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The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism
... 4 See, e.g., Ravizza (1994), Fischer and Ravizza (1998, chp. 6), Warfield (1996), Stump and Fischer (2000), Stump (2000), McKenna (2001), Stump (2002), Widerker (2002), Fischer (2004Fischer ( , reprinted in his 2006, Haji (2008), Haji (2010), Shabo (2010a), Hermes (2014b), and Capes (2016). For a helpful review, see Widerker and Schnall (2014). ...
... 6) has made invaluable contributions to discussions of Transfer NR's validity, which include producing preemption-and simultaneous overdetermination-counterexamples (sometimes called "2-path-counterexamples") to Transfer NR. These counterexamples led McKenna (2001) and Stump (2000Stump ( , 2002 to revise Transfer NR, essentially by restricting it to non-preempted and nonoverdetermined cases (sometimes called "1-path cases"). It is in his (2004) response to these new versions of Transfer NR that Fischer makes the dialectical point presently at issue. ...
... Fischer argues that the debate between the compatibilist and the incompatibilist over the Direct Argument has reached a "dialectical stalemate". He (2004, p. 199) concedes, however, that to show that a dialectical stalemate has been reached, one must argue that the inference rule instances provided to support McKenna (2001), Stump (2000) and Stump's (2002) versions of Transfer NR also support to some rival, compatibilist-friendly, inference rule at least as well. (This is consistent with my own suggestions above.) ...
In the early 1980’s van Inwagen presented the Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism with moral responsibility. In the course of the ensuing debate, Fischer, McKenna and Loewenstein have replied, each in their own way, that versions of the Direct Argument do not pose even a prima facie threat to compatibilism. Their grounds were that versions of the Direct Argument all use (some version of) the “Transfer NR” inference rule in a dialectically problematic way. I rebut these replies here. By so doing, I hope to set the Direct Argument debate on a more fruitful path.
The direct argument is among the most prominent arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. Some critics of the argument have accused it, or certain defenses of its central premise, of begging the question. This article responds to that accusation.
Traditionally, incompatibilism has rested on two theses. First, the familiar Principle of Alternative Possibilities says that we cannot be morally responsible for what we do unless we could have done otherwise. Accepting this principle, incompatibilists have then argued that there is no room for such alternative possibilities in a deterministic world. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that incompatibilism about moral responsibility can be defended independently of these traditional theses (Ginet 2005: 604-8; McKenna 2001; Stump 1999: 322-4, 2000 and 2002; van Inwagen 1983: 182-8; and Zagzebski 2000). Incompatibilists of this stripe are generally motivated by the concern that, if determinism is true, we are not genuine or ultimate sources of our actions and, hence, we are not responsible for what we do. Following Michael McKenna (2001), I shall call this view source incompatibilism. While the source incompatibilist's concern is rather vague as stated, it has given rise to a powerful argument against any attempt to reconcile moral responsibility and determinism. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) have labeled this the Direct Argument, as it avoids the detour of alternative possibilities.
Arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility sometimes make use of various transfer of non-responsibility principles. These principles purport to specify conditions in which lack of moral responsibility is transmitted to the consequences of things for which people are not morally responsible. In this paper, after developing what I take to be the most serious objections to extant principles of this sort, I identify and defend a new transfer of non-responsibility principle that is immune to these and other objections. This new principle says, roughly, that if you are not morally responsible for any of the circumstances that led to a particular outcome, and if you are not morally responsible for those circumstances leading to that outcome, then you are not morally responsible for the outcome either. After defending this principle against a number of objections, I use it to argue for the conclusion that no one is even partly morally responsible for anything, if determinism is true.
The truthmaker literature has recently come to the consensus that the logic of truthmaking is distinct from classical propositional logic. This development has huge implications for the free will literature. Since free will and moral responsibility are primarily ontological concerns (and not semantic concerns) the logic of truthmaking ought to be central to the free will debate. I shall demonstrate that counterexamples to transfer principles employed in the direct argument occur precisely where a plausible logic of truthmaking diverges from classical logic. Further, restricted transfer principles (like the ones employed by McKenna, Stump, and Warfield) are as problematic as the original formulation of the direct argument.
Traditionally, incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism claim that we cannot be morally responsible unless we could have done otherwise and that we cannot do otherwise if we are determined. The Direct Argument for incompatibilism supposedly offers its defenders a dialectical advantage over this traditional approach insofar as it does not appear to rely on either of these controversial claims. Recently, though, David Widerker has argued against this supposition and urged that it is time to say farewell to the Direct Argument. I examine two of Widerker’s criticisms and argue that, while they are not compelling, a revised version of one does show that supporters of the Direct Argument will very likely need to deny that an agent could do otherwise if determinism is true. I conclude that, nevertheless, the Direct Argument may still have considerable dialectical appeal and that neither of Widerker’s criticisms should lead us to say goodbye to it just yet.
Traditionally, incompatibilism has rested on two theses. First, the familiar Principle of Alternative Possibilities says that we cannot be morally responsible for what we do unless we could have done otherwise. Accepting this principle, incompatibilists have then argued that there is no room for such alternative possibilities in a deterministic world. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that incompatibilism about moral responsibility can be defended independently of these traditional theses (Ginet 2005: 604-8; McKenna 2001; Stump 1999: 322-4, 2000 and 2002; van Inwagen 1983: 182-8; and Zagzebski 2000). Incompatibilists of this stripe are generally motivated by the concern that, if determinism is true, we are not genuine or ultimate sources of our actions and, hence, we are not responsible for what we do. Following Michael McKenna (2001), I shall call this view source incompatibilism. While the source incompatibilist's concern is rather vague as stated, it has given rise to a powerful argument against any attempt to reconcile moral responsibility and determinism. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) have labeled this the Direct Argument, as it avoids the detour of alternative possibilities. I believe that this argument presents the greatest current challenge to compatibilism regarding determinism and moral responsibility. In fact, I shall argue that the Direct Argument cannot be defeated.
Instead, I conclude that it leads to a dialectical stalemate. While I am not alone on this point, the implications of this stalemate have not been fully appreciated. In particular, I contend that the most plausible conclusion to draw from the current debate is that we should embrace agnosticism about moral responsibility: we simply do not know whether anyone is ever morally responsible for her actions.
My argument is cast against the backdrop of two relatively controversial assumptions. I do not plan on presenting a full defense of either here; however, I would like to give some indication of why I find each plausible enough as a starting point for our discussion. First, I assume that there is currently no compelling evidence that we possess a libertarian free will. Of course, it surely does seem to us that we are free and that, when we act, we could have done otherwise. And there are clearly a number of cases in which agents appear to demonstrate the ability to perform different actions in relevantly similar circumstances. But this cannot amount to compelling evidence for a libertarian account of free will. Otherwise, we would need to accept that the phenomenology of experience and anecdotal evidence concerning our abilities give us deep insight into the causal structure of the world. This I find wildly implausible. Neither direct introspection of the deliberative process nor casual observations of human behavior can tell us whether determinism is true. Of course, it is possible that scientists may one day tell us that the world is indeterministic in just the right sort of way to allow us to exercise libertarian free will. Robert Kane (1996: 128-30), for one, is optimistic about such a prospect. Optimism, however, is not evidence, and we seem to be far away from understanding the inner workings of the mind well enough to make such a case.
While this assumption may appear innocuous enough, I believe that it presents a significant challenge to the commonplace belief that we are morally responsible agents. Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance of this assumption for my argument. In particular, I take it to imply that any successful argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility is also a successful argument for agnosticism about moral responsibility. If moral responsibility requires a certain sort of psychological or neurological indeterminism — and I will argue that, for all we know, it may very well — and if, as I am assume, we do not yet know whether this requirement is met, then we do not yet know whether we are ever morally responsible for what we do. And so, unless every argument for incompatibilism can be decisively defeated, we should be prepared to admit our ignorance.
Second, my argument for agnosticism relies on a particular version of the merit-based account of moral responsibility: an agent is morally responsible for what she has done...
In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free will and moral responsibility, and finally (6) the debate centering on luck.
In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, John Fischer and Mark Ravizza argue against incompatibilist principles of moral responsibility and offer a compatibilist
account of moral responsibility. The book has sparked much discussion and criticism. In this article I point out a significant
flaw in Fischer and Ravizza’s negative arguments against the incompatibilist Principle of the Transfer of Non-Responsibility.
I also criticise their positive argument that moral responsibility for consequences depends on action-responsiveness. In the
former case I argue that their putative counterexamples against Transfer NR and Transfer NR* are underdescribed but once fully
described depend upon consequence-particulars and not consequence-universals as they claim. In the latter case I argue that
their account is unable to cope with quite ordinary cases of jointly determined consequences.
The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents
any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could
have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct
Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing
counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.
In this paper, I distinguish causal from logical versions of the direct argument for incompatibilism. I argue that, contrary
to appearances, causal versions are better equipped to withstand an important recent challenge to the direct-argument strategy.
The challenge involves arguing that support for the argument’s pivotal inference principle falls short just when it is needed
most, namely when a deterministic series runs through an agent’s unimpaired deliberations. I then argue that, while there
are limits to what causal versions can accomplish, they can be used to buttress the ultimacy argument, another important argument
for incompatibilism.
KeywordsIncompatibilism-Direct argument-Determinism-Moral responsibility-Transfer principle-Ultimate responsibility-Michael McKenna
Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism
and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively.
In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does
not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’
limitations, they have not made it clear what the problem with the arguments is supposed to be. I suggest three possibilities,
arguing that none proves to be well founded. I conclude that the scope of these arguments is fully adequate for their defenders’
purposes.
KeywordsIncompatibilism–Direct Argument–Indirect Argument–Campbell–Fischer
Peter van Inwagen contends that nonresponsibility transfers across deterministic relations. Suppose it does. If the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every truth about what one does, and no one is even in part morally responsible for the past and the laws, then no one is even in part morally responsible for what one does. This argument, the Direct Argument, has drawn various critics, who have attempted to produce counterexamples to its core inference principle. This article considers two notable efforts, one by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza and another by David Widerker. It shows that neither is sufficient to reject the Direct Argument. The article then proceeds to challenge the argument in a novel fashion. Van Inwagen has not given us good reason to think that the principle in question has an adequate anchor in our inferential practices, especially in light of the dialectical context with the compatibilist . Hence, it is not the compatibilists' burden to produce counterexamples to it. Rather, it is van Inwagen's burden to produce relevant confirming instances of it.
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