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THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF ARCHITECTURAL EXPERIENCE:
SCRUTON ON ARCHITECTURE AS ART
ANDREA SAUCHELLI
The notion of architectural experience has been explored by Roger Scruton in a essay in
which he provides an account of both its structure and content, along with clarifications
of certain key concepts in architectural criticism, such as architectural success and
architectural beauty. In this article, Iintroduce Scruton’s theory and argue that, despite its
intuitive appeal, some crucial elements for the appreciation of buildings as works of
architecture are not adequately addressed there. Ithen propose various ways of addressing
these criticisms.
Roger Scruton’s account of the structure and content of our experience of
architecture remains analytic aesthetics’ most articulated theory on the topic.1
According to him, architectural experience is not only intrinsically interesting but
is also a central component in understanding the value of architecture and its
place in the system of the arts. In fact, Scruton argues that analysing the mental
states and features that are involved in an architectural experience provides better
insights into the nature of architecture than does an a priori definition of its
essence. In this article, I do not dispute such general assumptions but rather take
them as a starting point. My aims are (1) to provide an accessible exposition of
Scruton’s account of architectural experience, in both its structure and content,
and (2) to advance some critical remarks in order to amend his theory and meet
these criticisms.
The theory advanced by Scruton is important because it connects aspects of
Kantian aesthetics – particularly the idea of understanding architecture starting
from the concept of aesthetic experience – to more recent developments of
The Structure and Content of Architectural Experience: Scruton on Architecture as Art
I thank Rafael De Clercq and the anonymous referees of this journal for comments and
suggestions. This work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research
Fund of 2012.
1The theory advanced by Roger Scruton in The Aesthetics of Architecture (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1979) applies certain concepts analysed in his Art and
Imagination (London: Methuen, 1974) to architecture. Other authors associated with
the tradition of analytic aesthetics who have in some detail discussed questions
related to architecture are Nelson Goodman (‘How Buildings Mean’, Critical Inquiry 11
(1985): 642–53), Gordon Graham (‘Art and Architecture’, British Journal of Aesthetics
29 (1989): 248–57), Edward Winters (Aesthetics and Architecture (London: Continuum,
2007)), and Rafael De Clercq (‘Architecture’, in The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics,
ed. Anna Christina Ribeiro (London: Continuum, forthcoming)). Despite the quality
of these works, it is fair to say that architecture has been a neglected topic in analytic
aesthetics.
26 Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, XLIX/V, 2012, No. 1, 26–44
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analytic philosophy and classical sources of architectural theory.2It is also
relevant to the contemporary debate in the philosophy of architecture because
Scruton offers a valid alternative to a number of other (more influential)
theories according to which architecture is a language and thus there is more
than a simple analogy between interpreting a natural language and
understanding architecture.3In addition, Scruton’s theory, with its emphasis on
aesthetic and humanistic values, is also one of the most articulate philosophical
frameworks within which modernist and functionalist architecture has been
criticized.
This essay is organized as follows. In the first part, I discuss Scruton’s account
of the structure of architectural experience, in particular the notions of intellectual
pleasure, imaginative perception, and taste. In the second part, I describe the
content of such architectural experiences, that is, perceptions of expressive
qualities, beauty, harmony, and appropriateness. In the third part, Idraw attention
to what has been left out of Scruton’s theory, which nonetheless seems important
to understanding architecture. I then refine his accounts of architectural success
and experience in order to meet my criticisms.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF ARCHITECTURAL EXPERIENCE
I.1. INTELLECTUAL PLEASURE
Pleasure is an important component in experiencing art, for it provides (defeasible)
evidence of aesthetic value; however, there are different kinds of pleasure, and they
2The importance of the Kantian approach in Scruton’s aesthetics is also crucial in
other more recent Scruton contributions, such as ‘In Search of the Aesthetic’, British
Journal of Aesthetics 47 (2007): 232–50. The influence of Wittgenstein’s philosophy
is evident in Scruton’s criticisms of the definitions of architecture. See Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious
Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). Other analytic
philosophers whose ideas are important for Scruton are Stuart Hampshire and Frank
Sibley, and, in particular, their assessment of the concept of taste and its connection
to art criticism. Among the classic architectural theorists who influenced Scruton,
Leon Battista Alberti plays a central role with his definition of beauty in terms of the
harmony of relevant parts.
3These theories are discussed and criticized in Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, 137–78.
The tendency to interpret architecture as a language appears not only in the works
of semioticians such as Roland Barthes and Umberto Eco, but also in analytic
aesthetics. See Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of
Symbols, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976). The key difference between Goodman
and Scruton is in the idea that, according to the former, buildings are works of art
insofar as they symbolize, signify, or refer in a specific way. But, according to Scruton,
and following the work of contemporary philosophers of language, natural languages
have a semantic structure that is significantly different from the alleged architectural
‘idiom’.
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cannot all be taken as signalling aesthetic merit.4In order to identify the kind of
pleasure that constitutes an essential part of our architectural experience, Scruton
distinguishes sensuous from intellectual pleasure in terms of the internal/external
relation between cognitive processes and the object of the experience.5Intuitively,
there is a distinction between the pleasure we feel in eating an ice cream and the
pleasure we experience in perceiving Andrea Palladio’s Villa Almerico Capra (known
as La Rotonda). When eating, cognitive processes may influence our experience
positively or negatively, such as when we are told about unpleasant ingredients in
food (for example, if we know chocolate contains insect parts, we are bound to find
it less appetizing). This does not, however, constitute an essential component of the
experience because we may enjoy an ice cream even without thinking about its
composition. Thought can certainly influence sensuous pleasure but is not arequired
element of the pleasant experience itself; thus, the relation between cognitive
processes and the experience of sensuous pleasure is external. When it comes to
enjoying architectural works, however, the relationship between thought and
experience is internal (or essential): an intellectual understanding of a building
and active attention towards its particular details are both essential components
of pleasant aesthetic experiences. The reason is that without attention and
understanding (intended as forms of cognitive activities), there could be no object
of pleasure. This suggestion – that an aesthetic object is created by an intellectual act
– can be taken in a loose and non-metaphysically loaded sense. For instance, we can
rephrase the same idea adverbially by saying that what is central to the intellectual
pleasure typical of our architectural experience is an imaginative act of attention and
understanding, that is, an act of seeing abuilding imaginatively, without referring to
aesthetic objects.6No external object is literally built up by attention or imagination.7
The Structure and Content of Architectural Experience: Scruton on Architecture as Art
4Philosophers have questioned the importance of aesthetic experience and pleasure in
evaluating works of art. See, for instance, Noël Carroll, ‘Aesthetic Experience: A Question
of Content’, in Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art, ed. Matthew Kieran
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 71–72, and James Shelley, ‘Against Value Empiricism in Aesthetics’,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2010): 707–20. I will leave aside these more general
concerns, since, if we accept these criticisms, Scruton’s whole project would be a non-starter.
5Scruton is influenced here by Bernard Williams, ‘Pleasure and Belief ’, in Philosophy as
a Humanistic Discipline (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 34–46.
6Compare this view with Roman Ingarden’s theory of architecture according to which
understanding architecture requires the appreciation of objects over and above three-
dimensional buildings. See his Ontology of the Work of Art, trans. JohnT. Goldthwait and
Raymond Meyer (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 255–316.
7Compare Scruton’s account with Jerrold Levinson’s remarks on the relation between
pleasure and the value of art. Levinson claims that when pleasure is relevant to the
artistic value of awork of art, it should be an informed pleasure; the occasion of pleasure
must be seen as coming from an experience in which the perceiver is informed about
the contextual features of the work in question. See Jerrold Levinson, ‘Pleasure and the
Value of Works of Art’, British Journal of Aesthetics 32 (1992): 295–306, and Malcolm Budd,
Values of Art (Harmondsworth: Penguin Press, 1995), 11.
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I.2. IMAGINATIVE PERCEPTION
Scruton also introduces adistinction between literal and imaginative perception,
the first being characterized by seeing the world as it is (or as it appears to be)
and the second by seeing the world through a free application of imagination.8
The aim of literal perception is to adhere to reality, whilst perceiving imaginatively
is influenced by a special mode of attention we pay to objects, that is, the
particular point of view we apply to reality. Imaginative perception is not an
activity through which we modify our beliefs about how the world is constituted
but rather involves imaginative experiences, that is, experiences we have when
we imaginatively perceive something. More precisely, Scruton argues that there
is a categorial distinction between imagination and belief. Among the many
differences, Scruton claims that imagination involves unasserted thoughts and,
hence, does not coincide with believing.9For example, seeing a bunny in the
clouds is a case of imaginative perception, whilst seeing a bunny on the lawn
(when there is one) is a way of acquiring beliefs about the world.
Scruton argues that imaginative perception is acentral element of architectural
experience. Those mental states that are correlated to acts of imaginative
perception (that is, imaginative experiences) are the internal causes of pleasure
in experiencing a building. He also claims that the activity of imaginative
perception is particularly evident in the ambiguous ‘interpretation’ of patterns of
details on buildings’ exteriors. Take, for example, the Theatre of Marcellus or the
Flavian Amphitheatre (now known as the Colosseum).We can see the columns
as either supportive elements or as decorations on the walls and arches. Another,
example of architectural ambiguity, more recent, is the external patterns on the
Bank of China Tower in Hong Kong, in which we see combinations of either
crosses or diamonds.10 Alternative ways of seeing ambiguous patterns in buildings
are possible in experiencing architecture through our imaginative perception.
There is a strong reading and a weak reading of the three-sided relationship
between imaginative perception, ambiguity, and architectural experience: the
perception of ambiguities may be taken as either an essential component of
architectural enjoyment or not. If the former, then, in order to experience
a building as a work of art, it is necessary that the elements of the construction,
8Scruton provides a detailed account of imagination in his Art and Imagination, 84–120.
The terminological shifts between imagination and imaginative perception must always
be taken as thus qualified: imagining is a special case of ‘thinking xas y’, which also
involves thinking of the descriptive element (‘as y’) as appropriate to the qualified
object. When perception is involved, it is implied that we combine (or apply) such
imagining with a certain experience. See Art and Imagination, 97–98.
9See ibid., 97.
10 See Philip Jodidio and Janet Adams Strong, I. M. Pei: Complete Works (New York: Rizzoli,
2008).
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whether columns or steel frames, allow ambiguous and varied ways of seeing.
Aconsequence of this strong reading is that buildings that do not allow ambiguous
interpretations of their details cannot be seen imaginatively. This interpretation
does not seem to accommodate the current practice of architectural evaluation;
in fact, we do appreciate and experience buildings as works of art also when they
do not show ambiguities of the kind just described. For example, the Pyramids
do not allow such ambiguities but are still considered remarkable works of
architecture. A different and more plausible understanding of Scruton’s view is
that alternative ways of seeing a building are possible in experiencing architecture
through our imaginative perception but this is not an essential component of the
experience itself. According to this non-essentialist interpretation, one of the roles
of ambiguous readings in buildings is to signal that, even if we are not aware of
how imaginative perception influences us, cognitive processes are involved in
the architectural experience of certain buildings. Thus, ambiguous readings can
be seen as making explicit that there is more than one way of imagining an object.
They are important because they stimulate our attention and make us conscious
of the fact that some imaginative and cognitive activity may be present in our
perception of works of architecture.
Scruton also claims that we are not forced to see a building in a certain way
because imaginative perception is free, in the sense that what stands before us
does not compel us to see it imaginatively. Instead, perceiving a pattern of detail
on a building imaginatively is a voluntary activity.11 It is important to emphasize
that the role of imaginative perception is crucial to our architectural experience
because this is the faculty responsible for recognizing meaningful patterns of
ornamentation, which is a fundamental part of grasping expressive elements and
beauty in an architectural composition. Similarly to how we perceive movement
in sequences of sound, we notice different rhythms, resting points, or, more
generally, different arrangements of details in a physical construction. It must be
noted that in Scruton’s account of imaginative perception related to architecture,
the content of these perceptions is mainly visual. This way of introducing the
The Structure and Content of Architectural Experience: Scruton on Architecture as Art
11 Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, 85. The concept of imaginative perception can be
compared to criticisms of the ‘innocence of the eye’ in the perception of artworks. The
idea is that some form of mental or complex categorization is always present in our
way of perceiving the world. See Ernst Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 2nd ed. (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969) and Goodman, Languages of Art. See also Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations / Philosophische Untersuchungen, 2nd ed.,
trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 200. Another interesting connection
can be drawn with recent discussions of whether perceptual experience has conceptual
content. See Bill Brewer, ‘Perceptual Experience Has Conceptual Content’, in Contemporary
Debates in Epistemology, ed. Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004),
217–30, and Alex Byrne, ‘Perception and Conceptual Content’, in ibid., 231–50.
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concept of imaginative perception is of great importance regarding some of the
critical points I will discuss in the second part of the article.12
Another related element that characterizes imaginative perception is that this
activity can to some extent be directed by the will. For instance, we can focus on
certain groupings of columns and see them under a specific description if we are
asked to. Associated with this possibility is the idea that such ways of seeing
a building through adescription can be more or less adequate. This, in turn, leads
us to another central point of Scruton’s account of the experience of architecture:
taste.13
I.3. TASTE AND AESTHETIC JUDGEMENTS
Even though imaginative perception is free, this does not mean that aesthetic
judgements about buildings, which are influenced by this faculty, are not
grounded or that there cannot be genuine disagreement in aesthetics. In fact,
eventual reasons advanced to modify our way of seeing a work of art (or any other
object of aesthetic attention) can be more or less appropriate. In particular,
judgements of taste or arguments put forward by critics can lead us to different
imaginative perceptions and thus to a different, possibly more rewarding,
architectural experience. Applications of the faculty of taste are not limited to
suggestions about how to perceive an object; for example, aesthetic judgements
can take the form of attributing aesthetic properties to objects.14 Scruton argues
that these two applications work together in the same reasoning process. Relative
to the notion of expression, he claims that when we state that abuilding expresses
movement, we are also thereby committed to accepting such an aesthetic
judgement as an appropriate way of seeing the building. For example, if we assert
that Borromini’s San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane, an iconic Baroque building,
expresses movement, then we are also committed to the idea that the proper
way of seeing it is precisely how we have described it.15 Similarly, when Wölfflin
portrays the Baroque style as ‘exciting, ecstatic and intoxicating’, he is also
suggesting that his description is not merely apsychological and subjective effect
12 Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, 71–103.
13 For further discussion of Scruton’s notion of imaginative perception, see Kimmo
Lapintie, ‘The Imaginative Eye: Roger Scruton and the Aesthetics of Architecture’,
Architecture & Comportement/Architecture & Behaviour 3 (1987): 137–58.
14 For a recent account of the features of aesthetic judgements, see Malcolm Budd, ‘The
Intersubjective Validity of Aesthetic Judgements’, British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (2007):
333–71. See also Frank Sibley, ‘Particularity, Art, and Evaluation’, in Approach to
Aesthetics: Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics, ed. John Benson, Betty Redfern,
and Jeremy Roxbee Cox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 88–103.
15 See Anthony Blunt, Borromini (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 52–85
for a description of the building in question.
Andrea Sauchelli
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but is also a proper aesthetic judgement through which we are invited to see
acertain architectural style in a way that he is committed to take as appropriate.16
The concepts of justification and expression are thus tightly knit.17 Scruton also
claims that the reasoning of an art critic who invites us to appreciate a building
takes the form of practical reasoning in which the conclusion is a perception and,
more precisely, a change in the way of seeing. The mark of persuasion is not
a modification to our set of beliefs but rather a modification of our way of seeing.18
Such different ways of seeing an object imaginatively, however, can be more or
less adequate in relation to, among other things, the features of buildings and
the reasons adduced to adopt a particular perspective. For example, the
suggestion of seeing the columns in the Flavian Amphitheatre as decorations of
the walls and arches can be sensibly grounded in the observation that the whole
building, seen in this way, expresses firmness and solidity. The reason is that the
columns are relatively smaller than the walls and arches, so it would be better not
to see them as supportive structures of the edifices. In conclusion, Scruton argues
that not all judgements of taste are equally well grounded or of equal value and
one way of appreciating this point is by arguing that such judgements may
modify our way of seeing.
II. THE CONTENT OF ARCHITECTURAL EXPERIENCE: EXPRESSION, BEAUTY, AND
APPROPRIATENESS
II.1. EXPRESSION
Scruton draws the distinction between representational and abstract art in terms
of the different role played by the content associated with the work for its
appreciation. More specifically, a proper understanding of arepresentational work
of art is essentially connected to an adequate awareness of the content of the
work in question, where ‘content’ is understood as the set of propositions related
to its representation.19 This means that to appreciate a work of representational
art, we need to associate the formal features of the work with what it represents.
The Structure and Content of Architectural Experience: Scruton on Architecture as Art
16 See Heinrich Wölfflin, Renaissance and Baroque, trans. Kathrin Simon (London: Collins,
1964), chaps. 1 and 2.
17 See Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, 110 and 198.
18 For a discussion of this last claim, see Robert Hopkins, ‘Critical Reasoning and Critical
Perception’, in Knowing Art: Essays in Aesthetics and Epistemology, ed. Matthew Kieran
and Dominic McIver Lopes (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004), 137–53. An early work that
influenced Scruton on this topic is Stuart Hampshire, ‘Logic and Appreciation’, in
Aesthetics and Language, ed. William R. Elton and W. B. Gallie (Oxford: Blackwell, 1954),
161–69.
19 Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, 180. To a first approximation, a proposition is the
content of what is represented. For instance, the sentences ‘It rains’ and ‘Piove’ have the
same content: the proposition that it rains.
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Now, architecture cannot be considered a representational art because a building,
as opposed to a work of literature, does not articulate or develop a thought but
rather profits, in its imitative elements, from our previous capacity to recognize
a certain form and make it intelligible for our appreciation (for example, the shells
decorating Bramante’s Tempietto).20 The subject of a representational work of art
is also the subject of the thoughts (propositions) of whoever attends to it with
understanding. Such a requirement is not, however, essential for architecture.
If architecture is not a representational art, does it follow that no thoughts at
all are involved in its appreciation? If not, how could our architectural experience
have any meaning? Scruton argues that even if there is no narrative element,
architecture can still involve thoughts about things, or at least something akin to
thoughts. In particular, such ‘thoughts’ resemble ostensions more than making
statements, for certain architectural forms are better described (and understood)
as elements of reference rather than structured propositions. This feature may
explain why we frequently find it difficult to put into words the specific emotions
or concepts we feel are being expressed by a building. Scruton suggests that in
certain encounters with works of architecture, we feel that something is being
said even though we cannot completely describe this intuition, apart from
connecting our thoughts to general predicates like ‘deepness’, ‘sadness’, ‘purity’
and so on. In other words, even though buildings do not articulate thoughts, they
can still be seen as (metaphorical) acts of reference.21
For instance, certain details can contribute to establishing a connection
between abuilding and a predicate describing an expressive property. According
to Scruton, the notion of expression can be usefully connected with the display
of anatmosphere rather than the articulation of a thought. Take Tadao Ando’s Church
of the Light, a construction that expresses spirituality through an idealization of
reinforced concrete, its particular location, and the cruciform cut in the wall
behind the altar.22 These details are the building’s referential aspects, the means
by which the architect has established aconnection between matter and certain
expressive properties. In having a direct experience of the building, what unfolds
before our eyes is not the narration or representation of asubject but the experience
of an atmosphere by means of certain expressive elements. This display can be
understood as a sort of act of reference performed by the architect through the
work’s details. Appreciating such expressive connections is what grounds the
content of aesthetic judgements about an architectural work, that is, its beauty.
20 Ibid., 184–87.
21 Nelson Goodman argues for a similar view in his ‘How Buildings Mean’.
22 See Philip Drew, Church on the Water, Church of the Light: Tadao Ando (London: Phaidon,
1996).
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II.2. BEAUTY, HARMONY AND DETAIL
Arewarding experience of architecture will involve beauty. Describing his
understanding of the concept of architectural beauty, Scruton refers to Leon
Battista Alberti’s classical account.23Alberti notoriously explained beauty in
a building as a ‘reasoned harmony of all the parts within a body, so that nothing
may be added, taken away, or altered, but for the worse’.24 This kind of beauty is
a property composed of various elements: number (numerus), outline (finitio), and
position (collocatio). From the relationship between these elements, another
quality emerges: ‘gentle harmony’ (concinnitas).25 The aim of concinnitas is to
compose the parts of a body so that the existence of one part (aesthetically)
explains the existence of another (‘so that they correspond to one another in
appearance’). Thus, beauty is a form of sympathy generated by a mutual
correspondence of number (that is, quantity), outline (or lineaments), and position,
as dictated by concinnitas. Scruton seems to agree with this characterization of
architectural beauty. The atomic components of architectural meaning are the details
of the architectural composition, though the notion of detail is to be understood
only as decoration, not as meaning. On the contrary, a column, adoor, or an urn can
each be an architectural detail as can the mould of a cornice and the carving of
a capital: every focus of attention that can be separated from the whole can be called
a detail. Although such details can be perceived as separable parts, they gain their
significance in the context of the entire architectural composition.
According to Scruton, the capacity for perceiving beauty in an architectural
work comes from imaginative perception. The recognition of patterns of detail that
‘call to each other’ and form a meaningful correspondence is, in fact, both a visual
and intellectual task. He also claims that the measure of architectural success is
a pleasant architectural experience that is determined by the relationship between
a building’s parts and its whole. This notion of architectural success has interesting
consequences for the architect’s role. In particular, architecture cannot be described
as an activity involving a mere step-by-step theoretical procedure but rather as
including internal considerations of aesthetic value.26 Consequently, according to
The Structure and Content of Architectural Experience: Scruton on Architecture as Art
23 I will not discuss Scruton’s suggestion that judgements of beauty are not possible
without knowing what type of thing is being judged here (Aesthetics of Architecture, 9).
For a discussion on this, see Frank Sibley, ‘Aesthetic Judgements: Pebbles, Faces, and
Fields of Litter’, in Approach to Aesthetics, 176–89.
24 Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art of Building in Ten Books, trans. Neil Leach, Joseph
Rykwert, and Robert Tavenor (1485; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 156.
25 Ibid., 302–3. The bibliography on Alberti and the notion of concinnitas is vast. For a list
of references, see Robert Tavenor, On Alberti and the Art of Building (New Haven, CN: Yale
University Press, 1999).
26 See De Clercq, ‘Architecture’, in particular the discussion on architecture as problem-
solving, for an articulation of this idea along the line defended by Scruton.
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Scruton, the activity of the architect consists of designing a building in which
function is wedded to the arousal of beauty as previously described: aesthetic
values are essential for architectural success itself.
This notion of beauty relies on what is perceived as being appropriate to
a whole in which all parts are meaningfully related. Scruton, like Alberti, insists
on the concept of appropriateness in his elucidation of architectural success.
Generally, however, judging appropriateness does not involve only aesthetical
considerations; on the contrary, as its wider usage suggests, appropriateness can
also serve to introduce demands of value and moral character into the object’s
aesthetic sphere.27 The conceptual equivalent of the appropriate within the
aesthetic sphere is the notion of proportion, defined by Scruton as a property
exhibited by a building whose parts ‘provide adequate visual reason for one
another’.28 In this sense, being proportionate is one way of being adequate; in
particular, it is the aesthetic way of being appropriate.29 When Scruton discusses
his conception of proportion in terms of being adequate and appropriate, his
focus is exclusively on the appropriateness of the parts and the whole, within
a specific building. He recognizes the importance of location for buildings, but
location is not explicitly addressed in his account of architectural success in terms
of the appropriate relationship between the parts. This concludes our presentation
of the main aesthetic principles of Scruton’s theory of architecture.30
III. THE COMPLEXITY OF ARCHITECTURAL EXPERIENCE AND THE APPRECIATION
OF BUILDINGS
In this section, I will discuss two problems in Scruton’s account of architectural
success and experience and will offer emendations to meet these criticisms. In
the final part, I also revise his concept of imaginative perception by introducing
the notion of reflective movement, intended as an integration of the former. I first
argue that Scruton’s theory does not properly take into account one important
element of our understanding of the value of buildings: movement. The second
critical remark is that Scruton’s notion of architectural success does not address
the importance of the relation between a building and its location. I then amend
Scruton’s account to meet these objections. While Scruton is certainly aware of
27 Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, 232.
28 Ibid., 235. For a similar use of the notion of proportion, see also Patrick Suppes, ‘Rules
of Proportion in Architecture’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1991): 358.
29 For other discussions of proportion that take into account Scruton’s view, see Rafael
De Clercq, ‘Scruton on Rightness of Proportion in Architecture’, British Journal of
Aesthetics 49 (2009): 405–14, and Derek Matravers, ‘Revising Principles of Architecture’,
Journal of Architecture 4 (1999): 39–45.
30 I have not covered other topics included in Scruton’s theory, such as the relevance of
moral considerations in architecture and its implications for a theory of the self.
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the importance of these two elements, he does not acknowledge their
importance in his explicit definitions of architectural beauty, experience, and
architectural success. My criticisms are intended as attempts to integrate his
account, to make its parts more harmonious.
Various art forms, in line with the very nature of their artistic media, suggest
certain appreciative models.31 Here, the term ‘appreciative model’ is intended as
a set of attitudes and dispositions about regarding specific works of art as
valuable in relation to certain conceptions of what constitutes success in that
specific form of art. In architecture, the medium that is employed to convey the
aesthetic experience on which our aesthetic evaluations are based suggests
a different model of appreciation from the one for, say, painting.32Similarly to
architecture, sculpture also employs an artistic medium that does not allow us to
perceive all of the artwork’s features at once. We cannot, for example, simultaneously
experience all aspects of a statue such as Michelangelo’s David because of its
three-dimensional nature and the necessity of moving around it to get acquainted
with its non-aesthetic properties.
A distinction can usefully be drawn between (1) appreciative models of a form
of art in which the non-aesthetic properties of the work are given in a relatively
short period (time-static) and/or in a relatively restricted portion of space
(movement-static) and (2) appreciative models based on works whose non-aesthetic
propertiesrequire time (time-dynamic) and/or movement (movement-dynamic) to
be revealed to the perceiver. For instance, it does not make sense to walk around
Leonardo’s Mona Lisa (except to dodge tourists) because the proper model of
appreciating a painting is, relative to motion, static; once we have reached
a privileged point of view, the non-aesthetic properties of the work are displayed
in front of us. This can be sensibly disputed but, even so, this appreciative model
seems at least to apply to certain works of conceptual art that can be grasped in
a few seconds and from asingle stable location.33 In general, an appreciative strategy
can be classified as appropriate insofar as it allows a complete perception of those
The Structure and Content of Architectural Experience: Scruton on Architecture as Art
31 This is not uncontroversial, see, for example, Noël Carroll, ‘Performance’, Formation 3
(1986): 64–78, and David Davies, ‘Medium in Art’, in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics,
ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 181–91, for a discussion of
the contentious claim that each form of art has a specific nature determined by what
is allowed by its related medium. However, nothing crucial in this essay hinges on this
discussion.
32 See David Davies, Art as Performance (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), Davies, ‘Medium in Art’,
and Joseph Margolis, Art and Philosophy (Atlantic Heights, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980)
for the notion of artistic or vehicular medium. To a first approximation, an artistic (or
art) medium is something ‘that mediates the transmission of the content of an artwork
to a receiver’ (Davies, ‘Medium in Art’, 181).
33 With regard to painting, a possible counterexample is Hans Holbein the Younger’s The
Ambassadors (1533) with its anamorphic skull.
36 Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, XLIX/V, 2012, No. 1, 00–00
Zlom1_2012_Sestava 1 14.5.12 9:58 Stránka 36
non-aesthetic properties that characterize the artistic medium. Which appreciative
model is prescribed by the artistic medium of architecture? Because a building is
a three-dimensional object, its artistic medium demands a dynamic approach to
movement.
In addition to its necessity in perceiving non-aesthetic properties, movement
is also responsible for the appreciation of certain aesthetic properties of architectural
works. As maintained by Steen Eiler Rasmussen, having a certain experience of
movement inside a building can ground ascriptions of aesthetic features specific to
the work.34 For instance, the arrangement of rooms influences the perception of
rhythm in a space as well as aesthetic judgements about it. In addition, the spatial
effects of certain details can be properly appreciated only by moving within the
spaces created by the architectural work.35 Take, for instance, Ando’s central cube-
room, part of the recently restored Punta della Dogana in Venice. To perceive its
rich material quality, achieved by means of a successful combination of Ando’s
signature use of concrete and traditional masegni (traditional Venetian paving
stones), it is necessary to move around the cube inside the museum. In fact, the
best way to perceive the specific solemnity, purity, and uniqueness conveyed by
this spatial composition is by movement, which allows a number of perceptions
that, in turn, ground aesthetic judgements. In this case, a description of Ando’s
cube can alert us to the presence of expressive qualities in the Punta della
Dogana, qualities such as solemnity, purity, and uniqueness; but means other
than movement cannot properly convey the peculiar way in which these
properties are embodied in this particular building. For instance, it is only through
movement that we can appreciate the solemnity of Ando’s cube in the Punta della
Dogana. If my reasoning is correct, then a more appropriate appreciation of
certain aesthetic features of architectural works cannot be purely visual but must
also include bodily experiences.
Additionally, proper appreciation of architectural works and, consequently,
rewarding architectural experiences can also be related to the sense of touch.
Feeling with our hands the quality of the materials used in the walls of Ando’s
cube inside the museum is a perceptual experience that can ground different,
richer aesthetic judgements because at first, the raw concrete of the walls may
appear ‘unfriendly’, inhospitable. If, however, we run our hands over the concrete,
the impression is completely different: its smoothness and warm temperature
convey a radically different sense of the material, which can ultimately transform
our visual perception of the walls themselves. After touching the perfectly smooth
34 See Steen Eiler Rasmussen,Experiencing Architecture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1959).
35 For an analysis of the role of movement in architectural experience, see Fred Rush, On
Architecture (London: Routledge, 2008).
Andrea Sauchelli
Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, XLIX/V, 2012, No. 1, 00–00 37
Zlom1_2012_Sestava 1 14.5.12 9:58 Stránka 37
and pure concrete surface, we can start to feel that the walls are welcoming and
are a suitable place for the exposition and appreciation of other works of art.
Again, in this second case, direct perception of certain non-aesthetic properties
by specific perceptual means can radically modify our aesthetic judgements. It
follows that a proper architectural experience is not only related to sight but
includes other senses as well.
In conclusion, an adequate account of architectural experience on which
Scruton thinks ascriptions of aesthetic value are based must include an explicit
reference to the experience of movement, for this element is crucial to an inclusive
perception of both the non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties of a building.36
A second criticism of Scruton’s account is based on the fact that his theory does
not properly accommodate our intuitions about the relationship between abuilding
and its environment.37 By not explicitly mentioning this relation’s importance to
architectural success, Scruton’s account does not adequately capture an essential
aspect of architectural appreciation and beauty: its localized nature. For instance,
Frank Lloyd Wright’s Fallingwater is not only beautiful for its use of horizontal and
vertical lines but also because the horizontal lines echo the rocky plane on which
they rest. The so-called ‘sense of detail’ advocated by Scruton as the key element
of architectural understanding should be enhanced by an equally important
‘sense of location’.38 Taking into account a building’s location can sometimes
influence the perception of its aesthetic and artistic properties. For instance,
a building can also be judged appropriate based on what is built around it.
Architects usually design their buildings in relation to where these constructions
will stand; their features should therefore be seen as responding to the environment.
These interactions may cause us to judge certain buildings in different ways.
A famous example is Philip Johnson’s Sony Tower in New York City, which can be
seen as contrasting with the functional and modernist style of the surrounding
The Structure and Content of Architectural Experience: Scruton on Architecture as Art
36 For another theory that analyses architecture as a visual art, see Edward Winters,
‘Architecture’, in A Companion to Aesthetics, 2nd ed., ed. David E. Cooper et al. (Chichester:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 74–6. Scruton’s and Winters’s theories have recently been
criticized by Larry Shiner in his ‘On Aesthetics and Function in Architecture’, Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (2011): 31–41. An interesting discussion on the implications
of including senses other than sight in the category of aesthetics is Frank Sibley, ‘Tastes,
Smells, and Aesthetics’, in Approach to Aesthetics, 207–55.
37 For an analysis of the concept of harmony between buildings, see Rafael De Clercq,
‘Modern Architecture and the Concept of Harmony’, British Journal of Aesthetics 51
(2010): 69–79.
38 For clear discussions of the role of location in relation to the appreciation of architecture,
see Allen Carlson, ‘Existence, Location, and Function: The Appreciation of Architecture’,
in Philosophy and Architecture, ed. Michael H. Mitias (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), 141–64,
and ‘On Aesthetically Appreciating Human Environments’, Philosophy and Geography 4
(2001): 9–24.
38 Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, XLIX/V, 2012, No. 1, 00–00
Zlom1_2012_Sestava 1 14.5.12 9:58 Stránka 38
buildings and, thus, as addressing a certain architectural style in a peculiar and
interesting way. Just as he recognizes movement, Scruton also recognizes the
importance of the distinguishing feature of location in architecture. His notion of
architectural success, based on the notion of the appropriateness of the parts and
the whole of a single building, does not, however, emphasize the weight of this
concept. I do not claim that Scruton does not consider movement or location at
all. He does indeed recognize that location is a distinguishing feature of
architecture, and he acknowledges the role of movement and its importance in
the perception of ‘anticipatory’ appearances of objects.39 Rather, my criticism is
that these elements are not explicitly included in his account of imaginative
perception applied to architecture, which is developed principally in terms of
visual experiences and upon which our architectural experience is based.
The two previous lines of reasoning suggest one should make two revisions to
Scruton’s account. The charge of not including the localized nature of architecture
in the notion of architectural success can be addressed by refining the notion as
follows: ‘The measure of architectural success is apleasant architectural experience
that is determined by the relation between the parts that compose a building
and by the harmonization of a building with its surroundings.’ If this emendation
is accepted, we can also modify the related account of architectural beauty by
first recognizing an intrinsic and an extrinsic sense of beauty in buildings.
A building is intrinsically beautiful if a relation of proportion exists among its
proper parts, while it is extrinsically beautiful if the whole of such parts is in
harmony with its surroundings. Being extrinsically beautiful is not, however,
a sufficient condition for being intrinsically beautiful: a building may not look
completely unpleasant if visually combined with the appropriate surroundings,
even though it may not be taken as proportioned on its own.
In a similarly revisionist spirit, we can also accommodate our intuitions about
the importance of movement in architectural experience. For example, we can
say that an experience involving the perception of certain harmonic and rhythmic
aspects of abuilding is achieved by means of movement. The perception of these
elements is not only a matter of perceiving that one detail matches the other
visually but also involves kinaesthetic perception exercised through movement.
A pleasant experience, and therefore a successful architectural composition, is
related to the particular way in which a building leads us through its rooms and
internal spaces. Whether extrinsic or intrinsic, the beauty of a construction is
achieved not only by appealing to visual perception but also includes those
pleasant experiences derived by moving inside and around the building.
39 See Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, 10–13, and 96.
Andrea Sauchelli
Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, XLIX/V, 2012, No. 1, 00–00 39
Zlom1_2012_Sestava 1 14.5.12 9:58 Stránka 39
Elaborating on these last thoughts about movement, we can also significantly
improve on Scruton’s concept of imaginative perception. I have suggested that,
like instances of imaginative visual perception, aesthetically relevant experiences
of movement are not to be taken as unreflective and mindless strolls through
halls and rooms. Because imaginative perception, which is discussed by Scruton
in relation to sight, requires thinking about a detail in a certain way, an aesthetically
relevant experience of movement must be similarly seen as involving an awareness
of the spaces delimited by the parts of the building. In particular, the perceiver
must be aware that the building is leading her through its internal spaces in
a certain way, possibly for specific purposes. The notion of ‘reflective movement’
identifies this process of experiencing movement in which we are aware of aparticular
path suggested by the arrangement of the building’s details. Just as we may be
asked to view a pattern of detail in a particular way, we may be asked to become
aware of our movement in a specific space for certain reasons. For instance, we
may be asked to perceive moving inside a church from one specific position to
another as if it were a process of approaching faith or any other metaphorical
notion appropriate to the particular location. By becoming aware of how details
are arranged and how they guide us, the overall experience of an architectural
work is enriched, which can influence judgements of architectural value.40
The concept of reflective movement refers to imaginative experiences influenced
by perceptions not directly related to sight. The perception of solemnity and
purity in Ando’s cube, for instance, can be seen as emerging by applying
imagination to our perception when we touch the raw concrete of the walls.
Reflective movement cannot be classified as a type of imaginative perception in
the sense previously specified by Scruton, that is, as an activity strictly related to
sight. In fact, reflective movement, in certain cases, can influence emotions and
experiences felt when seeing a work, thereby subverting the senses’ order of
importance. This does not mean that movement and kinaesthetic sensations are
more important than sight, for this would completely subvert Scruton’s account
and, more importantly, does not seem to be correct. What is suggested here is
simply that there are cases in which imaginative perception, intended as an
activity strictly related to sight, can be influenced and also enhanced by reflective
movement, which is intended as an activity that combines imaginative (and thus
mental) elements with movement and kinaesthetic sensations. It can be convincingly
argued that the term ‘imaginative perception’ describes a broader category that
includes imaginative visual perception (in the sense previously explained) and
reflective movement (or imaginative kinaesthetic perception).
The Structure and Content of Architectural Experience: Scruton on Architecture as Art
40 See Alva Noë, Action in Perception (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005) for a theory that
underscores the importance of the localized aspects of our perception.
40 Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, XLIX/V, 2012, No. 1, 00–00
Zlom1_2012_Sestava 1 14.5.12 9:58 Stránka 40
One may legitimately contend that a crucial point in Scruton’s description of
imaginative perception is that it is the activity by which we perceive ‘what is not
there’, that is, something that emerges from the real composition of the architectural
details but whose content is of no existential import. Consequently, it can be argued
that reflective movement cannot be equated with imaginative perception because
reflective movement is an activity that acquaints us with how the world is. In
particular, by walking through a castle we become aware of how this castle is,
thereby precluding the activity of imagination. If this is the case, then reflective
movement cannot be equated with imaginative perception. One way of addressing
this objection is by again drawing attention to what attitude a successful and
adequate architectural experience may require us to adopt. In particular, sometimes
the proper appreciation of a building may actually require us to move and
experience the building while applying our imaginative faculties. For example, it
can be argued that a proper appreciation of the majesty and firmness of Margat,
a Crusader castle in Syria, requires moving around it and imagining ourselves as
soldiers of the Mamluk sultan of Egypt trying to capture it. The perception of certain
aesthetic features that abuilding possesses or possessed may require, among other
things, imagining ourselves in the context and conditions in which that building
was. Perceiving the difficulty of ascending the hills where the Krak des Chevaliers
(another Crusader castle) lies and actively engaging our imagination in this act may
provide us with aricher experience, which can sensibly ground perceptions of both
non-aesthetic properties and aesthetic features of the castle. In addition, such
experiences cannot be classified as merely visual, since they involve a more
complicated awareness of sensations and emotions derived from bodily perceptions
during our movement. In conclusion, it seems that Scruton’s theory of imaginative
perception should make room for a notion of active engagement. This is because
imagination can be applied to movement to allow for a richer, more appropriate
architectural experience. Including reflective movement is consistent with Scruton’s
theory and would, in fact, strengthen his account.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Scruton’s theory is a fascinating attempt to clarify the structure and content of
our aesthetic engagement with buildings. The aim of the first two parts of this
article was largely expository, and in them, I clarified various interpretative nodes
of Scruton’s theory.41 In the third part, I advanced two criticisms and suggested
41 Other criticisms of Scruton’s theory appear in Anthony Skillen, ‘The Foundations of
Roger Scruton’s The Aesthetics of Architecture’, British Journal of Aesthetics20 (1980): 257–65,
and R. A.Sharpe, review of The Aesthetics of Architecture, by Roger Scruton, Philosophy 55
(1980): 567–69.
Andrea Sauchelli
Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, XLIX/V, 2012, No. 1, 00–00 41
Zlom1_2012_Sestava 1 14.5.12 9:58 Stránka 41
various revisions. In particular, I underscored the importance of the relation
between abuilding and its surroundings as a criterion of architectural beauty and
discussed the notion of reflective movement. By including these emendations, it
seems that a broader range of elements that play a crucial role in our architectural
experience has been captured. Given that architectural experience is, according
to Scruton, what grounds aesthetic judgements about buildings, a more
comprehensive account of how architectural works are appreciated is required if
we want to achieve a better understanding of the value of certain constructions.
I also argued that the concept of imaginative perception should be understood
as including means of perception that are not exclusively visual.
Andrea Sauchelli
Department of Philosophy, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies,
Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do, Republic of Korea
andrea.sauchelli@gmail.com
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