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Significance There is evidence that the 2007−2010 drought contributed to the conflict in Syria. It was the worst drought in the instrumental record, causing widespread crop failure and a mass migration of farming families to urban centers. Century-long observed trends in precipitation, temperature, and sea-level pressure, supported by climate model results, strongly suggest that anthropogenic forcing has increased the probability of severe and persistent droughts in this region, and made the occurrence of a 3-year drought as severe as that of 2007−2010 2 to 3 times more likely than by natural variability alone. We conclude that human influences on the climate system are implicated in the current Syrian conflict.
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Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications
of the recent Syrian drought
Colin P. Kelley
, Shahrzad Mohtadi
, Mark A. Cane
, Richard Seager
, and Yochanan Kushnir
University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106;
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027; and
Earth Observatory, Columbia University, Palisades, NY 10964
Edited by Brian John Hoskins, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom, and approved January 30, 2015 (received for review November 16, 2014)
Before the Syrian uprising that began in 2011, the greater Fertile
Crescent experienced the most severe drought in the instrumental
record. For Syria, a country marked by poor governance and un-
sustainable agricultural and environmental policies, the drought
had a catalytic effect, contributing to political unrest. We show
that the recent decrease in Syrian precipitation is a combination of
natural variability and a long-term drying trend, and the unusual
severity of the observed drought is here shown to be highly unlikely
without this trend. Precipitation changes in Syria are linked to rising
mean sea-level pressure in the Eastern Mediterranean, which also
shows a long-term trend. There has been also a long-term warming
trend in the Eastern Mediterranean, adding to the drawdown of soil
moisture. No natural cause is apparent for these trends, whereas
the observed drying and warming are consistent with model studies
of the response to increases in greenhouse gases. Furthermore,
model studies show an increasingly drier and hotter future mean
climate for the Eastern Mediterranean. Analyses of observations and
model simulations indicate that a drought of the severity and
duration of the recent Syrian drought, which is implicated in the
current conflict, has become more than twice as likely as
a consequence of human interference in the climate system.
climate change
Beginning in the winter of 2006/2007, Syria and the greater
Fertile Crescent (FC), where agriculture and animal herding
began some 12,000 years ago (1), experienced the worst 3-year
drought in the instrumental record (2). The drought exacerbated
existing water and agricultural insecurity and caused massive
agricultural failures and livestock mortality. The most significant
consequence was the migration of as many as 1.5 million
people from rural farming areas to the peripheries of urban
centers (3, 4). Characterizing risk as the product of vulnerability
and hazard severity, we first analyze Syrias vulnerability to
drought and the social impacts of the recent drought leading to
the onset of the Syrian civil war. We then use observations and
climate models to assess how unusual the drought was within the
observed record and the reasons it was so severe. We also show
that climate models simulate a long-term drying trend for the
region as a consequence of human-induced climate change. If
correct, this has increased the severity and frequency of occur-
rence of extreme multiyear droughts such as the recent one. We
also present evidence that the circulation anomalies associated
with the recent drought are consistent with model projections of
human-induced climate change and aridification in the region
and are less consistent with patterns of natural variability.
Heightened Vulnerability and the Effects of the Drought
Government agricultural policy is prominent among the many
factors that shaped Syriasvulnerabilitytodrought.Despitegrowing
water scarcity and frequent droughts, the government of President
Hafez al-Assad (19712000) initiated policies to further increase
agricultural production, including land redistribution and irrigation
projects, quota systems, and subsidies for diesel fuel to garner
the support of rural constituents (59). These policies endangered
without regard for sustainability (10).
One critical consequence of these unsustainable policies is the
decline of groundwater. Nearly all rainfall in the FC occurs during
the 6-month winter season, November through April, and this
rainfall exhibits large year-to-year variability (Figs. 1Aand 2A). In
Syria, the rain falls along the countrys Mediterranean Sea coast
and in the north and northeast, the primary agricultural region.
Farmers depend strongly on year-to-year rainfall, as two thirds of
the cultivated land in Syria is rain fed, but the remainder relies
upon irrigation and groundwater (11). For those farms without
access to irrigation canals linked to river tributaries, pumped
groundwater supplies over half (60%) of all water used for irri-
gation purposes, and this groundwater has become increasingly
limited as extraction has been greatly overexploited (4). The
government attempted to stem the rate of groundwater depletion
by enacting a law in 2005 requiring a license to dig wells, but the
legislation was not enforced (6). Overuse of groundwater has
been blamed for the recent drying of the Khabur River in Syrias
northeast (6). The depletion of groundwater during the recent
drought is clearly evident from remotely sensed data by the
NASA Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE)
Tellus project (Fig. 2C) (12).
The reduced supply of groundwater dramatically increased
Syrias vulnerability to drought. When a severe drought began in
2006/2007, the agricultural system in the northeastern bread-
basketregion, which typically produced over two-thirds of the
countrys crop yields, collapsed (13). In 2003, before the
droughts onset, agriculture accounted for 25% of Syrian gross
domestic product. In 2008, after the driest winter in Syrias ob-
served record, wheat production failed and the agricultural share
fell to 17% (14). Small- and medium-scale farmers and herders
There is evidence that the 20072010 drought contributed to
the conflict in Syria. It was the worst drought in the in-
strumental record, causing widespread crop failure and a mass
migration of farming families to urban centers. Century-long
observed trends in precipitation, temperature, and sea-level
pressure, supported by climate model results, strongly suggest
that anthropogenic forcing has increased the probability of se-
vere and persistent droughts in this region, and made the oc-
currence of a 3-year drought as severe as that of 20072010
2to3timesmorelikelythanbynatural variability alone. We
conclude that human influences on the climate system are
implicated in the current Syrian conflict.
Author contributions: C.P.K., S.M., M.A.C., R.S., and Y.K. designed research; C.P.K. per-
formed research; C.P.K., S.M., M.A.C., R.S., and Y.K. analyzed data; and C.P.K., S.M., M.A.C.,
R.S., and Y.K. wrote the paper.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email:
This article contains supporting information online at
1073/pnas.1421533112/-/DCSupplemental. PNAS Early Edition
suffered from zero or near-zero production, and nearly all of their
livestock herds were lost (15). For the first time since self-suffi-
ciency in wheat was declared in the mid-1990s, Syria was forced to
import large quantities of wheat (13). The droughts devastating
impact on vegetation is clearly evident in Moderate Resolution
Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) Normalized Difference
Vegetative Index (NDVI) version 5 satellite imagery (Fig. 2D)
(16). Atieh El Hindi, the director of the Syrian National Agri-
cultural Policy Center, has stated that between 2007 and 2008,
drought was a main factor in the unprecedented rise in Syrian food
prices; in this single year, wheat, rice, and feed prices more than
doubled (17, 18). By February of 2010, the price of livestock feed
had increased by three fourths, and the drought nearly obliterated
all herds (16, 19). There was a dramatic increase in nutrition-
related diseases among children in the northeast provinces
(20), and enrollment in schools dropped by as much as 80% as
many families left the region (21). Bashar al-Assad, who suc-
ceeded his father in 2000, shiftedtoliberalizingtheeconomyby
cutting the fuel and food subsidies on which many Syrians had
become dependent. These cuts continued despite the drought,
further destabilizing the lives of those affected (22). Rural
Syrias heavy year-to-year reliance on agricultural production
left it unable to outlast a severe prolonged drought, and a mass
migration of rural farming families to urban areas ensued.
Estimates of the number of people internally displaced by the
drought are as high as 1.5 million (3, 4, 13). Most migrated to the
peripheries of Syrias cities, already burdened by strong pop-
ulation growth (2.5% per year) and the influx of an estimated
1.21.5 million Iraqi refugees between 2003 and 2007, many of
whom arrived toward the tail end of this time frame at the begin-
ning of the drought and remained inSyria(23).By2010,internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and Iraqi refugees made up roughly 20%
of Syriasurbanpopulation.ThetotalurbanpopulationofSyriain
2002 was 8.9 million but, by the end of 2010, had grown to 13.8
million, a more than 50% increase in only 8 years, a far greater
rate than for the Syrian population as a whole (Fig. 1D) (24). The
population shock to Syrias urban areas further increased the
strain on its resources (11).
The rapidly growing urban peripheries of Syria, marked by
illegal settlements, overcrowding, poor infrastructure, unemploy-
ment, and crime, were neglected by the Assad government and
became the heart of the developing unrest (13). Thus, the mi-
gration in response to the severe and prolonged drought exacer-
bated a number of the factors often cited as contributing to the
unrest, which include unemployment, corruption, and rampant
inequality (23). The conflict literature supports the idea that rapid
demographic change encourages instability (2527). Whether it
was a primary or substantial factor is impossible to know, but
drought can lead to devastating consequences when coupled with
preexisting acute vulnerability, caused by poor policies and un-
sustainable land use practices in Syrias case and perpetuated by
the slow and ineffective response of the Assad regime (13). Fig. S1
presents a timeline summarizing the events that preceded the
Syrian uprising.
Fig. 1. (A) Six-month winter (NovemberApril mean) Syria area mean precipitation, using CRU3.1 gridded data. (B) CRU annual near-surface temperature (red
shading indicates recent persistence above the long-term normal). (C) Annual self-calibrating Palmer Drought Severity Index. (D) Syrian total midyear pop-
ulation. Based on the area mean of the FC as defined by the domain 30.5°N41.5°N, 32.5°E50.5°E (as shown in Fig. 2). Linear least-squares fits from 1931 to
2008 are shown in red, time means are shown as dashed lines, gray shading denotes low station density, and brown shading indicates multiyear (3) droughts.
| Kelley et al.
The Drought in Context
Having established Syrias vulnerability to droughts, we now ex-
amine the 20072010 drought itself. The severity and persistence
of the drought can be seen in the area mean of FC rainfall
according to the University of East Anglia Climatic Research
Unit (UEA CRU) data (Fig. 1A) and in the two Global Historical
Climatology Network (GHCN) stations located closest to Syrias
northeastern agricultural region, Deir ez-Zor on the Euphrates
River and Kamishli near the Turkish border (Materials and
Methods). The 2007/2008 winter was easily the driest in the ob-
served records. Multiyear drought episodes, here defined as three
or more consecutive years of rainfall below the century-long
normal, occurred periodically over the last 80 years (CRU), in the
late 1950s, 1980s, and 1990s (Fig. 1A, brown shading). Although
less severe, these droughts raise the question of why the effects of
the recent drought were so much more dramatic. We offer three
reasons: (i) the recent demand for available resources was dis-
proportionately larger than in the 1950s; in addition to the recent
emphasis on agricultural production, the total population of
Syria (Fig. 1D) grew from 4 million in the 1950s to 22 million in
recent years; (ii) the decline in the supply of groundwater has
depleted the buffer against years with low rainfall; and (iii) the
recent drought occurred shortly after the 1990s drought, which
was also severe; Syria was far more vulnerable to a severe drought
in the first decade of the 21st century than in the 1950s, and the FC
never fully recovered from the late 1990s drought before collapsing
again into severe drought. In fact, the region has been in moderate
to severe drought from 1998 through 2009, with 7 of 11 years re-
ceiving rainfall below the 19012008 normal. It is notable that three
of the four most severe multiyear droughts have occurred in the last
25 years, the period during which external anthropogenic forcing
has seen its largest increase.
Regional Climate Variability and Trend
Agriculture in Syria depends not only on the precipitation that
falls within Syria and on local groundwater but also on water
from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and their numerous tributaries.
These rivers have long provided water to the region via precipitation
in their headwaters in the mountains of eastern Turkey. Despite
through its upstream placements of dams, Syria and Turkey have
cooperated in recent years, and Turkey increased water flow to
Syria during the recent drought (28). It has been previously
shown that natural winter-to-winter rainfall variability in western
Turkey is due largely to the influence of the North Atlantic
Oscillation (NAO) (29). For eastern Turkey and in Syria and
the other FC countries, however, the NAO influence is weak
or insignificant. This has allowed observational analyses to identify
an externally forced winter drying trend over the latter half of
the 20th century that is distinguishable from natural variability
(3032). Furthermore, global coupled climate models over-
whelmingly agree that this region will become drier in the future
as greenhouse gas concentrations rise (33), and a study using
a high-resolution model able to resolve the complex orography of
the region concluded that the FC, as such, is likely to disappear by
the end of the 21st century as a result of anthropogenic climate
change (34).
That the neighboring regions of southeast Turkey and northern
Iraq also experienced recent drought, to a lesser extent, perhaps
begs the question as to why the effects in Syria were so grave.
Syria was far more vulnerable to drought, given its stronger de-
pendence on year-to-year rainfall and declining groundwater for
agriculture. Water scarcity in Syria has been far more severe than
in Turkey or Iraq, with Syrias total annual water withdrawal as a
percentage of internal renewable water resources reaching 160%,
with Iraq at 80% and Turkey at around 20% in 2011 (35). Fur-
thermore, Turkeys geographic diversity and investment in the
southeast regions irrigation allowed it to better buffer the drought,
whereas the populace in northwest Iraq is far less dependent on
agriculture than their counterparts in northeast Syria (36, 37).
To address the question of whether the recent drought was
made more severe by a contribution from long-term trends, we
first determined the long-term change in winter rainfall. The FC
as a whole has experienced a statistically significant (P<0.05)
winter rainfall reduction (13%) since 1931 (Fig. 1A). Observa-
tional uncertainty was large before 1930 due to sparseness of
station data. Further examination of the linear trends present in
the individual GHCN stations for the FC corroborate the drying
trend, as 5 of 25 stations exhibited a statistically significant (P<
0.1) negative rainfall trend (Fig. 2B). The pattern of this trend
(Fig. 2B) is similar to the climatological rainfall pattern (Fig. 2A),
concentrated along the coast and in northeastern Syria. The long-
term drying trend is closely mirrored by recent changes in satellite
measurements of groundwater (measured in terms of liquid water
equivalent) (Fig. 2C) and, to a lesser extent, by estimates of veg-
etation changes (Fig. 2D).
The annual surface temperature in the FC also increased sig-
nificantly (P<0.01) during the 20th century (Fig. 1B). The warming
in this region since 1901 has outpaced the increase in global
mean surface temperature, with much of this increase occurring
over the last 20 years (all years from 1994 through 2009 were
above the century-long mean) (Fig. 1B, red shading). The trend
during the summer half year (1.2 degrees, Fig. S2) is also impor-
tant, as this is the season of highest evaporation, and winter crops
such as wheat are strongly dependent on reserves of soil moisture.
Reductions in winter precipitation and increases in summer
evaporation both reduce the excess of precipitation over evapo-
ration that sustains soil moisture, groundwater and streamflow.
The recent strong warming is concomitant with the three most
recent severe multiyear droughts, together serving to strongly dry
the region during winter and summer.
The century-long, statistically significant trends in both pre-
cipitation and temperature seen in Fig. 1 suggest anthropogenic
influence and contributed to the severity of the recent drought.
The FC area mean of the self-calibrating Palmer Drought Severity
Fig. 2. (A)Observedwinter(NovemberApril) precipitation climatology,
19312008, UEA CRU version 3.1 data. (B) The spatial pattern of the CRU
change in 6-month winter precipitation from 1931 to 2008 based on
a linear fit (shading); those GHCN stations that indicate a significant (P<0.1)
trend over their respective records are shown as circles and crosses (in-
dicating drying/wetting). (C) The difference in liquid water equivalent (LWE)
between 2008 (annual) and the mean of the previous 6 years using the NASA
GRACE Tellus project data. (D)ThedifferenceintheNormalizedDifference
Vegetation Index (NDVI) between 2008 (annual) and the mean of the previous
Kelley et al. PNAS Early Edition
Index (38), which combines precipitation and temperature as a
proxy for cumulative soil moisture change, also exhibits a signifi-
cant long-term trend (Fig. 1C). Although natural variability on
timescales of centuries or longer cannot be entirely ruled out
for this region, the long-term observed trends and the recent in-
crease in the occurrence of multiyear droughts and in surface
temperature is consistent with the time history of anthropogenic
climate forcing. The case for this influence is supported by
additional modeling and theoretical and observational evi-
dence (see Frequency of Multiyear Droughts,Mechanisms,and
Supporting Information).
Frequency of Multiyear Droughts
For Syria and for the greater FC, natural multiyear droughts
here defined as three or more consecutive years of rainfall below
the long-term normaloccurred periodically during the 20th
century (Fig. 1A). It is a generic property of a time series con-
sisting of a natural oscillatory part and a downward trend that
the minimum is most likely to occur toward the end of the time
period when the negative influence of the trend is greatest and
when the oscillation is also at a minimum. The century-long
trends in precipitation and temperature, here implicated as evi-
dence of anthropogenic influence, point toward them being key
contributors to the recent severe drought. We therefore esti-
mated the increased likelihood of an extreme 3-year drought
such as the recent one due to anthropogenic trend.
We did this in two ways. First we separated the observed an-
thropogenic precipitation trend from the residual, presumably
natural, variability by regressing the running 3-year mean of ob-
served (CRU) 6-month winter precipitation onto the running
3-year mean of observed annual global atmospheric carbon dioxide
) mixing ratios from 19012008 (39, 40). The latter time
series was used as an estimate of the monotonic but nonlinear
change in total greenhouse gas forcing (Materials and Methods).
After removing the CO
fit from the total observed winter pre-
cipitation timeseries (Fig. 3A), we constructed frequency dis-
tributions of the total and residual timeseries (Fig. 3B) and
applied gamma fits to the distributions. The difference in the
total and residual distributions is significant (P<0.06), based on
a KolmogorovSmirnoff test, and is due almost entirely to the
difference in the means. Thresholds are shown at 10%, 5%, and
2% (in percent of the total sample size of 76 3-year means) in the
dry tail for the timeseries (Fig. 3A) and for the distribution of the
total (Fig. 3B). The result is that, when combined, natural vari-
ability and CO
forcing are 2 to 3 times more likely to produce
the most severe 3-year droughts than natural variability alone.
Residual, or natural, events exceeding the 10% threshold of the
total occur less than half as often (3 versus 8, out of 76). For the
residual alone, no values exceed the 5% threshold of the total.
The trend contribution would be quite similar if we simply
calculated a linear time trend. There is no apparent natural ex-
planation for the trend, supporting the attribution to anthropo-
genic greenhouse gases. Further support comes from model
simulations. We used 16 Coupled Model Intercomparison Proj-
ect phase five (CMIP5) models (Materials and Methods and
Table S1) to construct similar distributions, providing a larger
sample size than for the observed 3-year droughts. In this case,
rather than removing the CO
forcing as in the observed case, we
compare the historical and historicalNat runs. The former in-
clude all external forcings during the 20th century, including the
change in greenhouse gas concentrations, whereas the latter in-
clude only the natural forcings (Materials and Methods). In this
analysis, the models were normalized to the observed CRU mean
and standard deviation (SD) (see Fig. S3 for model comparison
before normalizing). The resulting distributions support the ob-
served finding, as the driest 3-year events occur less than half as
often under natural forcing (historicalNat runs) alone (Fig. 3C).
The agreement between the model and observational analysis
results supports the attribution of the century-long negative trend
in precipitation to the rise in anthropogenic greenhouse forcing
and to the role of the latter in the devastating early 21st century
Syrian drought.
We examine the low-level (850 hPa) regional atmospheric circu-
lation by comparing a composite of driest minus wettest winters
(Fig. 4B) to the difference between the periods 19892008 and
19311950, representing the long-term change, or trend (Fig. 4C).
Climatologically, the flow is from the west, bringing moist air
(shading represents specific humidity) in from the Mediterra-
nean Sea and allowing moisture convergence that sustains pre-
cipitation (Fig. 4A). In both the composite dry anomalies and the
trend, the climatological westerly flow is weakened. In both
cases, there is a positive geopotential height anomaly over the
Mediterranean Sea (consistent with higher surface pressure) and
an anomalous anticyclonic (clockwise) circulation (arrows). In
the composite case, this anomaly extends over Turkey and be-
yond the eastern Black Sea, resulting in anomalous northeasterly
flow over the FC, advecting dry air and generating anomalous
moisture divergence. In the trend case, by contrast, the positive
geopotential height anomaly does not extend over most of
Turkey, and the flow anomaly is more northerly over most of the
FC. This difference between the composite and trend anomalies
can be seen in the specific humidity anomalies (Fig. 4 Band C,
1930 1950 1970 1990 2010
2, 5, 10% quantiles
(of total)
CO2 fit
30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
residual (CO2 removed)
total (including CO2)
CRU observed clim. 19312008
2, 5 and 10% quantiles (of total)
30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
histNat (all runs)
hist (all runs)
CRU observed clim. 19312004
2, 5 and 10% quantiles (histobs)
Threeyear running means of Fertile Crescent precipitation
(sixmonth winters, NovApr)
Fig. 3. (A) Timeseries of observed (CRU) 3-year running mean 6-month
winter FC (area mean) precipitation: total (red), CO
fit from regression
(black), and the residual or difference between these (dashed blue). Fre-
quency distributions based on gamma fits of 3-year running mean 6-month
winter FC (area mean) precipitation, for the (B)observeddata(corre-
sponding with above) and (C) CMIP5 model simulations, comparing histori-
cal and histNat runs. Quantile thresholds based on the total (in B) and
historical (in C) are shown at 2%, 5%, and 10% (dotted lines). The tables
indicate the percentage of actual (B) observed (sample size 76) and (C)
model simulated (sample size 46 ×72 for histNat and 69 ×72 for historical)
occurrences exceeding the respective thresholds.
| Kelley et al.
shading); in the composite, the center of the anomaly is located
over the FC and southeastern Turkey and northern Syria, Iraq,
and Iran, whereas in the trend case, it is centered over western
Turkey. Thus, the trend in the circulation enhances drying in
naturally occurring FC dry years by strengthening the northerly
flow, dry air advection, and moisture divergence anomalies. In
20052008, the long-term trend combined with a dry phase of
natural variability to produce the most severe drought in the
instrumental record over the greater FC.
We have here pointed to a connected path running from human
interference with climate to severe drought to agricultural collapse
and mass human migration. This path runs through a landscape of
vulnerability to drought that encompasses government policies
promoting unsustainable agricultural practices, and the failure of
the government to address the suffering of a displaced population.
Our thesis that drought contributed to the conflict in Syria draws
support from recent literature establishing a statistical link between
climate and conflict (2527). We believe that the technical
challenges to this work (41) have been adequately answered
(42, 43). A more fundamental objection (27) is that data-driven
methods do not provide the causal narrative needed to anoint a
theoryof civil conflict, and the quantitative work on climate
and conflict has thus far not adequately accounted for the effects
of poor governance, poverty, and other sociopolitical factors.
Our analysis of the conflict in Syria shows an impact of an extreme
climate event in the context of government failure, exacerbated by
the singular circumstance of the large influx of Iraqi refugees.
Multiyear droughts occur periodically in the FC due to natural
causes, but it is unlikely that the recent drought would have been
as extreme absent the century-long drying trend. We argued,
with support from analyses of observations and climate model
simulations, that the observed long-term trends in precipitation
and temperature are a consequence of human interference with
the climate system. The attribution to anthropogenic causes is also
supported by climate theory and previous studies (see Supporting
Information). Fortunately for this line of argument, this is a region
where models compare reasonably well with 20th century obser-
vations in terms of simulation of the climatology of precipitation
and its trend (44). The strong agreement between observations
and climate model simulations in century-long trends in pre-
cipitation, temperature, and sea-level pressure (Fig. S4) adds
confidence to the conclusion that in this region, the anthropogenic
precipitation signal has already begun to emerge from the natural
noiseand that the recent drought had a significant anthropo-
genic component. It also implies that model future projections of
continued drying for Syria and the FC are reliable.
An abundance of history books on the subject tell us that civil
unrest can never be said to have a simple or unique cause. The
Syrian conflict, now civil war, is no exception. Still, in a recent
interview (45), a displaced Syrian farmer was asked if this was
about the drought, and she replied, Of course. The drought and
unemployment were important in pushing people toward revo-
lution. When the drought happened, we could handle it for two
years, and then we said, Its enough.’” This recent drought was
likely made worse by human-induced climate change, and such
persistent, deep droughts are projected to become more com-
monplace in a warming world.
Materials and Methods
In this study, the winter and summer seasons are represented by the 6-month
periods November through April and May through October, respectively.
Timeseries of FC area means are here defined by the domain 30.5°N41.5°N,
32.5°E50.5°E (as shown in Fig. 2). Three datasets were used for observed
precipitation: the UEACRU version 3.1 (46, 47) and Global Precipitation Cli-
matology Centre v6 (48) gridded (0.5° by 0.5° horizontal resolution) pre-
cipitation data sets and the GHCN beta version 2 station precipitation data
(49). CRU v3.1 was also used for observed surface temperature. We used 16
CMIP5 global climate models (Table S1) assessed in the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment Report. For the 20th century, we
compare the historicalusing all forcings and historicalNatsimulations
including natural forcings only. To compare with 20th century observations,
Fig. 4. The 6-month winter low-level (850 hPa) horizontal winds (arrows)
and specific humidity (shading) for the period 19312008. Shown are the (A)
climatology, (B) composite difference between driest and wettest years (those
outside of ±1SD)and(C) the change, or difference between the recent 20
years and the 20 years at the beginning of the period.
Kelley et al. PNAS Early Edition
we first linearly interpolated the models to the same 0.5° by 0.5° horizontal
grid as the CRU observations. To determine the change due to trend, we
applied linear least-squares fits, except in the case of the estimation of mul-
tiyear droughts, when regression onto global CO
mixing ratios was used. For
the latter, this nonlinear detrending provided a more conservative estimate of
the residual than linear detrending. We also examined the sensitivity of using
global mean surface temperature rather than CO
and found almost no dif-
ference in the resulting residual. For analysis of the regional circulation, we
used the Twentieth Century Reanalysis Project, with a horizontal resolution of
2° by 2° (50). For composites, dry and wet years are here defined as those
outside of ±1 SD (based on the CRU 19312008 period).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We thank Dr. Dipali Mukhopadhyay for her gener-
ous assistance and outstanding advice, as well as Yuma Shinohara for his
assistance in creating Fig. S1.ThanksalsogotoDr.YotamMargalitand
to Lina Eklund for feedback and advice, and to Dr. Tahsin Tonkaz for field-
work support. We thank the Global Decadal Hydroclimate group at the
LamontDoherty Earth Observatory and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
for their support and funding. The authors were supported by the follow-
ing grants: Office of Naval Research Award N00014-12-1-0911, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Award NA10OAR4310137
(Global Decadal Hydroclimate Predictability, Variability and Change),
and Department of Energy Award SC0005107. This is LamontDoherty
Earth Observatory Contribution 7871.
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| Kelley et al.
... Wennersten and Robbins state that despite all the arguments surrounding to what extent climate change causes poverty, conflict, war and persecution, climate change made the world's most significant refugee crisis in recent times in Syria more likely to happen. The international scientific community has acknowledged the links between climate change and hyper urbanisation of climate-displaced people and believes that precipitation changes in Syria are linked to rising sea-level pressure in the Eastern Mediterranean and that there is no apparent natural cause for this increase [17] (p. 3241). ...
... 3241). Colin P. Kelly et al. highlight their substantial evidence that the 2007-2010 drought in Syria contributed to the conflict in Syria and century-long trends observing trends in precipitation, temperature and sealevel pressure suggest that anthropogenic forcing has increased the probability of similar droughts in MENA [17] (p. 3241). ...
... The scientific analysis between the relationship of migration of climate-displaced people and the civil war is quite shocking and highlights the true extent of human interaction into the climate system which has historically been implemented through western human interaction and has ultimately affected the contemporary human experience in the global south, particularly in MENA, of suffering and violence. Subsequently, scientific observations indicate that desertification and water scarcity in Syria has become "more than twice as likely as a consequence of human interference in the climate system [17] (p. 3241). ...
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This article critically reviews the idea of economic diversification of green social capital in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) through renewable and sustainable energy projects that strive to tackle climate change and alleviate the negative consequences of human interaction in the ecological system. The western dominance and monopolisation of natural resources has caused an unlevel playing field for development, economic advancement and climate change in the region through the imbalance of power in the oil market. The reliance on oil could affect the development in the region with long-term financial recession due to heavy reliance on the resource. These challenges posit a question for the Middle East: (1) how can the region adopt a transition to a diverse economic framework that is less reliant on oil, and (2) since the phenomenon of climate change does not discriminate its adverse effects on the global community, including the aspect of international political economy in the region, in what ways are the MENA nations planning to stimulate sustainable economic development via green social capital? Our review for these issues is based on a qualitative approach and is methodologically centred upon selected case studies and document analysis of literature on economic diversification and sustainable ecological innovations via green social capital enterprises in the MENA region. We argue that green social capital, as opposed to traditional capitalism, has positive effects in the MENA region such as creating new job opportunities, boosting the economy and developing knowledge on climate change. The green social capital approach is viewed to continue to have positive results in the region through investment, the collaboration between the public sector and private enterprises and creating innovative ideas. Green social capital is not perfect by any means, but the method is diverse from traditional capitalism which can benefit the population in the global south, particularly in the MENA region.
... Anecdotal evidence points to the possibility that the current civil war in Syria might have been triggered by a severe drought related to climate change. Kelley, Mohtadi, Cane, Seager, and Kushnir (2015) argued that the unusually long drought of 2007-2010 in Syria led to the displacement of a large number of young men and women. Even though Syria is located in what is called the Fertile Crescent, reaching from the south of Turkey to the Nile Delta in Egypt, the country suffered failed harvests for several years in a row. ...
Today’s investors need to understand geopolitical trends as a main driving force of markets. This book provides just that: an understanding of the interplay between geopolitics and economics, and of the impact of that dynamic on financial markets.
... This revealed that the regions with the highest number of recorded conflicts, namely the Middle East (86), Eastern Africa (75), and Central and Southern Asia (73) (Fig. 4), all largely fell within climate zone B (see Fig. 3). This zone consists of desert and steppe areas, generally dry areas that tend to experience low precipitation, often leading to increased drought risk and water insecurity (Kelley et al., 2015). However, these regions, apart from Eastern Africa, also showed high numbers of cooperation events, with 411 in the Middle East (highest across all regions), and 199 in Central and Southern Asia. ...
Despite strong interest and conflict research spanning multiple disciplines, connections between water flows and conflicts remain unclear, due to incomplete datasets on water-related conflict-cooperation events and poor understanding of socioeconomic and biophysical causes of such conflicts. The dataset on water-related conflict-cooperation events compiled in this study extends to 2019, updating previous datasets that covered only up to 2008, yielding important new insights on cooperation-conflict trends. Global and regional trends were analyzed using the new events dataset, together with changes in hydroclimatic variables and population density. The analysis revealed that water-related cooperation was far more common than conflicts across all regions, in both drier and wetter climates, indicating that abundance and lack of water can both promote cooperation. However, conflict events were more common in drier climates where water is scarcer. This cooperation-conflict balance shifted in the 2000s, with conflict events increasing, to outnumber cooperation events in 2017. The main shift occurred in Africa and Asia, where increased conflicts in Africa coincided with a prolonged period of below-average precipitation and severe drought, while the shift in Asia coincided with increased evapotranspiration caused by human activities and increased population density. Differences between regions were confirmed by event descriptions, with events in Africa relating to water access and farmer-herder conflicts, and events in Asia relating to irrigation and dam construction. These differences highlight the need for regional-scale analysis of water-related conflict-cooperation trends and pathways. With climate change and human activities expected to increase, the increasing trend in conflict events could persist, with water resources becoming a more frequent cause of future conflict. Identifying these complex cooperation-conflict changes is vital in determining future actions required to reduce conflict events and promote cooperation on water.
... Currently, four billion people live under the conditions of severe water scarcity for more than a month per year, and half a billion people even face severe water scarcity all year round [1][2][3]. To address this widespread, devastating problem, tremendous efforts have been made to develop novel water treatment technologies for freshwater production from seawater or contaminated water. ...
Owing to the intermittent nature of solar energy, the water generation yield of interfacial solar vapor generation during the nighttime is limited. Herein, we propose a phase change material (PCM)-integrated solar vapor generator to address this limitation. Specifically, three types of polyethylene glycol (PEG800, PEG1500, PEG2000)/expanded graphite (EG) form-stable PCMs (FSPCMs) with different thermophysical properties were fabricated. Upon comparing the performances of the three FSPCMs, PEG1500/EG was found to be the optimal specimen and the associated mechanism was discussed in detail. Further, a proof-of-concept evaporator was assembled to find that the all-day mass change of the FSPCM-integrated solar vapor generator was 1.5 times that of the conventional evaporator and 3.0 times that of pure water. Moreover, the mass change of the FSPCM-integrated solar vapor generator during the night was 3.6 times that of the conventional evaporator. Benefiting from the thermal energy storage capacity of the prepared FSPCMs, the FSPCM-integrated solar vapor generator can store the extra energy of the sun in the daytime and achieve continuous vapor generation in both daytime and nighttime. Furthermore, COMSOL simulations indicate that the overall performance of the FSPCM-integrated solar vapor generator can be further improved because the FSPCM module has good scalability. In a word, this study provides a novel strategy to effectively improve the all-day vapor generation yield of interfacial solar vapor generation and inspires further research aimed at the use of thermal storage technology to enable round-the-clock solar vapor generation.
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Detecting the characteristics and variability of droughts is of crucial importance. In this study, Guizhou Province in China is selected as the target area, and the dataset there covering daily precipitation and drought records from 1960 to 2016 is adopted. The spatial and temporal differences in yearly and seasonal Dnp (the drought indicator of continuous days without available precipitation) values and longest Dnp as well as their trends are examined. Then the Dnp values and droughts are classified into different categories, and the relationships between Dnp and droughts are revealed. There was a steep increasing trend in yearly Dnp with a rate of 6 d/10a, and the Mann–Kendall (MK) value was estimated to be 5.05 in the past 56 years. The seasonal Dnp values showed significant increasing trends. Yearly and seasonal Dnp varied significantly in the space domain. There were slight increases in yearly and four seasonal longest Dnp values in the time domain. Although the increases in the spring and summer were not significant, heavy droughts tended to occur at this time. As to the Dnp values corresponding to different levels of droughts, there was only a decrease in mild drought, while there were significant increases in mild, moderate, and heavy droughts. The mild droughts increased significantly in summer, and the moderate droughts increased significantly in spring. Different levels of Dnp also varied in the spatial domain. The elevation effect is not obvious in Guizhou province.
The Holocaust and today's climate emergency are not obvious bed fellows. But the post-Holocaust mantra “never again” has also been voiced by some climate activists who see similarities in the failure of Western governments in the 1930s to act to stop Hitler and an equivalent failure now to effectively halt state and corporate drives to biospheric catastrophe. This article examines whether the way Western society has understood the Holocaust in recent decades has relevance to the urge for climate action. It finds the mainstream, state-centred Holocaust paradigm wanting as a framework for empathy and solidarity with those in the Global South who will continue to suffer most as the environmental crisis magnifies. But with the likelihood of an explosion of environmental refugees across the world in coming decades and the increasing exclusion of those deemed outside the universe of obligation, it posits that Holocaust resonances are especially relevant in the here and now. In particular, it urges that the state of siege and exception likely to become prevalent as societies increasingly turn nationally populist and violent in the face of climate breakdown, demands a transformation of the Holocaust paradigm into one of active, grass-roots voice, speaking truth to power.
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Çağımızın en büyük çevre sorunu olarak görülen antropojenik iklim değişikliğinin, doğal ve beşeri sistemlere yansımaları büyük oranda olumsuz olacaktır. İklimsel elamanlardaki anormalliklere bağlı olarak, atmosferik doğal afetlerin sıklığında ve şiddetinde anlamlı artışlar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunun sonucu olarak da bireysel ve kitlesel göçler yaşanmış ve gelecekte bu göçlerin daha da artacağı tahmin edilmektedir. Uluslararası literatüre baktığımızda bu göçlere dair ilk çalışmaların 1970’lerde, buna karşılık Türkiye’de ise konuyla ilgili az sayıdaki çalışmanın, 2000’lerden sonra yapıldığı görülür. Bu yönüyle bakıldığında antropojenik iklim değişikliğinin neden olduğu göçler, akademi için yeni bir araştırma alanıdır. İklimsel parametrelerdeki anlamlı farklılaşmalara bağlı olarak henüz çok yeni olan bu olgunun, özellikle kapsam ve etkileri itibariyle gelecekte çok daha yoğun bir şekilde gündeme geleceği aşikârdır. Bu bakımdan böylesine önemli bir konuda yapılmış çalışmaların genel bir literatür bilgisini sunmak, konunun özünün anlaşılması açısından önemlidir. Tam da buradan hareketle iklimsel göçleri konu edinen bu çalışmada hem küresel hem de ulusal ölçekte yapılmış çalışmaların genel bir bilgisinin eleştirel bakış açısıyla verilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Genel bulgulara bakıldığında, iklimsel göçleri konu edinen literatür, hem yeni bir alan olması hem de iklimin kaotik yapısı hasebiyle farklı metotların denendiği kısmen zengin fakat bazı yönleriyle de sorunlu bir içerik ile temsil edilmektedir. Ayrıca az sayıda yapılmış çalışma ile birlikte ki bunların büyük bir bölümü de derleme şeklinde olup konunun Türkiye ölçeğinde neredeyse hiç tartışılmadığı görülür. İklimin yapısındaki istikrarlı değişimin yol açacağı sonuçları düşünecek olursak bu meselenin gelecekte çok önemli bir yer kaplayacağı aşikardır. Bu nedenle güvenirliliği daha yüksek karma yöntemlerin denendiği çalışmalara ağırlık vermek gerekir.
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Environmental change is a main consideration encompassing numerous perplexing philanthropic emergency and developing political and wellbeing worldwide difficulties, with Africa perceived as one of the most weak problem area districts to the damming results of environmental change. Nations in Africa are especially presented to the outcomes of environmental change. Environment disparity exists; regardless of Africa contributing relatively little to the anthropogenic reasons for climatic change, people living in this landmass face the most exceedingly terrible unfriendly impacts. The reason for this study is to look at the causes and association between environmental change and political unsteadiness in the African states. To this degree, it explored where and how environmental change presents dangers to solidness in Africa. For exact investigation, temperature and precipitation information addressing environmental change, political shakiness and struggle information are utilized. According to discoveries, there is a causal relationship from environmental change to struggle and political precariousness in African states. Consequently, observational outcomes support the presumption that environmental change goes about as a danger multiplier in African nations since it sets off, speeds up and develops the ongoing hazards.
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The hydrological cycle in the Mediterranean region, as well as its change over the coming decades, is investigated using the Interim European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts Re-Analysis (ERA-Interim) and phase 5 of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5) historical simulations and projections of the coming decades. The Mediterranean land regions have positive precipitation minus evaporation, P - E, in winter and negative P - E in summer. According to ERA-Interim, positive P - E over land in winter is sustained by transient eddy moisture convergence and opposed by mean flow moisture divergence. Dry mean flow advection is important for opposing the transient eddy moisture flux convergence in the winter half year and the mass divergent mean flow is a prime cause of negative P - E in the summer half year. These features are well reproduced in the CMIP5 ensemble. The models predict reduced P - E over the Mediterranean region in the future year-round. For both land and sea, a common cause of drying is increased mean flow moisture divergence. Changes in transient eddy moisture fluxes largely act diffusively and cause drying over the sea and moistening over many land areas to the north in winter and drying over western land areas and moistening over the eastern sea in summer. Increased mean flow moisture divergence is caused by both the increase in atmospheric humidity in a region of mean flow divergence and strengthening of the mass divergence. Increased mass divergence is related to increased high pressure over the central Mediterranean in winter and over the Atlantic and northern Europe in summer, which favors subsidence and low-level divergence over the Mediterranean region.
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Most migration literature focuses on large scale movements of people across country borders, while the internal migration trends of countries are commonly neglected, despite the fact that the understanding of internal migration trends is crucial for planning the future for a country. In Iraq a major reason for migration has been security - a direct result of its turbulent history since the 1980's. More recently, the Kurdistan Region in Iraq has stabilized which has led to more voluntary population movements, such as economic migration. This paper seeks to investigate the internal and external movements in Duhok Governorate, Kurdistan, Iraq, during the past decade. This is done by looking at reasons for migration, characteristics of the migrants, and the time for migration. Data on migration, environment, and rural livelihoods were collected through 606 interviews in rural villages in Duhok Governorate. Additionally, 600 interviews were conducted in the urban areas of Duhok, Semel, Zakho, and Amedi, in order to capture the rural to urban migration. The study found economic reasons to be the main motivation for migration, closely followed by family/marriage. Contradicting common notions of urbanization, there is a trend of urban to rural migration for households. Individuals, however, are more prone to migrate abroad or from rural to urban areas. Environmental migration is low and can be explained by the low dependence on agriculture in the region.
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This report aims to inform and stimulate the debate on key policy priorities for poverty reduction and food security in light of the Arab Awakening. Its findings are based on an innovative combination of datasets and rigorous economic analysis. Results suggest that poverty and income inequality in the Arab world are likely higher than official numbers have long suggested. Given that poverty indicators seem to be misleading for many countries in the region, the report introduces a new welfare measure reflecting food insecurity risks at both national and household levels to classify Arab countries into five risk groups. Regression analyses further show that, unlike in the rest of the world, manufacturing- and service sector–led growth, rather than agriculture-led growth, is most pro-poor in Arab countries. In addition, high levels of public spending in the Arab world do not do as much to stimulate growth as in other world regions, particularly in the case of education. Three key policy recommendations emerge from this report: (1) improve data and capacity as the basis for evidence-based decisionmaking, (2) foster growth that enhances food security at national and household levels, and (3) significantly enhance the efficiency and retool the allocation of public spending. More generally, the report argues that the region urgently needs national dialogues about societies’ joint vision and economic development strategies. Successful design and implementation of these strategies will require visionary leadership, sound laws and institutions, politicians who are accountable and listen to the voices of the people, and civil society that is patient and accepts the tenets of democracy. The Arab world is awake—it is time to move forward.
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A recent Climatic Change review article reports a remarkable convergence of scientific evidence for a link between climatic events and violent intergroup conflict, thus departing markedly from other contemporary assessments of the empirical literature. This commentary revisits the review in order to understand the discrepancy. We believe the origins of the disagreement can be traced back to the review article’s underlying quantitative meta-analysis, which suffers from shortcomings with respect to sample selection and analytical coherence. A modified assessment that addresses some of these problems suggests that scientific research on climate and conflict to date has produced mixed and inconclusive results.
Water-related development projects on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers have been highly contested over the last four decades and have caused relations between the riparian states, i.e. Turkey, Syria and Iraq, to become highly strained and serious crises occurred. All co-riparian states are unilaterally strengthening their efforts to develop water resources to increase their hydropower potential, and to extend their irrigated agricultural areas. These activities pose the main threat to their mutual relations, and to date, the riparians have failed to achieve a common agreement. Since major non-water issues are now solved, or are at least approached, in a more pragmatic manner, the prospects for joint initiatives have improved. Figure 1 shows a map of the two rivers, their main tributaries and selected dams. Table 1 and Table 2 provide an overview of the context for cooperation on both rivers.
Precipitation plays an important role in the global energy and water cycle. With regard to land use, agriculture and hydrology, accurate knowledge of precipitation amounts reaching the land surface is of special importance for fresh water assessment and management on all spatial scales. With respect to the global climate change and the needs for its assessment, the international organizations initialized a variety of research and monitoring programmes. In this framework, the Global Precipitation Climatology Centre (GPCC) has been established in 1989 on request of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). It is operated by Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD, National Meteorological Service of Germany) as a German contribution to the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP). From the origin, the centre is a component of the WCRP Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP). Later (1994), the long-term operation of the GPCC has been requested by WMO with regard to the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS). The products of the GPCC, gauge-based gridded precipitation data sets for the global land surface, are used world-wide by various institutions, in particular within water-related projects of WMO, FAO, UNESCO and UNEP. Analyses of time-series of area-averaged precipitation covering the periods from 1901 (resp. 1951) to present are currently carried out. They are of special interest for CLIVAR and GCOS and will support IPCC assessment. The aim of the GPCC is to serve different user requirements regarding on the one side the accuracy of the gridded precipitation results depending on the number of stations used, and on the other side the timeliness of the product availability. GEWEX for instance requests high spatial resolution and accuracy for the recent decade, while the priority of GCOS and IPCC is focused on long homogeneous time-series. Suitable products are realized by cut-off dates for data extraction and analysis corresponding to the application type. All gauge-based analysis products (except the 50-year climatology) result from the same quasi-operational data management and analysis system, but they differ with regard to the number of the stations included and the level of data quality control being performed. The gridded data sets are available in the spatial resolutions of 1.0° by 1.0° and 2.5° by 2.5° geographical latitude by longitude. Corresponding to international agreement, the gridded products are freely available on the Internet. In the year 2002, more than 200,000 accesses on GPCC's Website have been counted.
Few countries experience such an extraordinarily high degree of variability in national cereal production as Syria. In 1986, for example, national bar-ley production was only 15 percent of the previous year's production (Bakour 1984, p. 8). Such fluctuations are a long-standing phenomenon and originate largely from Syria's highly variable rainfall. There is evi-dence that the variability of national cereal production has increased in recent years, and this may be related to change in technology and agricul-tural policy. This chapter examines recent changes in the patterns of variability in Syrian cereal production. Variance decomposition is used to identify the importance of various contributing factors to the increase in variability.