International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism

Abstract

Contemporary structural realism, or "neorealism," has become immensely influential in the contemporary study of international relations, due in part to its claims to be more scientific than its predecessors. The realist tradition, however, has always laid claim to a species of scientific rigor. The arguments of the classical realists Thucydides and Machiavelli are used to assess the claims of contemporary realism to be an advance over classical realism, and to investigate the relation between the science of politics and the ethical issues raised by realism in general.

Full text

International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism
Author(s): Steven Forde
Source:
International Studies Quarterly,
Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 141-160
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International Studies Quarterly (1995) 39, 141-160
International
Realism and
the
Science
of Politics:
Thucydides,
Machiavelli,
and
Neorealism
STEVEN FORDE
University
of
North
Texas
Contemporary structural realism,
or "neorealism,"
has become im-
mensely influential
in
the
contemporary study
of
international relations,
due in
part to its claims to be more scientific than its
predecessors.
The
realist tradition, however, has always laid claim to a species of scientific
rigor. The arguments of the
classical realists Thucydides and Machiavelli
are used to assess
the claims
of
contemporary realism
to
be an advance
over classical realism, and to
investigate
the relation between the science
of politics and the ethical issues
raised
by
realism in
general.
Realism of one variety or another has dominated the study of international rela-
tions for
the past fifty years.
In the
last fifteen
to twenty years, a new form of
realist
argument, widely known
as structural
realism, or "neorealism,
"I has emerged which
presents itself partly
as a challenge to the realism that dominated the postwar
world. This new realism has rapidly established itself as the dominant approach to
international politics among American scholars,
to some extent because of its
claim
to be more scientific
than its
predecessor, as that term is understood in contempo-
rary
social science. In the large literature
that
has grown up in the course of this
development, many aspects of the neorealist position have been explored and some
have been challenged. One of the issues that has been raised by this debate
concerns what counts as a "scientific"
approach to politics,
and what the strengths
or limitations of such an approach might
be.
In at least one respect, the claims of neorealism to be more scientific are
paradoxical. The realist tradition,
whose roots go back to ancient Greece, has
always
had a strong
thread of what may
legitimately
be called "scientific"
thinking
in it. Drawing on analyses of human nature, on arguments about the necessary
structure of international relations, and on laws
of
political behavior derived from
both these sources, realists have quite frequently posed as the clear-eyed apostles
of objective reason, confronting
the deluded idealism or self-righteous
moralism
of their
fellow men.2 We will
look at these arguments and evaluate their scientific
IThe neorealist movement was
inaugurated by Kenneth Waltz, who made the most systematic
argument
for
the
new approach, and for its scientific rigor,
in his Theory of
International
Politics (Waltz, 1979). I will
treat his argument
as
paradigmatic. Others often identified with
the approach include Robert Gilpin,John
Mearsheimer, Stephen Krasner,
and Joseph Grieco.
I will also draw to
some extent upon recent game-theoretic approaches to
international politics,
which have numerous similarities to
neorealism (see Snidal, 1985).
2Realism
in ancient Greece is best
exemplified by some of the sophists, and of course
Thucydides. E. H. Carr
inaugurated twentieth-century realism for
the English-speaking world with prominent claims
about the "scientific"
? 1995 International
Studies
Association.
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main
Street, Cambridge,
MA
02142, USA, anld 108 Cowley Road,
Oxford OX4 1JF,
UK

142 International Realism and the Science of Politics
basis momentarily. In any
case, the claim of the new realism to represent an
advance
of
scientific rigor
vis-a-vis the older realism requires a bit of
explanation.
Kenneth Waltz locates this
explanation in a distinctive view of
what makes for
scientific rigor, a view
adopted from modern social science. In this
view, to count
as scientific,
a theoretical
approach must be "operationalizable,"
that is, able to
generate propositions
or
predictions that are
empirically
testable
in
such
a
way
that
the
tests and their results
may
be replicated.
Neorealism maintains that its
prede-
cessors failed
to
meet this
standard of scientific rigor,
in
part because
they did
not
focus their attention
narrowly
enough.
Neorealism strives for
rigor
by paring
the
foundations of realism
down
to a single element,
structure. The claim is that
only
by putting this single
element
or variable
at the heart of its theory
can realism
become truly scientific.
The abstraction from
everything except structural
or "sys-
tem-level" variables is what has earned this
theory
the alternative label "structural
realism" (see Waltz, 1979,
1991). The abstractness of this approach,
or its parsi-
mony,
has
been the focus of much of the criticism directed
against
it. The theory's
neglect of such factors as economics or human nature or domestic
politics has
been said to be fatal to its claim to comprehensiveness,
or its
ethical
outlook
is
decried
as crudely positivistic.3
Some
of this criticism has been properly
dismissed
by
the new
realists as misguided,
based on a failure to understand the role of
abstraction
in
scientific
theory building.4
Real controversy remains,
however,
over
whether
or not
the abstractions
on which neorealism is built are
appropriate.
Two of the issues
raised by
neorealism concern us here. The first is the
question
of the
adequacy
of
an approach
that focuses
exclusively,
or
almost
exclusively,
on
structure to ground
its
understanding
of the relations
among states. There has
been a fair
amount of discussion of this
question among
international relations
scholars. The second, more
fundamental issue concerns the implications
of
taking
a scientific
approach to international politics
in general, especially
the ethical
implications.
This has been the subject of too little discussion (cf. Loriaux,
1992:417). I propose that
interesting light can be shed on both of
these sets of
questions by comparing
the
latest
form of realism to some of
its forebears. Thu-
cydides and Machiavelli, two
of the founders of the realist
tradition,5 provide
especially interesting contrasts
to neorealism.
In their
work
can be found the
elements of a structural
approach to
realism,
and indications as to
why
they
do not
character of the enterprise (1940:8-10). Hans Morgenthau distanced himself from the scientific approach in an early
work (1946), but only
because he there defined science somewhat idiosyncratically as an inherently antirealist
enterprise. Morgenthau's approach can fairly
be called "scientific" within the terms
I am using here: see Morgenthau,
1952, p. 963 and the opening section of his great
textbook
(1978; see also Hollis and Smith, 1990:6, 16, 27; Russell,
1990:212). On the scientific cast of realist thought generally see Hollis and Smith, 1990:10, 27; Gilpin, 1981:226. Ashley
(1981:207 et passim) calls this the "technical" side of the realist argument, which he identifies with the core, or "true
tradition," of realism (id., 224).
More fundamental questions have been raised concerning whether "realism" can be said
to constitute a coherent
tradition at all (see Dunne, 1993; Walker, 1993:17, 105-106). These criticisms are overdrawn. Any tradition will dissolve
if
held to too high a standard of consistency. As will become clear, I believe realists share key beliefs concerning the
anarchic nature of the international arena, and the primacy of self-interest and power
in
the relations among states.
Realism also loses some of its coherence as a tradition if its moral or ethical thrust is forgotten, which is of course
the
case in
some quarters today. See also Loriaux, 1992:402; Nardin, 1992:6-9.
3Too
large a literature has developed on these subjects to be surveyed here. For some of the most important themes
see Beitz, 1979; Rosecrance, 1981; Ashley, 1984; Gilpin, 1986; Keohane, 1986b; and Nardin, 1988.
4Waltz
lays out his understanding of theory building and the role. of abstraction
in
it, anticipating many
of
these
objections,
in Theory of International Politics, 1979, ch. 1. See also Snidal, 1985.
5I refer to these authors throughout as the "early realists," or "classical realists." The realists of the periods just
before
and after
World War
II (Niebuhr, Carr, Morgenthau, Herz, et al.) are often referred to
as "classical
realists"
today, but the term applies with still greater justice to the authors I am investigating. In some important respects the
positions
of these
early
authors differ
from
all the writers
who
make
up the realist
movement(s)
of the
twentieth
century.

STEVEN FORDE 143
regard such an approach to be adequate on its own. They are even more illumi-
nating on the broader issue
of
the scientific approach to politics, and specifically
its relation to ethical issues.
For the classical realists do employ a recognizably scientific approach, while at
the same time retaining a lively sense of the normative questions that realism raises.
These authors
continually
remind us that realism was born in opposition to the
moralistic
or idealistic understanding of interstate relations, and they share the
view that the core
of
realism lies somehow
in
this
opposition.
At least the rhetorical
form
of
the whole realist tradition
prior
to
neorealism-including earlier twenti-
eth-century
realism-was shaped by
its critical function
vis-a-vis
these
opponents.
The new realism
has
denied
or
ignored the moral, or rather antimoral, dimension
of the realist
approach as it was
previously understood, even though, curiously
enough,
it
has
retained a lively
sense
of
its
opposition
to
international idealism,
or
"neoidealism" (see Kegley, 1993). The virtual disappearance of the ethical dimen-
sion of the
theory
is one of the
key, although seldom examined, respects
in
which
the
neorealists
depart
from their
predecessors. Comparison
with
the
arguments
of
the classical realists
on this score
is
most
useful in
helping
us to assess the
implica-
tions and the
validity
of this
departure.
In light of the earlier realist tradition, the notion that, among states, power is
the
predominant currency
and self-interest the
predominant
motivation-a view
common to
all
realism-presupposes
the
negation
of
competing,
moral outlooks.
For most earlier realists, this is precisely the heart, the defining aspect, of realism.
Its fundamental opposition
to moral
idealism
is indeed what gave "realism" its
name.
It
is in
this
sense
that realism
can be
called
a derivative
or
reactive theoretical
position, logically secondary to,
or even
parasitic upon, moral idealism
(Walker,
1993:22, 42, 74). The neorealists feel
justified
in
shedding
this
aspect
of the earlier
tradition
in
part
because of their reliance on the
theory
of
modern social science.
A cornerstone of that theory is the principle that truly scientific investigation
is
value-free and indeed incapable
of
pronouncing
on matters of ethics. Thucydides
and Machiavelli do not share this view of the study
of international
politics,
although
as stated there
are
strong
elements of their theories that are scientific
in
a sense that would
be recognized by contemporary
social scientists. These can be
sufficiently segregated
from
the
rest of their theories
to
be analyzed separately,
at
least
for
the
purpose
of
contrasting
the classical and contemporary approaches
to
scientific realism.6 This
analysis
reveals that
Thucydides
and Machiavelli are
quite
sensitive to the relation
between scientific
explanation
and ethics
as revealed
in
realist
argumentation.
Their
treatments of that relation
suggest
that
the
scientific
approach
is not
and cannot
be "value neutral."
They
both take
a somewhat darker
view
of
the
impact
of science on ethics: science
appears
in their
work as
inherently
"realist" that
is, inherently
hostile to moral
principle
as
a motive
of human action.
Realist
Foundation
and "Assumptions"
The neorealist decision to reduce international
relations
theory
to its structural
component
has
created,
or rather
reinvigorated,
a debate
over
what
elements must
be included
in a reasonably comprehensive exposition
of international
politics.
With
regard
to the realist
approach specifically,
it has given
new
urgency
to the
61t should thus
be clear that
in speaking of the scientific element
in the thought of Thucydides and Machiavelli
I
am not making
them
wholly
scientific
in the contemporary sense of
the word.
I do not dissent, for example,
from
Richard Sears's (1977) fine exposition
of the gulf
between
Thucydides
in particular and modern science.
I simply
believe strong scientific (and structural)
aspects of the thought of Thucydides
and Machiavelli may
be isolated
for the
purpose of contrasting them with
modern approaches that rely on these
elements exclusively. On the controversy
over
science
and Thucydides see,
in
addition
to
Sears, Cochrane, 1929;
Bluhm, 1962; and Clark, 1993.

144 International Realism and the Science of Politics
debate
over
what constitute
the
fundamental
principles,
or what
are
almost univer-
sally called the "assumptions," of realism. "Assumptions" are postulates relied on
as part
of a theory's foundation, which the theory itself does not
account for or
explain.
Modern
economics,
for
example, employs
an assumption
of
utility-maxi-
mizing
individual
rationality;
and a variety of assumptions-the existence and
persistence
of
anarchy
in
the international realm, state-centrism
or
its
equivalent,
and quasi-economic rationality-are often said
to
underlie realism.
Assumptions become especially important in neorealism, for it is
only with their
aid that the investigation
in international politics
can be focused or simplified
sufficiently
to
carry
out the research
program envisaged by
the
theory.
To a theory
simplified
to the extent of
focusing exclusively
on structural
considerations, many
assumptions
are indeed necessary (cf. Waltz, 1979:10). To the classical
realists,
however, this kind of procedure would not be acceptable, since it
essentially lays
the
foundations
of realism in stipulation rather than argument. Neither Machia-
velli nor
Thucydides
"assumes" that men are selfish or
ambitious,
that
states are
the
only significant
actors
in
international
politics,
or that states or other international
actors
behave
rationally.
Some
of
these
precepts they
do subscribe
to,
but
only
after
painstaking argument and investigation.
Others
they do not subscribe to at all,
although they
are often held to be "assumptions" necessary
to realism. Rather than
resting on "assumptions," the early realists embed the scientific
elements of their
theories
in
rich and
comprehensive analyses
of
human nature and domestic
as
well
as international
political practice.
In this
respect,
their
approaches
are "classical,"
rather
than
simple anticipations
of the
contemporary
scientific
approach
(cf. Bull,
1966; Singer, 1969). This
makes them impossible to operationalize,
as neorealism
alleges,
but it also makes them
less abstract.
One of
the
questions
before
us
is
which
approach
is
more
adequate to the
understanding
of
international
politics.
A brief look at the
attitude
of
Thucydides and Machiavelli toward some
of the
assumptions just mentioned reveals
something
about their
approach. State-cen-
trism is one principle
held by
neorealists to be central
to
realism,
although they
acknowledge
that
it
involves abstraction or
oversimplification
(Waltz, 1979:93-95;
Gilpin, 1981:ch. 1; cf. Snidal, 1985:35). To the early modern realist Hobbes,
state-centrism is also
crucial,
and his influence
may
be partially responsible
for
the
prevalence of this view among modern realists. But neither
Thucydides nor Ma-
chiavelli
rest
their
realism on a state-centric view
of international
politics.
They
do
regard states or similar political entities as ordinarily the dominant actors
in
international
politics;7
but the roles nonstate actors
play
in their
portrayals
of
international events are decisive
enough
to
disqualify
them
from
simple
state-cen-
trism. These nonstate actors are typically
individuals who
play
roles outside the
simple
framework of
sovereign
states. Statesmen
like Brasidas
and Alcibiades
play
this role in Thucydides;
and Machiavelli's
fascination with
condottieri, and, more
importantly,
with
founders
of
states,
is well
known.
Similarly,
both
Thucydides
and
Machiavelli show too much concern
with
the
phenomena
of state-formation and
-transformation
to allow
them
to be classified as state-centrists
in
any simple
sense.
State-centrism
is
a superfluous principle
in
classical realism: the
predominance
of
power
and self-interest
in international affairs
abides,
with
all its
consequences,
whether states are the sole actors in that realm or not.
7There are differences of course between the city-states and kingdoms Thucydides and Machiavelli were
dealing
with and the modern nation-state, whose foundation
is
often placed in the time of Hobbes. The relevance of
these
differences to international relations is, however, often overstated (see, e.g., Walker, 1993:65-66). With regard
to the
points
I desire
to
make
about realism, the differences can be left
out of account. See also Mansfield, 1983;
Russell,
1990:36.

STEVEN FORDE 145
Thucydides and Machiavelli are even less wedded to the principle of the ration-
ality of international actors. An assumption of rationality, once again, is especially
important to neorealism: only if states respond rationally to the conditions
of
international anarchy, it seems, can we hope to establish behavioral regularities
of
the kind that social
science,
in their
view,
is
built
on.8 Our two classical
authors do
indeed share the view that realism at some level represents a rational response
to
international conditions; but this does not lead them to the assertion that interna-
tional actors actually behave rationally. Nor does it lead them to treat irrational
behavior as an aberration from which their theories
abstract by "assumption."
Rather, irrationality
in
the real world
of
international politics is carefully integrated
into their reflections
on the status and purpose of realist theory. As we
shall see,
the
interplay between rationality
and irrationality plays
an important
role in their
evaluations
of the status and significance
of realist science
altogether.
Machiavelli's
awareness
that most states of his
day
fall short of the ideal of rational
policy
shapes
his
whole intellectual project.
The goal of his
writing
becomes
precisely
to change
the
behavior
of
states
and statesmen,
in
the
direction of
greater rationality,
that is,
greater realism.
In the
same vein, violations
of
realist rationality
are as salient in
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War as is realism itself. The Melians' failure
to
surrender to the
overwhelmingly superior power
of Athens is
only
the clearest
such case (5.89-105). But Thucydides, unlike Machiavelli, dedicates himself to
the
project of moderating realism.
If some of the precepts commonly associated with
realism are not vital
to
Thucydides or Machiavelli, there is at least one that is: the principle that
the
structure of the international arena is
necessarily
anarchic. Here the
classics and
the
neorealists
are in
agreement. But whereas neorealism aspires to
build a theory
on the bare
structural fact
of
anarchy,
the
classical
realists
supplement
this
with
an
account of human nature. The interplay of structure and human nature
in the
early
realists
provides
an indirect account of how
they
would
react
to the
project
of
relying
on structure
exclusively.
The Importance of
Structure
in the
Realist
Argument
When
neorealists
speak
of the structure of the international
system, they
refer to
two
distinct
things.
One is the
configuration
of a particular
international
system,
which
might
be multipolar, bipolar, hegemonic,
and so
on. Most neorealist
writing
concerns itself
with elaborating
the
theory
at this level. At a deeper level,
however,
structure refers to the
anarchy
that characterizes
all international
systems.
It is this
"deep
structure" that interests us here.
All
realism holds
that international relations
presents
an anarchic
structure,
if the
expression
is admissible as an oxymoron.
Neorealism
appeals to that fact
exclusively
as the foundation
of its realism. Yet
anarchy by
itself does not account
for the
political consequences
realism
describes.
To state the
problem
most
succinctly,
an anarchic
structure inhabited
by
angels
would
not constitute
the
world
of
international
politics
as realism describes it
(cf.
Donnelly, 1992:88). It is this
problem
that led all earlier realists to
ground
their
arguments
in human nature as well as structural considerations.
Neorealism
es-
chews
appeals to human
nature;
but the
"nonangelic"
character of human nature
must then be counted
among
its
assumptions.
Neorealists
rarely acknowledge
this,
unless in the form of
the
general postulate
that states
pursue
their
own interests
8The asstumption of rationality is not pectuliar to neorealism among contemporary approaches to in-ternationlal
relations: see Snidal, 1985:35, 38-39 on game theory, which shares many presuppositions with it (but see also Axelrod,
1984: ch. 5 and p. 173).

146 International Realism and the Science of
Politics
primarily.9 But the difficulties with this too are clear enough:
there are many ways
of being "nonangelic," and the differences among them
deeply influence the
complexion
of international
anarchy.
The classical realists thought it imperative to
explore
human nature because our
understanding
of it necessarily affects our view
of
realism.
The precise character of the compulsions
that anarchy exerts on states,
the urgency of the threats raised by it, and the prospects
for its melioration, are
all
deeply
affected
by
our view of human nature.
At a deeper
or more
philosophical
level, our understanding of human nature may affect
our view of whether or not
the
pressures
or threats caused by
it
ought
to
be meliorated.
If human
beings
are
simply beasts, there
is no reason why they should
not live by the law of the jungle.
Despite their refusal to rely exclusively
on structure, it is interesting that both
Thucydides and Machiavelli show the outlines of purely
structural arguments in
their
works.
These provide interesting points
of
comparison with contemporary
neorealism. There are key passages
in Machiavelli where
he presents his
realism
in simple structural terms.
In the opening chapters
of the Discourses, for example,
he makes his case for the superiority
of
the
ancient Roman constitution on struc-
tural grounds: only
such
a constitution
is
powerful
enough
to
cope with the threat
created by international anarchy (1.1, 2, 6). The third chapter
of The Prince is the
locus classicus of the structural argument
in Machiavelli.
Appealing again
to
ancient
Rome, Machiavelli
presents imperialism
as nothing
more than the rational re-
sponse to international anarchy (pp. 11-13). He asserts
that under
conditions
of
anarchy, threats
to one's security,
if not imminent,
are always forming
on the
horizon. Accordingly, in one of Machiavelli's more
memorable
formulations,
war
is never avoided, but only postponed to the advantage
of
your opponent (pp. 12-
13). Preemptive strikes on your adversaries present and future-up to
the
Roman
limit of universal imperialism-become the only secure means of coping with
international anarchy. According to the argument sketched
in these
pages,
anar-
chy, or the international "security dilemma," constitutes
in
itself
a comprehensive
threat,
one that
may
be
effectively
neutralized
only by
force
of arms. And we
should
not fail
to
notice that for
Machiavelli,
the structural
argument
becomes an ethical
one: it
shows that universal imperialism is
justified,
on the grounds
of
self-preser-
vation.
Machiavelli is
entirely
serious about
this
sweeping
conclusion.
His full
justifica-
tion for
it, however, goes beyond
the
purely
structural
argument just
outlined.
If
one looks
more closely
at his argument
in the
beginning
of the
Discourses,
for
example,
one finds
that Machiavelli
does not
attribute the international
security
dilemma
solely
to
anarchy.
He notes that constitutions weaker
than Rome's
might
be able to deal with international
anarchy-if
men
were not
so addicted
to
domi-
nation
(1.1, p. 102). Anarchy,
in
other
words, poses
a threat
to
states
only
because
of the
way
certain
impulses
of human nature
express
themselves in it.
In fact,
outside its
opening chapters,
the Discourses relies almost
exclusively
on appeals to
human nature and human ambition
rather
than on structure to drive
its realist
argument (cf. Hulliung, 1983:x, 225). Something
similar
happens in The
Prince,
even
in its
third
chapter.
Toward
the end of
that
chapter,
Machiavelli introduces
an argument
from human nature that is wholly
independent
of the structural
considerations he has relied on to this
point: "truly
it
is a natural and ordinary
thing
to
desire to
acquire,"
he laconically observes,
"and
always,
when
men
do it
who
can, they
will
be praised
or not
blamed;
but
when
they cannot,
and want to
9The most visible
asstumption
about human nature made by neorealism is that of
homo
oeconomicus. But
it
is by
no
means clear that this will
account
for
international politics as we know it either (cf. Loriaux, 1992:401-402). Neither
Thucydides nor Machiavelli, as we shall see, would regard this as an adequate realist supposition regarding
human
nature.

STEVEN FORDE 147
do it
anyway,
here lie the error and the blame" (14). The "desire
to
acquire," which,
we must strain to remember, means imperial ambition in this context, is now a
natural impulse in its own right. It is no longer simply a rational response to
anarchy; indeed, it is no longer rational per se at all. Nevertheless, as a natural
impulse, Machiavelli
maintains that there
is no valid moral objection
to it. Follow-
ing
this
thought
to its conclusion, we arrive
at the view that imperial
ambition is a
force
that ought to
be liberated on its own
account, wholly apart
from the security
dilemma that
may
also be used
as a
justification
for it.
Given
Machiavelli's presen-
tation of realism
in his works as a whole,
we would have to conclude
that this is
closer to his true view of the foundations of
realism. Why Machiavelli
should thrust
the structural
argument
so
obtrusively
to the fore in
selected
contexts is a question
we
will
have a chance to consider
momentarily.
Thucydides' thinking
on the importance
of structure, or almost
anything else,
is difficult
to specify,
because Thucydides
says so little
in his own name in his
History. However,
his
famous analysis
of the cause of the Peloponnesian
War is
strikingly
structural. He holds that the war was
made inevitable
on account of a
shift
in the balance of power:
the
growth
of
Athenian power
struck
fear in the
Spartans
and "compelled" them to go to war
(1.23). As in
the
case of Machiavelli,
the ethical
implications
of
this structural
argument
are
not
far
below
the surface.
Thucydides' appeal to a compulsion
or
necessity
driving the Spartans
implies they
are justified
in starting
the war (as they
did, technically speaking) on the basis of
the shift
in the balance of power. The implicit
argument parallels that of Machia-
velli: the plea of self-defense
is extended to the Spartans on the grounds of their
fear of Athenian power, even though the threat
to them at the beginning of the
war is anything but immediate.10 The most extensive argument for realism in
Thucydides' book, however,
is given by
the imperial Athenians. They too appeal to
compulsion, but in a much broader way.
They maintain that
imperialism
is
justified
because it is driven by three compulsions, of which fear
of the type
the Spartans
experience is one. Speaking of their
own case, the Athenians assert
that they were
forced to take up their
empire, first
by
fear, but then also by
honor, and finally by
profit
or self-interest (ophelia) as well (1.75). Their position is that these compul-
sions are universal,
ensuring that
every
state with
the requisite power will become
expansionist. The Athenians put fear first
among the compulsions in this context
because they
are speaking of
the beginning of their
empire, which originated as a
defensive alliance against the Persians. When reformulating
their argument mo-
ments later as a general law of human behavior, they place honor first,
followed
by
fear and then profit
(1.76).
Fear in this context derives
from the "security
dilemma" created by
the anarchy
of international relations, and thus corresponds to the structural
argument for
realism. The Athenians make this the first root
of
their
(or any
state's) realist
policy,
but they
do not rely
on it
exclusively.
Fear may explain the beginning of
Athenian
imperialism,
but it is
not enough to account for
the
general law
they
describe later:
"the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they
must" (borrowing
Crawley's poetic translation of
5.89; see also 1.76). It is
not enough even to account
fully
for the beginning of the Peloponnesian War as Thucydides presents it,
inas-
I Martin Ostwald (1988) proposes
a different reading
of 1.23, according to
which the "necessity" Thtucydides speaks
of applies
not
to the Spartans exclusively btht
only to
the general historical
process at work ("the growth
of
Athenian
power struck
fear
in the
Spartans
and compelled the coming
of the war").
I do not
find this
reading perstuasive,
on
grammatical or
semantic grounds.
It should
be noted that on my
reading of this passage,
the compulsion Thucydides refers to
is
subjective.
That
is,
the
growth of
Athenian power didn't
directly compel the
Spartans; it was
their fear of
that
power
(whether wholly
justified or not) that
compelled
them. It is typical of
Thucydides' approach
to focus on the
subjective
rather
than the
objective element.

148 International Realism and the Science
of Politics
much as it
was Athenian expansionism that inspired the Spartans with the fear that
was the immediate cause of the conflagration. Honor, and profit (i.e., self-interest
understood as aggrandizement rather than bare preservation), are necessary to
account for this. And these are impulses rooted in human nature, independent of
the structural imperatives of international politics.
The account of Athenian imperialism that emerges in Thucydides is interesting
partly because of the way
its treatment of the different human motives
for
expan-
sion produces a relatively transparent segregation of the structural from the other
elements of realism. As such, it makes especially visible some of the differences
between a realism that is purely structural and one that draws on an analysis of
human nature as well. The most obvious of the differences is that the human
impulses of
honor and profit make realism much more dynamic, and much more
virulent, than structuralism by itself. Whereas structurally
motivated fear is rela-
tively circumscribed in the Athenian presentation, honor and acquisitiveness are
obviously unlimited, expansionist motivations.
For the same reason, the two differ-
ent approaches to realist
argument result
in radically different understandings of
what would today be called the "national interest."
Defining the national interest
has been a perennial problem of twentieth-century
realism.11 If states' motivation
were limited to structurally
motivated fear, specifying
the national interest
might
be a relatively straightforward problem. But the
Athenians incorporate honor and
profit as well into their perception of their interests. They are interested
in much
more than mere security,
and they
assert that
every powerful
state will be interested
in much more. If the Athenians are correct about this,
the struggle for power in
international politics will be much more intractable,
and the prospects for stable
peace or order in international politics much dimmer,
than on a purely
structural
rendering of realism. There will be much less room for a common interest or
common good among states.
Thucydides presents us with
one way
of envisaging a "nonangelic" human na-
ture,
and his History represents
a rather elaborate reflection on the consequences
of such a view for international politics.
At least two other features
of
Thucydides'
presentation of human nature are significant
in light
of current debates in inter-
national realism.
First, although fear
motivated
by
concern for
security or self-pres-
ervation
represents certainly
a rational response to structural
anarchy,
the
impulses
of honor and profit
are not rational in the same way.
This is one key respect in
which we can say
that not the rationality,
but to a large degree the nonrationality
of international actors lies at the foundation of Thucydides' realism. But at the
same time and in the second place, the fact that the human impulses that underlie
realism are irrational does not for
Thucydides make them simply evil.
This is one
of the most striking
features of Thucydides' realism. Machiavelli does not believe
that the human impulses that stand behind realism are evil,
because he rejects the
validity
of distinctions
of good and evil in international politics.12
Mid-twentieth-
century
realists maintained this moral distinction (as does Thucydides), but that
led them to identify
the realist elements of human nature as evil.13
Thucydides'
I
'This problem was the source of some notable criticism of earlier twentieth-centtury
realism (cf., e.g., Morgenthau,
1952; Tucker, 1952). Among the neorealists, Waltz has been criticized for remarking
that states are motivated
in
international relations by a desire for
secturity
at a minimum, domination at a maximum: the shift from one to the
other
is
not very well supported by
his
theory (Keohane, 1986b:173-174).
Bringing
human nature into the
equiation
as the classical realists do makes the shift qulite easy to understand-but
it
also
makes
realism
more volatile and brings
out its ethically problematic character more clearly than does neorealism.
121t is evident that I interpret Machiavelli as a thorough realist, although
there is controversy among scholars as
to this point.
I arguLe more fully for my interpretation of Machiavelli
in
Forde,
1992.
I hope also that what I say about
Machiavelli here makes this interpretation plausible.
13Niebuhr and Morgenthau are classic cases of this. See Niebuhr, 1944; Morgenthau,
1946
and 1978.

STEVEN
FORDE 149
History
charts
many evil consequences of realism, but in his work realism's roots
even have something noble about them (Bruell, 1974:16).
The Athenians' love of
their
city was one of the things that motived them to
augment its power (cf. 2.43).
And their love of honor was responsible not only for
Athenian imperialism but for
many
of the splendid things we still associate with classical Athens. These facts
always
color
Thucydides'
assessment of Athenian
imperialism,
and might provide
food for our
own reflection.
A final opportunity to gauge Thucydides' attitude
toward purely structural real-
ism is provided, interestingly enough, by a speech found rather late in his work
(6.82-87). An Athenian named
Euphemus, speaking
in the Sicilian
city
of Cama-
rina near the beginning of Athens' ill-fated expedition to Sicily, attempts to per-
suade its
citizens
to
ally
themselves
with Athens. Euphemus's audience
is
wary,
since
they know that the Athenian Empire was built precisely
by subjugating former
allies.
What
makes
Euphemus's speech interesting
from our point
of view is that
he attempts
in it to
reassure the Camarinaeans
by
recasting
the Athenian
defense
of
imperialism along structural lines. Of the three compulsions that Athenians had
previously relied on to justify their imperialism,
Euphemus focuses exclusively
on
fear and the
balance of
power.
The Athenian
Empire is
no longer
a product
of the
love of honor, or of self-interest understood as something wider
than defensive
security. Euphemus portrays
it as a simple
monument
to the
Athenian desire to
escape being
ruled
by
outside
powers,
Persian or
Spartan
(6.82-83). Athens holds
its
empire on account of fear, because, in international affairs, ruling is the only
way to avoid being ruled by others (6.87). Nonetheless, Euphemus assures his
audience-this is the point of his speech-that if fear led to Athenian expansion
at home, it will dictate a policy of free alliances in Sicily.
Thucydides
casts
grave doubts
on the
accuracy
of
Euphemus's modest account
of Athenian ambitions
in
Sicily (cf. 6.15, 6.24). But
Euphemus's
truthfulness is
of
less
interest
to us than the
way
he modifies the Athenian
argument for realism-
and the motives he has
for
doing
so. What
makes
Euphemus's
account structural
is its
exclusive reliance on fear born of the anarchic
character of
international
politics,
rather than "compulsions"
of honor and profit.
As with
contemporary
neorealism,
this
makes for
a much more "parsimonious"
explanation
of his
city's
actions,
but
Euphemus's
motive for thus
paring
down
the
realist
argument
is less
scientific
than
rhetorical: he resorts to a structural account because it renders
realism
both less controversial
and less threatening
to his audience. It is less
threatening
because it
limits Athens
to the
pursuit
of
security
interests that are
narrower
than ambitions
founded on love of honor
or
of
gain.
It
is
less controver-
sial
on account of its ethical
complexion. Self-defense,
or
the national
interest con-
strued
narrowly
as self-defense,
is a much
less
controversial
justification
of
policies
that would
otherwise
violate moral
principles
than motives like honor or
gain (cf.
Bruell, 1974:13).
And moral
justification,
for
Euphemus
as
for the other Athenians
who
speak
of
imperialism,
is a critical element
of the realist
argument.
Justification
or exoneration
is a principal purpose of realist
argument,
and for
Euphemus,
structuralism offers distinctive
advantages
in
precisely
this vein. Of
course,
it
does
this
partly by concealing
the true
nature of Athenian
policy,
and therefore of
realism as the
Athenians, and Thucydides, see it. Structuralism
makes realism seem
at
once less immoral and less
dynamic
or
expansionist
than it
actually
is.
These features of the structural
approach
have not been a prominent part
of
contemporary
discussions of the
subject,
to
say
the least. But the rhetorical advan-
tages
of structuralism
would interest Machiavelli
a great
deal. We have already
noted some of
the
passages
where Machiavelli
presents
his
argument
in heavily
structural
terms,
and raised but did not answer the
question
of
why
Machiavelli
would want
to
present
his
argument
this
way.
It
is not difficult to
imagine
that one

150 International Realism and the Science of Politics
of his motives for doing so would be the rhetorical advantage structuralism pro-
vides. Since Machiavelli has set himself the project of persuading princes and
others who do not (yet) share his realism, he is well served by an opening
presentation that displays realism in the least controversial light. The structural
argument, linked closely as it is to security and self-preservation, does precisely
that.
In Chapter Three of The Prince, the strategy
of putting structuralism in the
foreground is perfectly calculated to carry along readers who might be willing to
admit realism on the basis of
self-defense,
but who would balk at excusing imperi-
alism on the
grounds of
simple ambition or "the desire to
acquire." From this
point
of view, it is no coincidence that structuralism
figures so prominently in the
beginning of his two
great works, and not elsewhere. Structuralism
is a most useful
screen, or opening wedge, for someone like Machiavelli whose realism may in
reality be based on it to only a modest degree.
Structuralism
actually recedes in importance the closer we get to the heart of
Thucydides' and Machiavelli's realism. There, analyses of human nature and its
"compulsions" or
appetites preponderate. On the basis of the above considerations,
we would even have to say
that
the purely
structural
argument is of interest
to the
two more on account of
what it conceals
about realism than what
it
reveals.
Among
the most important of
its
concealments are the harsh moral implications of
realist
doctrine. The prominence of structuralism
in contemporary thinking
is perhaps
not surprising, therefore, given the fact that contemporary structuralism is inspired
by
a paradigm of social science that eschews moral theorizing. Today's structural
realists are not, of course, attempting through structuralism to conceal the true
nature of realism. Thucydides and Machiavelli would maintain nonetheless that
one of the effects of their
approach is to do just that.
The classical realists, therefore, do not reject a purely structural account of
realism because they were unaware of the possibility of such an account. Rather,
they regard it as incomplete, and deceptive because of its incompleteness. The
contrast between them and contemporary
realists
does not end here, however.
The
classical writers are as fascinated as their
present-day counterparts by
the
possibility
of a scientific
approach to understanding the human and political world, and, like
our contemporaries, they
see realism
as such an approach. But their
understanding
of realism as a whole leads them to distinctive reflections on the way scientific
argument in this case intersects
with
moral argument. In their analysis, realism,
precisely insofar
as it is scientific,
is not a "value-neutral"
approach. Rather, they
see the scientific
approach inclining intrinsically
toward realism and away from
moralism, owing to the fact that scientific
and moral logic are at odds with
one
another. Although this
aspect of
realist
argument is barely
visible in the literature
of scientific realism today,
the classical realists invite
us to explore it
in depth.
Realism as a Science
For the classical authors,
what gives the realist
argument its
scientific
character is
its
grounding in necessity. Compulsions arising
from
the structure
of
international
relations and from human nature induce states and statesmen to act in the ways
described by
realism. Grounding in necessity
is important
for two reasons. In the
first
place, only
if
these are compulsions in some legitimate
sense of the word can
we construct anything resembling scientific laws out of them. And second, only
their compulsory character allows them to neutralize the moral restraints that
might otherwise be thought to apply to the behavior of states. For the classical
realists,
it is the
second of these properties that
makes the
argument
from
necessity
truly
"realist."
The argument of
Thucydides' Athenians is paradigmatic. They trace their
impe-
rialism to motives whose compulsory character, they claim, is shown by the fact

STEVEN FORDE 151
that no state with the requisite power has ever been able to resist
them
(1.75-76).
The revolutionary nature of this proposition against the background of traditional
Greek thinking must be emphasized. Not only is it
shocking
to that traditional
mentality
in its content, but the scientific rationality of its approach
is unprece-
dented. There are,
of
course, many
differences between
the science reflected in
this
Athenian
proposition
and the
paradigms
of modern social science
(cf. Garst,
1989:4; Clark, 1993). But these should not be overstated. The Athenians are
introducing what can be called
a scientific law
of human
behavior
in terms
recog-
nizable to us: they assert its universal applicability, identify the
forces that
drive it,
and stipulate
the
empirical conditions
under
which
it comes into
play. They
treat
it as both a descriptive and a predictive proposition (1.76, 5.105.2). Moreover,
Thucydides'
interest in the Athenian
argument
is partly
that of a social scientist.
One of the
goals
of his
History
is to test this realist Athenian thesis
against
the
facts
he has in view. The evidence he presents corroborates the thesis
in its
essential
outlines
(Rengakos, 1984:37; Forde, 1992). His own
analysis
of
the
origins
of
the
Peloponnesian War, and the
general consensus before the war's
outbreak concern-
ing its inevitability, bespeak a widespread realist
outlook (1.23; Kiechle, 1963).
Thucydides scatters arguments echoing
the Athenian
understanding
of
power
and
imperialism throughout his work (e.g., the Corinthians, 1.69; the Athenian Diodo-
tus, 3.45.4-5; Hermocrates of Syracuse, 4.61; see also Thucydides' own remark
at
1.99.2). Perhaps most important, Thucydides allows
us to see that the
Spartans,
who
appear
at first to be a counter-example
to the
Athenian
thesis,
in fact confirm
it: the Spartans rule over immense populations of Helot slaves,
victims
of
an
ancient
Spartan conquest (1.101; Strauss, 1977:191-192).
The Spartans stopped expanding
only
when they
reached the limits
of their
power, long ago; their
"empire"
is
invisible due only
to
age.
What interests
Thucydides, though,
as well as the
Athenians,
is not only
the
verification
of this
law of power and domination, but its
consequences, including
its consequences in the ethical realm. For the Athenians, as already noted, the
concern is partly
rhetorical: they
seek to justfy
their policy,
before a potentially
hostile or skeptical audience. In Thucydides' History, the realist argument that is
the Athenian hallmark is presented systematically
in only two or three places: at
Sparta, at Melos, and (by Euphemus, in altered form) at Camarina. Its
purpose in
all these venues is
justificatory. Thucydides' Athenians have noticed, and they
force
us to notice, that a scientific claim of the type they
make is not merely
a scientific
claim, but is also, and
for
that
very reason,
an exoneration. If
expansionism, or more
generally the exercise of power based only on interest,
constitutes
a genuine law
of international behavior in the sense argued by the Athenians, no state can be
blamed for
acting
in accordance with
it. This is how the Athenians apply
their
newly
discovered behavioral law to their own case, but it epitomizes the application of
scientific
logic to human affairs
altogether. To state the matter most generally,
bringing
behavior under the rubric of
a scientific
law,
as the Athenians do, justifies
it.
To the extent that behavior is referred to scientific
necessity,
it
is removed from
the realm of moral discourse.14 To understand scientifically,
we might
almost say,
is to forgive.
Tout
comprendre
c'est tout
pardonner15
'4This holds
truie
whether the law in question is understood deterministically or probabilistically: to the extent that
behavior comes tinder such a law, it is excused. The fact that the
behavioral
laws of realism are not deterministic raises
a number
of interesting isstues for the classical authors, some of which will be discussed below.
On the general conflict
between justice and necessity
in
Thtucydides see also Orwin, 1989; Strauss, 1977:174-192.
On some of the
subtleties
created by different types and degrees
of
necessity
in
social
life
see Mandelbauim, 1987:114-147.
'5The origin of this French
proverb
seems to
be Mme
de Stael's remark, "tout
comprendre
rend tres indulgent" (Corinne,
Bk
18, 5). In a parallel vein, consider the comment of
British Prime
MinisterJohn Major
on attittudes
toward crime:
"I feel
strongly that society needs
to
condemn a little
more
and understand
a little
less"
(quoted
in Thze Newv York
Times,
February 23, 1993:A3).

152 International Realism and the Science of Politics
Consequently, as Thucydides and his
Athenians are fully aware, a social science
that discovers
"laws"
of
behavior is not just a form of the search for truth, but also
a potent political weapon.16
For
them,
its
power comes from its hidden ethical, or
rather antiethical, dimension. Naturally
enough, this consequence of scientific
reasoning was
not
lost on Machiavelli. The scientific language he employs in his
presentation of realism is powerful and striking
(cf. Gilbert, 1965; Mansfield, 1981).
The realist argument
in Chapter Three of The
Prince,
for example, is filled with
references to necessities, to "universal causes"
(p. 9), and
to
the unalterable "order
of
things" (p. 11). All these are said to compel the
prudent prince to take the
actions
Machiavelli describes-and thereby
justify him
in
doing so. The preemptive
strikes
Machiavelli recommends against
potential or future enemies are portrayed
as the actions of a doctor
applying
medicine in
the
early stages
of
a disease
(pp. 12,
8; cf.
Discourses
I preface).
Since the
physician
Machiavelli
can certify
that threats
are
inevitable-scientifically
predictable-preemptive
attack is
a
justified response,
indeed
the
only rational response.
Machiavelli deploys this scientific terminology
at the same point in his work
where
he presents
his
argument
almost
exclusively
in structural
terms. Thus Ma-
chiavelli combines the
relatively
noncontroversial character of structuralism with
the
logic
of science to
give
his
argument great
rhetorical
power.
He uses this
power
to cut through supposed moral limitations
on the behavior of
princes
and states
with
a peculiar
kind of
authority.
But the
logic
of scientific discourse
plays
another
important
role
in
Machiavelli's
argument
as
well, pushing
Machiavelli's realism to
greater
extremes than
it
might
otherwise have attained.
It is
part of Machiavelli's extremism
to insist that
universal imperialism is justified
on the
grounds
of self-defense. It
would
seem natural to
presume
that
this insis-
tence is founded on some
especially
severe estimate of the threats states face
in
international
politics.
In fact, though,
it
owes more to the
rigor
of the scientific
logic
Machiavelli
applies
to those threats. He concedes,
for
example,
that a state
like
Sparta
could survive "more than
eight
hundred
years" despite
its
deficiency
in
strength (Discourses 1.2). But this is
only
because Sparta
was
lucky enough
not
to
encounter a truly
formidable foe: she was
dependent upon fortune for her
long-
term
survival.
The aim of
Machiavelli's political
science, however, is to take matters
out of the hands
of fortune
(e.g., The
Prince,
Ch. 25;
Discourses
2.1). The goal of
this
science, parallel
to the
goal of
medicine,
is to
guarantee
the survival of the
state,
insofar as it
can be guaranteed.
And this can be accomplished, according
to
Machiavelli, only by
the
accumulation
of
power and the
practice
of
"preemptive
imperialism," neutralizing
threats when
they
are small and remote. It is not so
much because threats are constant and overwhelming,
as because they
are inevi-
table in
the
long run,
that
Machiavelli
argues
for
universal
imperialism.
He would
have us
attack
precisely
when the threat does not
immediately imperil us,
because
this
is
what
the
logic
of a science
that
aspires
to
guarantee security requires. Again,
the
science
of medicine
provides
the
paradigm:
no doctor
deliberately
waits
for a
condition to become
life-threatening
before
treating
it.
Thus it is the scientific
logic employed by
Machiavelli-his
uncompromising
view
of
political
science as a technology
of
survival-that accounts
as much as
anything
else for the extreme character of his realism.17 For this
reason,
his
argument puts
16Note
that this is not
intended
in the "postmodern"
sense which would make all "knowledge"
a covert
exercise
of
power.
For
Thucydides,
it
is
not a question
of the Athenians
imposing
their realist
"language-game"
on others, but
of
the discovery
of a realist trtuth that
disarms
idealism by showing
it
to be illusory. Contrast
White's
(1984:ch. 3) view
of the "culture
of argument"
in
Thucydides.
17Here
I am speaking exclusively of the
strtucttural
side of Machiavelli's argument. As noted earlier, the argument
from ambition and human nature is free-standing, and can itself account for his extremism. As also noted earlier, this,
rather than structuralism, seems to
constittute
the truie core of Machiavelli's realism. This point will be reiterated below.
It
does not alter
the
argtument of the text, however, which concerns the bearing of scientific logic
per
se.

STEVEN FORDE 153
in starkest light the conflict between scientific logic and ethical discourse. But in
so doing,
it
might also provoke us to reflect
on possible limits of
the
scientific
approach to human behavior. Laws of social science, after all, unlike those of
natural science, are not deterministic in the strong sense of the word. This fact was
known to both Thucydides and Machiavelli, of course, but it reopens the question
of whether or not
the
compulsion
that stands
behind
these
laws
is
strong enough
to sustain
the
realist
position;
in particular, strong enough to negate
ethical re-
straints
in the
way
the realist
argument
maintains.
Machiavelli, again,
concedes that
states
that
defy
his realist
logic might
still
survive
by good fortune. Whereas
his
science can predict
the
inevitability
of threats
in
the
long term,
in the short term
everything
is
contingent.
The extreme realist
conclusion Machiavelli draws is
thus
not a response to determinism
in the strong sense; it is based rather
on his
insistence
that
political science disregard every competing goal of policy
in its
attempt
to
provide
a guarantee
of
security
in
international
politics.
The bearing of this logic becomes clearer if
we consider one of
the possible
ethical
objections
to it. It
has
always
been
admitted, by
realists
and
nonrealists
alike,
that there are cases of national self-defense that create legitimate exceptions
to
moral
duty.18
Nonrealists
maintain, however,
that
these
exceptions
are
neither
so
extensive nor so significant
as to
negate
moral
obligation altogether. They argue
that
since
the
threats faced by states are usually not immediate, nor truly
matters
of
life
and death, adhering
to
moral
principal
in
most cases involves
only running
relatively minimal risks, not jeopardizing the survival of the state. This being
the
case, they
maintain
that states have
a duty
to run these risks.19
Machiavelli
undoubt-
edly has a livelier
sense
of the
risks involved
in international politics
than
many,
but the crux of his
disagreement with
the moralists is not
there.
The fact that
he
refuses
to
run any security
risks
for
the
sake of morality suggests that
his
position
rests in reality on a prior determination that the principles international moralists
stand
on are simply illusory.
Thus it becomes not a question
of
running
risks for
the
sake of a legitimate moral ideal, but of compromising security for the sake of
a mere
illusion. From
this
point
of
view we might say
that Machiavelli takes the
realist argument to its logical extreme only because he has made a prior decision
to allow it
to go to the extreme. Proponents of the more moral viewpoint
have not
been blind to the logic of self-defense
that Machiavelli relies on; they
have simply
argued that it
does not negate moral duty (cf. Grotius, 1625:11.1.17). Looked at in
this
way, we may
even say
that
Machiavelli's very project of
conquering fortune,
or
of guaranteeing security, already implies the wholesale abandonment of moral
scruples, for scruples interfere with the untrammeled pursuit of those goals. To
that
extent,
the scientific
logic he musters to
justify
his position is more rhetorical
than determinative. Machiavelli gives unrestricted
play to a political science dedi-
cated exclusively
and unremittingly
to national security
because in his
judgment
there is no reason not to-no competing goal of state
policy,
moral or otherwise,
in international politics.
In effect,
Machiavelli's thought is so revealing of the tension between science
and ethics because one of its
premises is that
scientific
logic should be allowed to
run its course regardless
of the
consequences. Those consequences include the full
immoralism of Machiavelli's teaching. Yet because Machiavelli's science is so single-
mindedly dedicated to the goal of security, rejecting all competing goals, it can
paradoxically be called normative. This is one of the most significant
differences
between Machiavelli's science and the science of politics as understood today.
In
'8The best short treatment of the various traditions of moral argument in international
politics
is Pangle, 1977.
See also Gilbert, 1939. For a more extensive treatment see the essays assembled
in
Nardin
and Mapel, 1992.
I5This argument is made by, among others, Arnold Wolfers (1962:58, 60); Michael
Walzer (1977:chs. 1, 5); and
Marshall Cohen (1984). See also Grotius, 1625:11.1.5.1, 11.1.17.

154 International
Realism and the Science of Politics
both cases the science is "soft," meaning not strongly predictive. Yet that
is precisely
what leads Machiavelli to make his science normative: he wishes to close
the gap
between realism, as he sees it, and actual state behavior. In this he resembles
some
of the American realists of the mid-twentieth century (e.g., Morgenthau,
Kennan,
Kissinger), for whom realism was not simply an outlook on international
politics
but a goal to
which public policy should aspire. Unlike them, however,
and unlike
most realists, Machiavelli pushes realism to its extreme. Machiavelli in
this respect
is an atypical realist, one whose extremism is rarely duplicated. For realists who
continue
to
cherish some moral ideals
in
international politics, who are
not such
thoroughgoing realists, the gap between realism as a descriptive paradigm
and
actual
state behavior opens up the possibility that states might not be compelled
to be fully realist
in
their policies. Might not the nondeterministic nature
of realist
laws of behavior,
and the consequent imperfection of realism as a description
of
international affairs, allow us some leeway
to
advocate a policy tempered
by moral
concern?
Thucydides should stand as a model
for realists who seek
this
kind
of approach.
Thucydides' realism begins with his verification of the Athenian thesis
on power
and
justice
in
international affairs,
but it
does not end there.
To begin
with, Athens
was defeated
in
its war
with Sparta,
a fact
that
realists above
all
must
be impressed
with.
In fact, Thucydides' reflections
on the
causes
of
this
defeat
lead him to an
important qualification of the
realist
outlook.
Relatively early
in his History,
he
informs
us
of his view that Athens essentially defeated herself
in
the war,
through
faction and internal disputes motivated by self-interest, that is, by a moral break-
down in which
the
public good was overwhelmed by private interest
(2.65). This
breakdown was
due in
part
to
the simple pressure
of
war, but
more
important,
it
was
prepared by
the
Athenian
policy
of realism
itself, specifically by
the immoral
aspects of
that
policy. The
frank
pursuit of self-interest
and
of power at
the
expense
of
other
cities,
made the
explicit
basis
of
the
city's policy
for a generation
and
more,
came eventually
to infect,
and then
to undermine,
the
community of
the
city
within.20
For Thucydides, this denouement reveals
a double defect
in Athenian
realism.
First, the
notion that extreme and unconcealed realism is
ultimately
self-destructive
suggests
that
it must
somehow be tempered
on the purely
realist
grounds
of
survival.
That
is,
Athens
herself,
in her heedless
pursuit
of
realist
policy,
does not
in the final
analysis
measure
up to the true standard
of
realist
rationality.
True or
sophisticated
realism would have
prescribed
a more
moderate course. But
second,
the
decay
of
Athens
and the Athenian
political community appear
in his
History
as
unfortunate from
an ethical
as
well
as a simply
realist
point
of
view.
Thucydides
is
so widely
known
as a realist that the ethical
or humane elements of his
thought
are often
overlooked.21 Yet
signs
of his ethical
concern are scattered
throughout
his History-in the moral coloring
he gives
his accounts
of the rise of Greek
civilization
and of the demise of civic
community
at Corcyra (see especially 1.6,
3.82-83), as well
as his
analysis
of
the fall of Athens.
The humane side of
Thu-
cydides
is
centered
primarily
around
his notion of an ethical
community
as a high
human achievement,
and he deplores the outcome of Athenian realism
as a
destruction
of this achievement. As
a realist, however,
he must balance
the ethical
principles
of this community against the immoral
pressures
of international
conflict.
25This connection between Athenian realism and
self-destrtuction
has been
arguied
elsewhere. See Grene, 1950:31-
32; Strauss, 1977:193-194;
and Orwin, 1986:81-82.
2IThis is a larger theme than can be developed here.
For more detailed discussions of the
htumane
or nonrealist
Thucydides see Reinhardt, 1966:207, 211, 217; Strauss, 1977:145,
cf.
150; and Forde, 1989:47-53, 1992:380-381.

STEVEN FORDE 155
Thucydides' final assessment of realism represents a kind of uncomfortable
compromise. As
a realist, he concedes that the Athenian thesis on power and justice
represents a genuine discovery about international politics. But what the Atheni-
ans,
and
other realists
like
them,
fail
to grasp is how dangerous or corrosive a truth
this is. The necessity to follow realist policy is genuine, but its impact can and
should
be minimized or
avoided wherever possible, for realism also threatens the
integrity
of the
community.
For
Thucydides, true realist prudence would bow to
those realist necessities of international politics that are genuinely unavoidable,
while attempting
to
moderate
the
impulse
to
carry realism to its limit. The result
would
be a subtle and nuanced
policy
motivated
by
some
realist
and some ethical
concerns.
But Thucydides' analysis
of human nature
prevents
him from
being
sanguine
about the
prospects
of
states
actually following
such a balanced policy,
and his
overall view
of
politics suggests
that
this balance cannot be struck
in a
perfect
or
durable way
in
any case. In a sense, therefore,
for
Thucydides, realism
represents
a problem
with no perfect
solution.
Opportunities for ethical action are
severely
circumscribed
in international
politics. Improvements
in
the ethical com-
plexion of interstate relations can be made only
at the
margin,
and then only
temporarily.
And
the realist environment
continually
threatens the
genuine
moral
achievement represented by
the domestic
politics
of civilized communities. The
realism of Thucydides, balanced between
the
two irreconcilable poles of morality
and necessity,
in the end suggests
an almost
tragic perspective.
A sense
of
tragedy
is one thing lacking
from most
contemporary
elaborations of realism
(cf. Loriaux,
1992:417).
But
Thucydides would
doubtless
hold
that
any
realist who does not
wish
to become simply Machiavellian, yet
does not see the tragic
element of such a
position,
has not
thought enough
about what realism
as a moral and intellectual
position actually entails.
Conclusion: Realism as a Technology
The contrast between
Thucydides
and Machiavelli on
the
prescriptions
to be
drawn
from realism
raises a question
that should be considered
by contemporary propo-
nents of realist
theory.
If
realism
provides
us
with
an improved, "scientific,"
under-
standing
of international
politics
based on empirically grounded
laws
of
behavior,
to
what use should we
put
this
knowledge?
One neorealist has
argued
that
realism
is,
and has
always
been intended
by
its advocates
as a "science of
peace,"
a kind of
technology
of international affairs dedicated
to the
creation
of a "more
just and
more peaceful
world"
(Gilpin, 1981:226-227). It is somewhat
surprising
that a
realism
based
self-consciously
on a paradigm
in
which all value choices
are
arbitrary
should
give
rise to such a moralized vision of
its
own
avocation. It nonetheless
appears
to be true that
all twentieth-century
American realists have
taken
some-
thing
like the attitude described.22 The example
of
Machiavelli, however,
to say
nothing
of
others,23
is
enough
to demonstrate
that
this is not
necessarily
the
case,
and I believe
the
general analysis
of realism
given
here rebuts the
notion that
22The subtitle of Morgenthau's
great text Politics
Among
Nations:
The
Strulggle
for
Power
and
Peace,
as well as the
final
sections of that work,
testify to
his
dedication to
a "pacifying" application of realism. The same is
truLe of
Niebuhr's
notion that the "children
of light"
mtust
learn some
of the wiles of the "children of
darkness" in order to put them
in
the service of more ethical
policies
(Niebtuhr,
1944).
Kennan, Herz, Wolfers, and others
belong
in
the same
camp. See
Herz, 1951:chs. 4, 5; Morgenthau,
1978:ch. 32; Keohane,
1986a:198; and Gilpin, 1981:226,
1986:319, 321. This is
doubly
paradoxical in the case of the more scientifically self-conscious
neorealists. See Loriaux,
1992:407.
230ne thinks of Treitschke
(1914), or a host of fascist
writers, who were definitely realists, and great despisers of
peace. And then there is
Nietzsche: "You say
it
is the
good cause that hallows even
war? I say unto you:
it
is
the good
war that
hallows any
cauise" (1884:159).

156 International
Realism and the Science of Politics
realism could have any intrinsic
moral thrust at all. To the contrary,
the classical
authors reveal its intrinsic
thrust to
be quite
in the
opposite
direction.
Machiavelli was the first to portray realism as a "technology"
of international
politics, that is, a scientifically
grounded technique that
could be used to master
the international arena. But he argues that this technology is
of necessity the very
negation of all moral concern.
If it is directed toward peace, it
is only
the
peace
of universal empire. Machiavelli's
realism seeks control of international politics,
and, according
to
him,
one masters the jungle only by
utmost
conformity
to the
ways
of
the jungle. Moral
principles
and other extraneous
goals-including what
we would today
call
ideological
goals-get in
the
way
of this mastery, although
of
course morality
or
ideology
might be used
for
rhetorical cover.
Thucydides is much
closer to contemporary
realism
in his
desire
to combine the
insights
of realism
with some devotion to ethics. But
he
does
not see
realism,
even
in its most scientific
guise, as the
foundation of anything like
a technology
of international
politics,
much less a "science of peace" based on the manipulation
of realist laws of
behavior.
He does not even
develop
a general theory
of the balance of
power
as a
stabilizing technique,
one of the mainstays
of modern
realist
theory,
although
certain
elements
of
his
presentation
lean in that direction.24
Thucydides' approach
to improving
the moral
complexion
of international relations relies not
on ma-
nipulating realist technique
and the behavioral laws
on which
it rests, but on
moderating
or restricting
realism
itself. The moral dimension
of his thought
expresses
itself in an injunction
to resist realism.
The difference between
the classical realists and their
modern
successors on this
question goes to the heart of their
respective understandings
of realism.
Thucy-
dides and Machiavelli do not
regard
realism as a science of
peace because they
understand
it to be both
an inherently
antimoral
phenomenon
and a much more
virulent one than modern
realists, especially neorealists,
believe. It is antimoral
in
their view
in part
on account of
its
scientific character.
Its
virulence
stems
partly
from the fact that it is based upon certain aspects of human
nature rather than
simply
structural considerations.
This accounts
for the
largely
ironic view these
classical authors take of structuralism
in their works. But their
interpretation
of
realism, by going beyond
structuralism
to
rely on expansionist
impulses
of human
nature, considerably
diminishes the prospects for cooperation
in international
politics.
It must be remembered
that,
for both
Thucydides
and Machiavelli,
the
paradigmatic
manifestation of realism is imperialism,
and a realism
that
justifies
imperialism clearly
leaves
little
room for a common good among
states.
Yet
without
a common
good, it is difficult
if not
impossible
to
pacify
relations
among
states.
The notion
that realism can be employed as a science of peace rests decisively
on
the
possibility
of
identifying
an international common
good,
something
that it is
in the interests
of
all states to pursue, and persuading
them to embrace it.
This can be seen
in
the realism of Hans Morgenthau, who
throughout
his
career
championed
a rationally
limited view of
the
national
interest as the
only grounds
for
achieving
accommodation
among
nations
(e.g., 1952:977,
1977).
More
recently,
the
search
for an international common
good has been taken
up by
a variety
of
scholars, working
more
or less
in
the realist
vein,
who
hope to find the basis for a
more
cooperative
international
order. Theorists of
hegemony
and international
regimes
are part
of this effort.
Others, inspired by game theory, have sought
techniques
that
may
further
cooperation among purely
self-interested
states,
hold-
24For example, when his account of the causes of the Peloponnesian War holds that the Spartans were
compelled
to war because they had failed to balance gains in Athenian power during the previous generation. Similarly, he blames
Athens' allies for allowing Athens to
subjugate
them: they should have maintained their own forces as a counterbalance
(1.99). Consider also 1.69, 71; 1.91.

STEVEN FORDE 157
ing out the promise
of
a legitimate "science
of peace" with realist
overtones.25
They
would lengthen
the
"shadow
of the future," inducing states
either by persuasion
or
by manipulation of the environment to think more in terms of their long-term
interests
in
an ongoing relationship
with other states. They
would make norms and
expectations explicit
wherever
possible,
and persuade at least a critical mass
of
states to
adopt policies
of
reciprocity,
which can then become self-reinforcing.
And,
to repeat, all of
this
would
be accomplished while relying
only
on the self-interest
of the states themselves.
The limits
of these
expedients
may be severe, however,
as
these theorists are fully aware.
The
long-term rationality advocated
by this approach
requires
the toleration of some short-term
risks for the sake of hoped-for gains
from cooperation
in the future. It also
requires states to think
in terms of absolute
gains over
time rather than gains relative
to
other states.
For this reason it is less
likely
to be found in military and security
matters
than elsewhere, where relative
strength
is critical,
and where
common interests
are less stable
at the
same time
that the stakes are higher for each state.26 Yet the
impossibility
of constructing
a
reliable order
in
the realm of security
is
precisely what drives
the realist argument.
The devices uncovered
by game theory
can help identify
and build on a common
good among
states, but they cannot
create a common
good where one does not
exist
(cf. Oye, 1985:7). No realist,
and certainly
not Thucydides
or Machiavelli,
denies the
possibility
of common interests
among states,
at selected
moments
and
for selected
purposes.
Machiavelli nowhere says
that treaties should not
be con-
cluded,
or that
they
should
not
be adhered
to-as long
as adherence remains
in
a state's interest
(see, e.g., The
Prince,
Ch. 18). Thucydides
chronicles the
"grand
alliance" of almost all the
Greek states against
the
Persians,
an alliance
that en-
dured
for almost a generation
after the Persian Wars.
It
was
eventually,
and inevi-
tably, ruptured
by
mutual
suspicion
between Athens and Sparta,
and especially
by
Athenian imperialism.
For,
as realists will emphasize, any
cooperative regime
may
be upset by
a sufficiently powerful
state
that
refuses
to
play
by
its rules
(cf. Gilpin,
1981:51ff.).
This refusal might be motivated by a state's
expansive view
of its
national interest,
which might
be driven
in turn
by human
impulses
of the
type
that
Thucydides'
Athenians,
or
Machiavelli,
describe.
For this reason,
others
who have tried to use realism
as an instrument
for
reducing
conflict
in
international affairs
have attempted
to bring states around
to
a narrower view
of
what
their national interest
requires.
Again,
this
is the effect
Hans Morgenthau
and many
realists of
his
generation hoped to have on American
policy during
the Cold War. It is also a fair
description
of the effect
Thucydides
hopes to
have
on the leaders
of
states,
inasmuch as he teaches
us that
construing
the national interest
as expansively
as the Athenians did proves self-defeating
in
the long run. But,
in view
of the irrational
elements that are always
found
in
politics, Thucydides
does not have
hopes
for a significant
transformation
of inter-
national
politics
on the basis of his
own,
moderate
realism. It might
be true,
as
Morgenthau
and others
have
argued,
that the true national interest
is the national
interest shorn
of its
passionate
or ideological
accretions.
But actual nations'
per-
ceptions
of their interests
are
often
if
not
always
burdened
with
such
accretions,
as
twentieth-century
realists
have been forced
to admit.
The attention
Thucydides
pays
to the sources
of these "aberrations"
prevents
him from
believing
that
a
rationalization of nations'
thinking
about their interests is a likely path
to interna-
tional
peace or cooperation.
To the
contrary,
he is led to endorse the Athenian
argument
that such motives
as honor
and cupidity qualify
as compulsions
in
some
25Some of the theorists
in
this school are Axelrod, 1984; Oye, 1985;
and Snidal,
1985.
260n this
point
see Grieco
1988, 1990,
as well
as the 1993
exchange
between
Grieco, Powell,
and Snidal in the
American Political Science Review 87:729-743).

158 International Realism and the Science of Politics
legitimate sense of the word, forever pushing
the
behavior of states
to destructive
excesses.
It is for reasons like these that Thucydides and Machiavelli do not see realism
as a technology devoted to peace or justice.
The self-interested
character
of
states
may lead them to cooperation some of the time, but
this
cooperation
will neces-
sarily
be tenuous.
At
a deeper level, Thucydides
and Machiavelli see realism as
inherently
amoral
precisely
because of its
grounding
in
necessity
and compulsion,
that is, because of its scientific character. Technology based on the
natural sciences
might
be ethically neutral,
but the
example
of
realism shows
that
the application
of scientific
logic
to the
human realm
is
different.
Here,
it cuts
across
a domain
of ethical concern
in
such a way
as to
negate
the
logic
of
ethical argument. The
essence of
realism as portrayed by Thucydides
and Machiavelli is
the
replacement
of
moral
principle by compulsions
or necessities, by "laws"
of
behavior. Since these
behavioral laws
hold that states are driven
by necessity
to pursue power and
security,
as well as honor or
glory,
realism
in effect
signifies
the
liberation
of these
impulses
from
any
restraints
that
are
not
themselves
realist in character.
This is why Thucydides believes that international ethics can be furthered only
by limiting
and resisting realism,
not by manipulating
it
in some
way,
and why
Machiavelli insists that realist
logic inevitably points
in the
direction
of
universal
imperialism
and the
repudiation
of all ethical restraints.
The "law" that power rules
the relations
of
states-a principle
that lies at the heart of all realism, classical,
modern,
and contemporary-points
to
expansion
constrained
only by
the limits
of one's
own power,
or
by countervailing
outside
power.
It
certainly
absolves such
expansion
of
any
moral taint. What
the
classical realists were
acutely
aware
of,
and
what
most
if
not all twentieth-century Anglo-American
realism
has
lost
sight of,
is
the
fact
that
realism,
at
its
core, poses
the
question
not
only
of
why
ethics has
such
little
effect
on the behavior
of
states,
but
of
why
it should
have any
effect at all.
For both
Thucydides
and Machiavelli,
the
true character
of realism
as a scientific
approach
is
missed unless
this essential fact is
grasped:
the same
logic
that
explains
the
amorality
of
international behavior excuses it; and this
logic,
if
unchecked by
something
outside
it, pushes
us to the
conclusion that there is
no reason even to
deplore
this state of affairs. Realists
who,
like
Thucydides,
have
some concern for
justice
in
international affairs
might
do well
to
consider
his
view that,
at this
level,
realism cannot be brought
to its
aid. Realist doctrine
is, rather,
locked into an
inveterate conflict with moral
aspirations, giving any
realism that
desires
to
com-
bine the
two
an inescapable complexion
of
tragedy.
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