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Do meditators have higher awareness of their intentions to act?
... We have tested all three hypotheses in several studies in our EEG lab (Jo et al., 2013(Jo et al., , 2014a(Jo et al., , 2015Schmidt et al., 2016). We have shown that meditators do indeed perform differently in the Libet task, although their w-times were not earlier than in controls (Jo et al., 2015). ...
... We have tested all three hypotheses in several studies in our EEG lab (Jo et al., 2013(Jo et al., , 2014a(Jo et al., , 2015Schmidt et al., 2016). We have shown that meditators do indeed perform differently in the Libet task, although their w-times were not earlier than in controls (Jo et al., 2015). We have also shown that a highly experienced meditator has a comparatively strong RP and small variances in w-time in a single case study (Jo et al., 2014a). ...
... Based on this line of research, we developed two theoretical accounts with respect to volitional action initiation and the Libet task. The first one is the three-stage model of voluntary action initiation, a theoretical framework of the various mental processes of initiating a voluntary action (Jo et al., 2015). It can be regarded as a first step of a phenomenological model of self-initiated action. ...
In this conceptual contribution, we argue that experimental investigations of phenomena in the cognitive sciences and consciousness research may benefit from a thorough integration of data acquired from the first-person perspective. We present a line of research from our lab applying this approach to the Libet task on voluntary action. In this well-known experimental paradigm, participants perform a movement at a moment of their own choice. Previous research has shown that this voluntary decision to perform the action is preceded by a specific pattern in the electroencephalogram, the so-called readiness potential. This finding that the decision is preceded (and presumably determined) by an action-related brain processes puts the neuroscientific account at odds with our subjective intuition and challenges the notion of free will. This discrepancy exemplifies the gap between neuro-cognitive models of the mind and the accounts of our conscious experience. The aim of our theoretical proposal is to enrich the study of volitional action by integrating reports from the first-person perspective with the Libet paradigm to develop a more coherent account. This provides an example of implementing the research program of neurophenomenology developed by Francisco Varela to overcome the gap between scientific accounts of the mind and subjective experience. Specifically, we show how this can be achieved by interweaving three methodological approaches: (i) adapting common neuro-cognitive paradigms (i.e., the Libet task); (ii) employing refined first-person methods such as the micro-phenomenological interview; and (iii) collaborating with experienced meditators as research participants. Our contribution demonstrates how the neurophenomenological framework can be used to shed new light on long-standing and fundamental debates in consciousness research. We show that this approach not only addresses questions of intellectual curiosity but also has concrete ethical implications for the practice of science itself, self-determination, and the accountability of the conscious subject. On the basis of our approach, meditation can be seen as a method for enhancing self-regulation and self-determination, which allows for more deliberate decisions and thus more ethical behavior.
... A further link between metacognition and interval timing is suggested by psychological manipulations that alter conscious states and distort time perception as well as by disorders of consciousness. Two such psychological techniques include hypnosis, which involves the administration of a hypnotic induction, involving suggestions for reduced awareness and meta-awareness [38] and meditation, which involves a variety of practices with the intent to foment awareness of mental representations [39]. A hypnotic induction reliably produces a tendency to underestimate time, particularly in highly suggestible individuals [6,8], who comprise approximately 10-15% of the population [38]. ...
... A hypnotic induction reliably produces a tendency to underestimate time, particularly in highly suggestible individuals [6,8], who comprise approximately 10-15% of the population [38]. Alongside distortions in time perception, highly suggestible individuals routinely experience states of depersonalization and derealization spontaneously following a hypnotic induction [39]. Although they have not been systematically studied, depersonalization disorder patients are similarly known to experience pronounced disruptions in time perception [40] and drugs that elicit distortions in time perception also induce depersonalization [41]. ...
... These changes implicate default mode, executive attention, and motor networks involved in metacognition, cognitive control, and interval timing [46]. In contrast, there is evidence suggesting that meditators have greater awareness of their intentions to act [39]. Cumulatively, these results suggest that awareness of mental representations is closely intertwined with one's perception of time. ...
... A further link between metacognition and interval timing is suggested by psychological manipulations that alter conscious states and distort time perception as well as by disorders of consciousness. Two such psychological techniques include hypnosis, which involves the administration of a hypnotic induction, involving suggestions for reduced awareness and meta-awareness [38] and meditation, which involves a variety of practices with the intent to foment awareness of mental representations [39]. A hypnotic induction reliably produces a tendency to underestimate time, particularly in highly suggestible individuals [6,8], who comprise approximately 10-15% of the population [38]. ...
... A hypnotic induction reliably produces a tendency to underestimate time, particularly in highly suggestible individuals [6,8], who comprise approximately 10-15% of the population [38]. Alongside distortions in time perception, highly suggestible individuals routinely experience states of depersonalization and derealization spontaneously following a hypnotic induction [39]. Although they have not been systematically studied, depersonalization disorder patients are similarly known to experience pronounced disruptions in time perception [40] and drugs that elicit distortions in time perception also induce depersonalization [41]. ...
... These changes implicate default mode, executive attention, and motor networks involved in metacognition, cognitive control, and interval timing [46]. In contrast, there is evidence suggesting that meditators have greater awareness of their intentions to act [39]. Cumulatively, these results suggest that awareness of mental representations is closely intertwined with one's perception of time. ...
The claustrum has been proposed as a possible neural candidate for the coordination of conscious experience due to its extensive “connectome”. Herein we propose that the claustrum contributes to consciousness by supporting the temporal integration of multisensory patterns of cortical oscillations. A close link between conscious awareness and interval timing is suggested by models of consciousness and conjunctive changes in meta-awareness and timing in multiple contexts and conditions. Using striatal beat-frequency model of interval timing as a framework, we propose that the claustrum integrates varying frequencies of neural oscillations in different sensory cortices into a coherent pattern that binds different and overlapping temporal percepts into a unitary conscious representation. The proposed coordination of the striatum and claustrum allows for time-based dimensions of multisensory integration and decision-making to be incorporated into consciousness.
... A key question pertaining to the temporal relation between the neural signal (ERD) and decision-making then would be: how is beta ERD related to the experience of the decision to move? To address this question we collected subjective reports on timing when a decision to move was made using the Libet paradigm [13] in parallel with electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings. 1 We have proposed distinct roles for intention and decision components of a voluntary movement process [16]. According to the model, while 'intention' could be conceptualized as combining an inner impulse (an inner drive which results in 'looking for an objective' as described in [18]) with one's goals and plans, 'decision' could be a final stage about whether to commit this intention. ...
... In the present study, we performed spectral analyses from the existing EEG data set, which we used in previous studies [16,17] to focus on the slow cortical potentials (SCPs), to assess rolandic brain activity and its possible link with subjective experiences of timing observed during the Libet-type tasks. Spectral data as presented here has not been reported in the previous studies. ...
... Although, similarities between the RP and beta ERD have been observed in voluntary movement and motor imaginary, different topographical evolutions suggest distinct neuronal mechanisms between them [15]. Analyses focusing on the RPs of the present tasks can be found in Jo et al. [16,17]. the left mouse button with their right index finger whenever they wanted to, by their own decision, but not earlier than after one full rotation of the clock-hand. ...
... Whether positive affect can also impact on the awareness of inner states during the execution of intentional actions has never been investigated directly. Partial support for the hypothesis that intention awareness can be modulated by the valence of individuals' affective state comes from a recent study on expert meditators (Jo et al., 2015). Meditation is a psychological state that is known to decrease negative affect, such as anxiety, and simultaneously increase positive affect (Davidson et al., 2003). ...
... Meditation is a psychological state that is known to decrease negative affect, such as anxiety, and simultaneously increase positive affect (Davidson et al., 2003). Jo et al. (2015) employed the Libet's task to investigate whether meditation leads to changes in intention awareness, and found that motor intentions were reported earlier in time in meditators as compared to non-meditators. This observation was taken as evidence that meditators are more capable to access inner processes underlying the initiation of a voluntary movement (Jo et al., 2015). ...
... Jo et al. (2015) employed the Libet's task to investigate whether meditation leads to changes in intention awareness, and found that motor intentions were reported earlier in time in meditators as compared to non-meditators. This observation was taken as evidence that meditators are more capable to access inner processes underlying the initiation of a voluntary movement (Jo et al., 2015). It should be noted, however, that affect or mood were not directly manipulated in Jo et al. (2015) study, and thus the question whether affective states alone impact on intention awareness remains unanswered. ...
The temporal relationship between our conscious intentions to act and the action itself has been widely investigated. Previous research consistently shows that the motor intention enters awareness a few 100 ms before movement onset. As research in other domains has shown that most behavior is affected by the emotional state people are in, it is remarkable that the role of emotional states on intention awareness has never been investigated. Here we tested the hypothesis that positive and negative affects have opposite effects on the temporal relationship between the conscious intention to act and the action itself. A mood induction procedure that combined guided imagery and music listening was employed to induce positive, negative, or neutral affective states. After each mood induction session, participants were asked to execute voluntary self-paced movements and to report when they formed the intention to act. Exposure to pleasant material, as compared to exposure to unpleasant material, enhanced positive affect and dampened negative affect. Importantly, in the positive affect condition participants reported their intention to act earlier in time with respect to action onset, as compared to when they were in the negative or in the neutral affect conditions. Conversely the reported time of the intention to act when participants experienced negative affect did not differ significantly from the neutral condition. These findings suggest that the temporal relationship between the conscious intention to act and the action itself is malleable to changes in affective states and may indicate that positive affect enhances intentional awareness.
... The primary motor cortex is involved in the control of voluntary movements. The process of executing voluntary movements starts with the awareness of an inner impulse to move (Jo et al., 2015). Interestingly, one of the key aspects of MBIs is to raise inner awareness by monitoring presentmoment experiences without elaborating on them (Chiesa, 2013). ...
... For example, it has been suggested that MBI can increase inner awareness of impulses to move, leading to enhanced voluntary motor control. This could in turn lead to improved conflict monitoring, by selecting more goal-congruent behavior (Jo et al., 2015(Jo et al., , 2017. As goal disturbance after chemotherapy treatment has been linked to cognitive complaints (Haydon et al., 2019), moving towards goal-congruent behavior might aid in the recovery of CRCI. ...
Objectives
Cancer-related cognitive impairment (CRCI) is a common side effect of breast cancer treatment and has been linked to structural brain abnormalities. As previous research showed that mindfulness-based interventions (MBI) might alter brain structure, we hypothesized that MBI can induce structural brain recovery after chemotherapy in breast cancer survivors with cognitive complaints.
Method
Female breast cancer survivors reporting cognitive complaints (n = 117) were randomly assigned to a mindfulness (n = 43), physical training (n = 36), or waitlist control condition (n = 38). Multimodal MRI was used to investigate differences between groups in gray matter volume changes using a voxel-based morphometry analysis, and white matter structure using a fixel-based whole-brain and tract-based analysis.
Results
Ninety-five participants completed structural MRI scans before the intervention, immediately after, and 3 months post-intervention. Comparing MBI to the waitlist control group, results showed an increase in gray matter volume in the right primary motor cortex immediately after MBI compared to baseline. Tract-based analysis showed small regional differences within the corpus callosum between both intervention groups and the waitlist controls. No differences in the whole-brain white matter or between MBI and physical training could be identified.
Conclusions
This study showed that MBI may be associated with subtle short-term structural brain changes in a region involved in the control of voluntary movements and pain processing, which might indirectly impact cognitive functioning. However, no long-term effects were found, suggesting that longer interventions might be needed to widely affect brain structure and associated CRCI. Nonetheless, MBI might show promise as a non-invasive intervention in the context of CRCI.
Preregistration
The study was registered at clinicaltrial.gov (NCT03736460).
... Meditation appears to either strengthen or attenuate the sense of agency depending on the meditation technique employed [32,33]. Studies using the classic Libet paradigm have shown that meditators are more aware of their impulses to act than are non-meditators [34,35]. Compared to non-meditators, meditators seemed to be aware of subjective concomitants of negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials that precede actions (i.e., button presses), which could reflect the crucial feature of being able to initiate the usually unconscious processes of a voluntary movement with awareness [35]. ...
... Studies using the classic Libet paradigm have shown that meditators are more aware of their impulses to act than are non-meditators [34,35]. Compared to non-meditators, meditators seemed to be aware of subjective concomitants of negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials that precede actions (i.e., button presses), which could reflect the crucial feature of being able to initiate the usually unconscious processes of a voluntary movement with awareness [35]. On the other hand, styles of meditation emphasising the 'letting-go' of experiences can attenuate the sense of agency and/or ownership [36]. ...
No contemporary unifying framework has been provided for the study of non-ordinary states of consciousness (NSCs) despite increased interest in hypnosis, meditation, and psychedelics. NSCs induce shifts in experiential contents (what appears to the experiencer) and/or structure (how it appears). This can allow the investigation of the plastic and dynamic nature of experience from a multiscale perspective that includes mind, brain, body, and context. We propose a neurophenomenological (NP) approach to the study of NSCs which highlights their role as catalysts of transformation in clinical practice by refining our understanding of the relationships between experiential (subjective) and neural dynamics. We outline the ethical implications of the NP approach for standard conceptions of health and pathology as well as the crucial role of experience-based know-how in NSC-related research and application.
... Extensive research has been conducted on the influencing factors of the RP waveform. Jo et al. proposed that the amplitude of the RP was related to the subject's concentration (Jo et al. 2015). Similarly, a more difficult decision-making task could lead to a larger amplitude of the RP (Lin et al. 2016). ...
... Our results suggested the RP could disappear in the MEATE task. Many factors can influence the RP waveform, such as training (Jochumsen et al. 2017), meditation (Jo et al. 2015), behavior feedback (Vercillo et al. 2018;Wen et al. 2018), and attention (Houdayer et al. 2014). Besides, some diseases can influence the RP waveforms, such as attention deficit disorder (Klimkeit et al. 2005) or traumatic head injuries (Russo et al. 2005). ...
Generally, the readiness potential (RP) is considered to be the scalp electroencephalography (EEG) activity preceding movement. In our previous study, we found early RP was absent among approximately half of the subjects during instructed action, but we did not identify the mechanism causing the disappearance of the RP. In this study, we investigated whether the time-estimation process could cause the disappearance of the RP. First, we designed experiments consisting of motor execution (ME), motor execution after time estimation (MEATE), and time estimation (TE) tasks, and we collected and preprocessed the EEG data of 16 subjects. Second, we compared the event related potential (ERP) waveform and scalp topography between ME and MEATE tasks. Then, to explore the influence of time-estimation, we analyzed the difference in ERP between MEATE and TE tasks. Finally, we used source imaging to probe the activation of brain regions during the three tasks, and we calculated the average activation amplitude of eight motor related brain regions. We found that the RP occurred in the ME task but not in the MEATE task. We also found that the waveform of the difference in ERP between the MEATE and TE tasks was similar to that of the ME task. The results of source imaging indicated that, compared to the ME task, the activation amplitude of the supplementary motor area (SMA) decreased significantly for the MEATE task. Our results suggested that the time estimation process could cause the disappearance of the RP. This phenomenon might be caused by the counteraction of neural electrical activity related to time estimation and motor preparation in the SMA.
... However, the time at which awareness emerged was associated with the fear intensity. Several previous reports have indicated that the timing of motor intention awareness depends not only on the RP onset time [46], but also other cognitive factors [47,48]. For example, attending to the internal urge to make a voluntary movement can increase sensitivity to motor intention, and can speed up awareness of motor intention [47]. ...
... Several previous reports have indicated that the timing of motor intention awareness depends not only on the RP onset time [46], but also other cognitive factors [47,48]. For example, attending to the internal urge to make a voluntary movement can increase sensitivity to motor intention, and can speed up awareness of motor intention [47]. Considering that negative emotions that accompany pain can affect attentional cognitive processes [49,50], the fear of movement-related pain observed in the present study might have caused the participants to concentrate on their movement, thus strengthening the relationship between awareness of motor intention and fear of movement-related pain. ...
Fear of movement-related pain is known to disturb the process of motor preparation in patients with chronic pain. In the present study, we aimed to clarify the neural mechanisms underlying the influence of fear movement-related pain on motor preparatory brain activity using Libet’s clock and electroencephalography (EEG). Healthy participants were asked to press a button while watching a rotating Libet’s clock-hand, and report the number on the clock (“W time”) when they made the “decision” to press the button with their right index finger. Immediately after pressing the button, a painful electrical stimulus was delivered to the dorsum of the left hand, causing participants to feel fear of movement (button press-related pain). We found that fear of movement-related pain caused the W time to be early, and that the amplitudes of readiness potentials (RPs) increased after awareness of motor intention emerged. In addition, fear of movement-related pain caused over-activation of the medial frontal cortex, supplementary motor area, cingulate motor area, and primary motor cortex after participants became aware of their motor intention. Such over-activation might result from conflict between the unrealized desire to escape from a painful experience and motivation to perform a required motor task.
... An earlier experiment by Haggard and Eimer (1999) supported that the timing of the RP is not correlated with W time, but that timing of the LRP is. Recent work that has attempted to replicate Haggard and Eimer's findings is not univocal, with Jo et al. (2015) finding that the RP covaries with W time for a particular subpopulation, committed meditators, 27 but others finding no covariance of either the RP or the LRP with W (Schlegel et al. 2013;Alexander et al. 2015). ...
... Committed meditators, the experimental group inJo et al. (2015), were those who had at least three years of experience practicing mindfulness meditation.Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved. ...
Neuroscientists have located brain activity that prepares or encodes action plans before agents are aware of intending to act. On the basis of these findings and broader agency research, activity in these regions has been proposed as the neural realizers of practical intention. My aim in this paper is to evaluate the case for taking these neural states to be neural representations of intention. I draw on work in philosophy of action on the role and nature of practical intentions to construct a framework of the functional profile of intentions fit for empirical investigation. With this framework, I turn to the broader empirical neuroscience literature on agency to assess these proposed neural representations of intention. I argue that while these neural states in some respects satisfy the functions of intention in planning agency prospective of action, their fit with the role of intention in action execution is not well supported. I close by offering a sketch of which experimental task features could aid in the search for the neural realizer of intention in action.
... Although Jo et al. (2014) using a classic Libet's Clock paradigm to measure IB did not find a difference between meditators and non-meditators in behavioral data or brain activity, Lush et al. (2016) using the similar paradigm reported stronger intentional binding effect, and thus increase in sense of agency, in meditators compared with non-meditators. This effect was attributed by the authors to greater meta-cognitive access to one's own intentions (see also Jo et al. 2015), resulting from continued practice of sustained attention to intentions and actions in mindfulness practitioners. Even though self is an important component of IB, the majority of studies investigated IB primarily in terms of self's relation to action (e.g., Haggard and Clark 2003;Haggard et al. 2002;Wolpe et al. 2013) but have rarely investigated self's relation to outcome. ...
... In terms of overall group effects, we did not find any overall difference between the two groups. This is consistent with the lack of a significant effect with temporal estimates between meditators and non-meditators using the standard task (Jo et al. 2015). One way to reconcile the different findings between our study and the Lush et al. (2016) is that different kinds of stimuli were used in the two studies. ...
Objectives
Mindfulness meditation is based on Buddhist teachings and meditation practices that promote a reduced identification with thoughts and mental states. Mindfulness meditation is also suggested to promote self-other integration, either by decreasing preference for self-related processing or by rebalancing self and other-related processing. However, it is not clear how meditation practice influences attachment to self and more specifically sense of agency. Hence, we investigated how mindfulness meditation (Vipassana or insight meditation) practice influences an implicit measure of sense of agency known as intentional binding effect with self- vs other-associated stimuli by comparing long-term meditators with non-meditators.Methods
This study had two phases. The first phase consisted of a perceptual matching task using self-related and other-related shape-label pairings so that participants can learn the shape-label associations. In the second phase, participants performed an intentional binding task with the same self-associated and other-associated stimuli displayed as target outcome of self-generated action.ResultsWhile meditators did show faster responses to self vs other shape-label processing similar to non-meditators, they did not show stronger binding (reduced temporal estimation between action and outcome shape) for self-associated compared with other-associated outcome.Conclusions
The results indicate that even though meditators preferentially process self-related information, they are less attached to self-associated stimuli as indicated by an implicit measure of sense of agency. These results have implications for theories of action and agency based on contemplative traditions that emphasize less attachment to outcomes of our actions.
... 232). Different mindfulness practices can allow one to direct one's attention to the different dimensions of subjective experience and to observe their one's states and processes [57,58]. ...
... 232). Different mindfulness practices can allow one to direct one's attention to the different dimensions of subjective experience and to observe their one's states and processes [57,58]. This core mechanism of mindfulness practice is also associated with a number of positive effects on individuals, such as improvements in affect regulation [59], the enhancement of emotional resilience [60], an increase in self-determination [61], or the cultivation of empathy. ...
Despite growing educational efforts in various areas of society and albeit expanding knowledge on the background and consequences of consumption, little has changed about individual consumer behavior and its detrimental impact. Against this backdrop, some scholars called for a stronger focus on personal competencies, especially affective-motivational ones to foster more sustainable consumption. Such competencies, however, are rarely addressed within the context of education for sustainable consumption. Responding to this gap, we suggest two new learning formats that allow students to systematically acquire affective-motivational competencies: self-inquiry-based learning (SIBL) and self-experience-based learning (SEBL). We developed these approaches at Leuphana University Lüneburg, Germany, since 2016, and applied them within the framework of two seminars called Personal Approaches to Sustainable Consumption. Conducting scholarship of teaching and learning, we investigated the potential of SIBL and SEBL for cultivating personal competencies for sustainable development in general and sustainable consumption in particular. Our results indicate that SIBL and SEBL are promising approaches for this purpose.
... Therefore, mindfulness meditators might be expected to have an earlier awareness of an intention to move (cf. Jo et al., 2015, who report that meditators have greater access to the negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials averaged to produce the early readiness potential which is associated with conscious intentions to act). ...
... Meta-analytically combined Fisher z-transformed Pearson and Spearman's correlations between measures of hypnotisability, mindfulness, and timing of intention (W) in Studies 2 and 3 Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses after means. 95% CI and Bayes factors are reported below means. * ¼ sensitive B (evidence for the hypothesis).Jo et al. (2015) reported no significant difference in W judgements between meditators and non-meditators, but with means showing large effects in the same direction as we found here. A fixed-effect meta-analysis of the standard Libet instruction comparison reported in Jo et al. and Study 1 revealed strong evidence in favor of an earlier W time in medit ...
In a famous series of experiments, Libet investigated the subjective timing of awareness of an intention to move, a task that can be considered a metacognitive judgement. The ability to strategically produce inaccurate metacognitions about intentions has been postulated to be central to the changes in judgements of agency common to all hypnotic responding. Therefore, differences in hypnotisability may be reflected in Libet’s measure. Specifically, the ability to sustain inaccurate judgements of agency displayed by highly hypnotisable people may result from their having coarser higher order representations of intentions. They, therefore, should report a delayed time of intention relative to less hypnotisable individuals. Conversely, mindfulness practice aims at accurate metacognition, including of intentions, and may lead to the development of finer grained higher order representations of intending. Thus, the long-term practice of mindfulness may produce an earlier judgement of the time of an intention. We tested these groups using Libet’s task, and found that, consistent with predictions, highly hypnotisable people reported a later time of intention than less hypnotisable people and meditators an earlier time than non-meditators. In a further two studies, we replicated the finding that hypnotisable people report later awareness of a motor intention and additionally found a negative relationship between trait mindfulness and this measure. Based on these findings, we argue that hypnotic response and meditation involve opposite processes.
... Unsere Resultate legen nahe, dass die vor der Willensentscheidung registrierten Hirnpotentialschwankungen nicht kausal mit der Handlungsintention verbunden sind, wie dies oft ganz selbstverständlich angenommen wird. Im Folgenden sollen ausschnittweise wesentliche Resultate von vier Studien zusammengefasst werden, die zeigen, dass das mit der "freien Willensentscheidung" einhergehende Bereitschaftspotential nicht zwingend kausal mit der Handlungsausführung zusammenhängen muss (Jo et al., 2013(Jo et al., , 2015Jo, Wittmann, Borghardt, Hinterberger & Schmidt, 2014;. ...
... In der Gruppe der 20 erfahrenen Meditierenden zeigte sich eine Korrelation zwischen dem Bereitschaftspotential und dem Zeitpunkt der gefühlten Handlungsintention, der an der Experimentaluhr abgelesen wurde. Dieser Zusammenhang stellte sich bei der Kontrollgruppe nicht ein (Jo et al., 2015). Je steiler die Flanke des Bereitschaftspotentials bei den Meditierenden, desto früher berichten sie von der Handlungsintention. ...
Wir berichten von einer Serie von Experimenten mit dem berühmten Libet-Paradigma zur Frage des freien Willens. Die klassischen, oft replizierten Befunde dieses experimentellen Paradigmas zeigen, wie das aus dem EEG-Signal extrahierte Bereitschaftspotential deutlich vor der bewussten Entscheidung, zu handeln, beginnt. Dies wird häufig als Beleg dafür genommen, dass die scheinbar willentliche Handlungsinitiierung eine Illusion ist, da ihr unbewusst neuronale Vorbereitungsprozesse vorausgehen. Wir zeigen hier, wie das frühe Bereitschaftspotential durch Mittelung von spontanen oder aufgabenbedingten EEG-Fluktuationen entsteht. Diese spontanen Fluktuationen begünstigen zwar die Handlungsausführung, sind jedoch nicht notwendigerweise kausal an der Handlung beteiligt. Zudem deuten unsere Untersuchungen mit erfahrenen Meditierenden achtsamkeitsbasierter Praktiken darauf hin, dass diese sensitiver auf Phasenzustände der EEG-Fluktuationen reagieren.
... Certain psychological manipulations, such as meditation (Jo et al. 2015) and hypnosis (Halsband et al. 2009), have the capacity to alter consciousness. Both methods enable individuals to disengage from external reality and immerse themselves in internally generated experiences. ...
Our ability to measure time is vital for daily life, technology use, and even mental health; however, separating pure time perception from other mental processes (like emotions) is a research challenge requiring precise tests to isolate and understand brain activity solely related to time estimation. To address this challenge, we designed an experiment utilizing hypnosis alongside electroencephalography (EEG) to assess differences in time estimation, namely underestimation and overestimation. Hypnotic induction is designed to reduce awareness and meta-awareness, facilitating a detachment from the immediate environment. This reduced information processing load minimizes the need for elaborate internal thought during hypnosis, further simplifying the cognitive landscape. To predict time perception based on brain activity during extended durations (5 min), we employed artificial intelligence techniques. Utilizing Support Vector Machines (SVMs) with both radial basis function (RBF) and polynomial kernels, we assessed their effectiveness in classifying time perception-related brain patterns. We evaluated various feature combinations and different algorithms to identify the most accurate configuration. Our analysis revealed an impressive 80.9% classification accuracy for time perception detection using the RBF kernel, demonstrating the potential of AI in decoding this complex cognitive function.
... Current studies that make use of naïve first person reports may, for instance, overlook ambiguities inherent in lived experience or inaccurate reports may be used to support specific hypotheses that could have been challenged by the reports of subjects who have undergone introspective training. The case of the rubber hand illusion is an example of the former (Valenzuela Moguillansky et al., 2013) the Libet-experiment is a good example of the latter (Jo et al., 2015). Furthermore, introspective training such as meditation is known to increase the accuracy of reports (Fox et al., 2012). ...
There are two basic aspects of attentional control. The ability to direct attention toward different objects is typically experienced as a fundamental indicator of attentional freedom. One can control what one attends to and directing attention is a relatively simple task. In contrast, sustaining attention on a chosen object proves to be difficult as mind-wandering seems to be inevitable. Does the problem of sustaining attention, mean that we are fundamentally unfree? We discuss this issue in light of an introspective study of directing and sustaining attention, looking specifically into the question of whether it is possible to experience the source of attention, i.e., the subject enacting freedom through attention. The study involved six persons performing different attention tasks over the course of about a month. Common experiences and contrasting reports are presented. This forms the basis for a discussion of the method of introspection and in particular of how to approach conflicting reports.
... Lutz et al. (2008) commented that long-term regular meditation practice shows enhanced action of brain regions responsible for attention, which could be a potential reason why the meditators in this study also could relate better to the items of the act with awareness facet and marked them as highly important. Given that the meditators in this study were daily practitioners of different types of meditation over the past 11-25 years, awareness, attention, and cognitive flexibility, which are components of the act with awareness facet, could be enhanced (Jo et al., 2015;Marchand, 2014) making them mark the items on this facet with high agreement. ...
Despite the interest in mindfulness research, there is a dearth of studies about mindfulness assessment in India. Particularly, little is known about the extent to which the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) represents content relevant for experienced meditators in Indian cultural and spiritual contexts. A sequential explanatory mixed-method design was used for this study. Six experienced meditators completed the standard FFMQ along with corresponding perceived importance items, followed by retrospective cognitive interviews. In addition to quantitative analysis related to reliability, content validity, and agreement, qualitative data from cognitive interviews were used to explore the reasons for high and low ratings of some items. Most of the items on the FFMQ facets act with awareness (75%), and nonreact (85.7%) were rated by all participants as being important. For 87.5% of the items in the describe facet, there was moderate agreement among the meditators regarding their importance. Only one out of eight items in each of the observe and nonjudge facets were rated as important by all participants. The qualitative statements supported the quantitative results by throwing some light on the reasons for high and low agreement. The observe and nonjudge facets were found to have questionable content validity for use with meditators in India who are non-Buddhist and also do not practice in mindfulness-based interventions contexts. Future psychometric work in India will need to explore to what extent a shortened version, excluding the low validity items of the FFMQ, may be a suitable alternative.
... While these networks are engaged during daily activities, there are types of meditation to train the ability to be more aware of this whole cycle of brain activity. Focused attention practices require an intentional and sustained focus on a single object (e.g. the breath) (Bishop et al., 2004;Jo et al., 2015). Alternatively, open monitoring practices have a wider aperture of attentional focus and require "light-touch" attention to everything that arises, whether an internal stimulus such as a thought or something external, such as a sound (Lutz et al., 2008). ...
Aim
This study investigated the differences in frontoparietal EEG gamma coherence between expert meditators (EM) and naïve meditators (NM).
Material and methods
This is a cross-sectional study with a sample of twenty-one healthy adults divided under two groups (experts meditators vs. naive-meditators), with analyzing the intra-hemispheric coherence of frontoparietal gamma oscillations by electroencephalography during the study steps: EEG resting-state 1, during the open presence meditation practice, and EEG resting-state 2.
Results
The findings demonstrated greater frontoparietal EEG coherence in gamma for experts meditators in the Fp1-P3, F4-P4, F8-P4 electrode pairs during rest 1 and rest 2 (p ≤ 0.0083). In addition, we evidenced differences in the frontoparietal EEG coherence for expert meditators in F4-P4, F8-P4 during the meditation (p ≤ 0.0083).
Conclusion
Our results can support evidence that the connectivity of the right frontoparietal network acts as a biomarker of the enhanced Open monitoring meditation training.
... Jo et al. (2014) studied the voluntary movement link with sensory feedback in Mindfulness meditators (CDM-FA), and reported that lower perception delays (binding effect) were associated with negative deflections of slow cortical potentials, an ERP known to precede voluntary movements. In further studies of the group, the results suggest that mindfulness meditators also had a more reliable control over their slow cortical potentials (Jo et al., 2015). In a similar way, Radin et al. (2011) presented randomly visual and auditory stimuli, and described a distinction in the pre-stimulus waveforms when visual and auditory ERP were compared only in non-dual meditators (NDM). ...
Meditation practices, originated from ancient traditions, have increasingly received attention due to their potential benefits to mental and physical health. The scientific community invests efforts into scrutinizing and quantifying the effects of these practices, especially on the brain. There are methodological challenges in describing the neural correlates of the subjective experience of meditation. We noticed, however, that technical considerations on signal processing also don't follow standardized approaches, which may hinder generalizations. Therefore, in this article, we discuss the usage of the electroencephalogram (EEG) as a tool to study meditation experiences in healthy individuals. We describe the main EEG signal processing techniques and how they have been translated to the meditation field until April 2020. Moreover, we examine in detail the limitations/assumptions of these techniques and highlight some good practices, further discussing how technical specifications may impact the interpretation of the outcomes. By shedding light on technical features, this article contributes to more rigorous approaches to evaluate the construct of meditation.
... Again, no specific ontological presuppositions are required for this kind of investigation. Studies have already shown that meditators are able to increase access to cognitive and volitional processes (Jo et al. 2015;Fox et al. 2012), and this may be true also for the experience of deeper esthetic qualities such as atmospheres. ...
This article presents the results of a qualitative study of Anthroposophic meditation, which arose in the German-speaking world in the early 20th Century focusing on cognition, self-development, and pro-social action. The objective was to explore this previously unstudied form of meditation. The current sample (N = 30) consists of long-term practitioners of Anthroposophic meditation. Semi-structured interviews, focusing on demographics, background, and phenomenology and interpretation, were conducted with these practitioners. The material gathered was investigated using thematic analysis. Seven main themes were found: Self, cognition, perception, affect, sleep, embodiment, and environment, and, among these, 32 subthemes. Potential avenues for further research are outlined. Some of these overlap with current approaches to meditation while others represent new areas of inquiry: Personal development with a focus on strengthening the self, introspection or contemplative inquiry, sensed presences, the experience of phenomenological atmospheres, consciousness in the sleep state, embodied aspects of meditation experience, the relationship between practice and daily life, and meditation challenges.
... This was, eventually, also connected back to neuroscience: Varela was the first to postulate a phenomenology of experience as a complement to neuroscientific methods (Varela et al., 1991). This has inspired a strand of research within neuroscience that calls itself contemplative neuroscience (Shear, 2007;Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013;Dor-Ziderman et al., 2013;Jo et al., 2013Jo et al., , 2014Jo et al., , 2015Lutz et al., 2015;Winter et al., 2020). This refers to a scientific model of experience, where neuroscientific methods, such as electroencephalogram (EEG), MRI, magnetoencephalogram (MEG), or others, are used to understand brain states or dynamics-experience of the outer world or third-person types of experience. ...
Ontology, the ideas we have about the nature of reality, and epistemology, our concepts about how to gain knowledge about the world, are interdependent. Currently, the dominant ontology in science is a materialist model, and associated with it an empiricist epistemology. Historically speaking, there was a more comprehensive notion at the cradle of modern science in the middle ages. Then “experience” meant both inner, or first person, and outer, or third person, experience. With the historical development, experience has come to mean only sense experience of outer reality. This has become associated with the ontology that matter is the most important substance in the universe, everything else—consciousness, mind, values, etc., —being derived thereof or reducible to it. This ontology is insufficient to explain the phenomena we are living with—consciousness, as a precondition of this idea, or anomalous cognitions. These have a robust empirical grounding, although we do not understand them sufficiently. The phenomenology, though, demands some sort of non-local model of the world and one in which consciousness is not derivative of, but coprimary with matter. I propose such a complementarist dual aspect model of consciousness and brain, or mind and matter. This then also entails a different epistemology. For if consciousness is coprimary with matter, then we can also use a deeper exploration of consciousness as happens in contemplative practice to reach an understanding of the deep structure of the world, for instance in mathematical or theoretical intuition, and perhaps also in other areas such as in ethics. This would entail a kind of contemplative science that would also complement our current experiential mode that is exclusively directed to the outside aspect of our world. Such an epistemology might help us with various issues, such as good theoretical and other intuitions.
... In fact, the cultivation of such a "witnessing perspective" (Vago, 2014, p. 30) is considered key by mindfulness practitioners (Pagis, 2009;Kerr et al., 2011). Studies inquiring introspective self-reports (Fox et al., 2012) as well as their relation to neurological processes (Lutz et al., 2007& Jo et al., 2015 provide further evidence that mindfulness training improves the ability to introspect. In addition, other research finds that mindfulness practice can develop cognitive abilities (such as memorization) (Chiesa et al., 2011), thereby facilitating the verbalization of inner experience (Fox et al., 2012). ...
Purpose
This paper aims to explore the relationship between introspection and key competencies for sustainable consumption (KCSCs). It investigates whether mindfulness training can cultivate the ability to introspect and stimulate the development of KCSCs.
Design/methodology/approach
Two independent studies were analyzed. Data were retrieved from interviews with participants of a consumer-focused mindfulness training (Study 1, 11 participants), as well as from diaries of students attending a university seminar with mindfulness training (Study 2, 13 students), and made subject to qualitative content analysis.
Findings
Both studies show a clear intersection between both constructs and suggest that mindfulness training can contribute to the development of KCSCs and learners’ ability to introspect. The studies also demonstrated that introspection is not equally related to all competencies and that KCSCs must not be reduced to introspection.
Research limitations/implications
Both KCSCs and introspection are complex and latent constructs and hence challenging to observe. The research understands itself as a first exploratory approach for empirically investigating this complex relation.
Originality/value
While increasing (self-)reflectivity is at the core of competence-based education, a systematic engagement with the practice of introspection as a means to enhancing reflectivity is surprisingly lacking. Mindfulness training could be a promising way to cultivate introspective abilities and thus facilitate learning processes that are conducive to competence development.
... Although speculative, such an explanation in terms of increased action preparation would also be in line with earlier research on inter-individual differences in the experience of intentionality and free will beliefs in agency contexts. Specifically, past research showed correlations between intentional awareness and brain activation related to motor preparation for individuals who are assumed to enjoy high levels of internal insight (e.g., meditators; Jo et al., 2015), as well as demonstrated that these differences can affect the implicit sense of agency. A study by Lush et al. (2016), for example, found that intentional binding was stronger for experienced meditators who find practicing mindfulness pleasurable, than for controls (Lush et al., 2016). ...
Awareness of action is a pervasive personal experience that is crucial in understanding self-generated and other-generated actions as well as their effects. A large body of research suggests that action awareness, as measured by the magnitude of temporal binding between an action and its effect in an operant action task (i.e., intentional binding), is rooted in the human capacity to experience self-agency and establish action intentions. Whereas previous research mainly addressed the role of intentionality itself in these socially well-shared experiences, in the present study we focused specifically on one important aspect of it: the quality or strength of action intentions. We expected and established that stronger intentions increase intentional binding. Specifically, the magnitude of the binding effect, as assessed by the Libet clock task in which two actions were followed by the same neutral tone, was elevated for the action that was enacted with stronger intentions. We briefly discuss the implications of the observed role of intentional strength in temporal binding between action and effect, for promoting a better understanding and examination of how the concept of intentionality is associated with action awareness in general, and the experience of being the agent of one’s own actions in particular.
... 207). Consistent with these suggestions, there is evidence that Buddhist meditators may have improved access to negative deflections of slow cortical potentials which, when averaged, produce the RP ; see also Jo, Hinterberger, Wittmann, & Schmidt, 2015;Jo, Wittmann, Borghardt, Hinterberger, & Schmidt, 2014). Furthermore, there is evidence that meditators are less hypnotizable than nonmeditators, perhaps because they have finer-grained concepts of first-order intentions Semmens-Wheeler, 2012;Semmens-Wheeler & Dienes, 2012). ...
Mindfulness meditation and hypnosis are related in opposing ways to awareness of intentions. The cold control theory of hypnosis proposes that hypnotic responding involves the experience of involuntariness while performing an actually intentional action. Hypnosis therefore relies upon inaccurate metacognition about intentional actions and experiences. Mindfulness meditation centrally involves awareness of intentions and is associated with improved metacognitive access to intentions. Therefore, mindfulness meditators and highly hypnotizable people may lie at opposite ends of a spectrum with regard to metacognitive access to intention‐related information. Here we review the theoretical background and evidence for differences in the metacognition of intentions in these groups, as revealed by chronometric measures of the awareness of voluntary action: the timing of an intention to move (Libet's “W” judgments) and the compressed perception of time between an intentional action and its outcome (“intentional binding”). We review these measures and critically evaluate their proposed connection to the experience of volition and sense of agency.
... Given that SCP can be self-controlled without physiological influences [1], it is not a surprise that a meditative state can change ongoing fluctuations of SCP. In addition, it has recently been suggested that experienced meditators might have a heightened sense of SCPs [19,20], whereas the general population can hardly sense them [21]. Following this reasoning, the decreased amount of SCP phase synchrony during meditation among expert meditators might be due to their mental state, which is different from a resting state. ...
Neuronal interactions coupled by phase synchronization have been studied in a wide range of frequency bands, but fluctuations below the delta frequency have often been neglected. In the present study, phase synchrony in slow cortical potentials (SCPs, 0.01–0.1 Hz) was examined during two different mental states; a resting state and a breath-focused mindfulness meditation. SCP phase synchrony in 9 long-term expert meditators (on average 22 years of experience) were compared with the data obtained from 11 novices. Additionally, after the novices attended an 8-week mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) program, SCP phase synchrony was measured again. While expert meditators and novices exhibited the same amount of SCP phase synchrony in the resting state, decreased synchronization was found during meditation among expert meditators as well as novices who had participated in the MBSR program (but not prior to the program). These findings suggest that phase synchrony in slow cortical activity is context-dependent and could provide crucial information in the study of the human mind.
... Although implicated in a wide variety of "higher" cognitive tasks, such as probabilistic reasoning or integrating abstract information stored in working memory (Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000;Ramnani & Owen, 2004), perhaps most intriguing for our purposes is the apparent link between the RLPFC and introspective ability (Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & Blackmon, 2014;Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010). Given that most meditation practitioners spend significant time engaging in self-reflective, introspective practices, consistently altered structure in a brain region key to introspective ability suggests that such capacities might be enhanced with meditation training Lutz & Thompson, 2003)-a hypothesis supported by some preliminary research (Bornemann & Singer, 2017;Fox et al., 2012;Jo, Hinterberger, Wittmann, & Schmidt, 2015;Sze et al., 2010). As with body awareness, heightened introspective awareness might not only facilitate the goals of meditation practice itself, but might also have ancillary benefits. ...
The aim of this chapter is to provide an accessible introduction to the neuroscience of meditation. First, we review studies examining the relationship between meditation and alterations in the structure of the brain’s grey and white matter (so-called morphometric neuroimaging). Next, we discuss findings from functional neuroimaging methods, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) scans, and what they have taught us about the brain’s patterns of activity during different forms of meditation, how meditation alters the brain’s response to various tasks and experiences, and how the expertise of long-term meditators might be harnessed to help us explore subtle aspects of human cognition. Third, we review electrophysiological methods of measuring brain activity during meditation, such as electroencephalography (EEG), and how these findings relate to what we have learned from morphometric and functional neuroimaging. Finally, we discuss the implications of this research and of meditation more generally for brain health and psychological well-being. Specifically, we focus on how meditation might ameliorate the deficits related to cognitive aging, as well as help ameliorate the symptoms and underlying neural substrates associated with neurodegenerative and psychiatric disease.
https://mindrxiv.org/m2sez/
... Hypnotic suggestibility is negatively associated with mindfulness and meditators display reduced or average hypnotic suggestibility (Semmens-Wheeler & Dienes, 2012;Spanos, Steggles, Radtke-Bodorik, & Rivers, 1979). Meditators seem to have greater awareness of motor intentions (Jo, Hinterberger, Wittmann, & Schmidt, 2015) whereas HS individuals seem to have delayed awareness of such intentions (Lush, Naish, & Dienes, 2016). Reducing metaawareness may also enhance suggestibility (Brown, Antonova, Langley, & Oakley, 2001). ...
A disruption in the sense of agency is the primary phenomenological feature of response to hypnotic suggestions but its cognitive basis remains elusive. Here we tested the proposal that distorted volition during response to suggestions arises from poor metacognition pertaining to the sources of one’s control. Highly suggestible and control participants completed a motor task in which performance was reduced through surreptitious manipulations of cursor lag and stimuli speed. Highly suggestible participants did not differ from controls in performance or metacognition of performance, but their sense of agency was less sensitive to cursor lag manipulations, suggesting reduced awareness that their control was being manipulated. These results indicate that highly suggestible individuals have aberrant metacognition of agency and may be a valuable population for studying distortions in the sense of agency.
... Mindfulness meditation is a specific self-regulation technique, which aims at achieving a mental state of non-judgmental awareness in the present moment. Therefore, it is expected that individuals who regularly engage in meditation practices that include mindfulness techniques would increase the awareness of their motor intention (Jo et al., 2014(Jo et al., , 2015 and show enhanced skills in controlling motor responses. For instance, recent studies on conflict effects using the flanker-type attention network test (ANT, Fan et al., 2002; see Figure 1) showed fewer error responses among meditators than non-meditators (van den Hurk et al., 2010;Jo et al., 2016). ...
Mindfulness meditators often show greater efficiency in resolving response conflicts than non-meditators. However, the neural mechanisms underlying the improved behavioral efficiency are unclear. Here, we investigated frontal theta dynamics—a neural mechanism involved in cognitive control processes—in long-term mindfulness meditators. The dynamics of EEG theta oscillations (4–8 Hz) recorded over the medial frontal cortex (MFC) were examined in terms of their power (MFC theta power) and their functional connectivity with other brain areas (the MFC-centered theta network). Using a flanker-type paradigm, EEG data were obtained from 22 long-term mindfulness meditators and compared to those from 23 matched controls without meditation experience. Meditators showed more efficient cognitive control after conflicts, evidenced by fewer error responses irrespective of response timing. Furthermore, meditators exhibited enhanced conflict modulations of the MFC-centered theta network shortly before the response, in particular for the functional connection between the MFC and the motor cortex. In contrast, MFC theta power was comparable between groups. These results suggest that the higher behavioral efficiency after conflicts in mindfulness meditators could be a function of increased engagement to control the motor system in association with the MFC-centered theta network.
... A contribution to the understanding of inter-individual differences in the MRCP comes from a study by Jo et al. (2015) that compared experienced meditators to controls, and found that meditators are more able than controls to access the emergence of negative deflections of slow cortical potentials, which could have fundamental effects on initiating a voluntary movement with awareness. ...
Research on preparatory brain processes taking place before acting shows unexpected connections with cognitive processing. From 50 years, we know that motor-related brain activity can be measured by electrocortical recordings 1–3 s before voluntary actions. This readiness potential has been associated with increasing excitably of premotor and motor areas and directly linked to the kinematic of the upcoming action. Now we know that the mere motor preparation is only one function of a more complex preparatory activity. Recent research shows that before any action many cognitive processes may occur depending on various aspects of the action, such as complexity, meaning, emotional valence, fatigue and consequences of the action itself. In addition to studies on self-paced action, the review considers also studies on externally-triggered paradigms showing differences in preparation processes related to age, physical exercise, and task instructions. Evidences from electrophysiological and neuroimaging recording indicate that in addition to the motor areas, the prefrontal, parietal and sensory cortices may be active during action preparation to anticipate future events and calibrate responses.
... It needs to be honed, cultivated and trained. Some promising blends are already being published under the term 'contemplative neuroscience', where trained meditators qualify the findings of neuroscientific measurements (Jo et al. 2015(Jo et al. , 2016Lutz et al. 2015). ...
Spirituality is the taboo topic of science. Science, in conjunction with political and secular enlightenment movements, was one of the major drivers of modern enlightenment, secularization and progress. Science has itself become a powerful meta-narrative. And part of this meta-narrative is a materialist view of the world. In such a model consciousness can only be secondary to material events in the brain. Yet, spiritual experiences are, as data show, quite common. Because the enlightenment movement was so successful, it has done away with all that is considered unnecessary baggage, including spirituality. Therefore, a new discourse needs to start that addresses this problem. This can only be done via the notion of experience. Spiritual experiences are experiences of a reality that is experienced to be beyond the ego and its immediate needs. They are the basis of religion that later starts out to interpret and ritualize these experiences. In them human consciousness seems to have direct access to the structure of reality as such. It is interesting to see that the scientific process has a similar mode of operation: it needs a deep, often creative insight into the structure behind data in order to create a theory. This process is called abduction and is, phenomenologically speaking, very similar to a spiritual experience or insight. Thus, spirituality and science might have more in common than one would think at first glance. This would entail that we need to develop a methodology of inner experience if we want to take spirituality scientifically seriously.
... As a test of cold control theory,Lush et al. (2016)hypothesized that highly suggestible individuals' awareness of their intention to act would be temporally delayed because of impaired metacognition pertaining to motor intentions. This prediction was supported; in addition, the authors further found that meditators displayed earlier awareness of motor intentions than non-meditators, which is consistent with research suggesting that meditation and mindfulness are associated with superior metacognition (Jo et al., 2015) and thus are qualitatively distinct from hypnosis (Dienes et al., 2016). These results imply that highly suggestible individuals exhibit impaired metacognition pertaining to motor intentions and are consistent with the view that hypnosis involves the strategic relinquishing of metacognition, rather than a disruption in executive control itself. ...
Hypnosis is a unique form of top-down regulation in which verbal suggestions are capable of eliciting pronounced changes in a multitude of psychological phenomena. Hypnotic suggestion has been widely used both as a technique for studying basic science questions regarding human consciousness but also as a method for targeting a range of symptoms within a therapeutic context. Here we provide a synthesis of current knowledge regarding the characteristics and neurocognitive mechanisms of hypnosis. We review evidence from cognitive neuroscience, experimental psychopathology, and clinical psychology regarding the utility of hypnosis as an experimental method for modulating consciousness, as a model for studying healthy and pathological cognition, and as a therapeutic vehicle. We also highlight the relationships between hypnosis and other psychological phenomena, including the broader domain of suggestion and suggestibility and conclude by identifying the most salient challenges confronting the nascent cognitive neuroscience of hypnosis and outlining future directions for research on hypnosis and suggestion.
... Meditation is an exercise in metacognitive processes, both in monitoring and control (Jankowski and Holas 2014) and sustained meditation practice seems likely to lead to changes in metacognition . Consistently, meditators have been found to show more accurate metacognition related to the timing of an intention than non-meditators, ) and experienced meditators have been shown to have greater metacognitive access to negative deflections of slow cortical potentials (which, when averaged, produce the early readiness potential) (Jo Hinterberger Wittmann and Schmidt 2015). ...
We investigate conditions in which more accurate metacognition may lead to greater susceptibility to illusion and thus conditions under which mindfulness meditation may lead to less accurate perceptions. Specifically, greater awareness of intentions may lead to an illusory compression of time between a voluntary action and its outcome (“intentional binding”). Here, we report that experienced Buddhist mindfulness meditators rather than non-meditators display a greater illusory shift of the timing of an outcome toward an intentional action. Mindfulness meditation involves awareness of causal connections between different mental states, including intentions. We argue that this supports improvements in metacognition targeted at motor intentions. Changes in metacognitive ability may result in an earlier and less veridical experience of the timing of action outcomes either through increased access to sensorimotor pre-representations of an action outcome or by affording greater precision to action timing judgements. Furthermore, as intentional binding is an implicit measure of the sense of agency; these results also provide evidence that mindfulness meditators experience a stronger sense of agency.
... Based on our empirical studies and the first person account reported in 6.3 and 6.4 we have suggested a model in order to describe how self-initiated actions are made with respect to inner urges, intentions, and final decisions (Jo et al., 2015). ...
The readiness potential is an ongoing negativity in the EEG preceding a self-initiated movement by approximately 1.5seconds. So far it has predominantly been interpreted as a preparatory signal with a causal link to the upcoming movement. Here a different hypothesis is suggested which we call the selective slow cortical potential sampling hypothesis. In this review of recent research results we argue that the initiation of a voluntary action is more likely during negative fluctuations of the slow cortical potential and that the sampling and averaging of many trials leads to the observed negativity. That is, empirical evidence indicates that the early readiness potential is not a neural correlate of preconscious motor preparation and thus a determinant of action. Our hypothesis thereafter challenges the classic interpretation of the Libet experiment which is often taken as proof that there is no free will. We furthermore suggest that slow cortical potentials are related to an urge to act but are not a neural indicator of the decision process of action initiation.
... et al., 2013). Expert mindfulness meditators have in general shown to be more sensitive to inner urges and impulses which are important for decision-making and movement initiation (Jo et al., 2014Jo et al., , 2015). The discrepancies with our results may be explained by a dissociation between interoceptive sensibility (i.e., self-attributed interoception) and interoceptive accuracy as assessed in an objective heart beat counting task (Garfinkel et al., 2015): Only self-attributed interoception but not interoceptive accuracy might be enhanced in mindfulness meditators as compared to non-meditating controls. ...
Recent research suggests that bodily signals and interoception are strongly related to our sense of time. Mindfulness meditators train to be aware of their body states and therefore could be more accurate at interval timing. In this study, n = 22 experienced mindfulness meditators and n = 22 matched controls performed both, an acoustic and a visual duration reproduction task of 8, 14, and 20 s intervals, while heart rate and skin conductance were continuously assessed. In addition, participants accomplished a heart beat perception task and two selective attention tasks. Results revealed no differences between meditators and controls with respect to performance in duration reproduction or attentional capacities. Additionally no group difference in heart beat perception scores was found. Across all subjects, correlational analyses revealed several associations between performance in the duration reproduction tasks and psychophysiological changes, the latter being also related to heart beat perception scores. Furthermore, former findings of linearly increasing cardiac periods and decreasing skin conductance levels during the auditory duration estimation task (Meissner and Wittmann, 2011) could be replicated, and these changes could also be observed during a visual duration reproduction task. In contrast to our earlier findings, the heart beat perception test was not related with timing performance. Overall, although experienced meditators did not differ from matched controls with respect to duration reproduction and interoceptive awareness, this study adds significantly to the emerging view that time perception is related to autonomic regulation and awareness of body states.
... Also, the measurement of objective indices of body related judgment, i.e. tactile sensitivity and accuracy, reveal a better performance after body-centered meditation (Fox et al., 2012;Mirams, Poliakoff, Brown, & Lloyd, 2013). In general, individuals with long-term practice of mindfulness meditation are more sensitive to inner movements and impulses which are important for decision-making and action control (Jo, Hinterberger, Wittmann, & Schmidt, 2015;Jo, Wittmann, Borghardt, Hinterberger, & Schmidt, 2014). As elaborated above, an increased awareness of the (bodily) self would lead to a relative expansion of duration . ...
Varela's enactive approach to cognitive science has been elaborated into a theoretical framework of agency, sense-making, and sociality, while his key methodological innovation-neurophenom-enology (NP)-continues to inspire empirical work. We argue that the enactive approach was originally expressed in NP as three core tenets: (1) phenomenological pragmatics, (2) embodied cognition, and (3) conscious efficacy. However, most efforts in NP have focused on applying tenet 1, while tenet 2 has received notably less attention, and there is even explicit distancing from tenet 3. By way of a critical review of four case studies, we show how NP thereby falls short of its full potential. Crucially, it needs to demonstrate that the first-person perspective matters, not only as a source of correlations with third-person data, but because lived experience, as such, makes a difference in its own right to the living body's dynamics. Given that methods for improving subjective reports have become accepted in human neuro-science (tenet 1), and given the increasing availability for recording multi-scalar organismic activity during embodied action (tenet 2), we propose it is time to integrate these research strands by using this issue of conscious efficacy as a pivot point (tenet 3). The development of genuinely experience-involving accounts of neurophysiological activity during embodied action holds promise for rebooting neuro-phenomenology in stronger form.
The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet’s method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.
Philosophers and neuroscientists address central issues in both fields, including morality, action, mental illness, consciousness, perception, and memory.
Philosophers and neuroscientists grapple with the same profound questions involving consciousness, perception, behavior, and moral judgment, but only recently have the two disciplines begun to work together. This volume offers fourteen original chapters that address these issues, each written by a team that includes at least one philosopher and one neuroscientist, who integrate disciplinary perspectives and reflect the latest research in both fields. Topics include morality, empathy, agency, the self, mental illness, neuroprediction, optogenetics, pain, vision, consciousness, memory, concepts, mind wandering, and the neural basis of psychological categories.
The chapters first address basic issues about our social and moral lives: how we decide to act and ought to act toward each other, how we understand each other's mental states and selves, and how we deal with pressing social problems regarding crime and mental or brain health. The following chapters consider basic issues about our mental lives: how we classify and recall what we experience, how we see and feel objects in the world, how we ponder plans and alternatives, and how our brains make us conscious and create specific mental states.
Contributors
Sara Abdulla, Eyal Aharoni, Corey H. Allen, Sara Aronowitz, Jenny Blumenthal-Barby, Ned Block, Allison J. Brager, Antonio Cataldo, Tony Cheng, Felipe De Brigard, Rachel N. Denison, Jim A. C. Everett, Gidon Felsen, Julia Haas, Hyemin Han, Zac Irving, Kristina Krasich, Enoch Lambert, Cristina Leon, Anna Leshinskaya, Jordan L. Livingston, Brian Maniscalco, Joshua May, Joseph McCaffrey, Jorge Morales, Samuel Murray, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Laura Niemi, Brian Odegaard, Hannah Read, Robyn Repko Waller, Sarah Robins, Jason Samaha, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Joshua August Skorburg, Shannon Spaulding, Arjen Stolk, Rita Svetlova, Natalia Washington, Clifford Workman, Jessey Wright
In the seminal Libet experiment (Libet et al., 1983), unconscious brain activity preceded the self-reported, conscious intention to move. This was repeatedly interpreted as challenging the view that (conscious) mental states cause behavior and, prominently, as challenging the existence of free will. Extensive discussions in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and jurisprudence followed, but further empirical findings were heterogeneous. However, a quantitative review of the literature summarizing the evidence of Libet-style experiments is lacking. The present meta-analysis fills this gap. The results revealed a temporal pattern that is largely consistent with the one found by Libet and colleagues. Remarkably, there were only k = 6 studies for the time difference between unconscious brain activity and the conscious intention to move — the most crucial time difference regarding implications about conscious causation and free will. Additionally, there was a high degree of uncertainty associated with this meta-analytic effect. We conclude that some of Libet et al.’s findings appear more fragile than anticipated in light of the substantial scientific work that built on them.
This paper is a practical guide to neurophenomenology. Varela’s neurophenomenological research program (NRP) aspires to bridge the gap between, and integrate, first-person (1P) and third-person (3P) approaches to understanding the mind. It does so by suggesting a methodological framework allowing these two irreducible phenomenal domains to relate and reciprocally support the investigation of one another. While highly appealing theoretically, neurophenomenology invites researchers to a challenging methodological endeavor. Based on our experience with empirical neurophenomenological implementation, we offer practical clarifications and insights learnt along the way. In the first part of the paper, we outline the theoretical principles of the NRP and briefly present the field of 1P research. We speak to the importance of phenomenological training and outline the utility of cooperating with meditators as skilled participants. We suggest that 1P accounts of subjective experience can be placed on a complexity continuum ranging between thick and thin phenomenology, highlighting the tension and trade-off inherent to the neurophenomenological attempt to naturalize phenomenology. We then outline a typology of bridges, which create mutual constraints between 1P and 3P approaches, and argue for the utility of alternating between the bridges depending on the available experimental resources, domain of interest and level of sought articulation. In the second part of the paper, we demonstrate how the theory can be put into practice by describing a decade of neurophenomenological studies investigating the sense of self with increasing focus on its embodied, and minimal, aspects. These aspects are accessed via the dissolution of the sense-of-boundaries, shedding new light on the multi-dimensionality and flexibility of embodied selfhood. We emphasize the evolving neurophenomenological dialogue, showing how consecutive studies, placed differently on the thin-to-thick 1P continuum, advance the research project by using the bridging principles appropriate for each stage.
1. Das Experiment von Benjamin Libet Was geschieht im Gehirn, wenn man eine Handlung ausführt? Um dieser Frage, und damit der Frage, ob das menschliche Handeln durch neuro-physiologische Prozesse determiniert ist, nachzugehen, kann man u.a. die elektrischen Aktivitäten der Hirnrinde mittels Elektroenzephalographie (EEG) über dem Schädel ableiten. Schon 1964 entdeckten Kornhuber und Deecke, dass sich kurz vor einer willkürlichen Bewegung eine Verände-rung im EEG aufzeichnen lässt (Deecke 2014, Kornhuber und Deecke 1965). Versuchsteilnehmer sollten zu einem selbstgewählten Zeitpunkt einen Finger beugen, während kontinuierlich das EEG abgeleitet wurde. Die EEG-Aktivitäten mehrerer Versuchsdurchgänge wurden summiert und gemittelt. Es zeigte sich eine Negativierung der elektrischen Signale im EEG 1,5 sek. vor der Bewegung. Wenn der Finger passiv gebeugt wur-de, zeigte sich diese Signalveränderung nicht. Diese Negativierung wurde Bereitschaftspotential (BP) benannt (Abb. 1). Man interpretierte es als neuronales Korrelat der Vorbereitung auf die Bewegung, wie etwa das Planen oder Entscheiden. Dieser klassische Versuchsaufbau zur Messung des BP wurde oft wiederholt und in vielen Hinsichten fortgeführt (Übersicht in Schmidt et al 2016). Beispielsweise wurde untersucht, wie die Komplexität der Bewe-gungsaufgabe oder die Schnelligkeit der Bewegung das BP modifizieren. Übung, Motivation und andere emotionale Einflussfaktoren der Proban-den wurden berücksichtigt. Das BP kann detailliert in seinem Verlauf und in seinem Zusammenhang mit den Gehirnarealen beschrieben werden. Grob können ein frühes und ein spätes BP unterschieden werden. Das frühe BP beginnt 1,5 sek. oder früher, ca. 400 ms vor der Bewegung wird der Anstieg steiler, ab hier spricht man vom späten BP (Deecke et al. 1976, Shibasaki und Hallett 2006) 1. Benjamin Libet wiederholte 1983 das Experiment von Kornhuber und Deecke auf eine interessante Weise (Libet et al 1983). Wieder sollten die Teilnehmer zu einem selbstgewählten Zeitpunkt den Finger bewegen, 1 Für eine detaillierte Abbildung von frühem und spätem BP in den EEG Ableitun-gen eines einzelnen Menschen, gemittelt von mehreren Durchgängen siehe Shiba-saki und Hallett 2006, Abb. 1.
This chapter provides a theoretical introduction to states of consciousness and reviews neuroscientific investigations of meditation. The different states of consciousness consist of four mental states, i.e., cancalata (random thinking), ekagrata (non-meditative focusing), dharna (focused meditation), and dhyana (meditation) as defined in yoga texts. Meditation is a self-regulated mental process associated with deep relaxation and increased internalized attention. Scientific investigations on meditation reported changes in electrophysiological signals and neuroimaging measures. But most outcomes of meditation studies showed inconsistent results, this may be due to heterogeneity in meditation methods and techniques evolved in the last 200 years. Traditionally, the features of meditation include the capacity to sustain a heightened awareness of thoughts, behaviors, emotions, and perceptions. Generally, meditation involves non-reactive effortless monitoring of the content of experience from moment to moment. Focused meditation practice involves awareness on a single object and open monitoring meditation is a non-directive meditation involved attention in breathing, mantra, or sound. Therefore, results of few empirical studies of advanced meditators or beginners remain tentative. This is an attempt to compile the meditation-related changes in electrophysiological and neuroimaging processes among experienced and novice practitioners.
Der Konsum tierischer Produkte ist aufgrund der ökologischen Konsequenzen der Herstellung tierischer Lebensmittel ein bedeutsames Thema für eine hochschulische Bildung für nachhaltigen Konsum. Nichtsdestotrotz ist eine Thematisierung der Problematik in der Hochschullehre mit Schwierigkeiten verbunden, die vor allem auf deren affektiv-moralische Aufgeladenheit zurückzuführen ist. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt ein Lehr-Lern-Format vor, welches an der Leuphana Universität Lüneburg entwickelt und im Wintersemester 16/17 erstmals mit Bachelor- und Masterstudierenden erprobt wurde. Das Seminar stellte einen Versuch dar, eine rein diskursive Beschäftigung mit dem Konsum tierischer Produkte um Zugänge zu affektiv-motivationalen Einflussfaktoren zu ergänzen, die im Rahmen der Beschäftigung mit Gründen für den Konsum tierischer Produkte aufkommen. Dies geschah durch den Einsatz von Achtsamkeitsmeditationen sowie die Vermittlung introspektiver Methoden (Forschungstagebücher, elicitation interviews, Interpretativ-Phänomenologische Analyse), um die eigenen Emotionen und Motivationen im Hinblick auf den Konsum tierischer Produkte selbstreflexiv beobachten und systematisch-kontrolliert analysieren zu können. Der Beitrag liefert empirische Hinweise darauf, dass das Lehr-Lern-Format bei Studierenden die Fähigkeit zur forschenden Auseinandersetzung mit Werthaltungen, Affekten und unreflektierten Handlungsroutinen fördern und dadurch den Erwerb von Gestaltungskompetenzen für nachhaltigen Konsum in Bezug auf den Konsum tierischer Produkte anregen konnte.
When a voluntary action is causally linked with a sensory outcome, the action and its consequent effect are perceived as being closer together in time. This effect is called intentional binding. Although many experiments were conducted on this phenomenon, the underlying neural mechanisms are not well understood. While intentional binding is specific to voluntary action, we presumed that preconscious brain activity (the readiness potential, RP), which occurs before an action is made, might play an important role in this binding effect. In this study, the brain dynamics were recorded with electroencephalography (EEG) and analyzed in single-trials in order to estimate whether intentional binding is correlated with the early neural processes. Moreover, we were interested in different behavioral performance between meditators and non-meditators since meditators are expected to be able to keep attention more consistently on a task. Thus, we performed the intentional binding paradigm with 20 mindfulness meditators and compared them to matched controls. Although, we did not observe a group effect on either behavioral data or EEG recordings, we found that self-initiated movements following ongoing negative deflections of slow cortical potentials (SCPs) result in a stronger binding effect compared to positive potentials, especially regarding the perceived time of the consequent effect. Our results provide the first direct evidence that the early neural activity within the range of SCPs affects perceived time of a sensory outcome that is caused by intentional action.
Speech is usually assumed to start with a clearly defined preverbal message, which provides a benchmark for self-monitoring and a robust sense of agency for one's utterances. However, an alternative hypothesis states that speakers often have no detailed preview of what they are about to say, and that they instead use auditory feedback to infer the meaning of their words. In the experiment reported here, participants performed a Stroop color-naming task while we covertly manipulated their auditory feedback in real time so that they said one thing but heard themselves saying something else. Under ideal timing conditions, two thirds of these semantic exchanges went undetected by the participants, and in 85% of all nondetected exchanges, the inserted words were experienced as self-produced. These findings indicate that the sense of agency for speech has a strong inferential component, and that auditory feedback of one's own voice acts as a pathway for semantic monitoring, potentially overriding other feedback loops.
Neurophenomenological studies seek to utilize first-person self-report to elucidate cognitive processes related to physiological data. Grounded theory offers an approach to the qualitative analysis of self-report, whereby theoretical constructs are derived from empirical data. Here we used grounded theory methodology (GTM) to assess how the first-person experience of meditation relates to neural activity in a core region of the default mode network—the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). We analyzed first-person data consisting of meditators' accounts of their subjective experience during runs of a real time fMRI neurofeedback study of meditation, and third-person data consisting of corresponding feedback graphs of PCC activity during the same runs. We found that for meditators, the subjective experiences of “undistracted awareness” such as “concentration” and “observing sensory experience,” and “effortless doing” such as “observing sensory experience,” “not efforting,” and “contentment,” correspond with PCC deactivation. Further, the subjective experiences of “distracted awareness” such as “distraction” and “interpreting,” and “controlling” such as “efforting” and “discontentment,” correspond with PCC activation. Moreover, we derived several novel hypotheses about how specific qualities of cognitive processes during meditation relate to PCC activity, such as the difference between meditation and “trying to meditate.” These findings offer novel insights into the relationship between meditation and mind wandering or self-related thinking and neural activity in the default mode network, driven by first-person reports.
In the early 1980s, Libet found that a readiness potential (RP) over central scalp locations begins on average several hundred milliseconds before the reported time of awareness of willing to move (W). Haggard and Eimer Exp Brain Res 126(1):128-133, (1999) later found no correlation between the timing of the RP and W, suggesting that the RP does not reflect processes causal of W. However, they did find a positive correlation between the onset of the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) and W, suggesting that the LRP might reflect processes causal of W. Here, we report a failure to replicate Haggard and Eimer's LRP finding with a larger group of participants and several variations of their analytical method. Although we did find a between-subject correlation in just one of 12 related analyses of the LRP, we crucially found no within-subject covariation between LRP onset and W. These results suggest that the RP and LRP reflect processes independent of will and consciousness. This conclusion has significant implications for our understanding of the neural basis of motor action and potentially for arguments about free will and the causal role of consciousness.
A central feature of voluntary movement is the sense of volition, but when this sense arises in the course of movement formulation and execution is not clear. Many studies have explored how the brain might be actively preparing movement before the sense of volition; however, because the timing of the sense of volition has depended on subjective and retrospective judgments, these findings are still regarded with a degree of scepticism. EEG events such as beta event-related desynchronization and movement-related cortical potentials are associated with the brain's programming of movement. Using an optimized EEG signal derived from multiple variables, we were able to make real-time predictions of movements in advance of their occurrence with a low false-positive rate. We asked participants what they were thinking at the time of prediction: Sometimes they were thinking about movement, and other times they were not. Our results indicate that the brain can be preparing to make voluntary movements while participants are thinking about something else.
The accuracy of subjective reports, especially those involving introspection of one's own internal processes, remains unclear, and research has demonstrated large individual differences in introspective accuracy. It has been hypothesized that introspective accuracy may be heightened in persons who engage in meditation practices, due to the highly introspective nature of such practices. We undertook a preliminary exploration of this hypothesis, examining introspective accuracy in a cross-section of meditation practitioners (1-15,000 hrs experience). Introspective accuracy was assessed by comparing subjective reports of tactile sensitivity for each of 20 body regions during a 'body-scanning' meditation with averaged, objective measures of tactile sensitivity (mean size of body representation area in primary somatosensory cortex; two-point discrimination threshold) as reported in prior research. Expert meditators showed significantly better introspective accuracy than novices; overall meditation experience also significantly predicted individual introspective accuracy. These results suggest that long-term meditators provide more accurate introspective reports than novices.
A gradual buildup of neuronal activity known as the "readiness potential" reliably precedes voluntary self-initiated movements, in the average time locked to movement onset. This buildup is presumed to reflect the final stages of planning and preparation for movement. Here we present a different interpretation of the premovement buildup. We used a leaky stochastic accumulator to model the neural decision of "when" to move in a task where there is no specific temporal cue, but only a general imperative to produce a movement after an unspecified delay on the order of several seconds. According to our model, when the imperative to produce a movement is weak, the precise moment at which the decision threshold is crossed leading to movement is largely determined by spontaneous subthreshold fluctuations in neuronal activity. Time locking to movement onset ensures that these fluctuations appear in the average as a gradual exponential-looking increase in neuronal activity. Our model accounts for the behavioral and electroencephalography data recorded from human subjects performing the task and also makes a specific prediction that we confirmed in a second electroencephalography experiment: Fast responses to temporally unpredictable interruptions should be preceded by a slow negative-going voltage deflection beginning well before the interruption itself, even when the subject was not preparing to move at that particular moment.
Reviews evidence which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Ss are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes. (86 ref)
Several cortical regions are reported to vary in meditation practitioners. However, prior analyses have focused primarily on examining gray matter or cortical thickness. Thus, additional effects with respect to other cortical features might have remained undetected. Gyrification (the pattern and degree of cortical folding) is an important cerebral characteristic related to the geometry of the brain’s surface. Thus, exploring cortical gyrification in long-term meditators may provide additional clues with respect to the underlying anatomical correlates of meditation. This study examined cortical gyrification in a large sample (n = 100) of meditators and controls, carefully matched for sex and age. Cortical gyrification was established by calculating mean curvature across thousands of vertices on individual cortical surface models. Pronounced group differences indicating larger gyrification in meditators were evident within the left precentral gyrus, right fusiform gyrus, right cuneus, as well as left and right anterior dorsal insula (the latter representing the global significance maximum). Positive correlations between gyrification and the number of meditation years were similarly pronounced in the right anterior dorsal insula. Although the exact functional implications of larger cortical gyrification remain to be established, these findings suggest the insula to be a key structure involved in aspects of meditation. For example, variations in insular complexity could affect the regulation of well-known distractions in the process of meditation, such as daydreaming, mind-wandering, and projections into past or future. Moreover, given that meditators are masters in introspection, awareness, and emotional control, increased insular gyrification may reflect an integration of autonomic, affective, and cognitive processes. Due to the cross-sectional nature of this study, further research is necessary to determine the relative contribution of nature and nurture to links between cortical gyrification and meditation.
The question of whether our behavior is guided by our conscious intentions is gaining momentum within the field of cognitive neuroscience. It has been demonstrated that the subjective experience that conscious intentions are the driving force of our actions, is built partially on a post hoc reconstruction. Our hypothesis was that this reconstructive process is mediated by an action-monitoring system that compares the predicted and the actual sensory consequences of an action. We applied event-related potentials (ERP) to a variant of the Libet's task in which participants were asked to press a button and to report the time of decision – will judgment (W) – to press. We provided delayed auditory feedbacks after participants’ action to signify an action time later than the actual action. We found that auditory feedbacks evoked a negative component in the 250–300 time range, namely action-effect negativity (NAE), that is thought to reflect the activity of a system that detects violation from expectancies. We showed that the amplitude of the NAE was sensitive to the delay of the auditory feedback, with a larger amplitude for more delayed feedbacks. Furthermore, changes in the NAE were also associated with changes in the reported W. These results not only confirm that we infer the time we decided to act from events occurring after the response, but these results also indicate that the subjective experience of when an action is decided is influenced by the activity of an action-monitoring system that detects mismatches between predicted and actual sensory consequences of the actions.
The ability to focus one's attention underlies success in many everyday tasks, but voluntary attention cannot be sustained for extended periods of time. In the laboratory, sustained-attention failure is manifest as a decline in perceptual sensitivity with increasing time on task, known as the vigilance decrement. We investigated improvements in sustained attention with training (approximately 5 hr/day for 3 months), which consisted of meditation practice that involved sustained selective attention on a chosen stimulus (e.g., the participant's breath). Participants were randomly assigned either to receive training first (n = 30) or to serve as waiting-list controls and receive training second (n = 30). Training produced improvements in visual discrimination that were linked to increases in perceptual sensitivity and improved vigilance during sustained visual attention. Consistent with the resource model of vigilance, these results suggest that perceptual improvements can reduce the resource demand imposed by target discrimination and thus make it easier to sustain voluntary attention.
The capacity to stabilize the content of attention over time varies among individuals, and its impairment is a hallmark of several mental illnesses. Impairments in sustained attention in patients with attention disorders have been associated with increased trial-to-trial variability in reaction time and event-related potential deficits during attention tasks. At present, it is unclear whether the ability to sustain attention and its underlying brain circuitry are transformable through training. Here, we show, with dichotic listening task performance and electroencephalography, that training attention, as cultivated by meditation, can improve the ability to sustain attention. Three months of intensive meditation training reduced variability in attentional processing of target tones, as indicated by both enhanced theta-band phase consistency of oscillatory neural responses over anterior brain areas and reduced reaction time variability. Furthermore, those individuals who showed the greatest increase in neural response consistency showed the largest decrease in behavioral response variability. Notably, we also observed reduced variability in neural processing, in particular in low-frequency bands, regardless of whether the deviant tone was attended or unattended. Focused attention meditation may thus affect both distracter and target processing, perhaps by enhancing entrainment of neuronal oscillations to sensory input rhythms, a mechanism important for controlling the content of attention. These novel findings highlight the mechanisms underlying focused attention meditation and support the notion that mental training can significantly affect attention and brain function.
A seminal experiment found that the reported time of a decision to perform a simple action was at least 300 ms after the onset of brain activity that normally preceded the action. In Experiment 1, we presented deceptive feedback (an auditory beep) 5 to 60 ms after the action to signify a movement time later than the actual movement. The reported time of decision moved forward in time linearly with the delay in feedback, and came after the muscular initiation of the response at all but the 5-ms delay. In Experiment 2, participants viewed their hand with and without a 120-ms video delay, and gave a time of decision 44 ms later with than without the delay. We conclude that participants' report of their decision time is largely inferred from the apparent time of response. The perception of a hypothetical brain event prior to the response could have, at most, a small influence.
Libet et al. (1983) developed a method to compare the onset time of a readiness potential (RP) with the onset time of the corresponding intention to perform a spontaneous voluntary motor act. In relation to the onset of the RP, the time of conscious intention to move followed 350 msec later. From these results Libet (1985) concluded that the cerebral initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously. We investigated the alternative interpretation that with the instruction to pay attention to feelings of 'wanting to move,' automatic and normally unconscious motor acts might have been brought to a level of conscious awareness. Therefore we conducted 3 kinds of experiment. In the first, RPs were measured from subjects performing unconscious movements. The second experiment was a replication of Libet's study while the third was a resting condition in which subjects looked for intentions to move introspectively. The results showed that RPs beginning approximately 500 msec before movement onset can be obtained with unconsciously as well as consciously performed spontaneous motor acts. The different scalp distributions of the two types of RP indicate that unconscious movements can be attributed to the activation of a contralateral process (lateral premotor system (LPS), primary motor cortex), whereas voluntary spontaneous motor acts seemed to be predominated by the medial premotor system (MPS). It is proposed that in the Libet situation focused attention on internal events led to the conscious detection of a normally unconscious process. This resulted in the activation of the MPS, especially the supplementary motor area (SMA), which released the starting signal for the execution of the motor act. We believe that the activation of the SMA and the urge to move occurred at the same time.
The recordable cerebral activity (readiness-potential, RP) that precedes a freely voluntary, fully endogenous motor act was directly compared with the reportable time (W) for appearance of the subjective experience of ‘wanting’ or intending to act. The onset of cerebral activity clearly preceded by at least several hundred milliseconds the reported time of conscious intention to act. This relationship held even for those series (with ‘type II’ RPs) in which subjects reported that all of the 40 self-initiated movements in the series appeared ‘spontaneously’ and capriciously.
Data were obtained in at least 6 different experimental sessions with each of 5 subjects. In series with type II RPs, onset of the main negative shift in each RP preceded the corresponding mean W value by an average of about 350 ms, and by a minimum of about 150 ms. In series with type I RPs, in which an experience of preplanning occurred in some of the 40 self-initiated acts, onset of RP preceded W by an average of about 800 ms (or by 500 ms, taking onset of RP at 90 per cent of its area).
Reports of W time depended upon the subject’s recall of the spatial ‘clock-position’ of a revolving spot at the time of his initial awareness of wanting or intending to move. Two different modes of recall produced similar values. Subjects distinguished awareness of wanting to move (W) from awareness of actually moving (M). W times were consistently and substantially negative to, in advance of, mean times reported for M and also those for S, the sensation elicited by a task-related skin stimulus delivered at irregular times that were unknown to the subject.
It is concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous, freely voluntary act .can begin unconsciously, that is, before there is any (at least recallable) subjective awareness that a ‘decision’ to act has already been initiated cerebrally. This introduces certain constraints on the potentiality for conscious initiation and control of voluntary acts.
A central question in the study of human behavior is the origin of willed action. EEG recordings of surface brain activity from human subjects performing a self-initiated movement show that the subjective experience of wanting to move follows, rather than precedes, the 'readiness potential'--an electrophysiological mark of motor preparation. This raises the issue of how conscious experience of willed action is generated. Here we show that patients with parietal lesions can report when they started moving, but not when they first became aware of their intention to move. This stands in contrast with the performance of cerebellar patients who behaved as normal subjects. We thus propose that when a movement is planned, activity in the parietal cortex, as part of a cortico-cortical sensorimotor processing loop, generates a predictive internal model of the upcoming movement. This model might form the neural correlate of motor awareness.
We have developed a toolbox and graphic user interface, EEGLAB, running under the crossplatform MATLAB environment (The Mathworks, Inc.) for processing collections of single-trial and/or averaged EEG data of any number of channels. Available functions include EEG data, channel and event information importing, data visualization (scrolling, scalp map and dipole model plotting, plus multi-trial ERP-image plots), preprocessing (including artifact rejection, filtering, epoch selection, and averaging), independent component analysis (ICA) and time/frequency decompositions including channel and component cross-coherence supported by bootstrap statistical methods based on data resampling. EEGLAB functions are organized into three layers. Top-layer functions allow users to interact with the data through the graphic interface without needing to use MATLAB syntax. Menu options allow users to tune the behavior of EEGLAB to available memory. Middle-layer functions allow users to customize data processing using command history and interactive 'pop' functions. Experienced MATLAB users can use EEGLAB data structures and stand-alone signal processing functions to write custom and/or batch analysis scripts. Extensive function help and tutorial information are included. A 'plug-in' facility allows easy incorporation of new EEG modules into the main menu. EEGLAB is freely available (http://www.sccn.ucsd.edu/eeglab/) under the GNU public license for noncommercial use and open source development, together with sample data, user tutorial and extensive documentation.
A fundamental assumption of theories of decision-making is that we detect mismatches between intention and outcome, adjust our behavior in the face of error, and adapt to changing circumstances. Is this always the case? We investigated the relation between intention, choice, and introspection. Participants made choices between presented face pairs on the basis of attractiveness, while we covertly manipulated the relationship between choice and outcome that they experienced. Participants failed to notice conspicuous mismatches between their intended choice and the outcome they were presented with, while nevertheless offering introspectively derived reasons for why they chose the way they did. We call this effect choice blindness.
Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we have tested the time needed for the perceived onset of spontaneous motor intention to be fully determined. We found that TMS applied over the presupplementary motor area after the execution of a simple spontaneous action shifted the perceived onset of the motor intention backward in time, and shifted the perceived time of action execution forward in time. The size of the effect was similar regardless of whether TMS was applied immediately after the action or 200 msec after. The results of three control studies suggest that this effect is time-limited, specific to modality, and also specific to the anatomical site of stimulation. We conclude that the perceived onset of intention depends, at least in part, on neural activity that takes place after the execution of action. A model, which is based on the mechanism of cue integration under the presence of noise, is offered to explain the results. The implications for the conscious control of spontaneous actions are discussed.
Mindfulness is defined as paying attention in the present moment. We investigate the hypothesis that mindfulness training may alter or enhance specific aspects of attention. We examined three functionally and neuroanatomically distinct but overlapping attentional subsystems: alerting, orienting, and conflict monitoring. Functioning of each subsystem was indexed by performance on the Attention Network Test. Two types of mindfulness training (MT) programs were examined, and behavioral testing was conducted on participants before (Time 1) and after (Time 2) training. One training group consisted of individuals naive to mindfulness techniques who participated in an 8-week mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) course that emphasized the development of concentrative meditation skills. The other training group consisted of individuals experienced in concentrative meditation techniques who participated in a 1-month intensive mindfulness retreat. Performance of these groups was compared with that of control participants who were meditation naive and received no MT. At Time 1, the participants in the retreat group demonstrated improved conflict monitoring performance relative to those in the MBSR and control groups. At Time 2, the participants in the MBSR course demonstrated significantly improved orienting in comparison with the control and retreat participants. In contrast, the participants in the retreat group demonstrated altered performance on the alerting component, with improvements in exogenous stimulus detection in comparison with the control and MBSR participants. The groups did not differ in conflict monitoring performance at Time 2. These results suggest that mindfulness training may improve attention-related behavioral responses by enhancing functioning of specific subcomponents of attention. Whereas participation in the MBSR course improved the ability to endogenously orient attention, retreat participation appeared to allow for the development and emergence of receptive attentional skills, which improved exogenous alerting-related process.
The present investigation examined the contributions of specific attentional networks to long-term trait effects of meditation. It was hypothesized that meditation could improve the efficiency of executive processing (inhibits prepotent/incorrect responses) or orientational processing (orients to specific objects in the attentional field). Participants (50 meditators and 10 controls) were given the Stroop (measures executive attention) and Global-Local Letters (measures orientational attention) tasks. Results showed that meditation experience was associated with reduced interference on the Stroop task (p < 0.03), in contrast with a lack of effect on interference in the Global-Local Letters task. This suggests that meditation produces long-term increases in the efficiency of the executive attentional network (anterior cingulate/prefrontal cortex) but no effect on the orientation network (parietal systems). The amount of time participants spent meditating each day, rather than the total number of hours of meditative practice over their lifetime, was negatively correlated with interference on the Stroop task (r = -0.31, p < 0.005).
Because of the distance between the skull and brain and their different resistivities, electroencephalographic (EEG) data collected from any point on the human scalp includes activity generated within a large brain area. This spatial smearing of EEG data by volume conduction does not involve significant time delays, however, suggesting that the Independent Component Analysis (ICA) algorithm of Bell and Sejnowski [1] is suitable for performing blind source separation on EEG data. The ICA algorithm separates the problem of source identification from that of source localization. First results of applying the ICA algorithm to EEG and event-related potential (ERP) data collected during a sustained auditory detection task show: (1) ICA training is insensitive to different random seeds. (2) ICA may be used to segregate obvious artifactual EEG components (line and muscle noise, eye movements) from other sources. (3) ICA is capable of isolating overlapping EEG phenomena, including...
Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Subjects are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes.
The role of conscious intention in relation to motoric movements has become a major topic of investigation in neuroscience. Traditionally, reports of conscious intention have been compared to various features of the readiness-potential (RP) - an electrophysiological signal that appears before voluntary movements. Experiments, however, tend to study intentions in immediate relation to movements (proximal intentions), thus ignoring other aspects of intentions such as planning or deciding in advance of movement (distal intentions). The current study examines the difference in electrophysiological activity between proximal intention and distal intention, using electroencephalography (EEG). Participants had to form an intention to move and then wait 2.5 sec before performing the actual movement. In this way, the electrophysiological activity related to forming a conscious intention was separated from any confounding activity related to automated motor activity. This was compared to conditions in which participants had to act as soon as they had the intention and a condition where participants acted upon an external cue 2.5 sec prior to movement. We examined the RP for the three conditions. No difference was found in early RP, but late RP differed significantly depending on the type of intention. In addition, we analysed signals during a longer time-interval starting before the time of distal intention formation until after the actual movement concluded. Results showed a slow negative electrophysiological "intention potential" above the mid-frontal areas at the time participants formed a distal intention. This potential was only found when the distal intention was self-paced and not when the intention was formed in response to an external cue.
It has been repeatedly shown that specific brain activity related to planning movement develops before the conscious intention to act. This empirical finding strongly challenges the notion of free will. Here, we demonstrate that in the Libet experiment, spontaneous fluctuations of the slow electro-cortical potentials (SCPs) account for a significant fraction of the readiness potential (RP). The individual potential shifts preceding self-initiated movements were classified as showing a negative or positive shift. The negative and positive potential shifts were analyzed in a self-initiated movement condition and in a no-movement condition. Comparing the potential shifts between both conditions, we observed no differences in the early part of the potential. This reveals that the apparently negative RP emerges through an unequal ratio of negative and positive potential shifts. These results suggest that ongoing negative shifts of the SCPs facilitate self-initiated movement but are not related to processes underlying preparation or decision to act.
The capacity to inhibit a planned action gives human behavior its characteristic flexibility. How this mechanism operates and what factors influence a decision to act or not act remain relatively unexplored. We used EEG readiness potentials (RPs) to examine preparatory activity before each action of an ongoing sequence, in which one action was occasionally omitted. We compared RPs between sequences in which omissions were instructed by a rule (e.g., "omit every fourth action") and sequences in which the participant themselves freely decided which action to omit. RP amplitude was reduced for actions that immediately preceded a voluntary omission but not a rule-based omission. We also used the regular temporal pattern of the action sequences to explore brain processes linked to omitting an action by time-locking EEG averages to the inferred time when an action would have occurred had it not been omitted. When omissions were instructed by a rule, there was a negative-going trend in the EEG, recalling the rising ramp of an RP. No such component was found for voluntary omissions. The results are consistent with a model in which spontaneously fluctuating activity in motor areas of the brain could bias "free" decisions to act or not.
It is typically assumed that the conscious experience of wanting to move is not the driving force for motor planning, but the secondary consequence of the unconscious neural processes preparing the movement. A recent study by Schneider et al. seems consistent with this dominant view by showing that the brain can be preparing to make voluntary movements not only "prior to the conscious appreciation that this is happening" but also "while subjects are thinking about something else." However, an alternative hypothesis exists. It is supported by several lines of evidence and suggests that the early neural signals recorded by Schneider et al. (and others) do not reflect movement preparation per se, but rather a buildup in neural activity that ultimately leads to the emergence of a conscious intention to move. According to this view, the conscious experience of wanting to move is not the consequence but the cause of movement initiation.
We have previously found that attention to internal somatic sensations (interoceptive attention) during a heart beat perception task increases the misperception of external touch on a somatic signal detection task (SSDT), during which healthy participants erroneously report feeling near-threshold vibrations presented to their fingertip in the absence of a stimulus. However, it has been suggested that mindful interoceptive attention should result in more accurate somatic perception, due to its non-evaluative and controlled nature. To investigate this possibility, 62 participants completed the SSDT before and after a period of brief body-scan mindfulness meditation training, or a control intervention (listening to a recorded story). The meditation intervention reduced tactile misperception and increased sensitivity during the SSDT. This finding suggests that the perceptual effects of interoceptive attention depend on its particular nature, and raises the possibility that body-scan meditation could reduce the misperception of physical symptoms in individuals with medically unexplained symptoms.
There is an ongoing discussion about the definition of mindfulness including the question whether mindfulness is a one-dimensional or multidimensional construct. Research on the Freiburg mindfulness inventory (FMI) has also reflected this debate. We have investigated the psychometric properties of the FMI-14-item in an online convenience sample of n = 244 individuals (150 female; mean age 28.7 (SD = 8.76)) with (n = 75) and without (n = 169) regular meditative training). A simplified version of the beck depression inventory (BDI-V) and the trait subscale of the state-trait-anxiety-inventory (STAI-T) were used for determining criterion validity. A one-dimensional (α = .83) and an alternative two-dimensional solution (αF1 = .77; αF2 = .69) of the FMI-14 were tested with a confirmatory factor analysis and yielded suboptimal fit indices. An exploratory analysis resulted in a reduced 8-item version of the two-dimensional solution with better fit indices, but low internal consistency (αF1 = .71; αF2 = .64). The factors could be identified as “Presence” (F1) and “Acceptance” (F2). Further investigation revealed that the substantial negative relationship between mindfulness and anxiety and depression is completely due to the “Acceptance” factor of mindfulness. This suggests that there may be heuristic value in the two-factorial solution, although for practical purposes it seems sufficient to assess mindfulness as one-dimensional construct.
Mindfulness, a concept originally derived from Buddhist psychology, is essential for some well-known clinical interventions. Therefore an instrument for measuring mindfulness is useful. We report here on two studies constructing and validating the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI) including a short form. A preliminary questionnaire was constructed through expert interviews and extensive literature analysis and tested in 115 subjects attending mindfulness meditation retreats. This psychometrically sound 30-item scale with an internal consistency of Cronbach alpha = .93 was able to significantly demonstrate the increase in mindfulness after the retreat and to discriminate between experienced and novice meditators. In a second study we broadened the scope of the concept to 86 subjects without meditation experience, 117 subjects with clinical problems, and 54 participants from retreats. Reducing the scale to a short form with 14 items resulted in a semantically robust and psychometrically stable (alpha = .86) form. Correlation with other relevant constructs (self-awareness, dissociation, global severity index, meditation experience in years) was significant in the medium to low range of correlations and lends construct validity to the scale. Principal Component Analysis suggests one common factor. This short scale is sensitive to change and can be used also with subjects without previous meditation experience.
Electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was recorded while participants waited to make spontaneous key-press movements (Experiment 1) or waited for tones in a pitch judgment task (Experiment 2). In one condition of each experiment, participants also had to report the position of a spot traveling on a clock at the crucial time point (i.e., when they decided to move or when the tone was presented), mimicking a procedure used to assess the time of conscious awareness of an event of interest. In a second condition, there was no clock or temporal judgment. Average EEG activity preceding key presses was substantially different when participants had to monitor the clock than when they did not. Smaller clock-related differences in average EEG activity were also present preceding tone onsets. The effects of clock monitoring on EEG activity could be responsible for previous reports that movement-related brain activity begins before participants have consciously decided to move (e.g., Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983).
We investigated the relation between neural events and the perceived time of voluntary actions or the perceived time of initiating those actions using the method of Libet. No differences were found in either movement-related potentials or perceived time of motor events between a fixed movement condition, where subjects made voluntary movements of a single finger in each block, and a free movement condition, in which subjects chose whether to respond with the left or the right index finger on each trial. We next calculated both the readiness potential (RP) and lateralised readiness potential (LRP) for trials with early and late times of awareness. The RP tended to occur later on trials with early awareness of movement initiation than on trials with late awareness, ruling out the RP as a cause of our awareness of movement intiation. However, the LRP occurred significantly earlier on trials with early awareness than on trials with late awareness, suggesting that the processes underlying the LRP may cause our awareness of movement initiation.
The capacity for voluntary action is seen as essential to human nature. Yet neuroscience and behaviourist psychology have traditionally dismissed the topic as unscientific, perhaps because the mechanisms that cause actions have long been unclear. However, new research has identified networks of brain areas, including the pre-supplementary motor area, the anterior prefrontal cortex and the parietal cortex, that underlie voluntary action. These areas generate information for forthcoming actions, and also cause the distinctive conscious experience of intending to act and then controlling one's own actions. Volition consists of a series of decisions regarding whether to act, what action to perform and when to perform it. Neuroscientific accounts of voluntary action may inform debates about the nature of individual responsibility.
Since discovery of the slow negative electroencephalographic (EEG) activity preceding self-initiated movement by Kornhuber and Deecke [Kornhuber HH, Deecke L. Hirnpotentialänderungen bei Willkurbewegungen und passiven Bewegungen des Menschen: Bereitschaftspotential und reafferente Potentiale. Pflugers Archiv 1965;284:1-17], various source localization techniques in normal subjects and epicortical recording in epilepsy patients have disclosed the generator mechanisms of each identifiable component of movement-related cortical potentials (MRCPs) to some extent. The initial slow segment of BP, called 'early BP' in this article, begins about 2 s before the movement onset in the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) with no site-specificity and in the SMA proper according to the somatotopic organization, and shortly thereafter in the lateral premotor cortex bilaterally with relatively clear somatotopy. About 400 ms before the movement onset, the steeper negative slope, called 'late BP' in this article (also referred to as NS'), occurs in the contralateral primary motor cortex (M1) and lateral premotor cortex with precise somatotopy. These two phases of BP are differentially influenced by various factors, especially by complexity of the movement which enhances only the late BP. Event-related desynchronization (ERD) of beta frequency EEG band before self-initiated movements shows a different temporospatial pattern from that of the BP, suggesting different neuronal mechanisms for the two. BP has been applied for investigating pathophysiology of various movement disorders. Volitional motor inhibition or muscle relaxation is preceded by BP quite similar to that preceding voluntary muscle contraction. Since BP of typical waveforms and temporospatial pattern does not occur before organic involuntary movements, BP is used for detecting the participation of the 'voluntary motor system' in the generation of apparently involuntary movements in patients with psychogenic movement disorders. In view of Libet et al.'s report [Libet B, Gleason CA, Wright EW, Pearl DK. Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 1983;106:623-642] that the awareness of intention to move occurred much later than the onset of BP, the early BP might reflect, physiologically, slowly increasing cortical excitability and, behaviorally, subconscious readiness for the forthcoming movement. Whether the late BP reflects conscious preparation for intended movement or not remains to be clarified.
Zen meditation, a Buddhist practice centered on attentional and postural self-regulation, has been speculated to bring about beneficial long-term effects for the individual, ranging from stress reduction to improvement of cognitive function. In this study, we examined how the regular practice of meditation may affect the normal age-related decline of cerebral gray matter volume and attentional performance observed in healthy individuals. Voxel-based morphometry for MRI anatomical brain images and a computerized sustained attention task were employed in 13 regular practitioners of Zen meditation and 13 matched controls. While control subjects displayed the expected negative correlation of both gray matter volume and attentional performance with age, meditators did not show a significant correlation of either measure with age. The effect of meditation on gray matter volume was most prominent in the putamen, a structure strongly implicated in attentional processing. These findings suggest that the regular practice of meditation may have neuroprotective effects and reduce the cognitive decline associated with normal aging.
Manipulating the experience onset of intention after action execution Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential)
- H C Lau
- R D Rogers
- R E Passingham
Lau, H. C., Rogers, R. D., & Passingham, R. E. (2007). Manipulating the experience onset of intention after action execution. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 81e90. Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). Brain, 106, 623e642.
Telling more than we can know: verbal reports on mental processes Age effects on gray matter volume and attentional performance in Zen meditation Post-action determines of the reported time of conscious intentions
- R E Nisbett