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Experimental Philosophy and the Concept of Moral Responsibility
Abstract
In recent years, so-called experimental philosophers have argued that participants in the moral responsibility debate ought to adopt a new methodology. In particular, they argue, the results of experimental surveys ought to be introduced into the debate. According to the experimental philosophers, these surveys are philosophically relevant because they provide information about the moral responsibility judgments that ordinary people make. Moreover, they argue, an account of moral responsibility is satisfactory only if it is tightly connected to ordinary judgments. The purpose of this paper is to undermine this argument. I will argue that experimental philosophers have not adequately acknowledged the distinction between metaphysics and conceptual analysis; they have not carefully distinguished what-it-is-to-be morally responsible from the concept of moral responsibility. I will draw this distinction, and then argue that metaphysicians qua metaphysicians may both ignore experimental data and offer an account of moral responsibility that satisfies the tight connection desideratum.
... Understanding the mechanisms behind dishonesty is likewise a fundamental research challenge for psychology and other social sciences (Mazar & Ariely, 2006;Ayal et al., 2015). Psychological (e.g., Monin & Miller, 2001), sociological (e.g., Tembrunsel & Messick, 2004), and philosophical (e.g., Finch, 2011) research has provided some evidence and insights into variables that modulate dishonest behavior. For example, it is known that dishonesty decreases with the probability of detection, and that self-reported measures cannot be fully trusted. ...
Experimental studies of dishonesty usually rely on population-level analyses, which compare the distribution of claimed rewards in an unsupervised, self-administered lottery (e.g., tossing a coin) with the expected lottery statistics (e.g., 50/50 chance of winning). Here, we provide a paradigm that measures dishonesty at the individual level and identifies new dishonesty profiles with specific theoretical interpretations. We found that among dishonest participants, (a) some did not bother implementing the lottery at all, (b) some implemented but lied about the lottery outcome, and (c) some violated instructions by repeating the lottery multiple times until obtaining an outcome they felt was acceptable. These results held both in the lab and with online participants. In Experiment 1 ( N = 178), the lottery was a coin toss, which permitted only a binary honest/dishonest response; Experiment 2 ( N = 172) employed a six-sided-die roll, which permitted gradations in dishonesty. We replicated some previous results and also provide a new, richer classification of dishonest behavior.
A long tradition of research, both in philosophy and in psychology, has sought to uncover the criteria that people use when assigning moral responsibility. Nonetheless, it seems that most existing accounts fall prey to one counterexample or another. This chapter suggests a diagnosis for this persistent difficulty. Specifically, it suggests that there simply isn't any single system of criteria that people apply in all cases of responsibility attribution. Instead, people use quite different criteria in different kinds of cases. In other words, researchers should abandon the assumption of "invariance" (that people use the same criteria in all cases) and instead adopt "variantism" (the view that people use different criteria in different cases).
Philosophers working in the nascent field of 'experimental philosophy' have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we describe our methodology of surveying people's prephilosophical judgments about the freedom and responsibility of agents in deterministic scenarios. In two studies, we found that a majority of participants judged that such agents act of their own free will and are morally responsible for their actions. We then discuss the philosophical implications of our results as well as various difficulties inherent in such research.
The dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists must be one of the most persistent and heated deadlocks in Western philosophy. Incompatibilists maintain that people are not fully morally responsible if determinism is true, i.e., if every event is an inevitable consequence of the prior conditions and the natural laws. By contrast
Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our studies, which put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Finally, we consider and respond to several potential objections to our approach.
There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g