On 7 March 2014, the International Criminal Court (ICC) rendered its third and arguably most controversial trial judgment
in the case against Germain Katanga. It marks the first final judgment under Article 74 following the discontinuation of both
the Defence and Prosecution appeals. This article analyses the procedural and substantive implications of the decision. While
the judgment makes some important contributions to the development of jurisprudence, it departs significantly from the ‘case’
at pre-trial and contains some inherent contradictions, flawed interpretations and evidentiary weaknesses that are well known
from other Courts and tribunals. Judge Van den Wyngaert’s ‘fundamental dissent’ on key points of law and fact raises doubts
whether the decision meets the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard. Ultimately, the Katanga case highlights continuing challenges related to fairness and trial management at the ICC, including an urgent need to re-consider
the relationship between pre-trial and trial. Its contentious findings leave an incomplete, and partly contradictory picture
of the role of actors in the Ituri crisis, which confirms scepticism about the fact-finding function of international criminal
courts and tribunals.