported the idea of making Jerusalem a center of Islam
in the framework of the Khalifat movement, since Jerusalem was neutral
in relation to different Muslim rulers who potentially entertained the idea
of claiming the title of Caliph. For Shawkat Ali, Al-Quds was not to be a
seat of the Khalifat, but a center of Islam that would exert influence on the
Muslim world. Sharing the vision of Al-Quds as a Muslim center, the Mufti
and Shawkat Ali were ostensibly strategic allies.¹²
e Geopolitics of Interment •
In contrast to the grandeur of his geopolitical vision and pan-Islamic
strategic cooperation with Indian Muslim leaders, in January the politi-
cal opposition to the Mufti within Arab-Palestinian society seemed to seri-
ously threaten his position as the president of the Supreme Muslim Council
(SMC). e opposition accused the Mufti of corruption and charged him
with mismanagement of the large waqf assets under SMC control as well as
other Islamic institutions under his direct control.¹³ For instance, the Mufti
was accused of transforming important Muslim cemeteries into develop-
ment projects.¹⁴ e opposition used the financial crisis of the SMC to call
for elections to SMC presidency to depose Amin al-Husayni.
A TALE OF TELEGRAMS
Muhammad Ali died in London aged on January . e Times
reported the death and Ali’s biography as did Davar on January. While
the e Times focused on Ali’s Indian politics, Davar emphasized his active
support for Palestine’s Arabs.¹⁵ At first the news about the death of Muham-
mad Ali seemed of little relevance for the immediate politics of Palestine. As
attested in reports in the Arabic and Hebrew press, to a substantial extent
Arab-Palestinian politics revolved around the struggle between the Mufti
and his opponents over control of the SMC.¹⁶ However, when the burial
of Muhammad Ali in the Haram al-Sharif was publicly announced it was
commented upon in the Arabic and Hebrew press.
Initially the family thought that Muhammad Ali would be buried in
Delhi, where his mother and other members of the Ali family were buried.¹⁷
is was also reported in the press.¹⁸ However, on January Ha’aretz
reported that he would be buried in Jerusalem.¹⁹ e initiative was the
Mufti’s, but the cooperation of Shawkat Ali was indispensable for imple-
menting the idea to bury his brother in Jerusalem rather than in India.²⁰
Ostensibly the active involvement of the Mufti began before Muham-
mad Ali’s death. e newspaper Filastin reported that on his deathbed Ali
received al-Husayni’s telegram informing him that thousands of Arab-
Palestinians were praying at Al-Aqsa for his recovery and good health.
According to the report, Muhammad telegrammed the Mufti expressing
his wish that Palestine would be liberated, and the Haram al-Sharif and
Al-Buraq would not be harmed.²¹ It is unclear whether this exchange took
place, but since it was made public after Muhammad Ali’s death, it clearly
shows the Mufti’s intent to capitalize on Muhammad Ali’s reputation and
open support for the Arab-Muslim cause in Palestine.
• ,
Fig. : Scheme of Al-Haram al-Sharif
e journey of Muhammad Ali’s coffin to Jerusalem began on Janu-
ary, with a telegram the Mufti sent to London in which he proposed to bury
the Indian-Muslim leader in the area of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem,
“in accordance with his honor and his name in the Muslim world.”²² e
relatives of the deceased promptly accepted. It is not clear whether the
widow had a say. e public face of the family was that of Shawkat Ali. In
the telegram he sent in response he accepted the Mufti’s proposal: “Muham-
mad Ali family friends greatly appreciate honor burial Muhammad Ali”
near the Al-Aqsa mosque.²³
e Geopolitics of Interment •
Two successive Reuter dispatches reporting on the telegram sent by
Shawkat Ali to the Mufti told two versions of the same story.²⁴ According to
one telegram, the relatives of Muhammad Ali agreed to the Mufti’s proposal
to bury the Indian-Muslim leader in Jerusalem. is version clearly stated
that the initiative was the Mufti’s. e other Reuter telegram mentioned that
before his death Muhammad Ali had expressed his wish to be buried in the
holy precinct.²⁵ According to this version, the Mufti’s initiative was a response
to an expressed wish of the deceased; in this sense, his burial at the Haram
al-Sharif was Muhammad Ali’s testament, and his brother and the Mufti were
mere implementers of the last wish of the great man. With the exception of
the Reuters dispatches there is no evidence that Muhammad Ali pronounced
his wish to be buried in the Al-Aqsa mosque. Shawkat Ali’s telegram of
approval to the Mufti did not make such a bold claim. It merely stated that
“Muhammad Ali himself casually mentioned Jerusalem before death.”²⁶
As the sovereign power in the land, the British government’s consent
was a precondition for the endeavor. Without consulting the High Com-
missioner,²⁷ the British Government in London instructed him on Janu-
ary to facilitate the burial.²⁸ e close ties between the Ali brothers and the
British Government implied a favorable reaction of the Colonial Office to
Shawkat Ali’s a request to bury his brother in Jerusalem, especially if it could
be beneficial for the British Government in India. e tensions between the
Muslims and the Congress Party in India occasioned sectarian violence. On
January riots broke out in Bombay when Muslim militants forced factories
and shops to close and stopped buses, cars, and even bicycles.²⁹ e next day
riots broke out in Karachi, when Muslims taking part in a memorial proces-
sion protested against the Congress flag.³⁰ e possibility that the burial of
Muhammad Ali would stir riots in India was real, a fact that suggested that
ulterior British motives influenced the British support for the burial in Pal-
estine. e Arabic newspaper Al-Karmil addressed prevalent rumors that it
was actually the British Government that raised the idea to bury Muhammad
Ali in Jerusalem.³¹ It denied British direct involvement, but acquiesced that
the decision was beneficial for the British, since “In this grave moment it
prevented large demonstrations in India that would have erupted during the
funeral of Muhammad Ali there.” According to al-Karmil, “at is why the
government will no doubt value this service rendered by Haj Amin al-Husayni
and will reward him by respecting the rights of the Arabs in Palestine.”
e burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem was approved by the Brit-
ish Government on January. In his telegram to the Mufti, Shawkat Ali
reported that the coffin would be sent on board the steamer Narkunda, due
• ,
in Port Said, Egypt, on January. A large reception was planned to take
place at the port.³² From Port Said the coffin would be sent to Jerusalem by
train, arriving on Friday January. However, for all involved, the funeral
was but the culmination of a process that included issues of protocol and
planning regarding the design of the gravesite and the conduct of the
funeral procession. Notably it also involved the propaganda campaign run
by the Mufti and his acolytes intended to influence Arab public opinion
to garner political capital.
On the background of the bitter struggle between the Mufti and
his opponents in the SMC, the forthcoming funeral of the Indian-Mus-
lim leader in Jerusalem increasingly gained in public resonance through
reports in the Arabic and Hebrew press about the deceased, the political
circumstances of his burial in Palestine, and preparations for the burial
ceremony on Friday January. e planning involved the construction
of the gravesite and the organization of the funeral procession and rites.
e SMC appointed a special committee to make the arrangements for the
burial ceremony.³³
SETTING THE AGENDA: THE MUFTI’S PERSPECTIVE
On Friday January prayers in memory of Muhammad Ali were recited
in mosques throughout Palestine. Many Muslim dignitaries attended the
prayer at Al-Aqsa. e preacher, Sheikh Sa‘d al-Din al-Khatib, praised the
contribution of the deceased to Islam and to the cause of Arab Palestine.³⁴
For the Mufti, the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem was a mea-
sure of political propaganda. e SMC organ Al-Jami‘a al-Arabiyya was a
major conduit of the Mufti’s propaganda campaign. e message was clear
and simple—the burial in Jerusalem was a token of gratitude to the great
Muslim-Indian leader who unequivocally supported the Mufti in his relent-
less struggle against alleged Zionist threats to Muslim Holy shrines. On
January the paper reported that the Ali brothers were about to organize a
Pan-Islamic conference in London to defend the cause of Arab Palestine
and in particular, Muslim ownership of the Western Wall.³⁵
Praises for the Ali brothers and directing attention to the geopolitical
importance of the burial of Muhammad Ali reflected positively on their ally
Amin al-Husayni. In his reporting about the deceased and the preparation
for the funeral, Al-Jami‘a al-Arabiyya cultivated the image of the Mufti as
a leader capable of “great deeds” in the arena of international Muslim poli-
tics. On January it reported that the Muslim Committee of Haifa, which
e Geopolitics of Interment •
stood in opposition to al-Husayni, sent a telegram to Shawkat Ali and to
the Indian Khilafa Movement, stating that Haifa Arabs were deeply moved
by the death of Ali, known for his efforts to “save Palestine from its current
situation” and “his activity to expand Islamic solidarity in India regarding
the holy places in Palestine.”
Whereas Al-Jami‘a al-Arabiyya was a vehicle of the Mufti’s propaganda,
positive reports in other Arabic newspapers were significant in that they
clearly evidenced the extent to which the Mufti was successful in setting
the agenda. e Haifa newspaper al-Karmil wrote that the Mufti’s initiative
was a fair reward to the family of Muhammad Ali, and that his burial in
Al-Aqsa would strengthen the ties between seventy million Indian Muslims
and Al-Aqsa and Palestine, and would further serve as a precedent for other
Muslim leaders who would ask to be buried there.³⁶ In a similar vein, the
newspaper Mira’at al-Sharq, which was close to the opposition to the Mufti,
commented that
e enlightened ones are of the opinion that this great deed is a first step for
more great deeds. Many Muslim leaders will ask to be buried close to the
Haram al-Sharif. In this manner the connection between the Muslim world
and Palestine will be enhanced and the strength of the resistance to the Zionist
movement will be augmented.³⁷
e commentary did not suggest anything new or original that had not
already been discussed in the Arab press. However, it clearly implied that
the opposition to the Mufti complied with the agenda set by him.
On January the SMC discussed preparations for the funeral; notably
no issues pertaining to the conflict between the Mufti and the Opposition
were deliberated.³⁸ In the period leading to the funeral the opposition to
the Mufti in the SMC kept a low profile. e opposition newspaper Mira’at
al-Sharq explained that the conflict was not over, but the opposition post-
poned involving the government in the conflict within the SMC until after
the funeral.³⁹ According to a Jewish commentator, the Mufti’s rivals in the
SMC were aware of the Mufti’s obvious political gains, but they were also
aware that Arab public opinion in Palestine was firmly behind and uncon-
ditionally supportive of the Mufti’s initiative and its anti-Zionist message.⁴⁰
is was evident in commentaries in Arab newspapers that hailed the Mufti
for his endeavor. Hyperbolic language was not the exception to the rule.
After the funeral Filastin wrote: “e Al-Quds Mufti’s initiative to bury
Muhammad Ali here is inspired by God who wished to wrap Jerusalem
with millions to help her in her hour of anguish caused by world Jewry.”⁴¹
• ,
THE GR AVESITE
It is not clear whether al-Husayni had a specific site when he offered to inter
Muhammad Ali close to al-Aqsa. e sanctity of the Haram entailed setting
a boundary between the holy and the defiled. e Madrasa al-Khatuniyya
bordering the western wall of the Haram offered an appropriate burial site.
e Madrasa is located on the Western arcade of the Haram to the north of
Suq al-Qattanin and south of the Madrasa Arghuniyya and the Iron Gate.
It was donated and built in as a Madrasa, but it seems that it never
operated as a religious seminary but rather as a residence for distinguished
pilgrims.⁴² In modern times it was known as Dar al-Khatib because the
building was under the custodianship of the Khatib family waqf. It is a two-
story building with an open courtyard. e part that was used for burial
already contained in its ground floor a domed tomb chamber ( probably
Ughul Khatun’s grave without a remaining inscription)⁴³ with an anteroom
to its north and an assembly/prayer room with a mihrab to its south. Only
this part of the building was allocated as a burial site.
e agreement between the SMC and the Khatib family was reached
on January.⁴⁴ e burial chamber is situated above the western wall of
the Haram and against the Foundation Stone (inside the Dome of the
Rock). e area of the Madrasa allocated for burial is sqm; the floor
and tombstone are made of marble.⁴⁵ e tombstone was shaped in the
traditional form of tombs of Muslim holy men.⁴⁶ e SMC took upon
itself to make an opening between the Mosque’s courtyard and the burial
room and agreed that the family would retain forever the keys to this
door.⁴⁷ e doors and windows to the open courtyard on its western side
were blocked while a window to the East (to the Haram) was rendered
into the only door and entrance.⁴⁸ Since the door key was in the hands of
the family waqf, regular visitors can see the tomb of Muhammad Ali only
through the window.
THE MANDATE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE
e High Commissioner met separately with the Mufti and the Zionist
leaders. Constrained by the policy decided upon in London, these meetings
gave Chancellor an opportunity to convey his suggestions, recommenda-
tions, and concerns to the major political players in the local arena and by
so doing, to safeguard British interests.
e Geopolitics of Interment •
Fig. : Scheme of Madrasa Khatuniyya
According to the directive from London, the Mandate Government
took steps to support the endeavor. e head of the Health Department
visited the SMC and conferred with the Mufti. He also paid a visit to the
burial site. e railway authority was also engaged and discussed transport
possibilities and prices with the Mufti. As a token of good will, in their
meeting on January, Chancellor informed the Mufti that he would
place his personal coach at the disposal of the family for the train journey
to Jerusalem.⁴⁹
Notwithstanding practical issues such as public health and transpor-
tation, of much concern for the Mandate Government was maintaining
public safety. e memory of the Arab riots was still fresh. e capacity
for violence was real since the funeral could be used a vehicle for express-
ing Muslim grievances and Arab resentment against the Jewish National
Home and the British administration. e responsibility lay with the High
Commissioner. Aware of the potential for violence, Chancellor needed the
cooperation of the Mufti to ensure that the burial would be conducted
• ,
peacefully. On January the Head of Police met with the Mufti to discuss
funeral arrangements.⁵⁰ In his dispatch to London, Chancellor related
that the Mufti assured him that “speeches and songs would not be permit-
ted as the funeral procession passed through the streets.”⁵¹ Lord Passfield,
Secretary of State for the Colonies, reported to the Cabinet on January
that the Government of Palestine was taking “every possible precaution” to
prevent communal violence in Palestine.⁵²
THE POLITICS OF INVITATIONS
As a major political production, the list of invited guests attending the burial
ceremony was a powerful message. Of much political significance is not
only those invited, but also those who were not. According to one report the
SMC issued , invitations to “dignitaries and consuls, religious leaders,
high-ranking government officials,” as well as to Muslim and Arab associa-
tions and clubs.⁵³ Invitations were sent to Arab dignitaries in neighboring
Arab countries: the Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan and the Prime Ministers
of Egypt and Syria. Another Arab source reported that , invitations
to the funeral of Muhammad Ali were sent, wherein the Mufti hailed the
deceased as “the supreme symbol of relentless effort and self-sacrifice of
his spirit and property for the cause of Islam in general and in favor of the
Arab-Palestinian cause in particular.”⁵⁴ Notably, no invitations were issued
to the Chief Rabbis or to leaders of the Jewish Yishuv.⁵⁵
e Mufti’s handling of the list of invited guests irked the opposition.
A critical report published after the funeral in Mira’at al-Sharq specified
the “mistakes” by the funeral committee appointed by and associated with
the Mufti’s acolytes in the SMC.⁵⁶ It reported that the Mufti intention-
ally refrained from inviting people identified with the opposition, thereby
making the funeral ceremony a factional issue. ose not invited included
Arab mayors who were identified with the opposition to the Mufti, and
members of the Arab Executive Committee who did not belong to the
Mufti’s faction. Criticism in Ramallah directed at the funeral committee
was that it “discounted the people of this city”.
Another matter was issuing invitations to government officials and
members of the consular corps in Palestine. e Mufti consulted and fol-
lowed the advice of the High Commissioner.⁵⁷ In an answer to a direct
question, Chancellor informed the Mufti that he would not accept an invi-
tation to attend the funeral, and that he would be represented by a member
of his staff. He also urged the Mufti to send invitations to government
e Geopolitics of Interment •
officers. Chancellor suggested that instead of going to the railway station
and taking part in the procession, government representatives should attend
the ceremony at the Haram, in a special enclosure prepared for this purpose.
e Mufti concurred with this suggestion.
In a response to the Mufti’s enquiry whether the consular corps should
be invited to attend, the High Commissioner told him that “he should do
so and that they would [be] hurt if they did not receive an invitation.” He
also opined that the Consuls should be treated as members of the Gov-
ernment. Encouraged by the High Commissioner’s support, the Mufti
contacted the Doyen of the Consular Corps, Dr. Erich Nord, the Consul
General of Germany, who recommended to the Mufti to send invitations to
the Consular Corps. e Mufti arranged with him that the Consuls would
welcome the coffin in the Railway Station and join the funeral procession
on its way to the Haram. However, a number of consuls, most prominently
the American Consul General, declined to participate in the funeral pro-
cession which they considered “as being more of a political demonstration
than a religious ceremony.”⁵⁸
THE ZIONIST RESPONSE IBEHIND THE SCENES
In an article published in the organ of the Zionist movement Ha’Olam a
month after the burial of Muhammad Ali, the author claimed that in prin-
ciple, the Zionist movement considered Jerusalem and other holy sites as
a special realm that was essentially different from “political and economic
areas of the country”.⁵⁹ e author argued that preserving the full rights
of every religion to its holy sites should be a guiding political principle for
the government. He further claimed that the Zionist movement practiced
a policy of “neutral tolerance” in regard to the activities pursued by reli-
gious leaders in the holy places under their control—unless these activities
infringed on the religious rights of Jews, and provided that they were not
explicitly political. According to the author, Jerusalem was a holy city for
the three religions, and the custom of burying distinguished religious and
even national figures in holy sites could be accepted in principle; in his
opinion, however, the burial of Muhammad Ali was different in that it was
a “dramatic political episode” that combined politics and religion.
ough not apparent in the reports in the Hebrew press, the Zionist
leadership was concerned about the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusa-
lem. On January, Kisch and Pinhas Rutenberg, the head of the Va’ad
Leumi, met separately with the High Commissioner to discuss the burial
• ,
of Muhammad Ali. e Zionist leaders claimed that the Mufti’s initiative
was “solely for political reasons”, and expressed their fear that Muhammad
Ali’s tomb would become “a shrine which would be used as an instrument
for rousing the fanaticism of Moslems in connection with the Wailing
Wall.”⁶⁰ Zionist leaders were concerned that the funeral would ignite vio-
lence. Chancellor assured them that “Every precaution would be taken to
ensure that the funeral went off without incident.” He suggested advising
Jews “to keep out of sight while the procession was passing.”⁶¹ He did not
tell his interlocutors what he confided to Passfield, that he hoped that if
the funeral would not stir up violence, “the presence of the tomb would
soon be forgotten.”⁶²
e Zionist leaders pressed the High Commissioner to urge his Maj-
esty’s Government to withdraw the permission. Chancellor explained that it
was impossible to cancel the permission, and that such a move would mean
a grave offence to the entire Muslim world. is was the only reference to
British interests in the Muslim world. e Zionist leaders told Chancellor
that they would telegraph the Jewish Agency in London to petition HMG
to withdraw the permission. Notably, two days after the meeting members
of the Jewish community in Cairo sent a telegram to the Colonial Office in
London and to the High Commissioner in Jerusalem protesting the burial
in the Temple area:
e Jewish community in Cairo received with surprise the news of the burial
of the Indian Muhammad Ali in the area of Solomon’s Temple, as such burial
adversely reflects upon the dignity of the world Jewry in their holy places and
is a challenge to the Jews’ national awakening. In the name of the Community
we protest against such burial and persistently request Your Excellency to
prevent it, as it would arouse the wrath of all the Jewish people.⁶³
It is not clear who was behind the telegram. In an emergency meeting
of the Zionist leadership in Palestine held a few days later Kisch criticized
the telegram to which he referred as a “strange thing” and added that he sent
Zionist representatives “a strong letter” warning them not to do something
like that again.⁶⁴ Clearly the telegram’s tough language was in stark contrast
to the cautious language used by the Zionist leaders when they met with
Chancellor. Once leaked, it was a propaganda fodder for the Mufti’s news-
paper: “e Zionists . . . trespassed every boundary, thinking that they can
prevent the Muslims in the country to hold a burial ceremony of a great
Muslim leader in Dar al-Islam [Muslim soil].” It called upon the Egyptian
Muslims “to teach these petitioners a lesson they will never forget.”⁶⁵
e Geopolitics of Interment •
e aforementioned telegram of protest was not meant for public
consumption. Notably the only public condemnation in the Hebrew press
of the burial as an affront to Jewish claims to the holy compound was
expressed by the poet Uri Zvi Greenberg after the burial. Unlike Kisch,
Greenberg was not bound by the constraints of public office. In a casual
reference to the burial in an article directed against the Zionist leadership
and its ostensible incompetence, the militant revisionist poet renounced
the “political burial in the Temple Mount” that “sanctified the place by the
burial of a corpse”.⁶⁶ For Greenberg, the Temple Mount’s essential sanctity
was exclusively embedded in the House of David and the vision of the
restored Kingdom of Israel.
Kisch did not mention the sanctity of the Temple Mount for Jews as
an argument against the burial of Muhammad Ali. However, he informed
Chancellor that it was contrary to Shari‘a Law to bury Muslims outside a
cemetery (in his report to Passfield Chancellor mentioned that according
to his information, this was not the case).⁶⁷ e only reference to the holi-
ness of the Temple Mount for Jews was in a response to the High Com-
missioner’s suggestion made in their meeting on January to facilitate an
invitation for some Jewish leaders to the funeral “to promote improvement
of the relations between Arabs and Jews.”⁶⁸ A day later Kisch informed
him that “leading Rabbis” would not accept such an invitation because
it was contrary to Jewish law: a visit to the Temple Mount entailed the
danger of treading upon the Holy of Holies, which was strictly forbidden
for Jews.⁶⁹
While discussing the invitations with Chancellor, Kisch confided the
intention to reinter Herzl in Jerusalem. He referred to a resolution of the
Zionist executive from September to reinter Herzl in Palestine.⁷⁰ e
idea was prompted by the re-interment of the Zionist leader and famed
writer Max Nordau at Tel-Aviv’s cemetery in May , which was initi-
ated and carried out by the Tel-Aviv Municipality. Kisch mentioned the
intention to bury Herzl in Jerusalem as an argument against the idea of
issuing invitations to Jewish leaders to attend the funeral of Muhammad
Ali. He was sure that “in view of the attitude of Arabs toward Zionism
. . . the Jews would not issue invitations to the leading Arabs to be present
at that ceremony.”⁷¹ Chancellor consented not to raise the issue with the
Mufti. In his report to London he speculated that the Mufti would not have
enthusiastically agreed to invite Jews to the funeral because “[H]e would
thereby expose himself to hostile criticisms by his political opponents.”⁷²
At the end of his meeting with Chancellor on January Kisch
expressed his fear that the precedent created by the burial of Muhammad
• ,
Ali at the Haram al-Sharif would result in converting the Haram “into a
mausoleum for prominent Muslim leaders”, which would make it a “center
of political and religious propaganda”.⁷³ In his diary he reiterated his con-
cern in regard to the Mufti’s intent to make the Haram a burial place for
Muslim leaders “with no relationship whatsoever with Palestine”.⁷⁴ In
his response to Kisch, Chancellor claimed that in his view the burial of
Muhammad Ali would not “add greatly to the sanctity of the Haram al-
Sharif in the eyes of the Muslims”, since the site was already regarded by
Muslims to be “only less sacred than Mecca and Medina.”⁷⁵
THE ZIONIST RESPONSE IIGOING PUBLIC
e official Zionist policy formulated and pursued by Kisch was to avoid
open criticism of Muhammad Ali’s burial in Jerusalem. He opted for cau-
tion. As he noted in his diary, “At this time there is no place for public
criticism by Jews.”⁷⁶ He limited his concerns to his diary and to his confi-
dential talks with the High Commissioner. He was aware that the Mufti’s
propaganda campaign could only benefit from open criticism of the burial.
However, as the case of the telegram sent by Zionists in Egypt showed, an
official policy of non-belligerence in public was hostage to the compliance
of Zionist activists and pundits of different ideological colors with a policy
that had never been openly discussed and never proclaimed.
e impracticality of Kisch’s policy of public non-belligerence was
clearly evidenced when the weekly English edition of Davar, the Histadrut
paper, published an editorial critical of the burial of Muhammad Ali in
Jerusalem.⁷⁷ Davar was considered a mouthpiece not only of Labor Zion-
ism, but of the Jewish Yishuv. As Filastin made clear, “Davar speaks for the
majority of the Jews in Palestine.”⁷⁸ From an Arab perspective the editorial
was the smoking gun: the proof that the Zionists/Jews, “angry since the
grave will unite Palestine and the Muslim world,”⁷⁹ were against the burial
of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem.
For Kisch, the editorial that had rendered Jewish objections public was
a mistake that caused substantial damage; in his view, there was an urgent
need to “repair” the mistake that “put us in a grave situation.”⁸⁰ Kisch
wrote an angry letter to Davar,⁸¹ but this did not change the fact that the
editorial was a liability. George Antonius, a Lebanese-Egyptian author and
diplomat who lived in Jerusalem, and according to Kisch “a crony of the
Mufti”, mentioned the editorial when they met. Kisch told Antonius that
it was a misunderstanding, and in any case the editorial did not represent
e Geopolitics of Interment •
the “Jewish position” since “We respect Muhammad Ali who also was close
to the Zionists and we know him and appreciate him.”⁸²
Aware that public expression of Zionist objections to the funeral would
only serve the Mufti’s propaganda, Kisch realized that the best way to avoid
a “lose-lose” situation was to offer public condolences to Shawkat Ali, while
ignoring the Mufti altogether. Chaim Weizmann informed Kisch that he
had met Shawkat Ali in London before he embarked on the journey with
the coffin to Palestine, and Shawkat Ali assured him that his intent was
friendly and he wanted to assist in bolstering peace in the land. Weizmann
suggested sending a telegram to Shawkat Ali in Port Said to remind him
of the conversation they had had. As suggested, Kisch and Ruppin sent a
telegram on behalf of the Executive of the Jewish Agency to Shawkat Ali:
As you approach Palestine, the Executive of the Jewish Agency conveys to
you our heartfelt condolences on the passing of your brother with the hope
that the transferal of his body to his last resting place, the exalted character
of his soul will inspire peace and cooperation between Muslims and Jews in
the land.⁸³
e Mufti’s organ was not impressed by the gesture of goodwill. After
mentioning the surprise that condolences were conveyed, the newspaper
asserted that the “Zionists would have done anything they could to prevent
bringing the coffin to the country”, and if they only could, “they would
have withheld bread and water from the Muslims.”⁸⁴ After congratulating
Kisch for the deed, Filastin expressed the hope “[T]hat the Jews indeed
realized what the human obligation towards the dead is.”⁸⁵
However, Kisch felt that for the sake of its impact on Arab public opin
-
ion, this telegram needed to be complemented by a public expression of
condolences on behalf of the entire Yishuv. For this purpose he summoned
an urgent joint meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, the Execu-
tive of the Va’ad Leumi, Agudat Israel, and members of the Council of the
Lishka Meuhedet.⁸⁶ e meeting took place on January in Jerusalem, two
days before the funeral. e number and rank of those attending testified
to the importance ascribed to this meeting and to its resolution(s), which
were supposed to represent the entire Jewish Yishuv and hence the widest
consensus possible.⁸⁷
Kisch opened the discussion with his version of events and a proposed
text for the telegram. Speakers concurred with Kisch’s assertion that Davar’s
editorial was “a mistake (that) put us in a grave situation.”⁸⁸ Ben-Zvi opined
that it was a tactical mistake, but pointed out that the paper expressed the
• ,
editors’ views only¸ and did not represent the official view of the Executive
of the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad Leumi. Yitzhak Elishar, a former deputy
mayor of Jerusalem argued that an apology for the publication of the article
was appropriate. As to the telegram, the idea to send a condolences telegram
on behalf of the Yishuv was accepted in principle by all speakers. e text
of the telegram read:
On the eve of the arrival of the body of Mawlana Muhammad Ali to Palestine
we want to express our deep sympathy with the family of the deceased and
Muslims all over the globe for their big loss. e Jews of Palestine convey their
condolences to the deceased leader’s co-religionists who accompany him to
his grave and to the Muslims in Palestine who mourn him.⁸⁹
To make an impact on Arab public opinion, the telegram of con-
dolences on behalf of the Yishuv was sent to Arab newspapers. Al-Jami‘a
al-Arabiyya printed the telegram in a prominent place, with no comment
attached to it; Filastin printed the telegram, but added that it was out of
politeness, and its credibility could not be assured.⁹⁰ In a commentary pub-
lished two days later Filastin stated that the telegram of condolences was a
mere “political lie”, since the editorial in Davar proved that the “Jews” were
against the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem.⁹¹ Further, it reported
that when Shawkat Ali waved to the crowds, without making a distinction
between Arabs and non-Arabs, everyone present with the exception of the
“Jews” responded by taking their hats off. is was proof that the “Jews”
approved of the aforementioned editorial of Davar.
In contradistinction, Shawakt Ali sent a letter to Kisch in which he
expressed appreciation for the attitude of the Executive towards his brother’s
funeral. He also invited Kisch for a meeting. e meeting took place on
February, but as Kisch wrote in his diary, the presence of the secretary
assigned to Shawkat Ali by the Mufti rendered candid and open conversa-
tion and exchange of ideas between the two impossible.⁹² Weizmann’s idea
was to use the telegram to remind Shawkat Ali of their meeting in London.
e telegram did not entail such a reminder, but evidently Shawkat Ali
did not forget his meeting with Weizmann. In a speech he held in Jaffa to
members of the Muslim-Christian Association the day before his meeting
with Kisch he mentioned that he had met Weizmann in London since he
wanted to help in peace-making.⁹³ He told his audience that only when he
came to Palestine did he realize how vast Arab hatred of Jews was, hatred
that was the result of Jewish politics. In his opinion in order to achieve
peace, the Jews should change their political course.
e Geopolitics of Interment •
THE FUNER AL
In a public announcement issued the day before the funeral the Mufti
encouraged Palestine Arabs to take part in the funeral and to preserve public
order.⁹⁴ As planned, on Friday January, a sunny winter day, the coffin of
Muhammad Ali arrived at Jerusalem’s central railway station. Covered with
a green cloth adorned with Qur’an verses, the coffin was placed in a special
van. e funeral procession moved to Damascus Gate, headed by mounted
police. Following a group singing a funeral chant, groups of young men
carrying banners, wreaths, and images of the deceased preceded the coffin.
Shawkat Ali and the Mufti marched behind the coffin. e widow, accompa-
nied by representatives of Arab women’s organizations, watched the funeral
procession from the balcony of the post office. e route was secured by the
police. Upon arriving at the Damascus Gate, the funeral procession entered
the Old City. According to the official report, the streets were filled by “an
orderly crowd” moving in the direction of the Haram.⁹⁵
e representatives of the Government saluted the coffin upon enter-
ing the Haram and then, together with Heads of Christian communities,
joined the procession immediately behind the coffin. Members of the
consular corps joined the procession at the bottom of the steps leading to
the Dome of the Rock. e procession halted upon reaching the northern
door of the Dome of the Rock, where Shawkat Ali acknowledged the salutes
of the crowds. After shaking hands with him and the Mufti, the official
representatives left the Haram, while the procession entered the Dome of
the Rock and the coffin was carried to the designated burial place.
e Mufti agreed that no speeches were held on the streets, but this
restriction obviously did not apply to the precincts of the Haram. Repeat-
ing familiar motives, the eulogies delivered there rendered the anti-Zionist
message of the burial explicit.⁹⁶ e list of speakers conveyed a message of
pan-Arab and pan-Islamic solidarity: these were representatives of Islamic
associations and organizations in Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria. A Christian-
Arab poet read a poem composed especially for the funeral.
A clear statement about his unique function in the event and his claim
to position of supreme leadership, the Mufti was not only the first to eulo-
gize, but also the only Palestinian-Muslim leader to deliver a eulogy. Among
other eulogists were the famous Egyptian Pan-Arab philologist Ahmad Zaki
Pasha, who presented Muhammad Ali as a Holy martyr of Jihad (shahid)
and the Tunisian nationalist leader in exile Abdelaziz a‘alibi.⁹⁷
e fissures in the demonstration of unity were manifest in terms of
absence. Raghib al-Nashashibi, the Mayor of Jerusalem and a prominent
• ,
Fig : Muhammad Ali’s Gravestone
leader of the opposition to the Mufti, did not attend, the official explana-
tion being that he was ill. Mussa Kazim al-Husayni, head of the Executive
Committee of the Palestine Arab Congress, stayed in his hometown of
Jericho. e absence of the High Commissioner was not related to the
struggle between the Mufti and the opposition. It was a matter of policy,
which was made clear to the Mufti in their meeting on January. Officially
his absence was due to illness.
e Geopolitics of Interment •
CONCLUSIONS
A poem published in Filastin on the day Muhammad Ali was buried praised
the casket, which “engaged the world and its inhabitants” as the “the hero
of Islam . . . the hero of justice with many supporters”. e pathos was
expressed in hyperbolic language designed to emphasize the greatness of
the deceased and the importance of his funeral. e poem focused on the
casket rather on Muhammad Ali himself: indeed, it was the casket and its
journey to Jerusalem that was at the center of the large-scale geo-political
production master-minded by Haj Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of
Jerusalem.
e burial in Jerusalem was much more than a mere religious rite.
Conceived of as a political production and designed by the Mufti as a means
of political propaganda, a relevant question is whether the Mufti could
consider the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem a success. Obviously
this is a matter of interpretation and ideological point of view. e Mufti
himself did not refer to the issue in public.
According to Filastin, , attended the funeral.⁹⁸ e Jewish
press was skeptical. According to Davar the funeral did not attract much
attention in neighboring countries and the number of those who attended
the funeral was small.⁹⁹ However, the report conceded that the funeral
was “an impressive religious demonstration”. e Palestine Bulletin, on the
other hand, wrote that “the procession . . . was drab” and noted that “Com-
paratively few cared to pay him (Muhammad Ali) their last respect.”¹⁰⁰
From the perspective of the Government the funeral was a success since
its conduct was peaceful. is was the main issue for the British Mandate
administration. Of course, the dignified manner in which the funeral was
conducted reflected on the Mufti, who demonstrated that he was a reliable
partner of the Government, when it was in his interest.
However, success was also a function of the (geo)political impact of the
burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem. e opposition to the Mufti in the
SMC was silenced. e Arab-Palestinian press enthusiastically supported
the Mufti’s initiative. Echoing a theme celebrated in the Arab press, Doa’r
Ha’yom conceded that “e burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem estab-
lished a spiritual link between Palestinian Muslims and their brethren in
India.”¹⁰¹ e underlying issue was the struggle against the Jewish National
Home. In Arab public opinion, the burial in Jerusalem was a decisive blow
to Zionism: the aforementioned commentary in Doar Ha’yom quotes a
young Arab leader in Beirut as stating: “When we buried Muhammad Ali
in Jerusalem we also buried your Zionism.”
• ,
e burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem was but the first stage in
the Mufti’s strategic design to transform Jerusalem into an Arab-Muslim
center. Kisch was concerned about the Mufti’s intention to make the Haram
al-Sharif “a mausoleum for prominent Muslim leaders.”¹⁰² e Mufti’s next
strategic move in this direction was the burial of the Sharif Husayn Ibn
Ali in the vicinity of Muhammad Ali’s gravesite following the death of the
founder of the Hashemite dynasty in June . According to a commen-
tary in Davar, “e burial of Muhammad Ali and Sharif Husayn fortified
the position of the Mufti for the time being; it created important political
connections and it laid the foundation for the future Muslim center in
Jerusalem.”¹⁰³
In December the pan-Islamic congress organized by the Mufti and
Shawkat Ali convened in Jerusalem. As a display of pan-Islamic solidarity
and support for the cause of Palestinian Arabs, the congress buttressed the
leadership position of the Mufti and his ambitious plans for Jerusalem.
However, with the exception of creating a pan-Muslim and pan-Arab pan-
theon in Jerusalem, the Mufti’s grand design for the creation of “an Islamic
center” in the city did not materialize. As fund-raising failed, the Islamic
college envisioned by the Mufti was not built.
Notably the idea to create a Zionist pantheon in Jerusalem promoted
by Menachem Ussishkin materialized in when the mortal remains
of the Zionist leader Leo Pinsker (–) were interred at the Cave of
Nicanor on Mount Scopus. Following the War, Mount Scopus was an
Israeli exclave and could not be further developed as a Zionist pantheon.
In August the mortal remains of Herzl were reinterred on a hilltop in
western Jerusalem. Mount Herzl, as the hill was officially named, became
Israel’s national cemetery, a distinguished Zionist pantheon belonging to
the symbolic and ceremonial fabric of Jewish statehood.
Hidden behind closed doors and devoid of ritual functions, the Mus-
lim-Arab pantheon created by the Mufti at the outskirts of the Haram has
not become a notable feature of the holy area dominated by the Dome of
the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque. Remarkably, the High Commissioner
proved to be far sighted when, in his meeting with Colonel Kisch on Janu-
ary, he expressed his hope that “if the funeral went off quietly the presence
of the tomb would soon be forgotten.”
e Geopolitics of Interment •
N
Yitzhak Reiter acknowledges the generous support of the Israel Science Foundation
(ISF) grant no. / on Shared Holy Places in Palestine/Israel: Between Violence
and Tolerance in A Comparative Perspective, as well as the continuous support
of Ashkelon Academic College, the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, and the
Truman Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
1. On gravesites and burials of Great Wo/Men see Maoz Azaryahu, “Mount
Herzl: e Creation of Israel’s National Cemetery,” Israel Studies . (): –;
Avner Ben Amos, Funerals, Politics and Memory in Modern France 1789–1996
(Oxford, ).
2.
Uri M. Kupferschmidt, e Supreme Muslim Council, Islam under the British
Mandate for Palestine (Leiden, ), ; Yehoshua Porath, e Palestinian Arab
National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion (London, ), –; Ilan Pappe,
Aristocracy of the Land: e Husayni Family. Political Biography ( Jerusalem, ),
[Hebrew].
3. Porath, e Palestinian Arab Movement, .
4. Do’ar HaYom, September , .
5.
Omar Khalidi “Indian Muslims and Palestinian Waqf,” e Jerusalem Quar-
terly (–): –.
6. Sandeep Chawla, “e Palestine Issue in India Politics in s,” in Com-
munal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India, ed. Mushirul Hasan (New Delhi,
), , quoted by Khalidi, “Indian Muslims and Palestinian Waqf,” n..
7. Kupferschmidt, e Supreme Muslim Council, –.
8. Porath, e Palestinian Arab Movement, .
9. Ibid., .
10. Ha’aretz, January , .
11. Porath, e Palestinian Arab Movement, .
12. Davar, September , .
13. Davar, “e Battle between the Mufti and the Opposition,” January
, .
14.
Yitzhak Reiter, Allah’s Safe Haven?: e Controversy Surrounding the Mamilla
Cemetery and the Museum of Tolerance, Contesting Domination over the Symbolic and
Physical Landscapes ( Jerusalem, ), – [Hebrew].
15. e Times, ; Davar, January, , .
16. Ha’aretz, January, and January , .
17.
NAUK (National Archives United Kingdom), FO / (FCO /)
Telegram, Shawkat Ali to Amin al-Husayni, January .
18. Ha’aretz, January , ; Filastin reported that the family was informed
that the Government would finance the transfer of the coffin to India, January
.
19. Ha’aretz, January , .
20. Porath, e Palestinian Arab National Movement, .
• ,
21. Filastin, January .
22. Ha’aretz, January , .
23. NAUK, Shawkat Ali to Amin al-Husayni, January .
24. Filastin, January ; Ha’aretz, January , .
25. Ha’aretz, January, ; Palestine Bulletin, January , .
26. Al-Jami‘a al-Arabiyya, January , .
27. e High Commissioner admitted to that in his meeting with Colonel
Fredrick Kisch, head of the political department of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem
on January, Fredrick H. Kisch, Palestine Diary ( Jerusalem, ), [Hebrew].
28. In his telegram to Mufti Amin al-Husayn, Shawkat Ali wrote that the Brit-
ish Government cabled the High Commissioner asking him to give every facility
needed. See also Ha’aretz, January , .
29. Filastin, January .
30. e Times, January; Filastin, January .
31. Reported in Davar, January ,
32. Filastin, January .
33. Ha’aretz, January , .
34. Al-Jami‘a al-Arabiyya, January , .
35. Ibid., January , .
36. Ha’aretz, January. See also Palestine Bulletin, January , .
37. Cited in Ha’aretz, January .
38. Davar, January , .
39. Cited in Davar, January , .
40. Ha’Olam, no. , “Politics and Holiness,” February , .
41. Filastin, January .
42. Michael Hamilton Burgoyne, Mamluk Jerusalem ( Jerusalem, ), .
43. Ughul Khatun al-Qazaniyya al-Baghdadiyya, probably the wife of Amir
Qazan Shah. e endowment was expanded later in by her daughter Isfahan.
On the building and its history see “Khatuniyya Madrasa” at http://archnet.org/
library/sites/one-site.jsp?site_id= citing the following sources: Kamil J. Asali,
Jerusalem in History: 3000 .. to the Present Day (London & New York, ),
–; Burgoyne, Mamluk Jerusalem, –; Ra’if Yusuf Najm, ed., Kunuz al-Quds
(Milan, ), –; Al-Ulaymi, Mujir al-Din, Al uns al-jalil bi-tarikh al Quds
wa’l-Khalil (Amman, ), [Arabic]; Al-Umari, Ahmad Ibn Yahya, and Kamil
al-Jaburi, eds., Masalik al-absar fi mamalik al-amsar (Beirut, ), [Arabic].
44. Davar, January , .
45. Filastin, January, ; Ha’aretz, January , .
46. Davar, January , .
47. Ibid.
48. See Burgoyne, Mamluk Jerusalem, Figure ..
49. Ha’aretz, January , .
50. Ibid., January , .
51. NAUK, Dispatch, Chancellor to Passfield, January , .
e Geopolitics of Interment •
52. NAUK, Cabinet Minutes, January .
53. Ha’aretz, January , .
54. Davar, January , .
55. Al-Jami‘a al-Arabiyya, Davar, January, ; January , .
56. Davar, January , .
57. UKNA, Chancellor to Passfield, Report on the meeting with the Mufti,
and January , .
58. UKNA, Chancellor to Passfield, January , .
59. Ha’Olam, “Political Association,” February , .
60. NAUK, Chancellor to Passfield, January , –.
61. Ibid.
62. NAUK, Chancellor to Passfield January , .
63. NAUK, Isaac Loevi, Jack Cohen, and Zaki Douek, Cairo, to the High
Commissioner, Jerusalem, January in Enclosure III Chancellor to Passfield,
January .
64.
CZA (Central Zionist Archives) J/, Protocol, joint meeting of the
Executive of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, the Executive of the Vaad Le’umi,
members of the Lishka Meuchedet and Agudat Israel, January , .
65. Al-Jami‘a al-Arabiyya, January , .
66. Do’ar Ha’yom, Uri Zvi Greenberg, “On Tel-Aviv’s Chatterbox,” January
, .
67. NAUK, Chancellor to Passfield, January , .
68. Ibid., January , .
69. Ibid., .
70. Davar, September , .
71. NAUK, Chancellor to Passfield, January .
72. Ibid., .
73. Ibid., –.
74. Kisch, Palestine Diary, January , .
75. NAUK, Chancellor to Passfield, January , .
76. Kisch, Palestine Diary, .
77.
Berl Katzenelson was editor of Davar. e weekly English edition was edited
by Moshe Sharett. Perplexingly, the editorial could not be traced in the English
issues of Davar. Information about the content of this editorial is limited to refer-
ences in contemporaneous sources, most notably Kisch, Palestine Diary, ; CZA,
J/, Protocol, .
78. Filastin, January .
79. Ibid.
80. CZA, J/, Protocol, .
81. Kisch, Palestine Diary, .
82. CZA, J/, Protocol, .
83. Ibid., .
84. Davar, January , .
• ,
85. Ibid., January , .
86. Established in December , the Lishka Meuchedet was put in charge of
cultivating and improving relations with the Arabs. It was headed by Kisch, Jewish
Agency; Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Vaad Leumi; and Haim Margaliot Kalvarisky. e Public
Council of the Lishka Meuchedet included Jewish mayors and deputy mayors. On
Agudat Israel and its cooperation with the Jewish Agency see Yosef Fond, “Into the
Circle: Attempts by Agudat Israel to cooperate with the Jewish Agency,” Israel
(): – [Hebrew].
87.
Pinhas Rutenberg, Head of the Va’ad Leumi, could not attend, but concurred
with Kisch, CZA, J/, Protocol, .
88. Ibid., .
89. Ibid.
90. Davar, January , .
91. Filastin, January , .
92. Kisch, Palestine Diary, February , .
93. Davar, February , .
94. Ibid., January , .
95. NAUK, Mr. Perowne report, Funeral of the late Maulana Mohammed Ali,
Enclosure, Chancellor to Passfield, January .
96. Davar, January , .
97. Filastin, January , .
98. Ibid.
99. Davar, January , .
100. e Palestine Bulletin, January , .
101. Doar Ha’yon, January , .
102. NAUK, Chancellor to Passfield, January , .
103. Davar, September , .
