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Framing yourself into a corner: Russia, Crimea, and the minimal action space
Abstract
A long-held axiom, political leaders are said to favour an action space sufficiently wide to allow them, as a minimum, a face-saving exit. This makes it particularly interesting for us to study those rare cases where political leaders seem to be deliberately reducing their policy options to the point of having merely one line to pursue. The handling by Russian President Vladimir Putin of the early 2014 crisis over Crimea, eventually leading to the annexation by Russia of the Ukrainian Peninsula on 21 March 2014, seems to represent such a rare case. Through the use of state-controlled media, a highly dichotomized framing of the crisis was presented to the Russian audience, essentially leaving Putin with just the one option of acting to “save” the Crimeans from the Ukrainian Government by bringing them into Russia.
... According to Splidsboel (2015), the invasion and annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 led to the beginning of a full-blown conflict between the two countries and the annexation of Crimea was made official through a referendum that was slanted toward the propaganda of demonisation of the Ukrainian authority and the control of the voting process. Splidsboel (2015) also argued that the invasion and annexation of Crimea peninsula in 2014 led to the beginning of (Szostok, Gluszek-Szafraniec & Guzek, 2016;Clapp, 2022). ...
... According to Splidsboel (2015), the invasion and annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 led to the beginning of a full-blown conflict between the two countries and the annexation of Crimea was made official through a referendum that was slanted toward the propaganda of demonisation of the Ukrainian authority and the control of the voting process. Splidsboel (2015) also argued that the invasion and annexation of Crimea peninsula in 2014 led to the beginning of (Szostok, Gluszek-Szafraniec & Guzek, 2016;Clapp, 2022). Without providing any explanation, Russia began moving troops and military equipment, including armour, missiles and other heavy weaponry, near its border with Ukraine in 2021. ...
This study sought to evaluate corporate social responsibility in war ridden-zones of Russia and Ukraine. The objective was to find out how CSR can and if any, has been used by multinational organisations in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. The researchers made used of the stakeholder theory as theoretical framework and the library research method was adopted. Findings from the study showed that CSR is also applicable in war-ridden zones and that over 50 multinational companies have carried out different corporate social responsibility works in support of Ukraine while boycotting Russia in a bid to dissuading the latter from its assault on the former. The findings also showed that if appropriately carried out, organisations can use CSR to mitigate the effect of war on stakeholders and to some extent, even curb war. As a result, the researchers recommended that organisations, especially multinational organisations should educate their employees on measures of carrying effective CSR in times of war as such measures are often not the same in times of peace.
... This is particularly important to understand, since the emerging economies of Eastern Europe are now faced with critical societal choices (Langmead et al., 2009;O'Higgins et al., 2014) about their future use of the Black Sea and its catchments. Recovery is by no means assured (Oguz and Velikova, 2010), especially in the context of current regional geopolitical instability (Christakis, 2015;Hansen, 2015). However, there are encouraging signs of the adoption of contemporary adaptive management approaches (Mee, 2005;Douvere and Ehler, 2011;Dungaciu, 2015), including the declaration of a 4,025 km 2 marine reserve within the area of the former "Zernov's Phyllophora Field" (ZPF) (Kostylev et al., 2010). ...
... It is ironic that the observed turnaround in nutrient inputs to the Black Sea is in large part due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing social and political restructuring of the region (Rabotyagov et al., 2014), rather than the co-ordinated actions of interested parties, as well as European Union regulations governing nutrient inputs via the Danube (Artioli et al., 2008). At present, the region faces significant geopolitical instability (Christakis, 2015;Hansen, 2015) and stark choices about the future use of the resources of the Black Sea and its catchments (Langmead et al., 2009;O'Higgins et al., 2014;Dungaciu, 2015). It is therefore critically important that the regional players, including the EU, recognise the progress that has been made, and continue to press for regional-scale agreements in areas such as nutrient inputs and fisheries management (O'Higgins et al., 2014), as well as a commitment to long-term studies (McCrackin et al., 2016). ...
The north-west shelf of the Black Sea has suffered well-documented declines in biodiversity since the 1960s, and by the 1990s was considered a dead zone with virtually no sign of macroscopic epibenthic life. It was characterised by high levels of anthropogenic input, massive phytoplankton blooms, and periodically hypoxic to anoxic bottom waters. An important contributor to primary production on the northwest shelf is the red alga Phyllophora spp. growing in waters to 70 m depth. Phyllophora is a habitat forming taxon supporting complex assemblages of bivalves, sponges, and ascidians, with an associated rich fish fauna. From 1990 on, nutrient loads entering the system plummeted and the severity of algal blooms decreased. Changes to benthic communities, however, were far less rapid, and the trajectory and rate of any recovery of the dead zone, in particular Zernov’s Phyllophora Field, is far from certain. This study used towed underwater video imagery from research cruises in summer 2006 and spring 2008 to classify and map macro-epibenthic assemblage structure, and related this to putative physical, chemical and spatial drivers. Distinct and relatively stable benthic communities were in evidence across the northwest shelf at that time. These communities were largely structured by substrate type and depth, but there is some evidence that nutrients continued to play a role. Phyllophora spp. was present across much, but not all, of its former range, but at far lower percent cover than previously. The pattern of abundance of Phyllophora in 2006–2008 did not correlate with the documented pre-eutrophication pattern from 1966. There is some evidence that faster-growing opportunistic species have hindered recovery. We conclude that while there was evidence of sustained recovery, by 2008 the macro-epibenthic communities of the northwest shelf of the Black Sea were far from their pre-eutrophication state.
... Previous research on the role of television during the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 was mainly concerned with news broadcasts (cf. e. g., Hansen 2015;Khaldarova 2016;Pasitselska 2017) or the influence of television on social media (e. g., Cottiero et al. 2015;Khaldarova & Pantti 2016). However, the popular and widespread TV talk show received only nominal attention. ...
This article examines the war discourse on Russian television, particularly in political talk show broadcasts aired after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The question of how the two conflicting parties, Russia and Ukraine, are portrayed verbally and visually in these shows is specifically emphasized. While the quantitative analysis traces a massive increase in Russian talk show broadcasts since the beginning of the war, the Critical Discourse Analysis demonstrates which strategies are utilized to demonise and defame the Ukrainian side and to legitimise the war. By comparing the current war discourse with the Ukraine discourse in 2014, this study shows that talk shows have undertaken a significant role in supporting the war and have become a puissant didactic tool to influence and manipulate public opinion by perennially repeating key governmental messages and efficiently orchestrating all visual, verbal, and non-verbal means at their disposal.
... I analyse weekly news programmes from Channel One Russia and from RT. Their selection as materials for the analysis is explained by channels' relative similarity in a sense that both of them are major Russian state-controlled TV channels helping the Russian regime to achieve its communication goals (Hansen 2015;Unwala & Ghori 2015); and, at the same time, by the crucial differences between the information environments in which channels' audiences live. The latter fact makes Channel One Russia and RT adjust their communication strategies to their audiences in order to maximise the outcome fruitful for the regime. ...
The central role of mass communication in the construction of crises, threats and enemies was acknowledged decades ago. In those cases when media reporting about crises, threats and enemies is studied, it is predominately done based on the media content from Western liberal democracies. The article broadens the usual framework of research on this topic by empirically studying the securitisation and enmification campaign performed by TV channels of an autocracy through the lens of agenda-setting and framing theories. In other words, this article helps understand how the Russian regime securitises political issues and constructs enemies. In particular, eight weekly news programmes by Russian state-controlled Channel One Russia and RT (former Russia Today) covering the period of the Euromaidan, Annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas are studied in order to address the question of how the channels’ strategies of setting their agendas and framing the covered events contributed to the construction of a Nazi enemy that has to be fought.
... The Russian military involvement in Crimea in 2014, however, became the spark that ignited the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine on the world stage, and the interests of international players such as the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN) in the rift showed the difficulties in settling the dispute as a direct result of Vladimir Putin's hard neo-imperial foreign policy (Pifer 2016). Splidsboel (2015) argues that the invasion and annexation of the Crimea peninsula in 2014 led to the beginning of a full-blown conflict between the two countries, and the Crimea annexation was made official through a referendum that was slanted toward the propaganda of demonisation of the Ukrainian authority and the control of the voting process. In 2021, without providing any explanation, Russia started moving troops and military equipment (including armour, missiles, and other heavy weaponry) near its border with Ukraine, and on the 24th of February 2022, Russia began its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and this invasion has led to a full-scale ongoing war between the two countries. ...
Purpose
The mass media have continued to be significant news sources for human society, particularly during conflict and war. The media dependency theory posits that during crisis or instability, society relies more on traditional and new media to help it understand the developments in the war. This article investigated the frequency of the coverage of the Russia–Ukraine War by Sahara Reporters and Premium Times , ascertained the most dominant tone used by Sahara Reporters and Premium Times in the reporting of the Russian–Ukraine War, and unfurled the frame of coverage of Russian–Ukraine War by Sahara Reporters and Premium Times .
Theoretical and Methodical Considerations
Anchored in Robert Entman’s Framing Theory, online publications of Sahara Reporters and Premium Times from March 2022 to September 2022 served as the population of the study and the census sampling technique was used to draw a sample for the study. The explanation-building model was the method of data analysis.
Findings
Results showed that Sahara Reporters and Premium Times reports on the 2022 Russian–Ukraine War were frequent. Also, they paid more attention to the impacts of the war on Nigerian emigrants or students overseas in Russia and Ukraine.
Implications
Our findings suggest that online newspapers mostly toned the Russian–Ukraine War in negative slants and framed the stories highlighting the impact of the war on Nigerians, especially Nigerian students in Russia and Ukraine.
Value
The article brings a new perspective to the Russian–Ukraine War in media scholarship by examining Nigeria’s online news reporting of the Russian–Ukraine conflict. It is, therefore, recommended that Nigerian online newspapers not solely focus on negative reports of the war and its implications for stakeholders in Nigeria. They should adopt a more diverse range of frames and tones in their coverage, to influence stakeholders to take action to prevent wars and hold the Nigerian government accountable for providing adequate infrastructure and human capital that discourages emigration in search of a better life both academically and otherwise.
... Subsequently, these aggressive attacks were more and more frequently targeted at Ukraine. The most important events in this context are: the Russian Ukrainian conflict over the island of Tuzla in -European candidate Viktor Yushchenko (the perpetrators have not been identified) and undisguised Russian support for the other candidate Viktor Yanukovych (who nevertheless could not become president because of the Orange Revolution in 2004(Karatnycky, 2005); regular visits to Crimea by the mayor of Moscow and other Russian politicians, who repeatedly stated that the peninsula had been handed over to Ukraine illegally (Hansen, 2015); and the intensification of Russian propaganda spreading messages about the ethnic division in Ukraine and the oppression of the rights of Russian-speakers. Since then, the Russian media has consistently portrayed Ukraine as a failed state; a non-viable entity; a mistake of history; an artificial crumbling construct of hostile forces; and have argued that Ukrainians are an integral part of the Russian people (Fedor, 2015;Hutchings, 2015;Lupion, 2018;Pomerantsev, 2015). ...
The paper examines peculiarities and futures of the Ukrainian Russian war, the hot phase of which began in February, 2022. Using causal layered analysis, the reasons for the large-scale war as well as underlying theories, worldviews and myths are identified and linked together. The main factors that have not allowed Russia to achieve the expected results in the first two months of the invasion are identified. The analysis concludes with four scenarios for future developments: “westernisation”, “Ukraine’s own way”, “postponed war”, and “apocalypse”.
... Rightly or wrongly, Russian leaders also feared that Ukraine's association with the EU might be a backdoor to NATO membership. These discursive patterns among Kremlin officials, which are well documented in the existing literature, enabled and partially motivated Russia's annexation of Crimea (Casier, 2016;Hansen, 2015;Hopf, 2016). 4 By taking over the peninsula, Moscow established direct control over the part of Ukraine with the closest ethno-linguistic, cultural, and historical ties to Russia. ...
This article explores Russia’s attack on Ukraine using the lens of strategic culture. Specifically, two strands in Russian strategic culture are identified. The first is a deep-seated sense of vulnerability, especially vis-à-vis “the West.” To counter this perceived threat, Russia’s national security establishment has long emphasized the importance of possessing strategic depth and buffer zones. The second strand revolves around a feeling of entitlement to great power status. A central component in Russia’s great power vision is the right to have a sphere of influence in its Eurasian neighborhood. The article shows that Kremlin officials perceived Ukraine’s drift toward the West as a major threat to both Russia’s security interests and its status aspirations. As a result, Russia’s rhetorical milieu regarding Ukraine became increasingly radicalized. The article concludes that this provided the discursive and intellectual habitat that enabled Putin to launch a large-scale attack.
... Sin duda, son dos formas más que interesantes de alcanzar tales ideas, de hecho, si recurrimos a aportes como el de Benoit et al. (2018), podríamos fusionar ambos constructos. De este modo, asistimos a una evolución donde los aspectos macro de los marcos, se ven, en cierta medida, virados por el influjo de microframes (Hansen, 2015). O, siguiendo a Kwak et al. (2020), cómo el uso de un simple antónimo (ej. ...
... Russa (Bandeira, 2018: 355-372). Na sequência, foi iniciado o fortalecimento da presença militar dos EUA no Leste Europeu, incluindo aumento de exerícios militares da OTAN à margem das linhas de fronteira com a Rússia, o que, por sua vez influenciou as relações entre o Ocidente e a Rússia de forma muito negativa (Hansen, 2015;Pifer, 2017 Parece então muito provável o confronto entre Rússia e o Ocidente, confronto esse que possuiria características distintas em relação a dita "primeira" Guerra Fria. Está ausente um conflito ideológico bem recortado; a Rússia de hoje não é um país socialista, e assim, sendo, é a categoria mais geral de "totalitarismo" que ocupa o espaço na narrativa ocidental para amalgamar numa só condição Rússia e China (Gessen, 2017). ...
A chamada Guerra Fria 2.0 representa uma nova realidade de interesses geopolíticos multifacetados. Esse artigo busca definir quais as suas características principais e o que distinguiria esse novo fenômeno das relações internacionais de seu análogo no século XX? Atualmente não se verifica uma dimensão genuinamente global para o fenômeno, tampouco a solidez de elementos institucionais na esfera interestatal capazes de regular uma corrida armamentista, vigorando assim um “vácuo de regras” especialmente no domínio das armas nucleares. Superada a fase de “vácuo geopolítico” da década de 1990, observa-se, atualmente, tendências antigas como uma nova e acirrada corrida armamentista, a renovação da corrida espacial, intensa interferência estrangeira em assuntos de política interna e a formação de blocos econômicos e militares de grande envergadura. Vemos também engajarem-se na “Segunda Guerra Fria” novos jogadores como China e Índia, cada qual com agendas geopolíticas distintas, e a formação de dois pares de bipolaridades (EUA-Rússia/ EUA-China) com relativa simetria. Em suma, a Segunda Guerra Fria, sem uma nítida clivagem ideológica entre blocos oponentes, carente de uma arquitetura institucional internacional sólida capaz de conter avanços estratégicos desestabilizadores, e com múltiplas partes semoventes, apresenta-se como um desafio para a análise internacional.
... Russian mainstream television has taken a key position in advancing the strategic narratives of the government, presenting stories about the cause, nature and resolution of the conflict to domestic and international audiences. These narratives have centred, on the one hand, on the hostility and self-interest of Western states behind the regime change in Kiev and, on the other, on the idea of a fascist threat spreading in Ukraine (Cottiero et al. 2015;Hansen 2015). Much of the discussion about Russia's information war focuses on the governmentled creation of confusion and disinformation in the media (e.g. ...
... In Valentina's explanation, note the replication of the popular revival of fascism used by the Russian media and political elites to represent the crisis in Ukraine as driven by nationalistic sentiments drawing on the powerful grand narrative of the Great Patriotic War involving the Red Army's victory over Nazi Germany (see e.g. Cottiero, Kucharski, Olimpieva, & Orttung, 2015;Hansen, 2015;Hutchings & Szostek, 2015;Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016;Nygren et al., 2018). ...
This article offers a theoretically explained model for analysing the strategies of vernacular sense-making used by transnational audiences in times of political disagreement. The analysis proceeds from the findings of earlier studies that reveal that audience members interpret news in a geopolitically indoctrinated manner despite their exposure to alternative information from geopolitically opposing sources and their general critical stance towards the objectivity of the media in political conflicts. The authors of this qualitative study among Latvian and Estonian Russian-speaking audiences explain how geopolitical convictions are (re)established through interpretations of news reports about politically conflicting events involving Russia vs. Western states. The results reveal that despite of the widespread scepticism and mistrust towards media organizations, the members of audiences strive for independence in their sense-making. In general, there are no signs of a degradation of deliberation as an ideal among the audiences. Nevertheless, the use of moral-cultural heuristics and the search for ‘authentic’ information from personal networks contributes to the enduring hegemony of Russian geopolitical narratives.
... The strategic narratives existing in Russia's public sphere regarding the Ukrainian crisis draw on Russia's geopolitical and historical imagination. These narratives have centred, on the one hand, on the hostility and self-interest of Western states behind the regime change in Kyiv, and, on the other, on the idea of a fascist threat spreading in Ukraine (Cottiero, Kucharski, Olimpieva & Orttung, 2015;Hansen, 2015). These narratives have not spontaneously emerged, nor are they new; they reflect a public discourse that has existed in Russian society for a long time. ...
The power of actors in contemporary conflicts is no longer simply defined by mil- itary equipment and the outcome of tactical operations but by the support of the public at home and within the area of operations. Russia has mastered the ability to conduct an information war—as shown during its conflict with Ukraine—in which media campaigns are targeted toward both domestic and international au- diences. In this context, the concept of strategic narratives has become relevant as they are used to construct activities, themes and messages in a compelling storyline with the aim of explaining events, obtaining legitimacy and gaining public support. The objective of this chapter is to examine how (and if ) the strategic narratives of the Ukrainian crisis are different on Russian television when they are broadcast to different audiences: domestic and foreign.
... Addressing both domestic and international audiences through broadcast media, Russia attempts to achieve approval of its international politics (Khaldarova 2015). Denying Russia's direct involvement in the conflict, its state-controlled media frame the crisis in Ukraine as a result of the spread of nationalist ideas in the bordering country and western interest behind the regime change (Khaldarova and Pantti 2016; with a reference to Cottiero et al. 2015, Hansen 2015. This framing of the situation in the Russian media became labelled as disinformation and fabrication of news by Ukrainian actors -for example, the StopFake project (Khaldarova and Pantti 2016). ...
... A domestic Russian nationalist framing narrative concerning the Crimean annexation in Russian public and elite opinion is today prevalent (Laruelle 2015). Political dynamics have raised its salience for contemporary Moscow regime legitimacy (Hansen 2015). International application of hard and soft power instruments to unwind the Russian annexation without Russian regime change is therefore highly problematic. ...
... Russian mainstream television has taken a key position in advancing the strategic narratives of the government, presenting stories about the cause, nature and resolution of the conflict to domestic and international audiences. These narratives have centred, on the one hand, on the hostility and self-interest of Western states behind the regime change in Kiev and, on the other, on the idea of a fascist threat spreading in Ukraine (Cottiero et al. 2015;Hansen 2015). Much of the discussion about Russia's information war focuses on the governmentled creation of confusion and disinformation in the media (e.g. ...
The crisis in Ukraine has accentuated the position of Russian television as the government’s strongest asset in its information warfare. The internet, however, allows other players to challenge the Kremlin’s narrative by providing counter-narratives and debunking distorted information and fake images. Accounting for the new media ecology—through which strategic narratives are created and interpreted, this article scrutinizes the narratives of allegedly fake news on Channel One, perceiving the fabricated stories as extreme projections of Russia’s strategic narratives, and the attempts of the Ukrainian fact-checking website Stopfake.org to counter the Russian narrative by refuting misinformation and exposing misleading images about Ukraine. Secondly, it analyses how Twitter users judged the veracity of these news stories and contributed to the perpetuation of strategic narratives.
This study examines how the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and the Ukraine Crisis in 2014 were discussed in Western and Russian academic circles. The findings show that historical accounts as well as various theoretical frameworks were used to explain the Russian foreign policy (RFP) regarding these conflicts. In comparison, although mono-theoretical models were utilized in both cases, they are more dominant in the works of Western scholars. On the other hand, inductive historical explanations were used more in the works of Russian scholars. Another important point is that in the latter studies, alternative accounts to the Western unilateralism are more popular. These accounts reveal themselves with concepts such as “multipolar world” or “Eurasianism”. As for the mono theoretical accounts, realist approaches seem to be the dominant framework in both cases. Realist frameworks emphasize the improved material capabilities of Russia and external pressures in its sphere of influence. The later component of the realist approach is stressed more by scholars from both academic circles. Moreover, even the studies that utilize different approaches, such as ideational explanations, domestic political factors, decision-maker related approaches, or the ones that highlight the regional competition, emphasize the role of the strategic or geopolitical imperatives as a factor that cannot be ignored regarding how RFP is formed and implemented.
The feminist movement has emerged as one of the leitmotifs of the second half of the twentieth century. Its demands have reached a multitude of scenarios, going from academic theorizations and requests to the mass taking of the streets, and thus propitiating a new drift within the movement. The so-called fourth wave of feminism assumes as its central axis the unification and aggregation of the different feminist sensibilities, but, especially, the social muscle that their struggles possess today. This fact can be seen particularly in Spain, a country that has become a spearhead in the Western world for the implementation and development of both public policies and mass demonstrations (e.g., feminist strikes or parity laws). For these reasons, the feminist issue has become one of the central elements of public debate in this country. This study addresses, through media analysis, how the relationship between pandemic and feminism has been treated and constructed in Spain. To do so, we analyze the headlines of the main Spanish newspapers and, supported by novel algorithmic techniques of natural language processing, we seek to show how the media treatment has been structured in this country during the pandemic period. In that sense, with six headers and nearly 1500 headlines analyzed, the results show that the information about feminism has evolved during these 4 years. The findings reveal that the feminist movements have ceased to have the presence of the first year of study. Besides it seems evident that the newspapers permeate the news events within the feminist topic.
A chamada Guerra Fria 2.0 representa uma nova realidade de interesses geopolíticos multifacetados. Esse artigo busca definir quais as suas características principais e o que distinguiria esse novo fenômeno das relações internacionais de seu análogo no século XX? Atualmente não se verifica uma dimensão genuinamente global para o fenômeno, tampouco a solidez de elementos institucionais na esfera interestatal capazes de regular uma corrida armamentista, vigorando assim um “vácuo de regras” especialmente no domínio das armas nucleares. Superada a fase de “vácuo geopolítico” da década de 1990, observa-se, atualmente, tendências antigas como uma nova e acirrada corrida armamentista, a renovação da corrida espacial, intensa interferência estrangeira em assuntos de política interna e a formação de blocos econômicos e militares de grande envergadura. Vemos também engajarem-se na “Segunda Guerra Fria” novos jogadores como China e Índia, cada qual com agendas geopolíticas distintas, e a formação de dois pares de bipolaridades (EUA-Rússia/ EUA-China) com relativa simetria. Em suma, a Segunda Guerra Fria, sem uma nítida clivagem ideológica entre blocos oponentes, carente de uma arquitetura institucional internacional sólida capaz de conter avanços estratégicos desestabilizadores, e com múltiplas partes semoventes, apresenta-se como um desafio para a análise internacional.
Although new communication technologies are ubiquitous, and school syllabi as well as educational standards require Russian teachers to integrate digital media into their teaching, such technologies and media have not yet been consistently employed in the foreign anguage classroom. After defining the terms media and media literacy, and illustrating educational policy requirements with regard to developing pupils’ digital competences, this paper explores some of the reasons why digital media are still not regularly used in the Russian language classroom. Aside from addressing positive effects that arise from working with digital media in classroom settings, also challenges that Russian language teachers face when implementing digital technologies will be focused on. By relying on empirical research data conclusions concerning the technical equipment at schools as well as the pre- and in-service teacher training will be drawn.
Existing explanations for the Russian annexation of Crimea do not pay enough attention to changes in the representation of the Ukraine crisis throughout its duration in Russian foreign policy discourse. This paper provides an additional interpretation, contending that the annexation became possible due to a particular context in which the events in Ukraine were presented as a threat to Russian compatriots. It also argues that due to the external shock of February 2014 events, the “threat to compatriots” narrative became a dominant one and was adopted by Russian authorities, which likely contributed to the decision to annex Crimea.
The armed conflict in South-East Ukraine has brought a massive increase in refugees in the Russian Federation. This article examines the meaning-making process surrounding the sudden presence of these refugees, through analysis of narratives in three major national newspapers – Izvestiya, Novaya gazeta and Rossiiskaya gazeta –1 June – 30 September 2014. Three thematic groups of narratives predominated: about war, about refugee reception and aid, and about Russia in international relations. These give meaning to the subject-position “refugees from Ukraine” primarily as war victims and aid recipients.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has operated a liberal foreign policy while Russia has continued to use a realist foreign policy. Due to liberalism not being solely focused on devoting resources to gaining power and security, liberalism can cause the United States to lose relative power to realist states. This paper argues that this problem may happen to the United States, as it pertains to their relations with Russia. This leads to the main argument of the paper which is that the United States conducts foreign relations and interventions in foreign states from a liberal theoretical perspective and that the United States should instead approach foreign relations and interventions in foreign states from a realist perspective to combat Russia’s realist approach to foreign relations, which, inevitably leads to the United States losing power relative to Russia and to the United States facing a greater security threat from Russia.
This article argues that accounts of the Russian media system that tend to view the time from Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 2000 as a single homogenous period do not capture major qualitative shifts in state-controlled media coverage. By analyzing the output of Russia’s two main television channels during Putin’s third presidential term, we identify a range of distinctly new features that amount to a new media strategy. This involves a significant increase in the coverage of political issues through the replacement of infotainment with what we term agitainment—an ideologically inflected content that, through adapting global media formats to local needs, attempts to appeal to less engaged and even sceptical viewers. Despite the tightening of political control over the media following the annexation of Crimea, the new strategy paradoxically has strengthened the constitutive role played by the state-controlled broadcasters in the articulation of official discourse.
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea without the consent of Ukraine was a rare case of a state taking territory from a state with whom it previously enjoyed friendly relations. The paper seeks to explain the causes and consequences of this annexation by examining theories of democratic peace, constructivism and irredentism. In 1971, political scientist Myron Weiner published an article “The Macedonian Syndrome” in the journal World Politics (vol. 23, no. 4, 665–683). In particular, the paper examines the applicability of Weiner’s theses to Russia’s 2014 attempt to annex Crimea from Ukraine. While Weiner’s theory helps to explain Russia’s moves, his theory can be updated to consider the consequences of those moves. Russia attempted to justify its annexation by transposing the concept of friendship from Ukraine itself to a piece of its territory – Crimea. This transposition rested on a false dichotomy between Ukraine and Crimea, and Russia’s failure to live up to its international commitments to respect Ukrainian borders brought swift consequences in the form of Western sanctions.
The chapter is structured as follows: first, attention is be paid to the issue of theorising proxy wars. The chapter defines proxy wars by observing how they differ from cases of third-party military intervention. Here, the focus is on differentiating the Proxy Agent from third parties such as mediators or auxiliaries. Second, the chapter addresses the question of ‘Why do states engage in proxy wars?’, and attempts an examination of contenting and competing explanations. These two aims are then put to the empirical test. By using two recent and ongoing cases of proxy wars, the theoretical discussion is brought into the empirical realm. The chosen cases are, first, the situation in Ukraine emerging from the 2013 protests and culminating with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and, second, the collapse of the Syrian state and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Because proxy wars have generally been linked to the Cold War period and, thus, came to be associated with a superpower practice of avoiding direct interaction, the chapter moves away from discussing classic proxy wars such as the 1954 Guatemalan coup d’état, the civil war in Angola (1975–2002), or the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977–1978). A view from a post-Cold War security standpoint significantly expands our understanding of this ever-present security problem.
This article interrogates the role of non-state armed actors in the Ukrainian civil conflict. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to identify the differences between the patterns of military intervention in Crimea (direct, covert intervention), and those in the South-East (mixed direct and indirect – proxy – intervention). It does so by assessing the extent of Russian troop involvement and that of external sponsorship to non-state actors. Second, it puts forward a tentative theoretical framework that allows distinguishing between the different outcomes the two patterns of intervention generate. Here, the focus is on the role of non-state actors in the two interventionist scenarios. The core argument is that the use of non-state actors is aimed at sovereign defection. The article introduces the concept of sovereign defection and defines it as a break-away from an existing state. To capture the differences between the outcomes of the interventions in Crimea and South-East, sovereign defection is classified into two categories: inward and outward. Outward sovereign defection is equated to the territorial seizure of the Crimean Peninsula by Russian Special Forces, aided by existing criminal gangs acting in an auxiliary capacity. Inward sovereign defection refers to the external sponsorship of the secessionist rebels in South-East Ukraine and their use as proxy forces with the purpose of creating a political buffer-zone in the shape of a frozen conflict. To demonstrate these claims, the article analyses the configuration of the dynamics of violence in both regions. It effectively argues that, in pursuing sovereign defection, the auxiliary and proxy forces operate under two competing dynamics of violence, delegative and non-delegative, with distinct implications to the course and future of the conflict.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of Eastern Ukraine have radically altered the European security order, with the Black Sea region becoming an acutely contested geostrategic zone. Russia’s strategic interests in the Black Sea region, especially in terms of energy and military presence, collide with those of Ukraine, Turkey, the European Union and the United States, among others, and expose the governance gap left by the existing conventions and institutions in dealing with the region. It is argued that Russia’s move to annex Crimea was a strategic decision made irrespective of the destructive effect on the post-Cold War order. Furthermore, until a new normal has been accepted by the main players, there is no hope of revising the existing conventions and institutions pertaining to the basin.
In order to determine how history education can be harnessed to reduce conflict attitudes and intentions and create a culture of peace, this book examines how history curricula and textbooks shape the identities of their students through their portrayals of ingroup and outgroup identity, intergroup boundaries, and value systems.
In this chapter, I examine whether a neoclassical realist approach can explain a liberal puzzle, namely the persistence of security competition between trade partners and the absence of peace dividends between economically interdependent states. In other words, why do states continue to perceive each other as security threats despite increased economic interdependence between them? How is it possible for states that are engaged in an active security conflict to continue trading with one another? Why does the purported peace dividend of economic interdependence so often fail to materialize? That there should be a peace dividend is an assumption with deep philosophical roots. It is an assumption that has served as the analytical bedrock for a variety of liberal theoretical projects in the international relations discipline, and it continues to inform foreign policy and decision-making throughout the globe. I argue that neoclassical realism can explain this apparent paradox because it can recognize how external structure and the internal governance institutions interact with national identity politics. Specifically it can logically explain how external competitions with other states, internal competition for control of the state, and processes of national identity politics can be entwined in foreign policy choices and the assessment of external threat. And it is this entwining that allows trade and conflict to coexist. The notion that such behavior is puzzling and impossible is based on a set of faulty liberal assumptions about the relationship between identity, nationalism, capitalist profit and exchange, cooperation and the nature of nation-states in general. The China-Taiwan-US relationship constitutes a microcosm of this interrelated phenomena of economic interdependence, peace and conflict.
This article explores when and why sanction threats succeed in extracting concessions from the targeted country. We focus on two different, albeit not mutually exclusive, mechanisms that can explain the success of sanction threats. The first mechanism relates to incomplete information regarding the sanctioner’s determination to impose sanctions and suggests that threats help to extract concessions by revealing the sanctioner’s resolve. The second mechanism underscores the direct impact of common interest between the two countries and explains the success of sanction threats by the targeted country’s greater dependence on this link between the two countries and the sanctioner’s ability to exploit this dependence. We test the hypotheses using a new strategic structural estimator. Our results provide no evidence in favor of the informational hypothesis, while lending robust support for the coercive hypothesis.
This article seeks to answer two interrelated questions: where does press freedom stand in Russia more than 15 years after Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy glasnost began? and, what does Russia’s media transformation tell us about our understanding of mass political media systems? It is argued that while the Russian media are suffering under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, circumstances are in no way as dire as in the pre-Gorbachev Soviet period, nor even as bad as some journalists’ rights organizations would have it. By using comparative analysis, and incorporating political science literature that offers typologies of non-democratic systems of governance, the article demonstrates that contemporary Russian media find much in common with authoritarian regimes across the world and are not sui generis as some have argued. In the process, the author attempts to resurrect some of the important distinctions made in Siebert et al.’s much maligned FourTheories of the Press, particularly the role of the state as the leading threat to media freedom. The author also argues for the need to distinguish more clearly between different types of non-democratic mass political media systems.
This paper analyzes the propaganda campaign orchestrated by the Russian authorities with the aim of promoting a version of the country’s history for political purposes. This version puts the accent on the exceptionality of Russian historical development, and is Geared to endowing the figure of Vladimir Putin – seen as the person who has succeeded in carrying out a number of national projects that have been frequently abandoned throughout Russian history. The analysis presented here centres on two channels used in the campaign: school textbooks and the film industry.
What are the main challenges facing realist foreign policy analysis today? Which strategies might realists follow in order to answer these challenges? This article argues that contemporary realism faces two fundamental challenges when attempting to explain foreign policy. The first challenge is to combine structural factors with other variables without ending up with a collection of ad hoc arguments. The second, and related, challenge is to combine the realist emphasis on the continued importance of materialist factors such as power with the observation that these factors are interpreted and perceived — not objectively measured — by human beings making foreign policy. The article explores the potential of contemporary realism in order to shed light on the nature of the challenges and discuss how they might be answered.Journal of International Relations and Development (2005) 8, 355–380. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800064
This article examines the deductive basis upon which domestic-level theorizing may be combined with liberal and realist systemic-level theory in order to account for international outcomes. It is particularly concerned with whether existing systemic theory can incorporate domestic-level variables in a causally consistent rather than ad hoc manner. In addressing such a concern, it confronts the widely held assumption in the IR theory literature that liberalism is more accommodating of domestic-level variables and their potential causal impact than is realism. When the deductive logic of systemic liberal and realist theory is examined, however, it becomes clear that domestic-level variables can be consistently causal in systemic realist theory, but are accorded little causal weight in systemic liberal theory. The article concludes that realism is actually more accommodating of domestic-level variables and theorizing than is liberalism. Given the common misconceptions within the field regarding the relationship between systemic theories and domestic-level theorizing, issues of theoretical causal compatibility must be considered if domestic-level variables are going to be incorporated in a rigorous rather than ad hoc manner.
All academic disciplines periodically appraise their effectiveness, evaluating the progress of previous scholarship and judging which approaches are useful and which are not. Although no field could survive if it did nothing but appraise its progress, occasional appraisals are important and if done well can help advance the field. This book investigates how international relations theorists can better equip themselves to determine the state of scholarly work in their field. It takes as its starting point Imre Lakatos's influential theory of scientific change, and in particular his methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP). It uses MSRP to organize its analysis of major research programs over the last several decades and uses MSRP's criteria for theoretical progress to evaluate these programs. The contributors appraise the progress of institutional theory, varieties of realist and liberal theory, operational code analysis, and other research programs in international relations. Their analyses reveal the strengths and limits of Lakatosian criteria and the need for metatheoretical metrics for evaluating scientific progress.
Arguably one of the most remarkable developments in Russian political life in the 2000’s, the formulation by leading politicians of a new national identity based inter alia on distrust of the West has given a large part of the Russian population a clearer understanding of who they are. As such, it has increased their ontological security, that is, their sense of existence now seen as a fundamental need for groups also. This is an unfortunate development as it increases tension in Russia’s relationship with the West. The Russian population may, however, be reluctant to move away from this new identity as this would re-open the question of „who are we?“ and thus cause their ontological security to be reduced. The challenge for the West will be to make the Russian population feel comfortable with an identity that is based on Western values and on thus on trust of the West.
A FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE confronting the newly independent Ukrainian state is the preservation of its territorial integrity in the face of claims by neighbouring countries and regional movements supporting one or another form of self-determination. The problem can be viewed from several perspectives. First, there is the question of Russia's claims to territory presently within the boundaries of Ukraine. To date such claims have not been made on an official, inter-state level, although in the aftermath of Ukraine's declaration of independence on 24 August 1991 the Russian parliament as well as leading Russian political figures, including President El'tsin, have raised the question of reviewing borders between the two countries. A case in point is Crimea, which was transferred from the RSFSR to Ukraine in 1954 and which has now become enmeshed in the Ukrainian-Russian dispute over the Black Sea Fleet. Such heavily Russian and linguistically Russified areas as the Donbass and parts of
This article discusses the reinterpretations of the career of Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera and his place in contemporary Ukraine by examining scholarly debates in academic books and articles, school textbooks and media sources from the late 1980s to the present. The article seeks to elucidate the place of Bandera in modern Ukrainian history and illustrates his metamorphosis from arch-villain and alleged traitor in Soviet works to a modern and mythical national hero with a firm place in the historical narrative of twentieth century Ukraine.
International crises are modeled as a political “war of attrition” in which state leaders choose at each moment whether to attack, back down, or escalate. A leader who backs down suffers audience costs that increase as the public confrontation proceeds. Equilibrium analysis shows how audience costs enable leaders to learn an adversary's true preferences concerning settlement versus war and thus whether and when attack is rational. The model also generates strong comparative statics results, mainly on the question of which side is most likely to back down. Publicly observable measures of relative military capabilities and relative interests prove to have no direct effect once a crisis begins. Instead, relative audience costs matter: the side with a stronger domestic audience (e.g., a democracy) is always less likely to back down than the side less able to generate audience costs (a nondemocracy). More broadly, the analysis suggests that democracies should be able to signal their intentions to other states more credibly and clearly than authoritarian states can, perhaps ameliorating the security dilemma between democratic states.
This article distils Edward Said's celebrated critique of Orientalism and applies it to the mainstream Western discourse on Russian foreign policy. It finds that the literature in this field, while not as afflicted as the material towards which Said's strident criticism was originally directed, displays a number of the characteristic symptoms of Orientalism – the exaggeration of difference, assumption of Western superiority and resort to clichéd analytical models. To overcome this malaise, it is proposed that scholars make greater efforts to break free of these ‘mind-forg'd manacles’ and reflect more deeply upon the assumptions underpinning their scholarship.
It is increasingly common for social scientists to describe political processes as "path dependent." The concept, however, is often employed without careful elaboration. This article conceptualizes path dependence as a social process grounded in a dynamic of "increasing returns." Reviewing recent literature in economics and suggesting extensions to the world of politics, the article demonstrates that increasing returns processes are likely to be prevalent, and that good analytical foundations exist for exploring their causes and consequences. The investigation of increasing returns can provide a more rigorous framework for developing some of the key claims of recent scholarship in historical institutionalism: Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced, can be almost impossible to reverse; and consequently, political development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life.
To succeed in foreign policy, U.S. presidents have to sell their versions or framings of political events to the news media and to the public. But since the end of the Cold War, journalists have increasingly resisted presidential views, even offering their own spin on events. What, then, determines whether the media will accept or reject the White House perspective? And what consequences does this new media environment have for policymaking and public opinion? To answer these questions, Robert M. Entman develops a powerful new model of how media framing worksâa model that allows him to explain why the media cheered American victories over small-time dictators in Grenada and Panama but barely noticed the success of far more difficult missions in Haiti and Kosovo. Discussing the practical implications of his model, Entman also suggests ways to more effectively encourage the exchange of ideas between the government and the media and between the media and the public. His book will be an essential guide for political scientists, students of the media, and anyone interested in the increasingly influential role of the media in foreign policy.
The Politics of State-Building
- Solchanyk
Solchanyk, " The Politics of State-Building ", p. 51 and Kuzio (2011).
The Crimean Conomdrum
- Kuzio
Kuzio, " The Crimean Conomdrum ", pp. 183–187.
Sudba Sevastopolya: Komu dolzhen prinadlezhat gorod russkikh moryakov " ? Press release 961
- See
- Vtsiom
See, e.g., VTsIOM, " Sudba Sevastopolya: Komu dolzhen prinadlezhat gorod russkikh moryakov " ? Press release 961 (23 May 2008).
which is the textbook preferred by the Kremlin. It is also true, however, for Kiselev and Popov
- Central
Central among these is Danilov et al. (2009) which is the textbook preferred by the Kremlin. It is also true, however, for Kiselev and Popov (2007), Levandovskiy et al. (2011), Shestakov (2011), Volobuev and Kuleshov (2013), and Izmozik and Rudnik (2013).
Speech and the following discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy
- Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin, Speech and the following discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy (10 February 2007); at archive.kremlin.ru.
druzyam " opasno i vredno dlya strany; Cem bolshe ya rabotayu, cem bolshe ya razocarovyvayus v mire The former is Surkov's famous " secret speech
- Vladislav Surkov
- My
- Scitaem
Vladislav Surkov, My realno scitaem, cto davat vlast liberalnym " druzyam " opasno i vredno dlya strany; Cem bolshe ya rabotayu, cem bolshe ya razocarovyvayus v mire (17 May 2005); at http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/127679.html and " Suverenitet – eto politicheskiy sinonim konkurentno-sposobnosti " (7 February 2006), reprinted in Leonid Polyakov,, (ed.), Pro suverennuyu demokratiyu (Moscow: Evropa 2007), pp. 33–61. The former is Surkov's famous " secret speech ".
Putin in Channel One News
- Ibid
Ibid. 40. Putin in Channel One News (10 March 2014), 21:55; at http://www.1tv.ru/news/social/253811. 41. Channel One News (27 February 2014), 12:00; at http://www.1tv.ru/news/world/253074.
Vystuplenie i otvety na voprosy senatorov Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S. V. Lavrova v khode vneocherednogo zasedaniya Soveta Federatsii Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii
- E Sergei
- Lavrov
E.g. Sergei Lavrov, Vystuplenie i otvety na voprosy senatorov Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S. V. Lavrova v khode vneocherednogo zasedaniya Soveta Federatsii Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii (21 March 2014).
Istoriya Rossii XX – nachalo XXI veka
- Levandovskiy
- Shchetinov
- Mironenko
Levandovskiy, Shchetinov and Mironenko, Istoriya Rossii XX – nachalo XXI veka, pp. 212–213.
Krym v Rossii – navsegda! " Press release 2622
- Vtsiom
VtsIOM, " Krym v Rossii – navsegda! " Press release 2622 (9 July 2014); at http://wciom.ru/ index.php?id=459&uid=114888.
Russian TV market: between state supervision, commercial logic and simulacrum of public service
- E Degtereva
- I Kiriya
Degtereva, E. and Kiriya, I., 2010. Russian TV market: between state supervision, commercial logic and simulacrum of public service. Central European journal of communication, 3 (1), 37–51.
Of salient environments, action spaces and weak states
- F S Hansen
Hansen, F.S., 2014. Of salient environments, action spaces and weak states. International politics review, 2 (1), 31–47.
Istoriya Rossii [A history of Russia]. Moscow: Ventana-Graf
- V Izmozik
- S Rudnik
Izmozik, V. and Rudnik, S., 2013. Istoriya Rossii [A history of Russia]. Moscow: Ventana-Graf.
Istoriya Rossii XX-nachalo XXI veka [A 20th and early 21st century history of Russia
- A Kiselev
- V Popov
Kiselev, A. and Popov, V., 2007. Istoriya Rossii XX – nachalo XXI veka [A 20th and early 21st century history of Russia]. Moscow: Drofa.
Amerika-rossiya: kholodnaya voina kultur [America-Russia: the cold war of culture
- V Krashenninikova
Krashenninikova, V., 2007. Amerika-rossiya: kholodnaya voina kultur [America-Russia: the cold war of culture]. Moscow: Evropa, 205. European Security 157 Downloaded by [Georgian Court University] at 01:07 08 March 2015
Finding frames in a web of culture – the case of the war on terror Doing news framing analysis Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy
- S Reese
Reese, S., 2010. Finding frames in a web of culture – the case of the war on terror. In: P. D'Angelo and J. Kuypers, eds. Doing news framing analysis. London: Routledge, 21. Rose, G., 1998. Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. World politics, 51 (1), 144–172.
A history of twentieth-century Russia. London: Penguin, 367. Shestakov, V., 2011. Istoriya Rossii XX – nachalo XXI veka [A 20th and early 21st century history of Russia]
- R Service
Service, R., 1997. A history of twentieth-century Russia. London: Penguin, 367. Shestakov, V., 2011. Istoriya Rossii XX – nachalo XXI veka [A 20th and early 21st century history of Russia]. Moscow: Prosveshchenie.
The politics of state building: centre-periphery relations in post-Soviet Ukraine Realist environment, liberal process, and domestic-level variables. International studies quarterly
- R Solchanyk
Solchanyk, R., 1994. The politics of state building: centre-periphery relations in post-Soviet Ukraine. Europe-Asia studies, 46 (1), 48. Sterling-Folker, J., 1997. Realist environment, liberal process, and domestic-level variables. International studies quarterly, 41 (1), 1–25.
Neoclassical realism and identity: peril despite profit across the Taiwan Strait Istoriya Rossii XX – nachalo XXI veka [A 20th and early 21st century history of Russia]
- J Sterling-Volker
Sterling-Volker, J., 2009. Neoclassical realism and identity: peril despite profit across the Taiwan Strait. In: S. Lobell, N. Ripsman, and J. Taliaferro, eds. Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 111. Volobuev, O. and Kuleshov, S., 2013. Istoriya Rossii XX – nachalo XXI veka [A 20th and early 21st century history of Russia]. Moscow: Mnemozina.
Istoriya Rossii 1945-2008 [A history of Russia
- A Danilov
- A Utkin
- A Filippov